

THE 29 QUESTIONS ON TRUTH

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Translated from the definitive Leonine text

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QUESTION ONE: Truth

ARTICLE 1: WHAT IS TRUTH?

Difficulties:

It seems that the true is exactly the same as being, for

1. Augustine says: "The true is that which is." But that which is, is simply being. The true, therefore, means exactly the same as being.

2. It was said in reply that the true and being are the same materially but differ formally.—On the contrary the nature of a thing is signified by its definition; and the definition of the true, according to Augustine, is "that which is" He rejects all other definitions. Now, since the true and being are materially the same, it seems that they are also formally the same.

3. Things which differ conceptually are so related to each other that one of them can be understood without the other. For this reason, Boethius says that the existence of God can be understood if for a moment we mentally separate His goodness from His existence. Being, however, can in no way be understood apart from the true, for being is known only in so far as it is true. Therefore, the true and being do not differ conceptually.

4. If the true is not the same as being, it must be a state of being. But it cannot be a state of being. It is not a state that entirely corrupts— otherwise, this would follow: "It is true. Therefore, it is non-being"— as it follows when we say: "This man is dead. Therefore, this is not a man."

Similarly, the true is not a state that limits. If it were, one could not say: "It is true. Therefore it is." For one cannot say that a thing is white simply because it has white teeth. Finally, the true is not a state which contracts or specifies being, for it is convertible with being. It follows, therefore, that the true and being are entirely the same.

5. Things in the same state are the same. But the true and being are in the same state. Therefore, they are the same. For Aristotle writes: "The state of a thing in its act of existence is the same as its state in truth." Therefore, the true and being are entirely the same.

6. Things not the same differ in some respect. But the true and being differ in no respect. They do not differ essentially, for every being is true by its very essence. And they do not differ in any other ways, for they must belong to some common genus. Therefore, they are entirely the same.

7. If they were not entirely the same, the true would add something to being. But the true adds nothing to being, even though it has greater extension than being. This is borne out by the statement of the Philosopher that we define the true as: "That which affirms the existence of what is, and denies the existence of what is not." Consequently, the true includes both being and non-being; since it does not add anything to being, it seems to be entirely the same as being.

To the Contrary:

1'. Useless repetition of the same thing is meaningless; so, if the true were the same as being, it would be meaningless to say: "Being is true." This, however, is hardly correct. Therefore, they are not the same.

2'. Being and the good are convertible. The true and the good, however, are not interchangeable, for some things, such as fornication, are true but not good. The true, therefore, and being are not interchangeable. And so they are not the same.

3'. In all creatures, as Boethius has pointed out, "to be is other than that which is." Now, the true signifies the existence of things. Consequently, in creatures it is different from that which is. But that which is, is the same as being. Therefore, in creatures the true is different from being.

4'. Things related as before and after must differ. But the true and being are related in the aforesaid manner; for, as is said in The Causes: "The first of all created things is the act of existence. In a study of this work, a commentator writes as follows: "Everything else is predicated as a specification of being." Consequently, everything else comes after being. Therefore, the true and being are not the same.

5'. What are predicated of a cause and of the effects of the cause are more united in the cause than in its effects—and more so in God than in creatures. But in God four predicates—being, the one, the true, and the good—are appropriated as follows: being, to the essence; the one, to the Father; the true, to the Son; and the good, to the Holy Spirit.

Since the divine Persons are really and not merely conceptually distinct, these notions cannot be predicated of each other; if really distinct when verified of the divine Persons, the four notions in question are much more so when verified of creatures.

REPLY:

When investigating the nature of anything, one should make the same kind of analysis as he makes when he reduces a proposition to certain self-evident principles. Otherwise, both types of knowledge will become involved in an infinite regress, and science and our knowledge of things will perish.

Now, as Avicenna says, that which the intellect first conceives as, in a way, the most evident, and to which it reduces all its concepts, is being. Consequently, all the other conceptions of the intellect are had by additions to being. But nothing can be added to being as though it were something not included in being—in the way that a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a subject—for every reality is essentially a being. The Philosopher has shown this by proving that being cannot be a genus. Yet, in this sense, some predicates may be said to add to being inasmuch as they express a mode of being not expressed by the term being. This happens in two ways.

First, the mode expressed is a certain special manner of being; for there are different grades of being according to which we speak when we speak of different levels of existence, and according to these grades different things are classified. Consequently, substance does not add a difference to being by signifying some reality added to it, but substance simply expresses a special manner of existing, namely, as a being in itself. The same is true of the other classes of existents.

Second, some are said to add to being because the mode they express is one that is common, and consequent upon every being. This mode can be taken in two ways: first, in so far as it follows upon every being considered absolutely; second, in so far as it follows upon every being considered in relation to another. In the first, the term is used in two ways, because it expresses something in the being either affirmatively or negatively. We can, however, find nothing that can be predicated of every being affirmatively and, at the same time, absolutely, with the exception of its essence by which the being is said to be. To express this, the term *thing* is used; for, according to Avicenna, "thing differs from being because being gets its name from *to-be*, but thing expresses the quiddity or essence of the being. There is, however, a negation consequent upon every being considered absolutely: its undividedness, and this is expressed by *one*. For the one is simply undivided being.

If the mode of being is taken in the second way—according to the relation of one being to another—we find a twofold use. The first is based on the distinction of one being from another, and this distinctness is expressed by the word *something*, which implies, as it were, some other thing. For, just as a being is said to be one in so far as it is without division in itself, so it is said to be something in so far as it is divided from others. The second division is

based on the correspondence one being has with another. This is possible only if there is some thing which is such that it agrees with every being. Such a being is the soul, which, as is said in *The Soul*, "in some way is all things." The soul, however, has both knowing and appetitive powers. Good expresses the correspondence of being to the appetitive power, for, and so we note in *the Ethics*, the good is "that which all desire." True expresses the correspondence of being to the knowing power, for all knowing is produced by an assimilation of the knower to the thing known, so that assimilation is said to be the cause of knowledge. Similarly, the sense of sight knows a colour by being informed with a species of the colour.

The first reference of being to the intellect, therefore, consists in its agreement with the intellect. This agreement is called "the conformity of thing and intellect." In this conformity is fulfilled the formal constituent of the true, and this is what the true adds to being, namely, the conformity or equation of thing and intellect. As we said, the knowledge of a thing is a consequence of this conformity; therefore, it is an effect of truth, even though the fact that the thing is a being is prior to its truth.

Consequently, truth or the true has been defined in three ways. First of all, it is defined according to that which precedes truth and is the basis of truth. This is why Augustine writes: "The true is that which is"; and Avicenna: "The truth of each thing is a property of the act of being which has been established for it." Still others say: "The true is the undividedness of the act of existence from that which." Truth is also defined in another way—according to that in which its intelligible determination is formally completed. Thus, Isaac writes: "Truth is the conformity of thing and intellect"; and Anselm: "Truth is a rectitude perceptible only by the mind." This rectitude, of course, is said to be based on some conformity. The Philosopher says that in defining truth we say that truth is had when one affirms that "to be which is, and that not to be which is not."

The third way of defining truth is according to the effect following upon it. Thus, Hilary says that the true is that which manifests and proclaims existence. And Augustine says: "Truth is that by which that which is, is shown"; and also: "Truth is that according to which we judge about inferior things."

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That definition of Augustine is given for the true as it has its foundation in reality and not as its formal nature is given complete expression by conformity of thing and intellect. An alternative answer would be that in the statement, "The true is that which is," the word *is* is not here understood as referring to the act of existing, but rather as the mark of the intellectual act of judging, signifying, that is, the affirmation of a proposition. The meaning would then be this: "The true is that which is—it is had when the existence of what is, is affirmed." If this is its meaning, then Augustine's definition agrees with that of the Philosopher mentioned above.

2. The answer is clear from what has been said.

3. "Something can be understood without another" can be taken in two ways. It can mean that something can be known while another remains unknown. Taken in this way, it is true that things which differ conceptually are such that one can be understood without the other. But there is another way that a thing can be understood without another: when it is known even though the other does not exist. Taken in this sense, being cannot be known without the true, for it cannot be known unless it agrees with or confirms to intellect. It is not necessary however, that everyone who understands the formal notion of being should also understand the formal notion of the true—just as not everyone who understands being understands the agent intellect, even though nothing can be known without the agent intellect.

4. The true is a state of being even though it does not add any reality to being or express any special mode of existence. It is rather something that is generally found in every being, although it is not expressed by the word being. Consequently, it is not a state that corrupts, limits, or Contracts.

5. In this objection, condition should not be understood as belonging to the genus of quality. It implies, rather, a certain order; for those which are the cause of the existence of other things are themselves beings most completely, and those which are the cause of the truth of other things are themselves true most completely. It is for this reason that the Philosopher concludes that the rank of a thing in its existence corresponds to its rank in truth, so that when one finds that which is most fully being, he finds there also that which is most fully true. But this does not mean that being and the true are the same in concept. It means simply that in the degree in which a thing has being, in that degree it is capable of being proportioned to intellect. Consequently, the true is dependent upon the formal character of being.

6. There is a conceptual difference between the true and being since there is something in the notion of the true that is not in the concept of the existing—not in such a way, however, that there is something in the concept of being which is not in the concept of the true. They do not differ essentially nor are they distinguished from one another by opposing differences.

7. The true does not have a wider extension than being. Being is, in some way, predicated of non-being in so far as non-being is apprehended by the intellect. For, as the Philosopher says, the negation or the privation of being may, in a sense, be called being. Avicenna supports this by pointing out that one can form propositions only of beings, for that about which a proposition is formed must be apprehended by the intellect. Consequently, it is clear that everything true is being in some way.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. The reason why it is not tautological to call a being true is that something is expressed by the word true that is not expressed by the word being, and not that the two differ in reality.

2'. Although fornication is evil, it possesses some being and can conform to intellect. Accordingly, the formal character of the true is found here. So it is clear that true is coextensive with being.

3'. In the statement, "To be is other than that which is," the act of being is distinguished from that to which that act belongs. But the name of being is taken from the act of existence, not from that whose act it is. Hence, the argument does not follow.

4'. The true comes after being in this respect, that the notion of the true differs from that of being in the manner we have described.

5'. This argument has three flaws. First, although the Persons are really distinct, the things appropriated to each Person are only conceptually, and not really, distinct. Secondly, although the Persons are really distinct from each other, they are not really distinct from the essence; so, truth appropriated to the Person of the Son is not distinct from the act of existence He possesses through the divine essence. Thirdly, although being, the true, the one, and the good are more united in God than they are in created things, it does not follow from the fact that they are conceptually distinct in God that they are really distinct in created beings. This line of argument is valid only when it is applied to things which are not by their very nature one in reality, as wisdom and power, which, although one in God, are distinct in creatures. But being, the true, the one, and the good are such that by their very nature they are one in reality. Therefore, no matter where they are found, they are really one. Their unity in God, however, is more perfect than their unity in creatures.

ARTICLE II: IS TRUTH FOUND PRINCIPALLY IN THE INTELLECT OR IN THINGS?

Difficulties:

It seems that it is found principally in things, for

- 1.** It was pointed out that the true is convertible with being. But being is found more principally in things than in the soul. The true, therefore, is principally outside the soul.
- 2.** Things are not in the soul through their essences but, as pointed out by the Philosopher, through species. If, therefore, truth is found principally in the soul, truth will not be the essence of a thing but merely its likeness or species; and the true will be the species of a being existing outside the soul. But the species of a thing existing in the soul is not predicated of a thing outside the soul and is not convertible with it; for, if this were so, the true could not be convertible with being_ is false.
- 3.** That which is in something is based upon that in which it is. If truth, then, is principally in the soul, judgments about truth will have as their criterion the soul's estimation. This would revive that error of the ancient philosophers who said that any opinion a person has in his intellect is true and that two contradictories can be true at the same time. This, of course, is absurd.
- 4.** If truth is principally in the intellect, anything which pertains to the intellect should be included in the definition of truth. Augustine, however, sharply criticizes such definitions, as, for example, "The true is that which is as it is seen." For, according to this definition, something would not be true if it were not seen. This is clearly false of rocks hidden deep in the earth. Augustine similarly criticizes the following definition: "The true is that which is as it appears to the knower, provided he is willing and able to know." For, according to this definition, something would not be true unless the knower wished and were able to know. The same criticism can be leveled against other definitions that include any reference to intellect. Truth, therefore, is not principally in the intellect.

To the Contrary:

- 1'.** The Philosopher says: "The true and the false are not in things but in the mind."
- 2'.** Truth is "the conformity of thing and intellect." But since this conformity can be only in the intellect, truth is only in the intellect.

REPLY:

When a predicate is used primarily and secondarily of many things, it is not necessary that that which is the cause of the others receive the primary predication of the common term, but rather that in which the meaning of the common term is first fully verified. For example, healthy is primarily predicated of an animal, for it is in an animal that the nature of health is first found in its fullest sense. But inasmuch as medicine causes health, it is also said to be healthy. Therefore, since truth is predicated of many things in a primary and a secondary sense, it ought to be primarily predicated of that in which its full meaning is primarily found.

Now, the fulfilment of any motion is found in the term of the motion; and, since the term of the motion of a cognitive power is the soul, the known must be in the knower after the manner of the knower. But the motion of an appetitive power terminates in things. For this reason the Philosopher speaks of a sort of circle formed by the acts of the soul: for a thing outside the soul moves the intellect, and the thing known moves the appetite, which tends to reach the things from which the motion originally started. Since good, as mentioned previously, expresses a relation to appetite, and true, a relation to the intellect, the Philosopher says that good and evil are in things, but true and false are in the mind. A thing is not called true, however, unless it conforms to an intellect. The true, therefore, is found secondarily in things and primarily in intellect.

Note, however, that a thing is referred differently to the practical intellect than it is to the speculative intellect. Since the practical intellect causes things, it is a measure of what it causes. But, since the speculative intellect is receptive in regard to things, it is, in a certain sense, moved by things and consequently measured by them. It is clear, therefore, that, as is said in the Metaphysics, natural things from which our intellect gets its scientific knowledge measure our intellect. Yet these things are themselves measured by the divine intellect, in which are all created things—just as all works of art find their origin in the intellect of an artist. The divine intellect, therefore, measures and is not measured; a natural thing both measures and is measured; but our intellect is measured, and measures only artifacts, not natural things.

A natural thing, therefore, being placed between two intellects is called true in so far as it conforms to either. It is said to be true with respect to its conformity with the divine intellect in so far as it fulfils the end to which it was ordained by the divine intellect. This is clear from the writings of Anselm and Augustine, as well as from the definition of Avicenna, previously cited: "The truth of anything is a property of the act of being which has been established for it." With respect to its conformity with a human intellect, a thing is said to be true in so far as it is such as to cause a true estimate about itself; and a thing is said to be false if, as Aristotle says, "by nature it is such that it seems to be what it is not, or seems to possess qualities which it does not possess."

In a natural thing, truth is found especially in the first, rather than in the second, sense; for its reference to the divine intellect comes before its reference to a human intellect. Even if there were no human intellects, things could be said to be true because of their relation to the divine intellect. But if, by an impossible supposition, intellect did not exist and things did continue to exist, then the essentials of truth would in no way remain.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. As is clear from the discussion, true is predicated primarily of a true intellect and secondarily of a thing confirmed with intellect. True taken in either sense, however, is interchangeable with being, but in different ways. Used of things, it can be interchanged with being through a judgment asserting merely material identity, for every being is confirmed with the divine intellect and can be confirmed with a human intellect. The converse of this is also true.

But if true is understood as used of the intellect, then it can be converted with being outside the soul—not as denominating the same subject, but as expressing conformity. For every true act of understanding is referred to a being, and every being corresponds to a true act of understanding.

2. The solution of the second argument is clear from the solution of the first.

3. What is in another does not depend on that other unless it is caused by the principles of that other. For example, even though light is in the air, it is caused by something extrinsic, the sun; and it is based on the motion of the sun rather than on air. In the same way, truth which is in the soul but caused by things does not depend on what one thinks but on the existence of things. For from the fact that a thing is or is not, a statement or an intellect is said to be true or false.

4. Augustine is speaking of a thing's being seen by the human intellect. Truth, of course, does not depend on this, for many things exist that are not known by our intellects. There is nothing, however, that the divine intellect does not actually know, and nothing that the human intellect does not know potentially, for the agent intellect is said to be that "by which we make all things knowable," and the possible intellect, as that "by which we become all things." For this reason, one can place in the definition of a true thing its actually being seen by the divine intellect, but not its being seen by a human intellect— except potentially, as is clear from our earlier discussion.

Parallel readings: *Contra Gentiles* I, 59; *III De anima*, lectura II, nn. 746-51, 760-64; *Summa Theol.*, I, 16, 2. See also readings given for preceding article.

ARTICLE III: IS TRUTH ONLY IN THE INTELLECT JOINING AND SEPARATING?

Parallel readings: *De veritate*, I, *Summa Theol.*, I, i6, 2; *I Sentences* 19, g, 1, ad *Contra Gentiles* I, lii *De anima*, lectura ii, flfl. 746-51, 760-64; *I Perihermen.*, lectura, nn. 3-b; *VI Metaph.*, lectura 4, flfl. 1233-44; *IX Metaph.*, lectura ii, n. 1896 seq.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. The true is predicated from the relation of being to intellect. But the first operation by which an intellect is related to things is that in which the intellect forms the quiddities of things by conceiving their definitions. Truth, therefore, is principally and more properly found in that operation of the intellect.

2. The true is a "conformity of thing and intellect." Now, although the intellect, in joining and separating, can be confirmed with things, it can also be confirmed with things in understanding their quiddities. Truth, therefore, is not merely in the intellect joining and separating.

To the Contrary:

1'. In *the Metaphysics* we read: "The true and the false are not in things but in the mind. In regard to simple natures and quiddities, however, it is not in the mind."

2'. In *The Soul* the statement is made that the true and the false are not to be found in simple apprehension.

REPLY:

Just as the true is found primarily in the intellect rather than in things, so also is it found primarily in an act of the intellect joining and separating, rather than in an act by which it forms the quiddities of things. For the nature of the true consists in a conformity of thing and

intellect. Nothing becomes confirmed with itself, but conformity requires distinct terms. Consequently, the nature of truth is first found in the intellect when the intellect begins to possess something proper to itself, not possessed by the thing outside the soul, yet corresponding to it, so that between the two—intellect and thing— a conformity may be found. In forming the quiddities of things, the intellect merely has a likeness of a thing existing outside the soul, as a sense has a likeness when it receives the species of a sensible thing. But when the intellect begins to judge about the thing it has apprehended, then its judgment is something proper to itself—not something found outside in the thing. And the judgment is said to be true when it conforms to the external reality. Moreover, the intellect judges about the thing it has apprehended at the moment when it says that something is or is not. This is the role of "the intellect composing and dividing."

For these reasons, the Philosopher says that composition and division are in the intellect, and not in things. Moreover, this is why truth is found primarily in the joining and separating by the intellect, and only secondarily in its formation of the quiddities of things or definitions, for a definition is called true or false because of a true or false combination. For it may happen that a definition will be applied to something to which it does not belong, as when the definition of a circle is assigned to a triangle. Sometimes, too, the parts of a definition cannot be reconciled, as happens when one defines a thing as "an animal entirely without the power of sensing." The judgment implied in such a definition—"some animal is incapable of sensing" is false. Consequently, a definition is said to be true or false only because of its relation to a judgment, as a thing is said to be true because of its relation to intellect.

From our discussion, then, it is clear that the true is predicated, first of all, of joining and separating by the intellect; second, of the definitions of things in so far as they imply a true or a false judgment. Third, the true may be predicated of things in so far as they are confirmed with the divine intellect or in so far as, by their very nature, they can be confirmed with human intellects. Fourth, true or false may be predicated of man in so far as he chooses to express truth, or in so far as he gives a true or false impression of himself or of others by his words and actions; for truth can be predicated of words in the same way as it can be predicated of the ideas which they convey.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although the formation of a quiddity is the first operation of the intellect, by it the intellect does not yet possess anything that, properly speaking, is its own and can be confirmed to the thing. Truth, accordingly, is not found in it.
2. From this the solution of the second difficulty is clear.

ARTICLE IV: IS THERE ONLY ONE TRUTH BY WHICH ALL THINGS ARE TRUE?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 21., ad 5; 27, I, ad 7; Summa Theol., I, i6, 6; I-II, 33, r, ad 3; Contra Gentiles III, 47; Quolibet X., I Sentences 19, g, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that this is so, for

1. Anselm says that the relation of truth to all true things is like that of time to all temporal things. But there is only one time to which all temporal things are related. Therefore, there will be only one truth to which all true things are related.

2. But it was said that truth is used in two ways. In one, it means the entity of a thing, as when Augustine says: "The true is that which is" If truth be understood in this sense, then there should be as many truths as there are essences of things. In the second way in which truth is used, it signifies truth as it is expressed in the intellect. Consequently, Hilary writes: "The true affirms existence." But since nothing can manifest anything to the intellect except in virtue of the first divine truth, all truths are, in some sense, one, inasmuch as they all move the intellect—just as colors are one in moving the sense of sight, since they all move it because of one thing: light.

On the contrary, however, time, the measure of all temporal things, is numerically one; and if truth is related to true things as time is related to temporal things, the truth of all true things must also be numerically one. It will not be sufficient for all truths to be one in their action of moving the intellect or to be one in their exemplary cause.

3. Anselm argues as follows: If there are as many truths as there are true things, then truths should change as true things change. But truths do not change with the changes of true things, for, even when true and correct things are destroyed, the truth and correctness by which they are true or correct remain. There is, therefore, only one truth. He proves the minor from this: When a sign is destroyed, the correctness of the signification remains, for it remains correct that the sign should signify that which it did signify. For the same reason, rectitude or truth remains even when a true or correct thing has been destroyed.

4. With regard to created things, nothing is identical with that whose truth it is. The truth of a man is not the man; the truth of flesh is not the flesh. But every created thing is true. No created thing, therefore, is truth. Consequently, every truth is uncreated, and so there is only one truth.

5. As Augustine says, only God is greater than the human mind. But, as he proves elsewhere, truth is greater than the human mind, for truth certainly cannot be said to be less than the human mind. If this were so, it would be within the competence of the mind to pass judgment on truth. This, of course, is false, for the mind does not judge truth but judges according to the truth, like a magistrate who does not pass judgment upon the law but, as Augustine himself says, judges according to the law. Similarly, the mind of man cannot be said to be equal to truth, for it judges everything according to truth. It does not judge everything according to itself. Truth, therefore, must be God alone, and so there is only one truth.

6. Augustine has proved that truth is not perceived by any bodily sense. His proof is that nothing is perceived by sense unless it is changeable. But truth is unchangeable. Truth, therefore, is not perceived by sense.

One could similarly argue that everything created is changeable. But truth is not changeable. Therefore, it is not a creature but is some thing uncreated. Consequently, there is only one truth.

7. Augustine offers another proof in the same place: "There is no sensible thing that does not have some similarity to what is false, and, as a result, the two cannot be distinguished. To mention only one example: all that we sense through the body. Even when these objects are not present to the senses, we experience their images as though they were present, as when we are asleep or become delirious." Truth, however, has no resemblance to what is false. Therefore, truth is not perceived by a sense.

One could similarly argue that every created thing has some similarity to what is false in so far as it has some defect. Nothing created, therefore, is truth, and so there is only one truth.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine writes: "As likeness is the form of like things, so truth is the form of true things." But for many like things there are many likenesses. Therefore, for many true things there are many truths.

2'. Just as every created truth is derived from the uncreated truth as its model, and has its truth from it, so all intelligible light is derived from the first uncreated light as from its exemplary cause, and from it possesses its power of making things known. But we say that there are many intelligible lights, as is clear from the writings of Dionysius." Therefore, following this analogy, it seems we must likewise simply concede that there are many truths.

3'. Although all colors are able to affect the sense of sight in virtue of light, nevertheless, in themselves colors are distinct and different, and cannot be said to be one, except from a particular point of view. Consequently, even though all created truths manifest themselves in the intellect by virtue of the first truth, we cannot for this reason say that there is one truth, unless considered under this one aspect.

4'. Just as a created truth can manifest itself to the intellect only by virtue of the uncreated truth, so no power in a creature can act except by virtue of the uncreated power. Yet we do not say that somehow or other there is one power for all powers; so, in the same manner, we should not say that in some way there is one truth for all truths.

5'. God as a cause is related to things in three ways: as an efficient, an exemplary, and as a final cause. Consequently, by a kind of appropriation, the entity of things is referred to God as efficient cause, their truth to Him as an exemplary cause, their goodness to Him as a final cause—even though, properly speaking, each single one could be referred to each single cause. But in no manner of speaking do we say that there is one goodness for all good things, or one entity for all beings. Therefore, we should not say that there is one truth for all true things.

6'. Although there is one uncreated truth from which all created truths take their model, these truths are not modeled on it in the same way. For while it is true that the uncreated truth has the same relation to all, all do not have the same relation to it—as pointed out in The Causes. Necessary and contingent truths are modeled on the uncreated truth in quite different ways. But different ways of imitating the divine model cause diversity among created things. Consequently, there are many created truths.

7'. Truth is "the conformity of thing and intellect." But since things differ specifically, there cannot be a single conformity to the intellect. So, since true things are specifically different, there cannot be one truth for all true things.

8'. Augustine writes as follows: "One must believe that the nature of the human mind is so connected with intelligible things that it gazes upon all it knows by means of a unique light." Now, the light by whose means the soul knows all things is truth. Truth, therefore, belongs to the same genus as the soul and must be a created thing. Consequently, in different creatures there are different truths.

REPLY:

From our previous discussion it is clear that truth is properly found in the human or divine intellect, as health is found in an animal. In things, however, truth is found because of some relation to intellect just as health is said to be in things other than animals in so far as they bring about or preserve animal health. Truth, therefore, is properly and primarily in the divine

intellect. In the human intellect, it exists properly but secondarily, for it exists there only because of a relation to either one of the two truths just mentioned.

In his gloss on these words of Psalm II (v. 2), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," Augustine writes that the truth of the divine intellect is one, and from it are drawn the many truths that are in the human intellect—"just as from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror." Now, there are many truths in things, just as there are many entities of things. But truth predicated of things because of their relation to the human intellect is, as it were, accidental to those things; for, supposing that the human intellect did not or could not exist, things would still remain essentially the same. But truth predicated of things because of their relation to the divine intellect is inseparably attendant on them, for they cannot exist except by reason of the divine intellect which keeps bringing them into being. Again, truth is primarily in a thing because of its relation to the divine intellect, not to the human intellect, because it is related to the divine intellect as to its cause, but to the human intellect as to its effect in the sense that the latter receives its knowledge from things. For this reason, a thing is said to be true principally because of its order to the truth of the divine intellect rather than because of its relation to the truth of a human intellect.

So, if truth in its proper sense be taken as that by which all things are primarily true, then all things are true by means of one truth, the truth of the divine intellect. This is the truth which Anselm writes about. But if truth in its proper sense be taken as that by which things are said to be true secondarily, then there are many truths about many true things, and even many truths in different minds about one true thing. Finally, if truth in its improper sense be taken as that by which all things are said to be true, then there are many truths for many true things, but only one truth for one true thing.

Things are called true from the truth in the divine or human intellect, just as food is called healthy, not because of any inherent form, but because of the health which is in an animal. If, however, a thing is called true because of the truth in the thing, which is simply its entity confirmed will intellect, then it is so called because of something inhering in it after the manner of a form, as food is said to be healthy because of a quality of its own—which is the reason for its being said to be healthy.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Time is related to temporal things as a measure is related to the measured. It is clear, therefore, that Anselm is referring to that truth which is only the measure of all true things. There is only one such truth numerically, just as there is only one time—as the second argument concludes. However, the truth in the human intellect or in things themselves is not related to things as an extrinsic or common measure is related to those it measures. It is related as a measured thing is related to a measure, for such is the relation of truth in a human intellect to things, and it must, as a consequence, vary as things vary. Or, it is related as an intrinsic measure to the thing itself, as is the case will the truth that is in things themselves. Intrinsic measures must be multiplied as the number of things measured is multiplied—just as dimensions must be multiplied will the multiplicity of bodies.

2. We concede the second argument.

3. The truth which remains after things are destroyed is the truth of the divine intellect, and this is numerically one. However, the truth which is in things or in the soul is diversified according to the diversity of things.

4. The proposition "Nothing is its own truth" is understood of things having a complete act of existence in reality. It is likewise said that "Nothing is its own act of existence," yet the act of

existence of a thing is, in a sense, something created. In the same way, the truth of a thing is something created.

5. The truth by which the soul passes judgment on all things is the first truth; for, just as from the truth of the divine intellect there flow into the angelic intellects those intelligible species by which angels know all things, so does the truth of the first principles by which we judge everything proceed from the truth of the divine intellect as from its exemplary cause. Since we can judge by means of the truth of these first principles only in so far as this truth is a likeness of the first truth, we are said to judge everything according to the first truth.

6. That immutable truth is the first truth, which is neither perceptible by sense nor something created.

7. Although every creature has some similarity to what is false, created truth itself does not have this similarity. For a creature has some similarity to what is false in so far as it is deficient. Truth, however, does not depend on a creature in so far as it is deficient, but in so far as it rises above its deficiency by being confirmed to the first truth.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. Properly speaking, when two things are similar, likeness is found in both. Truth, however, being a certain agreement of intellect and thing, is not, properly speaking, found in both, but only in intellect; and since all things are true and said to be true in so far as they are in conformity with one intellect, the divine intellect, everything must be true according to one truth, even though in many like things there are many different likenesses.

2'. Although intelligible light has the divine light for its exemplary cause, light is nevertheless predicated in the proper sense of created intelligible lights. Truth, however, is not predicated in the proper sense of things having the divine intellect as their exemplary cause.

Consequently, we do not say that there is one light in the same way that we say that there is one truth.

3'. Our reply given immediately above will answer the argument taken from colors, for visible is properly predicated of colors, also, even though they are not seen except by means of light.

4'-5'. Our answer to the fourth argument (from the nature of power) and to the fifth (from the nature of being) is the same.

6'. Even though things are modeled in different ways upon the divine truth, this does not keep things from being true in the proper sense of the term by a single truth—not by many truths. For that which is received in different ways in the things modeled upon the exemplar is not properly called truth will the same propriety as truth is said to be in the exemplar itself.

7'. Although things differing specifically are not on their own part confirmed with the divine intellect by one conformity, the divine intellect to which all things are confirmed is one, and on its part there is one conformity with all things even though all things are not conformed to it in the same way. The truth of all things, therefore, is one in the manner described.

8'. Augustine is speaking of truth in our mind as it is modeled upon the divine mind as the likeness of a face is reflected in a mirror; and, as we said, there are many reflections of the first truth in our souls. Or one can say that the first truth belongs to the genus of the soul if genus be taken in a broad sense, namely, in so far as everything intelligible or incorporeal is said to belong to one genus. Genus is used in this way in the Acts of the Apostles (17:28) where we read: "For we are also his offspring [genus]."

ARTICLE V: IS SOME TRUTH BESIDES THE FIRST TRUTH ETERNAL?

Parallel readings: Sum. Theol., I, i0, 3, ad 3; i6, 7 I Sentences 79, 5, Contra Gentiles II, CC. 36, 83-84; De potentia 3, 17, ad 27-29.

Difficulties:

It seems that there is some such truth, for

1. 'When treating the truth of propositions, Anselm says: "Whether truth be said to have, or whether it is understood not to have, a beginning or end, it cannot be circumscribed by a beginning or end." But every truth is understood either to have or not to have a beginning or end. Therefore, no truth is circumscribed by a beginning or end, and, since anything like this is eternal, every truth is eternal.
 2. Anything whose existence is a consequence of the destruction of its existence is eternal; for, whether it is taken as existing or not existing, it follows that it is. Moreover, at any given time each and every thing must be held as either existing or not existing. Now, a consequence of the destruction of truth is that truth is; for, if truth is not, the fact that truth is not is true, and nothing can be true except by truth. Therefore, truth is eternal.
 3. If the truth of propositions is not eternal, then a time must be assigned when their truth was not. But at that time it was true to say: "There is no truth of propositions." Therefore, truth of propositions exists—which contradicts the supposition. Therefore, one cannot say that the truth of propositions is not eternal.
 4. The Philosopher's proof that matter is eternal (which is false) rests on the fact that matter remains after its corruption and exists prior to its generation, since, if it corrupts, it corrupts into something, and if it is generated, it is generated out of something. But that from which something is generated and that into which it corrupts is matter. The same would be true of truth if it were said to undergo corruption or generation: it would exist before its generation and after its corruption. If it were generated, it would be changed from non-being to being, and if it corrupted, it would change from being to non-being. However, when truth did not exist, it would have been true that it did not exist—which could not be unless there was truth. Therefore, truth is eternal.
- g. Whatever cannot be conceived as not existing is eternal, for what ever is able not to exist can be conceived as not existing. The truth of propositions, however, cannot be conceived as not existing, because the intellect cannot understand anything unless it understands it to be true. Therefore, the truth of propositions is eternal.
6. Anselm argues as follows: "Let him who is able think of when this truth began or when it did not exist."
 7. That which is future always was future, and that which is past will always be past. Consequently, a proposition about the future is true since something is future, and a proposition about the past is true since something is past. Therefore, the truth of a future proposition always was, as the truth of a proposition concerning the past always will be. Hence, not only the first truth is eternal, but also many other truths are eternal.
 8. St. Augustine says that nothing is more eternal than the nature of a circle and that two and three are five. Since these are created truths, some truth besides the first truth is eternal.

9. For a proposition to be true, it is not necessary that something be actually stated. It is sufficient that something exist about which a proposition can be formed. But, even before the world existed, there was something, even apart from God, about which a proposition could be formed. Hence, before the world existed, the truth of propositions existed, and, since what existed before the world is eternal, the truth of propositions is eternal. The minor is proved thus: The world is made from nothing, that is, after nothing. Hence, before the world was, there was its non-existence. But a true proposition is formed not only about that which is, but also about that which is not; for, just as what is, is truly stated to be, so that which is not is truly stated not to be—as is clearly shown in Interpretation. Hence, before the world existed, there was that from which a true proposition could be formed.

10. Whatever is known is true while it is known. But from all eternity God knew all possible propositions. Therefore, from all eternity the truth of all propositions has existed, and so there are many eternal truths.

11. It was said, however, that from this it follows that those propositions are true in the divine intellect—not in themselves.—On the contrary, things must be true in the way in which they are known. But from eternity all things are known by God not only in so far as they are in His mind, but also as they exist in their proper nature; for Ecclesiasticus (23:29) says: "all things were known to the Lord God before they were created: so also after they were perfected, he be holdeth all things." He accordingly knows things in no other way after they are perfected than He did from eternity. Therefore, from eternity there were many truths existing not only in the divine intellect but in themselves.

12. A thing is said to exist simply in so far as it is in that which gives it its formal perfection. But the character of truth finds its formal perfection in the intellect. Hence, if from eternity there were many things simply true in the divine intellect, it must be granted that there are many eternal truths.

13. Wisdom (I: 15) states: "For justice is perpetual and immortal." As Cicero says, however, truth is a part of justice. Hence, truth is perpetual and immortal.

14. Universals are perpetual and immortal. But the true is most universal, for it is interchangeable with being. Therefore, truth is perpetual and immortal.

15. It was said, however, that, although a universal does not cease of itself, it may cease accidentally.—On the contrary, a thing ought to be denominated by that which belongs to it essentially rather than by that which belongs to it accidentally. Therefore, if truth taken essentially is perpetual and incorruptible, and does not cease or begin to be except accidentally, truth taken universally must be eternal.

16. Since from eternity God was prior to the world, this relation of priority in God was eternal. But when one member of a relation is posited, the other must also be posited. Therefore, from eternity the posteriority of the world with respect to God existed; consequently, there was from all eternity something outside of God to which truth belonged in some way. Hence, our original position stands.

17. It must be said that that relation of before and after is not some thing in nature but merely a rational relation.—On the contrary, as Boethius says, God is by nature prior to the world, even if the world had always existed. Therefore, that relation of priority is a relation of nature and not of reason alone.

18. The truth of signification is correctness of signification. But from eternity it was correct that something is signified. Therefore, the — truth of signification was from eternity.

19. From eternity it was true that the Father generates the Son, and that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both. Since these are a number of truths, a number of truths exist from eternity.

20. It was said, however, that these are true by one truth; hence, it does not follow that several truths existed from eternity.—On the contrary, that by which the Father is Father and generates the Son is not that by which the Son is Son and breathes the Holy Spirit. But by that by which the Father is Father it is true that the Father generates the Son, or that the Father is the Father; and by that by which the Son is the Son it is true that the Son is generated by the Father. Hence, propositions of this kind are not true by one truth.

21. Although man and capable of laughter are interchangeable, the truth is not found in each of the two following propositions: "Man is man" and "Man is capable of laughter"; for the property which the word man predicates is not the same as that predicated by capable of laughter. Similarly, the property implied in the word Father is not that implied in the word Son. Therefore, the truth is not the in the propositions mentioned above.

22. It was said, however, that those propositions were not from eternity-.-On the contrary, whenever there is an intellect able to make a proposition, there can be a proposition. But from eternity the divine intellect existed, understanding the Father to be the Father, and the Son to be the Son, and thus forming propositions or speaking—since, according to Anselm, "for the most high Spirit to speak is the same as to understand." Therefore, the propositions previously mentioned existed from eternity-.

To the Contrary:

1'. No creature is eternal, and every truth, except the first, is created. Therefore, only the first truth is eternal.

2'. Being and the true are interchangeable. But only one being is eternal. Therefore, only one truth is eternal.

REPLY:

As mentioned previously, truth means a proportion and commensuration. Hence, something is said to be true just as something is said to be commensurate. A body, however, is measured both by an intrinsic measure, such as a line, surface, or depth, and by an extrinsic measure, such as happens when a located body is measured by place, or when motion is measured by time, or a piece of cloth by an elbow length. Similarly, a thing can receive the name true in two ways: by its inherent truth or by an extrinsic truth. In this latter way, all things receive the name true from the first truth; and since truth in the intellect is measured by things themselves, it follows that not only the truth of things, but also the truth of the intellect or of a proposition signifying what is understood, gets its name from the first truth.

In this commensuration or conformity of intellect and thing it is not necessary that each of the two actually exist. Our intellect can be in conformity with things that, although not existing now, will exist in the future. Otherwise, it would not be true to say that "the Antichrist will be born." Hence, a proposition is said to be true because of the truth that is in the intellect alone even when the thing stated does not exist. Similarly, the divine intellect can be in conformity with things that did not exist eternally but were created in time; thus, those in time can be said to be true from eternity because of the eternal truth.

If we take truth, therefore, as meaning the inherent truth of true created things—the truth we find in things and in a created intellect— then truth is not eternal whether it be that of things or that of propositions; for neither the things themselves nor the intellect in which these truths inhere exists from all eternity. On the other hand, if we take it to mean the truth of true created things, by which all are said to be true—their extrinsic measure, as it were, which is the first truth— then the truth of everything—of things, propositions, and intellects— is eternal. Both Augustine and Anselm search for an eternal truth of this sort; the latter writes: "You can

understand how I have proved in my Monologion that the highest truth does not have a beginning or end from the truth that is in speech."

This first truth must be one for all things. For in our intellect truth is multiplied in only two ways: first, by the multiplicity of the things known, for this results in a multiplicity of conceptions upon which there follows a multiplicity of truths in our soul; second, by the multiplicity of our ways of knowing, for even though Socrates running is one thing, the soul understands time along with it by joining and separating—as it is said in *The Soul*. Consequently, the soul knows his running as present, as past, and as future—each in a different way. Accordingly, it forms separate conceptions in which separate truths are found. In divine knowledge, however, neither of these two kinds of diversity can be found. For God does not have separate acts of knowing for separate things, but by one act He knows all, since He knows all by a single principle, that is, by His essence, as Dionysius points out, and He does not direct His act of knowing toward things one by one. Similarly, too, His own act of knowing does not involve time, since it is measured by eternity, which abstracts from all time inasmuch as it embraces all. It remains, therefore, that there are not many truths from eternity, but one alone.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. As Anselm explains his meaning in another place, he said that the truth of statements is not circumscribed by a beginning or end, "not because the statement itself has no beginning but because no time can be conceived at which the statement could exist and truth be absent from it." The statement referred to here is one discussed previously, namely, one by which it is truly signified that something will take place in the future. Hence, it is quite clear that Anselm did not want to imply that either the truth inherent in a created thing or a proposition itself is without a beginning and end. He held simply that the first truth by which a proposition is said to be true by a sort of extrinsic measure is without beginning or end.

2. Outside the mind we find two things: the thing itself, and its privations and negations. These two are not related to truth in the same way, for they do not have the same relation to intellect. Because of the species it possesses, the thing itself is proportioned to the divine intellect as a product of art is to art. Because of the same species, more over, the thing is able to confirm our intellect to it, in so far as its likeness, being received into the soul, causes the thing itself to be known. But non-being, considered outside the soul, has nothing by which it can be proportioned to the divine intellect or cause itself to be known in our intellects. Hence, if non-being is in conformity with any intellect, it is not because of itself but because of the intellect which forms within itself the notion of non-being.

Anything existing positively outside the soul has something in itself by which it can be called true; but this is not the case with the non-existence of a thing: whatever truth is attributed to it comes from the intellect. When it is said, therefore, "It is true that truth does not exist," the truth here signified has no reality except in the intellect, since it is about a non-being. Hence, from the fact that the truth in a thing is destroyed nothing follows except that there is a truth which is in the intellect. And so it is clear that from this argument we can conclude only that the truth which is in the intellect is eternal. This truth must, of course, be in an eternal intellect, and it is the first truth. Consequently, from the argument given only the first truth is shown to be eternal.

3-4. The explanation just given also makes clear the solution to the third and fourth arguments.

5. Truth, taken without any qualification, cannot be understood as not existing; but all created truth can be conceived as not existing, just as it can be conceived that no creature exists. For

the intellect can conceive itself as not existing and not understanding, even though it can never conceive without existing or understanding. It is not necessary, however, that, in its act of understanding, the intellect understand everything that it has in its act of understanding, because it does not always reflect upon itself. Hence, there is no contradiction if it understands created truth as not existing, even though, without it, it cannot understand.

6. [No solution is given for the sixth difficulty.]

7. Since the future as such is not, and the past as such is not, the same reasoning holds for the truth of the past and future as for the truth of non-being. From this, as has been said, the eternity of no truth other than the first can be concluded.

8. The words of Augustine must be understood in the sense that the truths mentioned are eternal in so far as they are in the divine mind. Or Augustine takes eternal in the sense of perpetual.

9. Although a true proposition can be made about being and non being, being and non-being are not similarly related to truth, as is clear from what was said above. From it, also, the solution to this difficulty is clear.

10. Although God knew many propositions from eternity, He knew them by one act of knowing. Hence, from eternity there was only one truth by which the divine cognition was true of many things that would come about in time.

11. As is clear from our previous discussion, intellect is in conformity not only will things actually existing but also will those not actually existing—especially the divine intellect to which the past and the future are the same. Hence, although things did not exist from eternity in their own proper nature, the divine intellect was con formed will things in their proper nature even though they would come into being in time. In this way, from eternity, God had true knowledge of things, even in their proper natures, although the truths of things did not exist from eternity.

12. Truth finds its formal perfection in the intellect, but a thing does not. Hence, although we must concede without qualification that the — truth of all things was from eternity, since it was in the divine intellect, cannot concede without qualification that there were true things from eternity merely because they existed in the divine intellect.

13. The definition refers to divine justice; or, if it refers to human justice, then it is said to be perpetual in the way in which natural things are said to be perpetual. For example, we say that fire always moves upwards, unless impeded, because of its natural inclination. Now, because a virtue is, as Cicero says, "a habit resembling a nature and in harmony will reason," in so far as the nature of the virtue goes, it has an unfailing inclination to its act, even though this is sometimes impeded. Hence, in the Digest one reads that justice is: "the constant and perpetual will to give each one his due." However, the truth which is a part of justice is found in the testimony of legal trials. But we are not now discussing that kind of truth.

14. The statement that a universal is perpetual and incorruptible is explained by Avicenna in two ways. First, a universal is said to be incorruptible and perpetual because, according to those who hold the eternity of the world, particulars had no beginning and will have no end. For, according to the philosophers, generation is for the purpose of conserving the perpetual existence of the species—since it cannot be preserved by the individual. Second, a universal is said to be perpetual in so far as it does not cease of itself but accidentally—because of the corruption of the individual.

15. A thing is predicated of another essentially in two ways. First, it is done positively, as when we say of fire that it is carried upwards. A thing gets its name from this kind of essential

predicate rather than from an accidental predicate; for we say rather that it is carried up wards and belongs to the class of things carried upwards than that it belongs to the class of those that are carried downwards, even though it may happen, accidentally, that fire is carried downwards—as would evidently be the case of red-hot iron.

The second type of essential predication is by "removal"—when there is removed from a thing those things which bring on a contrary disposition. If one of those things should happen to be present, the contrary disposition will be predicated absolutely. For example, unity is predicated essentially of first matter, not by positing some unifying form, but by removing diversifying forms. Hence, when forms occur which differentiate matter, we say, without qualification, that there are several matters rather than that there is only one. Such is the case in the difficulty; for a universal is said to be incorruptible, not because it possesses some form giving it incorruptibility, but because those material qualities which cause corruption in individuals do not belong to it as a universal. Hence, a universal existing in particular things is said, without qualification, to be corrupted in this or that individual.

16. All genera as such, will the exception of relation, posit some thing in reality. For example, quantity by its very nature posits some thing. But relation, alone, because of what it is, does not posit anything in reality, for what it predicates is not something but to something. Hence, there are certain relations which posit nothing in reality, but only in reason. This occurs in four ways, as can be seen in the writings of the Philosopher and Avicenna.

First, there occurs a relation merely in reason when a thing is referred to itself; for example, when we say that a thing is identical will itself. If this relation posited something in reality in addition to the thing which is declared to be identical will itself, we should have an infinite process in relations; for the very relation by which something is said to be identical will itself would also be identical will itself through an added relation, and so on to infinity. Second, a relation existing only in reason occurs when the relation itself is referred to some thing. For example, one cannot say that paternity is referred to its subject by some intermediate relation; for that mediate relation would need another intermediate relation, and so on to infinity. Consequently, the relation signified when paternity is compared to its subject is not real but only rational. Third, a relation existing in reason alone occurs when one of the related things depends on the other and not conversely. For example, knowledge depends on the thing known but not the other way about. Hence, the relation of knowledge to a thing known is something real, but the relation of the thing known to knowledge is merely rational. Fourth, a rational relation occurs when a being is compared with a non-being. For example, we say that we are prior to those who are to come after us. If this were a real relation, it would follow (if future generations were infinite) that there could be an infinite number of relations in the same thing.

From the last two types it is clear that that relation of priority posits nothing in reality but only in the intellect, because God does not depend on creatures and because such a priority is a relation of being to non-being. From this argument, therefore, it does not follow that there is an eternal truth except in the divine intellect, which alone is eternal. This is the first truth.

17. Although God is prior by nature to created beings, it does not follow that this relation is real. Since it arises merely from a consideration of what is naturally prior and what is naturally posterior—in the way in which a thing known is said to be naturally prior to knowledge—the relation of the thing known to knowledge is not a real relation.

18. The statement that, even when signification does not exist, it is nevertheless correct that something is signified, is taken with respect to the order of things existing in the divine intellect. For example, even when a trunk does not exist, it is correct to say that a trunk has a lid according to the plan conceived by the craftsman. Consequently, this argument also does not prove that there is an eternal truth other than the first.

19. The intelligible character of the true is based upon being. Although several persons and properties are posited in God, only one act of being is posited in Him, for the act of being is predicated essentially of Him; so, all those propositions, such as that the Father is or generates, and that the Son is or is generated, and so on,—in so far as they are related to the divine essence—all have one truth, the first and eternal truth.

20. Although that by which the Father is Father, and that by which the Son is Son, are different, since one is paternity, the other, filiation, that by which the Father is, and that by which the Son is, is the same. For each is because of the divine essence, which is one. Moreover, the intelligible character of truth is not based upon the character of paternity and sonship as such, but upon the character of being. Here, moreover, paternity and sonship are the one essence. Therefore, there is one truth for both.

21. The property predicated by man and capable of laughter is not the same essentially, nor does it have one act of existence, as is the case of paternity and sonship. Hence, there is no analogy.

22. The divine intellect knows things, no matter how diverse they be, by one act of knowing, even if they have different truths considered in themselves. Hence, He knows will only one act of knowing all the various propositions about the persons even to a greater degree. Consequently, there is only one truth for these, also.

ARTICLE VI: IS CREATED TRUTH IMMUTABLE?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 16, 8; I Sentences 19, 5, 3; *Quolibet X.*, 7.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Anselm says: "By this argument, I see that truth persists immutable." The argument he refers to is that taken from the truth of signification, which we discussed earlier. Hence, the truth of propositions is immutable; for the same reason, so is the truth of the thing which it signifies.

2. If the truth of a proposition changes, it changes especially when a thing changes. But when a thing has been changed, the truth of the proposition remains. Therefore, the truth of a proposition is immutable. Proof of the minor: Truth according to Anselm is "a certain correctness" as the thing fulfils that which it receives in the divine mind. But the fact that the proposition, "Socrates is sitting," signifies the sitting of Socrates comes from the divine mind, and this proposition will signify his sitting even when Socrates does not sit. Therefore, even when Socrates does not sit, truth remains in that proposition. Consequently, the truth of the proposition is not changed, even if the thing be changed.

3. If truth is changed, this can be only because the subjects in which truth inheres have previously been changed—just as certain forms can not be said to be changed unless their subjects have changed. But truth is not changed with the change of true things; for, as both Augustine and Anselm prove, when true things have been destroyed, truth still remains. Therefore, truth is entirely immutable.

4. The truth of a thing is the cause of the truth of a proposition, for a statement is said to be true or false in so far as a thing exists or does not exist. But the truth of a thing is immutable. Therefore, the truth of a proposition is also immutable. Proof of the minor: Anselm proves

that the truth of a proposition remains fixed to the extent that it fulfils that which it has received in the divine mind. But each thing like will fulfil that which it has been ordained in the divine mind to have. Therefore, the truth of each and every thing is immutable.

5. That which always remains when every change has been made is never changed. For example, when colors are changed, we do not say that the surface is changed, for it remains no matter what change of colors is made. Now, truth remains in a thing, no matter what change a thing undergoes, for being and the true are interchangeable. Therefore, truth is immutable.

6. Where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of these three propositions: "Socrates sits," "Socrates will sit," and "Socrates sat"—namely, the sitting of Socrates. Therefore, the truth of each is the same. Now, if one of these three propositions is true, one of the other two must always be true; for, if at some time it is true that Socrates sits, it always was true and will be true that Socrates sat or will sit. Therefore, one truth remains constant for the three propositions, and, consequently, is immutable. For the same reason, any other truth is immutable.

To the Contrary:

Effects are changed when their causes are changed. But things, which cause the truth of a proposition, undergo changes. Therefore, the truth of propositions changes.

REPLY:

A thing is said to be changed in two ways. First, because it is the subject of a change, as when we say that a body is changeable. In this meaning, no form is said to be changeable. Consequently, a form is said to be something steadfast in an unchanging essence; since truth consists in a form, the present question is not whether truth is mutable in this sense. Second, a thing is said to be changed because something else changes according to it, as when we say that whiteness is changed because a body is changed in its whiteness. It is in this sense that we ask whether or not truth is changeable.

To clarify this point, we should note that the thing according to which there is a change is sometimes said to be changed and sometimes not. For, when it is inhering in a thing which is affected in its respect, then it is said to be changed itself—as whiteness or quantity is said to be changed when something is changed in their respect because they succeed each other in a subject. When, however, that according to which the change occurs is extrinsic, the thing itself is not changed but remains unaffected throughout the whole change. For example, a place is not said to be moved when a thing moves with respect to it. For this reason, it is said in the Physics that place is "the unchangeable boundary of the container," because local motion does not mean a succession of loci in regard to one located body, but a succession of many located bodies in one place.

Now, there are two ways in which inhering forms are said to be changed with respect to a change of their subject; for general forms are said to be changed in one way and special forms in another. After a change, a special form does not remain the same either according to its act of existing or according to its intelligible character. For example, when a qualitative change has been made, whiteness does not remain at all. But, after a change has been made, a general form retains the same intelligible character, though not the same act of existing. For example, after a change from white to black has taken place, colour, according to the general character of colour, remains unchanged; but the same species of colour does not remain.

It was noted previously, however, that a thing is said to be true by the first truth as by an extrinsic measure; but it is said to be true by an inherent truth as by an intrinsic measure.

Consequently, created things change in their participation of the first truth, yet the first truth itself, according to which they are said to be true, does not change in any way. This is what Augustine says: "Our minds sometimes see more, sometimes less, of truth itself; but truth itself remains, and neither increases nor decreases."

If we take truth as inherent in things, however, then truth is said to be changed inasmuch as some things are said to be changed with respect to truth. For, as pointed out previously, truth in creatures is found in two different subjects: in things themselves and in intellect. The truth of an action is included in the truth of a thing, and the truth of a proposition is included in the truth of the understanding which it signifies. A thing, however, is said to be true by its relation to intellect, divine and human.

Consequently, if the truth of a thing is considered according to its reference to the divine intellect, then, indeed, the truth of a changeable thing is changed into another truth, but not into falsity. For truth is a most general form because the true and being are interchangeable. Hence, just as, even after any change has been made, a thing nevertheless remains a being, although it is other as a result of the other form by which it has existence; so, also, a thing always remains true—but by another truth; for, no matter what form or what privation it acquires through the change, it is confirmed in that respect to the divine intellect, which knows it as it is, whatever may be its state.

If, however, the truth of a thing is considered in its reference to a human intellect, or conversely, then sometimes there is a change from truth into falsity, sometimes from one truth to another. For truth is "an equation of thing and intellect"; and, if equal amounts are taken from things that are equal, these things remain equal, although the equality is not the same. Hence, when intellect and thing are similarly changed, truth remains; but it is another truth. For example, when Socrates sits, what is understood is that Socrates is sitting. Afterwards, when he does not sit, what is understood is that he is not sitting. But, if something is taken from one of two equal things, and nothing from the other, or if unequal amounts are taken from each, then inequality must result; and this corresponds to falsity, just as equality corresponds to truth.

Consequently, if an intellect is true, and it is not changed when a thing is changed, or vice versa, or if each is changed but not similarly, falsity results, and there will be a change from truth to falsity. For example, if, when Socrates is white, he is understood to be white, the intellect is true. If, however, the intellect later understands him to be black, although Socrates still is white; or if, conversely, he is still understood to be white, although he has turned black; or if, when he has turned pale, he is understood to be reddish—then there will be falsity in the intellect. Accordingly, it is clear how truth changes and how it does not.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Anselm is speaking here of the first truth according to which all things are said to be true as by an extrinsic measure.

2. Since the intellect reflects upon itself and knows itself as it knows other things (as said in *The Soul* the things belonging to the intellect as regards the intelligible character of truth can be considered in two ways. First, in so far as they are things; in this way, truth is predicated of them in the same way in which it is predicated of other things. Consequently, as a thing is said to be true because it fulfils what was assigned to it in the divine mind by retaining its own nature, so a proposition is also said to be true by retaining its own nature, which was also allotted to it in the divine mind; and this cannot be taken from it as long as the proposition itself remains. Second, these may be considered in their reference to things that are known. In

this way, a proposition is said to be true when it is proportioned to a thing. This kind of truth is changed, as has been said.

. Truth which remains after true things have been destroyed is the first truth, which does not change even when things change.

4. As long as a thing remains, no change can take place in it concerning its essentials. For example, it is essential to a proposition that it signify that which it has been made to signify. Consequently, it does not follow that the truth of a thing is in no way changeable, but only that it is unchangeable with respect to the essentials of the thing while the thing remains. Nevertheless, in those cases in which a change occurs through corruption of a thing, but only with respect to its accidentals, this accidental change can take place even though the thing remains. In this way, a change can take place in the truth of a thing in regard to its accidentals.

5. When every change has been made, truth remains, but not the same truth—as is clear from what has been said.

6. The identity of the truth depends not only on the identity of the thing but also on the identity of the intellect—the same way that identity of an effect depends on the identity of the agent and that of the patient. Moreover, even though the same thing is signified by those three propositions, the understanding of each is not the same; for time enters into the intellect's conjunctive operation, and the understandings of things differ with the differences of time.

ARTICLE VII: IS TRUTH AS APPLIED TO GOD PREDICATED PERSONALLY OR ESSENTIALLY?

Parallel readings: [Summa Theol., I, 16, 5, ad 2 3 8.](#)

Difficulties:

It seems that it is predicated personally, for

1. In regard to God, whatever implies the relation of origin is predicated personally. But truth belongs to this class, as is clear from Augustine; for he says that the divine truth is "the greatest possible

likeness of its source, without any unlikeness" from which falseness arises. Therefore, truth is predicated personally of God.

2. Just as nothing is similar to itself, so also, nothing is equal to itself. But, according to Hilary, from the fact that nothing is similar to itself, likeness in God implies a distinction of persons. The same reasoning can be applied to equality. But truth is a certain equality. Therefore, truth implies a distinction of persons in God.

3. Whatever implies procession in God is predicated personally of Him. But truth implies a certain procession since it signifies an intellectual concept just as a word does. Therefore, just as the Word is predicated personally, so also is truth.

To the Contrary:

Augustine says that of the three Persons there is but one truth. Therefore, it is something essential, not personal.

REPLY:

In regard to God, truth can be taken in two ways: properly and, as it were, metaphorically. If truth is taken properly, then it will imply an equality of the divine intellect and of a thing. Since the first thing the divine intellect knows is its own essence, through which it knows all other things, truth in God principally implies an equality between the divine intellect and a thing which is its essence; and, in a secondary sense, truth likewise implies an equality of the divine intellect with created things.

The divine intellect and the divine essence are not, however, made equal to each other in the way in which a measure is related to what is measured, since one is not the source of the other, but both are entirely identical. Consequently, the truth resulting from such equality does not involve its having the character of a source, whether it be considered from the standpoint of the essence or from that of the intellect, since both in this case are one and the same. For, just as in God the knower and the thing known are the same, so also in Him the truth of the thing and that of intellect are the same, without any connotation of origin.

But if the truth of the divine intellect be considered in its conformity to created things, the same truth will still remain; for God knows Himself and other things through the same means. However, there is added to the concept of truth the note of origin with respect to creatures, to which the divine intellect is compared as a measure and cause. Moreover, in theological matters every name which does not imply the notion of origin or of being from a principle is predicated essentially. And even if the name implies the notion of origin of creatures, it still is also predicated essentially. Consequently, if truth is taken properly in whatever pertains to God, it is predicated essentially; yet it is appropriated to the person of the Son, as are also art and all else pertaining to intellect.

Truth is taken metaphorically or figuratively in divine matters when we take it according to that formal character by which truth is found in created things. For in these, truth is said to exist inasmuch as a created thing imitates its source, the divine intellect. Similarly, when truth is applied to God and is said to be the highest possible imitation of its principle, this is attributed to the Son. Taken in this way, truth properly belongs to the Son and is predicated personally; and this, too, is what Augustine says.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The response is clear from the reply.
2. When equality is referred to divine things it sometimes implies a relation that indicates a distinction of Persons—as when we say that the Father and the Son are equal. In this respect a real distinction is understood in the word equality. Sometimes, however, a real distinction is not understood in the word equality, but merely a rational distinction, as when we say that the divine wisdom and the divine goodness are equal. Hence, equality does not necessarily imply a distinction of persons. Such also is the distinction implied in the word truth, since truth is an equality of intellect and essence.
3. Although truth is conceived by the intellect, the notion of a concept is not expressed by the word truth as it is by the term word. Hence, no analogy can be drawn.

ARTICLE VIII: IS EVERY OTHER TRUTH FROM THE FIRST TRUTH?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 21., ad 5; 27, 5, ad 7; Summa Theol., I, 16, aa. 5-6; Contra Gentiles III, 47; Quolibet X, 4,7; I Sentences 19, 5, aa. 1-2; II Sentences 37, 1, 2, ad 1; X Metaph., lectura 2, nn. 1956-59.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

2. Fornication is a true thing; yet it is not from the first truth. Therefore, not every truth is from the first truth.

2. The answer was given that fornication is said to be true by reason of the truth of the sign or concept, and this is from God. Its truth as a thing, however, is not from God.—On the contrary, besides the first truth, there is not only the truth of the sign or of the concept, but also the truth of the thing. Therefore, if its truth as a thing is not from God, then there is a truth of a thing not from God, and our proposition that not every truth other than the first is from God will have to be granted.

3. From "He fornicates," it follows that "fornication is true." Therefore, a transition can be made from the truth of a proposition to the truth of what is said, which in turn expresses the truth of the thing. Consequently, the truth mentioned consists in this: that that act is joined to that subject. But the truth of what is said would not arise from the conjunction of such an act with a subject unless the conjunction of the act, which has the deformity, were understood. Therefore, the truth of the thing regards not only the very essence of an act but also its deformity. But an act considered as having a deformity— is by no means from God. Not all truth of things, therefore, is from God.

4. Anselm says that a thing is called true if it is as it ought to be. Among the ways in which a thing can be said to be what it ought to be he mentions one, namely, that it happens with God's permission. Now, God's permission extends even to the deformity in an act. Therefore, the truth of the thing reaches as far as that deformity. But deformity is in no way from God. Therefore, not every truth is from God.

5. It was said, however, that just as a deformity or privation cannot be called a being without qualification, but only a being in a certain respect, so also a deformity or privation cannot be said to have truth without qualification, but only in a certain respect. Such a restricted truth is not from God.—On the contrary, to being, the true adds a reference to intellect. Now, although privation or deformity in itself is not being absolutely, it is apprehended absolutely by the intellect. Therefore, even though it does not have entity absolutely, it does have truth absolutely.

6. Everything qualified is reduced to something unqualified. For example, "An Ethiopian is white with respect to teeth" is reduced to this: "The teeth of an Ethiopian are white without qualification." Consequently, if some limited truth is not from God, then not every unqualified truth will be from God—which is absurd.

7. What is not the cause of the cause is not the cause of the effect. For example, God is not the cause of the deformity of sin, for He is not the cause of the defect in a free choice from which the deformity of sin arises. Now, just as the act of existing is the cause of the truth of affirmative propositions, so non-existing is the cause of negative propositions. Now, as Augustine says, since God is not the cause of this non-existing, it follows that He is not the cause of negative propositions. Hence, not every truth is from God.

8. Augustine says: "The true is that which is as it appears." Now, an evil thing is as it appears. Therefore, something evil is true. But no evil is from God. Therefore, not every true thing is from God.

9. But it was said that evil is not seen through the species of evil but through the species of a good.—On the contrary, the species of a good never makes anything appear but that good. Consequently, if evil is seen only through the species of a good, evil will appear only as a good. But this is false.

To the Contrary:

1' Commenting on the text, "And no man can say the Lord Jesus..." (I Cor. 12:3), Ambrose says: "Every true thing, no matter who says it, is from the Holy Spirit."

2' All created goodness is from the first uncreated goodness, God. For the same reason, all other truth is from the first truth, God.

3' The formal character of truth finds its completion in the intellect. But every intellect is from God. Hence, every truth is from God.

4' Augustine says: "The true is that which But every act of existing is from God. Therefore, every truth is from Him."

5' Just as the one is interchangeable with being, so is the true, and conversely. But all unity is from the first unity, as Augustine says. Therefore, every truth also is from the first truth.

REPLY:

As is clear from what has been said, among created things truth is found both in things and in intellect. In the intellect it is found according to the conformity which the intellect has with the things whose notions it has. In things it is found according as they imitate the divine intellect, which is their measure—as art is the measure of all products of art—and also in another way, according as they can by their very nature bring about a true apprehension of themselves in the human intellect, which, as is said in the Metaphysics, is measured by things. By its form a thing existing outside the soul imitates the art of the divine intellect; and, by the same form, it is such that it can bring about a true apprehension in the human intellect. Through this form, moreover, each and every thing has its act of existing. Consequently, the truth of existing things includes their entity in its intelligible character, adding to this a relation of conformity to the human or divine intellect. But negations or privations existing outside the soul do not have any form by which they can imitate the model of divine art or introduce a knowledge of themselves into the human intellect. The fact that they are confirmed to intellect is due to the intellect, which apprehends their intelligible notes.

It is clear, therefore, that when a stone and blindness are said to be true, truth is not related to both in the same way; for truth predicated of the stone includes in its notion the entity of the stone, adding a reference to intellect, which is also caused by the thing itself since it has something by which it can be referred to intellect. As predicated of blindness, however, truth does not include in itself that privation which is blindness, but only the relation of blindness to intellect. This relation, moreover, is not supported by anything in the blindness itself, since blindness is not confirmed to intellect by virtue of anything which it has in itself. —Hence, it is clear that the truth found in created things can include nothing more than the entity of a thing and conformity of the thing to intellect or conformity of intellect to things or to the privations of things. All this is entirely from God, because both the very form of a thing, through which it is confirmed, is from God, and the truth itself in so far as it is the good of the intellect, as is said in the Ethics; for the good of any thing whatsoever consists in its perfect operation. But since the perfect operation of the intellect consists in its knowing the true, that is its good in the sense just mentioned. Hence, since every good and every form is from God, one must say, without any qualification, that every truth is from God.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The argument—"Every true thing is from God. But to fornicate is true. Therefore."—falls into the fallacy of accident. For, as is evident from our discussion above, when we say that fornicating is true, we do not imply that the defect involved in the act of fornication is included in the notion of truth. True predicates merely the conformity of that act to an

intellect. Hence, one cannot conclude that fornicating is from God, but merely that its truth is from God.

2. As is clear from our reply just above, deformities and other defects do not possess truth in the same way that other things do. Consequently, even though the truth of defects is from God, it does not follow that the deformity is from God.

3. According to the Philosopher, truth does not consist in the composition found in things but in that made by the soul. Hence, truth does not consist in this, that the act will its deformity inheres in a subject (for this is proper, rather, to the character of good and evil). It consists in the conformity of the act, inherent in its subject, to the soul's apprehension.

4. The good, the due, the right, and all other things of this sort are related in one way to the divine permission, and in another, to other manifestations of the divine will. In the latter, there is a reference to the object of the will act, as well as to the will act itself. For example, when God commands that parents be honored, both the honor to be given parents and the act of commanding are goods. But in a divine permission there is a reference only to the subjective act of permitting, and not to the object of the permission. Hence, it is right that God should permit deformities, but it does not follow from this that the deformity itself has some rectitude.

5. [The solution to the fifth difficulty is not given.]

6. The qualified truth which belongs to negations and defects is reducible to that unqualified truth which is in the intellect and from God. Consequently, the truth of defects is from God, although the defects themselves are not from Him.

7. Non-existing is not the cause of the truth of negative propositions in the sense that it causes them to exist in the intellect. The soul itself does this by confirming itself to a non-being outside the soul. Hence, this non-existing outside the soul is not the efficient cause of truth in the soul, but, as it were, its exemplary cause. The difficulty is based upon the efficient cause.

8. Although evil is not from God, that evil is seen to be what it is, is from God. Hence, the truth by which it is true that there is evil is from God.

9. Although evil does not act on the soul except through the species of good, nevertheless, since evil is a deficient good, the soul grasps the intelligible character of the defect, and so conceives the character of evil. Accordingly, evil is seen as evil.

ARTICLE IX: IS TRUTH IN SENSE?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, i6, 2; 17, 2; 85, 6; III *De anima*, lectura 6, n. 660 seq.; IV *Metaph.*, lectura 12, nn. 673, 68r seq.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. Anselm says: "Truth is a correctness perceivable only by the mind." But sense does not have the same nature as the mind. Hence, truth is not in sense.

2. Augustine proves that truth is not known by the bodily senses, and his reasons were set down above. Hence, truth is not in sense.

To the Contrary:

Augustine says: "Truth manifests that which is." But that which is, is manifested not only to the intellect, but also to sense. Therefore.

REPLY:

Truth is both in intellect and in sense, but not in the same way. It is in intellect as a consequence of the act of the intellect and as known by the intellect. Truth follows the operation of the intellect inasmuch as it belongs to the intellect to judge about a thing as it is. And truth is known by the intellect in view of the fact that the intellect reflects upon its own act—not merely as knowing its own act, but as knowing the proportion of its act to the thing. Now, this proportion cannot be known without knowing the nature of the act; and the nature of the act cannot be known without knowing the nature of the active principle, that is, the intellect itself, to whose nature it belongs to be confirmed to things. Consequently, it is because the intellect reflects upon itself that it knows truth.

Truth is in sense also as a consequence of its act, for sense judges of things as they are. Truth is not in sense, however, as something known by sense; for, although sense judges truly about things, it does not know the truth by which it truly judges. Although sense knows that it senses, it does not know its own nature; consequently, it knows neither the nature of its act nor the proportion of this act to things. As a result, it does not know its truth.

The reason for this is that the most perfect beings, such as, for example, intellectual substances, return to their essence will a complete return: knowing something external to themselves, in a certain sense they go outside of themselves; but by knowing that they know, they are already beginning to return to themselves, because the act of cognition mediates between the knower and the thing known. That return is completed inasmuch as they know their own essences. Hence, it is said in The Causes: "A being which is such as to know its own essence returns to it by a complete return."

Since sense is closer to an intellectual substance than other things are, it begins to return to its essence; it not only knows the sensible, but it also knows that it senses. Its return, however, is not complete, since it does not know its own essence. Avicenna has given the reason for this by pointing out that the sense knows nothing except through a bodily organ, and a bodily organ cannot be a medium between a sensing power and itself. But powers without any ability to sense cannot return to themselves in any way, for they do not know that they are acting. For example, fire does not know that it is heating.

From this discussion the solutions to the difficulties are clear.

ARTICLE X: IS THERE ANY FALSE THING?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 16, aa. 1, 6; *I Sentences* 19, g. 1; *IV Metaph.*, lectura 52, n. 68i seq.; *V Metaph.*, lectura 22, nn. 1128-29; *VI Metaph.*, lectura 4, n. 5237 seq.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. According to Augustine: "The true is that which is." Hence, the false is that which is not. Now, what is not is not a thing. Therefore, no thing is false.
2. It was said that the true is a differentia of being; consequently, the false, like the true, is that which is.—On the contrary, no dividing differentia is interchangeable with that whose differentia it is. Now, as was said, the true is interchangeable with being. Consequently, the true is not a dividing differentia of being, for this would make it possible to call some thing false.

3. Truth is a conformity of thing and intellect. Now, all things are confirmed to the divine intellect, since in itself nothing can be other than it is known to be by the divine intellect. Hence, all things are true, and nothing is false.

4. All things possess truth from their forms. For example, one is said to be a true man if he has the true form of a man. But there is nothing which does not have some form, for every act of existing comes from form. Hence, everything is true, and there is no thing which is false.

5. Good and evil are related as true and false are related. Now, since evil is found in things, it has concrete reality only in something good, as Dionysius and Augustine say. Therefore, if falseness is found in things, it can have reality only in what is true. But this does not seem possible, for then the same thing would be both true and false; but this is impossible. This would mean, for example, that man and white are the same because whiteness is made real in a man.

6. Augustine proposes the following difficulty. If a thing is called false, it is either because it is similar or because it is dissimilar. "If because it is dissimilar, there is nothing that cannot be called false, for there is nothing that is not unlike something else. If because it is similar, all things loudly protest, for they are true because they are similar." Therefore, falsity cannot be found in things in any way.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine defines the false as follows: "The false is that which approaches the likeness of something else without being that whose likeness it bears." But every creature bears the likeness of God. Therefore, since no creature is identical with God Himself, it seems that every creature is false.

2'. Augustine says that "Every body is a true body and a false unity." Now, a body is said to be false because it imitates unity, yet is not a unity. Therefore, since every creature, in so far as it is perfect, imitates the divine perfection, and, nevertheless, in any perfection which it has, remains infinitely distant from it, it seems that every creature is false.

3'. The good, like the true, is interchangeable with being. But the interchangeability of the good and being does not stand in the way of a thing's being evil. Therefore, the fact that the true is interchangeable with being does not stand in the way of a thing's being false.

4'. Anselm says that there are two kinds of truth in propositions. "The first type occurs when the proposition has the meaning which was given to it." For example, this proposition, "Socrates sits," means that Socrates is sitting, whether he is actually sitting or not. "The second type of truth occurs when the proposition signifies that for which it was formed"—and it has been formed to signify that something is when it is. In this respect, a proposition is properly said to be true. In the same way, a thing may be called true when it fulfils its purpose, and false when it does not do so. But everything which falls short of its end does not fulfil its purpose; and, since there are many things of this sort, it seems that many things are false.

REPLY:

Just as truth consists in an equation of thing and intellect, so falsity consists in an inequality between them. Now, as was said, a thing is related to divine and human intellects. In regard to everything that is positively predicated of things or found in them, it is related to the divine in one way as the measured to its measure; for all such things come from the divine intellect's art. A thing is related in another way to the divine intellect: as a thing known is related to the knower. In this way even negations and defects are equated to the divine intellect, since God knows all these even though He does not cause them. It is clear, then, that a thing is confirmed

to the divine intellect in what ever way it exists, under any form whatsoever or even under a privation or a defect. Consequently, it is clear that everything is true in its relation to the divine intellect. Hence, Anselm says: "There is, then, truth in the essence of all things which are, for they are what they are in the highest truth." Therefore, in its relation to the divine intellect, nothing can be false.

In its relation to a human intellect, however, an inequality of thing will intellect, caused in some way by the thing, is occasionally found; for a thing makes itself known in the soul by its exterior appearance, since our cognition takes its beginning from sense, whose direct object is sensible qualities. For this reason it is said in *The Soul*: "Accidents greatly contribute to our knowledge of the quiddity." Consequently, when there are manifested in any object sensible qualities indicating a nature which does not actually underlie them, that thing is said to be false. Hence, the Philosopher says that those things are called false "which are such as to seem to be what they are not, or of a kind which they are not." For example, that is called "false" gold which has in its external appearance the colour and other accidents of genuine gold, whereas the nature of gold does not interiorly underlie them. But a thing is not to be the cause of falsity in the soul in the sense that it necessarily causes falsity; for truth and falsity exist principally in the soul's judgment; and the soul, inasmuch as it judges about things, is not acted U by things, but rather, in a sense, acts upon them. Hence, a thing is not said to be false because it always of itself causes a false apprehension, but rather because its natural appearance is likely to cause a false apprehension.

As was pointed out previously, however, the relation to the divine intellect is essential to a thing; and in this respect a thing is said to be true in itself. Its relation to the human intellect is accidental to it; and in this respect a thing is not true, absolutely speaking but, as it were, in some respect and in potency. Therefore, all things are true absolutely speaking, and nothing is false. But in a certain respect, that is, will reference to our intellect, some things are said to be false. Hence, it is necessary to answer the arguments of both sides.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The definition, "The true is that which is," does not perfectly express the intelligible character of truth. It expresses it, as it were, only materially, unless is here signifies the affirmation of a proposition, and means that a thing is said to be true when it is said to be or to be understood as it is in reality. Taken in this sense, the false may be said to be that which does not exist; it is not as it is said or understood to be. And this type of falsity can be found in things.
2. Properly speaking, the true cannot be a differentia of being, for being does not have any differentia, as is proved in the Metaphysics. But in some sense the true, as well as the good, is related to being in the manner of a differentia, since it expresses something about being which is not expressed by the noun being; and in this sense the meaning of being is indeterminate will respect to the meaning of the true. Consequently, the meaning of the true is compared to the notion of being somewhat as a differentia is compared to its genus.
3. That argument must be conceded, since it treats a thing in its relation to the divine intellect.
4. All things have some form, yet not everything has that form whose characteristics are externally manifested by sensible qualities; and it is in regard to these that a thing is said to be false if it is naturally apt to produce a false estimation about itself.
5. As is clear from what has been said, something outside the soul is said to be false if it is naturally such as to give a false impression of itself. But what is nothing is not capable of making any impression, since it does not move a knowing power. What is said to be false, therefore, must be a being; and since every being, in so far as it is a being, is true, falsity must

exist in things and be based upon some truth. For this reason Augustine says that a tragedian representing true persons in dramas would not be false without being a true tragedian. Similarly, a painting of a horse would not be a false horse were it not a true picture. It does not follow, however, that contradictories are true, because the affirmation and the negation in expressing the true and the false do not refer to the same reality.

6. A thing is said to be false in so far as, by its nature, it is likely to deceive. When I say deceive, however, I mean an action that brings on some defect; for nothing can act except to the extent that it is being, and every defect is non-being. Moreover, everything has some likeness to the true to the extent that it is a being; and in so far as it does not exist it departs from this likeness. Consequently, this deceiving as implying action arises from likeness; but the defect it implies (and in which the intelligible character of falsity formally consists) arises from unlikeness. Hence, Augustine says that falsity arises from unlikeness.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. The soul is not so constituted as to be deceived by any likeness whatsoever, but only by a considerable resemblance which makes it difficult to discover the unlikeness. Hence, the soul is deceived by similarities, more or less great, according to the varying degrees of its acuteness in discovering unlikeness. A thing, however, should not be said to be absolutely false because it leads into error, however much it may do that, but only because it is such as to deceive many or highly intelligent men. Now, although creatures bear some resemblance to God in themselves, so great is the dissimilarity between the two that only because of great stupidity could it happen that a mind would be deceived by such similarity. Hence, from the similarity and dissimilarity between creatures and God, it does not follow that all creatures should be called false.

2'. Some have thought that God is a body; and, since He is the unity by which all things are one, they consequently thought that body was unity itself, because of its likeness to unity. Therefore, a body is called a false unity for this reason, that it has led or could lead some into the error of believing it to be unity.

3'. There are two kinds of perfection, first and second. First perfection is the form of each thing, and that by which it has its act of existing. Nothing is without it while it continues in existence. Second perfection is operation, which is the end of a thing or the means by which a thing reaches its end; and a thing is sometimes deprived of this perfection. The note of truth in things results from first perfection; for it is because a thing has a form that it imitates the act of the divine intellect and produces knowledge of itself in the soul. But the note of goodness in things results from its second perfection, for this goodness arises from the end. Consequently, evil, but not falsity, is found in things absolutely.

4'. According to the Philosopher, the true itself is the good of the intellect, for an operation of intellect is perfect because its concept is true. And since a proposition is a sign of what is understood, truth is its end. But this is not the case with other things, and so there is no similarity.

ARTICLE XI: IS FALSITY IN SENSE?

Parallel readings: Sec readings given for q. 1, a. 9.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. As is said in *The Soul*: "The intellect is always correct." Now, since the intellect is the superior part of man, his other parts must also pursue correctness just as the disposition of lower bodies in the universe depends on the motion of the higher bodies. Therefore, sense, which is the inferior part of the soul, will also always be correct; there is, then, no falsity in it.
2. Augustine says: "Our eyes do not deceive us: they can report to the mind only their own modification. And if all the bodily senses report as they are affected, I do not know what more we can require of them." Hence, there is no falsity in the senses.
3. Anselm says: "it seems to me that truth or falsity is not in the sense but in opinion." This confirms our thesis.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. Anselm says: "Truth is, indeed, in our senses, but not always; for they sometimes deceive us."
- 2'. According to Augustine: "A thing is called false because it is far from being a likeness of the true, even though it does in some way imitate the true." Now, a sense has at times a likeness of certain things other than they are in reality. For example, when the eye is pressed, one thing is sometimes seen as two. Consequently, there is falsity in sense.
- 3'. The answer was given that sense is not deceived will regard to proper sensibles, but only will regard to common sensibles.—On the contrary, whenever something is apprehended about a thing other than it is, the apprehension is false. Now, when a white body is seen through a green glass, the sense apprehends it other than it is, for it sees it as green and judges accordingly—unless a higher judgment is present, detecting the falsity. Therefore, sense is deceived even will regard to proper sensibles.

REPLY:

Our knowledge, taking its start from things, proceeds in this order. First, it begins in sense; second, it is completed in the intellect. As a consequence, sense is found to be in some way an intermediary between the intellect and things; for will reference to things, it is, as it were, an intellect, and will reference to intellect, it is, as it were, a thing. Hence, truth or falsity is said to be in sense in two respects. The first is in the relation of sense to intellect. In this respect, the sense is said to be true or false as a thing is, namely, in so far as it causes a true or false judgment in the intellect. The second respect is in the relation of sense to things. In this, truth and falsity are said to be in sense as they are said to be in the intellect, namely, in so far as the sense judges that what is, is or is not.

Hence, if we speak of a sense in the first meaning, in a way there is falsity in sense, and in a way there is not. For sense, in itself, is a thing; and it also passes judgment on other things. If, in its relation to the intellect, it is considered as a thing, then there is no falsity in sense; for a sense reveals its state to the intellect exactly as it is affected. Hence, Augustine says, in the passage referred to: "The senses can report to the mind only how they are affected." On the other hand, if sense is considered in its relation to the intellect as representing some other thing, it may be called false in view of the fact that it sometimes represents a thing to the intellect other than it actually is. For, in that case, as we said about things, it is such as to cause a false judgment in the intellect—but not necessarily, since the intellect judges on what is presented by sense just as it judges about things. Thus, in its relation to the intellect, sense always produces a true judgment in the intellect will respect to its own condition, but not always will respect to the condition of things.

If sense is considered in its relation to things, however, then there are truth and falsity in sense in the manner in which these are in the intellect. For truth and falsity are found primarily and

principally in the judgment of the intellect as it associates and dissociates, and in the formation of quiddities, only in their relation to the judgment following upon this formation. Hence, truth and falsity are properly said to be in sense inasmuch as it judges about sensible objects, but inasmuch as it apprehends a sensible object, there is not properly truth or falsity, except in the relation of this apprehension to the judgment, in so far as a judgment of this or that sort naturally follows upon a particular apprehension.

The judgment of sense about certain things for example, proper sensibles—takes place spontaneously. About other things, however, it takes place by means of a certain comparison, made in man by the cogitative power, a sense power, whose place in animals is taken by a spontaneous estimation. This sensitive power judges about common sensibles and accidental sensibles. However, the spontaneous action of a thing always takes place in one way, unless by accident it is impeded intrinsically by some defect or extrinsically by some impediment. Consequently, the judgment of sense about proper sensibles is always true unless there is an impediment in the organ or in the medium; but its judgment about common or accidental sensibles is some times wrong. Thus, it is clear how there can be falsity in the judgment of sense.

As regards the apprehension of the senses, it must be noted that there is one type of apprehensive power, for example, a proper sense, which apprehends a sensible species in the presence of a sensible thing; but there is also a second type, the imagination, for example, which apprehends a sensible species when the thing is absent. So, even though the sense always apprehends a thing as it is, unless there is an impediment in the organ or in the medium, the imagination usually apprehends a thing as it is not, since it apprehends it as present though it is absent. Consequently, the Philosopher says: "Imagination, not sense, is the master of falsity."

Answers to Difficulties:

1. In the macrocosm the higher bodies do not receive anything from the lower. Just the opposite occurs. In man, the microcosm, the intellect, which is superior, does receive something from sense. Hence, no parallel can be made.
- 2-3. Our previous discussion will easily answer the other difficulties.

ARTICLE XII: IS FALSITY IN THE INTELLECT?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 17, 3; 58, 5; 85, 6; I Sentences 19, 5, 1, ad 7; Contra Gentiles I, 5 III, io8; III De anima, lectura 11, nn. 746-51, 760-64; I Perihermen., lectura, nn. 3-10; Vi Metaph., lectura, nn. 1223 seq., esp. n. 1241; IX Metaph., lectura II n. 1896 seq.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. The intellect has two operations. By one it forms quiddities, and, as the Philosopher says, the false is not in this. By the other it joins and separates, and the false is not in this either, as is clear from Augustine's saying: "No one has intellectual knowledge of false things." Consequently, falsity is not in the intellect.
2. According to Augustine: "Whoever is deceived does not understand that in which he is deceived." The intellect is always true, therefore, and there can be no falsity in it.

3. Algazel says: "Either we understand something as it is or we do not understand." But whoever understands a thing as it is truly understands it. Therefore, the intellect is always true, and there is no falsity in it.

To the Contrary:

The Philosopher says: "Where there is a joining of concepts, there the true and the false begin to be." Hence, falsity is found in the intellect.

REPLY:

The name intellect arises from the intellect's ability to know the most profound elements of a thing; for to understand (*intelligere*) means to read what is inside a thing (*intus legere*). Sense and imagination know only external accidents, but the intellect alone penetrates to the interior and to the essence of a thing. But even beyond this, the intellect, having perceived essences, operates in different ways by reasoning and inquiring. Hence, intellect can be taken in two senses.

First, it can be taken merely according to its relation to that from which it first received its name. We are said to understand, properly speaking, when we apprehend the quiddity of things or when we understand those truths that are immediately known by the intellect, once it knows the quiddities of things. For example, first principles are immediately known when we know their terms, and for this reason intellect or understanding is called "a habit of principles." The proper object of the intellect, however, is the quiddity of a thing. Hence, just as the sensing of proper sensibles is always true, so the intellect is always true in knowing what a thing is, as is said in *The Soul*. By accident, however, falsity can occur in this knowing of quiddities, if the intellect falsely joins and separates. This happens in two ways: when it attributes the definition of one thing to another, as would happen were it to conceive that "mortal rational animal" were the definition of an ass; or when it joins together parts of definitions that cannot be joined, as would happen were it to conceive that "irrational, immortal animal" were the definition of an ass. For it is false to say that some irrational animal is immortal. So it is clear that a definition cannot be false except to the extent that it implies a false affirmation. (This two fold mode of falsity is touched upon in the Metaphysics. Similarly, the intellect is not deceived in any way with respect to first principles. It is plain, then, that if intellect is taken in the first sense—according to that action from which it receives the name intellect—falsity is not in the intellect.

Intellect can also be taken in a second sense—in general, that is, as extending to all its operations, including opinion and reasoning. In that case, there is falsity in the intellect. But it never occurs if a reduction to first principles is made correctly.

From this discussion, the answers to the difficulties are clear.

QUESTION 2: God's Knowledge

ARTICLE I: IS THERE KNOWLEDGE IN GOD?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 14, 1; *I Sentences* 35, 1; C. G. I, XII *Metaph.*, *lectura* 8, n. 2542 seq.; *lectura* 11, n. 2600 seq.; *Comp. Theol.*, I, CC. 28-32.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. That which is had by an addition to another cannot be found in most simple being, and God is most simple. Therefore, since knowledge is had by an addition to the essence—for life adds something to the act of existence and knowledge adds something to life—it seems that knowledge is not in God.
2. The answer was given that knowledge does not add anything to God's essence, since knowledge merely indicates a perfection God has that is not indicated by essence.—On the contrary, perfection is the name of a thing. But in God, essence and knowledge are absolutely one thing. The same perfection, therefore, is indicated by both words, essence and knowledge.
3. No noun can be used of God which does not signify the entire divine perfection; for if it does not signify His entire perfection, it signifies nothing about Him, since parts are not found in God and can not be attributed to Him. Now, knowledge does not represent His entire perfection, for God "is above all names which name Him," as is stated in The Causes. Therefore, knowledge cannot be attributed to Him.
4. Moreover, science is the habit of conclusions, and understanding, the habit of principles—as is clear from what the Philosopher says. But God does not know anything as a conclusion: for this would mean that His intellect would proceed from premises to conclusions, though, as Dionysius has shown, this is not true even for the angels. Hence, science is not in God.
5. Whatever is known scientifically is known through something more known. For God, however, there is not anything more known or less known. Therefore, scientific knowledge cannot be in God.
6. Algazel says that knowledge is an impression of the known in the intellect of the knower. But an impression is entirely alien to God, for it implies receptivity and composition. Therefore, knowledge can not be attributed to God.
7. Nothing implying imperfection can be attributed to God. But knowledge implies imperfection, for it is regarded as a habit or first act—the operation of considering being regarded as second act, as is stated in The Soul. But a first act is imperfect with respect to the second since it is in potency to the second. Therefore, knowledge cannot be in God.
8. The answer was that there is only actual knowledge in God.—On the contrary, God's knowledge is the cause of things. Therefore, if knowledge is attributed to God, it existed eternally in Him; and if only actual knowledge is in God, He produced things from all eternity. This is false.
9. Whenever there is anything which corresponds to the concept we have of the word knowledge, of it we know not only that it is but also what it is, for knowledge is a distinct reality. But, as Damascene says, we cannot know what God is, but only that He is. Therefore, in God there is nothing corresponding to our concept expressed by knowledge. Knowledge, therefore, does not exist in God.
10. Augustine states that God is not accessible to the intellect since He eludes every form. But knowledge is a form which the intellect conceives. Hence, God also eludes this form, and so there cannot be knowledge in God.
11. To understand is more simple and of greater dignity than to know. But as stated in The Causes, when we say that God understands or is an intelligence, we are not naming Him with a proper noun but "with the name of His first effect." Much less, then, can we use knowledge of God.

Quality implies a greater composition than quantity does, for quality inheres in a substance by means of quantity. We do not at tribute anything of the genus of quantity to God because of His simplicity, for everything quantified has parts. Hence, since knowledge is in the genus of quality, it cannot be attributed to God.

To the Contrary:

1' The Epistle to the Romans (11:33) says: "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God!"

2' According to Anselm, we must attribute to God everything which in each thing it is better absolutely to have than not to have. Since knowledge is a perfection of this kind, it must be attributed to God.

3' Only three things are required for knowledge: an active power in the knower by which he judges about things, a thing known, and the union of both. But in God there is the most active power possible and an essence that is most knowable; consequently, there is a union of both. God, therefore, knows in the highest degree. Our proof of the minor premise is drawn from the fact mentioned in The Intelligences, namely: "The first substance is light." But light has active power most of all, as is shown from its diffusion and multiplication. It is, besides, highly knowable and, because of this, also makes other things known. Therefore, the first substance, God, has an active power to know and is Himself also knowable.

REPLY:

All attribute knowledge to God, but in different ways. Some, not being able by their own intellectual power to go beyond the manner of created knowledge, have believed that knowledge is in God like some sort of disposition added to His essence, as is the case with us. This is quite absurd and erroneous. For, if it were true, God would not be absolutely simple. There would be in Him a composition of substance and accident, and, further, God would not be His own act of existence; for, as Boethius says: "What exists can share in something else, but existence itself in no way shares in anything else." If God shared in knowledge as if it were a state added to His essence, He would not be His own act of existence, and, thus, He would have His origin from another who would be the cause of His existence. In short, He would not be God.

For this reason others have asserted that, when we attribute knowledge or something of the same sort to God, we postulate nothing positive in Him but merely designate Him as the cause of knowledge in created things. In other words, God is said to be a knower merely because He communicates knowledge to creatures. Although a partial for the truth of the proposition "God is a knower" may be that He causes truth (and Origen and Augustine seem to say this), it is not the whole truth for two reasons. First, by the same reasoning we should have to predicate of God whatever He causes in creatures, and so we should have to say that He moves since He causes motion in things. This, of course, cannot be said. Second, those attributes which are predicated of both causes and effects are not said to be in the causes because of the effects. Rather, they are said to be in the effects because they are found in the causes. For example, because fire is hot, it induces heat into the air. The converse is not true. Similarly, because the nature of God is to have knowledge, He communicates knowledge to us, and not the other way about.

Still others have said that knowledge and the like are attributed to God in a certain proportionate likeness, as anger, mercy, and similar passions are attributed to Him. For God is said to be angry in so far as He does something similar to what an angry man does, for He punishes. In us, this is the effect of anger. Properly speaking, of course, the passion of anger cannot be in God. In the same way, they say, God is said to be a knower because His effects

resemble those of a knowing agent. For example, the works of one who has scientific knowledge proceed from determined principles to determined ends and so do the divinely originated works of nature—as is clear from the Physics. But, according to this view, knowledge is attributed merely metaphorically to God, as are anger and other like things—an opinion contrary to the words of Dionysius and other saints.

Consequently, one must give another answer and say that, when knowledge is attributed to God, it signifies something which is in Him. The same is true of life, essence, and the like. These attributes do not differ as regards the reality which is signified, but only in our manner of understanding them. For God's essence, life, knowledge, and whatever else of this sort that may be predicated of Him are all the same; but in understanding essence, life, and so forth in His regard, our intellect has different concepts for each. This does not mean that these concepts are false; for our intellectual conceptions are true inasmuch as they actually represent the thing known by a certain process of assimilation. Otherwise they would be false, that is, if they corresponded to nothing.

Our intellect, however, cannot represent God in the same way that it represents creatures; for, when it knows a creature, it conceives a certain form which is the likeness of the thing according to its entire perfection; and in this manner defines the things understood. But since God infinitely exceeds the power of our intellect, any form we conceive cannot completely represent the divine essence, but merely has, in some small measure, an imitation of it. Similarly, extramental realities imitate it somewhat, but imperfectly. Hence, all different things imitate God in different ways; and, according to different forms, they represent the one simple form of God, since in His form are found perfectly united all the perfections that are found, distinct and multiple, among creatures. This is like the properties of numbers, which all, in a certain sense, pre-exist in unity, and like all the individual authorities of royal officials, which are all united in the authority of the king. If there were anything that could perfectly represent God, that thing would be unique, for it would represent Him in one way and according to one form. For this reason, there is in God only one Son, who is the perfect image of the Father.

Accordingly, our intellect represents the divine perfection by means of different conceptions, for each one of them is imperfect. If one were perfect, it would be the only one, just as there is only one Word in the divine intellect. There are, therefore, many conceptions in our intellect that represent the divine essence, and the divine intellect corresponds to each one of these as a thing corresponds to an imperfect image of itself. Thus, even though we have several intellectual conceptions about one thing, they are all true. Moreover, since names do not signify things without the mediation of the intellect, as is pointed out in Interpretation, the intellect applies several names to one thing according to the different ways in which it understands it, or (what comes to the same thing) according to different formal aspects. To all of these, however, there corresponds something in reality.

Answers to Difficulties

1. Knowledge is not had by an addition to being, except in so far as our intellect grasps someone's knowledge and essence as distinct; for addition presupposes distinction. In God, knowledge and essence are not really distinct, as is clear from our discussion. They are merely conceived in this way. Therefore, knowledge is not in God by an addition to His essence, except according to our way of understanding.

2. One cannot correctly say that knowledge in God signifies a perfection other than His essence. It is merely signified as though it were another perfection, since our intellect applies to Him the names referred to from the different concepts we have of Him.

3. Since names represent concepts, a name signifies the totality of a thing in direct proportion to the intellect's understanding of it. Our intellect can understand the whole of God, but not wholly. With God, one must know the whole or nothing at all, since in Him there is no question of part and whole. I say "not wholly," however, since the intellect does not know Him perfectly in so far as He is knowable by His very nature. Thus, our knowledge is like that of a man who knows with probability the conclusion, "The diameter is asymmetric to the side," merely because all men assert it. He does not know this conclusion wholly, since he does not arrive at the perfect manner of knowing which it is capable of being grasped. Yet he knows the entire conclusion and is ignorant of no part of it. So, too, the names which are applied to God signify the whole God, but not wholly.

4. What is in God without imperfection is found with some defect in creatures. Hence, if we attribute to God something found in creatures, we must entirely remove everything that smacks of imperfection so that only what is perfect will remain; for it is only according to its perfection that a creature imitates God. I point out, therefore, that our scientific knowledge contains both some perfection and some imperfection. Its certitude pertains to its perfection, for what is known scientifically is known with certainty. To its imperfection belongs its progression from principles to the conclusions contained in that science; for this progression happens only because the intellect, in knowing the premises, knows the conclusions only potentially. If it actually knew the conclusions, there would be no need of it to go further, since motion is simply the passage from potency to act. Knowledge is said to be in God, therefore, because of its certitude about things known, but not because of the progression mentioned above, for, as Dionysius says, this is not found even in angels.

5. If we take into consideration the manner proper to God as a knower, there is nothing more known or less known in God, because He sees all with the same intuition. If we consider the condition of the things known, however, He knows some to be more knowable in themselves and some less knowable; for example, of all the things He knows, the most knowable is His own essence, through which He knows everything not by a progression, however, since by seeing His essence He simultaneously sees all things. If this order of things known in the divine cognition is considered, the notion of science can also be verified in God, for He knows all things principally in their Cause.

6. That statement of Algazel is to be understood of our knowledge, which is acquired by the impression upon our souls of the likenesses of things. The opposite is true of God's cognition, for it is from His intellect that forms flow into creatures. Our knowledge is the impressing of things in our souls; but the forms of things are the impressing of the divine knowledge in things.

7. The knowledge posited of God is not like a habit but rather like an act, since He always actually knows all things.

8. Effects proceed from acting causes according to the condition of the causes. Hence, every effect which proceeds by reason of knowledge follows the determination of that knowledge, which limits its conditions. Therefore, the things which have God's knowledge as their cause proceed only when it has been determined by God that they should proceed. Consequently, it is not necessary that things actually exist from eternity, even though God's knowledge is actual from all eternity.

9. The intellect is said to know what a thing is when it defines that thing, that is, when it conceives some form of the thing which corresponds to it in all respects. From our previous

discussion, it is clear that whatever our intellect conceives of God falls short of being a representation of Him. Consequently, the quiddity of God Himself remains forever hidden from us. The most we can know of God during our present life is that He transcends everything that we can conceive of Him—as is clear from Dionysius.

10. God is said to elude every form of our intellect, not because there is no form of our intellect that can represent Him at all, but because there is no form that can represent Him perfectly.

11. As is said in the Metaphysics: "An intelligible character signified by a noun is a definition." Hence, the name of a thing is proper if its meaning is its definition. Now, since no intelligible character signified by a name defines God Himself, no name we apply to God is proper to Him. It is proper rather to the creature defined by the character signified by the name. These names, though the names of creatures, are attributed to God, however, in so far as a likeness of Him is found in some way in creatures.

12. The knowledge attributed to God is not a quality. Furthermore, a quality that follows upon quantity is a bodily quality a spiritual quality, as knowledge s.

ARTICLE II: DOES GOD KNOW OR UNDERSTAND HIMSELF?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., 1, i 2; Contra Gentiles 1, XII Metaph., Iect. 8, n. 2544; lectura X n. 2600 seq.; De causis, lectura 13 (P. 21:736b seq.); Comp. Theol., I, C. 30.; III Sentences 27, I, 4, sol.

Difficulties:

It seems that He does not, for

1. A knower is related to the thing known because of his knowledge. Now, as Boethius says: "The essence accounts for the divine unity, and the relations account for the multiplicity of the Trinity of Persons." In God, therefore, the thing known must be personally distinct from the knower. Furthermore, the distinction of Persons in God will not permit a reciprocal predication the Father is not said to have generated Himself because He generated the Son. Consequently, we can not grant that God knows Himself.

2. In The Causes we read: "Everyone knowing his own essence returns to it by a complete return." But God does not return to His essence, since He never leaves it; and there cannot be a return if there has been no departure. God, therefore, does not know His own essence and does not know Himself.

3. Knowledge is an assimilation of a knower to a thing known. But nothing is similar to itself, for, as Hilary says: "likeness is not referred to oneself." Hence, God does not know Himself.

4. Scientific knowledge is on about universals. But God is not a universal, for every universal is had by abstraction. There can be no abstraction from God, however, since He is perfectly simple. Hence, God does not know Himself.

5. If God knew Himself scientifically He would understand Himself, since understanding is more simple than scientific knowledge and, for this reason, is the more to be attributed to God. But God does not understand Himself; hence, He does not know Himself scientifically. Proof of the minor premise: Augustine says: "Whatever understands itself comprehends itself." However, only a finite being can be comprehended, as Augustine clearly shows in the same passage. Therefore, God does not understand Himself.

6. Augustine argues as follows: "Our intellect does not will to be infinite (although it is able so to will), since it desires to know itself." Hence, what wishes to know itself does not will to be infinite. But God wishes to be infinite, since He is infinite; for, if He were some thing He did not will to be, He would not be supremely happy. Consequently, He does not will to be known to Himself and, hence, does not know Himself.

7. The answer was given that, although God is simply infinite and wills to be such, He is not, however, infinite but finite to Himself, and SO does not will that He be infinite.—On the contrary, as is pointed out in the Physics, something is said to be infinite if it is untraversable, finite if it is traversable. But, as is proved in the Physics, the infinite cannot be traversed by means of either a finite or another infinite being. Therefore, although God is infinite, He cannot be finite to Him self.

8. What is a good to God is simply good. Therefore, what is finite to God is simply finite. But God is not simply finite. Hence, He is not finite to Himself.

9. God knows Himself only in so far as He enters into a relation will Himself. Therefore, if He were finite to Himself, He would know Himself in a finite manner; but, since He is infinite, He would be knowing Himself other than He is and, consequently, have false knowledge of Himself.

10. of those who know God, one knows Him more than another, according as his manner of cognition surpasses that of the other. But God knows Himself infinitely more than any one else knows Him. Hence, His manner of knowing is infinite, He knows Himself infinitely, and is not finite to Himself.

11. St. Augustine proves that one person cannot understand a thing more than another can. He argues as follows: "Whoever knows a thing otherwise than as it is, is deceived, and anyone who is deceived about a thing does not understand it. Hence, whoever understands anything otherwise than as it is does not understand it; for nothing can be understood in any other way than as it is." Since a thing exists in one manner, it is known in one manner by all. Hence, no one under stands a thing more than another does. Therefore, if God were to understand Himself, He would not understand Himself more than others understand Him. Thus, in some respect a creature would be equal to his Creator; this, however, would be absurd.

To the Contrary:

Dionysius declares: "By knowing itself, the divine wisdom knows all else." Hence, God knows Himself especially.

REPLY:

When it is said that a being knows itself, it is implicitly said to be both the knower and the known. Hence, in order to consider what kind of knowledge God has of Himself we have to see what kind of a nature it is that can be both knower and known.

Note, therefore, that a thing is perfect in two ways. First, it is perfect will respect to the perfection of its act of existence, which be longs to it according to its own species. But, since the specific act of existence of one thing is distinct from the specific act of existence of another, in every created thing of this kind, the perfection falls short of absolute perfection to the extent that that perfection is found in other species. Consequently, the perfection of each individual thing considered in itself is imperfect, being a part of the perfection of the entire universe, which arises from the sum total of the perfections of all individual things.

In order that there might be some remedy for this imperfection, another kind of perfection is to be found in created things. It consists in this, that the perfection belonging to one thing is

found in another. This is the perfection of a knower in so far as he knows; for something is known by a knower by reason of the fact that the thing known is, in some fashion, in the possession of the knower. Hence, it is said in *The Soul* that the soul is, "in some manner, all things," since its nature is such that it can know all things. In this way it is possible for the perfection of the entire universe to exist in one thing. The ultimate perfection which the soul can attain, therefore, is, according to the philosophers, to have delineated in it the entire order and causes of the universe. This they held to be the ultimate end of man. We, however, hold that it consists in the vision of God; for, as Gregory says: "What is there that they do not see who see Him who sees all things?" Moreover, the perfection of one thing cannot be in another according to the determined act of existence which it has in the thing itself. Hence, if we were to consider it in so far as it can be in another, we must consider it apart from those things which determine it by their very nature. Now, since forms and perfections of things are made determinate by matter, a thing is knowable in so far as it is separated from matter. For this reason, the subject in which these perfections are received must be immaterial; for, if it were material, the perfection would be received in it according to a determinate act of existence. It would, accordingly, not be in the intellect in a state in which it is knowable, that is, in the way in which the perfection of one thing can be in another.

Hence, those ancient philosophers erred who asserted that like is known by like, meaning by this that the soul, which knows all things, is materially constituted of all things: its earth knows the earth, its water knows water, and so forth. They thought that the perfection of the thing known had the same determined act of existence in the knower as it had in its own nature. But the form of the thing known is not received in this way in the knower. As the Commentator remarks, forms are not received in the possible intellect in the same way in which they are received in first matter, for a thing must be received by a knowing intellect in an immaterial way.

For this reason, we observe, a nature capable of knowing is found in things in proportion to their degree of immateriality. Plants and things inferior to plants can receive nothing in an immaterial way. Accordingly, they are entirely lacking in the power of knowing, as is clear from *The Soul*. A sense, however, can receive species without matter although still under the conditions of matter; but the intellect receives its species entirely purified of such conditions.

There is likewise a hierarchy among knowable things; for, as the Commentator says, material things are intelligible only because we make them intelligible; they are merely potentially intelligible and are made actually intelligible by the light of the agent intellect, just as colors are made actually visible by the light of the sun. But immaterial things are intelligible in themselves. Hence, although less known to us, they are better known in the order of nature.

Since God, being entirely free of all potentiality, is at the extreme of separation from matter, it follows that He is most knowing and most knowable. It follows, too, that the knowability of His nature is directly proportioned to the act of existence which it exercises. Finally, because God is by reason of the fact that He possesses His own nature, it follows that God knows to the extent that He possesses His nature as one most knowing. For this reason Avicenna says: "He Himself self knows and apprehends Himself because His own quiddity, being completely stripped (that is, of matter) is that of a thing perfectly identified with Himself."

Answers to Difficulties:

1. In God, the Trinity of Persons gets its plurality from the real relations in Him, namely, the relations of origin. When one says "God knows Himself," the relation connoted is not a real relation but a rational relation, for, whenever a thing is referred to itself, the relation is not real but merely rational. A real relation demands two terms.

2. The dictum stating that one who knows himself returns to his essence is metaphorical. For, as shown in the Physics, there is no motion in intellection, and hence, properly speaking, no departure or re turn. Intellection is said to be a progression or movement to the extent that in it one passes from one thing known to another. In us, this takes place by a sort of discourse; and so, when the soul knows itself, there is a departure from the soul and a return to it. For the act, going out from the soul, first terminates in the object. Then one reflects upon the act, and finally upon the power and the essence, in so far as acts are known from their object, and powers by their acts. In divine cognition, however, there is, as was pointed out above, no progression from the known to the unknown. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the thing known, one can find a certain cycle in God's knowledge; for in knowing His own essence He beholds all other things, and in these things He sees a likeness of His own essence. Hence, in some way He may be said to return to His own essence—not, however, in the sense that He knows His essence only from other things, as is the case with our soul.

Note, however, that in The Causes the return to one's own essence is called the very subsistence of a thing in itself; for non-subsistent forms are, as it were, poured out upon something other than them selves, and are not in possession of themselves. But subsistent forms reach out to other things, perfecting them and influencing them—in such a way, however, that they still retain their immanence and self possession. In this way, God returns to His essence in the highest degree, for He provides for all, and, because of this providence, in a sense He goes forth and out into all things, although in Himself He remains unmoved and uncontaminated by anything else.

3. A likeness which is a real relation demands a distinction of things. If it is merely a conceptual relation, a distinction of reason between the things which are similar is sufficient.

4. A universal is intelligible in direct proportion to its separation from matter. Hence, those things which have not been separated from matter by an act of our intellect but are, in themselves, free from all matter, are most knowable. Consequently, God is most knowable, even though He is not a universal.

5. God knows, understands, and comprehends Himself, although, absolutely speaking, He is infinite. He is not infinite privatively—as a quantity is infinite, having part after part ad infinitum. If such an infinite had to be known according to the formal character of its infinity, one could never comprehend it; one could never come to its end, for it does not have an end. But God is said to be negatively infinite since His essence is not limited by anything. Now, every form received in a subject is limited according to the capacity of the subject; but since the divine act of existence is not received in a subject, for He is His own act of existence, His act of existence is infinite and, for that very reason, His essence is said to be infinite.

The knowing power of every created intellect is finite, since it is received in some subject. Consequently, our intellect cannot come to know God as clearly as He is capable of being known. Accordingly, our intellect cannot comprehend Him, for it cannot attain that fullness of knowledge which is the meaning of comprehend, as was mentioned above. But the divine essence and its knowing power possess the same infinity, and God's knowledge is just as powerful as His essence is great. Consequently, He attains a perfect knowledge of Himself and is thus said to have comprehensive knowledge—because such comprehension imposes some limits on the thing known, but rather because the knowledge is perfect and there is nothing lacking to it.

6. Since our intellect is finite in its nature, it cannot comprehend or perfectly understand anything infinite. Augustine's reasoning proceeded on the assumption of this limited nature. The nature of the divine intellect, however, is different; so the argument does not follow.

7. If the word God, properly speaking, is given its full meaning, He is finite neither to Himself or to others. He is said to be finite to Himself merely because He knows Himself as a finite intellect knows a finite thing; for, just as a finite intellect can attain a complete knowledge of a finite thing, so the divine intellect can have a complete knowledge of God Himself. But that characteristic of the infinite by which its end can never be reached is proper to a privative infinite. But this is entirely beside the point.

8. In regard to those perfections which involve quantity, if anything in reference to God has a certain attribute, the consequence is that it has that attribute absolutely. Thus, whatever is great in reference to God is, as a consequence, simply great. But in regard to those terms which involve imperfection, the same thing does not follow. If, for instance, something is small in comparison with God, it is not necessarily, as a consequence, small absolutely. All things are, indeed, nothing in comparison with God, yet they are not absolutely nothing. What is good in the sight of God, therefore, is good absolutely; but it does not follow that what is finite for God is finite absolutely, because finite involves imperfection, but good expresses a perfection. In either case, however, anything which is found in the divine judgment to have a certain attribute has that attribute absolutely.

9. The statement, "God knows Himself limitedly," can be understood in two ways. In the first way, limitedly is applied to the thing known, so that God would know Himself to be limited. In this sense the statement is incorrect, for then God's knowledge would be false. In the second way, limitedly is applied to the knower. Then, two interpretations are possible. Either limitedly means perfectly, so that the knower is said to know limitedly whose knowledge attains its end—and, in this sense, God actually does know Himself "limitedly"; or limitedly pertains to the efficacy of cognition—and in this sense God knows Himself, not limitedly, but infinitely, for the extent of the power of His cognition is the infinite itself. However, from the fact that He is finite to himself in the manner described, one cannot conclude that His knowledge of Himself is limited, except in the sense in which this was said to be true.

10. That argument is based on the word infinite being taken as referring to the efficacy of knowledge. Consequently, it is clear that God does not know Himself finitely.

11. The statement that one person can understand more than another may be taken in two ways. In the first, the word more refers primarily to the thing known. In this sense, no one of those who understand understands more than another of the thing understood, provided that it is understood. For whoever attributes more or less to the thing known than is in the nature of the thing is in error and does not, properly speaking, understand. But the word more can also be taken as referring to the manner in which one knows. In this sense, one understands more than another because he understands more clearly as an angel understands more clearly than a man, and God more than an angel, because of a greater power of understanding. We must similarly distinguish another phrase assumed in this proof, that is, "to know a thing other than as it is." For, if the word other refers primarily to the thing known, then no one who understands knows a thing other than it is; for this would be to understand it to be in some other way than it is. If the word other, however, refers to the manner by which one knows, then everyone who understands a material thing knows it other than it is, because a thing having a material act of existence is understood only in an immaterial way.

ARTICLE III: DOES GOD KNOW THINGS OTHER THAN HIMSELF?

4. The medium through which a thing is known ought to be proportional to the thing known. Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 14, 5; I Sentences 35, 2; Contra Gentiles I, 48-49; XII Metaph., lectura xx, nn. 2614-16; De causis, lects. ID, 13 (P. zi: seq.; 74 Comp. Theol., I, CC. 132—35.

Difficulties:

It seems that He does not, for

1. The known is a perfection of the knower. But nothing distinct from God Himself can be His perfection; otherwise, something would be more noble than He is. Therefore, He can know nothing distinct from Himself.
2. But it was said that in so far as a thing or creature is known by God, it is one will Him.— On the contrary, a creature is one will God only inasmuch as it is in Him. Hence, if God knows a creature only as it is one will Him, He will know it only as it is in Him, and not as it is in its own nature.
3. If the divine intellect knows a creature, it knows it either through its essence or through something extrinsic. If it knows it through some extrinsic medium, then, since every medium of knowing is a perfection of the knower, because it is his form as knower (as is evident of the species of a stone in the pupil of the eye), it would follow that something extrinsic to God would be one of His perfections. But this is absurd. On the other hand, if He knows a creature through His own essence, since His essence is something distinct from the creature, it will follow that from knowing one thing He will know another. Now, every intellect that knows one thing from another is one which discourses and reasons. Consequently, there is discursive thought in the divine intellect, and, therefore, imperfection. But this is absurd.
4. The medium through which a thing is known ought to be proportionate to that which is known through it. But the divine essence is not proportionate to a creature since it infinitely surpasses it, and there is no proportion between the infinite and the finite. Therefore, by knowing His own essence, God cannot know a creature.
5. The Philosopher proves that God knows only Himself. Now, only means "not will something else." Therefore, He does not know things other than Himself.
6. If God knows things other than Himself, since He knows Himself, He knows either Himself and other things also under the same formal aspect or Himself under one formal aspect and other things under another. If He knows both under the same formal aspect, then, since He knows Himself through His own essence, it follows that He knows other things through their essence. But this is impossible. However, if He knows one under one formal aspect and the other under another, then, since the knowledge of the knower is specified by the formal aspect under which the thing is known, there would be multiplicity and diversity in the divine cognition; but this is repugnant to the divine simplicity. Therefore, God does not know a creature in any way whatsoever.
7. A creature is farther removed from God than the person of the Father is from the nature of the Godhead. But God does not know that He is God in the same act that He knows that He is the Father, for, when it is said that He knows He is the Father, the notion of Father is included, which is not included in the statement, "He knows that He is God." Much more is it true, then, that, if God knows a creature, He will know Himself under a different formality than that under which He will know the creature. This, however, would be absurd, as is proved above in the sixth difficulty.
8. The principles of being and of knowing are the same. But, as Augustine says, the Father is not the Father by the same principle that He is God. Therefore, the Father does not know that He is the Father by the same principle that He knows He is God, and much more so the Father does not know Himself and a creature by the same principle if He does know any creatures.

9. Knowledge is an assimilation of the knower to the thing known. But the least possible likeness exists between God and a creature. Therefore, God has the least possible knowledge, or none at all, of creatures

10. Whatever God knows He beholds. But, as Augustine says: "God does not behold anything outside Himself." Therefore, He does not know anything outside Himself.

11. A creature is compared to God as a point to a line. Hence, Trismegistus says: "God is an intelligible sphere, whose center is every where, and whose circumference is nowhere"; and by its center, as Alanus explains, he means a creature. Now, a line loses none of its quantity if a point is taken from it. Hence, the divine perfection loses none of its perfection if knowledge of a creature is taken from it. But whatever is in God pertains to His perfection, since nothing is in Him as an accident. Consequently, He does not have any knowledge of creatures.

12. Whatever God knows He knows from eternity, since His knowledge does not vary. Now, whatever He knows is a being, for knowledge is only of being. Hence, whatever He knows existed from eternity. But no creature existed from eternity. Consequently, He knows no creature.

13. Whatever is perfected by something else has a passive potency in regard to that thing, because perfection is, as it were, a form of that which is perfected. But God does not have any passive potency in Himself, for this is a principle of change, which is far removed from God. Therefore, God is not perfected by anything other than Himself. Now, the perfection of a knower depends on the object of his knowledge, for his perfection consists in his actual knowing; and this is only something that can be known. Therefore, God does not know anything other than Himself.

14. As is said in the Metaphysics, "The mover is prior by nature to what is moved." But, as is said in the same place, just as the object of sense moves the sense, so the object of the intellect moves the intellect. Therefore, if God were to know something other than Himself, it would follow that something were prior to Him. But this is absurd.

15. Whatever is known causes some delight in the knower. Hence, it is said in the Metaphysics: "all men naturally desire knowledge. An indication of this is the delight of the senses..." some books have this passage. If, therefore, God knew something other than Himself, that something would be a cause of delight in Him. But this is absurd.

i 6. Nothing is known except through the nature of being. But a creature possesses more non-existence than existence, as is evident from Ambrose and from the sayings of many saints. Hence, a creature is more unknown than known to God.

17. Nothing is apprehended unless it has the character of truth, just as nothing is desired unless it has the character of goodness. But in Scripture visible creatures are compared to lies, as is evident in Ecclesiasticus (34:2): "The man that giveth heed to lying visions is like to him that catcheth at a shadow and followed after the will." Therefore, creatures are more unknown than known.

18. However, it was noted that a creature is said to be a non-being only in comparison with God.—On the contrary, a creature is known by God only in so far as it is compared with Him. Therefore, if a creature, as compared with God, is a lie and a non-being, then it is unknowable and cannot be known by God in any way whatsoever.

19. Nothing is in the intellect that was not previously in sense. But in God there is no sensitive cognition, because this is material. Therefore, He does not know created things, since they were not previously in His sense.

20. Things are known most thoroughly by a knowledge of their causes, especially of those that are the cause of the thing's act of existence. But of the four causes, the efficient and final are the causes of a thing's becoming. Form and matter, however, are causes of a thing's existence because they enter into the thing's constitution. God, however, is only the efficient and final cause of things; hence, what He knows about creatures is very little.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Epistle to the Hebrews (4:13) says: "all things are naked and open to his eyes..."

2'. When one of two related things is known, the other is known. But a principle and that which arises from the principle are said to be related. Therefore, since God is the principle of things through His essence, by knowing His essence He knows creatures.

3'. God is omnipotent. For the same reasons, He should be said to be omniscient. Hence, He knows not only delightful but also useful things.

4'. Anaxagoras affirmed the existence of an intellect that was unmixed so that it could know all things; and for this he is praised by the Philosopher. But the divine intellect is unmixed and pure in the highest possible degree. Therefore, God knows all things in the highest possible degree, not only Himself but things other than Himself.

5'. The more simple a substance is, the more it can comprehend a number of forms. Now, God is the most simple substance there is. Hence, He can comprehend the forms of all things, and consequently He knows all things, not merely Himself.

6'. A cause always contains the perfection of its effect in a higher degree. But God is the cause of knowing for all who know; for He is the "light, which enlightened every man that cometh into this world" (John I:9). Therefore, He knows creatures in the highest possible degree.

7'. Augustine proves that nothing is loved unless it is known. But God "loved all things that are" (Wisdom II:25). Hence, He knows all things.

8'. The Psalmist asks rhetorically: "Fie that formed the eye, doth he not consider?" (Psalms 93:9), implying the answer "Yes." Consequently, God Himself, who has made all things, considers and knows all things.

9'. The following is also found in the Psalms (32:15): "He who hath made the hearts of every one of them: who understandeth all their works." Now, the person referred to is God, the maker of hearts. Therefore, He knows the works of men, and thus things other than Himself.

10'. The same conclusion must be drawn from what is said elsewhere in the Psalms (135: 6): "Who made the heavens in understanding"; for, as the Psalmist says, He knew the heavens which He created.

11'. When a cause, especially a formal cause, is known, the effect is known. Now, God is the formal exemplary cause of creatures. Therefore, since He knows Himself, He also knows creatures.

REPLY:

Undoubtedly, it must be granted that God knows not only Himself but also all other things. This can be proved in the following manner. Whatever naturally tends toward another must have this tendency from someone directing it toward its end; otherwise, it would tend toward it merely by chance. Now, in the things of nature we find a natural appetite by which each and every thing tends toward its end. Hence, we must affirm the existence of some intellect above natural things, which has ordained natural things to their end and implanted in them a natural

appetite or inclination. But a thing cannot be ordained to any end unless the thing itself is known, together with the end to which it is ordained. Hence, there must be a knowledge of natural things in the divine intellect from which the origin and the order of nature come. The Psalmist suggests this proof when he says: "He that formed the eye, doth he not consider?" (Psalms 93:9); for, as Rabbi Moses points out, it is as if the Psalmist had said: "Does He not consider the nature of the eye—who has made it to be proportioned to its end, which is its act of seeing?" But now we must further consider the manner by which He knows creatures.

It should be understood, therefore, that, since every agent acts to the extent that it is in act, that which is effected by the agent must in some way exist in the agent. This is the reason why every agent causes something similar to itself. Now, whatever is in another is in it according to the manner of the recipient. Hence, if the active principle is material, the effect is in it somehow materially, because it is, as it were, in a material power. If the active principle is immaterial, however, its effect will also be in it immaterially.

Now, as we have said earlier, a thing is known by another in so far as it is received immaterially by that other. Consequently, active material principles do not know their effects, because these latter do not exist in them in a manner in which they could be known; but in immaterial active principles the effects are present in a manner in which they are knowable, since they are there immaterially. Therefore, every immaterial active principle knows its own effect. This is why it is said in The Causes: "An intelligence knows what is below it in so far as it is its cause." Therefore, since God is the immaterial active principle of things, it follows that in Him there is knowledge of things.

Answers to Difficulties:

The known is a perfection of the knower, not by its substance (for the thing is outside the knower), but rather by the likeness by which it is known; for a perfection exists in the perfected and the likeness of the stone, not the stone, exists in the soul. Now, the likeness of the thing known exists in the intellect in two ways: sometimes as something other than the knower himself, at other times as the very essence of the knower. For example, our intellect, by knowing itself, knows other intellects in so far as it is itself a likeness of other intellects; but the likeness of a stone in the intellect is not the very essence of intellect; in fact, this likeness is received somewhat as a form is received in matter. Now, this form, which is other than the intellect, is sometimes the cause of the thing whose likeness it is. We have an evident example of this in the practical intellect, whose form is the cause of the thing done. But sometimes this form is the effect of the thing, as is clearly the case with our speculative intellect when it receives its knowledge from things.

Therefore, whenever an intellect knows a thing through a likeness which is not the essence of the knower, then the intellect is perfected by something other than itself; but if that likeness should happen to be the cause of the thing, in that case the intellect will be perfected only by the likeness, and not at all by the thing whose likeness it is. For example, a house is not the perfection of the artistic conception, but rather the contrary. On the other hand, if the likeness is caused by the thing, then the perfection of the intellect will be, as it were, the thing in an active sense, but its likeness in a formal sense. However, when the likeness of the thing known is the very essence of the knower, the intellect is not perfected by something other than itself—except, perhaps, actively, as would be the case if its essence were produced by another. But because the knowledge of the divine intellect is not caused by things and neither the likeness by which it knows the thing nor its own essence is caused by another, it by no means follows from the fact that God knows things other than Himself that His intellect is perfected by something else.

2. God does not know other things only inasmuch as they exist in Him, if inasmuch as refers to His knowledge from the point of view of the thing known, because, in regard to things, He knows not only the act of being which they have inasmuch as they are one with Him, but also the act of being which they have outside of Him, and by which they are distinguished from Him. However, if inasmuch as specifies His knowledge from the point of view of the knower, then it is true that God knows things only inasmuch as they are in Him; for He knows them from their likeness, which is identical in reality with Himself.

3. The manner in which God knows creatures is by their existence within Himself. An effect existing in any efficient cause whatsoever is not other than that cause if there is question of a thing which is a cause in itself. For example, a house existing in the conception of the artist is not other than that conception itself; for an effect is in an active principle simply inasmuch as the active principle produces an effect similar to itself, and this active principle is the very thing by which the artist acts. Consequently, if some active principle acts only through its form, its effect is in it in so far as it has that form, and its effect will not exist in the principle as something distinct from its form. Similarly, since God acts through His essence, His effect is not in Him as something distinct from His essence; but it is entirely one with it. Therefore, His knowledge of an effect is not distinct from His own essence.

Nevertheless, from the fact that He knows His effect by knowing His own essence, it does not follow that there is any discursive reasoning in His intellect; for an intellect is said to reason from one thing to another only if it apprehends each by distinct apprehensions. Thus, the human intellect apprehends a cause and an effect by distinct acts; and since it knows an effect through its cause, it is said to reason from the cause to the effect. When, however, the knowing power is directed by the same act to the medium by which it knows and to the thing known, then there is no discursive process in knowing. For example, when sight knows a stone by means of the species of stone in this sense, or when it knows by means of a mirror a thing reflected in the mirror, it is not said to reason discursively; for to be directed to the likeness of a thing is the same as to be directed to the thing which is known through this likeness. It is in this manner that God knows His effects through His essence—just as a thing is known through its likeness. Therefore, will one cognition know Himself and other things. Dionysius agrees when he speaks as follows: "God does not have a proper knowledge of Himself and another general knowledge that comprehends all existing things."¹⁴ Consequently, there is no discourse in God's intellect.

4. A thing is said to be proportionate to another in two ways. In one way, a proportion is noted between the two things. For example, we say that four is proportioned to two since its proportion to two is double. In the second way, they are proportioned as by a proportionality. For example, we say that six and eight are proportionate because, just as six is the double of three, so eight is the double of four; for proportionality is a similarity of proportions. Now, since in every proportion a relation is noted between those things that are said to be proportioned because of some definite excess of one over the other, it is impossible for any infinite to be proportionate to a finite by way of proportion. When, however, things are said to be proportionate by way of proportionality, their relation to each other is not considered. All that is considered is the similarity of the relation of two things to two other things. Thus, nothing prevents an infinite from being proportionate to an infinite; for, just as a particular finite is equal to a certain finite, so an infinite is equal to another infinite. In this way, there should be a medium that is proportionate to that which is known by the medium. Consequently, just as the medium is related to the act of demonstrating, so that which is known through the medium is related to the act of being demonstrated. Thus, nothing prevents the divine essence from being the medium by which a creature is known.

5. A thing is understood intellectually in two ways. First, it is understood in itself, as happens when the regard of the beholder is shaped directly by the thing itself, which is understood or known. Second, a thing is seen in something else; and, when this latter is known, it itself is known. God, therefore, knows only Himself in Himself; but He does not know other things in themselves except by knowing His own essence. This is what the Philosopher meant when he said that God knows only Himself; and the following statement of Dionysius is quite in agreement: "God knows things that come to be, not by a knowledge of such things, but by His knowledge of Himself."

6. If the formal aspect under which knowledge occurs is considered here from the point of view of the knower, then God knows Himself and other things under the same formal aspect; for the knower, the act of knowing, and the medium of knowing are all the same. But, if we consider the formal aspect from the point of view of the thing known, then He does not know Himself and other things under the same formal aspect; for the relation of Himself and of other things to the medium by which He knows is not the same; for He is the same as that medium by His essence, while other things are "the same" as the medium merely because of their resemblance to it. Therefore, He knows Himself through His essence, but other things through a likeness. However, that which is His essence and that which is the likeness of other things is the same reality.

7. If we consider the knower, it is entirely true that God knows that He is God and that He is the Father by the same act of knowing. But He does not know both by the same act of knowing if we consider that which is known; for He knows that He is God by the Godhead, and that He is the Father by His paternity. This latter, according to our manner of understanding, is not the same as the Godhead, although they are one in reality.

8. If we consider only the thing known, that which is the principle of its existence is also the principle of its being known, because a thing is knowable by means of its principles. But if we consider the knower, then that by which a thing is known is a likeness of the thing or of its principles. This likeness is not a principle of the existence of the thing, except in practical knowledge.

9. There are two ways of considering the mutual likeness between two things. First, we can consider them inasmuch as they agree in a common nature. Such a likeness between the knower and the known is not required; indeed, we sometimes see that the smaller the likeness, the sharper the cognition. For example, there is less resemblance between the intellectual likeness of a stone and the stone than there is between the sense likeness and the stone, for the intellectual likeness is farther removed from matter; yet the intellect knows more profoundly than sense.

Secondly, the likeness between two things can be considered from the point of view of representation. Such a likeness of the knower to the thing known is necessary. Therefore, although there is the least possible likeness between a creature and God in regard to agreement in nature, there is, on the other hand, the greatest possible likeness between them inasmuch as the divine essence most clearly represents the creature. Consequently, the divine intellect knows a thing most perfectly.

10. The statement that God beholds nothing outside Himself should be taken as referring to that in which God beholds, not to that which He beholds; for that in which He beholds all things is Himself.

11. Although a lime loses none of its quantity if an actual point is taken from it, if we take from a lime its essential property of terminating in a point, the very substance of the lime perishes. The same principle is also true of God; for, while nothing will be detracted from God if a creature of His is supposed as not existing, His perfection will be destroyed if His

power of producing a creature is taken from Him. For He knows things, not only inasmuch as they actually exist, but also inasmuch as they are within His power.

12. Although knowledge has only being for its object, it is not necessary that what is known should be a real being at the time in which it is known; for, just as we know things that are distant in place, we also know things distant in time, as is evident from our knowledge of things past. Hence, it is not inconsistent to affirm a knowledge of God that is about things that are not eternal.

13. The word perfection, if taken strictly, cannot be used of God, for nothing is perfected unless it is made. Perfection, however, is used more negatively of God than positively. Hence, He is said to be perfect because nothing at all is lacking to Him, not because there is some thing in Him which was in potency to perfection and is perfected by something else which is its act. Consequently, there is no passive potency in God.

14. What is understood or sensed moves the sense or intellect only if the sense knowledge or intellectual knowledge is received from things. Divine cognition is not of this kind; hence, the argument does not follow.

15. According to the Philosopher, the delight of the intellect arises from its agreeable operation. Hence, he says: "God delights in one simple operation." Therefore, the object of the intellect is the cause of intellectual delight in so far as it is the cause of an intellectual operation; and it is this in so far as it produces its likeness in the intellect, so that by it the activity of the intellect may be informed. Hence, it is clear that the thing which is understood causes delight in the intellect only when the intellect's knowledge is received from things. This is not true of the divine intellect.

16. The term to be, taken simply and absolutely, is understood only of the divine existence. This is also true of the good; and for this reason it is said in Luke (18: 19): "None is good but God alone." Hence, the more closely a creature approaches God, the more it possesses of the act of existence; the further it is from Him, the more it possesses of non-existence. But, since a creature approaches God only in so far as it participates in a finite act of existence, yet its distance from God is always infinite, it is said to have more non-existence than existence. However, since the act of existing which it has is from God, it is known by God.

17. In line with the preceding answer, a visible creature possesses truth only in so far as it approaches the first truth. As Avicenna says, it possesses falsity in so far as it fails short of it.

18. A thing is compared to God in two ways: first, according to a common measurement, and then a creature, when compared with God, is found to be almost nothing at all; second, according to its dependence upon God, from whom it receives its act of existing. In this latter way, it is compared with God only with respect to its act of existing, and in this way, also, it can be known by God.

19. That axiom is to be understood as applying only to our intellect, which receives its knowledge from things. For a thing is led by gradual steps from its own material conditions to the immateriality of the intellect through the mediation of the immateriality of sense. Consequently, whatever is in our intellect must have previously been in the senses. This, however, does not take place in the divine intellect.

20. It is true, as Avicenna says, that a natural agent is a cause only of becoming. This is evident from the fact that, when such a cause ceases to exist, a thing does not cease to be, but merely ceases to be come. But since the divine agent imparts the act of existence to things, He is the cause of their existence, although He does not enter into their constitution. Yet He has a certain resemblance to the essential principles which enter into the constitution of a thing, and

for this reason He knows not only the becoming of a thing, but also its act of existing and its essential principles.

ARTICLE IV: DOES GOD HAVE PROPER AND DETERMINATE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 14, 6; I Sentences 3; Contra Gentiles I, o; De potentia 6, I, C.; De causis, lectura 10 (P. 21:737a); Comp. Theol., I, CC. 132_35.

Difficulties:

It seems that He does not, for

As Boethius says, the object of cognition is "universal as long as it is understood, singular as long as it is sensed." Now, since there is no sensitive knowledge in God, but only intellectual knowledge, God has only universal knowledge of things.

2. If God knows creatures, He knows them either by many or by one species. If He knows them by many, His knowledge as it is in the knower will be multiplied, because that by which one knows is in the knower. If He knows creatures by one species, and it is impossible to have proper and distinct knowledge of many things by means of one species, it would seem that God does not have proper knowledge of things.

3. God is the cause of things in so far as He imparts the act of existing to them—just as fire is the cause of warm things from the fact that it pours heat into them. Now, if fire could know itself, by knowing its own heat, it would know other things only in so far as they are warm. Consequently, by knowing His own essence, God knows other things inasmuch as they are beings. That, however, is not proper knowledge of things, but a most universal knowledge of things. Therefore, God does not have proper knowledge of things.

4. Proper knowledge of a thing can be had only through a species which comprises nothing more or nothing less than is in the thing itself. For, just as the colour green would be imperfectly known by means of a species that fell short of it,—for example, the species of black - so also would green be imperfectly known by a species that went beyond it—for example, the species of white. For in white, the nature of colour is found to exist most perfectly; therefore, whiteness, as is said in the Metaphysics, is the measure of all colors. Now, in the measure in which God surpasses a creature, in that measure the creature fails short of God. Therefore, since the divine essence can in no way be known properly and completely by means of a creature, neither can a creature be known properly by means of the divine essence. God, however, knows creatures only through His essence. Therefore, He does not have proper knowledge of them.

5. Any medium that causes proper knowledge of a thing can be used as the middle term of a demonstration whose conclusion will be that thing. The divine essence, however, does not stand in such a relation to a creature; otherwise, creatures would exist whenever the divine essence existed. Consequently, by knowing creatures through His essence, God does not have proper knowledge of things.

6. If God knows a creature, He knows it either in its own nature or in an idea. If He knows it in its own nature, then the proper nature of a creature is the means by which God knows a creature. But the medium of knowing is a perfection of the knower; hence, the nature of a creature would be a perfection of the divine intellect. This, of course, is absurd. On the other hand, if God knows a creature in an idea, since the idea is more removed from a thing than are

the essentials or accidentals of the thing, God's knowledge of a thing will be less than that knowledge which is had through its essentials or accidentals. But all proper knowledge of a thing is had through its essential constituents or accidents, because, as is said in *The Soul*: "Even accidents contribute in a great part to our knowledge of what a thing. Consequently, God does not have proper knowledge of things.

7. Proper knowledge of any particular thing cannot be had through a universal medium. For example, we cannot have proper knowledge of man by means of "animal." But the divine essence is the most universal medium possible, since it is the universal medium for knowing all things. Therefore, God cannot have proper knowledge of creatures by means of His essence.

8. The type of knowledge is determined by its medium of knowing. Therefore, proper knowledge can be had only through a proper medium. The divine essence, however, cannot be the proper medium of knowing a particular creature, because, if it were proper to that one, it would not be the medium of knowing anything else; for what belongs to this creature and to that is common to both and not proper to either. Therefore, God does not have proper knowledge of creatures by knowing through His own essence.

9. Dionysius says that God knows "material things immaterially and many things as united," or, in other words, distinct things indistinctly. Now, since this is the kind of knowledge by which God knows things, He has merely indistinct knowledge of things, and therefore He does not properly know this or that.

To the Contrary:

1'. No one can distinguish between things if he does not have proper knowledge of them. But God has that kind of knowledge of creatures which distinguishes between them; for He knows that this creature is not that creature. Otherwise, He could not give each creature according to its own capacity or reward each person according to his merits by passing a just judgment upon men's actions. Therefore, God has proper knowledge of things.

2'. Nothing imperfect should be attributed to God. But that kind of knowledge by which something is known in merely a general way and not in particular is imperfect knowledge, for it lacks something. Therefore, divine knowledge of things is not merely general but also particular.

3'. God, who is most happy, would be most stupid if it were true that He does not know what we know about things. The Philosopher regards such a position as inconsistent.

REPLY:

From the fact that God ordains a thing to its end one can prove that God has proper knowledge of things; for a thing can be ordained to its proper end only through knowledge of its proper nature, according to which it has a determinate relation to that end. How this is possible we must consider as follows.

By knowing a cause, we know the effect only inasmuch as the effect follows from the cause. Therefore, if there is some universal cause whose action is not determined to any effect except through the intermediate action of some particular cause, from the knowledge of such a common cause we will not have proper knowledge of the effect but merely a general knowledge of it. For example, the action of the sun is determined to the production of this plant through the intermediate action of a germinating force which is either in the ground or in the seed. Consequently, if the sun could know itself, it would not have a proper knowledge of this plant but only a general knowledge, unless it also knew the proper causes of the plant. Therefore, in order to have proper and perfect knowledge of any effect, the knower must have

assembled in himself complete knowledge of the proper and common causes. This is also what the Philosopher says: "We are said to know a thing when we know its first causes and its first principles down to its elements," that is, down to its proximate causes, as the Commentator explains.

Now, we say that something is known to God inasmuch as He is its cause through His essence. In this way a thing is in Him and can be known by Him. Therefore, since He is the cause of all proper and common causes, through His essence He knows all proper and common causes; for there is in a thing, determining its common nature, nothing of which God is not the cause. Consequently, the reason for His knowledge of the common nature of things is the very same as the reason for His knowledge of the proper nature and proper causes of each individual thing. Dionysius gives the same explanation when he writes: "If according to one cause God gives being to all existing things, then He knows all things according to that same cause" further on: "For the cause of all, knowing itself, would be idle some where if it did not know those things that are from it and whose cause it is." Idle here means to fall short of causing something that is found in a thing; and it would follow that God would be idle in this sense were He ignorant of any of the realities that exist in a thing.

Thus, it is clear from what has been said that all the examples induced to show that God knows all things in Himself are faulty—like that of the point, which, if it could know itself, would (according to the example) know lines, and that of light, which, by knowing itself, would know colors. For not everything in a line can be reduced to a point as to its cause, nor can everything in colour be reduced to light. Consequently, if a point knew itself, it would know the line only in a general way; and light would know colour similarly. This is not the case with divine knowledge, as is clear from what has been said in the preceding article.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That statement of Boethius should be understood as referring to our intellect, not to the divine intellect, which can know singulars, as will be explained later. However, even though our intellect does not know singulars, it has proper knowledge of things by knowing them according to their distinctive specific characters. Consequently, even if the divine intellect did not know singulars, it could nevertheless have proper knowledge of things.

2. God knows all things by one principle, for that principle has the intelligible character of many. This principle is His essence, which is the likeness of all things; and since His essence is the proper intelligible character of each and every thing, He has proper knowledge of all things. How one thing can be both the proper and the common intelligible character of many things may be explained as follows.

The divine essence is the intelligible character of a thing inasmuch as that thing imitates the divine essence. No created thing, however, fully imitates the divine essence. For, if so, there would be only one such imitation, and the divine essence considered in that way would be the proper intelligible character of only one being, just as there is only one image of the Father which perfectly imitates Him, and that is the Son. However, since a created thing imperfectly imitates the divine essence, it happens that different things imitate it in different ways; yet every one of them has been produced according to a likeness of the divine essence. Thus, whatever is proper to each finds in the divine essence that which it imitates. In this respect, the divine essence is the likeness of a thing, even in regard to what is proper to it. Similarly, it is the proper intelligible character of that thing, and, for the same reason, the proper character of another thing, and also of all other things. Therefore, it is the common character of all things in so far as it is the one thing which all things imitate; but it is the proper character of this or that thing inasmuch as things imitate it in different ways. In this way the divine

essence causes proper knowledge of each and every thing, for it is the proper intelligible character of all.

3. Fire is not the cause of warm things with respect to everything found in them, as is the case with the divine essence, as we have pointed out. Hence, there is no parallel.

4. Whiteness surpasses green with respect to one of the two things that belong to the nature of colour, namely, light, which is, as it were, the formal element in the composition of colour. In this respect, whiteness is the measure of all colors. But there is something else in colors which is, as it were, their material element, namely, the determination of the transparent medium. In this respect, whiteness is not the measure of colors; and thus it is clear that everything contained in the other colors does not exist in the species of whiteness. Consequently, proper knowledge of any of the other colors cannot be had through the species of whiteness. This is not the case with the divine essence. Moreover, in the divine essence, other things exist as in their cause; but other colors do not exist in whiteness as in their cause. Hence, there is no parallel.

5. Demonstration is a type of argumentation accomplished by a discursive process of the intellect. The divine intellect, which is not discursive, does not know its effects through its essence as if by demonstration, even though it has more certain knowledge of things by means of its essence than one who demonstrates has by means of his demonstration. Besides, if anyone could comprehend God's essence, through it he would know the nature of each individual thing with greater certainty than a conclusion is known by means of demonstration. Nevertheless, it does not follow from the fact that God's essence is eternal that His effects are eternal; for His effects are not in His essence in such a way that they should always exist in themselves but merely that they should exist at some time, whenever the divine wisdom has determined.

6. God knows things in their proper nature if that restriction refers to His knowledge from the point of view of the thing known. However, if we are speaking of His knowledge on the part of the knower, then God knows things in an idea, that is, through an idea which is the likeness of all things existing in reality, both accidental and essential, although the idea itself is neither an accident nor the essence of the thing. In the same manner, our intellectual likeness of a thing is neither essential nor accidental to the thing itself, but it nevertheless is a likeness of the thing's essence or accident.

7. The divine essence is a universal medium as though it were a universal cause. The relation of a universal cause to the production of knowledge is quite different from that of a universal form. For in a universal form the effect is, as it were, in material potency, somewhat as differences are in a genus after the analogy of forms in matter, as Porphyry says. However, effects are in a cause in an active potency, just as a house exists in the mind of the architect in active potency. Now, since everything is known in so far as it is in act, and not in so far as it is in potency, the fact that the differences specifying a genus are in it potentially does not suffice for proper knowledge of a species through the generic form. But since what is proper to a thing exists in some active cause, it is sufficient to know that thing through that cause. Consequently, a house is not known by means of its wood and stones as it is known by means of the form of it which is in the architect. Since the proper conditions of each and every thing are in God as in its active cause, even though His essence is a universal medium, it can give proper knowledge of all things.

8. The divine essence is both a common and a proper medium, but not in the same respect, as has been said.

9. When it is said that "God knows distinct things indistinctly," the statement is true if indistinctly qualifies the knowing from the point of view of the knower; for will one cognition God knows all things.

This is how Dionysius understands the statement. On the other hand, if it qualifies the knowing in regard to what is known, the statement is false; for God knows the distinction of one thing from another, and also that by which one thing is distinguished from another. Therefore, He has proper knowledge of each and every thing.

ARTICLE V: DOES GOD KNOW SINGULAR THINGS?

Parallel readings De veritate, 19, 2; Summa Theol., I, 14, li; 89, 4; I Sentences 36, 1, 1; II Sentences 3,3,3; Contra Gentiles I, CC. 50, 63, 65; Q. D. De anima, aa. 5, 20; Comp. Theol., I, CC. 132 I Perihermen., lectura 14, n. i6 seq.; De subst. sep., cc. 11-12 (Perr. i: nn. 68-76).

Difficulties:

It seems that He does not, for

1. Our intellect does not know singulars because it is separated from matter. But the divine intellect is much more separated from matter than ours. Hence, it does not know singulars.

2. It was noted, however, that our intellect does not know singulars, not only because it is separated from matter, but also because it abstracts its knowledge from things.—On the contrary-, our intellect can not receive anything from things without the mediation of sense or imagination. Consequently, sense and imagination receive from singular things before our intellect does, yet singulars are known through sense and imagination. Hence, the fact that the intellect receives from things is no reason why it should not know singulars.

3. It was said, however, that from things the intellect receives a form that is entirely purified; but this is not the case will sense and imagination.—On the contrary, it is not by reason of the purifying of the form considered as a starting point that our intellect does not know singulars. Indeed, from this point of view the intellect ought to know singulars all the more, for the assimilative character of intellection comes from the fact that it has received something from reality. It remains, therefore, that what prevents knowledge of singulars is the purifying of the form considered as an end-result, which is the purity that the form has in the intellect. Now, that purity of the form is had only because of the freedom of the intellect from matter; and that is the only reason why our intellect does not know singulars, namely, because it is separated from matter. Thus, our point that God does not know singulars is proved.

4. If God knows some singulars, He should know all; for the argument for one is the same as the argument for all. But He does not know all singulars. Therefore, He knows none. The proof of the *mi* for premise is as follows: "Many things," as Augustine says, meaning despicable things, "it is better not to know than to know." But many singulars are worthless. Since everything which is better should always be attributed to God, it seems that He does not know all singulars.

. All knowledge takes place through an assimilation of the knower will what is known. But there is no assimilation between singulars and God, for singulars are changeable and material, and have many other qualities of this sort, whose complete contraries are in God. Therefore, God does not know singulars.

6. Whatever God knows, He knows perfectly. But perfect knowledge is not had of a thing unless it is known in the same way as it exists. Now, since God does not know a singular in the same way as it exists, for a singular is material, and God knows immaterially, it seems that God cannot know the singular perfectly, and consequently does not know it at all.

7. But it was said that while perfect knowledge demands that the knower know the thing just as it is, this refers only to what is known, not to the operation of the knower.—On the contrary, knowledge arises from the application of the thing known to the knower. There fore, the mode of what is known and the mode of the knower should be the same. Thus, the distinction given seems to be invalid.

8. According to the Philosopher, if one wishes to find something, he must previously have some knowledge of it. What he has through some common form is not sufficient, unless that form is contracted by something. For example, one could not well look for a slave he has lost unless he had previously had some knowledge of the slave, other will he would not recognize him even when he found him; nor would it be enough to know that the slave was a man, because this would not mark him off from others. He must, instead, have some knowledge particularized by the points that are proper to the slave. Consequently, if God is to know any singular, the common form by which He knows, His essence, must be contracted by something. But since there is nothing in Him by which it can be contracted, it seems that He does not know singulars.

9. It was said, however, that that species through which God knows is common in such a way that it nevertheless is proper to each and

every thing.—On the contrary, pro per and common are opposed to each other. Therefore, it is impossible that the same reality be both proper and a common form.

10. The operation of sight is not determined to any one colored thing because of light, which is the medium of sight; it is determined rather by the object, the colored thing itself. But in God's knowledge, His essence is the medium by which He knows things; for His essence is, as it were, a medium of knowledge, and, as Dionysius says, like a light by which all things are known. Consequently, His knowledge is in no way determined to any singular; thus, He does not know singulars.

11. Since knowledge is a quality, it is a form whose variations change the subject. But knowledge is changed as its objects are changed; for example, if I know that you are sitting, I lose that knowledge when you get up. Hence, the knower is changed when what he knows changes. But God cannot be changed in any way whatsoever. There fore, He cannot know singulars, which are subject to change.

12. No one can know a singular unless he knows that by which a singular is constituted. But that which makes a singular to be such is matter. God, however, does not know matter. Hence, He does not know singulars. The proof of the minor is as follows: There are, as Boethius and the Commentator say, certain things which are difficult for us to know because of a defect in us—for example, the very things which are most knowable in themselves, immaterial substances. On the other hand, there are other things which are not known be cause of some defect in them—for example, those that have very little existence, such as motion, time, vacuums, and the like. Now, first matter has a very limited act of existence. Hence, God does not know matter since it is of itself unknowable.

13. But it was said that although matter cannot be known by our intellect, it can be known by the divine intellect.—On the contrary, our intellect knows a thing by means of a likeness received from the thing, but the divine intellect knows it by means of a likeness that is the cause of the thing. Now, a greater conformity is needed between a thing and a likeness which

causes that thing than is needed between [that thing and] some other likeness. Therefore, since the deficiency of matter is the reason why our intellects cannot get a likeness sufficient for the knowledge of matter, much more will it be the reason why the divine intellect cannot get a likeness sufficient for the knowledge of matter.

24. According to Algazel, God knows Himself because the three things required for knowledge are found in Him: an intelligent substance separated from matter, an intelligible thing separated from matter, and the union of both. From this it follows that nothing is known unless it is separated from matter. Now, a singular as such cannot be separated from matter. Hence, it cannot be understood.

15. Knowledge is an intermediary between the knower and the object; and the more knowledge moves away from the knower, the more imperfect it is. Now, whenever knowledge is directed to something outside the knower, it rushes out, as it were, to something external. But, since divine knowledge is most perfect, it does not seem that it should be about singulars, which are outside of God.

i 6. The act of knowledge essentially depends upon the knowing power, but just as essentially upon the thing known. But it is out of place to say that an act of divine knowledge, which is God's essence, essentially depends on something outside of itself. Hence, it is inadmissible to say that He knows singulars, which are outside of Him.

17. Whatever is known is known according to the manner in which it is in the knower, as Boethius says. But things exist in God immaterially and, hence, without the concretion of matter and material conditions. Therefore, He does not know those things which depend upon matter, such as singulars.

To the Contrary:

1' We read in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:12): "But then I shall know even as I am known." Now, the Apostle who was speaking was a singular. Therefore, singulars are known by God.

2' As is clear from what was said earlier, things are known by God in so far as He is their cause. But since He is the cause of singulars, He must know them.

3' It is impossible to know the nature of an instrument without knowing the purpose for which the instrument is ordained. Now, senses are certain powers ordained as instruments to knowledge of singular things. If God did not know singulars, He would also be ignorant of the nature of the senses, and, as a consequence, of the nature of the human intellect, whose object is the forms in the imagination. This, however, is absurd.

4' God's wisdom is equal to His power. Therefore, whatever falls under His power falls under His knowledge. Now, His power extends itself to the production of singulars. Consequently, His knowledge extends itself to a knowledge of the same.

5' As was said above, God's knowledge of things is proper and

distinct. But this could not be true if He did not know the factors which distinguish one thing from another. He knows, therefore, the singular conditions of each and every thing, by which one thing is distinguished from another; consequently, He knows singulars in their singularity.

REPLY:

There have been many errors in connection with this problem. Some, as the Commentator mentions, have simply denied that God knows singulars, except, perhaps, in general. These persons will to confine the nature of the divine intellect within the limits of our own. But this error can be destroyed by the reasoning used by the Philosopher against Empedocles; for if—

as would follow from what Empedocles had said—God were ignorant of that which others knew, God would be most stupid, although He Himself is most happy and, for this reason, most will. The same thing would be true if it were asserted that God did not know the singulars which all of us know.

Therefore, others, such as Avicenna and his followers, have said that God knows every singular, but universally, as it were, in knowing all the universal causes from which a singular is produced. An astronomer, for example, knowing all the motions of the heavens and the distances between the celestial bodies, would know every eclipse that will occur even for the next hundred years, yet he would not know any one eclipse as a distinct singular so as to have evidential knowledge that it actually exists or not—which a country bumpkin has when he sees an eclipse. It is in this manner, they say, that God knows singulars: He does not, as it were, see them in their singular nature but through knowledge of universal causes. But neither can this opinion stand; for from universal causes there follow only universal forms, unless something intervenes through which these forms are individuated. But from a number of universal forms gathered together—no matter how great this number may be—no singular can be constituted, because the collection of these forms can still be understood to be in many. Therefore, if one were to know an eclipse by means of universal causes in the manner described above, he would know, not a singular, but only a universal. For a universal cause has as proportionate to it a universal effect, and a particular cause, a particular effect. Hence, there would still remain the inadmissible consequence mentioned earlier, that God should be ignorant of singulars.

Therefore, we must simply admit that God knows all singulars, not only in their universal causes, but also each in its proper and singular nature. As proof of this, note that the divine knowledge which God has of things can be compared to the knowledge of an artist, since He is the cause of all things as art is the cause of all works of art. Now, an artist knows a product of his art by means of the form which he has in himself and upon which he models his product. However, he produces his work only with respect to its form—nature has prepared the matter for the works of art. Accordingly, by means of his art, an artist knows his works only under the aspect of the form. Now, every form is of itself universal; and, consequently, by means of his art, a builder knows, indeed, house in general, but not this house or that house, unless he acquires other knowledge of it through his senses. But if the artistic form produced matter as it produces form, then by its means the artist would know his work both under the aspect of its form and under that of its matter. Consequently, since matter is the principle of individuation, he would know it not only in its universal nature but also inasmuch as it is a definite singular. Therefore, since divine art produces not only the form but also the matter, it contains not only the likeness of form but also that of matter. Consequently, God knows things in regard to both their matter and their form; and, therefore, He knows not only universals but also singulars.

But a difficulty still remains. Since everything that is in something is in it according to the manner of that in which it is, and thus the likeness of a thing can be in God only immaterially, how is it that our intellect, because it receives the forms of things in an immaterial way, does not know singulars, yet God knows them?

The reason for this will be clear if we consider the difference between the relation to the thing had by its likeness in our intellect and that had by its likeness in the divine intellect. For the likeness in our intellect is received from a thing in so far as the thing acts upon our intellect by previously acting upon our senses. Now, matter, because of the feebleness of its existence (for it is being only potentially), can not be a principle of action; hence, a thing which acts upon our soul acts only through its form; consequently, the likeness of a thing which is impressed

upon our sense and purified by several stages until it reaches the intellect is a likeness only of the form.

On the other hand, the likeness of things in the divine intellect is one which causes things; for, whether a thing has a vigorous or a feeble share in the act of being, it has this from God alone; and because each thing participates in an act of existence given by God, the likeness of each is found in Him. Consequently, the immaterial likeness in God is a likeness, not only of the form, but also of the matter. Now, in order that a thing be known, its likeness must be in the knower, though it need not be in him in the same manner as it is in reality. Hence, our intellect does not know singulars, because the knowledge of these depends upon matter, and the likeness of matter is not in our intellect. It is not because a likeness of the singular is in our intellect in an immaterial way. The divine intellect, however, can know singulars, since it possesses a likeness of matter, although in an immaterial way.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Besides being separated from matter, our intellect receives its knowledge from things. Consequently, because it does not receive forms materially and, because matter can have no likeness, our intellect does not know singulars. The case is otherwise with the divine intellect, as has been said.
- 2.** Sense and imagination are powers attached to bodily organs. Consequently, likenesses of things are received in them in a material manner, that is, with material conditions, although without matter. For this reason, they know singulars. The case is otherwise with the intellect. Hence, the argument does not follow.
- 3.** Because of the terminus of the purifying process, it happens that the form is received immaterially; but this alone does not explain why the singular is not known. It is rather because of the very beginning of this process that the likeness of matter is not received into the intellect, but only that of the form. Hence, the argument does not follow.
- 4.** All knowledge, taken in itself, belongs to the class of good things; but it may happen accidentally that the knowledge of certain despicable things is bad, either because it is the occasion of some base action (and for this reason certain knowledge is forbidden) or because some individual might be kept from better things because of certain knowledge; consequently, what is good in itself may harm certain people. This, however, cannot happen to God.
- 5.** For knowledge a likeness of conformity in nature is not required, but only a representative likeness. For example, we are reminded of a certain man merely by a golden statue of him. This argument, however, proceeds on the assumption that knowledge requires a likeness consisting in conformity in nature.
- 6.** The perfection of knowledge consists in knowing the thing to be as it is, not in having the same mode of existence as the thing known in the knower—as we have said repeatedly above.
- 7.** That application of the known to the knower, which causes knowledge, should not be understood by way of identity but rather by way of representation. Therefore, it is not necessary that the mode of the knower and of what is known be the same.
- 8.** That argument would hold if the likeness by which God knows were common in such a way that it could not be proper to each individual thing. That the contrary is true we have shown earlier.
- 9.** The same thing in the same aspect cannot be both common and proper. But how the divine essence, through which God knows all things, is a common likeness of all, yet a proper likeness of each, has been explained above.

10. There are two mediums for physical sight. First, there is the medium under which it knows. This is light, which does not determine sight to any particular object. Second, there is the medium by which it knows, namely, the likeness of the thing known. By this medium, sight is determined to a special object. In divine knowledge, however, the divine essence takes the place of both. Hence, it can cause proper knowledge of individual things.

11. Divine knowledge is in no way changed by a change in the objects of its knowledge. Our knowledge varies when the objects change because it knows will separate conceptions things present, past, and future. Consequently, when Socrates is not sitting, the cognition had of him when he was sitting becomes false. God, however, sees things as present, past, or future in a single intuition. Therefore, no matter how a thing may change, the truth in His intellect remains the same.

12. Those things which possess a defective act of existence fall short of knowability for our intellect for the very reason that they fail short of the ability to act. But this does not affect the divine intellect, which, as we have said, does not receive its knowledge from things.

13. In the divine intellect, which is the cause of matter, there can exist a likeness of matter which, as it were, leaves its impression upon the matter. In our intellect, however, a likeness cannot exist that is capable of making us know matter. This is clear from what has been said.'

14. Although a singular as such cannot be separated from matter, it can be known by means of a likeness separated from matter, namely, the likeness of matter itself. Consequently, even if it be separated from matter physically, it is not separated from matter representatively.

15. An act of divine knowledge is not something other than God's essence, for in God intellect and intellectual operation are one and the same, because His action is His essence. His knowledge, therefore, cannot be said to pass outside of Him simply because He knows some

thing other than Himself. Moreover, no action of a cognitive power can be said to pass outside in the way in which acts of physical powers do, which go from the agent into the patient. For knowledge does not mean something flowing from the knower to a thing known, as happens in physical actions. It means, rather, the existence of the thing known in the knower.

16. An act of divine knowledge has no dependence upon the thing known; for the relation implied in divine knowledge does not involve dependence of the knowledge upon the things known, but, rather, the dependence of the thing known upon the knowledge. The opposite is true of us, for the relation implied by the word knowledge when used of us is one that indicates a dependence of our knowledge upon its object. Moreover, the relation of an act of knowledge to its object is not the same as its relation to the power of knowing; for it is supported in its act of existence by the knowing power, not by its object, because the act is in the power but not in the object.

17. A thing is known because it is represented in the knower, not because it exists in him; for the likeness existing in a knowing power is a principle by which a thing is known, not under the aspect of the act of being it has in the knowing power, but under the aspect of the relation it has to the thing known. Consequently, a thing is not known according to the mode of existence which the likeness of the thing has in the knower, but rather according to the manner in which the likeness existing in the intellect represents the thing. Therefore, although the likeness in the divine intellect has an immaterial act of existence, nevertheless, since it is a likeness of matter, it is also a principle of knowing material things and, therefore, singulars.

ARTICLE VI: DOES THE HUMAN INTELLECT KNOW SINGULARS?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 86, 1; II Sentences 3, 3, 3, ad 1; IV Sentences 50, 1, 3; Contra Gentiles 1,65; III De anima, lectura 8, n. 710 seq.; Q. D. De anima, aa. 5, 20; Quodibet VII, I, 3 Quodibet XII, 8, li; De prin. individ. (Perr. i:nn. I-4).

Difficulties:

It seems that it does, for

- 1.** The human intellect knows by abstracting the form from matter. Now, the abstraction of a form from matter does not destroy its particularity, for mathematics, which abstracts from matter, considers particular lines. Consequently, the fact that our intellect is immaterial does not prevent it from knowing singulars.
- 2.** Singulars are not distinct according to their participation in a common nature, for the fact that many men participate in the species of man makes them one man. Therefore, if our intellect knows only universals, it does not know one singular as distinct from another. Consequently, our intellect would not direct us to those objects of operations in regard to which we are guided by choice; for choice presupposes the distinction of one thing from another.
- 3.** But it was said that our intellect knows singulars inasmuch as it applies the universal form to some particulars.—On the contrary, our intellect cannot apply one thing to another unless it already knows each. Consequently, knowledge of the singular precedes the application of the universal to the singular. Therefore, the above-mentioned application cannot be the reason why our intellect knows the singular.
- 4.** According to Boethius, whatever a lower power can do a higher power can do. Now, as he says in the same place, the intellect is superior to imagination and the imagination is superior to sense. Therefore, since sense knows the singular, our intellect should also know it.

To the Contrary:

Boethius says: "What is sensed is singular, what is understood is universal."

REPLY:

All action is determined by the condition of the form of the agent, the principle of action, just as the process of heating is measured by the amount of heat. Now, the likeness of the thing known, by which the knowing power is informed, is the principle of actual knowledge, just as heat is of heating. Hence, all cognition is necessarily determined by the limitations of the form in the knower. Consequently, since the likeness of a thing existing in our intellect is received as separated from matter and all the conditions of matter, which are the principles of individuation, it follows that our intellect, of itself, does not know singulars but only universals. For every form as such is universal, unless it happens to be a subsistent form, which, from the very fact of its being subsistent, is incommunicable.

It happens, however, that our intellect knows the singular indirectly. For, as the Philosopher says, phantasms are related to our intellect as sensible objects are related to sense and as colors outside the soul are related to sight. Therefore, just as the species in the sense is abstracted from things themselves and by its means the cognition of the sense is extended to the sensible things themselves, so also our intellect abstracts the species from the phantasms, and, by means of this species, its cognition is extended, in a certain sense, to the phantasms.

There is, however, this difference: The likeness in sense is abstracted from the thing as from an object of knowledge, and, consequently, the thing itself is directly known by means of this likeness. The likeness in the intellect, however, is not abstracted from the phantasm as from an object of knowledge but as from a medium of knowledge after the manner in which our sense receives the likeness of a thing which is in a mirror; it is directed to it not as to a thing but rather as to a likeness of a thing. Consequently, from the species which it receives, our intellect is not applied directly to knowing the phantasm but rather the thing whose phantasm is presented. Nevertheless, by a certain reflection our intellect also returns to a knowledge of the phantasm itself when it considers the nature of its act, the nature of the species by which it knows, and, finally, the nature of that from which it has abstracted the species, namely, the phantasm. It is like the case of sight, which is brought through a likeness received from a mirror directly to a knowledge of the thing reflected, but by a sort of reflection to the image itself in the mirror. Therefore, inasmuch as our intellect, through the likeness which it receives from the phantasm, turns back upon the phantasm from which it abstracts the species, the phantasm being a particular likeness, our intellect gets some kind of knowledge of the singular because of its dynamic union with the imagination.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. There are two kinds of matter from which abstraction is made: intelligible matter and sensible matter—as is clear from the *Meta physics*. I call that matter intelligible which is considered in the nature of a continuum, and sensible, that which is physical matter. Each, however, can be taken in two ways: as designated and as not designated. I call matter designated if it is considered together with the determination of its dimensions, that is, with these or those dimensions. I call it not designated, however, if it is considered without the determination of its dimensions. In this connection, it must be noted that designated matter is the principle of individuation, from which every intellect abstracts inasmuch as it is said to abstract from the here and now. The intellect of the natural philosopher, however, does not abstract from non-designated sensible matter; for it considers man, flesh, and bone, in whose definitions non-designated sensible matter is included. The intellect of the mathematician, however, abstracts entirely from sensible matter, though not from non-designated intelligible matter. Hence, it is clear that abstraction, which is common to all intellects, makes a form universal.
2. According to the Philosopher, in us the intellect is not the only motive principle. The imagination is also such, and, by its means, the universal knowledge of the intellect is applied to some particular thing to be done. For this reason, the intellect is, as it were, a remote mover; but particular reason and the imagination are proximate movers.
3. Man has prior knowledge of singulars through imagination and sense. Consequently, he can apply his universal intellectual knowledge to a particular; for, properly speaking, it is neither the intellect nor the sense that knows, but man that knows through both—as is clear from *The Soul*.
4. What a lower power can do a higher power can do; not in the same, but in a more noble, way. Consequently, the intellect knows the same thing that sense knows, but in a more noble, because a more immaterial, way. Hence, it does not follow that the intellect knows the singular if the senses know it.

ARTICLE VII: DOES GOD KNOW THE SINGULAR As Now EXISTING OR NOT EXISTING?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, II Sentences 38, 3; 41, 5; *Contra Gentiles* I, cc. 58-59.

This inquiry is occasioned by the position of Avicenna mentioned above. We will to inquire whether God knows propositions, especially about singulars.

Difficulties:

It seems that He does not, for

1. The divine intellect always remains in the same state; but a singular, inasmuch as now it exists and now it does not exist, has different states. Consequently, the divine intellect does not know whether or not a singular now exists.
2. Those powers of the soul which are indifferent to a thing's presence or absence—as, for example, the imagination—do not know whether or not a thing exists; this is known only by those powers, such as sense, which do not know absent things as though they were present. Now, the divine intellect is disposed in the same way to things present or absent. Consequently, it does not know whether things exist now or not; it knows merely their natures.
3. According to the Philosopher, the composition signified when a thing is said to be or not to be is not in things but only in the intellect. Now, there can be no composition in the divine intellect. Therefore, God does not know whether or not a thing exists.
4. In the Gospel according to St. John (1:3-4) we read: "What was made, in Him was life." Now, in his explanation of this passage, Augustine says that created things are in God in the way in which a trunk is in the mind of the one who makes it. By means of the mental likeness of the trunk, however, a carpenter does not know whether the trunk exists or not. Consequently, neither does God know whether or not a singular now exists.
5. The more noble knowledge is, the more it resembles God's knowledge. But the knowledge of an intellect comprehending the definitions of things is more noble than sense knowledge; for, when the intellect defines, it penetrates to the interior of a thing, but sense deals with externals. When the intellect defines, however, it does not know whether a thing exists or not, but simply the nature of the thing. Sense, however, does have such knowledge. It seems, therefore, that that type of knowledge by which only the nature of a thing is known, but not whether a thing exists or not, should be attributed to God.
6. God knows each and every thing by means of the idea He has of it. Now, that idea is indifferent to the existence or the non-existence of the thing. Otherwise, God could not know the future by means of it. God, therefore, does not know whether or not a thing exists.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. The more perfect knowledge is, the more conditions it grasps in its object. Now, divine knowledge is most perfect; consequently, it knows a thing according to all its conditions. Therefore, God knows whether or not a thing exists.
- 2'. As we have said above, God has a proper and distinct knowledge of things. Now, He would not know things distinctly unless He could distinguish an existing thing from one which does not exist. Therefore, He knows if a thing does or does not exist.

REPLY:

The relation of the universal essence of any species to the essential properties of that species is the same as that of a singular essence to all the proper accidents of that singular, that is, all the accidents found in the singular; for, in so far as they are individuated by the singular, they are made proper to it. Now, by knowing the essence of a species, the intellect comprehends all the essential properties of that species; for, as the Philosopher says, the definition is the principle of any demonstration that concludes to the proper accidents of a subject. Therefore, once the proper essence of any singular were known, all the accidents of that singular would also be known. Our intellect, however, cannot know the essence of a singular, because it abstracts from designated matter, which pertains to the essence of a singular and would be placed in its definition if the singular had one. The divine intellect, however, can comprehend not only the universal essence of a species, but, since it can apprehend matter, it can also comprehend the singular essence of each and every thing. Therefore, it knows all accidents, those common to the entire species or genus, as well as those proper to each individual. Among these latter is time, in which every concrete reality is found and according to which a thing is said to exist now or not. Consequently, God knows whether or not each and every thing exists; and He knows all other propositions that can be formed about universals or individuals.

In this respect, however, the divine intellect differs from ours. In order to know a subject and an accident and to know different accidents, our intellect forms separate concepts, and, consequently, passes from knowledge of a substance to knowledge of one of its accidents. Again, in order to know the inherence of one of its accidents, it joins one species with the other, and, in a certain manner, unites them. In this way, the intellect forms propositions in itself. But by one reality, namely, its own essence, the divine intellect knows all substances and all accidents. Consequently, it neither passes from substance to accident nor joins one with the other; but instead of the joining of species which takes place in our intellect, there is, in the divine intellect, complete unity; because of this, God, without complexity, knows what is complex, just as He knows many things simply and will unity, and material things immaterially.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. By means of one and the same reality, the divine intellect knows all the conditions in a thing that are subject to change; so, while remaining in one and the same state, it knows all the states of things, no matter how they change.
2. The likeness in the imagination is a likeness merely of the thing; it is not a likeness by which one can know the time in which a thing exists. This limitation is not found in the divine intellect, so the cases are not parallel.
3. In place of the composition found in our intellect, there is, instead, a unity in the divine intellect. This composition, however, is a kind of imitation of unity, and for this reason it is said to be a union. Thus, it is clear that God knows enunciable truths by not composing more truly than an intellect that does compose and divide.
4. The trunk in the mind of its maker is not a likeness of everything which can belong to it. Consequently, a craftsman's knowledge and God's are not similar.
5. He who knows a definition knows potentially the truths demonstrable by the definition. But in the divine intellect, actually to be does not differ from to be able to be. Consequently, from the fact that it knows the essences of things, it immediately comprehends all the accidents that follow upon them.

6. That idea in the divine mind is related to a thing in the same way, no matter what its condition is, for it is a likeness of the thing according to all its states. Consequently, through it the divine mind knows that thing in any condition whatever.

ARTICLE VIII: DOES GOD KNOW NON-BEINGS AND THINGS WHICH ARE NOT, HAVE NOT BEEN, AND WILL NOT BE?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 14, I Sentences 38, III Sentences 14, 2, sol. 2; Contra Gentiles I, 66.

Difficulties:

It seems that He does not have such knowledge, for

1. Dionysius says that cognition is had only of existing things. But that which neither is nor will be nor has been does not exist in any way. Hence, God cannot have knowledge of such a thing.
2. All cognition takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the thing known. But the divine intellect cannot be assimilated to a non-being. Hence, it cannot know a non-being.
3. God's knowledge of things is through ideas. But there is no idea of a non-being. Hence, God does not know a non-being.
4. Whatever God knows is in His Word. But, as Anselm says: "There is no word for that which neither is, was, nor will be." Hence, God does not know non-beings.
5. God knows only the true. But the true and being are interchangeable. Hence, God does not know things that do not exist.

To the Contrary:

According to the Epistle to the Romans (4:17): "He calls things that are not as though they were." But God would not call non beings unless He knew them. Therefore, He knows non-beings.

REPLY:

God's knowledge of created things may be compared to that which an artist has of his artistic products and which is their cause. Hence, the relation of God's knowledge to things known is the opposite of the relation of our knowledge to them. Our knowledge is received from things, and, by its nature, comes after them. But the Creator's knowledge of creatures, and the artist's of his products, by its very nature, precedes the things known. Now, when what is antecedent is removed, what is subsequent is likewise removed; but the opposite is not true. Hence, our knowledge of natural things cannot be had unless these things previously exist; but the actual existence or non-existence of a thing is a matter of indifference to the intellect of God or that of an artist.

We must remark, however, that an artist has two kinds of knowledge about something that can be made: speculative and practical. He has speculative or theoretical knowledge when he knows the intimate nature of a work but does not have the intention of applying the principles to the production of the work. His knowledge is practical, properly speaking, when by his intention he ordains the principles of the work to operation as an end. In this way, as Avicenna says, medicine is divided into theoretical and practical.

It is clear that the practical knowledge of an artist follows his speculative knowledge, since it is made practical by applying the speculative to a work. But when the practical is absent, the speculative remains. Evidently, then, an artist can have knowledge of some work which he sometimes sets about making and sometimes does not, as when he thinks up the form of some piece of handicraft which he does not intend to make. Moreover, the artist does not always regard this work which he does not take steps to make as something within his power; for sometimes he visualizes a type of device entirely beyond his power of making. He regards it rather in the light of his own purposes, that is, he sees that he could attain such and such an end by means of such and such a device. For, as the Philosopher says, in the order of things to be done, ends are as principles are in the order of things to be studied; hence, as conclusions are known in their principles, products of art are known in the light of their purposes.

It is clear, therefore, that God *eau* know some non-beings of some He has, as it were, practical knowledge—that is, of those which are, have been, or will be; and these come forth from His knowledge as He decides. of those which neither have been, are, nor will be—which He has decreed never to make—He has a kind of speculative knowledge. And although one can say that He sees these things as within His power, since there is nothing He cannot do, it is more appropriate to say that He sees them in His goodness, the end of all that is made by Him; for He sees that there are many other ways of communicating His goodness, besides those He has already communicated to existing things, having existence, past, present, or future, because all created things cannot equal His goodness, no matter how much they seem to participate in it.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Things which neither have been, are, nor will be, exist in some way in God's power as in an active principle, or in His goodness as in a final cause.
- 2.** Knowledge received from things known consists in a passive assimilation by which the knower is assimilated to objects of knowledge previously existing. But knowledge which is the cause of things known consists in an active assimilation by which the knower assimilates the thing known to himself. Since God can assimilate to Himself that Which has not yet been assimilated to Him, He can also have knowledge of non-being.
- 3.** If, according to common usage, *idea* is taken as meaning the form of practical knowledge, then there is an *idea* only of those things which have been, are, or will be. If it be taken as also meaning the form of speculative knowledge, then there *eau* also be an *idea* of other things those things which neither are, have been, for will be.
- 4.** The Word designates the operative power of the Father by which all His operations take place. Hence, the Word is extended only to those things to which the divine operation is extended. Consequently, we read in the Psalms (32:9): "He spoke and they were made." For, although the Word knows other beings, it is not the word of other beings.
- 5.** Things which neither have been, are, nor will be possess truth in so far as they possess existence, namely, in so far as they are in their active principle or final cause. As such, they are also known by God.

ARTICLE IX: DOES GOD KNOW INFINITES?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 20,4, ad I; Summa Theol., I, 14, 12; III, 10, I Sentences 1, 2; Contra Gentiles 1,69; Quolibet III, 2, 3; Comp. Theol., I, C. 133.

Difficulties:

It seems that He does not, for

1. Augustine says: "Whatever is known is made finite by the comprehension of the knower." But the infinite cannot be made finite. Therefore, the infinite is unknown to God.
2. But it was said that God knows infinite things by His knowledge of simple intelligence, not by His knowledge of vision.—On the contrary, all perfect knowledge comprehends and consequently limits that which it knows. But God's knowledge of simple intelligence is as perfect as His knowledge of vision; so, just as He does not know infinities by His knowledge of vision, neither does He know them by His knowledge of simple intelligence.
3. Whatever God knows He knows through His intellect. But intellectual cognition is called vision. Therefore, whatever He knows He knows by His knowledge of vision. But through His knowledge of vision He does not know infinities. Hence, He does not know in finities in any manner.
4. The natures of all the things known by God are in God, and are in Him actually. If, therefore, infinities were known by God, infinite natures would be in Him actually; but this is impossible.
5. Whatever God knows He knows perfectly. But nothing is known perfectly unless the knowledge of the knower penetrates to the heart of the thing. Therefore, whatever God knows, in some sense He passes through. But an infinite cannot in any way be passed through either by a finite or by an infinite being. Therefore, God does not know in finities in any way whatsoever.
6. Whoever sees something limits that thing by the very fact that he can see it. But whatever God knows He sees. Therefore, what is infinite cannot be known by Him.
7. If God knows infinite things, then His knowledge is infinite. But this cannot be, for whatever is infinite is imperfect, as is proved in the Physics. Consequently, God does not know infinite things.
8. Whatever is repugnant to the definition of an infinite can by no means be attributed to an infinite. But to be known is repugnant to the definition of an infinite; for "it is characteristic of an infinite," as is said in the Physics, "that whatever quantity one takes from it, there always remains more to be taken." However, that which is known must be taken or received by the knower; and a thing is not known fully if something of it remains beyond the knower. Consequently, it is clearly repugnant to the definition of an infinite that it be fully known by someone. Therefore, since whatever God knows He knows fully, He does not know infinite things.
9. God's knowledge is the measure of the thing He knows. But there cannot be any measure for an infinite. Hence, an infinite does not come within His knowledge.
10. Measuring is simply ascertaining the quantity of what is measured. Therefore, if God knew an infinite, and thus knew its quantity, He would measure it. But this is impossible, because an infinite, by its very nature, is immeasurable. Hence, God does not know an infinite.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. As Augustine says: "Although there is no number for an infinite number, yet an infinite is not incomprehensible to Him whose knowledge has no number."
- 2'. Since God makes nothing that is unknown to Him, He can know whatever He can make. But, since He can make infinite things, He can know them.

3'. In order to understand something, immateriality is required in the one who understands, in the thing understood, and in the conjunction of the two. But, since the divine intellect is infinitely more immaterial than any created intellect, it is infinitely more capable of understanding. Now, a created intellect can know what is potentially infinite. Therefore, the divine intellect can know what is actually in finite.

4'. God knows whatever is, will be, or has been. But, if the duration of the world were infinite, then generation would never end, and there would be an infinite number of singular things. This, moreover, would be possible for God. Therefore, it is not impossible for Him to know infinities.

5'. As the Commentator says, "all proportions and forms which are potentially in first matter exist actually in the first mover." Augustine agrees when he says that there are seminal principles of things in first matter, but that the causal principles are in God. Now, in first matter there are, potentially, an infinite number of forms, because its passive potency is infinite. Therefore, in God, the first mover, there are actual infinities. But God knows whatever is in Him actually. Hence, God knows infinities.

6'. In arguing against the Academics, who denied that anything was true, Augustine shows that there is not merely a multitude of true things but even an infinite multitude of them, resulting from a kind of intellectual reduplication or from the reduplication of a sentence. For example, if I tell the truth, it is true that I tell the truth, and it is true that I say that I tell the truth, and so on to infinity. But God knows all true things. Hence, He knows infinities.

7'. Whatever is in God is God. Therefore, God's knowledge is God Himself. But God is infinite, because He cannot be comprehended. Therefore, His knowledge is infinite, and He has knowledge of infinities.

REPLY:

As Augustine says, some, wishing to conceive of the divine intellect in terms of our own intellects, have said that God cannot know infinities, just as we cannot know them; and since they asserted both that God knows singulars and that the world is eternal, it followed that there would be a cycle of numerically the same things in different ages—an opinion which is utterly absurd.

It must accordingly be said that God knows infinities, as can be shown from the reasons given above. For, since He knows not only things which have been, are, or will be, but also all those which could participate in His goodness—and the number of these is infinite since His goodness is infinite—it follows that He knows infinities. How this takes place must now be considered.

Note, therefore, that cognition extends itself to many or to few things according to the force of the means of knowing. For example, a likeness received in the sense of sight has the same determinations as the particular conditions of the thing. Hence, it leads us to the knowledge of only one thing. But a likeness received in the intellect is freed from particular conditions; and since it is more elevated, it leads us to the knowledge of a number of things. Indeed, because one universal form, by its very nature, is such that it can be participated in by an infinite number of singulars, the intellect can in some way be said to know infinities. However, since that intellectual likeness does not lead to knowledge of a singular according to its distinctive features but only under the aspect of a common nature, our intellect, through the species which it has within it, knows infinities only potentially. But the medium by which God knows, namely, His own essence, is a likeness of the infinities capable of imitating that essence. It is a likeness not only of that which is common to them, but also of those features by which they

are distinguished from one another, as is clear from what was said earlier. Hence, the divine cognition has the power to know infinities.

The manner in which God knows actual infinities must now be considered. There is no reason why something cannot be infinite in one respect and finite in another. For example, a body can be infinite in length but finite in width. The same can be true of forms. For example, let us suppose some infinite body that is white. The extensive quantity of the whiteness (in so far as whiteness can be said to have quantity accidentally) will be infinite; but its intensive or essential quantity will nevertheless be finite. The same is true of any other form of an infinite body; for every form received in matter is limited according to the nature of the recipient and so does not have infinite intensity. It is possible neither to know nor to traverse an infinite. Both are repugnant to the idea of infinite. Nevertheless, if something were to be moved across an infinite, not in the direction of its infinity, it could be traversed. For example, what is infinite in length but finite in width could be traversed across its width but not along its length. Similarly, if an infinite were known in the respect in which it is infinite, it could by no means be known perfectly; but, if it were known in a respect which is not that of the infinite, it could be perfectly known. For, since "the character of infinity fits quantity," as the Philosopher says, and quantity of its very nature has an order of parts, an infinite would be known by way of its infinity if it were known part by part.

If our intellect had to know a white body in this manner, it would never be able to know either it or its whiteness perfectly. If, however, it knew the nature of whiteness or of corporeity which is found in an infinite body, then it would know the infinite perfectly with respect to all its parts not, however, according to its infinity. Thus it is possible for our intellect in some manner to know an infinite continuum perfectly; but it cannot know an infinite number of things taken one by one, since it cannot know many things by means of one species. Hence, if our intellect has to consider a number of things, it has to know them one after another. Consequently, it knows discontinuous quantity only through continuous quantity. Therefore, if it were to know a multitude that is actually infinite, our intellect would be knowing an infinite according to its infinity, but that is impossible.

The divine intellect, however, knows all things through one species. Hence, simultaneously and with one intuition, God has knowledge of all things. Consequently, He does not know a multitude according to the order of its parts, and He can know an infinite multitude, but not according to its infinity; for, if He were to know it according to its infinity so that He would be grasping part after part of the multitude, He would never come to its end and never know it perfectly. I simply concede, therefore, that God actually knows infinities absolutely. These infinities, however, are not equal to His intellect in the way in which He Himself as known equals His intellect; for the essences of created infinities are, as it were, intensively finite as whiteness is in an infinite body. God's essence, however, is infinite in all respects; and because of this all infinities are finite to Him and can be comprehended by Him.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. A thing is said to be made finite by a knower in the sense that it is known to such an extent that it does not exceed the intellect of the knower; in other words, some part of it does not remain outside the knower's intellect. In this way, the thing known stands as something finite to the intellect. There is no reason why this cannot happen to an infinite which is known in a way other than according to its infinity.

2. Knowledge of simple intelligence and that of vision imply no difference on the part of the knower but only on the part of the things known. Knowledge of vision is said to be in God because of its resemblance to bodily sight which looks upon things outside of itself. Hence, God is said to know by His knowledge of vision only those things that are outside of Him, whether they are present, past, or future. But, as was proved above, God knows by His

knowledge of simple intelligence things that neither are, will be, for ever have been. There is no other way by which God knows these and those things.

Hence, the fact that God does not see infinities is not due to His knowledge of vision but rather to the non-existence of the things that would be the objects of His knowledge of vision. For if it were held that these were infinite, either actually or successively, no doubt God would know them by His knowledge of vision.

3. Properly speaking, sight is a bodily sense. Hence, if the word vision is transferred to immaterial cognition, its use will be merely metaphorical. In metaphors, however, there is a different basis of truth according to the different points of likeness found in things. Hence, nothing prevents our sometimes calling all divine knowledge vision and at other times reserving the name to that which is about things present, past, and future.

4. By His essence God Himself is a likeness of all things and a proper likeness of each one of them. Hence, there cannot be said to be many intelligible characters of things in God except in regard to His various relations to various creatures. These relations, however, are merely rational relations. Moreover, as Avicenna says, there is no reason why rational relations cannot be multiplied to infinity.

5. Passing through implies a motion from one thing to another. Since God knows all the parts of an infinite, continuous or discontinuous, not by a progression of His thought, but in one simple intuition, He therefore knows an infinite perfectly. He does not, however, pass through an infinite in understanding it.

6. See the reply to the first difficulty.

7. This argument is based on what is infinite in a privative sense—a type of infinity peculiar to quantity. Whatever is spoken of privatively is imperfect. The argument does not touch what is infinite in the negative sense in which God is said to be infinite. It is more perfect for a thing not to be limited at all.

8. The argument proves that an infinite cannot be known according to its infinity; for whatever part of its infinity you take, no matter how big it is, something further will always remain to be taken. God, however, does not know an infinite by passing from part to part.

9. That which is infinite in quantity has a finite act of existence, as has been said. Accordingly, God's knowledge can be the measure of an infinite.

10. The nature of measuring consists in this, that from it certainty results about the determinate quantity of a thing. God, however, does not know an infinite in such a way that He knows its determinate quantity, for an infinite does not have determinate quantity. Hence, it is not repugnant to the nature of an infinite that God should know it.

ARTICLE X: CAN GOD MAKE INFINITES?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 25, 2, ad I Sentences 43, I, 3; Contra Gentiles I, 3; De potentia I, 2; Viii Phys., lectura 23, fl. 9; III Phys., lectura 8, n. 9; XII Metaph., lectura 8, 1111. 2549-50; Comp. Theol., I, C. 19.

Difficulties:

It seems that He can, for

1. Natures existing in the divine mind are productive of things, and one does not impede another by its action. Since there are infinite natures in the divine mind, infinite effects could follow from them were the divine power to carry them into execution.

2. The power of the Creator infinitely surpasses that of a creature. But a creature can produce infinities successively. Therefore, God can produce infinities simultaneously.

3. A power is useless if it is not put into act; it is especially useless if it cannot be put into act. But God's power extends to infinities. Hence, such a power would be useless if He could not actually make infinities.

Difficulties to the Contrary:

1'. Seneca's opinion is to the contrary: "An idea is an exemplar of things coming into being naturally." But, since there cannot be in finite things naturally, it would seem that they cannot come to be; for what cannot be cannot come to be. Therefore, there will be no idea of infinities in God. But God cannot make anything except through an idea. Therefore, He cannot make infinities.

2'. When God is said to create a thing, nothing new on the part of the Creator is affirmed but only on the part of the creature. Hence, it seems the same to say that God creates things as to say that things come forth into being from God. For the same reason, therefore, to say that God can create things is to say that things are able to come forth from God into being. But infinite things cannot come to be, for no creature has the capacity for infinite act. Hence, even God cannot make actual infinities.

REPLY:

The infinite can be distinguished in two ways. In one way, it is distinguished by means of potency and act. A potential infinite is that which consists in an endless succession. For example, we find potential infinity in generation, in time, and in the division of a continuum; for, when one member is given, another always follows. An example of an actual infinite, however, would be a line which we would assume to have no termini.

In the second way, an essential infinite is distinguished from an accidental infinite. This distinction is explained as follows: "The character of the infinite," as mentioned above, "belongs to quantity." Now, quantity is predicated first of all of discrete quantity rather than of continuous quantity. Hence, in order to see what is infinite essentially and what is infinite accidentally, we must consider that a multitude is sometimes required essentially and sometimes merely accidentally. Essentially a multitude is required in ordered causes and effects where one has an essential dependence upon another. For example, the soul sets in motion the natural heat by which nerves and muscles are moved, which, in turn, move the hands, which move a stick by which a stone is moved. In this series, each of the later members essentially depends upon every one that precedes. But an accidental multitude is found when all the members of the multitude are posited, as it were, in place of one; and their mutual relation is such that it is a matter of indifference whether they be one or many, or more or fewer. For example, if a builder makes a house in whose construction he wears out many saws successively, a multitude of saws is required for the erection of the house only accidentally, that is, because one saw cannot last forever. It does not matter to the house how many saws are used; hence, one saw does not have that dependence upon another which we find when a multitude is required essentially.

There are many different opinions about the infinite. Some ancient philosophers posited actual infinities, both essential and accidental, thinking that an infinite would necessarily be a result of what they posited as a beginning. For this reason, they also posited an infinite process of causes. The Philosopher refutes this position, however.

Others, following Aristotle, conceded that an essential infinite can not be found either in act or in potency, because it is impossible for a thing to depend essentially upon an infinite

number of things; for, if this were true, then its own act of existence would never be formally constituted. But they posited an accidental infinite, both in potency and in act. Algazel holds: "There are an infinite number of human souls separated from bodies" which he thought followed from his view that the world is eternal. He saw no difficulty since they have no mutual dependence, and so in their multiplicity they constituted merely an accidental infinity.

Others asserted that there cannot be an actual infinite, either essential or accidental. They admitted a potential infinite, which, as is taught in the Physics, consists in succession; and this is the position of the Commentator. But for either of two reasons it can happen that an actual infinite cannot exist: either because to be in act is contradictory to the infinite by the very fact that it is infinite; or because of some extrinsic reason—as being lifted up is repugnant to a lead triangle, not because it is a triangle, but because it is lead.

But if an actual infinite is not contradictory to the infinite as such and can exist, as I hold, or if it cannot exist merely because of some impediment extrinsic to the notion of an infinite, then I say that God can make an actual infinite. If, however, actual existence is repugnant to the very notion of an infinite, then God cannot make one, just as, for example, He cannot make a man be an irrational animal. This would mean that two contradictories would coincide in one act of existence. However, whether or not it is intrinsically repugnant for an actual infinite to exist must be discussed elsewhere, since this question arose only incidentally. Answers, however, must be given to the difficulties on both sides.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Natures in the divine mind are not reproduced in a creature the way in which they are in God, but in the way which the nature of a creature allows. Hence, although they themselves are immaterial, from them are brought forth things with a material act of existence. If, therefore, as the Philosopher says, it is of the essence of an infinite to exist, not actually and simultaneously, but merely successively, then the infinite natures in the divine mind cannot all be produced in creatures simultaneously but only successively. So, it does not follow that there are actual infinities.

2. The power of a creature is said to be wanting in two ways. First, it can be wanting because of a lack of strength. In this respect, it is correct to argue that what a creature cannot do God can do. Second, it can be wanting because that which is said to be impossible for a creature to do contains in itself some intrinsic repugnance. In this respect, it is possible neither for a creature nor for God—as, for instance, that contradictories should exist simultaneously, and that an infinite actually exist falls into this class, if to exist actually is repugnant to the nature of an infinite.

3. As is said in the Physics, a being is useless if it does not attain the end for which it exists. Hence, a power is not said to be had in vain simply because it is not put into act, but only because its effect or the very act, being distinct from the power itself, is the end for which the power exists. However, no effect of the divine power is its end, nor is its act distinct from it. Hence, the argument does not follow.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. Although the members of infinities may not naturally be able to exist simultaneously, they may, however, come into being. For the essence of an infinite does not consist in simultaneous existence; but it is like things which are in a state of becoming, such as a day or a contest, as is said in the Physics. Nor does it follow that God is able to make only things which come into being naturally. It is true that according to the meaning given previously an idea was taken as applying to practical knowledge, which is an idea for this reason that it is

determined by the divine will to an act. However, by His will God is able to make many things other than those which He has determined to exist now, in the past, or in the future.

2'. Although in creation there is nothing new except in reference to the creature, the word creation implies not only this newness but also something on the part of God; for it signifies a divine action, which is His essence, and connotes an effect in a creature, which is the reception of being from God. So, it does not follow that it is the same to say that God can create something as to say that something can be created by Him. Otherwise, before there was a creature, nothing could be created unless the potency of a creature first existed. This would be positing eternal matter. Therefore, although the potency of a creature does not extend to the existence of actual infinities, this does not exclude ability on the part of God to make actual infinities.

ARTICLE XI: IS KNOWLEDGE PREDICATED OF GOD AND MEN PURELY EQUIVOCALLY?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 13,5; 14, 1; I Sentences prol., a. 2, ad 2; 1,2,3; 19, 5,2, ad I; 35, I, nn. I, 4; Contra Gentiles I, CC. 32-34, <; X Metaph., lectura 8, n. 2541 seq.; De div. nom., 1,lectura (P. 15:27 De I 7,7; Comp. Theol., I, cc. 27—28.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

- 1.** Wherever there exists a common ground for univocal or analogical statement, there exists a certain likeness. But there can be no likeness between a creature and God. Therefore, there cannot be anything common to both either univocally or analogically. Consequently, if knowledge is predicated of God and of us, it will be merely an equivocal predication. Proof of the minor: In Isaias (40:18) we read: "To whom then have you likened God?"—as if to say: "He can resemble no one."
- 2.** Wherever a likeness exists, some comparison is possible. But no comparison between God and creature is possible, since a creature is finite and God is infinite. Therefore, no likeness can exist between them, and the original difficulty stands.
- 3.** Whenever a comparison is possible, there must be some form possessed to a greater and a lesser degree or equally by several things. But this cannot be said of God and a creature, for then something would be more simple than God. Therefore, no comparison between God and a creature is possible, nor is any likeness or community possible apart from that of equivocation.
- 4.** There is a greater distance between things which bear no resemblance than between those which do resemble each other. But there is an infinite distance between God and a creature; indeed, no greater distance is possible. Therefore, there is no likeness between them; thus, the original difficulty returns.
- 5.** A greater distance lies between a creature and God than lies between a created being and non-being; for a created being surpasses non-being only by reason of the amount of its entity, which is not infinite. But, as is said in the Metaphysics: "There is nothing common to being and non-being except by equivocation, which happens, for example, when that which we call man is called non-man by others." Hence, there cannot be anything common to God and a creature except by a pure equivocation.

6. All analogates are such that either one is placed in the definition of another—as substance is placed in the definition of accident, and act, in the definition of potency or the same thing is placed in the definition of both—as the health of an animal is placed in the definition of healthy, which is predicated of urine and food since one is the sign of this health and the other conserves it. But God and creatures are not related in this manner: one is not placed in the definition of the other, nor is something identical placed in the definition of each, even on the supposition that God could be defined. Therefore, it seems that nothing can be predicated analogously of God and creatures. As a consequence, any term predicated of both of them is used only equivocally.

7. Substance and accident differ more than do two species of substances. But when the same word is used to signify two species of substances according to formal character proper to each, the predication is merely equivocal. This happens, for example, when the word dog is applied to the dog-star, a barking dog, and the dog-fish. It would be a far more equivocal predication if one word were applied to a substance and an accident. Now, our knowledge is an accident and that of God, a substance. Therefore, the word knowledge is predicated equivocally of God's and of ours.

8. Our knowledge is merely an image of the divine knowledge. But the name of a thing cannot be applied to its image except by equivocation. Hence, animal, according to the Philosopher, is predicated equivocally of a real animal and of one in a picture. Therefore, the word knowledge is likewise predicated only equivocally of God's knowledge and ours.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Philosopher says that that is perfect, absolutely speaking, in which the perfections of all genera are found. As the Commentator remarks on this passage, such a being is God. But the perfections of other genera could not be said to be found in Him unless there were some resemblance between His perfection and the perfections of other genera. Hence, a creature resembles God in some way. Knowledge, therefore, and whatever else is predicated of God and creatures is not a pure equivocation.

2'. Genesis (1:26) says: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." Therefore, some likeness exists between God and creature. We conclude as before.

REPLY:

It is impossible to say that something is predicated univocally of a creature and God because in all univocal predication the nature signified by the name is common to those of whom the univocal predication is made. Hence, from the point of view of the nature signified by the predicate, the subjects of the univocal predication are equal, even though from the point of view of its real existence one may take precedence over another. For example, all numbers are equal from the point of view of the nature of number, even though, by the nature of things, one number is naturally prior to another. No matter how much a creature imitates God, however, a point cannot be reached where something would belong to it for the same reason it belongs to God. For things which have the same formal characters but are in separate subjects are common to the same subjects in regard to substance or quiddity but distinct in regard to the act of being. But whatever is in God is His own act of being; and just as His essence is the same as His act of being, so is His knowledge the same as His act of being a knower. Hence, since the act of existence proper to one thing cannot be communicated to another, it is impossible that a creature ever attain to the possession of something in the same manner in which God has it, just as it is impossible for it to attain the same act of being as that which God has. The same is true of us. If man and to exist as man did not differ in Socrates, man could not be predicated univocally of him and Plato, whose acts of existing are distinct.

Nevertheless, it cannot be said that whatever is predicated of God and creatures is an equivocal predication; for, unless there were at least some real agreement between creatures and God, His essence would not be the likeness of creatures, and so He could not know them by knowing His essence. Similarly, we would not be able to attain any knowledge of God from creatures, nor from among the names devised for creatures could we apply one to Him more than another; for in equivocal predication it makes no difference what name is used, since the word does not signify any real agreement.

Consequently, it must be said that knowledge is predicated neither entirely univocally nor yet purely equivocally of God's knowledge and ours. Instead, it is predicated analogously, or, in other words, according to a proportion. Since an agreement according to proportion can happen in two ways, two kinds of community can be noted in analogy. There is a certain agreement between things having a proportion to each other from the fact that they have a determinate distance between each other or some other relation to each other, like the proportion which the number two has to unity in as far as it is the double of unity. Again, the agreement is occasionally noted not between two things which have a proportion between them, but rather between two related proportions for example, six has something in common with four because six is two times three, just as four is two times two. The first type of agreement is one of proportion; the second, of proportionality.

We find something predicated analogously of two realities according to the first type of agreement when one of them has a relation to the other, as when being is predicated of substance and accident because of the relation which accident has to substance, or as when healthy is predicated of urine and animal because urine has some relation to the health of an animal. Sometimes, however, a thing is predicated analogously according to the second type of agreement, as when sight is predicated of bodily sight and of the intellect because understanding is in the mind as sight is in the eye.

In those terms predicated according to the first type of analogy, there must be some definite relation between the things having something in common analogously. Consequently, nothing can be predicated analogously of God and creature according to this type of analogy; for no creature has such a relation to God that it could determine the divine perfection. But in the other type of analogy, no definite relation is involved between the things which have something in common analogously, so there is no reason why some name cannot be predicated analogously of God and creature in this manner.

But this can happen in two ways. Sometimes the name implies some thing belonging to the thing primarily designated which cannot be common to God and creature even in the manner described above. This would be true, for example, of anything predicated of God metaphorically, as when God is called lion, sun, and the like, because their definition includes matter which cannot be attributed to God. At other times, however, a term predicated of God and creature implies nothing in its principal meaning which would prevent our finding between a creature and God an agreement of the type described above. To this kind belong all attributes which include no defect nor depend on matter for their act of existence, for example, being, the good, and similar things.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. As Dionysius says, God can in no way be said to be similar to creatures, but creatures can be said to be similar to Him in some sense. For what is made in imitation of something, if it imitates it perfectly, can be said to be like it absolutely. The opposite, however, is not true; for a man is not said to be similar to his image but vice versa. However, if the imitation is imperfect, then it is said to be both like and unlike that which it imitates: like, in so far as it resembles it; unlike, in so far as it falls short of a perfect representation. It is for this reason that Holy Scripture denies that creatures are similar to God in every respect. It does, however,

sometimes grant that creatures are similar to God, and sometimes deny this. It grants the similarity when it says that man is made in the likeness of God, but denies it when it says: "O God, who is like to thee?" (Psalms 70:19).

2. The Philosopher distinguishes two kinds of likenesses. One is found between things in different genera, and is taken according to proportion or proportionality; that is, one thing is related to another as a third thing is related to a fourth, as Aristotle himself says in the same place. The second kind of likeness is found existing between things in the same genus, as when the same thing is found in distinct subjects. Now, likeness of the first kind does not demand a comparison based on a definite relationship as does that of the second kind. Consequently, the possibility of the first type of likeness existing between God and creature should not be excluded.

3. That difficulty arises from the second type of likeness; and we grant that this type does not exist between creature and God.

4. A likeness that is found because two things share something in common or because one has such a determinate relation to the other that from one the other can be grasped by the intellect—such a likeness diminishes distance. A likeness according to an agreement of proportion does not; for such a likeness is also found between things far or little distant. Indeed, there is no greater likeness of proportionality between two to one and six to three than there is between two to one and one hundred to fifty. Consequently, the infinite distance between a creature and God does not take away the likeness mentioned above.

5. There is some agreement between being and non-being according to analogy, for non-being itself is called being analogously, as is made clear in the Metaphysics. Consequently, the distance lying between a creature and God cannot prevent a common ground for analogical statement.

6. That argument is valid in regard to community of analogy taken according to a definite relation of one thing to another. In that case, one thing must be put in the definition of the other as substance is put in the definition of accident or as one thing is put into the definition of two other things because both are predicated will reference to it, as substance is put into the definition of quantity and quality.

7. Although two species of substance have more in common than accident and substance have, it is possible that the same word is not applied to the two different species by reason of any consideration of something common between them. In that case, the word will be merely equivocal. But it is possible for a word common to substance and accident to be used because of a consideration of what they have in common. In such a case the word will not be equivocal but analogous.

8. The word animal is used not to signify the external form which a picture imitates when it depicts a real animal, but to signify its internal nature, in which it is not imitated. Hence, animal is used equivocally of the real animal and of the one painted. But the word knowledge is suitable to both creature and Creator in the respect in which the creature imitates the Creator. Consequently, knowledge is not predicated of the two altogether equivocally.

ARTICLE XII: DOES GOD KNOW SINGULAR FUTURE CONTINGENTS?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 14, I 3; 86,4; I Sentences 38, 1,5; Contra Gentiles I, 67; De rationibus fidei, c. 10 (P. 16:96a); Quodlibet XI., 3; De malo, 16, 7; I Perihermen., lectura 14 n. 16 seq., Comp. Theol., I, CC. 132-33.

Difficulties:

It seems that He does not, for

1. Nothing but the true can be known, as is said in the Posterior Analytics. But, as said in Interpretation, there is no definite truth in singular future contingents. Hence, God does not have knowledge of individual and contingent futures.
2. That from which the impossible would follow is impossible. But if God knew a singular future contingent, the impossible would follow, namely, that God's knowledge would be wrong. Hence, it is impossible for Him to know a singular future contingent. Proof of the minor follows. Let us suppose that God knows some singular future contingent event, such as that Socrates is sitting. Now, either it is possible that Socrates is not sitting or it is not possible. If it is not possible, then it is impossible for Socrates not to sit. Hence, for Socrates to sit is necessary, although what was granted was contingent. On the other hand, if it be possible not to sit, and granted he does not, nothing inconsistent follows from this. It would follow, however, that the knowledge of God is erroneous, and hence it would not be impossible for His knowledge to be false.
3. It was said, however, that the contingent, as it is in God, is necessary.—On the contrary, what is in itself contingent is not necessary with respect to God, except in the way in which it is in God. But inasmuch as it is in Him, it is not distinct from Him. If, therefore, it is known by God only as necessary, He will not know it in the way it exists distinct from Himself.
4. According to the Philosopher, when the major of a syllogism expresses necessity and the minor expresses inherence, a conclusion expressing necessity follows. But the following is true: Whatever is known by God must necessarily be. For, if what God knew as existing did not exist, His knowledge would be false. Therefore, if something is known by God to exist, it necessarily exists. But no contingent must necessarily be. Therefore, no contingent is known by God.
5. It was said, however, that when it is said that whatever is known by God must necessarily be, the necessity implied is not with reference to the creature but to God alone.—On the contrary, when it is said that whatever is known by God must necessarily be, the necessity is attributed to the thing for which the subject of the statement stands. Now, the subject of the statement is that which is known by God, not God Himself as knowing. Therefore, the necessity implied in this statement refers only to the thing known.
6. The more certain our knowledge is, the less it has to do with contingents; for science is only about necessary truths, since it is more certain than opinion, which may be about contingent things. Now, God's knowledge is most certain; hence, it can be about necessary matters only.
7. If the antecedent of any true conditional proposition is absolutely necessary, the consequent will be absolutely necessary. But the following conditional is true. If something is known by God, it will exist. Since this antecedent, "This is known by God," is absolutely necessary, the consequent will be absolutely necessary. Hence, whatever is known by God must necessarily exist. That this, namely, "This is known by God," is absolutely necessary was proved as follows. This is something said about the past. But whatever is said about the past, if true, is necessary; for, since it has been, it cannot not have been. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary.
8. Whatever is eternal is necessary. Now, all that God has known He has known from eternity. Therefore, that He has known is absolutely necessary.

9. Everything is related to the true as it is related to the act of existence. But future contingents do not have any act of existence; therefore, neither do they have truth. Hence, there can be no certain knowledge of them.

10. According to the Philosopher, whoever does not understand one determined thing understands nothing. But if a future contingent is open to its being or not being, it is by no means determined either in itself or in its cause. Therefore, there can, by no means, be any knowledge of it at all.

11. Hugh of St. Victor says: "God, who has all things in Himself, knows nothing outside Himself." Now, whatever is contingent is out side of Him, for in Him there is no potentiality. Hence, He does not know future contingents at all.

12. Something contingent cannot be known through a medium that is necessary; for, if the medium is necessary, the conclusion will be necessary. Now, God knows all things through a medium, His own essence. Hence, since this medium is necessary, it seems that He can not know anything contingent.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Psalms (32: 15) speak as follows: "He who hath made the hearts of every one of them; who understandeth all their works." But the works of men are contingent since they depend on free choice. Therefore, God knows future contingents.

2'. Whatever is necessary is known by God. Now, every contingent is necessary inasmuch as it is related to divine cognition, as Boethius says. Therefore, every contingent is known by God.

3'. Augustine says: "God knows changeable things in an unchangeable manner." But if a thing is contingent, it is changeable; for a contingent is said to be that which can either be or not be. Hence, God knows contingents in an unchangeable manner.

4'. God knows things in so far as He is their cause. But God is the cause not only of necessary but also of contingent things. Therefore, He knows both necessary and contingent things.

5'. God knows all things to the extent that the model of all things is in Him. But the divine model for the contingent and the necessary can be immutable, just as it is an immaterial model for the material and a simple model for the composite. Hence, it seems that just as God knows what is composite and material, although He Himself is immaterial and simple, so also He can know contingents, although contingency has no place in Him.

6'. To know is to understand the cause of a thing. Now, God knows the causes of all contingents; for He knows Himself, the cause of all things. Hence, He knows contingents.

REPLY:

On this question there have been several erroneous opinions. Some, wishing to pronounce upon divine knowledge from the viewpoint of our own way of knowing, have said that God does not know future contingents. This opinion cannot stand, for it would eliminate providence over human affairs, which are contingent. Consequently, others have said that God has knowledge of all futures, but that all take place necessarily, otherwise His knowledge of them would be subject to error. But neither can this opinion stand, for it would destroy free choice and there would be no need to ask advice. Moreover, it would be unjust to punish or to give rewards in proportion to merit when everything takes place necessarily.

Hence, it must be said that God knows all futures; nevertheless, this does not prevent things from taking place contingently. As evidence of this, it should be noted that we have certain powers and cognitive habits in which there can never be falsity; for example, sense, science,

and the understanding of principles. On the other hand, we have others in which there can be falsity; for example, imagination, opinion, and judgment. Now, falsity occurs in a cognitive act because something is not in reality as it is apprehended. Hence, if there is any knowing power such that there is never any falsity in it, then the thing to be known by it never falls short of what the knower apprehends about it.

Now, what is necessary cannot be prevented from happening even before it happens, in view of the fact that its causes are unchangeably ordained to its production. Hence, by means of habits that are always true, what is necessary can be known even when it will happen in the future, just as we know a coming eclipse or the rising of the sun by means of true science. But a contingent can be impeded before it is brought into being; for at that stage it exists only in its causes, which may be prevented from producing their effect. After a contingent has been brought into existence, however, it can no longer be prevented. Hence, such a power or habit can make about a present contingent a judgment in which falsity is never found, as sense does when it judges that Socrates is sitting when he sits.

From this it is clear that a contingent can be known as future by no cognition that excludes all falsity and the possibility of falsity; and since there is no falsity or possibility of falsity in the divine knowledge, it would be impossible for God to have knowledge of future contingents if He knew them as future. Now, something is known as future when an order of past and future stands between the event and the knowledge. This order, however, cannot be found between the divine knowledge and any contingent thing whatsoever; but the relation of the divine knowledge to anything whatsoever is like that of present to present. This may be understood by the following example.

If someone were to see many people walking successively down a road during a given period of time, in each part of that time he would see as present some of those who walk past, so that in the whole period of his watching he would see as present all of those who walked past him. Yet he would not simultaneously see them all as present, because the time of his seeing is not completely simultaneous. However, if all his seeing could exist at once, he would simultaneously see all the passers-by as present, even though they themselves would not all pass as simultaneously present. Therefore, since the vision of divine knowledge is measured by eternity, which is all simultaneous and yet includes the whole of time without being absent from any part of it, it follows that God sees whatever happens in time, not as future, but as present. For what is seen by God is, indeed, future to some other thing which it follows in time; to the divine vision, however, which is not in time but outside time, it is not future but present. Therefore, we see what is future as future because it is future will respect to our seeing, since our seeing is itself measured by time; but to the divine vision, which is outside of time, there is no future. For example, what one would see who is within the ranks of passers-by and sees only those who are in line ahead of him is quite different from what he would see were he outside their ranks and saw all of them simultaneously. Therefore, the fact that our sense of sight is never deceived when it sees contingents when they are present does not prevent the Contingents themselves from happening contingently. In like manner, God infallibly knows all the contingents, whether they are present, past, or future to us; for they are not future to Him, but He knows that they are when they are; and the fact of His knowing them does not prevent them from happening contingently.

The difficulty in this matter arises from the fact that we can describe the divine knowledge only after the manner of our own, at the same time pointing out the temporal differences. For example, if we were to describe God's knowledge as it is, we should have to say that God knows that this is, rather than that it will be; for to Him every thing is present and nothing is future. For this reason, Boethius says that His knowledge of future things "is more properly called providence than foresight," since He sees them all, as it were, from a great distance, in

the mirror of eternity. However, it might also be called fore sight because of its relation to other things in whose regard what He knows is future.

Answers to Difficulties:

Although a contingent is not determined as long as it is future, yet, as soon as it is produced in the realm of nature, it has a determinate truth. It is in this way that the gaze of divine knowledge is brought upon it.

2. As was said, a contingent is referred to divine knowledge according to its act of existence in the realm of nature. Moreover, from the moment that it is, it cannot not be when it is; for, "what is must be when it is," as is said in Interpretation. It does not follow, however, that it is necessary without any qualification or that God's knowledge is defective —just as my sense of sight is not deceived when I see that Socrates is sitting, although this fact is contingent.

3. A contingent is said to be necessary in so far as God knows it, because He knows it, not as something already present. Nevertheless, no necessity arises from the fact that it is going to be, so that one could say that it comes about necessarily; for event applies to something which is to be, because what already is cannot eventuate. But that it has happened is true, and this is necessary.

4. The necessity referred to in the statement, "Whatever is known by God is necessary," can concern either the manner of speaking or the thing spoken about. If the necessity is applied to the manner of speaking, then the proposition is composite and true. Its meaning will be as follows: It is necessary that whatever is known by God exists, since it is not possible that God would know something to be and it would not be. If the necessity is applied to the thing spoken about, then the proposition is divided and false. Its meaning will be as follows: What is known by God must necessarily exist. But, as is clear from what has been said, things do not happen necessarily simply because God knows them.

One might object that this distinction is valid only in regard to forms, such as whiteness and blackness, which can succeed one another in a subject, but that since it is impossible for something once known by God later not to be known by Him, this distinction does not apply here. However, we reply that, although God's knowledge does not change but always remains the same, the condition according to which a thing is referred to His knowledge does not always remain the same with respect to that knowledge. For a thing is related to God's knowledge as it is in its own present existence, yet present existence does not always belong to it. Hence, we can consider the thing either together with its condition of being present or without it, and, consequently, we can consider it either in the manner in which it is referred to God's knowledge or in some other manner. In this way, the afore-mentioned distinction is valid.

5. If this proposition concerns the thing, then it is true that necessity is applied to the thing itself which is known by God; but if it concerns the manner of speaking, then the necessity is not applied to the thing but to the relation of His knowledge to the thing known.

6. Neither our science nor God's knowledge can be about future contingents. This would be even more true if He knew them as future. He knows them, however, as present to Himself and future to others. Therefore, the objection does not stand.

7. There have been many opinions about this. Some say that the antecedent, "This is known by God," is contingent because, although it refers to something in the past, it nevertheless implies a relation to the future, and therefore is not necessary. For example, when it is said, "This was going to happen," the *was* does not mark the event as necessary, since what was going to happen could have failed to do so; for, as is said in Generation and Corruption: "He

who is about to walk, will not walk." This argument, however, is invalid; for when one says, "This is future" or "This was future," one designates the ordination of the causes of that thing to its production. Now, although it is possible that the causes ordained to a certain effect can be impeded in such a way that the effect will not follow from them, it is not possible to prevent their having been at some time ordained to produce this effect. Hence, even if that which is future should be able not to happen in the future, it will never be able at any time not to have been a future.

For this reason, others say that this antecedent is contingent since it is composed of a necessary and a contingent; for God's knowledge is necessary, but what is known by Him is contingent, and each of these is included in the antecedent mentioned in the difficulty. For example, the following are contingent: "Socrates is a white man," or "Socrates is an animal and he runs." However, this argument, too, is invalid, for the truth of a proposition is not affected by the necessity and contingency of that which is affirmed materially in a proposition. The truth of a proposition is determined only by the principal composition. Hence, the same character of necessity and contingency is found in each of the following: "I think that man is an animal" and "I think that Socrates is running." Consequently, since the principal act signified in the antecedent, "God knows Socrates is running," is necessary, no matter how contingent the thing may be which is affirmed materially, this still does not prevent the afore-mentioned antecedent from being necessary.

Hence, others simply concede that the antecedent is necessary. Yet, they add, from the fact that an antecedent is absolutely necessary, it need not follow that the consequent is absolutely necessary, unless the antecedent is the proximate cause of the consequent. If it is the remote cause, the necessity of the effect can be impeded by the contingency of the proximate cause. For example, even though the sun is a necessary cause, the flowering of a tree, its effect, is contingent; for its proximate cause, the tree's germinating power, is not constant. This argument, however, does not seem to be sufficient; for it is not due to the nature of the cause and effect that a necessary consequence follows from a necessary antecedent, but rather to the relation that the consequent has to its antecedent. For the contrary of the consequent can by no means stand with the antecedent. And this would happen if a contingent consequent followed from a necessary antecedent. This relationship must be found in any true conditional, whether the antecedent is the effect, the proximate cause, or the remote cause. Moreover, if this relationship is not found in the conditional, the proposition is not true at all. Therefore, this conditional is also false: "If the sun moves, the tree will flower."

Hence, the difficulty must be solved differently: the antecedent is necessary without any qualification, and the consequent is absolutely necessary in the way in which it follows from the antecedent. For what is attributed to a thing in itself is quite different from what is attributed to a thing in so far as it is known. What is attributed to it in itself belongs to it according to its own manner; but what is attributed to a thing or follows upon it in so far as it is known is according to the manner of the knower. Hence, if, in the antecedent, something is signified which pertains to knowledge, the consequent must be taken according to the manner of the knower, not according to the manner of the thing known. For example, were I to say, "If I understand something, that thing is without matter," what is understood need be immaterial only in so far as it is understood. Similarly, when I say, "If God knows something, it will be," the consequent should not be taken according to the mode of being of the thing in itself but according to the mode of the knower. For, although a thing in itself is future, it is present according to the mode of the knower. Consequently, we should rather say, "If God knows something, it is," than say, "it will be." We must, therefore, judge in the same way the proposition, "If God knows something, it will be," and this one, "If I see Socrates running, Socrates is running"; for both are necessary as long as the action is going on.

8. [There is no solution given for the eighth difficulty.]

9. Although a contingent does not exercise an act of existence as long as it is a future, as soon as it is present it has both existence and truth, and in this condition stands under the divine vision. God, however, also knows the relation of one thing to another, and in this way He knows that a thing is future in regard to another thing. Consequently, there is no difficulty in affirming that God knows something as future which will not take place, inasmuch as He knows that certain causes are inclined toward a certain effect which will not be produced. But when we talk in this way we are not speaking of that knowledge of the future by which God sees things in their causes, but of that by which He sees a thing in itself. In this latter type of knowledge a thing is known as present.

10. The future, in so far as it is known by God, is present; hence, it is determined to one or the other member of a contradiction. But as long as it is future it remains open to either.

11. It is true that God knows nothing outside Himself, if the word outside refers to that by which He knows. However, God does something outside Himself if this refers to what He knows. This point was discussed above.

12. There are two types of mediums for knowledge. One, the medium of demonstration, must be proportionate to the conclusion, so that, when it has been posited, its conclusion is posited. God is not such a medium for the knowledge of contingents. The other medium of knowledge is that which is a likeness of the thing known; and the divine essence is a medium of this sort. However, it is not equated with anything, even though it is a proper medium for singulars, as was said above.

ARTICLE XIII: DOES GOD'S KNOWLEDGE CHANGE?

Parallel readings: De veritate, I, 5, ad II; I, 7; Summa Theol., I, 14, 15; I Sentences 38, 1, aa. 2—3; 39, 1, aa. 1-2; 41, a. 5; Contra Gentiles I, cc. 58-59.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does, for

1. Knowledge is an assimilation of the knower to the thing known. Now, God's knowledge is perfect. Hence, He will be perfectly assimilated to the things He knows. However, the things God knows change. Therefore, His knowledge changes.

2. Any knowledge which is open to error can change. Now, God's knowledge is open to error since it is about contingent things, which are able not to be. Should they not be, then His knowledge is erroneous and, consequently, can change.

3. Our knowledge, which is had by receiving from things, follows the mode of the knower. Therefore, God's knowledge, which takes place by reason of the fact that He confers something upon things, follows the mode of the things known. But things which God knows can change. Therefore, His knowledge can change.

4. When one of two terms in a relation is taken away, the remaining one is also taken away. Hence, when one term changes, the other also changes. Now, what God knows changes. Hence, His knowledge of things changes.

5. Any knowledge that can be increased or diminished is subject to change. But God's knowledge can be increased or diminished. Therefore.—Proof of the minor is as follows: If a

knower at times knows more things, at other times fewer, his knowledge changes. Therefore, a knower who can know more or fewer things than he now knows possesses knowledge subject to change. Now, God can know more than He knows: He knows that there are, or were, or will be things made by Him; however, He could make more which He is never going to make. Consequently, He could know more things than He does. Similarly, He can know fewer than He does, since He could do away with a part of what He is going to make. Therefore, His knowledge can be increased and diminished.

6. The answer was given that even though more or fewer things could fall under God's knowledge, His knowledge itself could not change.—On the contrary, just as the possibles are subject to divine power, so are knowable things subject to divine knowledge. Now, if God could make more than He could previously, His power would be increased; and it would be diminished if He could make fewer. For the same reason, if He could know more than He knew previously, His knowledge would be increased.

7. At one time God knew that Christ would be born. Now, however, He does not know that Christ will be born but that He has been born. Therefore, God knows something which He previously did not know, and He has known something which now He does not know. Hence, His knowledge is changed.

8. A manner of knowing, as well as an object of knowledge, is required for knowledge. Now, if the manner in which God knows were changed, His knowledge would be changed. For the same reason, therefore, when the objects of God's knowledge change, His knowledge will be changed.

9. There is said to be a knowledge of approval in God by which He knows only good people. However, God could approve those whom He has not approved. Hence, He could know what He previously did not know; so, it seems that His knowledge is changeable.

10. Just as God's knowledge is God Himself, so God's power is God Himself. But we say that by the power of God things are brought into being through a change. For the same reason, therefore, things are known by God's knowledge through a change, without any detriment to the divine perfection.

11. Any knowledge changes if it goes from one thing to another. But God's knowledge is of this kind because He knows things through His essence. Hence, His knowledge changes.

To the Contrary:

1' The Epistle of St. James (1: 17) says of God: "With whom there is no change..."

2' Whatever is moved is reduced to the first unmovable being. But the first cause of all things that change is God's knowledge, just as art is the cause of products. Hence, God's knowledge cannot change.

3' As is said in The Soul, motion is the act of an imperfect thing. But in divine knowledge there is no imperfection. Hence, it cannot change.

REPLY:

Since knowledge is intermediate between the knower and the known, it can vary in two ways: first, on the part of the knower; second, on the part of the thing known. On the part of the knower, we can consider three things: his knowledge, his act, and the manner of his act. According to these three, changes can take place in knowledge on the part of the knower.

On the part of knowledge itself, a change takes place when knowledge which was not had previously is newly acquired or when knowledge of what was known previously is lost. Accordingly, we can speak of a generation or corruption, or of an increase or decrease, in

knowledge. Such a change, however, cannot take place in God's knowledge, since, as we have shown, its object is not only beings but also non beings, and there cannot be anything beyond being and non-being because between affirmation and negation there is no middle ground.

It is true that in a certain respect the objects of God's knowledge are only things existing in the present, past, or future, namely, in so far as His knowledge is ordained to the work which His will carries out. However, even if He would know something by this kind of knowledge that He did not know previously, there would be no change in His knowledge, because on its part it pertains equally to beings and non If there were any change in God, it would be in His will, which would be determining His knowledge to some thing to which it had not previously determined it.

This, however, could not cause any change in His will, either; for to produce its act freely belongs to the nature of the will, because, of its very nature, the will is equally able to go out to either of two opposites. For example, it can will or not will to make or not to make a thing. However, the will cannot make itself simultaneously will and not will; nor can the divine will, which is immutable, first will some thing and later not will the same thing at the same time, because then God's will would be circumscribed by time and would not be entirely simultaneous. If we are speaking of absolute necessity, therefore, it is not necessary for Him to will what He wishes. Therefore, absolutely speaking, it is possible for Him not to will it. On the other hand, if we are speaking of the necessity following a supposition, then it is necessary that He will it if He wishes or has wished it. On this supposition, then, namely, if He wishes or has wished, it is not possible for Him not to will.

Now, since a change requires two terms, it always views the final term in its relation to the first. Consequently, only this would follow, that it would be possible for His will to change if it were possible for Him not to will what He wishes, if He had previously wished. It is clear, therefore, that no change is affirmed of His knowledge or will by the fact that more or fewer things could be known by God through this kind of knowledge; for to say that He is able to know more means simply that He can by His will determine His knowledge to make more things.

On the part of the act, there are three ways a change takes place in knowledge. The first occurs when knowledge actually considers what it previously did not consider. For example, we say that a person changes who passes from habit to act. Now, this kind of change can not be found in God's knowledge, because He does not know habitually but only actually, since in Him there is no potentiality such as there is in a habit. Change is found in a second way in the act of knowing when it considers now one thing, now another. But neither can this be found in God's knowledge, since He sees all through the one species of His essence, and consequently looks upon all things in the same intuition. A third kind of change occurs when, in his contemplation, a person passes from one thing to another. But this, too, cannot be found in God, for discursive reasoning is a passage between two members, and there is no discursive reasoning in knowledge that sees two things if it sees both in one intuition. This is what actually takes place in the divine knowledge, since God sees all things by one intuition.

From the point of view of the manner of knowing, there can also be changes in knowledge by reason of the fact that one can now know something more clearly and perfectly than he did before. This can arise from two sources. First, it can arise from a difference in the medium by which the cognition takes place. For example, one may first know something through a probable middle term, and later through a middle term that is necessary. This, however, cannot take place in God because His essence, which for Him is the medium of knowing, never changes. Secondly, it can come from the intellectual power which causes a man of greater acumen to know something more penetratingly, even through the same medium, than

another man does. This, too, however, cannot take place in God, since the power by which He knows is His own essence, and this does not change. Hence, it remains that God's knowledge does not change in any way what so ever from the point of view of the knower.

But from the point of view of the thing known, knowledge can also change in its truth and falsity-, because, if a thing is changed while the judgment of it remains the same, the judgment which was previously true is now false. This, however, cannot take place in God either, since the intuition of God's cognition is directed w a thing as it is in its presentness, that is, in so far as it has already received this rather than that determination; and in this respect it can change no more. Even if that thing should receive another state, that state will again f all under the divine vision in the same way; hence, God's knowledge changes in no way whatsoever.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The assimilation of the knower to the thing known does not take place through a conformity of nature but through a representation. So, it is not necessary for the knowledge of changing things to change.
2. Although the thing known by God may be other than it is if considered in itself, it f ails under God's cognition inasmuch as it cannot be other than it is, as we have already shown.
3. All knowledge, whether had by receiving from things or by an impression upon the things themselves, takes place according to the manner of the knower, since both take place in so far as a likeness of the thing known is in the knower. Moreover, what exists in someone is in him according to the manner of him in whom it exists.
4. That to which God's knowledge is related is changeless in so far as it fails under His knowledge. Therefore, His knowledge does not change, either, will respect to its truth, which could be changed by a change of the afore-mentioned relation.
5. When it is said, "God can know what He does not know," one can understand this in two ways—even if we are speaking of His knowledge of vision. First, we can understand it in its composite sense, that is, on the supposition that God has not known what He is said to be able to know. In this sense it is false; for the following two things cannot be true simultaneously, namely, that God should have been ignorant of something, and later know that thing. The proposition can also be taken in a divided sense. In this sense, no supposition or condition of His power is included, and in this sense it is true, as is clear from our discussion.

Although it may, in some sense, be conceded that God can know what He did not know previously, we cannot concede in any sense that He can know more than He knows; for, since the word more implies a comparison to what has previously existed, it is always understood in a composite sense. For the same reason, we can in no way concede that God's knowledge can be increased or diminished.

6. We concede the sixth argument.

7. As we said previously, God knows propositions without joining and separating. Just as God knows many different things in the same manner, both when they exist and when they do not, so does He know in the same manner different propositions, both when they are true and when they are false, because He knows each to be true at the time when it is true. For example, He knows this proposition, "Socrates is running," to be true when it is true; similarly, this proposition, "Socrates will run," and so forth. Hence, although it is not true now that Socrates is running but that he has run, nevertheless, God knows each because He simultaneously intuits each time when each proposition is true. If He knew a proposition by

forming it in Himself, however, then He would know a proposition only when it is true, as happens in us. Then His knowledge would change.

8. The manner of knowing is in the knower himself. The thing known, however, is not in the knower according to its own nature. Therefore, a variation in the manner of knowing would make knowledge vary, but changes in the things known would not.

9. The answer to this is already clear.

10. This act of power terminates outside the agent in the thing as it is in its own nature—in which the thing has a changeable act of being. So, if we consider the thing produced, we must concede that it is given its act of existence by means of a change. But knowledge concerns things in so far as they are, in some way, in the knower. So, since the knower is unchanging, He knows things in an unchanging manner.

11. Although God knows other things through His essence, He does not pass from one thing to another; for in the same intuition He knows both His essence and other things.

ARTICLE XIV: IS GOD'S KNOWLEDGE THE CAUSE OF THINGS?

Parallel readings: [Summa Theol., I, 14, 8 I Sentences 38, 1, 1.](#)

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. Origen says: "A thing will be, not because God knows that it will be, but, because it will be, it is known by God before it exists." Consequently, it seems that things are the cause of His knowledge rather than conversely.

2. Given the cause, the effect follows. But God's knowledge has been from eternity. Therefore, if His knowledge is the cause of things, it seems that things have existed from eternity. But this is heretical.

3. A necessary effect follows a necessary cause. Hence, even demonstrations, which are made through a necessary cause, have necessary conclusions. But God's knowledge is necessary since it is eternal. Therefore, all things which are known by God would be necessary. But this is absurd.

4. If God's knowledge is the cause of things, then it will be related to things in the way in which things are related to our knowledge. But things determine the type of knowledge we have; for instance, of necessary things we have necessary knowledge. Therefore, if God's knowledge were the cause of things, it would impose the mode of necessity on all things. But this is false.

5. A first cause has a more powerful influence upon an effect than a second. But, if God's knowledge is the cause of things, it will be a first cause; and, since necessity follows in the effects of necessary secondary causes, much more will necessity in things follow from God's knowledge. Thus, the original difficulty stands.

6. Knowledge has a more essential relation to things to which it stands as their cause than to things to which it stands as their effect; for a cause leaves its impression upon an effect, but an effect does not leave its impression upon the cause. Now, our knowledge, which is related to

things as their effect, requires necessity in the things known if it is to be necessary itself. Therefore, if God's knowledge were the cause of things, much more would it demand necessity in the things it knows. Consequently, God would not know contingent beings, and this is contrary to what was said previously.

To the Contrary:

1' Augustine says: "Not because they are does God know all creatures, spiritual and corporeal, but they are because He knows them." Therefore, God's knowledge is the cause of created things.

2' God's knowledge is, in a sense, the art of the things that are to be created; hence Augustine says: "The Word is an artistic conception filled with the intelligible characters of living things." But art is the cause of artistic products. Therefore, God's knowledge is the cause of created things.

3' The opinion of Anaxagoras, approved by the Philosopher, seems to support this view; for he asserted that the first principle of things was an intellect, which moved and distinguished all things.

REPLY:

An effect cannot be more simple than its cause. Consequently, whatever things in which one nature is found must be reduced to some one thing which is the first subject of that nature, as all hot things are reduced to one and the first hot thing, namely, fire, which, as is said in the Metaphysics, is the cause of heat in others. Now, since every resemblance involves an agreement of forms, whatever things are alike are so related that either one is the cause of the other or both are caused by one cause. Moreover, in all knowledge there is an assimilation of the knower to the known. Hence, either the knowledge is the cause of the thing known, or the thing known is the cause of the knowledge, or both are caused by one cause. It cannot be said, however, that what is known by God is the cause of His knowledge; for things are temporal and His knowledge is eternal, and what is temporal cannot be the cause of anything eternal. Similarly, it cannot be said that both are caused by one cause, because there can be nothing caused in God, seeing that He is whatever He has. Hence, there is left only one possibility: His knowledge is the cause of things. Conversely, our knowledge is caused by things inasmuch as we receive it from things. Angels' knowledge, however, is not caused by things and is not the cause of things, but both the things which the angels know and their knowledge are from one cause; for in the same way that God communicates universal forms to things, making them subsist, He communicates likenesses of things to the minds of angels so that the angels can know them.

It should be observed, however, that knowledge as knowledge does not denote an active cause, no more than does a form as a form. Action consists, as it were, in the procession of something from the agent; but a form as a form has its act of existence by perfecting that in which it is, and by resting in that thing. Consequently, a form is not a principle of acting, except through the mediation of a power. In some cases, it is true, the form itself is the power, but not by reason of being a form. In other cases, the power is other than the substantial form of the thing. For example, the actions of bodies do not take place without the mediation of certain of their qualities. Similarly, knowledge denotes that there is something in the knower, not that something has been caused by the knower. Hence, an effect never arises from knowledge except through the mediation of the will, which, of its very nature, implies a certain influence upon what is willed. For action never proceeds from a substance without the mediation of a power, although in the case of some substances, such as God, will is identical with knowledge. In other substances, namely, all creatures, this is not the case. Similarly,

effects proceed from God, the first cause of all things, through the mediation of secondary causes.

Hence, between His knowledge (the cause of the thing) and the thing caused there is found a twofold medium: one on the part of God, namely, the divine will; another on the part of things themselves in regard to certain effects, namely, the medium of secondary causes through whose mediation things proceed from God's knowledge. Moreover, every effect follows not only the condition of the first cause but also that of the intermediate cause. Hence, the things known by God proceed from His knowledge as conditioned by His will and as conditioned by secondary causes. Consequently, it is not necessary that these things follow the manner of His knowledge in all respects.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Origen's meaning is that God's knowledge is not a cause so necessitating the thing known that from the very fact that something is known by God it must necessarily take place. Moreover, his phrase "Because it is to be, b is known by God..." gives the reason for concluding that God knows it, not the cause of the divine knowledge.
2. Since things proceed from knowledge through the mediation of the will, it is not necessary for them to come into being whenever there is knowledge of them, but only when the will determines that they should.
3. An effect follows the necessity of its proximate cause, which can also be a means of demonstrating the effect. An effect need not follow the necessity of the first cause, since an effect can be impeded, if it is contingent, by reason of a secondary cause. This is seen in the effects produced by the motion of the celestial bodies through the mediation of inferior forces on objects subject to generation and corruption. Even though the motion of the heavens remains always the same, these effects are contingent because the natural forces are defective.
4. A thing is the proximate cause of our knowledge. Hence, it imposes its own mode upon our knowledge. But, since God is a first cause, there is no parallel. Or we may say that our knowledge of necessary things is necessary, not by reason of the fact that things known cause our knowledge, but because of the conformity of the power to the things known, which is required for knowledge.
5. Although the first cause influences an effect more powerfully than a secondary cause does, the effect does not take place without the operation of the secondary cause. Hence, if it is possible for the secondary cause to fail in its operation, it is possible for the effect not to take place, even though the first cause itself cannot fail. The possibility of the effect's not taking place would be much greater if the first cause itself could fail. Therefore, since both causes are required for the existence of an effect, a failure of either cause will result in a failure of the effect. Hence, if contingency is affirmed of either cause, the effect will be contingent. But, if only one of the causes is necessary, the effect will not be necessary, since both causes are required for the existence of the effect. But, because a secondary cause cannot be necessary if the first cause is contingent, one can say that the necessity of an effect follows the necessity of the second cause.
6. Our reply here is the same as our reply to the fourth difficulty.

ARTICLE XV: DOES GOD HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF EVIL THINGS?

Parallel readings: De veritate, Summa Theol., I, 14, 10; 18., ad I Sentences 36, 1,2; Contra Gentiles I, 71; Quodlibet XI, 2,

Difficulties:

It seems that He does not, for

1. All knowledge either causes the thing known, is itself caused by it, or at least proceeds from one and the same cause. But God's knowledge is not the cause of evil things, evil things do not cause it, nor does some other thing cause both His knowledge and evil things. Therefore, God does not know evil things.
2. As is said in the Metaphysics, every being is related to truth in the same way as it is related to existence. But evil, as Dionysius and Augustine say, is not a being; therefore, it is not something true. Now, nothing is known unless it is true. Hence, evil cannot be known by God.
3. The Commentator says that an intellect that is always in act does not know a privation at all. But God's intellect is in act in the highest possible degree. Hence, it knows no privations. But, as Augustine says: "Evil is the privation of good." Therefore, God does not know evil.
4. Whatever is known is known either through its likeness or through its contrary. Now, evil is not like the divine essence through which God knows all things; nor is evil its contrary, for evil cannot harm it—and a thing is said to be evil because it is harmful. Therefore, God does not know evil things.
5. That which cannot be learned cannot be known. But, as Augustine says: "Evil cannot be learned through instruction, for only good things can be learned." Therefore, evil cannot be known, and so is not known by God.
6. Whoever knows grammar is grammatical. Therefore, whoever knows evil things is evil. But God is not evil. Hence, He does not know evil.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. No one avenges what he does not know. But God is the avenger of evil; therefore, He has knowledge of evil things.
- 2'. There is no good which God lacks. But the knowledge of evil things is good, for by it evils are avoided. Therefore, God knows evil things.

REPLY:

According to the Philosopher, whoever does not understand a thing which is one does not understand anything at all. A thing is one, however, by being undivided in itself and distinct from others. Hence, whoever knows a thing must know its distinction from other things. But the first basis of distinction lies in affirmation and negation. Therefore, whoever knows an affirmation must know its negation. Now, since privation is nothing but a negation having a subject (as is said in the Metaphysics and since "one of two contraries is always a privation" (as is said both in the Metaphysics and Physics—from the very fact that a thing is known, its privation and its contrary are known. Accordingly, since God has a proper knowledge of all His effects, knowing each one of them as it is, distinct in its own nature, He must know all the opposed negations and opposed privations, as well as all the contrarieties found in things. Consequently, since evil is the privation of good, by knowing any good at all and the measure of any thing whatsoever, He knows every evil thing.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That proposition is true about knowledge had from a thing through its likeness. But evil is not known to God by its likeness, but through the likeness of its opposite. Consequently, it

does not follow that God is the cause of evil things because He knows them. It follows, rather, that He is the cause of the good to which the evil is opposed.

2. From the fact that non-being is opposed to being, it is said in some way to be being, as is clear from the Metaphysics. As a consequence, from the fact that evil is opposed to good, it has the character of some thing knowable and of the true.

3. It was the opinion of the Commentator that by knowing His essence God does not know individual effects in a determined way, that is, as they are distinct in their own proper nature, but that He knows only the nature of being which is found in all of them. Since evil is not opposed to universal but to particular being, it follows from this that God would not know evil. But this position is false, as is evident from what has been said. Hence, what follows from this position is also false, namely, that God does not know privations and evil things. For, according to the Commentator, a privation is known by an intellect only by the absence of a form from the intellect—a condition that cannot exist in an intellect which is always in act. But this is not necessary; for, from the very fact that a thing is known, its privation is known. Hence, both thing and privation are known through the presence of a form in the intellect.

4. The opposition of one thing to another can be taken in two ways: first, in general, as when we say that evil is opposed to good, and in this sense evil is opposed to God; second, in particular, as when we say that this white thing is opposed to this black thing, and in this sense an evil is opposed only to that good which can be taken away by this evil and to which it would be harmful. In this second way evil is not opposed to God. Augustine accordingly says: "Vice is opposed to God in the way in which evil is opposed to good." But, to the nature which it vitiates, vice is opposed not merely as evil to good but also as some thing harmful to that nature.

5. In so far as evil is known, it is a good; for to know evil is a good. Thus, it is true that whatever can be learned is a good—not that it is good in itself, but that it is good only in so far as it is known.

6. Grammar is known by possessing the art of grammar. But evil is not known by possessing it. Hence, no analogy can be drawn.

QUESTION 3: Ideas

ARTICLE I: ARE THERE IDEAS IN GOD?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 15, 1; 44, 3; *I Sentences* 36, 2, 1; *I Metaph.*, *lectura* 15, nn. 232—33.

Difficulties:

It seems that there are no ideas in Him, for

1. God's knowledge is most perfect. Now, knowledge had from the essence of a thing is more perfect than knowledge had from its likeness. Consequently, God knows things, not by means of their likenesses, but by means of their essences. Hence, those likenesses of things which are called ideas do not exist in God.

2. But it was said that God knows things more perfectly by knowing them through His essence, which is a likeness of things, than He would if He knew them through their own essences.—On the contrary, knowledge is an assimilation to the thing known. Hence, the more the medium of knowing resembles and is united with the thing known, the more perfectly is the thing known by means of that medium. But the essence of created things is more united with things than the divine essence is. Consequently, God would know things more perfectly if He knew them by means of their essences than He does by knowing them through His own essence.
3. But it was said that the perfection of knowledge consists in the union of the medium of knowledge with the knower, not with the thing known.—On the contrary, the species of a thing, which is in the intellect, is rendered individual by the act of existence it has in the intellect; but in relation to the thing known it has the character of a universal, since it is a likeness of the thing according to its common nature and not according to its particular conditions. Yet the knowledge which is made possible by means of that species is not singular but universal. Hence, knowledge follows the relation of the species to the thing known rather than its relation to the knower.
4. The Philosopher criticizes Plato's theory of ideas because the latter asserted that the forms of material things existed without matter. Now, these forms would exist without matter to a much greater extent were they in the divine intellect instead of being outside of it, because the divine intellect is the acme of immateriality. Therefore, it is much more inconsistent to say that ideas exist in the divine intellect.
5. The Philosopher criticizes Plato's theory of ideas because the ideas he posited can neither generate nor be generated, and hence are useless. But, if the ideas are said to be in the divine mind, they also will not be generated -because whatever is generated is composite—nor will they generate, for, since whatever is generated is composite and whatever generates resembles what is generated, that which generates must also be composite. Hence, it would be inconsistent to say that there are ideas in the divine mind.
6. Dionysius says that God knows existing things by means of the non-existing, and that He does not know them by means of ideas. But the only reason for affirming the existence of ideas in God is so He can know things by their means. Hence, ideas do not exist in God's mind.
7. Whatever has been modeled upon an archetype is proportionate to it. But there is no proportion of a creature with God, just as there is no proportion between what is finite and what is infinite. Therefore, in God there cannot be any archetypes of creatures; consequently, since ideas are exemplary forms, it seems that ideas of things do not exist in God.
8. Ideas are the rule of knowledge and action. But that which can not err in its knowledge or action does not need a rule for either; and, since God is this kind of being, it seems out of place to say that there are ideas in him.
9. We read in the Metaphysics that just as being one in quantity causes equality, so being one in quality causes resemblance. Now, because of the difference between God and a creature, a creature can in no way be said to be equal to God, nor can God be said to be equal to a creature. Therefore, there is nothing in God that resembles a creature. Consequently, since idea means a likeness of a thing, it seems that there are no ideas of things in God.
10. If ideas are in God, they are there only for the production of creatures. But Anselm says: "It is sufficiently clear that in the Word, through which all things have been made, likenesses of things do not exist. Only the one simple essence is present." Therefore, it seems that ideas, which are called the likenesses of things, do not exist in God.

i 2. God knows Himself in the same way in which He knows other things; otherwise, His knowledge would be multiple and divisible. Now, God does not know Himself by means of an idea. Therefore, He does not know other things by means of ideas.

To the Contrary:

2'. Augustine says: "Whoever denies that there are ideas is an infidel, since he denies the existence of the Son." Therefore.

2'. Every intellectual agent possesses within himself a plan of his work; otherwise, he would not know what he was doing. But God acts through His intellect, and He is not ignorant of what He is doing. Therefore, there exist within Him intelligible characters of things, and these are called ideas.

3'. As is said in the Physics: "The three causes, namely, the efficient, final, and formal causes, are ultimately identical." Now, God is the efficient and final cause of things. Hence, He is also their formal cause—but as an exemplary cause, since He cannot be a form that is part of a creature. We conclude as before.

4'. A particular effect is not produced by a universal cause unless the universal cause is proper or appropriated. Now, all particular effects are from God, who is the universal cause of all things. Hence, they should come from Him in so far as He is the proper or appropriated cause of each and every one of them. But this would not be possible unless the intelligible characters of things existed in Him. Hence, the intelligible characters of things, that is, ideas, must exist in Him.

5'. Augustine says: "I regret that I said that there are two worlds, one the object of sense, the other the object of intellect—not because this is not true, but because I said it as though it were an original idea, when in fact it had been previously pointed out by philosophers, and because this manner of speaking is not usual in Holy Scripture." Now, the intelligible world is nothing other than the idea of the world. Hence, it is true that there are ideas.

6'. Speaking to God, Boethius says: "You have drawn all things from the highest pattern, having in your mind the glorious world— you, the most glorious of all." Therefore, the pattern of the world, and of all that is in the world, is in God; and our conclusion is the same as before.

7'. In the Gospel according to John (2:3-4), we read: "What was made in him was life..." This means, as Augustine says, that all creatures are in the divine mind as a piece of furniture is in the mind of a cabinetmaker. Now, a piece of furniture is in the mind of a cabinetmaker by means of its idea and likeness. Therefore, ideas of all things are in God.

8'. A mirror does not lead us to the knowledge of things unless their likenesses are reflected in it. Now, the uncreated Word is a mirror that leads to the knowledge of all creatures, because by the Word the Father utters Himself and all other things. Therefore, likenesses of all things are in the Word.

9'. Augustine says: "The Son is the Father's art, containing the living forms of all things." Now, those forms are nothing other than ideas. Therefore, ideas exist in God.

10'. Augustine says that there are two ways of knowing things: through an essence and through a likeness. Now, God does not know things by means of their essence, because only those things which are present in the knower are known in this manner. Therefore, since He does know things, as is clear from what has been said previously, He must know them by means of their likenesses. Hence, our conclusion is the same as before.

REPLY:

As Augustine says: "We can literally translate S as species or forms." Now, the form of a thing has three meanings. First, it can mean that from which a thing gets its form, as when we say that the informing of an effect proceeds from the form of the agent. Now, an action does not necessarily result in effects that attain the complete character of the form of the agent, for effects often fail short of this, especially in the case of equivocal causes. Consequently, the form from which something gets its form is not said to be its idea or form. Second, the form of a thing can mean that by which a thing is informed, as when we say that the soul is the form of man, and the shape of a statue is the form of the bronze. Now, although form, which is part of the composite, is truly said to be the form of a thing, we do not usually call it its idea, because it seems that the word idea signifies a form separate from that whose form it is. Third, the form of a thing can mean that according to which a thing is informed. This is the exemplary form in imitation of which a thing is made. It is in this meaning that idea is ordinarily used. Hence, the idea of a thing is the form which a thing imitates.

Note, however, that a thing can imitate a form in two ways. It can imitate it because of the agent's intention, as an artist makes his painting imitate someone whose portrait he is making. It happens at times, however, that such an imitation is not intentional, but happens by chance or by accident. For example, painters frequently paint some thing resembling someone when they have not intended to do so. Now, what imitates a form by chance is not said to be formed according to that form, because according to seems to imply direction to an end. Hence, since the exemplary form or idea is that according to which a thing is formed, the exemplary form or idea should imitate something intentionally, not accidentally.

We see also that a thing acts because of an end in two ways. The agent himself may determine his end—and this is true of all intellectual agents—or the end of the agent may be determined by another principal agent. For example, the flight of an arrow is toward a definite end, but this end is determined by the archer. Similarly, an operation of a nature which is for a definite end presupposes an intellect that has pre-established the end of the nature and ordered it to that end. For this reason, every work of nature is said to be a work of intelligence. Consequently, if a thing imitating something else comes into existence through an agent which has not itself determined the end, the form imitated will not have the character of an exemplar or idea merely because of what has happened. For example, we do not say that the form of the man who generates is the idea or exemplar of the man who is generated; but we use these terms only when an agent acting for an end has determined the end himself—whether the form imitated be within him or outside of him. For we say that the form of art in the artist is the plan or idea of the artistic product, and we also say that form outside the artist is a plan if he imitates it when he makes a thing. This, therefore, seems to constitute the character of an idea: It must be a form which something imitates because of the intention of an agent who antecedently determines the end himself.

Consequently, it is clear that those who say that all things happen by chance cannot admit the existence of ideas. This opinion, however, is criticized by philosophers, because things which happen by chance do not happen uniformly, but happen only in a few instances. We see, however, that the course of nature always, or at least in most cases, proceeds in a uniform manner.

Similarly, those who say that all things proceed from God by a necessity of nature and not by a decision of will cannot admit ideas, because those who act impelled by the necessity of nature do not determine the end for themselves. This cannot be the case here, however, because, if a thing acts for an end but does not determine that end itself, it has its end determined for it by something else superior to it; and thus there would be a cause superior to God. This, of course, is impossible, since all those who speak of God understand Him to be the first cause of beings.

For these reasons, Plato affirmed the existence of ideas, avoiding the opinion of the Epicureans, who asserted that everything happens by chance, and that of Empedocles and others who asserted that everything happens because of a natural necessity. This reason for affirming ideas, namely, on account of the previous planning of the works that are to be done, is suggested by Dionysius, who says: "We say that exemplars in God are the intelligible characters of things that come to be, the individually pre-existing causes of subsistent beings. These, theology calls 'predefinitions. They predetermine and cause godly and good inclinations in creatures. It is according to these that the supersubstance predefines and produces all things." However, because an exemplary form or idea has, in some sense, the nature of an end, and because an artist receives the form by which he acts—if it is outside of him—we cannot say that the divine ideas are outside of God. They can be only within the divine mind, for it is unreasonable to say that God acts on account of an end other than Himself or that He receives that which enables Him to act from a source other than Himself.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The perfection of knowledge can be considered either with reference to the knower or with reference to the thing known. When it is said, therefore, that knowledge by means of an essence is more perfect than that had by means of a likeness, this is to be understood as referring to what is known. For that which is knowable in itself is in itself, known more than that which, not knowable in itself, is known only in so far as it is in a knower by means of its likeness. In this sense, it is not inconsistent to say that created things are less knowable than the divine essence, which is knowable by its very nature.
2. Two things are required for a species which is a medium of knowledge. First, it must represent the thing known. This belongs to a species in so far as it approaches the nature of what is known. Second, it must have a spiritual or immaterial act of existing. This belongs to a species in so far as it has its act of existing in the knower. For this reason, a thing is known better by means of an intellectual species than by means of the species in sense, since the former is more immaterial. Similarly, a thing is known better by means of the species in the divine mind than it could be known by means of its own essence— even granting that the essence of a thing could be the medium of knowledge despite its materiality.
3. Two elements of knowledge must be considered. First, we must consider its nature; and this is determined by the relation of the species to the intellect in which it exists. Second, we must consider the determinate character which the knowledge has with respect to its object; and this follows the relation that the species has to the thing itself. Hence, the more similar the species is as a representation to the thing known, the more determinate is the knowledge; and the more it approaches immateriality, which belongs to the nature of the knower in so far as he knows, the more efficacious it is in the production of knowledge.
4. It is contrary to the nature of natural forms that they should be immaterial in themselves; but it is not inconsistent for them to acquire immateriality from the one in whom they exist. Consequently, in our intellects, the forms of natural things are immaterial. Hence, while it would be incorrect to assert that ideas of natural things have a separate subsistence, it would be correct to say that they are in the divine mind.
5. Strictly speaking, the ideas existing in the divine mind neither generate nor are generated, but rather create or produce things. Hence, Augustine says: "Although they themselves neither begin nor cease to be, nevertheless, whatever can begin or cease to be is said to be informed according to them." Nor is it necessary, when composite things are made, for the first efficient cause to resemble what is generated: this is true only of the proximate efficient cause. Since Plato asserted that the ideas are the proximate principle of generation, the argument mentioned in the difficulty is directed against him.

6. Dionysius wished to say merely that God does not know by means of an idea received from things or in such a manner that He would know a thing differently by means of an idea. For this reason, another translation of this passage reads: "Nor does He by His vision come into contact with individual things." Hence, from this argument, it is not impossible for ideas to exist.

7. Although there can be no proportion between God and a creature, there can be a proportionality, as we have previously shown.

8. Just as God does not need an essence other than His act of existence, because He cannot not be, neither does He need a norm other than Himself, because He cannot know or act in a way that would be faulty. The reason for this perfection is that He is His own norm, just as the reason for the necessity of His existence is that His essence is His act of existence.

9. In God there is no dimensional quantity on whose basis an equality could be established. There is in Him, however, quantity after the manner of intensive quantity. For example, whiteness is said to be great when it attains the perfect fullness of its nature. The intensity of a form, moreover, refers to the manner in which that form is possessed. Now, although that which is divine may in some way be passed on to creatures, we can never grant that a creature possesses it in the same way in which God possesses it. Hence, although we grant that there exists a likeness between a creature and God in some way, we do not grant that they are equal in any way whatsoever.

10. As will be evident to one who carefully considers Anselm's words, Anselm means to say merely that in the Word there exists no likeness drawn from things themselves, but, instead, all the forms of things are taken from the Word. Accordingly, he means that the Word is not a likeness of things, but things are imitations of the Word. Consequently, this argument does not dispense with the ideas, since an idea is a form which something imitates.

11. The statement that God knows Himself in the same way in which He knows other things is true if we are speaking about the way of knowing with reference to the knower. It is not true, however, if we are speaking about the way of knowing with reference to the thing known, because the creature which is known by God is not the same in the real order as the medium by which God knows. But He Himself is really the same as it. Consequently, it does not follow that there is multiplicity in His essence.

ARTICLE II: ARE THERE MANY IDEAS?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 15, 2 44, 3; 47, I, ad 2; I Sentences 36, 2, 2; III Sentences 12, sol. 2; *Contra Gentiles* I, 5 *De potentia*, 16, ad 12—4; *Quolibet* IV, 1, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. The things which are predicated essentially of God are not less true of Him than those which are predicated personally of Him. Now, a plurality of personal properties involves a plurality of persons, and for this reason God is said to be triune. Consequently, since ideas are essential perfections because common to all three Persons, if the number of ideas is determined by the number of things that there are, it follows that there are not only three Persons but an infinite number of them.

2. It was said, however, that ideas are not essential properties, since they are the essence itself.—On the contrary, God's goodness, wisdom, and power are His essence, yet they are

said to be essential attributes. Therefore, even though they are His essence, ideas can be called His essential properties.

3. Whatever is attributed to God should be attributed to Him as existing in the most noble manner possible. Now, God is the principle of all things; hence, whatever pertains to the nobility of a principle should be said to exist in Him in the highest possible degree. However, unity is a perfection of this sort, because, as is said in The Causes: "Every power is more infinite when it has unity than when it is multiplied." Hence, the highest unity is in God. He is, therefore, not only one in reality, but also one in concept, because that which is one in both respects is more one than that which is one merely in one respect. Consequently, many intelligible characters or ideas do not exist in God.

4. The Philosopher says: "What is entirely one cannot be separated either by intellect, time, place, or concept—especially with regard to its substance." Consequently, if God is one in the highest degree because He is being in the highest degree, conceptual distinctions are not applicable to Him; so, our original position stands.

5. If there are many ideas, they must be unequal, because one idea will contain only the act of existence, another, both existence and life, a third, both of these and intellection besides—according as the thing, whose idea it is, resembles God in one or many respects. But, since it is inconsistent to say that there is any inequality in God, it seems that there cannot be many ideas in Him.

6. Material causes can be reduced to one first matter, and efficient and final causes can be reduced in a similar manner. Consequently, formal causes can also be reduced to one first form. The end-term of this reduction, however, will be ideas, because, as Augustine says: "these are the principal forms or intelligible characters of things." Hence, there is only one idea in God.

7. But it was said that, although there is only one first form, ideas are nevertheless said to be many because of the different relations this form has.—On the contrary, it cannot be said that ideas are multiplied because of their relation to God in whom they exist, for He is one; nor can they be multiplied because of their relation to what is made according to them and as these creatures exist in the first cause, since, as Dionysius says, in the first cause creatures exist as one. Finally, ideas cannot be multiplied because of their relation to what is made according to them and as these things exist in their own natures, because creatures are temporal and ideas are eternal. Hence, there is no possible way of saying that the ideas are many because of their relation to the first form.

8. The relation between God and creature does not exist in God; it exists only in the creature. But an idea or exemplar implies a relation of God to a creature. Therefore, that relation is not in God but only in the creature. Now, since the idea is in God, ideas cannot be multiplied by relations of this sort.

9. An intellect that knows by means of many species is composite and moves from one to another. But this way of knowing is far from God's way. Therefore, since ideas are the intelligible characters of things by which God understands, it seems that there are not many ideas in Him.

To the Contrary:

1'. The same thing under the same aspect can, of its very nature, produce only one and the same reality. But God produces many and different things. Hence, God causes things, not according to one concept, but according to many concepts. But the concepts by which God produces things are ideas. Therefore, there are many ideas in God.

2'. Augustine says: "It remains, therefore, that all things are created by plan, but a man not by the same plan as a horse. So to think would be absurd." Each thing is therefore created according to its own plan; hence, there are many ideas.

3'. Augustine says that it is just as wrong to say that the plan which God has of man in general is the same as that of this man in particular as it is to say that the idea of an angle is the same as that of a square. It seems, therefore, that there are many plans in God's ideas.

4'. The Epistle to the Hebrews (i) states: "By faith we understand that the world was framed by the word of God; that from invisible things visible things might be made." Note that he refers to the ideal species as invisible things (plural). Hence, there are many ideas.

5'. The saints have ideas of art and the world, as is clear from the authorities cited. But art implies plurality, for art is a collection of precepts converging toward one end. World has a similar connotation, since it implies the collection of all creatures. Hence, we should affirm the existence of many ideas in God.

REPLY:

While admitting that God acts through His intellect and not under the compulsion of His nature, some have said that He intends only one thing, namely, creature in general, and the distinction between creatures is brought about by secondary causes. They declare that God first established one intelligence that produced three things: a soul, the world, and another intelligence; and by means of this procession a plurality of things issued forth from the one first principle. According to this position, there would, indeed, be an idea in God, but only one common to all creation. The proper idea of each individual thing would exist only in secondary causes. This opinion, Dionysius says, was held by a certain philosopher named Clement, who maintained that higher beings were the archetypes of lower.

This opinion, however, cannot stand, because if the intention of an agent is directed toward one thing only, whatever else that follows is apart from his intention and, as it were, a chance happening, which happens accidentally in conjunction with that which he principally intended. This would make the agent like someone who wants to produce something that is triangular, and whether it is small or large is a matter of indifference to him. Now, to whatever is general some thing special is indirectly connected. Hence, if an agent intends merely something general, in whatever way it is determined by something special it is entirely apart from his intention. For example, if nature intends to generate only an animal, it is apart from nature's intention that what is generated be a man or a horse. Consequently, if God's intention when He acts regards only creatures in general, then all distinction between creatures happens by chance. But it is hardly correct to say that this difference between creatures is related only accidentally to the first cause and essentially to second causes, since what is essential is previous to what is accidental, and the relation of a thing to the first cause is previous to its relation to a second cause, as is clear from The Causes. Consequently, it is impossible for the distinction between creatures to be related only accidentally to the first cause and essentially to a second cause. The opposite, however, can happen; for we see that those things that happen by chance as far as we are concerned are foreknown by God and ordained by Him. Hence, we must say that all the distinction between things is predefined by God. Consequently, we must affirm that intelligible characters proper to individual things exist in God and that for this reason there are in Him many ideas.

From this the plurality of ideas can be understood. A form can exist in the intellect in two ways. First, it can exist there so as to be a principle of the act of understanding, as is the form had by a knower in so far as he understands. This is the likeness of what is understood, existing in him. Second, the form can exist in the intellect so as to be the end-term of the act

of understanding. For example, by understanding an architect thinks out the form of a house; and since that form has been thought out by means of an act of understanding and is, as it were, effected by that act, it cannot be a principle of the act of understanding and thus the first means by which the understanding takes place. It is, instead, the understood, by which the knower makes something. Nevertheless, it is the second means by which understanding takes place, because it is by means of the excogitated form that the architect understands what he is to make. Similarly, with respect to the speculative intellect, we see that the species by which the intellect is informed so that it can actually understand is the first means by which understanding takes place; and because the intellect is brought into act by means of this form, it can now operate and form quiddities of things, as well as compose and divide. Consequently the quiddities formed in the intellect, or even the affirmative and negative propositions are, in a sense, products of the intellect, but products of such a kind that through them the intellect arrives at the knowledge of an exterior thing. Hence, this product is, in a fashion, a second means by which understanding takes place. If, however, the intellect of an artist were to produce a work that resembled itself, then, indeed, the very intellect of the artist would be an idea, not in so far as it is an intellect, but in so far as it is understood.

Now, with respect to those things made in imitation of something else, we sometimes find that they imitate their archetype perfectly. In such a case, the operative intellect when preconceiving the form of what was made, possesses as an idea the very form of the thing imitated precisely as the form of the thing imitated. At other times, however, we find that that which is made in imitation of another is not a perfect imitation. In this case, the operative intellect would not take as its idea or archetype the form of the archetype itself, absolutely and exactly as it is, but it takes it with a definite proportion varying according to the degree of closeness with which the copy imitates the original.

I say, therefore, that God, who makes all things by means of His intellect, produces them all in the likeness of His own essence. Hence, His essence is the idea of things not, indeed, His essence considered as an essence, but considered as it is known. Created things, however, do not perfectly imitate the divine essence. Consequently, His essence as the idea of things is not understood by the divine intellect unqualifiedly, but with the proportion to the divine essence had by the creature to be produced, that is, according as the creature falls short of, or imitates, the divine essence. Now, different things imitate the divine essence in different ways, each one according to its own proper manner, since each has its own act of existence, distinct from that of another. We can say, therefore, that the divine essence is the idea of each and every thing, understanding, of course, the different proportions that things have to it. Hence, since there are in things different proportions to the divine essence, there must necessarily be many ideas. If we consider the essence alone, however, there is but one idea for all things; but if we consider the different proportions of creatures to the divine essence, then there can be said to be a plurality of ideas.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Personal properties introduce a distinction of persons in God because they are opposed to each other by relative opposition. But properties that are not opposed, such as common spiration and paternity, do not distinguish one person from another. Moreover, neither the ideas nor other essential attributes are opposed by relative opposition. Hence, there is no similarity.

2. The same thing is not true of ideas and essential attributes. In their principal meaning, the essential attributes do not signify anything more than the essence of the Creator. Hence, strictly speaking, they are not plural, although God is compared to creatures with reference to them. For example, with reference to His goodness, we say that creatures are good; with

reference to His wisdom, we say that they are will. An idea, however, in its principal meaning signifies something other than God's essence, namely, the proportion a creature has to His essence; and this completes the formal notion of an idea. Because of this there are said to be many ideas. Nevertheless, the ideas may be called essential attributes inasmuch as they are related to the essence.

3. A plurality of concepts is sometimes reduced to a diversity in the thing. For example, there is a rational distinction between Socrates and Socrates sitting, and this is reduced to the difference that there is between substance and accident. Similarly, man and animal differ rationally; and this difference is reduced to the difference between form and matter, because genus is taken from matter but the specific difference from form. Consequently, such a conceptual difference is repugnant to the highest unity or simplicity. On the other hand, a conceptual difference sometimes is reduced not to any diversity in the thing, but to its truth, which can be understood in different ways. It is in this sense that we say that there is a plurality of intelligible characters in God. Hence, this plurality is not repugnant to His highest unity or simplicity.

4. In this passage, the Philosopher speaks of intelligible characters as definitions. But we cannot talk of there being many intelligible characters in God as though these were definitions, for none of these comprehends the divine essence. Hence, this passage is not to the point.

5. The form in the intellect has a double relationship. It is related not only to the thing whose form it is, but also to the intellect in which it exists. On the basis of its first relation, the form is not said to be of a certain kind but rather of a certain thing, for the intellectual form of material things is not a material form, nor is the intellectual form of sensible things sensible. It is on the basis of its second relationship that the intellectual form is said to be "of a certain kind," because its kind is determined by that in which it exists. Hence, from the fact that some of the things of which ideas are had imitate the divine essence more perfectly than others, it does not follow that the ideas are unequal, but that they are ideas of unequal things.

6. The one first form to which all things are reduced is the divine essence, considered in itself. Reflecting upon this essence, the divine intellect devises—if I may use such an expression different ways in which it can be imitated. The plurality of ideas comes from these different ways.

7. The ideas are multiplied according to the different relations they have to things existing in their own natures. It is not necessary that these relations be temporal even if the things are temporal, because the action of the intellect—even of the human intellect—can extend to something even when it does not exist, as, for example, when we know the past. Moreover, as is said in the Metaphysics, a relation follows upon action; hence, even relations to temporal things are eternal in the divine intellect.

8. The relation existing between God and creature is not a real relation in God. However, it is in God according to our manner of understanding Him; similarly, it can be in Him according to His own manner of understanding Himself, that is, in so far as He understands the relation things have to His essence. Thus, these relations exist in God as known by Him.

9. An idea does not have the character of that by which a thing is first understood, but, rather, of that which is understood and is existing in the intellect. Moreover, whether or not there is to be but one form in the understanding is determined by the Unity of that by which a thing is first understood, just as the unity of an action is determined by the unity of the form of the agent which is its principle. Hence, although the relations understood by God are many (and it is in these relations that the plurality of ideas consists), nevertheless, because He understands all things by means of His essence, His understanding is not multiple but one.

ARTICLE III: DO IDEAS BELONG TO SPECULATIVE OR ONLY TO PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 14, 16; 15, I Sentences 36, 2, 3; *De div. nom.*, c. 5, *lectura* 3 (P. 15:352a seq.); *De potentia* 1., ad 10-11; 3, 1, ad 13.

Difficulties:

It seems that they belong only to practical knowledge, for According to Augustine: "Ideas are the principal forms of things, according to which everything is formed that has a beginning or an end." But, since nothing is formed by reason of speculative knowledge, ideas do not belong to this type of knowledge.

2. It was said, however, that ideas are related not only to those things which have a beginning or an end, but also to those which can have a beginning or end, as Augustine says in the same passage. Consequently, ideas are related to those things which do not exist, will not exist, and never have existed, but nevertheless can exist. of these, God has speculative knowledge.—On the contrary, practical knowledge is said to be that knowledge according to which one knows how a thing is done, even if he never intends to do it. This is why part of medical study is called practical. Now, God knows how the things which He can make are to be made, even though He does not intend to make them. Therefore, God has practical knowledge of them. Hence, in both ways, ideas pertain to practical knowledge.

3. An idea is nothing but the exemplary form. Now, one can speak of the exemplary form only in connection with practical knowledge, because an exemplar is that upon which a thing else is modeled. Therefore, ideas pertain only to practical knowledge.

4. According to the Philosopher, the practical intellect pertains to those things whose principles are within us. But the ideas existing in the divine intellect are principles of the things that are modeled on the ideas. Therefore, they belong to the practical intellect.

5. All the forms in the intellect either are from things or have a relation to things. The latter type of forms belongs to the practical intellect; the former, to the speculative. But no forms in the divine intellect are from things, since it receives nothing from things. Therefore, the forms in the divine intellect have a relation to things, and thus belong to the practical intellect.

6. If in God an idea of the practical intellect were other than an idea of the speculative intellect, this diversity could not be based on something absolute in Him; for everything of this kind in God is one and one only; nor could it be based on a relation of identity such as exists when a thing is said to be identical with itself, because such a relation involves no plurality. Finally, it could not be based on a relation of diversity, since a cause is not multiplied even when its effects are multiple. Therefore, there is no possible way of distinguishing an idea of speculative knowledge from an idea of practical knowledge.

7. But it was said that these ideas are distinguished because a practical idea is a principle of being, while a speculative idea is a principle of knowing.—On the contrary, principles of being and of knowing are the same. Therefore, a speculative idea cannot be distinguished from a practical idea on the basis suggested.

8. God's speculative knowledge seems to be the same as His simple knowledge. God's simple knowledge, however, is nothing other than bare knowledge. Now, since an idea adds a relation to things, it seems that an idea does not belong to His speculative knowledge but only to His practical knowledge.

9. The end of the practical intellect is the good. Now, the reference of an idea can be determined only to a good; for, if evil occurs, that is outside of God's intention. Consequently, an idea pertains only to the practical intellect.

To the Contrary:

1'. Practical knowledge extends only to those things which are to be made. But by His ideas God knows not only what things are to be made, but also those things that are made and have been made. Therefore, ideas are not restricted merely to practical knowledge.

2'. God knows creatures more perfectly than an artist knows the products of his craftsmanship. But by means of the forms through which he acts, an artist, who is merely a creature, has speculative knowledge of his handicraft. How much more must this be true of God.

3'. Speculative knowledge is that which considers the principles and causes of things, as well as their properties. But by ideas God knows all that can be known of things. Therefore, the divine ideas pertain not only to practical, but also to speculative knowledge.

REPLY:

As is said in *The Soul*: "Practical knowledge differs from speculative knowledge in its end." For the end of speculative knowledge is simply truth, but the end of practical knowledge, as we read in *the Metaphysics*, is action. Now, some knowledge is called practical because it is directed to a work. This happens in two ways. In the first way, it is directed in act—that is, when it is actually directed to a certain work, as the form is which an artist preconceives and intends to introduce into matter. This is called actual practical knowledge and is the form by which knowledge takes place. At other times, however, there is a type of knowledge that is capable of being ordered to an act, but this ordering is not actual. For example, an artist thinks out a form for his work, knows how it can be made, yet does not intend to make it. This is practical knowledge, not actual, but habitual or virtual. At still other times, knowledge is utterly incapable of being ordered to execution. Such knowledge is purely speculative. This also happens in two ways. First, the knowledge is about those things whose natures are such that they cannot be produced by the knowledge of the knower, as is true for example, when we think about natural things. Second, it may happen that the thing known is something that is producible through knowledge but is not considered as producible; for thing is given existence through a productive operation, and there are certain realities that can be separated in understanding although they cannot exist separately. Therefore, when we consider a thing which is capable of production through the intellect and distinguish from each other realities that cannot exist separately, this knowledge is not practical knowledge, either actual or habitual, but only speculative. This is the kind of knowledge a craftsman has when he thinks about a house by reflecting only on its genus, differences, properties, and other things of this sort which have no separate existence in the thing itself. But a thing is considered as something capable of execution when there are considered in its regard all the things that are simultaneously required for its existence.

God's knowledge is related to things in these four ways. Since His knowledge causes things, He knows some things by ordaining by a decree of His will that they come into existence at a certain time of these things. He has actual practical knowledge. Moreover, He knows other things which He never intends to make, for He knows those things which do not exist, have not existed, and never will exist, as we said in the preceding question of these things. He has actual knowledge, not actually practical knowledge, however, but merely virtually practical. Again, since He knows the things which He makes or is able to make, not only as they exist in their own act of existence, but also according to all the notes which the human intellect can find in them by analysis, He knows things that He can make even under an aspect in which

they are incapable of execution. Finally, He knows certain things of which His knowledge cannot be the cause—evils, for example. Therefore, it is very true to say that there is both practical and speculative knowledge in God.

Now we must see which of the preceding ways is proper to the ideas which must be attributed to God's knowledge. As Augustine says, if we consider the proper meaning of the word itself, an idea is a form; but if we consider what the thing itself is, then an idea is an intelligible character or likeness of a thing. We find, moreover, in certain forms, a double relation: one relation to that which is informed by these forms, and this is the kind of relation that knowledge has to the knower; another to that which is outside, and this is the kind of a relation that knowledge has to what is known. This latter relationship, however, is not common to all forms, as the first is. Therefore, the word form implies only the first relation. This is why a form always has the nature of a cause, for a form is, in a sense, the cause of that which it informs—whether this informing takes place by inherence, as it does in the case of intrinsic forms, or by imitation, as it does in the case of exemplary forms. But an intelligible character and a likeness also have the second relationship, which does not give them the nature of a cause. If we speak, therefore, of an idea, considering only the notion that is properly conveyed by that word, then an idea includes only that kind of knowledge according to which a thing can be made. This is knowledge that is actually practical, or merely virtually practical, which, in some way, is speculative. On the other hand, if we call an idea an intelligible character or likeness in a will sense, then an idea can also pertain to purely speculative knowledge. Or, if we will to speak more formally, we should say that an idea belongs to knowledge that is practical, either actually or virtually; but an intelligible character or likeness belongs to both practical and speculative knowledge.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Augustine is referring the formative action of ideas not only to those things which are made but also to those which can be made. For, even if these latter never exist, they are, in a certain sense, known, speculatively, as is clear from what has been said.
- 2.** This argument refers only to knowledge which is practical virtually, not actually. Nothing prevents us from calling this speculative in some sense in so far as it falls short of actual execution.
- 3.** Although an exemplar implies a relation to something outside, it is related as a cause to that extrinsic thing. Therefore, properly speaking, it belongs to knowledge that is practical, either habitually or virtually. But an exemplar is not necessarily restricted to that which is actually practical, because a thing can be called an exemplar merely if something else can be made in imitation of it—even though this other thing is never made. The same is true of ideas.
- 4.** The practical intellect pertains to those things whose principles are within us not in any manner whatsoever, but as being capable of being executed by us. Hence, as is evident from what we have said, we can also have speculative knowledge of those things whose causes are within us.
- 5.** The speculative intellect is not differentiated from the practical because one has its forms from things, and the other, forms related to things, because our practical intellect, at times, also receives its forms from things, as happens, for example, when an artist, having seen some work of art, conceives a form according to which he intends to make something. Therefore, it is not necessary, either, that all the forms which pertain to the speculative intellect be received from things.
- 6.** God's practical and speculative ideas should not be distinguished as though they were two kinds of ideas. They are distinguished by cause, according to our way of understanding, to the

speculative idea the practical adds a relation to an operation. It is just as we say that man adds rational to animal, even though man and animal are not two things.

7. Principles of being and principles of knowing are said to be the same, because whatever is a principle of being is also a principle of knowing. The opposite, however, is not true, since effects are not in frequently principles of knowing causes. Consequently, there is no reason why the forms of the speculative intellect should not be merely principles of knowing, while the forms of the practical intellect are principles both of knowing and of being.

8. We speak of God's simple knowledge, not to exclude the relation which His knowledge has to what He knows, for such a relation is inseparably joined to all knowledge, but to exclude from it things that are outside the genus of knowledge. Such things are the existence of things (which is added by His knowledge of vision) and the relation of His will to the things that He knows and will produce (which is added by His knowledge of approval). It is just as we call fire a simple body, not to deny that it has essential parts, but rather to exclude foreign elements from its definition.

9. The true and the good include each other, since the true is a good and every good is true. Therefore, the good can be considered speculatively when only its truth is considered. For example, we can define the good and show what its nature is. But the good can also be considered practically if it is considered as a good, that is, as an end of a motion or operation. Consequently, it clearly does not follow that the ideas or likenesses or intelligible characters in the divine intellect belong only to practical knowledge simply because they have a relation terminating in a good.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. Time has no ebb or flow in God, because His eternity, which is entirely simultaneous, includes all time. Hence, He knows the past, present, and future in the same way. This is precisely what Ecclesiasticus (23:29) says: "For all things were known to the Lord God, before they were created: so also after they were perfected he beholdeth all things." Hence, it is not necessary that an idea properly so called should exceed the limits of practical knowledge merely because the past is known by means of it.

2'. If the knowledge of his handicraft which an artist, who is a creature, has by means of forms referred to action is a knowledge of his work as it can be produced, although he does not intend to produce it, then that knowledge is not speculative in all respects but is habitually practical. But that knowledge by which the artist knows works, not, however, as he can produce them, is purely speculative. It does not contain ideas corresponding to the work, although it might possibly contain likenesses or intelligible characters of it.

3'. Both speculative and practical knowledge are had by means of principles and causes. Consequently, this argument cannot prove that a science is speculative or that it is practical.

ARTICLE IV: IS THERE IN GOD AN IDEA OF EVIL?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 2, I5 Summa Theol., 1, 14, 10; 15, 3, ad I; I Sentences 36, 1, 2; Contra Gentiles 1,71; Quolibet XI, 2, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that there is, for

2. God knows evil things in His science of simple knowledge. But the ideas belong to His science of simple knowledge in some way if idea is taken in its broader meaning of a likeness or intelligible character. Therefore, there is an idea of evil in God.

2. There is no reason why evil cannot be in a good not opposed to it. Now, the likeness of evil is not opposed to the good, just as the likeness of black is not opposed to white, because the species of contraries in the soul are not contrary. Therefore, there is no reason why there cannot be an idea or likeness of evil in God, even though He is the highest good.

3. Wherever there is any community, there is likeness. Now, from the fact that a thing is a privation of being, being can be predicated of it; hence it is said in the Metaphysics that negations and privations are called beings. Therefore, from the fact that evil is the privation of good, some likeness of it exists in God, who is the highest good.

4. Whatever is known in itself has its idea in God. But the false, like the true, is known in itself; for, just as first principles are known in themselves in their truth, so also are the opposites of these principles known in themselves in their falsity. Hence, the false has its idea in God. Now, the false is a kind of evil, just as the true is the good of the intellect, as we read in the Ethics. Therefore, evil has an idea in God.

5. Whatever has a nature has an idea in God. Now, since vice is the contrary of virtue, it has a nature which belongs to the genus of quality. Therefore, it has an idea in God. But because it is vice, it is evil. Therefore, evil has an idea in God.

6. If evil has no idea, the only reason for this is that evil is non-being. But the forms by which one knows can have non-beings as their objects. There is nothing to prevent us, for example, from imagining golden mountains or chimeras. Therefore, there is no reason why evil cannot have an idea in God.

7. If a thing has no mark upon it and exists among other things that are marked, the very lack of a mark becomes its mark, as is clear in sheep which are marked. Now, an idea is, in a way, a sign of that of which it is an idea. Therefore, since all good things have an idea in God, and evil does not, evil itself should be said to be modeled upon or formed in the likeness of an idea.

8. Whatever comes from God has its idea in Him. But evil, that is, the evil of punishment, comes from God. Therefore, it has an idea in God.

To the Contrary:

1'. All effects of an idea have an act of existence determined by that idea. But evil does not have a determined act of existence, since it does not have any existence, and is, instead, a privation of being. Therefore, evil does not have an idea in God.

2'. According to Dionysius, the divine exemplar or idea is a pre definition of the divine will. But the divine will is related only to what is good. Therefore, evil has no exemplar in God.

3'. "Evil," according to Augustine, "is the privation of form, measure, and order." Now, Plato says that ideas themselves are beautiful. Consequently, evil can have no idea.

REPLY:

As pointed out previously, an idea, according to its proper nature, implies a form that is the principle of informing a thing. Consequently, since there is nothing in God that can be a principle of evil, evil can not have an idea in God if idea is taken in its proper sense. This is like will true if it is taken in its broad sense as meaning a likeness or intelligible character, because, as Augustine says, evil gets its name from the fact that it lacks form. Hence, since a likeness is considered as a form that is in some way shared by others, evil can have no like

ness in God, because a thing is called evil for the very reason that it falls short of any participation in divinity.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. God's science of simple knowledge has as its object, not only evil, but also certain good things that do not exist, will not exist, and never did exist. It is with respect to these non-existing things that there is an idea in God's simple knowledge, but there is no idea in it of evil things.
2. We deny that evil has an exemplar in God, not just because of its opposition, but because evil has no nature through which it could in some way participate in something that is in God and which could, therefore, be called a likeness of it.
3. That community by which something is predicated both of being and of non-being is a community merely of reason, because negations and privations are merely beings of reason. Such a community is not enough for the likeness of which we are now speaking.
4. That this principle, "No whole is greater than its part," is false is a truth. Therefore, to know that it is false is to know something true. However, the falsity of this principle is known only by its privation of truth, just as blindness is known by its being a privation of sight.
5. Just as evil actions are good in so far as they have existence and come from God, so also in this sense are the habits good which are the principles or effects of these actions. Therefore, the fact that they are bad does not posit any nature but only a privation.
6. A thing is called a non-being for two reasons. First, because non-existence is included in its definition; and this is why blindness is called non-being. It is impossible to conceive, either in our imagination or in our intellect, any form for such non-beings; and evil is a non-being of this type. Second, because the non-being is not found in the realm of nature, even though the privation of existence is not included in its definition. Here, however, there is no reason why we cannot imagine such non-beings and conceive their forms.
7. Because evil has no idea in God, God knows it by means of the idea of the good opposed to it. In this way, evil is related to His knowledge as though it had an idea—not that the privation of an idea stands in the place of an idea, however, because there can be no privation in God.
8. The evil of punishment proceeds from God as part of His order of justice. Hence, it is good and has an idea in Him.

ARTICLE V: IS THERE IN GOD AN IDEA OF FIRST MATTER?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 15, 3, ad I Sentences 36, 1, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. According to Augustine: "An idea is a form." But matter has no form. Therefore, in God there is no idea corresponding to matter.
2. Matter is merely a being in potency. Now, if an idea has to correspond to its effect, if matter has an idea, the idea of matter will be merely in potency. There is, however, no potentiality in God. Therefore, first matter has no idea in Him.
3. As they exist in God, the ideas are of those things which are or can be. But first matter does not exist separately, that is, by itself, nor can it so exist. Therefore, it has no idea in God.

4. An idea is that according to which a thing is informed. But first matter can never be informed so that a form would belong to its essence. Therefore, if it did have an idea, that idea would be useless in God. This, however, is absurd.

To the Contrary:

1'. Whatever derives its act of existence from God has an idea in God. Matter belongs to this class of beings. Therefore, it has an idea in God.

2 Every essence is derived from the divine essence. Therefore, whatever has an essence has an exemplar in God. Matter belongs to this class of beings. Therefore.

REPLY:

Plato, who was the first to speak about ideas, did not posit any idea for first matter, because he asserted that the ideas were the causes of the things modeled upon them, and first matter is not caused by an idea but, instead, is its co-cause. For he said that there are two principles to be found in matter, "the great" and "the small," but only one principle to be found in form, namely, the idea. We, however, assert that matter is caused by God. Hence, it is necessary to affirm that its exemplar in some way exists in God, since He possesses a likeness of whatever He causes.

On the other hand, if we take idea in its strict sense, we cannot say that first matter of itself has an idea in God that is distinct from the idea of the form or of the composite. For an idea, properly speaking, is related to a thing in so far as it can be brought into existence; and matter cannot come into existence without a form, nor can a form come into existence without matter. Hence, properly speaking, there is no idea corresponding merely to matter or merely to form; but one idea corresponds to the entire composite an idea that causes the whole, both its form and its matter. On the other hand, if we take idea in its broader sense as meaning an intelligible character or likeness, then both matter and form of themselves can be said to have an idea by which they can be known distinctly, even though they cannot exist separately. In this sense, there is no reason why there cannot be an idea of first matter, even taken in itself.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although first matter has no form, there is in it an imitation of the first form; for, even though its act of existence may be very feeble, it is an imitation of the first being. For this reason, its likeness can be in God.

2. The idea and its copy need not be similar according to a conformity in nature. It is enough that one represent the other. For this reason, the idea of even composite things is simple, and, similarly, the idea of a potential being is actual.

3. Even though matter cannot exist by itself, it can be considered in itself. Thus, it can, in itself, have a likeness.

4. That argument refers to the idea inasmuch as it is actually or virtually practical, and is related to a thing in so far as it can be brought into being. First matter does not have an idea of this kind.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. Matter derives its act of existence from God only in so far as it is part of a composite. In this sense, it does not, properly speaking, have an idea in God.

2'. Similarly, matter does not properly have an essence. It is, rather, part of the essence of the whole.

ARTICLE VI: ARE THERE IDEAS IN GOD OF THOSE THINGS WHICH DO NOT EXIST, WILL NOT EXIST, AND HAVE NOT EXISTED?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 1, ad 2. See also readings given for q. 2, a. 8.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. Nothing has an idea in God unless it has a determinate act of existence. But that which does not exist, never has existed, and never will exist has no determinate act of existence at all. Therefore, neither does it have an idea in God.
2. But it was said that, even though it does not have a determinate act of existence in itself, it has, nevertheless, such a determinate act in God. —On the contrary, a thing is determinate in so far as it is distinguished from another. But all things as they exist in God are one and are not distinct from each other. Therefore, even in God it does not have a determinate act of existence.
3. According to Dionysius, exemplars are those good acts of the divine will which cause and predetermine things. But the things which are not, have not been, nor will be were never predetermined by the divine will. Therefore, they do not have an idea or exemplar in God.
4. An idea is ordained to the production of a thing. If there is, there fore, an idea of something which will never be given existence, it seems that such an idea is useless. But this would be absurd. Therefore.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. God knows things by means of ideas. But as we said above, He knows those things which are not, have not been, nor will be. There fore, there is an idea in God of all that does not exist, has not existed, and never will exist.
- 2'. A cause does not depend on its effect. Now, an idea is a cause of the existence of things. Therefore, it does not depend in any way on their existence. Consequently, there can be ideas of those things which do not exist, have not existed, and never will exist.

REPLY:

Properly speaking, an idea belongs to practical knowledge that is not only actually but also habitually practical. Therefore, since God has virtually practical knowledge of those things which He could make, even though He never makes them or never will make them, there must be ideas of those things which are not, have not been, nor will be. But these ideas will not be the same as those of the things which are, have been, or will be, because the divine will determines to produce the things that are, have been, and will be, but not to produce those which neither are, have been, nor will be. The latter, therefore, have, in a certain sense, indeterminate ideas.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Even though that which never existed, does not exist, and will not exist lacks a determined act of existence in itself, it exists determinately in God's knowledge.

2. It is one thing to be in God, another to be in His knowledge. Evil is not in God; it is, however, contained in His knowledge. Now, a thing is said to be in God's knowledge if God knows it; and because God knows all things distinctly, as we said in the previous question, things are distinct in His knowledge even though in Him they are one.

3. Even though God may never will to bring into existence things of this class, whose ideas He possesses, He wills that He be able to produce them and that He possess the knowledge necessary for producing them. Consequently, Dionysius is saying that the nature of an exemplar demands, not a will that is predefining and effecting, but merely a will that can define and effect.

4. Those ideas are not directed by God's knowledge to the production of something in their likeness, but rather to this, that something can be produced in their likeness.

ARTICLE VII: ARE THERE IN GOD IDEAS OF ACCIDENTS?

Parallel readings: [Summa Theol., I, 15, 3, ad I Sentences 36, 1, 1.](#)

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. An idea is for knowing and causing things. But an accident is known by means of its substance, and is caused by the principles of the substance. Hence, it need not have an idea in God.

2. But it was stated that the existence, not the essence, of an accident is known by means of its subject.—On the contrary, the definition of thing signifies what it is, especially by giving its genus. But, in the definitions of accidents, as is said in the Metaphysics, are placed substance and the subject, in the sense in which subject is used instead of the genus, as the Commentator notes. For example, we say: "Snub means a curved nose." Consequently, we know the essence of an accident by knowing the substance.

3. Whatever has an idea participates in it. But accidents do not participate in anything, because participation is proper only to substances since they alone can receive something. Accidents, therefore, do not have ideas.

4. In regard to those things that are predicated as prior and subsequent, in Plato's opinion an idea should not be taken as common, e.g., as applied to numbers and geometrical figures. This is clear from the Metaphysics and Ethics. The reason for this is that the first is, as it were, the exemplar of the second. Now, being is predicated of substance and accident as prior and subsequent. Therefore, an accident does not have an idea, but has substance in the place of an idea.

To the Contrary:

1'. Whatever is caused by God has its idea in God. Now, God causes not only substances but accidents as well. Therefore, accidents have an idea in God.

2'. Every inferior of a genus should be reduced to the first of that genus, just as everything that is hot is reduced to the heat of fire. Now, as Augustine says: "Ideas are principal forms." Consequently, since accidents are forms, it seems that they have ideas in God.

REPLY:

As the Philosopher says, Plato, who first introduced the notion of ideas, posited ideas, not for accidents, but only for substances. The reason for this was that Plato thought that the ideas were the proximate causes of things. Hence, when he found a proximate cause other than an idea for a thing, he held that the thing did not have an idea. This also is the reason why he said that there is no common idea for those things that are predicated as being prior and subsequent, but that the first is the idea of the second. Dionysius also mentions this opinion, attributing it to a certain Clement the Philosopher, who said that superior beings were the exemplars for inferior. Using this argument, namely, that accidents are caused directly by substances, Plato did not posit ideas of accidents.

On the other hand, since we affirm that God is the direct cause of each and every thing because He works in all secondary causes and since all secondary effects are results of His predefinition, we posit ideas in Him not only of first beings but also of second beings, and, consequently, both of substances and of accidents, but of different accidents in different ways.

First, there are proper accidents, which are caused by the principles of their subjects and never have existence apart from their subjects. These accidents are brought into existence together with their subject by one operation. Consequently, since an idea, properly speaking, is a form of something that can be made, considered precisely under this aspect, there will not be distinct ideas of such accidents. There will be only one idea, that of the subject with all its accidents—just as an architect has one form of a house and of all the accidents that pertain to a house as such, and by means of this one form brings into being the house and all its accidents, such as its square shape and the like.

There are other accidents, however, that are not inseparable from their subject and do not depend on its principles. These are brought into existence by an operation other than that by which the subject is produced. For example, it does not follow from the fact that a man is made a man that he is a grammarian; this is the result of another operation. Now, the ideas in God of such accidents are distinct from the idea of the subject, just as the form of a picture of a house, which an artist conceives, is distinct from the form he conceives of the house itself.

If we take idea in its broader sense, however, as meaning a likeness, then we can say that both types of accidents have distinct ideas in God, because He can know each one in itself distinctly. This is why the Philosopher says that, with respect to their manner of being known, accidents should, like substances, have ideas; but with respect to the other reasons why Plato posited exemplars, namely, to be the causes of generation and of being, it seems that only substances have ideas.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. As we said above, there is in God an idea not only of first effects but also of second effects. Hence, even though accidents have their act of existence by means of substances, this does not prevent their having ideas.
2. An accident can be taken in two ways. First, it can be taken in the abstract. In this way, it is considered according to its proper nature, a genus and species are given it, and its subject is not placed in its definition as a genus but rather as a specific difference. In this sense we say: "Snubness is a curvature of the nose." On the other hand, an accident can be taken in the concrete. In this way, it is considered according as it has an accidental unity with its subject. Hence, neither a genus nor a species is assigned to it. Here it is true that the subject is put in the place of the genus in the definition of an accident.
3. Although an accident is not that which participates, it is, however, a participation. Hence, it is clear that in God there is an idea or likeness corresponding to it.
4. The response to this difficulty is clear from what has been said.

ARTICLE VIII: ARE THERE IN GOD IDEAS OF SINGULARS?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 15., ad *De veritate*, 2, aa. 4-5.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. Singulars are potentially infinite in number. Now, in God there is an idea, not merely of what exists, but also of what can exist. If, therefore, there were ideas of singulars in God, there would be an infinite number of ideas in Him. This seems absurd, since they could not be actually infinite.
2. If singulars have ideas in God, either there is one idea for the individual and the species, or there are distinct ideas for them. If there were distinct ideas, then there would be many ideas in God for one thing, because the idea of the species is also that of the individual. On the other hand, if there is but one and the same idea for the individual and the species, then, since all the individuals of the same species have the same idea, there would be only one idea for all, and, consequently, singulars would not have distinct ideas in God.
3. Many singulars happen by chance. Now, such beings are not predefined. Since, as is evident from what has been said previously, namely, that an idea postulates predefinition, it seems that not all singulars have an idea in God.
4. Certain singulars are combinations of two species. For example, a mule is a combination of a horse and an ass. Now, if such things had ideas in God, it would seem that there would be two ideas for each one. This seems absurd, since it is unreasonable to affirm multiplicity in the cause and unity in the effect.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. Ideas are in God for the purpose of knowing and making. But God is one who knows and makes singulars. Therefore, there are in God ideas of singulars.
- 2'. Ideas are directed to the existence of things. But singulars have acts of existence more truly than universals do, because the latter subsist only in singulars. Therefore, it is more necessary for singulars to have exemplars than it is for universals.

REPLY:

Plato did not posit ideas of singulars but only of species. There were two reasons for this. First, according to him, ideas did not cause the matter but only the forms of things here below. Now, the principle of individuation is matter, and it is because of the form that each singular is placed under a species. Consequently, his ideas did not correspond to a singular in so far as it is singular but only by reason of its species. His second reason may have been this: An idea is related only to those things that are intended directly, as is clear from what was said. But the intention of nature is principally to preserve the species. Consequently, even though generation terminates in this or in that man, the intention of nature is simply to generate man. For this reason, the Philosopher also says that final causes should be assigned for the accidents common to a species, but not for the accidents found in singulars. For the latter, only efficient and material causes can be assigned; consequently, an idea does not correspond to a singular but to a species. Using the same argument, moreover, Plato did not posit ideas for genera, alleging that nature does not intend to produce the form of a genus but only that of a species. We, however, assert that God is the cause of singulars, both of their form and of

their matter. We also assert that all individual things are determined by His divine providence. Hence, we must also posit ideas for all singulars.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Ideas are multiplied only in so far as they have different relations to things. As Avicenna says, however, it is not contradictory to multiply conceptual relations infinitely.
2. If we speak of idea in the proper sense, namely, inasmuch as it is the idea of a thing in so far as that thing is capable of being produced, then there is but one idea for the singular, the species, the genus, and for whatever is individuated in that singular, because Socrates the man and Socrates the animal do not have separate acts of existence. If, however, we are speaking of idea in its broader sense of a likeness or intelligible character, then, since the considerations of Socrates as Socrates, as a man, and as an animal all differ, a number of ideas or likenesses will correspond to him in this respect.
3. Although some things may happen by chance with respect to their proximate agent, nothing happens by chance with respect to the agent who knows all things beforehand.
4. The mule has a separate species, halfway between that of a horse and that of an ass. Therefore, the mule is not in two species but in one. This fact is due to the mixture of seeds, because the generative powers of the male cannot bring the material provided by the female to the perfection of his own species, since the material is outside his own species; so, instead, the male brings it to a term that is close to his species. For this reason, a separate idea is assigned to the mule and to the horse.

QUESTION 4: The Divine Word

ARTICLE I: CAN THERE BE A WORD, PROPERLY SPEAKING, IN GOD?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, I; I-II, 3, I, ad I Sentences 27, 2, 1; De potentia 9,9, ad 7-8; Quodlibet IV., 6, ad 1; Comp. Theol., I, CC. 37-44.

Difficulties:

It seems that there cannot be, for

1. There are two kinds of words: exterior and interior. An exterior word cannot be predicated properly of God since it is material and passing. Nor can an interior word be predicated of God, for Damascene defines it as follows: "Speech that is internally expressed is a motion of the soul, produced in the process of thinking, and not orally enunciated." Now, motion or a process of thinking cannot be said to exist in God. Hence, it seems that there cannot be a word, properly speaking, in Him.
2. Augustine proves that some word belongs to the mind, because something is also said to be the mouth of the mind, as is evident in the Gospel according to St. Matthew (15:18): "But the things which proceed out of the mouth... these defile a man." That this means the mouth of the heart is clear from what follows: "But the things which proceed out of the mouth, come forth from the heart" (15: 18). Now, a mouth cannot be predicated of spiritual things except metaphorically. Hence, neither can a word.
3. That the Word is a medium between the creator and creatures is shown from St. John (1:3) where we read: "all things were made by him." From this passage, Augustine proves that the

Word is not a creature. Using the same proof, we can show that the Word is not the creator. Consequently, the Word affirms nothing which is in God.

4. A medium is equidistant from extremes. Now, if the Word is the medium between the Father who utters and the creature which is uttered, the Word should be essentially distinct from the Father, since He is essentially distinct from creatures. But there is nothing in the divine Persons which is distinguished by the divine essence. Hence, a word, properly speaking, cannot be in God.

5. Whatever belongs to the Son in so far as He is incarnate is not properly predicated of God, as, for example, to be man, to walk, or anything of this sort. But being the Word belongs to the Son only in so far as He is incarnate, because it is the nature of a word to manifest the one who is speaking. The Son, however, manifests the Father only in so far as the Son is incarnate, just as our words manifest our understanding only in so far as they are expressed vocally. Hence, a word, properly speaking, does not exist in God.

6. If the Word, properly speaking, existed in God, the Word existing eternally in the Father and that which was made Incarnate in time would be the same—just as we say that b is the same Son. But it seems that we cannot say this, because the Incarnate Word is compared to a word vocally expressed; the Word existing in the Father, however, is compared to a mental word. This is clear from what Augustine has written. Now, the word that is vocally expressed is not the same as that existing in the heart. Therefore, it does not seem that the Word which is said to have existed eternally in the Father properly pertains to the divine nature.

7. The later in a series an effect occurs, the more does it have the nature of a sign. For example, will is the final cause of a will jar, and, more remotely, of the circular tag which is attached to the jar as a marker; for this reason, the tag is more truly a sign than the jar is. Now, a word that is vocally expressed is the last effect of the procession from the intellect. Consequently, the nature of a sign belongs to the vocal word more than to the mental concept, and, similarly, the nature of a word belongs more to the external expression from the fact that it manifests something. Now, whatever exists in its primary sense in material things and not in spiritual things is not properly predicated of God. Therefore, a word cannot be properly predicated of God. 8. Every noun especially signifies that from which it has been derived. But *verbum* (word) is derived either from *verberatio aeris* (a disturbing of the air) or from *boatus* (shout), so that *verbum* means simply *verum boans* (shouting what is true). Hence, this is what is especially signified by the noun *verbum*. Now, this cannot be said to be in God except metaphorically. Therefore, a word, properly speaking, is not in God.

9. The word that one says seems to be a likeness of the thing spoken, existing in the speaker. But when the Father knows Himself, He knows Himself not by means of a likeness, but by means of His essence. Consequently, it seems that by intuiting Himself the Father does not generate a word of Himself. "Now, will reference to the Highest Spirit, to speak means simply to intuit in thought," as Anselm says. Hence, a word, properly speaking, does not exist in God.

10. Whenever anything resembling a creature is predicated of God, it is not predicated of Him properly, but only metaphorically. Now, as Augustine says, the Word in God resembles the word which is in us. Hence, it seems that a word can be predicated of God metaphorically, but not properly.

11. Basil says that God is called the Word because all things are uttered by Him, and that He is called the wisdom by which all things are known, and the light by which all things are made manifest. However, to utter is not properly predicated of God, because uttering pertains to the voice. Consequently, word is not predicated of God in its proper sense.

12. The vocal word is related to the Incarnate Word as the mental word is related to the eternal Word. This is clear from Augustine. The vocal word, however, is predicated only

metaphorically of the Word Incarnate. Hence, the interior word is also predicated only metaphorically of the eternal Word.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "The Word which we are trying to make you understand is knowledge will love." Now, knowledge and love are predicated of God in their proper sense. Hence, so is the Word.

2'. Augustine says: "The word which is heard exteriorly is a sign of the word shining within; and to this latter the name word more properly belongs. For the vocalization of the word by a physical mouth is merely the voice of the word; and it also is called a word because of that from which it has been taken in order that the interior word might itself appear externally." It is clear from this that the term word belongs more properly to the spiritual than to the material word. Now, whatever is found more properly in spiritual things than in material things most properly belongs to God. Therefore, word is predicated of God in its most proper sense.

3'. Richard of St. Victor says that a word manifests the meaning of one who is will. But the Son manifests the meaning of the Father in the truest way possible. Hence, word is predicated of God in the most proper sense.

4'. According to Augustine, the word is "thought, fully formed." Now, God's contemplation is never capable of formation, but is always fully formed, since it is always in act. Consequently, a word, in the most proper sense, is predicated of God.

5'. Among the types of oneness, that which is most simple is called one primarily and most properly. The same is true of a word—that which is most simple is called a word in the most proper sense. Now, the Word that is in God is most simple; hence, it is most properly called a word.

6'. According to grammarians the part of speech called the verb receives this general name *verbum* as its own because it is a perfection of the entire sentence, and is, as it were, the most important part of it. Moreover, other parts of the sentence are expressed by the verb, since the noun is understood in it. Now, the divine Word (*Verbum*) is the most perfect of all things and expresses all things. Therefore, it is called a word in the most proper sense.

REPLY:

We give names to things according to the manner in which we receive our knowledge from things. Hence, since those things which come after others in the order of nature are usually the ones that we know first, it frequently happens that, in applying names to things, we first use a name of one of two things when the reality it signifies primarily exists in the second. We have a clear example of this in the names that are used of both God and creatures. Being, good, and words of this sort are first applied to creatures, and then transferred from creatures to God, even though the act of existence and the good are found primarily in God.

Consequently, since the exterior word is sensible, it is more known to us than the interior word; hence, according to the application of the term, the vocal word is meant before the interior word, even though the interior word is naturally prior, being the efficient and final cause of the exterior.

It is the final cause, indeed, because we use the exterior word to manifest the interior. Hence, the interior word is that which is expressed by the exterior. Moreover, the exterior word signifies that which is understood, not the act of understanding, nor the habit or faculty, as the objects of understanding, unless the habit and the faculty are themselves the things that are understood. Consequently, the interior word is what is understood interiorly. Again, the

interior word is the efficient cause of the word spoken exteriorly, for, since the meaning of a word is arbitrary, its principle is the will just as the will is the principle of other products. Moreover, just as there pre exists in the mind of a craftsman a certain image of his external work, so also does there pre-exist in the mind of one who pronounces an exterior word a certain archetype of it.

Consequently, just as we consider three things in the case of a crafts man, namely, the purpose of his work, its model, and the work now produced, so also do we find a threefold word in one who is speaking. There is the word conceived by the intellect, which, in turn, is signified by an exterior vocal word. The former is called the word of the heart, uttered but not vocalized. Then there is that upon which the exterior word is modeled; and this is called the interior word which has an image of the vocal word. Finally, there is the word expressed exteriorly, and this is called the vocal word. Now, just as a craftsman first intends his end, then thinks out the form of his product, and finally brings it into existence, so also, in one who is speaking, the word of the heart comes first, then the word which has an image of the oral word, and, finally, he utters the vocal word.

Now, because the vocal word is expressed by means of a body, such a word cannot be predicated of God except metaphorically, that is, only in the sense in which creatures or their motions, being produced by God, are said to be His word inasmuch as they are signs of the divine intellect as effects are signs of their cause. For the same reason, the word which has an image of the vocal word cannot be properly predicated of God, but only metaphorically. Consequently, His ideas of things to be made are called the Word of God only metaphorically. But the word of the heart—that which is actually considered by the intellect—is predicated properly of God, because it is entirely free of matter, corporeity, and all defects; and such things are properly predicated of God, for example, knowledge and the known, understanding and the understood.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Since the interior word is that which is understood and is within us only in so far as we actually understand, it always demands that the intellect be in its act, which is to understand. Now, the act of understanding is called a motion, not a motion of what is imperfect, such as is described in the Physics, but a motion of what is perfect—an operation, as is described in The Soul. It is in this sense that Damascene spoke of the interior word as a motion of the mind, because motion is taken for that in which the motion terminates; that is, operation is taken for the term of the operation, just as the act of understanding is taken for the understood. Moreover, the notion of the mental word does not require that the act of the intellect which terminates in a mental word take place by means of some reasoning process which thinking seems to involve. It is enough that something is actually understood—no matter how this takes place. But because we usually speak interiorly by means of a reasoning process, Damascene and Anselm in defining a word use thinking instead of consideration.

2. Augustine's argument is not from a parallel but from the lesser to the greater. For, if one can speak of the heart as having a mouth, he can with greater verisimilitude speak of it as containing a word. Hence, the argument proves nothing.

3. A medium can be understood in two ways. First, it can be understood as being a medium between the two terms of a motion, as pale is a medium between white and black in a process of blackening or whitening. Second, it can be understood as existing between what is active and what is passive, as the instrument of the artist is a medium between the artist and his work. In fact, anything by which the artist acts is a medium in this sense. It is in this second sense, too, that the Son is a medium between the creating Father and the creature created through the Word. The Son, however, is not a medium between God creating and the creature

created, for the Word is also God creating. Hence, just as the Son is not a creature, so also He is not the Father.

There is still another reason why the conclusion does not follow. 'We say that God creates by means of His wisdom predicated essentially; hence, His wisdom can be called a medium between God and creature. Yet, this very wisdom is God.

In the argument cited, moreover, Augustine is proving that the Word is not a creature, not because He is a medium, but because He is the universal cause of creatures. Now, every motion is reduced to some first mover which is itself unmoved at least relatively to the motion in question, just as all things which undergo qualitative change must be reduced to some first thing which causes this change but is itself not changed in this way. Similarly, that to which all created beings are reduced must itself be uncreated.

4. A medium understood as existing between the two terms of a motion is sometimes taken as existing equidistant from each term, but at other times it is not taken in this sense. For a medium that exists between what is active and what is passive—if, indeed, it is a medium, as an instrument is sometimes closer to the first active thing, some times closer to the last passive thing, although it may at other times stand equidistant from each. This becomes clear if we consider the action of an agent which finally terminates in what is passive by means of several instruments: the medium which is the form by which the agent acts is always closer to the agent because it is really in the agent, whereas only its likeness is in the patient. Now, it is in this manner that the Word is said to be a medium between the Father and the creature. Consequently, the Word does not necessarily stand equidistant between the Father and the creature.

5. It is true that we manifest something to another only by means of a word that is vocally expressed. Yet one can manifest something to oneself by means of the word of the heart; and, since this manifestation takes place before the other manifestation, the interior word is said to be the principal word. Similarly, the Father is revealed to all by means of the Word Incarnate, but the eternally generated Word has manifested Him to Himself. Consequently, the name word does not belong to the Son merely in so far as He is incarnate.

6. The Incarnate Word in some respects resembles, and, in other respects, does not resemble the vocal word. They have this in common as a basis for comparison: a vocal word manifests the interior word as flesh manifested the eternal Word. They differ, however, in the following respect: the flesh assumed by the eternal Word is not said to be a word, whereas the vocal word used to manifest an interior word is said to be a word. Consequently, the vocal word is something other than the interior word, but the Incarnate Word is the same as the eternal Word, just as the word signified by the vocal word is the same as the word within the heart.

7. The nature of a sign belongs more properly to an effect than to a cause when the cause brings about the existence of the effect but not its meaning, as is the case in the example given. But when the effect has derived from its cause, not only its existence, but also its meaning, then this cause is prior to the effect both in existence and in meaning. Hence, signification and manifestation belong more properly to the interior than to the exterior word, for whatever meaning the exterior word has been adopted to convey is due to the interior word.

8. A name is derived from two sources: from the one who uses the word or from the thing to which it has been applied. A word is said to be derived from a thing in so far as it signifies that by which the notion of the thing is completed, that is, the thing's specific difference; and this is what a word principally signifies. But, since we do not know essential differences, sometimes, as is said in the Metaphysics, we use accidents or effects in their place, and name a thing accordingly. Hence, in so far as something other than the essential difference of a

thing is used as the source of a word, the word is said to be derived from the one who uses it. An example of this is the word *lapis* (stone) which is derived from its effect, *laedere pedem* (to bruise the foot). Now, this effect should not be taken as that which the word principally signifies, but merely as that which takes the place of what is signified. Similarly, *verbum* (word) is derived from *verberatio* (a disturbing) or from *boatus* (shout) because of those who use it—not because of the thing it signifies.

9. As far as the nature of a word is concerned, it makes no difference whether a thing is understood by means of a likeness or by means of its essence; for it is evident that the exterior word signifies whatever can be understood—whether it be understood by means of its essence or by means of a likeness. Hence, whatever is understood, whether it has been caused by a likeness or by its essence, can be called an interior word.

10. Some of the things predicated both of God and creatures exist in God before they exist in creatures, even though their names were applied to creatures first. These predicates, such as goodness, wisdom, and the like, are used of God in their proper sense. Other names signifying other things cannot be used of God in their proper sense, but things similar to these things can be found in God. These things, therefore, are predicated metaphorically of God, as when we say that God is a lion or that God walks. Hence, when the term word is applied to the divine Word from our word, this indicates merely the order in the use of the name, not the order between the two realities. Consequently, Word is not used metaphorically of God.

11. Vocal expression pertains to the nature of a word only with respect to that from which the word was taken by the one who employed this noun, not with respect to the thing itself. Consequently, even though vocal expression is predicated metaphorically of God, it does not follow that a word is in Him only metaphorically. For example, Damascene says that the word *theos* (God) comes from *aitein* which means to hum; but, although burning is predicated metaphorically of God, God is not.

12. The Incarnate Word is compared with the vocal word merely because of a certain resemblance, as is clear from what has been said. Hence, the Incarnate Word can be said to be a vocal word only metaphorically. But the eternal Word is compared with the word of the heart, according to the true nature of the interior word. Hence, each is called a word in the proper sense.

ARTICLE II: IS WORD PREDICATED OF GOD ESSENTIALLY OR ONLY PERSONALLY?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, I Sentences 27, 2, 2; In *Evang. Joannis*, c. 1, *lectura* r (P. 10: 28 Sec also readings given for preceding article).

Difficulties:

It seems that word can also be predicated essentially, for

1. Word signifies making manifest, as we said in the preceding article. Now, of itself the divine essence can manifest itself. Consequently, a word of itself belongs to the divine essence, and can be predicated of it essentially.

2. As we read in *the Metaphysics*, a word signifies a definition. But, according to Augustine, the word is "knowledge will love;" and according to Anselm: "When the highest spirit is said to speak, this means that He is intuiting by thinking." Now, nothing but essential attributes are placed in these definitions. Hence, word is predicated essentially.

3. Whatever is said is a word. But, as Anselm writes, the Father utters not only Himself but also the Son and the Holy Spirit. Hence, word is common to all three Persons, and, therefore, is predicated essentially.

4. As Augustine says, whoever speaks possesses the word he speaks. But, as Anselm points out: "Just as the Father knows, and the Son knows, and the Holy Spirit knows, and yet there are not three knowers but one, so also the Father speaks, and the Son speaks, and the Holy Spirit speaks, and yet there are not three speakers but one." Hence, word can be used of any one of them. Now, nothing is common to the three persons but the essence. Hence, word is predicated essentially of God.

5. With respect to our intellect, there is no difference between speaking and understanding. Now, the divine Word is understood as resembling the word in the intellect. Hence, when we say that God speaks, we mean simply that He understands. Consequently, His Word is simply that which He understands. Now, what God understands is predicated of Him essentially. Hence, His Word should be similarly predicated.

6. As Augustine says, the divine Word is the operative power of the Father. Now, operative power is predicated essentially of God. Therefore, word is also predicated essentially.

7. Just as love implies an outpouring of affection, so does the word imply an outpouring of understanding. But love is predicated essentially of God. Hence, so also is the word.

8. That which can be understood of God without understanding the distinction of Persons is not predicated personally. Now, the word belongs to this type, for even those who deny the distinction of persons admit that God utters Himself. Hence, the word is not predicated of God personally.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "Only the Son is called the Word, not the Father and the Son taken together." Now, whatever is predicated essentially belongs equally to both. Therefore, the Word is not predicated essentially.

2'. In the Gospel according to St. John (1:1) we read: "The Word was with God." Since *with* is a transitive preposition, it implies a distinction. Consequently, the Word is distinct from God. But nothing that is predicated essentially is distinct in God. Therefore, the Word is not predicated essentially.

3'. In God whatever implies a relation of person to person is predicated personally, not essentially. But the Word is of this type. Therefore.

4'. In support of this position, the authority of Richard of St. Victor can be cited, since he shows that only the Son is called the Word.

REPLY:

The word that is predicated metaphorically of God, namely, a creature, which is called His word because it manifests Him, undoubtedly pertains to the entire Trinity. The object of our present inquiry, however, is the word in so far as it is predicated properly of God. Viewed superficially, the question seems to be very simple to solve, because the Word implies a certain origin according to which the divine Persons can be distinguished. Considered more profoundly, however, the question is more difficult, since we find in God certain things that imply origin, not in reality, but only according to our manner of thinking. For example, operation undoubtedly implies something proceeding from the one who operates, yet that procession is only according to our manner of thinking. Consequently, operation is predicated essentially of God, not personally, because God's power and operations do not differ from His

essence. Hence, it is not immediately evident whether the Word implies a real procession—as son does—or whether it implies merely a procession according to our way of thinking—as operation does, and so whether the Word is an essential or a personal predicate.

For the clarification of this matter, it should be noted that our intellectual word, which enables us to speak about the divine Word by a kind of resemblance, is that at which our intellectual operation terminates. This is the object of understanding, which is called the conception of the intellect—whether the conception can be signified by a simple expression, as is true when the intellect forms the quiddities of things, or whether it can be signified only by a complex expression, as is true when the intellect composes and divides. Now, for us every object of understanding really proceeds from something else. For example, conceptions of conclusions proceed from principles, conceptions of the quiddities of later things proceed from quiddities of things prior, or at least an actual conception proceeds from habitual knowledge. Now, this is universally true of whatever we understand, whether it be understood by its essence or by its likeness; for conception itself is an effect of the act of understanding. Consequently, when the mind understands itself, its conception is not the mind but some thing expressed by the mind's act of knowledge. Hence, two things pertain to the nature of our intellectual word: it is understood, and it is expressed by an agent distinct from itself.

Therefore, if word is predicated of God because of its resemblance to both of these characteristics, then the name of word implies a real procession—and not merely because of our manner of thinking. On the other hand, if it is predicated of God merely because of its resemblance to one of these characteristics, namely, that it is understood, then word as applied to God does not imply a real procession but one only according to our manner of thinking, such as the understood implies. This, however, would not be taking word in its proper meaning, because it is not taken in its proper meaning if something belonging to its nature is entirely left out. Consequently, if word is taken in its proper meaning when used of God, it can be predicated of Him only personally. However, if it is taken in a broad sense, it can also be predicated essentially. Since, however, we should use words as most people use them, as the Philosopher says, usage should be followed very carefully when it comes to the meanings of words. Moreover, since all the saints commonly use word as a personal predication, this is even a stronger reason for saying that it is predicated personally.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The nature of a word includes not only the property of making something manifest but also a real procession of one thing from another. Now, although the divine essence manifests itself, the essence does not come from itself in a real procession. Hence, it cannot be called a word unless it is called this because it is identical with that Person, as, for the same reason, the essence is called the Father or the Son.

2. The knowledge that is included in the definition of a word should be understood as knowledge uttered by another. In us, this is actual knowledge. Now, although knowledge or wisdom is predicated essentially of God, generated wisdom is predicated only personally. Similarly, Anselm's statement, "Speak signifies intuiting by thinking," can be understood if speak be taken, in its proper sense, in its relation to intellectual intuition. In this sense, we can say that something proceeds through speech, namely, the understood.

3. The intellectual conception is a medium between the intellect and the thing known, because through its mediation the intellectual operation attains the thing. Hence, the intellectual conception is not only that which is understood but also that by which the thing is understood. Consequently, that which is understood can be said to be both the thing itself as well as an intellectual conception. Similarly, that which is spoken interiorly can be said to be both the thing expressed by the word and the word itself, as is also true of the exterior word, because both the word and the thing the word signifies are expressed when the word is spoken. I

assert, therefore, that the Father is spoken, not as a word, but as a thing spoken by the Word. The same is true of the Holy Spirit, because the Son manifests the entire Trinity. Consequently, by Uttering His own one Word, the Father utters all three Persons.

4. Here Anselm seems to contradict himself, for he says that Word is predicated only personally and belongs only to the Son, while to speak belongs to all three Persons. To speak, however, means nothing else but to send forth a word from oneself. Augustine's statement also seems to contradict Anselm's, for he says that not each of the Persons in the Trinity speaks, but only the Father speaks by means of His Word. Consequently, just as the Word, properly speaking, is predicated only personally of God and belongs only to the Son, so also speech belongs only to the Father. Anselm, however, is taking to speak in its general meaning of to understand, and word in its proper sense. If he wished, he could have taken these words the other way around.

5. As used of us, speaking signifies not merely understanding but understanding plus the expression from within oneself of some conception; and we cannot understand in any way other than by forming a conception of this sort. Therefore, properly speaking, every act of understanding is, in our case, an act of uttering. God, however, can understand without something really proceeding from Him, because in Him the one understanding, the understood, and intellection itself are all identical. This is not true of us, however. Consequently, properly speaking, not all understanding in God is said to be uttering.

6. Just as the Word is said to be the Father's knowledge only in the sense that it is knowledge generated by the Father, so also it is called the operative power of the Father because it is a power proceeding from Him. Now, a power that proceeds is predicated personally, and an operative power proceeding from the Father is predicated in this manner.

7. One thing may proceed from another thing in two ways; First, it may proceed from it as action proceeds from an agent or as an operation proceeds from one operating. Second, it may proceed as a term of an operation from one operating. Now, the procession of an operation from the one operating does not distinguish a thing that is substantially existing from another substantially existing thing; it merely distinguishes a perfection from what is perfected, because an operation is a perfection of the one operating. On the other hand, the procession of the term of an operation distinguishes one thing from another. Now, in God the distinction between a perfection and what is perfected cannot be a real distinction. There are, however, distinct things in God, namely, the three Persons. Hence, a procession signified as existing in God as an operation from the one operating is a procession merely according to our manner of thinking. But a procession signified as that of a thing proceeding from a principle can really be found in God.

Moreover, there is this difference between the intellect and the will: an operation of the will terminates in things, in which good and evil are found; but an operation of the intellect terminates in the mind, in which the true and the false are found, as is said in the Metaphysics. Consequently, the will does not have anything proceeding from it except in the manner of an operation. The intellect, however, has some thing in itself that proceeds from it, not only in the manner of an operation, but also in the manner of a thing that is the term of an operation. Consequently, the word is signified as a thing that proceeds, but love, as an operation that proceeds. Hence, love is not such as to be predicated personally in the same way in which word is.

8. If one does not consider the distinction of Persons, he will not say that God utters Himself, properly speaking; and those who do not admit that there are distinct Persons in God do not understand this uttering in its proper sense.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

One could easily answer the objections proposed here if he wished to support the opposite opinion.

1'. To the difficulty drawn from the words of Augustine one could say that Augustine understands word in so far as it implies a real origin.

2'. One could reply to this by pointing out that, even if the preposition will implies a distinction, this distinction is not implied in word. Hence, from the fact that the 'Word is said to be with the Father, one cannot conclude that it is predicated personally, because the Word is also said to be "God of God" and "God with God."

3'. One could answer by saying that this relation is merely conceptual.

4'. This may be answered as the first difficulty is answered.

ARTICLE III: IS WORD A PROPER NAME OF THE HOLY SPIRIT?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 2; I Sentences 27, 2, 2, sol. 2; Contra errores graec., c. 12; in Hebr., c. I, lectura 2 (P. 13:672b).

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Basil says: "The Holy Spirit is related to the Son in the same way in which the Son is related to the Father; and, for this reason, the Son is the word of God, and the Spirit is the word of the Son." Therefore, the Holy Spirit can be called a word.

2. In the Epistle to the Hebrews (1:3) the following is said of the Son: "Who being the brightness of his glory, and the figure of his substance, and upholding all things by the word of his power...

Hence, the Son has a word proceeding from Himself by which He upholds all things. But in God no one proceeds from the Son except the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the Holy Spirit can be called the Word.

3. As Augustine says: "The Word is loving knowledge." But, just as knowledge is appropriated to the Son, so love is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Consequently, the Word is a proper name for the Holy Spirit, as well as for the Son.

4. The Gloss on "upholding all things by the word of his power" (Hebrews 1:3) says that word should be taken as meaning a command. But a command is classified as a sign of the will. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the will, it seems that He can be called Word.

5. The notion of word implies a making manifest. Now, the Holy Spirit manifests the Father and the Son, just as the Son manifests the Father; for, as we read in the Gospel of St. John (16: 13): "the Holy Spirit teaches all truth." Therefore, the Holy Spirit should be called Word.

To the Contrary:

Augustine says: "The Son is called Word for the same reason that He is called Son." Now, the Son is called Son because He is generated. Therefore, He is called Word, also, because He is generated. The Holy Spirit, however, is not generated; hence, He is not a word.

REPLY:

Word and image are used differently by us and our holy men than they were used by the ancient Greek doctors, who used these names to signify everything that proceeds from the Godhead, and indifferently called the Son and the Holy Spirit Word and Image. Our saints and ourselves, however, have followed the custom of canonical Scripture in the use of these words; and Scripture seldom if ever uses Word or Image for any one except the Son. We are not now concerned with image, but that our use of word is reasonable enough will appear from the following.

Word implies a making manifest, and manifestation is found essentially only in the intellect. If something outside the intellect is said to "manifest" this is true only to the extent that something of it remains in the intellect. Hence, what proximately manifests is within the intellect, even though what remotely manifests can be outside of it. Consequently, word is used properly of that which proceeds from the intellect of that which does not proceed from the intellect it can be used only metaphorically; that is, it can be used of such a thing only in so far as it manifests in some way or other. I say, therefore, that in God only the Son proceeds from the intellect, because He proceeds from one Person; the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from two Persons, proceeds from the will. Consequently, the Holy Spirit can be called Word only metaphorically, that is, only in so far as whatever manifests can be called a word. The quotation from Basil should be understood in this sense.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The reply is clear from our discussion.
2. According to Basil, the "word" referred to in this passage is the Holy Spirit. If this is true, our reply is the same as we gave to the first difficulty. Or, if we follow the Gloss, the "word" referred to is the command of the Son. This is called the word metaphorically, since we ordinarily command by means of a word.
3. Knowledge belongs to the notion of word since it implies, as it were, the very essence of word; but love belongs to the notion of word, not as something pertaining to its essence, but as something that accompanies a word. The passage cited shows this. Hence, one cannot conclude that the Holy Spirit is a word, but, rather, that He proceeds from the Word.
4. A word manifests not only what is in the intellect but also what is in the will, in so far as the will itself is also understood. Hence, even though a command is a sign of the will, it can be called a word and it pertains to the intellect.
5. The reply is clear from our discussion.

ARTICLE IV: DOES THE FATHER UTTER ALL CREATURES IN THE WORD BY WHICH HE UTTERS HIMSELF?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 37, 2, ad 3; III, 3, 8; I Sentences 27, 2, 3; Quodibet IV, 4, 6.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. When we say that the Father utters Himself, all that is signified is one uttering and something uttered, and the Father alone is signified by both. Now, since the Father does not produce the Word from Himself except as He utters Himself, it seems that creatures are not uttered by the Word which proceeds from the Father.
2. The word by which each thing is expressed is its likeness. "The Word cannot be called a likeness of creatures," as Anselm proves, because either it would resemble creatures

perfectly—and then it would be changeable and without its sublime immutability—or it would not resemble them perfectly and then it would lose its sublime truth, because the truth of a likeness is in direct proportion to its conformity with that whose likeness it is. Hence, the Son is not the Word by which creatures are uttered.

3. The word of creatures is said to be in God as the word of his products is in a craftsman. Now, the word of his products in a craftsman is merely the plan he has with respect to them. Therefore, the word of creatures in God is merely the plan He has made with respect to creatures. But God's plans for His creatures are predicated of the essence, not of a person. Hence, the word by which creatures are uttered is not the Word that is a personal predicate.

4. Every word is related as an archetype or image to that which is uttered by it. When a word causes a thing, as happens in the practical intellect, then that word is an archetype. When, however, a thing causes a word, as happens in our speculative intellect, then that word is an image. Now, in God there cannot be the word of a creature that is the image of a creature. Hence, the word of creatures that is in God must be an archetype of creatures. But the divine archetype of creatures is an idea. Therefore, the divine word of creatures is simply an idea. An idea, however, is predicated of God, not personally, but essentially. Consequently, the Word which is predicated personally of God, and by which the Father utters Himself, is not the word by which creatures are uttered.

5. The distance separating creatures from God is greater than that which separates them from other creatures. Now, in God there are many ideas of different creatures; hence, the Father does not utter Himself and creatures in the same word.

6. According to Augustine: "The Son is called the Word for the same reason that He is called an image." Now, the Son is not an image of creatures but only of the Father. Hence, He is not the word of creatures.

7. Every word proceeds from that whose word it is. But the Son does not proceed from creatures. Hence, He is not the word by which creatures are uttered.

To the Contrary:

1'. Anselm says that by uttering Himself the Father uttered all creatures. But the Word by which He uttered Himself is the Son. Therefore, by the Word, which is the Son, the Father utters all creatures.

2'. Augustine explains the expression, "He spoke and it was made," as meaning: "He begot the Word in which all things were in order to come into existence." Therefore, by the Word which is the Son the Father utters all creatures.

3'. By the same act, the artist is turned toward his art and his work. But God Himself is the eternal art from which creatures are produced like works of art. Therefore, in the same act, the Father is turned toward Himself and to all creatures. Hence, by uttering Himself, He utters all creatures.

4'. Whatever is subsequent is reduced to what is first in that class as to its cause. Now, creatures are uttered by God. Therefore, they are reduced to the first which God utters. But God first utters Himself. Hence, by the fact that He utters Himself, He utters all creatures.

REPLY:

The Son proceeds from the Father in the manner of nature inasmuch as He proceeds as a Son, and in the manner of intellect inasmuch as He proceeds as the Word. We find both types of processions in ourselves, although not in the same respect. For in our case nothing proceeds

from something else both in the manner of nature and in the manner of intellect, because will us the act of understanding and the act of existing are not the same—which they are in God.

Moreover, in both types of procession the difference between procession from God and procession from us is similar. For a human son, proceeding in the manner of nature from a human father, receives only a part of his father's substance, not all of it; but the Son of God, proceeding in the manner of nature from the Father, receives all of His Father's nature in such a way that both the Father and the Son have absolutely one and the same numerical nature.

This difference is also found with respect to the intellectual processions. The word expressed in us by actual consideration and arising, as it were, from a consideration of a thing known previously, or at least from habitual knowledge, does not receive into itself the whole of that from which it had its origin. For, in the conception of one word, the intellect expresses not all but only part of what it possesses in its habitual knowledge. Similarly, what is contained in one conclusion does not express all that was contained virtually in its principle. However, for the divine Word to be perfect, it must express whatever is contained in that from which it had its origin, especially since God sees all things, not in many intuitions, but in one. Consequently, whatever is contained in the Father's knowledge is necessarily and entirely expressed by His only Word and in the very same manner in which all things are contained in His knowledge. In this way it is a true word, whose intellectual content corresponds to that of its principle. Through His knowledge, moreover, the Father knows Himself, and, by knowing Himself, He knows all other things. Hence, His Word chiefly expresses the Father and, as a result, all other things which the Father knows by knowing Himself. Therefore, because the Son is a word that perfectly expresses the Father, the Son expresses all creatures. This sequence is outlined by the words of Anselm, who said that by uttering Himself the Father uttered all creatures.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. When we say that the Father utters Himself we signify that in this utterance every creature is included, since the Father's knowledge contains all creatures, being, as it were, their archetype.

2. Anselm is taking likeness in its strict sense, as Dionysius does when he says that, when things are ordered equally to each other, we receive a mutual likeness; that is, one thing can be said to be similar to the other and the other similar to it. But, properly speaking, no such mutual likeness is found between a cause and its effect. We say that a picture of Hercules resembles Hercules, but not that Hercules resembles the picture. Hence, since the divine Word is not, like our word, made in the likeness of a creature, but rather the opposite is true, Anselm means to say simply that the Word is not a likeness of creatures but creatures are a likeness of the Word.

However, if likeness is taken in its broader meaning, then we can say that the Word is a likeness of creatures, not, however, in the sense that it is an image of creatures, but in the sense that it is their archetype. Taking the term in this meaning, Augustine calls ideas likenesses of things.

Finally, it does not follow that the highest truth is not in the Word merely from the fact that the Word remains unchanged while existing creatures change; for the truth of a word does not demand that it be a likeness with the same nature as that of the thing declared by the word; it is enough if it is a true representation of the thing, as we have pointed out previously.

3. The divine plan for creatures is called a word, properly speaking, only if this plan proceeds from another—and is therefore a begotten plan. This, however, like begotten wisdom, is a personal predication. Taken simply, the divine plan is an essential predication.

4. A word differs from an idea, for the latter means an exemplary cause and nothing else, but the word in God of a creature means an exemplary form that is drawn from something else. Hence, a divine idea pertains to the essence, but a word, to a person.

5. Even though the greatest possible distance separates God from a creature because of what is proper to each, God is the model in whose likeness creatures are created. There is no creature that is a model for another creature. Hence, in that Word by which God is expressed every creature is expressed; but the idea by which one creature is expressed does not express another. Thus, this is another difference between the Word and an idea. The reason for this is that an idea is directly related to a creature; hence, for many creatures there are many ideas. On the other hand, the Word is directly related to God, whom the Word expresses first, and then, as a consequence, expresses creatures. Because all creatures are one as they exist in God there is only one Word for all of them.

6. When Augustine says that the Son "is called a Word for the same reason that He is called an Image," he is referring to the distinguishing personal characteristic of the Son, which remains the same whether He is called, because of it, the Son, the Word, or the Image of the Father. But in the manner of signifying, these three predicates are not of the same type, for word implies not only the notion of origin and imitation but also that of manifestation. Consequently, the Word is, in a fashion, the word of creatures, because creatures are manifested by means of the Word.

7. A word can belong to something in different ways. First, it can belong to one who is speaking. Taken in this sense, it proceeds from him whose word it is. Second, it can belong to that which is made manifest by the word. In this sense, the word does not necessarily proceed from that whose word it is, unless the knowledge from which the word proceeds has been caused by things. However, this is not true of God's knowledge. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.

ARTICLE V: DOES THE WORD IMPLY A RELATION TO CREATURES?

Parallel readings: See readings given for preceding article.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. Every name that implies a relation to creatures is predicated of God only from the beginning of time, for example. Creator and Lord. But Word is predicated of God from all eternity. Therefore, it does not imply a relation to creatures.

2. All relatives are relative in being or in predication. Now, the Word is not related to creatures in being, because then it would depend on creatures. Nor is it related to them merely in predication, because then it would have to be related to creatures in one of the grammatical cases. And since in this type of relation one thing is usually referred to another by means of the genitive case, we would have to say: "The Word is of creatures." This statement, however, Anselm denies. Therefore, the Word does not imply any relation to creatures.

3. Any name implying a relation to creatures cannot be understood unless the actual or potential existence of creatures is also understood, because, if one understands one of two relatives, he also understands the other. But, even if some creature is not understood as existing now or in the future, the divine Word, by which the Father utters Himself, is understood. Therefore, the Word does not imply any relation to creatures.

4. The relation of God to creatures can be only that of a cause to an effect. But, as Dionysius says, any name that implies an effect in creatures is common to the entire Trinity. However, Word is not this kind of a name. Hence, it does not imply any relation to creatures.
5. God is not understood as having a relation to creatures unless it be by His wisdom, goodness, and power. But these attributes are predicated of the Word merely by appropriation; and since Word is not merely an appropriated but a proper name, it seems that Word does not imply a relation to creatures.
6. Even though man arranges things, the word man does not imply a relation to the things he has arranged. Therefore, even though all things are arranged by the Word, Word does not imply a relation to them.
7. Like son, word is a relative predication. Now, the entire relation of the son terminates in the father, for he is not the son of any one but the father. Therefore, the entire relation of the Word terminates similarly. Hence, Word does not imply a relation to creatures.
8. According to the Philosopher, every relative is said to be such only with relation to one other thing. Otherwise, the relative would have two essences, since the essence of a relative lies simply in its being related to another. Now, the Word is predicated as relative to the Father; therefore, it is not predicated as relative to creatures.
9. If the same word is applied to specifically different things, it is used of them equivocally, as dog is used of hounds and fish. Now, superiority and inferiority are specifically different types of relations. If, therefore, one word implies both relations, then that word is used equivocally. But the relation of the Word to creatures is simply one of superiority, and the relation of the Word to the Father is, in a way, one of inferiority—not because of any unequal dignity, but because of the authority which a principle has. Hence, the Word which implies a relation to the Father does not imply a relation to creatures, unless it is taken equivocally.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. Augustine says: "In the beginning was the Word. (John I:

The Word is called Logos in Greek, and in Latin it means an intelligible character and word. In this passage, however, word is better interpreted as meaning a relation, not only to the Father, but also to those things which are made by His power, acting through the Word." This statement clearly supports our position.

- 2'. Explaining the words of the Psalmist, "God hath spoken once" (Psalms 61:12), the Gloss says: "Once, that is, God has eternally begotten the Word in which He disposes all things." Now, disposition implies a relation to the things disposed. Therefore, Word is predicated relatively.
- 3'. Every word implies a relation to what is signified by it. But, as Anselm says, by uttering Himself God utters all creatures. Therefore, the Word implies a relation, not only to the Father, but also to creatures.
- 4'. From the very fact of His being the Son, the Son perfectly represents the Father in that which is intrinsic to the Father. Now, the Word, by its very name, adds the notion of making manifest. But there can be no manifestation other than that in which the Father is manifested through creatures—a manifestation, as it were, to the exterior. Therefore, the Word implies a relation to creatures.
- 5'. Dionysius says that God is praised as being a word or principle of intelligibility because "He is the giver of wisdom and reason." From this it is clear that the Word as predicated of

God implies the notion of cause. Now, a cause is predicated relatively to its effect. Therefore, the Word implies a relation to creatures.

6'. The practical intellect is related to the things carried out through its instrumentality. Now, the divine Word is the word of an intellect that is practical, because, as Damascene says, the Word is an operative word. Therefore, it implies a relation to creatures.

REPLY:

Whenever two things are related to each other in such a way that one depends upon the other but the other does not depend upon it, there is a real relation in the dependent member, but in the independent member the relation is merely one of reason—simply because one thing cannot be understood as being related to another without that other being understood as being related to it. The notion of such a relation becomes clear if we consider knowledge, which depends on what is known, although the latter does not depend on it.

Consequently, since all creatures depend on God but He does not depend on them, there are real relations in creatures, referring them to God. The opposite relations in God to creatures, however, are merely conceptual relations; but, because names are signs of concepts, certain names we use for God imply a relation to creatures, even though, as we have said, this relation is merely conceptual. The only real relations in God are those by which the divine persons are distinguished from each other.

Among relative terms, we find that some are used to signify the relations themselves, for example, the word likeness. Others are used to signify something upon which a relation follows. For example, knowledge is used to signify a certain quality upon which a particular relation follows. We find this difference also in the relative names used of God, both in the names used of Him as from all eternity, as well as in those used of Him as from the beginning of time. For Father is used of Him as from all eternity, and Lord as from the beginning of time; and each of these words is used to signify the relations themselves. But Creator, used of God as from the beginning of time, is employed to signify a divine action upon which a certain relation follows. The same is true of Word; it is used to signify something absolute to which something relative is joined; for, as Augustine says, the Word is simply "begotten Wisdom."

This, however, does not prevent Word from being a personal predication, because God begetting or God begotten is, like Father, predicated personally. It may happen, however, that an absolute thing is able to have a relation to many other things. This is why a name that is used to signify something absolute upon which a relation follows can be spoken of as being relative to many things, and it is in this manner that knowledge is used. Inasmuch as it is knowledge, it is relative to what is known, but inasmuch as it is a particular accident or form, it is related to the knower. In the same way, word is related to the one who utters it and to that which is uttered by the word. In the latter relation, it can be taken in two ways: first, according as the two are interchangeable, and in this sense we speak of a word as being related to what is spoken; second, according as the word is related to a thing to which the character of being uttered belongs. And since the Father principally utters Himself by begetting His Word, and, as a consequence of this, utters creatures, the Word is principally, and, as it were, essentially referred to the Father, but consequently, and, as it were, accidentally, to creatures; for it is only accidental to the Word that creatures are uttered through it.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That argument is true of those names which imply an actual relation to creatures, but not of those which imply a habitual relation. A habitual relation is one that does not require the actual existence of a creature. All the relations that follow upon an act of the soul are of this

kind, because the will and the intellect can be related to a thing that does not actually exist. Now, the Word implies an intellectual procession. Hence, the argument proves nothing.

2. The Word is spoken of as being related to creatures, but this is not a real relation in the sense that this relation to creatures really exists in God. It is rather a relation merely according to predication. More over, there is no reason why this relation should not be expressed by some grammatical case; for I can say that He is the Word of creatures in the sense that the Word is about creatures, although not from them. It is this last sense that Anselm denies. Besides, even if the Word were not referred to creatures by means of some grammatical case, it would be enough if it is referred to them in any manner whatsoever; for example, if it were referred to them by a preposition joined with some case. Then one would say that the Word "is for creatures," that is, for constituting them.

3. That argument holds for those names whose notions imply a relation to creatures. But this name is not that type, as is evident from our discussion in the body of the article. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.

4. Inasmuch as Word implies something absolute, it expresses a relation of causality over creatures; but inasmuch as it implies a relation of real origin, it is a personal name; and under this aspect it expresses no relation to creatures.

5. From our last answer, the answer to the fifth difficulty is evident.

6. The Word is not merely that by which the arrangement of all creatures takes place; it is the arrangement itself which the Father makes of things to be created. Hence, in some way, the Word is related to creatures.

7. The name son implies a relation only to that principle from which He comes, but word implies a relation both to the principle by which the Word was uttered and to that which is, as it were, its term, namely, that which is manifested through the word. What is manifested, of course, is principally the Father; but also, and, as a consequence, creatures are manifested, which, however, can in no way be a principle of a divine Person. Hence, Son implies no relation at all to creatures, such as Word does.

8. That argument is based on those names used to signify relations themselves, for it is impossible for one relation to terminate in many things, unless these are in some way one.

9. The same reply may be given to the ninth difficulty.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

The arguments supporting the opposite opinion conclude that the Word is in some way related to creatures, but not that it implies this relation essentially or, as it were, principally-. In this limited sense, they must be granted.

ARTICLE VI: DO THINGS EXIST MORE TRULY IN THE WORD OR IN THEMSELVES?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 18, 4, ad 3; Contra Gentiles IV, x in Evang. Joannis, c. 1, lectura z (P. Io:293a); De diff. verbi div. et hum. (Perr. I:n. 5).

Difficulties:

It seems that things do not exist more truly in the Word, for

1. A thing exists more truly where it exists through its essence than where it exists only through its likeness. But things exist in the Word only through their likeness, and in themselves through their essence. Therefore, they exist more truly in themselves than in the Word.

2. But it was said that they exist more nobly in the Word because in the Word they have a more noble act of existence.—On the contrary, as Augustine says, a material thing has a more noble act of existence in our soul than it has in itself, yet it exists more truly in itself than it does in our soul. For the same reason, a thing exists more truly in itself than it does in the Word.

3. What exists actually exists more truly than what exists potentially. But a thing existing in itself is in act; in the Word, however, it exists only potentially, like a product existing in a craftsman. Therefore, a thing exists more truly in itself than it does in the Word.

4. The ultimate perfection of a thing is its operation. Now, things existing in themselves have their own operations—which they do not have as they exist in the Word. Therefore, they exist more truly in themselves than in the Word.

5. Only things of one character can be compared. Now, the act of existence which a thing in itself has is not of the same character as that which it has in the Word. Therefore, at least one cannot say that a thing exists more truly in the Word than in itself.

To the Contrary:

1'. As Anselm says, a creature as it exists in the Creator is a creative essence. But an uncreated act of existence exists more truly than the created act. Therefore, a thing has existence in the Word more truly than it has in itself.

2'. 'We assert that there are ideas in the divine mind, just as Plato asserted that the ideas of things exist outside of it. Now, according to Plato, the "separated man" was more truly man than the material man; hence, he called the separated man "man in himself." For this reason, and, indeed, because of the position of the Faith, things exist more truly in the Word than in themselves.

3'. That which is truest in any class is the measure for the entire class. But the likenesses of things existing in the Word are the measures of the truth of all things, because a thing is said to be true in so far as it imitates that upon which it was modeled, and this archetype exists in the Word. Therefore, things exist more truly in the Word than in themselves.

REPLY:

As Dionysius says, effects fail short of perfectly imitating their causes which are above them, and, because of this distance between the cause and the effect, something is truly predicated of the effect that is not predicated of the cause. For example, amusements are not properly said to be amused, although they are causes of our being amused. Now, this certainly could not happen unless the manner of the causes existence were more sublime than the things predicated of their effects. And we find this to be true of all equivocal efficient causes. For example, the sun cannot be said to be hot, even though other things are heated by it; and this is because of the superiority of the sun over those things that are called hot.

When, therefore, we ask if things exist more truly in themselves than in the Word we must make a distinction, because more truly can refer to the truth of the thing or to the truth of the predication. If it refers to the truth of the thing, then undoubtedly the truth of things as they exist in the Word is greater than that which they possess in themselves. But, if it refers to the truth of predication, then the opposite is true. For man is more truly predicated of a thing which is in its own nature than it is of a thing as it is in the Word. But this is not due to any defect in the 'Word, but, rather, to its great superiority, as was pointed out.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. If one is thinking of truth of predication, then, simply speaking, it is true that a thing exists more truly where it exists through its essence than where it exists through a likeness. But if one considers the truth of the thing, then a thing exists more truly where it exists through a likeness which is its cause than where it exists through a likeness which it has caused.
2. The likeness of a thing in our soul is not the cause of that thing, as is the likeness existing in the 'Word. Hence, there is no parallel.
3. An active potency is more perfect than an act which is its effect. It is according to this kind of potency that creatures are said to exist potentially in the Word.
4. Although creatures as they are in the Word do not have their own operations, nevertheless, they have more noble operations inasmuch as they cause things as well as the operations of things.
5. Although the act of existence of creatures in the Word and their act of existing in themselves are not of the same character univocally, they are of the same character analogously.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

- 1'. This argument proceeds from the truth of the thing, not from the truth of predication.
- 2'. Plato was criticized for asserting that natural forms exist in their own natures, without matter—as though matter were merely accidentally related to natural species. If this were true, "natural things" could be truly predicated of things without matter. Our position, however, is not the same as Plato's. Hence, there is no parallel.
- 3'. The reply to the third argument is the same as our reply to the first.

ARTICLE VII: IS THE WORD RELATED TO THOSE THINGS WHICH DO NOT EXIST, WILL NOT EXIST, AND NEVER HAVE EXISTED?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I., ad III, 3,8; Sentences 27,2,3; Quolibet IV, 4, a. 6.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. A word implies something proceeding from an intellect. Now, the divine intellect knows also those things which are not, will not be, and never have been. This we showed when we treated God's knowledge. Hence, the Word can be related to these things.
2. According to Augustine: "The Son is the Father's art, filled with the ideas of living things." But, as Augustine says elsewhere: "Even if nothing comes into being because of an idea, it is rightly called an idea." Hence, the Word is also related to those things which will not be or have not been made.
3. The Word would not be perfect unless it contained in itself all that is contained in the knowledge of Him who utters it. But the knowledge of the Father, who utters the Word, includes those things which never will be and never were. Therefore, these things also are contained in the Word.

To the Contrary:

1' Anselm says: "There can be no word of that which does not exist, will not exist, and never has existed."

2' That whatever a person says takes place is a sign of his power. Now, God is most powerful. Hence, His Word does not pertain to anything which will not, at some time, take place.

REPLY:

A thing can be in the Word in two ways. First, it can be in the Word as what the Word knows, or what can be known in the Word. It is in this latter way that those things exist in the Word that do not exist, have not existed, and will not exist; for the Word knows these things just as the Father does, and they can be known in the Word just as they can be known in the Father. Second, a thing is said to be in the Word as something spoken through the Word. Now, whatever is spoken by a word is in some way directed to be carried out, because it is by means of words that we incite others to action and arrange for them to carry out our ideas. This is why God's utterance is called His arrangement, as the Gloss says, commenting on the words of the Psalmist (Psalms 61: 12): "God hath spoken once." Hence, just as God does not dispose things unless they are, will be, or have been, so also He does not utter such things. Consequently, the Word is related to these things only, namely, the things that are actually uttered. But knowledge, art, and idea (in other words, intelligible representation) do not imply a relation to execution. Hence, no parallel exists between them and the Word.

From this, our replies to the difficulties are clear.

ARTICLE VIII: ARE ALL CREATED THINGS LIFE IN THE WORD?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, i8, 4. See also readings given for q. 4, a. 6.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. The Word causes things in so far as they exist in it. Therefore, if the things within the Word are life, the Word causes them through its life. Now, from the fact that the Word causes things through its goodness, all things are good. Hence, if it causes things through its life, all things would be living. This is false, and, consequently, the initial proposition is false.

2. Things exist in the Word as works exist in an artist. But as they are in an artist works are not life. They are not the life of the artist, who lived even before they existed in him, nor do they have any life themselves, for they are lifeless. Therefore, creatures in the Word are not life, either.

3. In Scripture, the causing of life is appropriated to the Holy Spirit rather than to the Word. This is clear from John (6:64): "It is the spirit the quickeneth," as well as from other passages. Now, as is clear from what we said previously, only the Son, and not the Holy Spirit, is called the Word. Consequently, it is not consistent to say that things existing in the Word are life.

4. Intellectual light is not the principle of life. But things in the Word are light. Hence, it seems that in the Word they are not life.

To the Contrary:

1' We read the following in John (1:3): "What is made in Him was life."

2'. According to the Philosopher, the motion of the heavens is said to be "a kind of life for all naturally existing things." But the Word has a greater influence on creatures than the motion of the heavens has on nature. Therefore, as they exist in the Word, things should be called life.

REPLY:

As they exist in the Word, things can be considered in two ways: in their relation to the Word and in their relation to things existing in their own natures. In both ways, the likeness of a creature in the Word is life.

Now, we say that something lives in the proper sense if it has a principle of motion or of any activity whatsoever within it, for the primary reason why things are said to be alive is that they seem to have something within them moving them in some kind of motion. For this reason the word life is used of all things which have in them the principle of their own activity. Consequently, because certain things understand, feel, or will, they are said to be living not merely because they move from place to place or because they increase in quantity. Hence, that act of existence which a thing has in so far as it moves itself to perform a certain action is properly called the life of the thing, because "the life of a living being is its act of existence," as is said in *The Soul*. In our case, however, no action that we move ourselves to perform is our act of existence. Hence, properly speaking, to understand is not our life, unless to live is taken to mean the end term of an operation; but this is merely a sign of life. Similarly, a likeness as conceived within us is not our life. On the other hand, the intellection of the Word is His act of existence, and so is the likeness of things He possesses. Therefore, a likeness of a creature existing in the Word is also His life.

Similarly, this likeness of the creature is, in a way, the creature itself—that is, in the same way that the soul is said to be, in some fashion, all things. Consequently, because the likeness of a creature existing within the Word in some way produces the creature and moves it as it exists in its own nature, the creature, in a sense, moves itself, and brings itself into being; that is, in view of the fact that it is brought into being, and is moved by its likeness existing in the Word. Thus, the likeness of a creature in the Word is, in a certain sense, the very life of the creature itself.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That a creature existing in the Word is called life does not pertain to the creature's own nature, but to its manner of existence in the Word. Since it does not exist in this manner in itself, it does not follow that it lives in itself, even though it is life in the Word more than it follows that the thing is immaterial in itself because it is immaterial in the Word. On the other hand, goodness, being, and other things of this sort belong to the creature's own nature. Hence, just as creatures are good when existing in the Word, so also are they good when existing in their own nature.

2. The likenesses of things in an artist cannot be called life in the strict sense, because they are neither the very act of existence of the living artist nor the artist's operation, as is true of God. It is true, however, as Augustine says, that "a cabinet existing in the mind of a cabinetmaker is living;" but this is because as it exists in his mind it possesses an intelligible act of existence, which belongs to the category of life.

3. Life is attributed to the Holy Spirit according as God is said to be the life of things, namely, as He is in all things and moves all things, will the result that all things seem to be moved, in some way, by an intrinsic principle. But life is appropriated to the Word according as things are in God. This is clear from what has been said.

4. Just as the likenesses of things in the Word cause existence in things, so also they cause knowledge in things—that is, in so far as they are received into intelligences, thus causing them to be able to know things. Hence, just as these likenesses are called life because they principles of existing, so are they also called light because they are principles of knowing.

QUESTION V: Providence

ARTICLE I: TO WHICH ATTRIBUTE CAN GOD'S PROVIDENCE BE REDUCED?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 3, aa. 2-3; Summa Theol., I, 22, 1; I Sentences 39, 2, I; VI Metaph., lectura 3, n. 1218 seq.

Difficulties:

It seems that it belongs only to His knowledge, for

1. Boethius says: "It is certainly clear that Providence is the immovable and simple form of things to be done." Now, in God the form of things that should be done is an idea, and an idea pertains to His knowledge. Providence, therefore, pertains to His knowledge.
2. But it was said that providence also pertains to God's will in so far as it is the cause of things. To the contrary, in us practical knowledge causes the things that we know. Practical knowledge, however, consists merely in knowledge. The same is true, therefore, of providence.
3. In the same section as cited above, Boethius writes: "The plan of carrying things out, when considered in the purity of God's understanding, is called Providence." Now, purity of understanding seems to pertain to speculative knowledge. Providence, therefore, pertains to speculative knowledge.
4. Boethius writes: "Providence is so called because, standing at a distance from the lowest things, it looks upon all things from their highest summit." Now, to look upon is to know, especially to know speculatively. Providence, therefore, seems to belong to speculative knowledge.
5. As Boethius says: "Fate is related to Providence as reasoning is to understanding." Now, understanding and reasoning are common to both speculative and practical knowledge. Providence, therefore, also belongs to both types of knowledge.
6. Augustine writes: "An unchangeable law controls all changeable things, governing them gloriously." Now, control and government belong to providence. Consequently, that unchangeable law is providence itself. But law pertains to knowledge. Therefore, providence also belongs to knowledge.
7. The natural law as it exists within us is caused by divine providence. Now, a cause acts to bring about an effect in its own likeness. For this reason we also say that God's goodness is the cause of goodness in things, His essence, the cause of their being, and His life, the cause of their living. Divine providence, therefore, is a law; hence, our former position stands.

8. Boethius says: "Providence is the divine plan set up within the ruler of all things." Now, as Augustine says, the divine plan of a thing is an idea. Providence, therefore, is an idea; and since an idea pertains to knowledge, providence also pertains to knowledge.

9. Practical knowledge is ordained either to bring things into existence or to order things already in existence. Now, it does not belong to providence to bring things into existence. It rather presupposes the things over which it is exercised. Nor does it order things that are in existence. This belongs to God's disposal of things. Providence, therefore, pertains not to practical, but only to speculative knowledge.

To the Contrary:

1'. Providence seems to belong to the will, because, as Damascene says: "Providence is the will of God, which brings all existing things to a suitable end."

2'. We do not see those people provident who know what to do but are unwilling to do it. Providence, therefore, is related more to the will than to knowledge.

3'. As Boethius says, God governs the world by His goodness. Now, goodness pertains to the will. Therefore, providence also pertains to the will, since the role of providence is to govern.

4'. To dispose things is a function, not of knowledge, but of will. Now, according to Boethius, providence is the plan according to which God disposes all things. Providence, therefore, pertains to the will, not to knowledge.

5'. What is provided for, taken simply as such, is neither a will thing nor a known thing. It is merely a good. Consequently, one who provides, taken as such, is not will, but good. Hence, providence does not pertain to wisdom, but to goodness or to the will.

To the Contrary (Second Series):

1'. Furthermore, it seems that providence pertains to power. For Boethius says: "Providence has given to the things it has created the greatest reason for enduring, so that as far as they are able, all things naturally desire to endure." Providence, therefore, is a principle of creation. But, since creation is appropriated to God's power, providence pertains to power.

2'. Government is the effect of providence, for the Book of Wisdom (1:3) says: "But thy providence, O Father, governed all." But, as Hugh of St. Victor says, the will commands, wisdom directs, and power executes. Power, therefore, is more closely related to govern merit than is knowledge or will. Consequently, providence pertains more to power than to knowledge or will.

REPLY:

Because our intellects are weak, what we know of God we have to learn from creatures around us. Consequently, to know how God is said to be provident, we have to see how creatures are provident.

We should first note that Cicero makes providence a part of prudence. Providence, as it were, completes prudence, since the other two parts of prudence, memory and understanding, are merely preparations for the prudent act. Moreover, according to the Philosopher, prudence is the reasoned plan of doing things. Now, things to be done differ from things to be made, because the latter start from an agent and terminate in some extrinsic matter, as, for example, a bench and a house; and the reasoned plan of making them is called art. On the other hand, things to be done are actions which do not go outside the agent, but, instead, are acts that perfect him, as, for example, chaste living, bearing oneself patiently, and the like. The reasoned plan of performing these is called prudence. With respect to action, two things should be considered: the end and the means.

However, it is especially the role of prudence to direct the means to the end; and, as we read in the Ethics, one is called prudent if he deliberates well. But, as we also read in the Ethics, deliberation "is not concerned with ends, but only with means." Now, the end of things to be done pre-exists in us in two ways: first, through the natural knowledge we have of man's end. This knowledge, of course, as the Philosopher says, belongs to the intellect, which is a principle of things to be done as well as of things to be studied; and, as the Philosopher also points out, ends are principles of things to be done. The second way that these ends pre-exist in us is through our desires. Here the ends of things to be done exist in us in our moral virtues, which influence a man to live a just, brave, or temperate life. This is, in a sense, the proximate end of things to be done. We are similarly perfected with respect to the means towards this end: our knowledge is perfected by counsel, our appetite, by choice; and in these matters we are directed by prudence.

It is clear, therefore, that it belongs to prudence to dispose, in an orderly way, the means towards an end. And because this disposing of means to an end is done by prudence, it can be said to take place by a kind of reasoning process, whose first principles are ends. The very reason for the sequence described above—and found in all things to be done—is taken from ends, as is clear in the case of art products. Consequently, if one would be prudent, he must stand in the proper relation to the ends themselves, for a reasoned plan cannot exist unless the principles of reason are maintained. Hence, prudence requires not only the understanding of ends but also moral virtues by which the will is settled in a correct end. For this reason, the Philosopher says that the prudent man must be virtuous. Finally, this is common to all rightly ordered powers and acts of the soul: the virtue of what is first is maintained in all the rest. Consequently, in prudence, in some way, are included both the will as directed towards an end and the knowledge of the end itself.

From what has been said it is now clear how providence is related to God's other attributes.. His knowledge is related both to ends and to means toward ends, because through knowledge God knows Himself and creatures. But providence pertains only to that knowledge which is concerned with means to ends and in so far as these means are ordained to ends. Consequently, in God providence includes both knowledge and will, although, taken essentially, it belongs only to knowledge, that is, to practical, not to speculative, knowledge. Providence, moreover, also includes the power of execution; hence, an act of power presupposes an act of providence, as it were, directing it, and for this reason power is not included in providence as the will is.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Two aspects of a creature can be considered: first, its species taken absolutely; second, its relation to an end. The form of each exists previously in God. The exemplary form of a thing considered absolutely in its species is an idea; but the form of a thing considered as directed to an end is called providence. Moreover, according to Boethius, the order of divine providence implants in things is called fate. Consequently, providence is related to fate as an idea is related to the species of a thing. An idea, however, can in some way pertain to speculative knowledge; but providence is related only to practical knowledge, since it implies an ordering to an end, and, consequently, to something to be done, by means of which the end will be reached.
2. Providence pertains more to the will than does practical knowledge taken absolutely, because the latter is concerned in general only with the knowledge of an end and of the means to achieve it. Consequently, practical knowledge does not presuppose that an end has been willed. If this were true, then the will would be included in knowledge, as has been said with regard to providence.

3. Purity of understanding is mentioned, not to exclude the will from the concept of providence, but to exclude change and mutability.

4. In this passage Boethius is not giving a complete description of the nature of providence. He is merely giving the reason for its name. Consequently, even though looking upon things may be considered as speculative knowledge, it does not follow that providence may be considered to be such. Besides, Boethius explains providence, or fore sight, as though it were far-sight, because "God Himself surveys all things from their highest summit." But God is on the highest summit of things for the very reason that He causes and directs all things. So, even in the words of Boethius something pertaining to practical knowledge can be noted.

5. The comparison Boethius makes is taken from the resemblance had by the proportion between the simple and the composite to the proportion between a body at rest and a body in motion. For, just as understanding is simple and non-discursive but reason is discursive, passing from one thing to another, similarly, providence is simple and unchangeable but fate is multiple and changeable. The conclusion, therefore, does not follow.

6. Properly speaking, God's providence is not the eternal law; it is something that follows upon the eternal law. The eternal law should be thought of as existing in God as those principles of action exist in us which we know naturally and upon which we base our deliberation and choice. These belong to prudence or providence. Consequently, the law of our intellect is related to prudence as an indemonstrable principle is related to a demonstration. Similarly, the eternal law in God is not His providence, but, as it were, a principle of His providence; for this reason one can, without any inconsistency, attribute an act of providence to the eternal law in the same way that he attributes every conclusion of a demonstration to self-evident principles.

7. There are two types of causality to be found in the divine attributes. The first type is exemplary causality. Because of this type, we say that all living beings come from the first living being. This type of causality is common to all the divine attributes. The second type of causality is according to the relation the attributes have to their objects. We say, for example, that divine power is the cause of the possibles, divine knowledge is the cause of what is known. An effect of this type of causality need not resemble its cause; for the things that are made by knowledge need not be knowledge, but merely known. It is according to this type of causality that the providence of God is said to be the cause of all things. Consequently, even though the natural law within our understanding is derived from providence, it does not follow that divine providence is the eternal law.

8. "That divine plan within the highest ruler" is not called providence unless one includes in it the notion of direction to an end, which, in turn, presupposes that an end has been willed. Consequently, even though providence may essentially belong to knowledge, it also, in some way, includes the divine will.

9. A twofold ordering may be found in things. First, there is that order according to which things come from their principles. Second, there is the order according to which they are directed to an end. Now, the divine disposing pertains to that order according to which things proceed from their principles; for things are said to be disposed inasmuch as they are put on different levels by God, who is like an artist arranging the different parts of his work in different ways. Consequently, disposition seems to pertain to art. Providence, however, implies the ordering which directs to an end; for this reason it differs from the divine art and disposition. For divine art is so called because of its relation to the production of things, but divine disposition is so called because of its relation to the order of what has already been produced. Providence, however, implies the ordination to an end. Now, we can gather from the end of an art product whatever exists in the thing itself. Moreover, the ordering of a thing

to an end is more closely related to the end than is the ordering of its parts to each other. In fact, their ordering to an end is, in a sense, the cause of the ordering of the parts to each other. Consequently, divine providence is, in a sense, the cause of God's disposition of things, and for this reason an act of His disposition is sometimes attributed to His providence. Therefore, even if providence is not an art related to the production of things or a disposition related to the ordering of things one to another, it does not follow that providence does not belong to practical knowledge.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. With reference to the difficulty about the will, we reply that Damascene calls providence will inasmuch as providence includes and presupposes the will, as we have pointed out previously.

2'. As the Philosopher says, no man can be prudent unless he has moral virtues which rightly dispose him toward his ends, just as no one can demonstrate properly unless he knows well the principles of demonstration. It is for this reason that no one is said to be provident unless he has a correct will—not because providence is in the will.

3'. God is said to govern through His goodness, not because His goodness is providence, but because, having the nature of an end, His goodness is a principle of providence. He is also said to govern through His goodness because the divine goodness is related to God as moral virtues are to us.

4'. Even though the disposition of things presupposes the will, it is not an act of the will, because, as the Philosopher says, ordering, which is what is meant by disposition, is the act of one who is will. Consequently, both disposition and providence really belong to knowledge.

5'. Providence is compared to what is provided for as knowledge is compared to what is known—not as knowledge is compared to the knower. Consequently, it is not necessary that what is foreseen, taken as such, be will, but rather that it be known.

The other two arguments we concede.

ARTICLE II: IS THE WORLD RULED BY PROVIDENCE?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 22, 2 103, I Sentences 39, 2, 2; Contra Gentiles III, cc. r, 64, 75, 79, 94; De div. nom., e. 3, lectura r (P. 15:292a); De subst. sep., cc. II- (Perr. 1 68-91); Comp. Theol., I, cc. 123, 130, 132-33.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. No agent that acts from natural necessity- acts through providence. But God acts upon created things through the necessity of nature, because, as Dionysius says: "The divine goodness communicates itself to us like the sun, which, without previous choice or knowledge, pours out its rays upon all bodies." The world, therefore, is not ruled by the providence of God.

2. A principle having many forms is posterior to a principle having but one form. Now, the will is a multiform principle because it is related to opposites. Consequently, providence is also multiform, since it presupposes will. On the other hand, nature is a principle having but one form, because it is determined to one. Therefore, nature precedes providence. Consequently, the realm of nature is not ruled by providence.

3. But it was said that a principle having one form precedes a multi form principle in the same genus, not in other genera.—On the contrary, the greater the power that a principle has of exercising causality, the greater is its priority. But the more a principle has but one form, the greater is its power of causality, since, as said in The Causes: "A united power is more infinite than one that is multiplied." Consequently, a principle having but one form precedes a multiform principle whether they are in the same genus or in different genera.

4. According to Boethius, any inequality is reduced to an equality and any multitude to a unity. Therefore, any multiple act of the will ought to be reduced to an act of nature that is simple and equal. Hence, the first cause must work through its own essence and nature, and not through providence. Thus, our original argument stands.

5. What is, of itself, determined to one course of action does not need the direction of anything else, because direction is applied to a thing to prevent it from taking a contrary course. Natural things, however, are determined to one course of action by their own natures. Consequently, they do not need the direction of providence.

6. But it was said that natural things need the direction of providence to be kept in being.—On the contrary, if no possibility of corruption exists in a thing, it has no need of something extrinsic to con serve it. Now, there are some things in which there is no potency to corruption, since there is none to generation, as, for example, the celestial bodies and the spiritual substances, which are the most important things in the universe. Therefore, substances of this sort do not need providence to keep them in being.

7. There are certain things in the realm of nature that even God cannot change, such as the principle that "one cannot assert and deny the same thing under the same aspect," and "what has existed cannot not have existed," as Augustine says. Therefore, at least principles of this sort do not need divine rule and conservation.

8. Damascene points out that it would be illogical to say that the one who makes things is other than the one who exercises providence over them. Material bodies, however, are not made by God, since He is a spirit, and it seems no more possible for a spirit to produce a material body than for a material body to produce a spirit. Material bodies of this sort, therefore, are not ruled through divine providence.

9. The government of things involves distinguishing between things. But making things distinct does not seem to be the work of God, because, as said in The Causes, God is related to all things in one way. Therefore, things are not ruled through divine providence.

10. Things ordered of themselves need not be ordered by others. But natural things are ordered of themselves, because, as is said in The Soul: "For all things naturally constituted there is a term and proportion set to their size and growth." Natural things, therefore, are not ordered by divine providence.

11. If things were ruled by divine providence, we could know divine providence by studying the order of nature. But, as Damascene says: "We should wonder at all things, praise all things, and accept without question all the works of providence." The world, therefore, is not ruled by providence.

To the Contrary:

1'. Boethius writes: "O Thou that dost the world in everlasting order guide.

2'. Whatever has a fixed order must be ruled by a providence. But natural things have a fixed order in their motions. Hence, they are ruled by providence.

3' Things which have different natures remain joined only if they are ruled by a providence. For this reason, certain philosophers were forced to say that the soul is a harmony, because contraries remain joined together in the bodies of animals. Now, we see that in the world contraries and things of different natures are kept together. Consequently, the world is ruled by providence.

4' As Boethius says: "Fate directs the motion of all things and determines their places, forms, and time. This unfolding of the temporal order, united in the foresight of God's mind, is providence." There fore, since we see that things have distinct forms, times, or places, we must admit the existence of fate and, consequently, that of providence.

5' Whatever cannot keep itself in existence needs something else to rule it and keep it in existence. But created things cannot keep them selves in existence, for, as Damascene says, what is made from nothing tends, of itself, to return to nothing. There must, therefore, be a providence ruling over things.

REPLY:

Providence is concerned with the direction of things to an end. Therefore, as the Commentator says, whoever denies final causality should also deny providence. Now, those who deny final causality take two positions.

Some of the very ancient philosophers admitted only a material cause. Since they would not admit an efficient cause, they could not affirm the existence of an end, for an end is a cause only in so far as it moves the efficient cause. Other and later philosophers admitted an efficient cause, but said nothing about a final cause. According to both schools, everything was necessarily caused by previously existing causes, material or efficient.

This position, however, was criticized by other philosophers on the following grounds. Material and efficient causes, as such, cause only the existence of their effects. They are not sufficient to produce goodness in them so that they be aptly disposed in themselves, so that they could continue to exist, and toward others so that they could help them. Heat, for example, of its very nature and of itself can break down other things, but this breaking down is good and helpful only if it happens up to a certain point and in a certain way. Consequently, if we do not admit that there exist in nature causes other than heat and similar agents, we cannot give any reason why things happen in a good and orderly way.

Moreover, whatever does not have a determinate cause happens by accident. Consequently, if the position mentioned above were true, all the harmony and usefulness found in things would be the result of chance. This was actually what Empedocles held. He asserted that it was by accident that the parts of animals came together in this way through friendship and this was his explanation of an animal and of a frequent occurrence. This explanation, of course, is absurd, for those things that happen by chance, happen only rarely; we know from experience, however, that harmony and usefulness are found in nature either at all times or at least for the most part. This cannot be the result of mere chance; it must be because an end is intended. What lacks intellect or knowledge, however, cannot tend directly toward an end. It can do this only if someone else's knowledge has established an end for it, and directs it to that end. Consequently, since natural things have no knowledge, there must be some previously existing intelligence directing them to an end, like an archer who gives a definite motion to an arrow so that it will will its way to a determined end. Now, the hit made by the arrow is said to be the work not of the arrow alone but also of the person who shot it. Similarly, philosophers call every work of nature the work of intelligence.

Consequently, the world is ruled by the providence of that intellect which gave this order to nature; and we may compare the providence by which God rules the world to the domestic

foresight by which a man rules his family, or to the political foresight by which a ruler governs a city or a kingdom, and directs the acts of others to a definite end. There is no providence, however, in God with respect to Himself, since whatever is in Him is an end, not a means to it.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The metaphor used by Dionysius notes merely that, like the sun which, on its own part, keeps no body from sharing its light, the divine goodness keeps no creature from participating in itself. The metaphor does not mean that providence acts without choice or knowledge.

2. A principle can be said to be multiform in two senses. First, the multiformity can refer to the very essence of the principle—that is, the principle is composite. A principle that is multiform in this sense must be posterior to a principle having but one form. Second, the multiformity may refer to the principle's relation to its effects, so that a principle is said to be multiform because it extends its influence to many things. A principle that is multiform in this sense precedes one that has but a single form, because the more simple a principle is, the more extensive is its influence. It is in this sense, moreover, that the will is said to be a multiform, and nature, a uniform principle.

3. The argument given is based on the uniformity of a principle according to its essence.

4. God is the cause of things by His essence. Consequently, any plurality in things can be reduced to one simple principle. His essence, however, is the cause of things only in so far as it is known, and consequently, only in so far as it wills to be conformed to a creature by the creature's being made in its likeness. Hence, things proceed from the divine essence through the ordering of knowledge and will, and so through providence.

5. That determination by which a natural thing is restricted to one course of action belongs to it, not because of itself, but because of something else. Consequently, the very determination for bringing about the suitable effect is, as has been said, a proof of divine providence.

6. Generation and corruption can be understood in two senses. First, generation and corruption can arise from a contrary being and terminate in a contrary. In this sense, the potency to generation and corruption exists in a thing because its matter is in potency to contrary forms; and in this respect celestial bodies and spiritual substances have no potency to generation or corruption. Second, these terms are commonly used to indicate any coming into or passing out of existence that is found in things. Consequently, even creation, by which a thing is drawn from nothingness into existence, is called generation; and the annihilation of a thing is called corruption.

Moreover, a thing is said to be in potency to generation in this sense if an agent has the power to produce it; and it is said to be in potency to corruption if an agent has the power to reduce it to nothingness. In this way of speaking, every creature is in potency to corruption; for all that God has brought into existence He can also reduce to nothingness. For, as Augustine says, for creatures to subsist God must constantly work in them. This action of God, however, must not be compared to the action of a craftsman building a house, for, when his action ceases, the house still remains; it should rather be compared to the sun's lighting up the air. Consequently, when God no longer gives existence to a creature, whose very existence depends on His will, then this creature is reduced to nothingness.

7. The necessity of the principles mentioned depends upon God's providence and disposition, because the fact that created things have a particular nature and, in this nature, a determined act of existence, makes these things distinct from their negations; and upon this distinction is based the principle that affirmation and negation cannot be true simultaneously. Moreover, on

this principle, as we read in the Meta physics, the necessity of all the other principles is founded.

8. An effect cannot be stronger than its cause. It can, however, be weaker than its cause. Now, since body is naturally inferior to spirit, it cannot produce a spirit; but a spirit can produce a body.

9. God is similarly said to be related to all things, because there is no diversity in Him. He is, however, the cause of diversity in things inasmuch as by His knowledge He contains within Himself the intelligible characters of all things.

10. That order which is found in nature is not caused by nature but by something else. Consequently, nature needs providence to implant such an order in it.

11. Creatures of all to represent their creator adequately. Consequently, through them we cannot arrive at a perfect knowledge of God. Another reason for our imperfect knowledge is the weakness of our intellect, which cannot assimilate all the evidence of God that is to be found in creatures. It is for this reason that we are forbidden to scrutinize God's attributes overzealously in the sense of aiming at the completion of such an inquiry, an aim which is implied in the very notion of overzealous scrutiny. If we were to act thus, we would not believe anything about God unless our intellect could grasp it. We are not, however, kept from humbly investigating God's attributes, remembering that we are too weak to arrive at a perfect comprehension of Him. Consequently, Hilary writes as follows: "Even if a man who reverently seeks the infinite ways of God never reaches the end of his search, his search will always profit him."

ARTICLE III: DOES GOD'S PROVIDENCE EXTEND TO CORRUPTIBLE THINGS?

Parallel readings: See readings given for preceding article.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. A cause and its effects are in the same order. Now, corruptible

creatures are the cause of sin. This is evident. For example, women's beauty is an incitement to and cause of lust. Moreover, Wisdom (14:11) Says: "The creatures of God have been turned into...a snare for the feet of the unwise." Now, since sin is outside the order of divine providence, it seems that corruptible beings are not subject to this order.

2. Nothing that a man arranges can destroy his work, because he would be contradicting himself were he to build and destroy the same thing. Now, we find among corruptible things some that are contrary to and destructive of others. Consequently, corruptible things were not arranged by God.

3. Damascene speaks as follows: "It must be true that all things happening according to God's providence take place according to right reason in a way that is best and most fitting in God's eyes—indeed, in way that is better for them to take place." But corruptible things could become better, for they could become incorruptible. The providence of God, therefore, does not extend to corruptible things.

4. Whatever is corruptible has corruption in it by its very nature; otherwise it would not be necessary for all corruptible things to corrupt. But, since corruption is a defect, it is not provided for by God, who cannot be a cause of any defect. Corruptible natures, therefore, do not come under God's providence.

5. As Dionysius says, providence does not destroy nature but saves it. The role of God's providence, therefore, is to save things continually. But corruptible things are not continually saved. They are not, therefore, subject to God's providence.

To the Contrary:

1'. Wisdom (14:3) says: "But thy Providence, O Father, governed all things."

2'. Wisdom (12: 13) also says that it is God who "hast care of all things." Therefore, corruptible as well as incorruptible things fail under His providence.

3'. As Damascene says, it is illogical to hold that one being creates things and another exercises providence over them. Now, God is the efficient cause of all corruptible things. Consequently, He also provides for them.

REPLY:

As we said above, the providence by which God rules things is similar to the providence by which the father of a family rules his household or a king rules a city or kingdom. The common element in these rules is the primacy of the common good over the good of the individual; for, as we read in the Ethics, the good of the nation is more divine than that of the city, family, or person. Consequently, whoever is supervising must—if he is to rule wisely pay more attention to what is good for the community than to what is good merely for an individual.

Some have not kept this point in mind, but considering only that there are corruptible things which, if taken in themselves, could be better, and not considering the order of the universe in which each and every thing is excellently arranged—some, I say, have said that those corruptible things are therefore not ruled by God but that only incorruptible things are. These persons are represented in Job (22: 14) by the man who says: "The clouds are God's covert, and he doth not consider our things, and he walketh about the poles of heaven." More over, they assert that corruptible things act necessarily and without any ruler at all or are ruled by an opposing principle. The Philosopher, however, has refuted this position by taking an army as an example. In an army we find two orders, one by which the parts of the army are related to each other, and a second by which the army is directed to an external good, namely, the good of its leader. That order by which the parts of the army are related to each other exists for the sake of the order by which the entire army is subordinated to its leader. Consequently, if the subordination to the leader did not exist, the ordering of the parts of the army to each other would not exist. Consequently, whenever we find a group whose members are ordered to each other, that group must necessarily be ordered to some external principle.

Now, the corruptible and incorruptible parts of the universe are related to each other essentially, not accidentally. For we see that corruptible bodies benefit from celestial bodies, and always, or at least ordinarily, in the same manner. Consequently, all things, corruptible and incorruptible, must be in one order under the providence of an external principle outside the universe. For this reason, the Philosopher concluded that it was necessary to affirm the existence of a single rule over the universe, and of not more than one.

It must be noted, however, that a thing is provided for in two ways: for itself, Or for other things. For example, in a home, care is taken of some things on their own account, namely, those things that constitute the essential goods of a household, such as sons, possessions, and

the like; and other things, such as utensils, animals, and the like are cared for so that the essential things can use them. Similarly, in the universe, the things in which the essential perfection of the universe consists are provided for on their own account, and like the universe itself, these things stay in existence. But the things that do not endure are provided for, not for their own sake, but for the sake of other things. Consequently, spiritual substances and heavenly bodies, which are perpetual both as species and as individuals, are provided for on their own account both as species and as individuals. Corruptible things, however, are perpetual only as a species; hence, these species are looked after for their own sake, but the individual members of these Species are not provided for except for this reason: to keep the species in perpetual existence.

If we thus understand the opinion of those who say that divine providence does not extend to corruptible things of this kind, except as they participate in the nature of a species, it need not be rejected; for this opinion is true if it is understood as referring to the providence of things by which they are provided for on their own account.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Of themselves, corruptible creatures do not cause sin. They are only its occasion and accidental cause. Now, an accidental cause and its effect do not have to belong to the same order.
2. A will provider does not consider what is good for merely one of the things that fall under his providence. He is concerned rather will what is better for all. Consequently, even though the corruption of a thing in the universe is not good for that thing, it is good for the perfection of the entire universe, because the continual generation and corruption of individuals makes it possible for the species to be perpetual; and it is in this that the perfection of the universe essentially consists.
3. Although a corruptible thing would be better if it possessed in corruptibility, it is better for the universe to be made of both corruptible and incorruptible things than to be made merely of the latter, because the nature of the corruptible thing, as well as that of the incorruptible, is good, and it is better to have two goods than merely one. Moreover, multiplication of individuals in one nature is of less value than a variety of natures, since the good found in a nature, being communicable, is superior to the good found in an individual, which is incommunicable.
4. Darkness is brought about by the sun, not because of any action of the sun, but because the sun does not send out light. Similarly, corruption comes from God, not because of any positive action by Him, but because He does not give the thing permanency.
5. The things that are provided for by God on their own account last forever. But this permanency is not necessary for those things that are not provided for on their own account. These need remain only so long as they are needed by the things for which they are provided. Consequently, as is clear from the previous discussion, certain things corrupt because they are not looked after for their own sakes.

ARTICLE IV: ARE THE MOTIONS AND ACTIONS OF ALL BODIES HERE BELOW SUBJECT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE?

Parallel readings: See readings given for q. 5, a. 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are not, for

1. God does not provide for a thing if He is not its author, because, as Damascene says, it is illogical to say that one person makes a thing and another provides for it. Now, God is not the author of evil, for to the extent that things come from Him they are good. Therefore, since many evil things happen in the actions and motions of creatures here below, it does not seem that all of their motions fail under His divine providence.
2. Motions that are contrary do not seem to belong to the same order. Now, in creatures here below there are contrary motions and actions. Consequently, it is impossible that they all fall under the order of divine providence.
3. A thing falls under divine providence only inasmuch as it is directed to an end. But evil is not ordered to an end. On the contrary, it is a privation of order. Consequently, evil does not fail under providence. In creatures here below, however, many evils occur. Therefore.
4. A man is not prudent if he allows something evil to occur in those things whose actions fail under his providence when he can prevent that evil from taking place. Now, God is most prudent and powerful. Hence, since many evils occur in creatures here below, it seems that certain of their acts do not fail under divine providence.
5. It was said, however, that God permits these evils to happen because He can draw good from them.—On the contrary, good is more powerful than evil, so it is easier to draw good from good than good from evil. Consequently, it is not necessary for God to permit evil to happen in order to draw good from it.
6. As Boethius says, just as God creates all things through His goodness, so does He also govern all things by His goodness. But His divine goodness does not permit Him to make anything evil. Consequently, His goodness does not permit anything evil from coming under His providence.
7. If a thing is arranged, it does not happen by chance. Therefore, if all the motions of creatures here below were arranged, nothing would happen by chance, but everything would happen by necessity. This, however, is impossible.
8. As the Commentator says, if everything happened in creatures here below because of the necessity of matter, they would not be ruled by providence. But many things in creatures here below happen because of the necessity of matter. At least these events, then, are not ruled by providence.
9. No prudent man permits a good so that evil will result. For the reason, therefore, no prudent man permits an evil that good will result. Since God is prudent, He will therefore not permit evils in order that good will result. Consequently, it seems that the evils occurring in creatures here below are not allowed by providence.
10. What is blameworthy in a man should by no means be attributed to God. But a man is blamed if he does wrong in order to get some thing good. This is clear from the Epistle to the Romans (3:8): "As we are slandered, and as some affirm that we say: 'Let us do evil, that there may come good.' "Consequently, it is contrary to God's nature for evil to come under His providence in order that good may be drawn from it.
11. If the acts of bodies here below were subject to God's providence, they would act in harmony with God's justice. But the lower elements do not act in this way: fire burns the homes of the just as well as those of the unjust. Consequently, acts of lower bodies do not fall under God's providence.

To the Contrary:

1'. In the Gospel according to Matthew (10:29), we read: "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and not one of them shall fall on the ground without your Father." On this, the Gloss reads: "Great is the providence of God. Not even the smallest things escape it." Consequently, even the smallest movement of things here below comes under God's providence.

2'. Augustine writes as follows: "it is because of God's providence that we see celestial bodies ordered from on high, stars and planets of the earth shining down on us below, the regular alternation of night and day, the rugged earth being cleansed by surrounding waves of water, air gushing out in the heavens, shrubs and animals being conceived and born, growing, wasting away, and killing, and all things else that happen by interior, natural motion." Consequently, all motions of lower bodies fall under God's providence.

REPLY:

Since the first principle of things is the same as their final end, things come from their first principle and are ordered to their ultimate end in the same manner. Studying things as they come from their principle, however, we find that those which are close to their principle have an unfailing act of existence, but, as is said in *Generation and Corruption*, those that are remote from their principle have a corruptible act of existence. Consequently, with respect to their relation to an end, those things that are closest to their ultimate end unfailingly keep their direction to their end, but those that are remote from their ultimate end sometimes diverge from their direction to it.

Moreover, the same things that are close to their principle are close to their end, and those that are remote from their principle are remote from their end. Consequently, not only have incorruptible substances an unfailing act of existence, but also their actions never fail to keep their direction to an end. For example, there are heavenly bodies whose motions never leave their natural orbit. However, because corruptible bodies have defective natures, many of their movements diverge from their proper order. It is for this reason that, in regard to the order of the universe, the Philosopher compares incorruptible bodies to children in a household who always do what is good for the home, and corruptible bodies to domestic animals and slaves whose actions frequently violate the order laid down by the one in charge of the household. This is the reason, too, why Avicenna says that nothing evil lies beyond the moon and that there is evil only in creatures here below.

It should not be thought, however, that those acts of things here below which are outside their proper course are entirely outside the order of providence. For a thing comes under God's providence in two ways: it can be something to which something else is ordered or it can be something that is ordered to something else. Now, as said in the Physics and in the Metaphysics, in an order of means to an end, all the intermediate members are ends as well as means to an end. Consequently, whatever is rightly ordered by providence comes under providence not only as something that is referred to something else, but also as something to which another thing is referred. However, a thing which leaves the right order comes under providence only as something referred, to something else, not as something to which another thing has been referred. For example, the act of the generative powers by which one man generates another complete in his nature is directed by God to a particular thing, namely, a human form; and to the act itself something else is directed, namely, the generative power. A defective act which results occasionally in the generation of natural monstrosities is, of course, directed by God to some useful purpose; but to this defective act itself nothing else was directed. It happened merely on account of the failure of some cause. With regard to the first-named act of generation, the providence is one of approval; with regard to the second, it is one of permission. These two kinds of providence are discussed by Damascene.

It should be noted, however, that some have restricted God's providence to only the species of natural things, and have excluded it from individuals except as they participate in a common nature. They did this because they did not admit that God knows singulars, but said that God directs the nature of a species in such a way that the resultant power of a species can bring about a certain action, and, if this should fail at times, the failure itself is directed to something useful—just as the corruption of one thing is directed to the generation of another. They denied, however, that a particular force is directed to a particular act and that this particular failure is directed to this particular use. But since we say that God knows all particular things perfectly, we assert that all individual things, even as individuals, fall under God's providence.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** That argument touches only the providence of approval. It is true, however, that God does not provide for a thing unless He is in some way its author. Consequently, since evil does not come from God, it does not fall under His providence of approval, but falls only under His providence of permission.
- 2.** Although contrary motions do not belong to the same specific order, they do belong to one general order, as do even the different orders of different crafts which are subordinated to the order of a city.
- 3.** Even though evil inasmuch as it issues from its own cause is without order and, for this reason, is defined as a privation of order, there is nothing that keeps a higher cause from ordering it. In this way evil comes under providence.
- 4.** Any prudent man will endure a small evil in order that a great good will not be prevented. Any particular good, moreover, is trifling in comparison with the good of a universal nature. Again, evil cannot be kept from certain things without taking away their nature, which is such that it may or may not fail; and, while this nature may harm something in particular, it nevertheless gives some added beauty to the universe. Consequently, since God is most prudent, His providence does not prevent evil, but allows each thing to act as its nature requires it to act. For, as Dionysius says, the role of providence is to save, not to destroy, nature.
- 5.** There are certain goods which can be drawn only from certain evils; for example, the good of patience can be drawn only from the evil of persecution, and the good of penitence only from the evil of sin. This, however, is not to deny that evil is weak in comparison with good, because things of this sort are drawn out of evil, not as from an essential cause, but, as it were, accidentally and materially.
- 6.** Inasmuch as it has an act of existence, whatever is made must have the form of the one who makes it, because the making of a thing terminates in its act of existence. Consequently, an evil cannot be produced by a cause that is good. Now, providence directs a thing to an end, and this direction to an end follows upon the act of existence of the thing. It is not impossible, therefore, for something evil to be directed to a good by one who is good, but it is impossible for one who is good to direct something to an evil. For, just as the goodness of a maker puts the form of goodness in the things he makes, so also does the goodness of one who is provident put a direction to good in the things that are subject to his providence.
- 7.** Effects happening accidentally in creatures here below can be considered in two ways: in their relation to proximate causes—and, in this sense, many things happen by chance—or in their relation to the first cause—and, in this sense, nothing in the world happens by chance. It does not follow, therefore, that all things happen necessarily, because in necessity and contingency effects do not follow first causes but proximate causes.

8. Those things resulting from the necessity of matter are themselves determined by natures ordered to an end, and for this reason can also fall under divine providence. This would not be possible if everything resulted from the necessity of matter.

9. Evil is the contrary of good. Now, of itself no contrary brings about its contrary, but every contrary brings its contrary to that which is similar to itself. For example, heat does not bring a thing to coldness, except accidentally. Instead, it reduces cold to warmth. Similarly, no good person directs a thing to evil; instead, he directs it to good.

10. As is clear from the above discussion, to do evil is in no way proper to those who are good. To do evil for the sake of a good is blameworthy in a man, and cannot be attributed to God. On the other hand, to direct evil to a good is not opposed to one's goodness. Hence, permitting evil in order to draw some good from it can be attributed to God.

11. [The answer is given to the eleventh difficulty. See the answer to the sixth difficulty of the following article.]

ARTICLE V: ARE HUMAN ACTS RULED BY PROVIDENCE?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 24, aa. 1-2 II Sentences 39, 1, 1; IV Sentences q, t, 3, ad r; Summa Theol., I, 2; 2, ad 4; 22,4; 59, 3; 83, 1; I-II, 9, 6, ad 3; 10,4; 13, aa. 1, 6; Contra Gentiles I, 68; III, De malo, 3, 2, ad 3, 3, ad 6, r (P. 8:3 De potentia 3, 7, ad 12-14; In Rom., c. 9, lectura 3 (P. 13:97a); De rationibus fidei, c. 10 (P. 16:96a).

Difficulties:

It seems that they are not, for

1. As Damascene says: "What is in us is the work not of providence but of our own free choice." What is in us means our human actions. Consequently, these do not fall under God's providence.

2. of the things coming under God's providence, the more noble a thing is, the more elaborately is it provided for. Now, man is more noble than those creatures that lack sensation and, never departing from their course, rarely, if ever, deviate from the right order. Men's actions, however, frequently deviate from the right order. Hence, they are not ruled by providence.

3. The evil of sin is very hateful to God. But no one who is provident permits what is most displeasing to him to happen for the sake of something else, because this would mean that the absence of the latter would be even more displeasing to him. Consequently, since God permits the evil of sin to occur in human acts, it seems that they are not ruled by His providence.

4. What is abandoned does not fail under the rule of providence. But, as we read in Ecclesiasticus (15: 14): "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." Human acts, therefore, are not ruled by providence.

5. In Ecclesiastes (9:11) we read: "I saw that... the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong... but time and chance in all." Since the author is speaking about human acts, it seems that men's actions are subject to the whims of chance and are not ruled by providence.

6. By the rule of providence, different allotments are made to different things. But in human affairs the same things happen to the good and to the evil; for, as we read in Ecclesiastes (9: 2): "all things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and to the evil." Consequently, human affairs are not ruled by providence.

To the Contrary:

1'. In the Gospel according to Matthew (10: 30) is written: "The very hairs of your head are all numbered." Even the least of human acts, therefore, is directed by God's providence.

2'. To punish, reward, and issue commands are acts of providence, because it is through acts of this kind that every provider governs his subjects. Now, God does all these things in connection with human acts. Consequently, all human acts are ruled by His providence.

REPLY:

As pointed out previously, the closer a being is to the first principle, the higher is its place in the order of providence. Now, among all things, spiritual substances stand closest to the first principle; this is why they are said to be stamped with God's image. Consequently, by God's providence they are not only provided for, but they are provident themselves. This is why these substances can exercise a choice in their actions while other creatures cannot. The latter are provided for, but they themselves are not provident.

Now, since providence is concerned with directing to an end, it must take place with the end as its norm; and since the first provider is Himself the end of His providence, He has the norm of providence within Himself. Consequently, it is impossible that any of the failures in those things for which He provides should be due to Him; the failures in these things can be due only to the objects of His providence. Now, creatures to whom His providence has been communicated are not the ends of their own providence. They are directed to another end, namely, God. Hence, it is necessary that they draw the rectitude of their own providence from God's norm. Consequently, in the providence exercised by creatures failures may take place that are due, not only to the objects of their providence, but also to the providers themselves.

However, the more faithful a creature is to the norm of the first provider, the firmer will be the rectitude of his own providence. Consequently, it is because creatures of this sort can fail in their actions and are the cause of their actions, that their failures are culpable—something which is not true of the failures of other creatures. More over, because these spiritual creatures are incorruptible even as individuals, they are provided for on their own account as individuals. Hence, defects that take place in them are destined to a reward or punishment which will belong to these individuals themselves—and not to them only as they are ordered to other things.

Now, man is numbered among these creatures, because his form — that is, his soul — is a spiritual being, the root of all his human acts, and that by which even his body has a relation to immortality. Consequently, human acts come under divine providence according as men themselves have providence over their own acts; and the defects in these acts are ordained according to what belongs to these men themselves, not only according to what belongs to others. For example, when a man sins, God orders the sin to the sinner's good, so that after his fall, upon rising again, he may be a more humble person; or it is ordered at least to a good which is brought about in him by divine justice when he is punished for his sin. The defects happening in sensible creatures, however, are directed only to what belongs to others; for example, the corruption of some particular fire is directed with the generation of some particular air. Consequently, to designate this special manner of providence which God exercises over human acts, Wisdom (12: 18) says: "Thou wilt greatly favour dispose of us."

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The statement of Damascene does not mean that the things in us (that is, in our power to choose) are entirely outside of God's providence, but it means rather that our choice is not determined to one course of action by divine providence, as are the actions of those beings which do not possess freedom.

2. Natural things lacking sensation are provided for by God alone. Consequently, no failure here is possible on the part of the one who provides, but only on the part of the objects of His providence. But human acts can be defective because of human providence. For this reason, we find more failures and deordinations in human acts than we do in the acts of natural things. Yet, the fact that man has providence over his own acts is part of his nobility. Consequently, the number of his failures does not keep man from holding a higher place under God's providence.

3. God loves a thing more if it is a greater good. Consequently, He wills the presence of a greater good more than He wills the absence of a lesser evil (for even the absence of an evil is a certain good). So, in order that certain greater goods may be had, He permits certain persons to fall even into the evils of sin, which, taken as a class, are most hateful, even though one of them may be more hateful to Him than another. Consequently, to cure a man of one sin, God sometimes permits him to fall into another.

4. "God leaves man in the hand of his own counsel" in the sense that He gives him providence over his own acts. Man's providence over his acts, however, does not exclude God's providence over them, just as the active power of creatures does not exclude the active power of God.

5. Even though many of our human acts are the result of chance if we consider only lower causes, still, if we consider the providence which God has over all things, there is nothing that results from chance. Indeed, the very fact that so many things happen in human affairs when, if we consider merely lower causes, just the opposite should happen, proves that human actions are governed by God's providence. Hence, the powerful frequently fail, for this shows that one is victorious because of God's providence and not because of any human power. The same can be said of other cases.

6. Even though it may seem to us that all things happen equally to the good and to the evil since we are ignorant of the reasons for God's providence in allotting these things, there is no doubt that in all these good and evil things happening to the good or to the evil there is operative a well worked out plan by which God's providence directs all things. It is because we do not know His reasons that we think many things happen without order or plan. We are like a man who enters a carpenter shop and thinks that there is a useless multiplication of tools because he does not know how each one is used; but one who knows the trade will see that this number of tools exists for a very good reason.

ARTICLE VI: ARE BRUTE ANIMALS AND THEIR ACTS SUBJECT TO GOD'S PROVIDENCE?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 2. See also readings given for q. 5, a. 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are not, for

1. In the first Epistle to the Corinthians (I:9) we read: "Doth God take care for oxen?" Consequently, God does not take care of other animals for the same reason.

2. In the Book of Habacuc (1: 14) we read: "Thou will make men as the fishes of the sea..." In this passage, the prophet is lamenting the troubling of the order which seems to happen in men's actions. It seems, therefore, that the acts of irrational creatures are not governed by divine providence.

3. If a man is punished for no fault of his own, and this punishment does not help him in any way, it would not seem that human affairs were ruled by providence. Now, brute animals cannot commit a fault, and, when they are killed, their death is not directed to their good, because there is no reward for them after death. Their lives, therefore, are not ruled by providence.

4. A thing is not ruled by God's providence unless it is ordained to the end which He intends; and this end is nothing other than God Himself. Brutes, however, cannot attain to any participation in God, since they are not capable of beatitude. Consequently, it seems that divine providence does not rule them.

To the Contrary:

1'. In the Gospel according to Matthew (10:29) we read: "not one sparrow shall fall on the ground without our heavenly Father's permission."

2'. Brutes are more noble than creatures that lack sensation. But these other creatures and all their actions come under God's providence. Even more, then, will brutes come under His providence.

REPLY:

In this matter two errors have been made. Some have said that brutes are not ruled by providence except as they participate in the nature of their species, which alone is provided for and directed by God. It is to this kind of providence, they say, that all the passages in Scripture refer when they seem to imply God's providence over brutes, for example: "Who giveth to beasts their food: and to the young..." (Psalms 146:9); "The young lions roaring..." (Psalms 103: 21); and many similar passages. This error, however, attributes a very great imperfection to God. Moreover, it is not possible that God should know the individual acts of brutes and not direct them, since He is most good and, because He is good, pours out His goodness upon all things. Consequently, the error we have mentioned belittles either God's knowledge by denying that He knows individual things or His goodness by denying that He directs individual things as individuals.

For this reason, others have said that the acts of brutes, also, fall under providence in the same way in which the acts of rational beings do. Consequently, no evil would be found in the acts of brutes that would not be directed to their good. This position, however, is also far from reasonable, for punishment and reward is due only to those who have free choice.

It must be said, therefore, that brutes and their acts, taken even individually, fall under God's providence, but not in the same way in which men and their actions do. For providence is exercised over men, even as individuals, for their own sake; but individual brutes are provided for merely for the sake of something else just as other corruptible creatures are, as mentioned previously. Hence, the evil that happens to a brute is not ordered to the good of the brute but to the good of something else, just as the death of an ass is ordered to the good of a lion or that of a wolf. But the death of a man killed by a lion is directed not merely to the good of the lion, but principally to the man's punishment or to the increase of his merit; for his merit can grow if he accepts his sufferings.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The Apostle does not intend to remove brutes entirely from God's care. He simply means to say that God does not care so much for brutes that He would impose a law upon men for the sake of brutes, commanding men to be good to them or not to kill them; for brutes have been made for man's use. Consequently, providence is not exercised over them for their own sake but for the sake of men.

2. God has so ordered fishes and brutes that the weak are subject to the strong. This was done without any consideration of merits or demerits, but only for the conservation of the good of nature. The prophet wondered, therefore, if human affairs were governed in the same way. For this to be true, of course, would be unreasonable.

3. A different order of providence is required for human affairs than is required for brutes. Consequently, if the ordering of human affairs were only that proper to brutes, human affairs would seem to be entirely without providence. Yet, that order is sufficient for the providence of brutes.

4. God Himself is the end of all creatures, but in different ways. He is said to be the end of some creatures inasmuch as they participate somewhat in God's image. This participation is common to all creatures. However, He is said to be the end of certain creatures inasmuch as they can attain God Himself through their own actions. This is the end only of rational creatures, who can know and love God in whom their beatitude lies.

ARTICLE VII: ARE SINNERS RULED BY GOD'S PROVIDENCE?

Parallel readings: [Summa Theol., I, 22, 2, ad Contra Gentiles III, cc. 71, 73, 113.](#)

Difficulties:

It seems that they are not, for

1. What is left to its own devices is not ruled. But the evil are left to themselves: "So I let them go according to the desires of their heart: they shall walk..."(Psalms 80: 13). The evil, therefore, are not governed by providence.

2. It is part of the providence by which God rules over men that they are guarded by angels. But guardian angels sometimes abandon men. From their own lips we have these words: "We would have cured Babylon, but she is not healed: let us forsake her..." (Jeremias 51:9). The evil, therefore, are not governed by God's providence.

3. What is given as a reward to the good should not be given to the evil. But government by God is promised as a reward to the good:

"The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" (Psalms 33:16). Therefore.

To the Contrary:

No one justly punishes those who are not under his rule. But God punishes the evil for the sins they commit. Therefore, they are under His rule.

REPLY:

Divine providence extends to men in two ways: first, in so far as men are provided for; second, in so far as they themselves become providers. If they fail in their own providence they are called evil; but if they observe the demands of justice they are called good. Moreover, in so far as they come under providence they are given both good and evil. Now, men are provided for in different ways according to the different ways they have of providing for themselves. For, if they keep the right order in their own providence, God's providence in their regard will keep an ordering that is congruent with their human dignity; that is, nothing will happen to them that is not for their own good, and everything that happens to them will be to their own advantage, according to what is said in the Epistle to the Romans (8:28): "To them that love God, all things work together unto good." However, if in their own providence men do not keep that order which is congruent with their dignity as rational creatures, but

provide after the manner of brute animals, then God's providence will dispose of them according to the order that belongs to brutes, so that their good and evil acts will not be directed to their own profit but to the profit of others, according to the words of the Psalmist: "And man when he was in honour did not understand; he is compared..." (Psalms 48:13). From this it is evident that God's providence governs the good in a higher way than it governs the evil. For, when the evil leave one order of providence, that is, by not doing the will of God, they fall into another order, an order in which the will of God is done to them. The good, however, are in the true order of His providence in both respects.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. God is said to abandon the wicked, not because they are entirely alien to His providence, but because their acts are not directed to their own profit. This is especially true of the depraved.
2. The angels in charge of guarding men never leave a man entirely. They are merely said to leave a man when, according to God's just judgment, they permit a man to fall into sin or into some punishment.
3. A special kind of providence is promised to the good as a reward. As we mentioned above, this does not belong to the wicked.

ARTICLE VIII: ARE ALL MATERIAL CREATURES GOVERNED BY GOD'S PROVIDENCE THROUGH ANGELS?

Parallel readings; Summa Theol., I, 22, 3; 103, 6; Contra Gentiles III, CC. 76-78, 83, 94, 124-25; De Subst. sep., C. 13 (Perr. In. 80); Comp. Theol., I, cc. 130-31.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are not, for

1. In Job (34:13) we read: "What other hath he appointed over the earth? or whom hath he set over the world which he hath made?" In his commentary on this passage, Gregory says: "By Himself, indeed, He rules that world who has created it by Himself." Consequently, God does not rule material creatures through the mediation of spirits.
2. Damascene says that it is inconsistent to say that one person makes a thing and another rules over it. But, without any medium, God alone creates material creatures. Therefore, He governs them without any intermediaries.
3. Hugh of St. Victor says that God's providence is His predestination, which is the highest wisdom and goodness. Now, the highest good or wisdom is not communicated to any creature. Therefore, neither is providence. Hence, God does not provide for material creatures through the mediation of spiritual creatures.
4. Material creatures are ruled by providence in so far as they are directed to an end. But bodies are ordained to their end through their natural operations in accordance with their own determinate natures. Therefore, since the natures of natural bodies are made determinate, not by spiritual creatures, but directly by God, it seems that they are not governed through the mediation of spiritual substances.
5. Augustine distinguishes⁴ between two types of providential operations: "natural and voluntary." The former he calls natural because it makes trees and plants grow; the latter he

calls voluntary because it takes place through the deeds of angels and men. It is clear, therefore, that all material things are ruled by the natural operation of providence, not through the mediation of angels, as would be true were they ruled by voluntary operation.

6. What is attributed to one person because of his dignity does not belong to another who does not have a similar dignity. Now, Jerome writes: "Great is the dignity of souls, each of whom has an angel appointed to guard it." This dignity, however, is not found in material creatures; consequently, they are not committed to the providence and direction of angels.

7. The effects and due courses of these material bodies are frequently hindered. This would not happen if they were governed by the mediation of angels, because these obstacles would then occur either with the consent of the angels and this is impossible, since it would be contrary to that for which angels were appointed, namely, the govern merit of natures according to its due order—or they would occur against the angels will—and this, too, is impossible, since the angels would not be in the state of beatitude if something could happen to them which they did not want to happen. Therefore, material creatures are not ruled through the mediation of spiritual creatures.

8. The more noble and powerful a cause is, the more perfect is its effect. Now, lower causes can produce such effects as can be kept in existence even after the operation of their efficient cause ceases; for example, a knife continues in existence even after the work of the cutler has ceased. Much more so, then, will the effects of God's power be able to exist by themselves without being provided for by any efficient cause. Consequently, they do not need to be ruled through angels.

. The divine goodness has created the whole world in order to manifest itself; for, as we read in Proverbs (16:4): "The Lord hath made all things for himself..." Now, God's goodness, as Augustine also says, is manifested more by a diversity of natures than by a number of things all possessing the same nature. For this reason, God did not make all creatures rational or all of them to exist in themselves. He made some creatures irrational, and some, like accidents, that exist in others. Consequently, it seems that for the greater manifestation of Himself God created not only creatures that needed the rule of an other, but also some creatures that needed no rule at all. Hence, our position stands.

10. There are two types of acts in creatures, first act and second act.

First act is the form and the act of existence that a form gives. Form is called the primarily first act, existence, the secondarily first act. Second act, however, is operation. Now, the first act of corporeal things comes directly from God. Therefore, their second acts are also caused directly by God. But the only way in which one thing governs another is by being in some manner the cause of its operations. Therefore, material creatures of this sort are not governed through the instrumentality of spirits.

11. According to Augustine, God simultaneously created a world that was perfect in all its parts in order that His power might be better shown. The praiseworthiness of His providence would similarly be even better shown if He were to govern all things directly. Therefore, He does not govern material things through the mediation of spirits.

12. There are two ways of governing. One way is to impart light or knowledge; this is the way in which a teacher rules his class, and a ruler, his city. The other way is to impart motion to a thing; this is the way in which a pilot guides his ship. Now, spiritual creatures do not govern material creatures by imparting light or knowledge, because these material things cannot receive knowledge, nor do they govern them by imparting motion, because, as is proved in the Physics, a mover must be joined to what he moves, and spiritual substances are not joined to

these lesser material bodies. Consequently, the latter are not governed in any way through their mediation.

13. Boethius says: "Through Himself alone God disposes all things." His disposition of material things, therefore, does not take place through spirits.

To the Contrary:

1'. Gregory says: "In this visible world, nothing can be disposed except through invisible creatures."

2'. Augustine writes: "all material things are ruled in a definite order through the spirit of life."

3'. Augustine also says: "God does certain things Himself, as illuminating and beatifying souls. Other things He does through creatures who serve Him. These, in proportion to their merit and according to inviolable laws, are ordained to care even for sparrows, even for the beauty of the grass of the fields, indeed, even for the number of hairs on our heads—and to all this divine providence extends." Now, the creatures ordained to serve God's inviolable decrees are the angels; consequently, it is through them that He governs material things.

4'. Origen writes: "The world needs the angels, who rule over beasts, preside over the birth of animals, and over the growth of bushes, plants, and other things."

5'. Hugh of St. Victor says: "The ministry of angels rules not only over the life of men but also over the things that are related to their life." Now, all material things are ordained for men's use. Consequently, all things are governed through the mediation of angels.

6'. In a co-ordinated series, the earlier members act on the later members. The later do not act on the earlier. But spiritual substances are prior to material, since they are closer to the first principle. Therefore, the action of spiritual substances governs material actions, and the opposite is not true.

7'. Man is said to be a "microcosm" because the soul rules the human body as God rules the whole universe. In this respect, the soul is called "an image of God" more than angels are. Now, our soul governs the body through the mediation of certain spirits which are spiritual in comparison with the body, although material in comparison with the soul. Consequently, God also rules material creatures through the mediation of spiritual creatures.

8'. Our soul exercises certain operations directly, for example, understanding and willing; but it exercises other operations mediately by using bodily organs as instruments, as, for example, in the operations of the sensitive and vegetative soul. God also exercises certain operations directly, such as the beatifying of souls and the other actions He performs in relation to the highest substances. Consequently, some of God's operations will also take place in the lowest substances through the mediation of the highest ones.

9'. The first cause does not take away the operation of a second cause, but, as is clear from what is said in The Causes, it strengthens it. Now, if God were to govern all things immediately, second causes would have no operations of their own. God, therefore, rules lower beings through higher beings.

10'. In the universe there is something, such as the ultimate constituents of bodies, which is ruled but does not rule. There is something, such as God, which is not ruled but rules. Therefore, there will exist something that both rules and is ruled—a medium between both types. Consequently, God rules lower creatures through the mediation of higher.

REPLY:

As Dionysius and Augustine say, the divine goodness is the cause of things being brought into existence, for God wished to communicate His goodness to others as far as this was possible to creatures. God's goodness, however, has a twofold perfection. We can consider it in itself as it contains all perfections in itself in a super eminent way, or we can consider it as it flows into things, that is, as it is the cause of things. It was fitting, therefore, that God's divine goodness should be communicated to creatures in both ways so that because of this goodness created things not only would exist and possess goodness but also would give existence and goodness to other things, just like the sun's outpoured rays, which not only illumine other bodies but also make them to be sources of light, too. However, the following order is kept:

Those that most resemble the sun receive the most of its light and, consequently, have sufficient light not only for themselves but also to pour out on other things.

Similarly, in the ordering of the universe, as a result of the outpouring of God's goodness, superior creatures have not only that by which they are good in themselves, but also that by which they are the cause of goodness for other things which participate the least in God's goodness. These last-named things participate in the divine goodness merely in order to exist—not to be the cause of other things. And this is the reason, as Augustine and the Philosopher say, why that which is active is always more noble than that which is passive.

Now, among the superior creatures, the closest to God are those rational ones that exist, live, and understand in the likeness of God. Consequently, God in His goodness gives them the power not only of pouring out upon other things but also of having the same manner of outpouring that He Himself has—that is, according to their will, and not according to any necessity of their nature. Hence, God governs inferior creatures both through spiritual creatures and through the more noble material creatures. He provides through material creatures, not by making them provident themselves, but by making them active. He governs through spiritual creatures, however, by making them provident themselves.

But even in rational creatures an order can be found. Rational souls hold the lowest place among these, and their light is shadowy in comparison with that of the angels. Consequently, as Dionysius says, their knowledge is more restricted, and their providence is likewise restricted to a few things, namely, to human affairs and practical matters of human life. But the providence of angels is universal and extends to all material creation. Consequently, both saints and philosophers say that all corporeal things are governed by divine providence through the mediation of angels. We must differ with the philosophers, however, in this, that some of them say that corporeal things are not only cared for by angels but are also created by them. This opinion is contrary to faith. We should follow, instead, the opinion of the saints who hold that corporeal things of this sort are administered by the providence of angels through motion only; that is, the angels move the higher bodies, and these motions cause the motions of the lower.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. An exclusive statement regarding an agent does not exclude the operation of an instrument; it merely excludes another principal agent. Hence, if one were to say, "Socrates alone makes a knife," not the operation of his hammer but only the operation of another carpenter is excluded. Similarly, when it is said that God governs the world by Himself, this does not exclude the operation of inferior causes, which God uses as instrumental means. All that is excluded is government by another principal ruler.

2. The governing of a thing pertains to its direction to an end. The ordination of a thing to an end, however, presupposes its act of existing; but its act of existing presupposes nothing else. Consequently, creation, by which all things are brought into existence, is the operation of the only cause that presupposes no other cause by which it is kept in existence. Government,

however, can be one of those causes that do presuppose other causes, so it is not necessary for God to create through the mediation of certain causes through whose instrumentality He governs.

3. What creatures receive from God cannot exist in them in the same manner in which it exists in Him. Consequently, this difference becomes apparent when names are applied to Him. Those names that express some perfection absolutely are common also to creatures; but those that express both a perfection and its manner of existing in God are not common to creatures, for example, omnipotence, supreme wisdom, and supreme goodness. It is clear, therefore, that even though supreme goodness is not communicated to a creature, providence can be communicated to it.

4. Even though that establishment of nature by which material things receive a tendency to an end comes directly from God, their motion and action can take place through the instrumentality of angels, just as natures in seeds possess their undeveloped nature from God alone but, by the providence of a farmer, are helped to develop into act. Consequently, just as a farmer supervises the growth of the crops in his fields, so do angels direct the entire activity of material creation.

5. Augustine divides the operation of natural providence from that of voluntary providence by considering the proximate principles of their operations; and nature is the proximate principle of some operations of divine providence, while the will is that of others. But the remote principle of all providential action is the will, at least the divine will. The argument, therefore, proves nothing.

6. Just as all material bodies lie under God's providence but God's care is nevertheless said to be only for men because of the special kind of providence He has for them, so also, even though all material bodies are subject to the rule of angels, nevertheless, because of the dignity of men's souls, angels are appointed to guard men in a very special way.

7. Just as the will of God as a ruler is not opposed to defects in things but, instead, allows or permits them, so is the same entirely true of the wills of angels, which are perfectly confirmed to the divine will.

8. As Avicenna says, no effect can remain if its proper cause is removed. Now, certain inferior causes are causes of becoming; others are causes of existing. A cause of becoming is that which educes a form from the potentiality of matter by means of motion, such as a cutler who is the efficient cause of a knife. A cause of a thing's existing, however, is that upon which the act of existence of a thing essentially depends, as the existence of light in the air depends upon the sun. Now, if the cutler is removed, the becoming of the knife ceases, but not its existence. However, if the sun is taken away, there ceases the very existence of the light in the air. Similarly, if God's action ceases, the existence of a creature utterly ceases, since God is the cause not only of a thing's becoming but also of its existence.

9. That condition cannot possibly be in a creature; that is, a creature cannot have an act of existence without someone keeping it in that act. It is repugnant to the very notion of a creature; for a creature, because it is a creature, has an act of existence that is caused, and, consequently, it depends on something else.

10. More things are required for second act than for first act. Hence, it is not unreasonable that something should be the cause of another's motion and operation, even though it is not the cause of its act of existence.

The breadth of God's providence and goodness is manifested more clearly in His governance of inferior beings through superior beings than if He were to govern all things directly. For in

this kind of government, as is clear from what has been said, the perfection of God's goodness is communicated in more than one regard.

12. A spiritual creature governs a material one by giving it motion. This does not necessitate that spiritual creatures be joined to all bodies, but only to those which they move directly, namely, the first bodies. Spiritual creatures, moreover, are not joined to these bodies by being their forms, as some have held, but by being their movers.

13. When something is said to take place through another, the preposition through implies that it is a cause of the operation. Now, since an operation stands halfway between the one doing the work and the work that is done, through can imply a cause of the operation in so far as this cause issues in a result. In this sense it is said that some thing takes place through an instrument. Through can also, however, signify a cause of the operation in so far as the operation comes from the one operating. In this sense we say that something takes place through the form of the agent. Now, here it is not the instrument which is the cause of the agent's action, but his form or some superior agent is the cause. However, an instrument can be the cause of the result which receives the agent's action.

Consequently, when we read that God disposes all things through Himself alone, through denotes the cause of His divine disposition in so far as it comes from God who is disposing. In this sense, God is said to dispose through Himself alone, because He is not moved by any superior disposing Him; and He disposes, not through any extrinsic form, but only through His own goodness.

ARTICLE IX: DOES DIVINE PROVIDENCE DISPOSE BODIES HERE BELOW BY MEANS OF THE CELESTIAL BODIES?

Parallel readings: [Summa Theol., I, 22, 3; 115, 3](#) [II Sentences 15, 1, 2; Contra Gentiles III, 82; Comp. Theol., I, C. 127.](#)

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. Speaking of celestial bodies, Damascene writes as follows: "We say, however, that they do not cause generation or corruption." Since bodies here below are subject to generation and corruption, they are consequently not disposed through celestial bodies.

2. It was said, however, that the celestial bodies are not called the causes of bodies here below merely because they do not introduce any necessity into them.—On the contrary, if an effect of a heavenly body on bodies here below is impeded, this must have been caused by some condition in the lower bodies. Now, if the lower bodies are ruled by the heavenly bodies, then that obstructing condition must be traced to some influence of a heavenly body. Consequently, no impediment could arise from bodies here below unless it were due to an exigency of the celestial bodies. Therefore, if the celestial bodies rule the lower, and if the motions of the celestial bodies are necessary, they will introduce necessity into the lower bodies.

3. For an action to be completed, all that is needed is something active and something passive. Now, both active and passive natural powers are found in bodies here below. Therefore, no power of a celestial body is needed for their actions. Consequently, bodies here below are not ruled through the instrumentality of celestial bodies.

4. According to Augustine, there are three types of things: first, things that are acted upon but do not act (e.g., bodies); second, things that act but are not acted upon (e.g., God); third,

things that both act and are acted upon (e.g., spiritual substances). Now, celestial bodies are simply corporeal. Consequently, they do not have the power of acting upon bodies here below. Hence, the latter are not disposed through their instrumentality.

5. If a celestial body acts upon bodies here below, either it acts upon them in so far as it is a body, that is, through its material form, or it acts upon them through something else. Now, a celestial body does not act in so far as it is a body, because this kind of action can be found in all bodies; and this explanation seems unlikely from what Augustine says. Consequently, if it does act upon lower bodies, its action is due to something else; and, in this case, it should be attributed to an immaterial power and not to the heavenly bodies. Hence, the conclusion is the same as before.

6. What does not belong to what is prior does not belong to what is subsequent. Now, as the Commentator says, material forms pre suppose indeterminate dimensions in matter. However, dimensions are not active, because quantity is not an active principle. Therefore, material forms are not active principles, and so no body can do anything except through an immaterial power existing within it. Consequently, the conclusion is the same as before.

7. Explaining this statement made in The Causes, "Every noble soul has three operations," a commentator declares that the soul acts on nature by means of a divine power existing within it. A soul, however, is much more noble than a body. Hence, neither can a body do any thing to the soul except by means of a divine power within it. Consequently, our original position stands.

8. That which is more simple is not moved by what is less simple. But seminal principles in the matter of bodies here below are more simple than the material power of the heavens, because the power of the latter is diffused in matter while that of the seminal principles is not. Therefore, the seminal principles in bodies here below cannot be moved by the power of a celestial body. Hence, bodies here below are not governed in their motions by celestial bodies.

9. Augustine writes as follows: "Nothing pertains to the body more than the body's sex. Yet, twins of different sexes can be conceived when the stars are in the same position." Therefore, celestial bodies have no influence even on material things, and our original position stands.

10. As we read in The Causes: "The first cause has more effect on what is caused by a second cause than the second cause itself has." Now, if bodies here below are disposed by celestial bodies, then will respect to the powers in bodies here below the powers of the celestial bodies are in a relation similar to that of the first cause; and the powers in bodies here below are then like second causes. Hence, effects taking place in bodies here below are determined more by the disposition of the celestial spheres than they are by the powers of the bodies themselves. However, there is necessity in the celestial bodies, since they always remain the same. Therefore, their effects below will also be necessary. But this is not true. Consequently, the first statement—that bodies here below are disposed by heavenly bodies—is also not true.

11. As we read in The Heavens, the motion of the heavens is natural. Consequently, it can hardly be voluntary or the result of a choice. The things that are caused by it, therefore, are not caused as the result of a choice, and so do not come under providence. It would be unreasonable, however, to suppose that bodies here below are not governed by providence. Therefore, it is unreasonable for the motion of celestial bodies to be the cause of bodies here below.

12. When a cause is placed, an effect is placed. Therefore, the act of existence of a cause is, as it were, antecedent to that of an effect. Now, if an antecedent is necessary, the consequent is also necessary. Therefore, if a cause is necessary, the effect is likewise necessary.

However, the effects taking place in bodies here below are not necessary but contingent. Consequently, they are not caused by the motion of the heavens, which is necessary because natural. Therefore, our original position stands.

13. The final cause of a thing's becoming is more noble than the thing. But all things were made for the sake of man—even heavenly bodies. For we read the following in Deuteronomy (4:19): "Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon, and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all the nations that are under heaven." Therefore, man is more noble than the celestial bodies. Now, what is less noble does not influence what is more noble. Consequently, celestial bodies have no influence on a human body, and, for the same reason, none on other bodies such as elements that are prior to the human body.

14. It was said, however, that man is more noble than the heavenly bodies because of his soul, not because of his body.—On the contrary, a nobler perfection is proper to a nobler subject. Now, the body of a man has a more noble form than a heavenly body has; for the form of the heavens is purely material, and a rational soul is much more noble than matter. Therefore, even the body of a man is nobler than a heavenly body.

15. A contrary is not the cause of its contrary. Now, occasionally, the power of a celestial body is opposed to the introduction of certain effects into lower bodies. For example, sometimes a celestial body starts to cause dampness, while a doctor is trying to dispose of some matter by drying it up in order to restore health; and he often succeeds in doing this even though a heavenly body is exerting a contrary influence. Therefore, heavenly bodies do not cause physical effects in bodies here below.

16. Since all action takes place through contact, what makes no contact does not act. Heavenly bodies, however, do not touch bodies here below. Consequently, they do not act upon them; and the original position stands.

17. But it was said that heavenly bodies contact lower bodies through a medium.—On the contrary, whenever there is contact and action through a medium, the medium must receive the effect of the agent before the end-term does. For example, fire heats the air before it heats us. Now, the effects of the sun and of the stars cannot be received in the lower spheres because these have the nature of the fifth essence and consequently cannot be affected by heat, cold, or any of the other states found in bodies here below. Therefore, no action can come from the heavenly bodies through the lower spheres to bodies here below.

18. Providence is communicated to what is an instrument of providence. But providence cannot be communicated to heavenly bodies, since they lack intelligence. Therefore, they cannot be an instrument for providing for things.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "Bodies of weaker and grosser natures are ruled in a definite order by those that are more subtle and powerful." Now, the heavenly bodies are more subtle and powerful than bodies here below. Therefore, they rule the bodies here below.

2'. Dionysius says that the rays of the sun "enable visible bodies to generate and give them life, nourishment, and growth." Now, these are the more noble effects to be found in bodies here below. Consequently, all the other physical effects also are produced by the providence of God through the mediation of celestial bodies.

3'. According to the Philosopher, that which is first in any genus is the cause of the others that come afterwards in that genus. But the heavenly bodies are first in the genus of bodies, and

their motions are first of all material motions. They are, therefore, the cause of material bodies that are moved here below. Hence, the conclusion is the same as before.

4'. According to the Philosopher, the movement of the sun along an inclined circle causes generation and corruption in bodies here below. Consequently, generations and corruptions are measured by this movement. Aristotle also says that all the variety found in concepts is due to the heavenly bodies. Therefore, bodies here below are disposed through their mediation.

5'. Rabbi Moses says that the heavens are in the universe as a heart is in an animal. But all the other members are ruled by the soul through the instrumentality of the heart. Therefore, all material things are ruled by God through the instrumentality of the heavens.

REPLY:

The common intention of all philosophers was to reduce multitude to unity and variety to uniformity as much as possible. Consequently after considering the diversity of actions to be found in bodies here below, the ancient philosophers attempted to reduce these bodies to some fewer and more simple principles, that is, to elements, one or many, and to elementary qualities. But their position is not logical; for, in the actions of natural things, elementary qualities are like instrumental principles. An indication of this is the fact that they do not have the same way of acting in all things, nor do their actions always arrive at the same term. They have different effects in gold, in wood, and in the flesh of an animal. Now, this would not happen unless their actions were controlled by something else. Moreover, the action of the principal agent is not reduced to the action of an instrument as to its principle. Rather, the opposite is true, as, for example, a product of handicraft ought not be attributed to the saw but to the craftsman. Therefore, neither can natural effects be reduced to elementary qualities as to their first principles.

Consequently, others (the Platonists) made simple and separated forms the first principles of natural effects. These were the origin, they said, of the existence, generation, and every natural property of bodies here below. This opinion also, however, is false; for, if a cause remains always the same, then the effect is always the same. Now, the forms they posited were immovable. Consequently, any generation resulting from them would always have to happen in bodies here below in a constant manner. But we see with our own eyes that what happens is quite the contrary.

It is therefore necessary to say that in bodies here below the principles of generation, of corruption, and of the other motions that depend upon these do not always remain the same; but they nevertheless always remain as the first principles of generation, and thereby make continual generation possible. Moreover, they must be unchangeable in their substance, and subject only to local motion. Consequently, as a result of their approach or withdrawal, they bring about diverse and contrary motions in bodies here below. Now, the heavenly bodies are of just such a nature. Consequently, all material effects should be reduced to them as to their cause.

In this reduction, however, two errors have been made. Some have reduced the bodies here below to heavenly bodies, as though the latter were their absolute first cause, for these philosophers denied that immaterial substances exist. Consequently, they said that what is prior among bodies is first among beings. This, however, is clearly false. Whatever is moved must be reduced to a first immovable principle, since nothing is moved by itself, and one cannot keep going back into infinity. Now, even though a heavenly body does not undergo change by generation or corruption or by a motion which would alter what belongs to its substance, it is nevertheless moved locally. Consequently, the reduction must be made to

some prior principle so that things undergoing qualitative change are traced back by a definite order to that which causes this change in other things but is not so changed itself, although it is moved locally; and then further back to that which does not change in any way at all.

Others have asserted that the heavenly bodies cause not only the motion of bodies here below but also their very beginning. For example, Avicenna says that, as a result of what is common to all heavenly bodies, that is, their circular motion, there is caused the common element of bodies here below, namely, first matter; and, as a result of those things which differentiate one heavenly body from another, there is caused the difference in their forms. Thus, the heavenly bodies are media, to some extent, between God and things here below even in the lime of creation. This position, however, is contrary to faith, which teaches that the whole of nature in its first beginning was created directly by God. But that one creature should be moved by another, presupposing that natural powers of each creature are given it as a result of God's work, is not contrary to faith. Consequently, we say that the heavenly bodies are the causes of bodies here below merely in the lime of motion. Thus, these heavenly bodies are instruments in the work of governing, but not in the work of creating.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Damascene intends to exclude from heavenly bodies only first causality or any causality which would introduce necessity into bodies here below. For, even if heavenly bodies always act in the same way, their effects are received in lower bodies according to the manner of these lower bodies, which are frequently seen to be in a contrary state. Consequently, the forces exercised by the heavenly bodies are not always able to bring about their effects in the bodies here below, because a contrary disposition prevents them from doing so. This is why the Philosopher says that signs of storms and winds frequently appear, but the storms and winds do not take place because the contrary dispositions are stronger.

2. Those dispositions that resist the force of the celestial bodies are caused in their original creation, not by a heavenly body, but by God's operation, which has made fire to be hot, water to be cold, and so forth. Consequently, we should not reduce all impediments of this kind to the celestial bodies.

3. The active powers in these lower bodies are merely instrumental

Consequently, like an instrument which does not move unless it is moved by a first agent, the active powers of inferior bodies cannot operate unless moved by celestial bodies.

4. That objection touches a certain opinion found in The Fount of Life, to the effect that no body acts because of any power that it has as a body, because the quantity found in matter prevents the form from acting. Hence, every action we attribute to a body is really the action of some spiritual power operating in it. According to Rabbi Moses, this opinion was held by certain teachers among the Moors who said that fire does not heat, but God heats in the fire. This position, however, is foolish, since it denies all thing their natural operations. Moreover, it is contrary to what philosophers and saints have said. Consequently, we say that bodies act by means of their material power; nevertheless, God operates in all things as a first cause operating in a second cause.

Therefore, the statement made to the effect that bodies are only acted upon but do not act should be understood in this sense: only that is said to act which has dominion over its action. It was in this sense that Damascene asserted: "Brute animals do not act but are only acted upon." But this does not mean that animals do not act if act is taken to mean simply the performance of an action.

5. As we read in Generation and Corruption, that which is active is always other than or contrary to that which is passive. Consequently, it does not belong to a body to act upon another body will respect to that which it has in common will that body, but only will respect

to that in which it is different from it. A body, therefore, does not act in so far as it is a body, but in so far as it is a certain kind of body. For example, no animal reasons inasmuch as it is simply animal, but some animals reason inasmuch as they are also men. Similarly, fire does not heat in so far as it is a body, but in so far as it is hot. The same is true of a celestial body.

6. Before the advent of natural forms, dimensions are presupposed as existing in matter in a state of incomplete act, not of complete act. Consequently, they are first in the line of matter and of generation. Form, however, is first in the line of completion. Now, a thing acts in so far as it is completed and is an actual being, not in so far as it is in potency. As a being in potency it is merely passive. Hence, it does not follow from the fact that matter or dimensions pre-existing in matter are not active that form is likewise inactive. Instead, the opposite follows. It would follow, however, if these dimensions were not passive, that the form would not be passive. But, as the Commentator says, the form of a heavenly body is not in it through the mediation of dimensions of the sort described.

7. The order of effects should correspond to the order of causes. According to the author of that book, however, the following order of causes exists: first, the first cause, God; second, the intelligence; third, the soul. Consequently, the first effect, the act of existence, is properly attributed to the first cause; the second effect, knowing, is attributed to intelligence; the third effect, moving, is attributed to the soul.

A second cause, however, always acts in virtue of the first cause, and, consequently, possesses something of its operation (like the lower spheres which possess something of the motion of the highest). According to the author, however, the intelligence not only knows but also gives existence; and the soul, which he holds to be caused by the intelligence, has not only the motion of the soul, which is to move, but also that of an intellect, which is to understand, and that of God, which is to give existence. I admit these to be the actions of a noble soul, but he understands such a soul to be the soul of a heavenly body or any other rational soul whatsoever.

Therefore, it is not necessary that the divine power be the only one to move all things without any intermediary. The lower causes can also move through their own powers in so far as they participate in the power of superior causes.

8. According to Augustine, seminal principles are all the active and passive powers given to creatures by God; and through their instrumentality natural effects are brought into existence. He writes in *The Trinity*: "Like a mother pregnant will her unborn infant, the world is pregnant with the causes of unborn things." While explaining what he said above about seminal principles, he also called them "the powers and faculties" that are allotted to things.

Consequently, included in these seminal principles are the active powers of celestial bodies, which are more noble than the active powers of bodies here below and, consequently, able to move them. They are called seminal principles inasmuch as all effects are originally in their active causes in the manner of seeds. But if, as some hold, seminal principles are understood as being the beginnings of forms in first matter, inasmuch as first matter is in potency to all forms, then, even though this does not agree very much with the words of Augustine, it can be said that the simplicity of these principles, like the simplicity of first matter, is caused by their imperfection, and, because of it, they cannot be moved, just as first matter cannot be.

9. Differentiation of the sexes must be attributed to celestial causes. Our reason for saying this is as follows: Every agent tends with form to its own likeness, as far as possible, that which is passive in its respect. Accordingly, the active principle in the male seed always tends toward the generation of a male offspring, which is more perfect than the female. From this it follows that conception of female offspring is something of an accident in the order of nature—in so

far, at least, as it is not the result of the natural causality of the particular agent. Therefore, if there were no other natural influence at work tending toward the conception of female offspring, such conception would be wholly outside the design of nature, as is the case with what we call "monstrous" births. And so it is said that, although the conception of female offspring is not the natural result of the efficient causality of the particular nature at work—for which reason the female is sometimes spoken of as an "accidental male"—nevertheless, the conception of female offspring is the natural result of universal nature; that is, it is due to the influence of a heavenly body, as Avicenna suggests.

Matter, however, can cause an impediment which will prevent both the celestial force and the particular nature from attaining their effect, namely, the production of a male. And so, sometimes, as a result of an improper disposition in matter, a female is conceived even when the celestial influence tends to the contrary; or the opposite may happen, and, despite the influence of the celestial body, a male will sometimes be conceived because the formative influence of the particular agent is strong enough to overcome the defect in the material. In the conception of twins, the matter is separated by the operation of nature; and one part of the matter yields to the active principle more than the other part does because of the latter's deficiency. Consequently, in one part a female is generated, in the other, a male—independently of the dispositions of the celestial spheres one way or the other. The generation of a female twin, however, happens more often when a celestial body disposes to the female sex.

10. A first cause is said to have more influence than a second cause in so far as its effect is deeper and more permanent in what is caused than the effect of the second cause is. Nevertheless, the effect has more resemblance to the second cause, since the action of the first cause is in some way determined to this particular effect by means of the second cause.

12. Although a movement in the heavens, as it is the act of a movable body, is not a voluntary motion, nevertheless, as it is the act of a mover, it is voluntary; that is to say, it is caused by a will. And in this respect the things which are caused by this movement may come under providence.

12. An effect does not follow from a first cause unless the second cause has already been placed. Consequently, the necessity of a first cause does not introduce necessity into its effect unless the second cause is also necessary.

13. The celestial bodies are not made for man in the sense that man is their principal end. Their principal end is the divine goodness. More over, that man is nobler than a heavenly body is not due to the nature of his body but to the nature of his rational soul. Besides, even granting that man's body were, speaking absolutely, nobler than a celestial body, this would not prevent a celestial body from being nobler than a human body under a certain aspect, namely, as it has active power while the latter has merely passive power; and in this respect, a celestial body can act upon the human body. Similarly, fire as it is actually hot can act upon a human body in so far as the latter is potentially hot.

14. The rational soul is a substance as well as the act of a body. As a substance, therefore, it is nobler than the form of a celestial body; but it is not nobler as the act of a body. Or it could be said that the soul is a perfection of the human body both as a form and as a mover. But, since a celestial body is more perfect, it does not need a spiritual substance to perfect it as a form, but only to perfect it as a mover. This self sufficiency makes it naturally more noble than [a man who needs] a human soul.

Even though some have asserted that the movers of the heavenly spheres are joined to them as forms, Augustine left the matter in doubt. In his commentary on the words of Ecclesiastes

(1:6), "The spirit goeth forward surveying all places round about," Jerome seems to follow the affirmative position; for he says: "He calls the sun a spirit because it breathes and lives like an animal." Damascene, however, holds the contrary: "Let no one think that the heavens or the stars are living. They lack both life and feeling."

15. Even the action of a contrary which resists the active influence of a celestial body has some cause in the heavens; for, as the philosophers say, things here below are sustained in their actions by the first motion. Consequently, a contrary whose action impedes the effect of a celestial body, like the hot remedy which impedes moistening by the moon, nevertheless has a cause in the heavens. Similarly, the health that follows is not entirely contrary to the action of the celestial body but has some roots there.

16. As is said in *Generation and Corruption*, heavenly bodies contact bodies here below, but are not contacted by them. Moreover, as was mentioned, no heavenly body immediately contacts a body here below. The contact is through a medium.

17. The action of the agent is received in the medium according to the manner of the medium. Consequently, it is sometimes received in a different way in the medium than in the ultimate term. For example, the force of a magnet attracting iron passes to the iron through the medium of air, which is not attracted; and, as the Commentator says, the force of a fish that shocks the hand is transmitted to the hand through a net which is not shocked. Moreover, heavenly bodies do have all the qualities found in bodies below, but in their own way (which is that of a source) and not as in these lower bodies. Consequently, their actions are not received in the intermediate spheres in such a way that these are changed as the lower bodies are.

18. Bodies of this kind here below are ruled by divine providence through the higher bodies, but not in such a way that divine providence is communicated to them. They are made merely the instruments by which God's providence is carried out just as art is not communicated to a hammer, which is merely an instrument of the art.

ARTICLE X: ARE HUMAN ACTS GOVERNED BY GOD'S PROVIDENCE THROUGH THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF CELESTIAL BODIES?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 22, 3; 115, 4; I-II, 9, 5; II-II, 95, 5; *Jl Sentences* 15, 1, 3; *In Matth.*, c. 2 (P. Io:2 *Contra Gentiles* III, CC. 84-85, 87; III *De anima*, *lectura* 4, n. 6zi; I *Perihermen.*, *lectura* 14, n. 14 seq.; VI *Metaph.*, *lectura* 3, nn. 1203-05, 1213-17; *Camp. Theol.*, I, CC. 127-28.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are, for

1. According to Damascene, heavenly bodies "are responsible for our habits, temperament, and disposition." Now, habits and dispositions belong to the intellect and the will, which are the principles of human acts. Consequently, human acts are disposed by God through the mediation of celestial bodies.

2. We read in *The Six Principles*: "That the soul when joined to a body, imitates the temperament of that body." But, since the celestial bodies leave their impression on a man's temperament, they thereby influence his soul. Hence, they can cause human acts.

3. Whatever acts upon a prior member of a series also acts upon a subsequent member. Now, the essence of the soul exists before its powers of intellect and will exist, because these have their origin in the essence of the soul. Therefore, since the celestial bodies leave their impression on the essence of the rational soul, which they do inasmuch as the soul is the act of

a body a function belonging to it by its very essence, it seems that they leave their impression on the intellect and will, and, consequently, are principles of human acts.

4. An instrument acts, not only because of its own power, but also because of the power of the principal agent. Now, since a heavenly body is a moved mover, it is the instrument of the spiritual substance moving it. Consequently, its motion is not that of a body alone but it is also the act of the spirit moving it. Therefore, its motion takes place, not only by reason of the body moved, but also by reason of the spirit moving it. Now, just as that celestial body is superior to a human body, so is that spiritual substance superior to a human spirit. Consequently, that motion leaves its impression on a man's soul as well as on his body. It seems, therefore, that they are the principles of his acts of intellect and will.

g. By experience we know that from their birth some men have talents for learning or exercising certain crafts. Hence, some become carpenters, others become doctors, and so forth. Now, this proclivity cannot be reduced to the proximate principles of generation as its cause, for children are often found to have a bent to certain things which their parents did not have. This difference in talent, therefore, should be reduced to the celestial bodies as its cause. Moreover, it can not be said that this sort of talent is in men's souls through the mediation of their bodies, because the physical qualities of the body do not contribute to these inclinations as they actually do to anger, joy, and similar passions of the soul. Celestial bodies, therefore, leave their impression on men's souls immediately and directly. Consequently, human acts are disposed through the instrumentality of the celestial bodies.

6. of all human acts, the following seem to be superior to all others: ruling, waging wars, and similar actions. But, as Isaac says: "God made a sphere to rule over kingdoms and wars." Much more, then, are other human acts disposed through the mediation of heavenly bodies.

7. It is easier to transfer a part than a whole. But, according to philosophers, the influence of the celestial bodies sometimes moves the entire population of a province to launch a war. Much more, then, can the power of these celestial bodies affect some particular man.

To the Contrary:

1'. Damascene writes of the heavenly bodies that they never cause our acts: "We have been given free choice by our Maker, and we are the masters of our conduct."

2'. Both Augustine and Gregory support this contrary view.

REPLY:

To get a clear understanding of this question, we must first understand what is meant by human acts. Human acts, properly speaking, are those over which a man is master. A man, however, is the master of his acts through his will or free choice. Consequently, this question is concerned with the acts of the will and of free choice. There are, of course, other acts in man that do not lie under the command of his will, for example, the acts of his nutritive and generative powers. These acts lie under the influence of celestial forces, just as other physical acts do.

There have been many errors regarding human acts. Some have said that human acts do not come under God's providence and cannot be reduced to any cause other than our own providence. As Augustine says, this seems to have been the position of Cicero. The position, however, is untenable; for, as proved in The Soul, our will is a moved mover. Consequently, its act must be reduced to some first principle that is an unmoved mover.

For this reason, some have reduced all the acts of the will to the celestial bodies; for, since they asserted that our senses and intellect are the same, it followed that all the powers of the soul are material and, therefore, subject to the action of the heavenly bodies. The Philosopher,

however, destroys this position by showing that the intellect is an immaterial power and that its action is not material. As he says in *The Generation of Animals*, if the actions of principles are immaterial, the principles themselves must be immaterial. Consequently, it is impossible for the actions of the will and intellect of themselves to be reduced to any material principles.

Avicenna, therefore, declared that heavenly bodies were made, like man, of a soul and body, and that, just as the actions and motion of a human body are reduced to celestial bodies, so all the actions of the soul are reduced to celestial souls as to their principles. Consequently, whatever will we have is caused by the will of a celestial soul. This position is consistent with his opinion on the end of man, which he holds to be the union of the human soul with a celestial soul or intelligence. For, since the perfection of the will is its end and its good and this is its object, just as the visible is the object of sight— then that which acts upon the will should have the nature of an end, because an efficient cause acts only in so far as it impresses its form on a recipient.

Faith, however, teaches that God is the direct end of man's life, and that we will be beatified and enjoy the vision of God. Consequently, He alone can leave an impression on our will. Now, the order of what is moved should correspond to the order of the movers. But in our ordination to our end, with which providence is concerned, the first thing that is in us is our will; and the characters of the good and of an end primarily pertain to the will, which uses everything we have as instruments toward achieving our end. However, in a certain respect the intellect precedes the will, and is, moreover, more closely related to it than our bodily powers are. Consequently, God alone, who is the first provider in all respects, leaves His imprint on our will; the angels, who follow Him in the order of causes, leave their imprint on our intellect in so far as we are enlightened, cleansed, and perfected by them, as Dionysius says. But the celestial bodies, which are inferior agents, can leave their imprint only upon our sensible powers and the other powers in our organs. of course, inasmuch as the move merit of one power of the soul flows over into another, it happens that the impression made by a celestial body will, as it were, accidentally flow over into the intellect and finally into the will. Similarly, the impression made by an angel upon our intellect also accidentally flows over into our will.

But the relation of the intellect and of the will to the sensitive powers is different in the following respect: the intellect is naturally moved by the sensitive apprehension in the way in which a potency is moved by an object, because, as is said in *The Soul*, the phantasm is related to the possible intellect as colour is to sight. Consequently, whenever an interior sensitive power is disturbed, the intellect is necessarily also disturbed. We see, for example, that when the organ of the imagination is injured the action of the intellect is necessarily impeded. By this means, therefore, the action or influence of a celestial body can flow over into the intellect with a kind of necessity; but this influence is accidental, because what it directly influences is the body. I say "necessity" flows over—unless there is a contrary disposition in what

is affected. But the sensitive appetite is not the natural mover of the will. Instead, the opposite is true, because, as is said in *The Soul*, a higher appetite moves a lower "as one sphere" moves another. And no matter how much a lower appetite is troubled by the passion, as of anger or of concupiscence, the will need not be disturbed. Indeed, the will has the power to repel a disturbance of this kind; for, as we read in *Genesis* (4:7): "The lust thereof shall be under thee." Consequently, no necessity is introduced into human acts by the influence of celestial bodies, either by the celestial bodies themselves or by those things which receive their influence. The celestial bodies introduce only an inclination, which the will can resist by means of an acquired or infused power.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Damascene is thinking of bodily habits and dispositions.
2. From what was said above, it is clear that an act of the will in the soul does not necessarily follow the disposition of the body. From the temperament of the body, only an inclination arises to those things which are the object of the will.
3. That argument would proceed correctly if a heavenly body could leave its impression on the essence of the soul directly. But the influence of a heavenly body reaches to the essence of the soul only indirectly, that is, only in so far as the soul is united to a body, whose act the soul is. The will, however, does not have its origin in the essence of the soul in so far as the soul is joined to a body. Consequently, the argument proves nothing.
4. An instrument of a spiritual agent acts through a spiritual power only as it acts through its own material power. Because of its material power, however, a heavenly body can act upon our bodies only. Consequently, the action that arises from its spiritual power can arrive at the soul only indirectly, that is, through the mediation of man's body. However, the material and spiritual power of a heavenly body can influence man's body directly. Because of its material power it moves elementary qualities, such as hot, cold, and so forth; and because of its spiritual power it moves to species and to those effects following the entire species which cannot be reduced to elementary qualities.
5. There are in those bodies some effects of the heavenly bodies which are not caused by heat or cold, such as the attraction of iron by a magnet. In this way some disposition is left in a human body by celestial body; and by reason of this disposition the soul that is joined to such a body is inclined to this or that craft.
6. If we must "save" the words of Isaac, we have to understand them to mean merely an inclination in the manner described above.
7. For the most part, a large group follows its natural inclinations, for, as members of a group, men give in to the passions of the group.

But by using their intelligence will men overcome these passions and inclinations. Consequently, it is more probable that a large group will do what a celestial body inclines it to do than that one individual will; for he may use his reason to overcome this inclination. Similarly, if there is a large group of hot tempered men, it is unlikely that they will not be angered, although it is more likely that an individual will not.

QUESTION 6: Predestination

ARTICLE I: DOES PREDESTINATION BELONG TO KNOWLEDGE OR WILL?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 2 aa. I, 3-4; I Sentences 40, 1, 2; Contra Gentiles III, 163; In Rom., C. 1, lectura (P. 13:7a, 8a).

Difficulties:

It seems that it has will as its genus, for

1. As Augustine says, predestination is the intention of being merciful. But intention belongs to the will. Consequently, predestination also belongs to the will.
2. Predestination seems to be the same as the eternal election referred to in the Epistle to the Ephesians (1:4): "He chose us in him before the foundation of the world"—because the chosen are the same as the predestined. Now, according to the Philosopher, choice belongs rather to appetite than to intellect. Hence, predestination belongs more to the will than to knowledge.
3. But it was said that election comes before predestination and is not the same as it.—On the contrary, will comes after knowledge, not before it. But choice pertains to the will. If, therefore, choice comes before predestination, then predestination cannot belong to knowledge.
4. If predestination belonged to knowledge, then it would seem to be the same as foreknowledge; and thus whoever foreknew the salvation of a person would predestine him. Now, this is false; for the prophets foreknew the salvation of the Gentiles; yet they did not predestine it. Therefore.
5. Predestination implies causality. Now, causality does not have the nature of knowledge, but rather the nature of will. Consequently, predestination belongs more to the will than to knowledge.
6. The will differs from a passive potency in this respect, that the latter refers only to effects taking place in the future, for we cannot speak of passive potency in relation to things that are or have been, whereas the will extends equally to both present and future effects. Now, predestination has both present and future effects; for, as Augustine says: "Predestination is the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future." Therefore, it belongs to the will.
7. Knowledge is not related to things in so far as they are made or to be made but in so far as they are known or to be known. Now, predestination is related to a thing as something that must be effected. Consequently, it does not belong to knowledge.
8. An effect receives its name from its proximate cause rather than from its remote cause. For example, we say that a man is begotten by a man, instead of saying by the sun, which also begets him. Now, preparation is the effect of both knowledge and will, but knowledge is prior to the will and more remote than it. Consequently, preparation belongs more to the will than to knowledge. But, as Augustine says: "Predestination is the preparation of someone for glory." Therefore, predestination pertains rather to the will than to knowledge.
9. When many motions are ordered w only one term, then the entire co-ordinated complex of motions takes the name of the last motion. For example, in the drawing out of a substantial form from the potency of matter, the following order is had: first, alteration, then generation. But the whole is called generation. Now, when something is prepared, this order is had: first, movements of knowledge, then movements of the will. Consequently, the whole should be attributed to the will; therefore, predestination seems to be especially in the will.
10. If one of two contraries is appropriated to something, then the other contrary is removed from it in the highest possible degree. Now, evil is appropriated especially to God's foreknowledge, for we say that the damned are known beforehand. Consequently, His foreknowledge does not have good things as its object. Predestination, however, is concerned only will those good things that lead to salvation. Therefore, predestination is not related to foreknowledge.
11. When a word is used in its proper sense, it does not need a gloss. But whenever the sacred Scripture speaks of knowledge of good, a gloss is added saying that this means approval. This

is evident from the Gloss on the first Epistle to the Corinthians (8:3): "If any man love God, the same is known by him"—that is, he is approved by God"; and from the Gloss on the second Epistle to Timothy (2:19): "The Lord knoweth who are his—that is, God approves him." In its proper sense, therefore, knowledge is not related to good things. But predestination is related to good things. Therefore.

12. To prepare belongs to a power that moves, for preparation is related to some work. But, as has been said, predestination is a preparation. Therefore, it belongs w a moving power and so to the will, not w knowledge.

13. A reasoning power modeled upon another reasoning power imitates it. Now, in the case of the human reason, which is modeled upon the divine, we see that preparation belongs to the will, not to knowledge. Consequently, divine preparation is similar; and the conclusion is the same as before.

14. Although the divine attributes are one reality, the difference between them is manifested in the difference in their effects. Consequently, something said of God should be reduced to that attribute to which this effect is appropriated. Now, grace and glory are the effects of predestination, and they are appropriated either to His will or His goodness. Therefore, predestination also belongs w His will, not w His knowledge.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Gloss on the Epistle to the Romans (8:29), "For whom he foreknew, he also predestinates," says: "Predestination is God's fore knowledge and preparation of benefits.

2'. Whatever is predestined is known, but the opposite is not true. Consequently, what is predestined belongs to the class of things that are known; hence, it is included in the genus of knowledge.

3'. A thing should be placed in the genus to which it always belongs, rather than in a genus which is not always proper w it. Now, the element of knowledge always belongs to predestination, because fore knowledge always accompanies it. The granting of grace, however, which takes place through the will, does not always accompany pre destination, since predestination is eternal while the bestowal of grace takes place in time. Predestination, therefore, should be placed in the genus of knowledge rather than in that of will acts.

4'. The Philosopher places habits of knowing and doing among the intellectual virtues, for they belong more to reason than to appetite. This is clearly what he does in the case of art and prudence, as can be seen in his Ethics. Now, predestination implies a principle of doing and of knowing, since, as is evident from the definition given, pre destination is both foreknowledge and preparation. Predestination, therefore, belongs more to knowledge than it does to the will.

5'. Contraries belong to the same genus. But predestination is the contrary of reprobation. Now, since reprobation belongs to the genus of knowledge, because God foreknows the malice of the damned but does not cause it, it seems that predestination also belongs to the genus of knowledge.

REPLY:

Destination (from which predestination is derived) implies the direction of something to an end. For this reason, one is said to destine a messenger if he directs him to do something. And because we direct our decisions to execution as to an end, we are said to destine what we decide. For example, Eleazar (2 Machabees 6:19) is said to have "des tined" in his heart not to do "any unlawful things for the love of life."

Now, the particle *pre-*, when joined to a word, adds a relation to the future. Consequently, to *destine* refers to what is present, while to *predestine* can also refer to what is future. For two reasons, therefore, predestination is placed under providence as one of its parts, namely, because direction to an end, as pointed out in the preceding question, pertains to providence, and because providence—even according to Cicero a relation to the future. In fact, some define providence by saying that it is present knowledge bearing upon future event.

On the other hand, predestination differs from providence in two respects. Providence means a general ordering to an end. Consequently, it extends to all things, rational or irrational, good or bad, that have been ordained by God to an end. Predestination, however, is concerned only with that end which is possible for a rational creature, namely, his eternal glory. Consequently, it concerns only men, and only with reference to those things that are related to salvation. Moreover, predestination differs from providence in a second respect. In any ordering to an end, two things must be considered: the ordering itself, and the outcome or result of the ordering, for not everything that is ordered to an end reaches that end. Providence, therefore, is concerned only with the ordering to the end. Consequently, by God's providence, all men are ordained to beatitude. But predestination is also concerned with the outcome or result of this ordering, and, therefore, it is related only to those who will attain heavenly glory. Hence, providence, is related to the initial establishment of an order, and predestination is related to its outcome or result; for the fact that some attain the end that is eternal glory is not due primarily to their own power but to the help of grace given by God.

Therefore, just as we said above that providence consists in an act of reason, like prudence, of which it is a part, because it belongs to reason alone to direct and to ordain, so now we say that predestination also consists in an act of reason, directing or ordering to an end. However, the willing of an end is required before there can be direction to an end, because no one directs anything to an end which he does not will. This is why the Philosopher says that a perfect prudential choice can be made only by a man of good moral character, because moral habits strengthen one's affections for the end which prudence dictates. Now, the one who predestines does not consider in a general way the end to which his predestination directs him; he considers it, rather, according to the relation it has to one who attains it, and such a person must be distinct in the mind of the one predestining from those persons who will not achieve this end. Consequently, predestination presupposes a love by which God wills the salvation of a person. Hence, just as a prudent man directs to an end only in so far as he is temperate or just, so God predestines only in so far as He loves.

Another prerequisite of predestination is the choice by which he who is directed to the end infallibly is separated from others who are not ordained with it in the same manner. This separation, however, is not on account of any difference, found in the predestined, which could arouse God's love; for, as we read in the Epistle to the Romans (9:11-13): "When the children were not yet born nor had done any good or evil... It was said... Jacob I have loved, but Esau I have hated." Consequently, predestination presupposes election and love, and election presupposes love. Again, two things follow upon predestination: the attainment of the end, which is glory, and the granting of help to attain this end, namely, the bestowal of the grace that pertains to the call to be among the predestined. Predestination, therefore, has two effects: grace and glory.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The acts of the soul are such that a preceding act in some way is virtually contained in the act that follows. Since predestination presupposes love, an act of the will, the notion of predestination includes something that belongs to the will. For this reason, intention and other elements belonging to the will are sometimes put into its definition.

2. Predestination is not the same as election, but, as we said above, it presupposes election. This is why the predestined are the same as the elect.
3. Since choice belongs to the will, and direction to the intellect, direction always precedes election if both have the same object. But if they have different objects, then there is no inconsistency in election's coming before predestination, which implies the existence of direction. As election is taken here, however, it pertains to one who is directed to an end; and the acceptance of one who is to be directed toward an end comes before the direction itself. In the case stated, therefore, election precedes predestination.
4. Even though predestination is placed under the genus of knowledge, it adds something to knowledge and foreknowledge, namely, direction or an order to an end. In this respect, it resembles prudence, which also adds something to the notion of knowledge. Consequently, just as every person who knows what to do is not thereby prudent, so also not every one who has foreknowledge thereby predestines.
5. Even though causality does not belong to the notion of knowledge as such, it belongs to that knowledge which directs and orders w an end; and direction of this kind is not proper to the will but to the intellect alone. Similarly, understanding does not belong to the nature of a rational animal in so far as it is animal but only in so far as it is rational.
6. Knowledge is related to both present and future effects, just as the will is. On this basis, therefore, it cannot be proved that predestination belongs more to one than to the other. Yet predestination, properly speaking, is related only to the future—as the prefix *pre* indicates, because it implies an ordering to the future. Nor is it the same to speak of having an effect in the present and of having a present effect, be cause whatever pertains to the state of this life—whether it be present, past, or future—is said to be in the present.
7. Even though knowledge as knowledge is not related to things in so far as they are to be made, practical knowledge is related to things under this aspect, and predestination is reduced to this type of knowledge.
8. In its proper sense, preparation implies a disposing of a potency for act. There are, however, two kinds of potencies: active and passive; consequently, there are two kinds of preparations. There is a preparation of the recipient, which we speak of when we say that matter is prepared for a form. Then there is a preparation of the agent, which we speak of when we say that someone is preparing himself in order to do something. It is this latter kind of preparation that pre destination implies; for it asserts simply this, that in God there exists the ordering of some person to an end. Now, the proximate principle of ordering is reason, and, as is clear from above, its remote principle is will. Consequently, for the reason given in the difficulty, predestination is attributed more to reason than to will.
9. A similar answer should be given to the ninth difficulty.
10. Evil things are ascribed as proper w foreknowledge, not because they are more proper objects of foreknowledge than good things, but because good things in God imply something more than mere fore knowledge, while evil things have no such added implication. Similarly, a convertible term which does not signify an essence appropriates to itself the name of property, which belongs just as properly to the definition, because the definition adds a certain priority.
11. A gloss does not always mean that a word has not been used in its proper sense. Sometimes a gloss is necessary merely to make specific what has been stated in a general way. This is why the gloss explains knowledge as meaning knowledge of approval.

12. To prepare or direct belongs only w powers that move. But to move is not peculiar to the will. As is clear from The Soul,¹⁶ this is also a property of the practical intellect.

13. In so far as preparation made even in a human reason implies an ordering or directing to an end, it is an act proper to the intellect, not to the will.

14. When treating a divine attribute, we should not consider only its effect but also its relation to the effect; for, while the effects of knowledge, power, and will are the same, still, as the names of these attributes imply, their relations to them are not. Now, in so far as predestination is directive, the relation implied by predestination to its effect is more logically said to be a relation of knowledge than a relation of power or will. Consequently, predestination is reduced to a type of knowledge.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'-2'. We concede the other arguments presented here. One might reply to the second, however, by pointing out that not every_ thing that is found in more things is thereby a genus, for it might be predicated of them as an accident.

3'. Even though the granting of grace does not always accompany predestination, the will to grant grace always does.

4'. Reprobation is directly opposed, not to predestination, but to election, for He who chooses accepts one and rejects another and this is called reprobation. Consequently, as the word itself shows, reprobation pertains more to the will. For to reprobate is, as it were, to reject—except that it might be said that to reprobate means the same as to judge unworthy of admittance. However, reprobation is said to belong to God's foreknowledge for this reason, that there is nothing positive on the part of His will that has any relation to sin. He does not will sin as He wills grace. Yet reprobation is said to be a preparation of the punishment which God wills consequent to sin—not antecedent to it.

ARTICLE II: IS FOREKNOWLEDGE OF MERITS THE CAUSE OF OR REASON FOR PREDESTINATION?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, i g; 23, aa. 2,4—5; I Sentences o, 1, I; 4', 3 Contra Gentiles III, 163; In Ephes., c. I, lects. 1, (P. i 4 In Evang. Joannis, c. 1 lectura 3 (P. io:g68b); In Rom., c. 1, lectura e. 8, lectura 6; C. 9, lectura (P. 13:8a, 86b, 96a, 97a).

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. In his gloss on the verse in Romans (9:15), "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy," Ambrose writes as follows: "I will give mercy to him who I know will return will his whole heart to He after his error. This is to give mercy to him to whom it should be given, and not to give it to one to whom it should not. Consequently, He calls Mm who He knows will obey, not him who He knows will disobey." Now, to obey and to return to God will all one's heart are meritorious; the opposite actions are demeritorious. Foreknowledge of merit or of demerit is therefore the cause of God's intention of being merciful to some and of excluding others from His mercy. This is equivalent to predestination and reprobation.

2. Predestination includes God's will to save men. It cannot be said that it includes only His antecedent will, because, according to this Will—as is said in the first Epistle to Timothy (2:4): "God wills all men to be saved"; hence, it would follow that all are predestined. It

remains, therefore, that predestination includes only His consequent will. Now, "We are the cause," as Damascene says, "of God's consequent will" according as we merit salvation or deserve damnation. Our merits foreknown by God are therefore the cause of predestination.

3. Predestination means primarily God's will with respect to man's salvation. But men's merits are the cause of their salvation. Moreover, knowledge causes and specifies the act of the will, since that which moves the will is a desirable thing which is known. Consequently, foreknowledge of merits is a cause of predestination, since two of the things which foreknowledge contains cause the two things contained in predestination.

4. Reprobation and predestination signify the divine essence while connoting an effect. There is no diversity, however, in the divine essence. Consequently, the difference between predestination and reprobation comes entirely from their effects. Now, effects are considered as caused by us. It is due to us, as cause, therefore, that the predestined are segregated from the reprobate, as takes place through predestination. Hence, the same must be said as before.

5. Taken in itself, the sun is in the same relation to all bodies that can be illuminated, even though all bodies cannot share its light equally. Similarly, God is equally related to all, even though all do not participate in His divine goodness in an equal measure, as the saints and philosophers say so often. Now, since the sun is in the same relation to all bodies, it is not the cause of the differences that we find in these bodies, namely, that some of them are dark and others bright. This is due, rather, to differences in the physical constitution of the bodies which affect their reception of sunlight. Similarly, the reason for this difference, namely, that some reach salvation and others are damned, or that some are predestined while others are rejected, is to be found not in God but in us. Consequently, our original thesis stands.

6. Good communicates itself. It belongs to the highest good, therefore, to communicate itself in the highest possible degree, that is, as much as each and every thing is capable of receiving it. Consequently, if it does not communicate itself to something, this is because that thing is not capable of receiving it. Now, according to the quality of his merits, a person is capable or not capable of receiving that salvation which predestination ordains. Foreknowledge of merits, therefore, is the reason why some are predestined and others are not.

7. Concerning the passage in Numbers (3: 12), "I took Levites..." Origen writes: "Jacob, younger by birth, was judged to be the first born. Because what they intended to do was in their hearts, and this was clear to God before they were born or did any good or evil, it was said of them: Jacob have I loved, Esau have I hated. "Now, this love, the saints commonly explain, pertains to Jacob's predestination. Consequently, God's foreknowledge of the intention Jacob was going to have in his heart was the reason for his predestination. Thus, the same must be said as was said previously.

8. Predestination cannot be unjust, since the ways of the Lord are always the ways of mercy and truth. Nor can there be any form of justice between God and men other than distributive justice. There is no place for commutative justice, since God, who needs none of our good things, receives nothing from us. Now, distributive justice rewards unequally only those that are unequal. But the only cause of inequality among men is difference in merit. Therefore, the reason why God predestines one man and not another is that He foreknows their different merits.

9. As mentioned previously, predestination presupposes election. But a choice cannot be reasonable unless there is some reason why one person is to be preferred to another. Now, in the election we are speaking about, there can be no reason for the preference other than merits. Therefore, since God's choice cannot be irrational, His election and, consequently, His predestination also must be caused by His fore knowledge of merits.

10. Commenting on that verse in the Prophecy of Malachias (1:2-3), "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau," Augustine says that "the will of God," by which He chose one and rejected the other, "cannot be unjust, for it came from their hidden merits." But these hidden merits can enter into an intention only in so far as they are foreknown. Consequently, predestination comes from foreknowledge of merits.

11. As the use of grace is related to the final effect of predestination so the abuse of it is related to the effect of reprobation. Now, in the case of Judas, the abuse of grace was the reason for his reprobation, since he was made reprobate because he died without grace. Moreover, the fact that he did not have grace when he died was not due to God's unwillingness to give it but to his unwillingness to accept it— as both Anselm and Dionysius point out. Consequently, the good use of grace by Peter or anyone else is the reason why he is elected or predestined.

12. One person can merit the first grace for another. For the same reason, it seems that he could merit for that other person a continuation of grace up to the end. Now, if one gets final grace, he is predestined. Consequently, predestination can be caused by merits.

13. According to the Philosopher: "One thing is said to be prior to another when the sequence of their being cannot be reversed." But God's foreknowledge is related to predestination in this way, because God knows beforehand what He predestines, while He foreknows the evil which He does not predestine. Foreknowledge, therefore, is antecedent to predestination. But what is prior in any order is the cause of what is posterior. Consequently, foreknowledge is the cause of predestination.

14. The word predestination is derived from sending or destining. But knowledge precedes sending or destining, because no one can send a person without knowing him first. Knowledge, therefore, is prior also to predestination; hence, it seems that it is the cause of predestination. Consequently, our thesis stands.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Gloss on the following verse in the Epistle to the Romans (9:12), "Not of works, but of him that calleth was it said," reads: "He shows that the words 'I have loved Jacob, etc., were due neither to any previous nor to any future merits.'" And the Gloss on the verse, "Is there injustice with God?" (9:14), says: "Let no one say that God chooses one man and rejects another because He foresaw future works." Consequently, it does not seem that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.

2'. Grace is the effect of predestination but the principle of merit. Hence, foreknowledge of merits cannot possibly be the cause of predestination.

3'. In the Epistle to Titus (3:5), the Apostle says: "Not by the works of justice which we have done but according to his mercy..." Predestination of one's salvation, therefore, does not arise from foreknowledge of merits.

4'. If foreknowledge of merits were the cause of predestination, then no one would be predestined who did not merit. But some predestined never merit, as is evidently the case of children. Consequently, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause of predestination.

REPLY:

There is this difference between a cause and an effect—that whatever is the cause of the effect must be the cause of the effect, but the cause of the effect is not necessarily the cause of the cause. It is evident, for example, that the first cause produces its effect through a second

cause, and so the second cause, in some way, causes the effect of the first cause, although it is not the cause of the first cause.

Now, we must distinguish two aspects of predestination, the eternal predestination itself and its twofold temporal effect, grace and glory. Glory has human acts as its meritorious cause, but grace cannot have human acts as its meritorious cause; human acts can act only as a certain material disposition to grace, inasmuch as through these acts men are prepared for the acceptance of it. It does not follow from this, however, that our acts, whether they precede or follow grace, are the cause of predestination.

Now, to discover the cause of predestination we must recall what we have said previously, namely, that predestination is a certain direction to an end, and this direction is brought about by reason, moved by the will. Consequently, a thing can be the cause of predestination if it can move the will. However, a thing can move the will in two ways, first, as something due, secondly, as something not due. Now, as something due, a thing can move the will in two ways, namely, either absolutely or on the supposition of something else. The ultimate end, which is the object of the will, moves absolutely; and it moves the will in such a fashion that the will cannot turn away from it. For example, as Augustine says, no man is capable of not willing to be happy. But that without which an end cannot be had is said to move as something due "on the supposition of something else." If an end can be had, however, without a certain thing which contributes merely to the well-being of the end, then that thing does not move the will as something due. In this case, the will inclines to it freely; but when the will is already inclined to it freely, the will is thereby inclined to all the things without which it cannot be had, as to things that are due on the supposition of that which was first willed. For example, out of liberality a king makes a person a soldier; but, because one cannot be a soldier without a horse, on the supposition of the afore-mentioned liberality, giving the soldier a horse becomes due and necessary.

Now, the end-object of the divine will is God's own goodness, which does not depend on anything else. God needs nothing to help Him possess it. Consequently, His will is inclined first to make some thing freely, not something due, inasmuch as it is His goodness that is manifested in His works. But, supposing that God wishes to make something, it follows as something due from the supposition of His liberality that He make those things also without which those that He has first willed cannot be had. For example, if He wills to make a man,

He must give him an intellect. But if there is anything which is not necessary for that which God wills, then that thing comes from God, not as something due, but simply as a result of His generosity. Now, the perfection of grace and glory are goods of this kind, because nature can exist without them inasmuch as they surpass the limits of natural powers. Consequently, the fact that God wishes to give grace and glory is due simply to His generosity. The reason for His willing these things that arise simply from His generosity is the overflowing love of His will for His end-object, in which the perfection of His goodness is found. The cause of predestination, therefore, is nothing other than God's goodness.

According to these principles, a solution can be found to the controversy that has been taking place between certain groups. Some have asserted that everything comes from God's simple pleasure, while others say that everything which comes from God is due. Both opinions are false. The former ignores the necessary order that exists between the things God causes, and the latter asserts that everything arises from God because of a natural necessity. A middle course must therefore be chosen so that it may be laid down that those things which are first willed by God come from His simple pleasure, but those that are required for this first class of things come as something due, although on the basis of a supposition. This "debt" does not,

however, make God obliged to things but only to His own will; for what is said to come from God as something due is due simply in order that His will be fulfilled.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Divine providence ordains that grace bestowed be used as it should. Consequently, it is impossible for foreknowledge of this right use of grace to be the cause that moves God to give grace. The words of Ambrose, "I will give grace to Men who I know will return to me with his whole heart," cannot be understood as meaning that a perfect change of heart inclines God's will to give grace but that His will ordains that the grace given be accepted by the person and that he be turned completely toward God.
2. Predestination includes God's consequent will, which is related in some way to that which we cause on our part, not by inclining the divine will to act, but by bringing about that effect for which His will has ordained grace or by bringing about that which, in a certain sense, disposes us for grace and merits glory.
3. While it is true that knowledge moves the will, not every kind of knowledge does this but only knowledge of an end; and an end is an object moving the will. Consequently, it is because of His knowledge of His own goodness that God loves it; and, from this love, He wishes to pour out His goodness upon others. But it does not therefore follow that knowledge of merits is the cause of His will in so far as it is included in predestination.
4. Although the different formal characters of God's attributes are drawn from the differences in their effects, it does not follow from this that these effects are the cause of His attributes. For the different formal characteristics of His attributes are not derived from our qualities as though our qualities caused them; rather, our qualities are signs that the attributes themselves are causes. Consequently, it does not follow that that which comes from us is the reason why one man is reprobated and another predestined.
5. We can consider God's relation to things in two ways. We can consider it only with respect to the first disposition of things that took place according to His divine wisdom, which established different grades of things. If only this is considered, then God is not related to all things in the same way. We can, however, consider His relation to things also according to the way in which He provides for them as already disposed. If His relation to them is considered in this manner, then He is related to all things in the same way, because He gives equally to all, according to the proportion He has made. Now, all that has been said to proceed from God, according to His will taken simply, belongs to the first disposition of things, of which preparation for grace is a part.
6. It belongs to the divine goodness as infinite to give from its perfections whatever the nature of each thing requires and is capable of receiving. But this is not required for superabundant perfections such as grace and glory. Hence, the argument proves nothing.
7. God's foreknowledge of what lay in the heart of Jacob was not the reason for His willing to give grace to him. Instead, the intention in Jacob's heart was a good for which God ordained the grace to be given to him. It is for this reason that God is said to have loved him "because his heart's intention was known by Him." For God loved him in order that he might have such an intention in his heart or because He foresaw that his heart's intention was a disposition for the acceptance of grace.
8. It would be contrary to the nature of distributive justice if things that were due to persons and were to be distributed to them were given out unequally to those that had equal rights. But things given out of liberality do not come under any form of justice. I may freely choose to give them to one person and not to another. Now, grace belongs to this class of things.

Consequently, it is not contrary to the nature of distributive justice if God intends to give grace to one person and not to another, and does not consider their unequal merits.

9. The election by which God chooses one man and reprobates another is reasonable. There is no reason why merit must be the reason for His choice, however, since the reason for this is the divine goodness. As Augustine says, moreover, a justifying reason for reprobation [the present] is the fact of original sin in man—for reprobation in the future, the fact that mere existence gives man no claim to grace. For I can reasonably deny something to a person if it is not due to him.

10. Peter Lombard says that Augustine retracted that statement in a similar passage. But, if it must be sustained, then it should be taken as referring to the effect of reprobation and of predestination, which has a meritorious or disposing cause.

11. God's foreknowledge of this abuse of grace was not the reason why Judas was reprobated, unless we are considering only the consequences of this abuse—though it is true that God denies grace to no one who is willing to accept it. Now, the very fact that we are willing to accept grace comes to us through God's predestination. Hence, our willingness cannot be a cause of predestination.

12. Although merit can be the cause of the effect of predestination, it cannot be the cause of predestination itself.

13. Although that will which the consequent cannot be interchanged is prior in some way, it does not always follow that it is prior as a cause is said to be prior; for, if this were true, then to be colored would be the cause of being a man. Consequently, it does not follow that foreknowledge is the cause of predestination.

14. The answer to this difficulty is clear from our last response.

ARTICLE III: IS PREDESTINATION CERTAIN?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 23, aa. 6-7; I *Sentences* 40, 3; *Quolibet* X, 3; XII, 3, 3; *De rationibus fidei*, c. 10 (P. 1 *Contra Gentiles* III, cc. 94, 162-63. See also readings given for q. 5, a. 5.

Difficulties:

It seems that it has no certitude, for

1. No cause whose effects can vary can be certain of its effects. But the effects of predestination can vary, for one who is predestined may not attain the effect of his predestination. This is clear from the commentary of Augustine on the words of the Apocalypse (3:11), "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no man take....," in which he says: "If one person will not receive glory unless another loses it, then the number of the elect is certain." Now, from this it seems that one could lose and another receive the crown of glory, which is the effect of predestination.

2. Human affairs fall under God's providence as things in nature do. But, according to the ordering of God's providence, only those natural effects that are produced necessarily by their causes proceed from them with certainty. Now, since the effect of predestination, man's salvation, arises not necessarily but contingently from its proximate causes, it seems that the ordering of predestination is not certain.

3. If a cause has certitude with respect to some effect, that effect will necessarily follow unless there is something that can resist the power of the agent. For example, dispositions in bodies

here below are sometimes found to resist the action of celestial bodies; and, as a consequence, these celestial bodies do not produce their characteristic effects, which they would produce were there not something resisting them. But nothing can resist divine predestination, because, as we read in the Epistle to the Romans (9:19): "Who resisted his will?" Therefore, if divine predestination is ordered with certitude to its effect, its effect will necessarily be produced.

4. The answer was given that the certitude which predestination has of its effect presupposes the second cause.—On the contrary, any certitude based on the supposition of something is not absolute but conditional certitude. For example, it is not certain that the sun will cause plant to bear fruit unless the generative power of the plant is in a favorable condition; and, because of this, the certitude of the sun's producing this effect presupposes the power of the plant as though the latter were a second cause. Consequently, if the certitude of divine predestination includes the presupposition of a second cause, that certitude will not be absolute but merely conditional—like the certitude I have that Socrates is moving if he runs, and that he will be saved if he prepares himself. Therefore, God will have no more certitude about those who are to be saved than I have. But this is absurd.

5. We read in Job (34:24): "He shall break in pieces many and innumerable, and shall make others to stand in their stead." In explanation of this passage, Gregory writes: "Some fail from the place of life while others are given it." Now, the place of life is that place to which men are ordained by predestination. Hence, one who is predestined can fail short of the effect of predestination; therefore, predestination is not certain.

6. According to Anselm, predestination has the same kind of truth that a proposition about the future has. But a proposition about the future does not have certain and determinate truth. Such a proposition is open to correction—as is clear from that passage in Aristotle where he says: "One about to walk may not walk." Similarly, therefore, the truth that predestination has does not possess certitude.

7. Sometimes one who is predestined is in mortal sin. This was clearly true of Paul when he was persecuting the Church. Now, he can stay in mortal sin until death or be killed immediately. If either happens, predestination will not obtain its effect. Therefore, it is possible for predestination not to obtain its effect.

8. But it was said that, when it is stated that one predestined may possibly die in the state of sin, the proposition is taken compositely and so is false; for its subject is taken as simultaneously having the determination predestined. But if its subject is taken without this determination, then the proposition is taken in a divided sense and is true. —On the contrary, will those forms which cannot be removed from the subject, it does not matter whether a thing is attributed to the subject with those qualifying determinations or without them. For example, taken either way, the following proposition is false: "A black crow can be white." Now, predestination is the kind of form that can not be removed from the one predestined. In the matter at hand, therefore, there is no room for the afore-mentioned distinction.

9. If what is eternal be joined to what is temporal and contingent, then the whole is temporal and contingent. Thus, it is clear that creation is temporal, even though its notion includes God's eternal essence as well as a temporal effect. The same is true of a divine mission, which implies an eternal procession and a temporal effect. Now, even though predestination implies something eternal, it also implies a temporal effect. Therefore, predestination as a whole is temporal and contingent and, consequently, does not seem to have certitude.

10. What can be or not be cannot have any certitude. But the fact that God predestines to salvation can be or not be. For just as He can, from all eternity, predestine and not predestine,

so even now He can predestine and not predestine, since present, past, and future do not differ in eternity. Consequently, predestination cannot have any certitude.

To the Contrary:

1' In explanation of that verse in the Epistle to the Romans (8:29), "Whom he foreknew, he also predestined," the Gloss says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God by which whoever are freed are most certainly freed."

2' If the truth of a thing is unshakable, it must be certain. But, as Augustine says: "The truth of predestination is unshakable." There fore, predestination is certain.

3' Whoever is predestined has this predestination from all eternity. But what exists from all eternity cannot be changed. Predestination, therefore, is unchangeable and, consequently, certain.

4' As is clear from the Gloss mentioned above, predestination includes foreknowledge. But, as Boethius has proved, foreknowledge is certain. Therefore, predestination is also certain.

REPLY:

There are two kinds of certitude: certitude of knowledge and certitude of ordination. Now, certitude of knowledge is had when one's knowledge does not deviate in any way from reality, and, consequently, when it judges about a thing as it is. But because a judgment which will be certain about a thing is had especially from its causes, the word certitude has been transferred to the relation that a cause has to its effect; therefore, the relation of a cause to an effect is said to be certain when the cause infallibly produces its effect. Consequently, since God's foreknowledge does not imply, in all cases, a relation of a cause to all the things which are its objects, it is considered to have only the certitude of knowledge. But His predestination adds another element, because it includes not only His foreknowledge but also the relation of a cause to its objects, since predestination is a kind of direction or preparation. Thus, not only the certitude of knowledge, but also the certitude of ordination is contained in predestination. Now we are concerned only will the certitude of predestination; the certitude of knowledge, found also in predestination, has been explained in our investigation of God's knowledge.

It should be known that, since predestination is a particular type of providence, not only its notion adds something to providence, but also its certitude adds something to the certitude of providence. Now, the ordering of providence is found to be certain in two respects. First, it is certain will relation to a particular thing, when God's providence ordains things to some particular end, and they attain that end without failure. This is evident in the motions of celestial spheres and in all things in nature that act necessarily. Second, providence is certain in relation to things in general, but not in particular. For example, we see that the power of beings capable of generation and corruption sometimes fails short of the proper effects to which it has been ordered as its proper ends. Thus, the power that shapes bodies sometimes falls short of forming members completely. Yet, as we saw above when treating providence, these very defects are directed by God to some end. Consequently, nothing can fail to attain the general end of providence, even though it may at times fail short of a particular end.

The ordering of predestination, however, is certain, not only will respect to its general end, but also will respect to a particular and determinate end. For one who is ordained to salvation by predestination never fails to obtain it. Moreover, the ordering of predestination is not certain will reference to a particular end in the way in which the ordering of providence s; for, in providence, the ordering is not certain will respect to a particular end unless the proximate cause necessarily produces its effect. In predestination, however, there is certitude will respect to an individual end even though the proximate cause, free choice, does not produce that effect except in a contingent manner.

Hence, it seems difficult to reconcile the infallibility of predestination with freedom of choice; for we cannot say that predestination adds nothing to the certitude of providence except the certitude of foreknowledge, because this would be to say that God orders one who is predestined to his salvation as He orders any other person, with this difference, that, in the case of the predestined, God knows he will not fall to be saved. According to this position, one predestined would not differ in ordination from one not predestined; he would differ only with respect to [God's] foreknowledge of the outcome. Consequently, foreknowledge would be the cause of predestination, and predestination would not take place by the choice of Him who predestines. This, however, is contrary to the authority of the Scriptures and the sayings of the saints. Thus, the ordering of predestination has an infallible certitude of its own—over and above the certitude of foreknowledge. Nevertheless, the proximate cause of salvation, free choice, is related to predestination contingently, not necessarily.

This can be considered in the following manner. We find that an ordering is infallible in regard to something in two ways. First, an individual cause necessarily brings about its own effect because of the ordering of divine providence. Secondly, a single effect may be attained only as the result of the convergence of many contingent causes individually capable of failure; but each one of these causes has been ordained by God either to bring about that effect itself if another cause should fail or to prevent that other cause from failing. We see, for example, that all the individual members of a species are corruptible. Yet, from the fact that one succeeds another, the nature of the species can be kept in existence; and this is how God keeps the species from extinction, despite the fact that the individual perishes.

A similar case is had in predestination; for, even though free choice can fail with respect to salvation, God prepares so many other helps for one who is predestined that he either does not fall at all or, if he does fall, he rises again. The helps that God gives a man to enable him to gain salvation are exhortations, the support of prayer, the gift of grace, and all similar things. Consequently, if we were to consider salvation only in relation to its proximate cause, free choice, salvation would not be certain but contingent; however, in relation to the first cause, namely, predestination, salvation is certain.

Answers to Difficulties:

The word crown as used in the Apocalypse (3:11) may mean either the crown of present justice or the crown of future glory. No matter which meaning is taken, however, one person is said to receive the crown of another when that other person falls in the sense that the goods of one person help another, either by aiding him to merit or even by increasing his glory. The reason for this is that all the members of the Church are connected by charity in such a way that their goods are common. Consequently, one receives the crown of another when that other fails through sin and does not achieve the reward of his merits; and another person receives the fruits of the sinner's merits, just as he would have benefited from the sinner's merits had the latter persevered. From this, however, it does not follow that predestination is ever in vain.

Or it can be answered that one is said to receive the crown of another, not because the other lost a crown that was predestined for him, but because whenever a person loses the crown that was due to him because of the justice he possessed, another person is substituted in his place to make up the number of the elect—just as men have been substituted to take the place of the fallen angels.

2. A natural effect issuing infallibly from God's providence takes place because of one proximate cause necessarily ordered to the effect.

The ordering of predestination, however, is not made certain in this manner but in the manner described above.

3. A celestial body, taken in itself, imposes a kind of determinism in its action on bodies here below. Consequently, its effect necessarily takes place, unless something resists it. But God does not act on the will in the manner of one necessitating; for He does not force the will but merely moves it, without taking away its own proper mode, which consists in being free will respect to opposites. Consequently, even though nothing can resist the divine will, our will, like everything else, carries out the divine will according to its own proper mode. Indeed, the divine will has given things their mode of being in order that His will be fulfilled. Therefore, some things fulfil the divine will necessarily, other things, contingently; but that which God wills always takes place.

4. The second cause, which we must suppose as prerequisite for obtaining the effect of predestination, lies also under the ordering of predestination. The relationship between lower powers and the power of a superior agent is not one of predestination. Consequently, even though the ordering of God's predestination includes the supposition of a human will, it nevertheless has absolute certitude, despite the fact that the example given points to the contrary.

5. Those words of Job and Gregory should be referred to the state of present justice. If some fall from it, others are chosen in their place. From this, therefore, we cannot conclude to any uncertainty with reference to predestination; for those who fall from grace at the end were never predestined at all.

6. The comparison Anselm makes holds good in this respect, that just as the truth of a proposition about the future does not remove contingency from a future event, so also the truth of predestination [does not take away the contingency of predestination]. But, in an other respect, the comparison is weak. For a proposition about the future is related to the future in so far as it is future, and, under this aspect, it cannot be certain. As we pointed out previously, however, the truth of predestination and foreknowledge is related to the future as present, and, consequently, is certain.

7. A thing can be said to be possible in two ways. First, we may consider the potency that exists in the thing itself, as when we say that a stone can be moved downwards. Or we may consider the potency that exists in another thing, as when we say that a stone can be moved upwards, not by a potency existing in the stone, but by a potency existing in the one who hurls it.

Consequently, when we say: "That predestined person can possibly die in sin," the statement is true if we consider only the potency that exists in him. But, if we are speaking of this predestined person according to the ordering which he has to another, namely, to God, who is predestining him, that event is incompatible with this ordering, even though it is compatible with the person's own power. Hence, we can use the distinction given above; that is, we can consider the subject with this form or without it.

8. Blackness and whiteness are, in a sense, examples of forms that exist in a subject said to be white or black. Consequently, nothing can be attributed to the subject, either according to potency or according to act, as long as blackness remains, if it is repugnant to this form of blackness. Predestination, however, is a form that exists, not in the person predestined, but in the one predestining, just as the known gets its name from knowledge in the knower. Consequently, no matter how fixed predestination may remain in the order of knowledge, yet, if we consider only the nature [of the predestined], we can attribute some thing to it which is repugnant to the ordering of predestination. For, considered this way, predestination is something other than the man who is said to be predestined, just as blackness is something

other than the essence of a crow, even though it is not something outside the crow, but, by considering only the essence of a crow, one can attribute to it something that is repugnant to its blackness. For this reason, as Porphyry says, one can think of a white crow. Similarly, in the problem being discussed, one can attribute something to a predestined person taken in himself which cannot be attributed to him in so far as he is predestined.

9. Creation and mission imply the production of a temporal effect. Consequently, they affirm the existence of a temporal effect, and so must be temporal themselves, even though they include something eternal. Predestination, however, does not imply the production of a temporal effect—as the word itself shows—but only an ordering to something temporal, such as will, power, and all such attributes also imply. Since it does not affirm the actual existence of a temporal effect, which is also contingent, predestination is not necessarily temporal and contingent itself, because from eternity something can be unchangeably ordained to a temporal and contingent effect.

10. Absolutely speaking, it is possible for God to predestine or not to predestine each and every person, and it is possible for Him to have predestined or not to have predestined. For, since the act of predestination is measured by eternity, it never is past and never is future. Consequently, it is always considered as issuing from His will as something free. Because of the supposition, however, certain things are impossible: He cannot predestine if He has predestined, and He cannot predestine if He has already not predestined for God does not change. Hence, it does not follow that predestination can change.

ARTICLE IV: IS THE NUMBER OF PREDESTINED CERTAIN?

Parallel readings: [See readings given for preceding article.](#)

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

2. No number is certain if something can be added to it. But some thing can be added to the number of the predestined, because Moses petition for such an increase is described in Deuteronomy (1: 11) where he says: "The Lord God of your fathers add to this number many thousands." And the Gloss comments: "This number is fixed by God, who knows who belong to Him." Now, unless such an addition were possible, Moses would have asked in vain. Consequently, the number of the predestined is not certain.

2. As we are prepared for grace through the disposition of natural perfections, so are we prepared through grace for the attainment of glory. Now, grace is found in whomsoever there is sufficient preparation of natural gifts. Similarly, then, glory will be found wherever grace is found. But one not predestined may, at one time, possess grace. Therefore, he will possess glory and so be predestined. Consequently, one not predestined may become predestined. In this way, the number of the predestined can be increased; hence, it is not certain.

3. If one who has grace is not to have glory, his loss of glory will be due to a failure either on the part of grace or on the part of the one giving glory. However, this loss cannot be due to a failure on the part of grace, for, in itself, it sufficiently disposes for glory; nor can it be due to a failure on the part of the one giving glory, for, on His part, He is ready to give it to all. Consequently, whoever has grace will necessarily have glory. Thus, one who is foreknown [as lost] will have glory and be predestined. Accordingly, our original argument stands.

4. Whoever prepares himself sufficiently for grace, gets grace. But one foreknown [as lost] can prepare himself for grace. Therefore, it is possible for him to have grace. Whoever has grace, however, can persevere in it. So it seems that one who is foreknown [as lost] can persevere in grace up to the time of his death and thus become pre destined. Consequently, the same must be said as before.

5. It was said, however, that God's foreknowledge that a man will die without grace is necessary by conditional necessity, not by absolute necessity. On the contrary, any necessity which lacks a beginning and an end, and which is without succession, is not conditional but simple and absolute. Now, this is the kind of necessity that the necessity of foreknowledge is, because it is eternal. Therefore, it is simple and not conditioned.

6. A number larger than any finite number is possible. But the number of the predestined is finite. Therefore, a larger number is possible, and the number of the predestined is not certain.

7. Since good communicates itself, infinite goodness should not impose a limit on its communication. Now, the divine goodness communicates itself to the predestined in the highest possible degree. Therefore, it does not belong to the divine goodness to establish a certain number of predestined.

8. Like the creation of things, the predestination of men depends on the divine will. Now, God can make more things than He has made, because, as we read in Wisdom (12: I 8): "His power is at hand when He wills." Similarly, He has not predestined so many men that He cannot predestine more; and so our original argument returns.

9. Whatever God was at one time able to do He still is able to do. But from eternity God was able to predestine one whom He did not predestine. Consequently, He is still able to predestine him, and so an addition can be made to the number of the predestined.

10. In the case of all powers not determined to one course of action, what can be can also not be. Now, the power of the one predestining will respect to the one to be predestined, and the power of the one predestined will respect to his obtaining the effect of predestination, belong to this class of powers, because the one predestining predestination by His will, and the one predestined obtains the effect of predestination by his will. Consequently, the predestined can be non-predestined, and the non-predestined can be predestined. Hence, the conclusion is the same as before.

11. In commentary on that verse in Luke (5:6), "And their net broke," the Gloss reads: "In the Church, the net of circumcision is broken, for not as many Jews enter as were preordained by God to life." Consequently, since the number of the predestined can be diminished, it is not certain.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "The number of the predestined is certain and can neither be increased nor diminished."

2'. Augustine says: "The heavenly Jerusalem, our mother, the City of God, will not be robbed of any of the number of its citizens nor will it reign will more than the predestined number." Now, the citizens mentioned are the predestined. Consequently, the number of the predestined cannot be increased or decreased. Hence, it is certain.

3'. W is predestined is predestined from eternity. But what exists from eternity is unchangeable, and what did not exist from eternity can never be eternal. Consequently, he who is not predestined cannot be predestined and, conversely, he who is predestined cannot be non-predestined.

4'. After the resurrection, all the predestined will be in the highest heaven with their own bodies. Now, that place is finite, since all bodies are finite, and, as is commonly held, not even two glorified bodies can exist simultaneously [one place]. Consequently, the number of the predestined should be determinate.

REPLY:

Treating this question, some have distinguished, saying that the number of the predestined is certain if we mean number understood actively or formally, but not certain if we mean number understood passively or materially. For example, one could say that it is certain that one hundred have been predestined, but it is not certain who these one hundred are. The occasion for such a position seems to be the words of Augustine mentioned previously. Augustine seems to imply that one can lose and another receive the predestined crown without the number of the predestined at all varying. But, if those holding this opinion are speaking about certitude of predestination in its relation to the first cause, that is, to God who predestines, then the opinion is entirely absurd, because God Himself has definite knowledge of the number of the predestined, whether the number be taken formally or materially. He knows exactly how many and who are to be saved, and, will respect to both, His ordination is infallible. Consequently, will respect to both numbers, God has certitude, not only of knowledge, but also of ordination.

On the other hand, if we are speaking about the certitude that can be had about the number of the predestined from its relation to the proximate cause of man's salvation (to which predestination is ordained), then our judgment about the formal number and the material number will not be the same. For, since the salvation of each individual has been produced through free choice as through its proximate cause, in some way the material number is subject to man's will, which is changeable. Consequently, the material number in some way lacks certainty. But the formal number is not determined in any manner by man's will, because by no kind of causality does the human will affect the number of the predestined taken as a whole. Consequently, the formal number remains completely certain. In this way the afore mentioned distinction can be sustained, as long as we concede, without any qualifications, that both numbers are certain as far as God is concerned.

It should be noted, moreover, that the number of the predestined is certain in this respect, that it cannot be increased or diminished. The number could be increased if one who was foreknown has lost could be predestined; but this would be contrary to the certainty of foreknowledge or of reprobation. Again, the number could be diminished if it were possible for one who is predestined to become non-predestined; but this would be contrary to the certainty of predestination. Thus, it is clear that the certitude about the number of the predestined is made up of two certitudes, the certitude of predestination and the certitude of foreknowledge or reprobation. These two certitudes differ, however; for, as has been said, the certitude of predestination is the certitude of knowledge and of direction to an end, while the certitude of foreknowledge is merely the certitude of knowledge. For God does not preordain the reprobate to sin as He ordains the predestined to merit.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That quotation from Deuteronomy should be understood as referring, not to the number of the predestined, but to the number of those who are in the state of present justice. This is clear from the Interlinear Gloss, which adds: "In number and in merit." Now, this number of those in present justice is both increased and diminished; but God's appointment, which predefines this number, too, is never wrong, because it is He who decrees that there be more of these at one time and fewer at another. Or we could even answer that God defines a certain number in the manner of a judgment in harmony with inferior reasons, and this limitation can be

changed; but He predestines another number in the manner of an election in harmony with superior reasons, and this limitation cannot be changed. For Gregory says: "He changes His judgment but never His election."

2. No preparation disposes anything to have a perfection at a time other than its proper time. For example, his natural temperament may dispose a boy to be brave or will—not, however, in the days of his childhood, but in the days of his manhood. Now, the time when one obtains grace is simultaneous with the time when nature is prepared. Consequently, no barrier can come between them. Thus, when the preparation of nature is found in a person, grace is also found in him. But the time when one obtains glory is not simultaneous with the time when he has grace. Consequently, a barrier can come between these two. For this reason, one who is foreknown to possess grace will not necessarily possess glory also.

3. That one who had grace is nevertheless deprived of glory is not due to failure either on the part of grace or on the part of Him who gives glory. It is due rather to a failure on the part of the recipient, in whom an impediment has arisen.

4. When we affirm that a person is foreknown [as lost], we thereby affirm that he will not have final grace; for, as we pointed out previously, God's knowledge is directed to future things as though they were present. Consequently, just as the condition of not having final grace cannot be reconciled with the condition of having final grace, even though the former condition is possible if taken by itself, so the condition of having final grace cannot be reconciled with the condition of being foreknown [as lost], even though the former condition is also possible if taken by itself.

5. The fact that such a thing known by God is not absolutely necessary comes, not from a defect in God's knowledge, but from a defect in the proximate cause. On the other hand, the reason why this necessity is eternal—without beginning and end, and, as it were, without succession—comes from God's knowledge, which is eternal, not from the proximate cause, which is temporal and changeable.

6. Even though finite number as finite number does not prevent a larger number from existing, the impossibility may come from another source, namely, from the fixed character of God's foreknowledge, which is apparent in the problem at hand. Similarly, when we consider the size of some natural thing, we see that a larger size cannot exist, not because of the nature of quantity, but because of the nature of the thing itself.

7. The divine goodness communicates itself only under the guidance of wisdom, for this is the best manner for its communication. Now, as we read in Wisdom (11:21), the ordering of God's wisdom requires that all things be made according to "number, weight, and measure." Consequently, that there be a definite number of predestined is in harmony with God's goodness.

8. As is clear from what was said previously, while it may be granted with reference to a determined person that God, absolutely speaking, can predestine or not predestine him, nevertheless, supposing that God has predestined him, He cannot not predestine him. Nor is the opposite possible, because God cannot change. Consequently, it is commonly said that the following proposition, "God can predestine one who is not predestined or not predestine one who is predestined," is false if taken in a composite sense, but true if taken in a divided sense. All statements, therefore, which imply that composite sense are absolutely false. Thus, we must not concede that the number of the predestined can be increased or diminished, because addition presupposes something which is increased, and subtraction, something which is diminished. For the same reason, we cannot concede that God can predestine more or fewer than He has already predestined.

Furthermore, the example drawn from the making of things is not to the point; for making is a particular action terminating exteriorly in an effect, and the fact that God makes something first and does not make it later indicates no change in God but only in the effect. On the other hand, predestination, foreknowledge, and similar things are acts intrinsic to God; and no change can take place in them without a change taking place in God. Nothing, therefore, that implies a change in these acts should be granted.

9-10. The answer to these arguments is clear, for they are based on an understanding of God's power as absolute, not as modified by a supposition of predestination or non-predestination.

11. That Gloss should be understood as meaning this: the number of Jews entering is not as large as the total number of all those who have been preordained to life, for it is not only Jews who have been predestined. Or one could reply that the Gloss is not speaking about the preordination of predestination but about the preordination of preparation by which the Jews were disposed for life by means of the Law. Or, finally, one could reply that not as many Jews entered the early Church as are predestined, because, as we read in the Epistle to the Romans (11:25-26): "When the fulness of the Gentiles should come in... All Israel will be saved" in the Church at the end of time.

ARTICLE V: ARE THE PREDESTINED CERTAIN OF THEIR PREDESTINATION?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 23, 1, ad 4; I-II, 112, 5; In *Evang. Joannis*, C. 10, *lectura* 5

Difficulties:

It seems that they are, for

1. The words of St. John, "His unction teacheth you of all things" (1 John 2:27), are understood as referring to all things pertaining to salvation. But predestination pertains very much to salvation, since it is the cause of salvation. Consequently, through an unction they receive, all men are made certain of their predestination.

2. It is consonant with God's goodness, which does all things in the best possible way, to lead men to their reward in the best possible way. Now, the best possible way seems to be that each and every man be certain of his reward. Therefore, each and every person who is predestined is given assurance that he will come to his reward. Consequently, the same must be said as before.

3. All whom the leader of an army enrolls for merit in battle are likewise enrolled for a reward. Consequently, they are as certain about their reward as they are about their merit. But men are certain that they are in the state of meriting. Consequently, they are also certain that they will obtain their reward. We conclude as before.

To the Contrary:

In Ecclesiastes (9: 1) we read: "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred."

REPLY:

There is nothing inconsistent in the revelation to some person of the fact of his predestination; but, in view of His general law, it would be inconsistent if He revealed this to all the predestined for the following two reasons. The first reason may be found by considering those who are not predestined. Now, if all the predestined knew that they were predestined, then all those not predestined would know that they were not predestined from the very fact that they did not know if they were predestined. This would, in some way, lead them to despair. The

second reason may be found by considering those who are predestined. Now, security is the mother of negligence; and if the predestined were certain about their predestination, they would be secure about their salvation. Consequently, they would not exercise so great care in avoiding evil. Hence, it has been wisely ordained by God's providence that men should be ignorant of their predestination or reprobation.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. When Scripture says that His unction teaches everything connected with salvation, this should be understood as referring to those things knowledge of which pertains to salvation, not to all those things which, in themselves, do pertain to salvation. And, although predestination itself is necessary for salvation, knowledge of predestination is not.
2. It is not proper, when giving a reward, to give the person who is to receive it unconditional assurance. The proper way is to give conditional assurance to the one for whom the reward is being prepared, namely, that the reward will be given to him unless he fails on his part. This kind of assurance is given to all the predestined through the infusion of the virtue of hope.
3. One cannot know with any certainty that he is in the state of meriting, although he can know, by conjecture, that this is probably the case. For a habit never can be known except through its acts, and the acts of the infused supernatural virtues greatly resemble the acts of the acquired natural virtues. Consequently, it is not easy to be certain that acts of this kind have their source in grace, unless, by a special privilege, a person is made certain of it through a revelation. Moreover, he who is enrolled by the leader of an army for a secular struggle is given only conditional assurance of his reward, because one "is not crowned, except he strive lawfully" (2 Timothy 2:5).

ARTICLE VI: CAN PREDESTINATION BE HELPED BY THE PRAYERS OF THE SAINTS?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 23, 8 ad 4 Sentences 41, I, 4; IV Sentences 45, 3, 3; Contra Gentiles III, CC. 95-96, 113.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. What can be aided can be prevented, but predestination cannot be prevented. Therefore, it cannot be aided in any way.
2. When one thing has its effect whether another thing is present or not, the latter is no help to it. But predestination must have its effect, because it cannot fail whether prayers take place or not. Consequently, predestination is not helped by prayers.
3. Nothing eternal is preceded by something temporal. But prayer is temporal, and predestination is eternal. Therefore, prayer cannot precede predestination, and, consequently, cannot help it.
4. As is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:12), the members of the mystical body resemble the members of a natural body. Now, in a natural body, a member does not acquire its perfection by means of another member. Consequently, the same is true [of members] in the mystical body. But the members of the mystical body receive their greatest perfection through the effects of predestination. Therefore, one man is not aided in obtaining the effects of predestination by the prayers of another.

To the Contrary:

1'. We read in Genesis (25:21): "Isaac besought the Lord for his will because she was barren; and he heard him, and made Rebecca to conceive." As a result of this conception Jacob was born, who had been predestined from all eternity; and this predestination would never have been fulfilled had he not been born. But it was effected by the prayer of Isaac. Consequently, predestination is helped by prayers.

2'. In a certain sermon on the conversion of St. Paul, in which the Lord is represented as speaking to Paul, we read: "Unless Stephen, my servant, had prayed for you, I would have destroyed you." The prayers of Stephen, therefore, freed Paul from reprobation; and so through these prayers he was predestined. Hence, we conclude as before.

3'. One can merit the first grace for someone. For the same reason, therefore, he can also merit final grace for Mm. But whoever possesses final grace is predestined. Therefore, the predestination of one person can be furthered by the prayers of another.

4'. As Damascene tells us in a certain sermon on the dead, Gregory prayed for Trajan and freed him from hell it seems, therefore, that he was freed from the company of the damned by Gregory's prayers. Hence, the same must be said as before.

5'. The members of the mystical body resemble the members of a natural body. But in a natural body one member is helped by another. Consequently, the same is true in the mystical body, and the above proposition stands.

REPLY:

That predestination can be helped by the prayers of the saints can be understood in two ways. First, it can mean that the prayers of the saints help one to be predestined. This, however, cannot be true of prayers, either as they exist in their own proper condition, which is temporal while predestination is eternal, or as they exist in God's fore knowledge, because, as explained above, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause of predestination, whether the merits be one's own or those of another. On the other hand, that predestination is furthered by the prayers of the saints can mean that their prayers help us obtain the effect of predestination as an instrument helps one in finishing his work. The problem has been considered in this way by all those who have studied God's providence over human affairs. Their answers, however, have been different.

Attending only to the immutability of God's decrees, some have declared that prayer, sacrifice, and similar actions help in no way at all. This is said to have been the opinion of the Epicureans, who taught that all things happened necessarily because of the influence of celestial bodies, which they called gods.

Others said that sacrifices and prayers help to this extent, that they change the preordination made by those who have the power to determine human acts. This is said to have been the opinion of the Stoics, who taught that all things are ruled by certain spirits whom they called gods; and, even though something had been pre-established by them, according to the Stoics, such a pre-arrangement could be changed by placating their souls through prayers and sacrifices. Avicenna seems to have fallen into this error, too; for he asserts that all human actions whose principle is the human will can be reduced to the wills of celestial souls. He thought that the heavenly bodies had souls, and, just as a heavenly body influences a human body, so, according to him, the celestial souls influence human souls. In fact, what takes place in things here below is according to the notions of these celestial souls. Consequently, he thought that sacrifices and prayers helped these souls to conceive what we wished to take place.

These theories, however, are opposed to the Faith. For the first destroys freedom of choice; the second, the certainty of predestination. Consequently, we must answer the problem differently, and must say that, while God's predestination never changes, prayers and other good works are nevertheless effective in obtaining the effect of predestination. Now, when considering any order of causes, we must consider not only the order of the first cause to the effect but also the order of the second cause to the effect and the order of the first cause to the second cause, since the second cause is ordered to an effect only through the direction of the first cause. For, as is clear from The Causes, the first cause gives to the second cause the power of influencing the effect.

I say, therefore, that the effect of predestination is man's salvation, and this comes from it as from its first cause. It can have, however, many other proximate and, as it were, instrumental causes, which are ordered by divine predestination for man's salvation, as tools are used by a craftsman for completing a product of his craft. Consequently, the effect of God's predestination is not only that an individual person be saved but also that he be saved by certain prayers or certain merits. Gregory also said this: "What holy men effect by their prayers is predestined to be obtained by prayer." Consequently, Boethius says: "If we pray well, our prayers cannot be without effect."

Answers to Difficulties:

1. There is nothing that can check the ordering of predestination. Consequently, predestination cannot be impeded. Many things, however, are related to the ordering of predestination as intermediate causes; and these are said to further predestination in the manner described.
2. From the fact that it is predestined that a certain man will be saved because of certain prayers, these prayers cannot be omitted without detriment to his predestination. The same is true of man's salvation, which is the effect of predestination.
3. That argument proves that prayer does not help predestination by being, as it were, its cause. This we concede.
4. The effects of predestination, which are grace and glory, are not, as it were, basic perfections but secondary perfections. Now, even though the members of a natural body do not help each other in acquiring their basic perfections, they nevertheless do help each other to acquire their secondary perfections. There is, moreover, a member in the body which, having been formed first, helps in the formation of other members namely, the heart. Consequently, the argument proceeds on a false assumption.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

- 1'. We concede this argument.
- 2'. Paul was never reprobated according to the disposition made by divine election, because this is unchangeable. He was reprobated, however, according to a [provisional] judgment of God in harmony with lower causes, a judgment which sometimes changes. It follows, therefore, not that prayer was the cause of predestination, but that it furthered only the effect of predestination.
- 3'. Although predestination and final grace are interchangeable, it does not necessarily follow that whatever is the cause of final grace in any manner whatsoever is also the cause of predestination. This is clear from what has been said previously.
- 4'. Although Trajan was in the place of the damned, he was not damned absolutely; for he was predestined to be saved by the prayers of Gregory.

5'. We concede the fifth argument.

QUESTION 7: The book of life

ARTICLE I: IS THE BOOK OF LIFE A CREATED THING?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 24, aa. 1-21; Sentences 40, 1, 2, ad 5; III Sentences 31, 1,2, sols. I—2; In Philip., C. 4, lectura I (P. i In Heb., C. 12, lectura (P. 13:78oa).

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Explaining that line in the Apocalypse (20:12), "and another book was opened, which was the book of life," the Gloss says: "The book of life is Christ, who will then appear in His power and give life to His own." Now, at the final judgment, Christ will appear in human form, which is not something uncreated. Consequently, the book of life does not mean anything uncreated.
2. Gregory says: "Our future judge Himself is called the book of life, because whoever sees Him will at once remember all he has done." Now, judgment has been given to Christ as man. This is clear from the words of John (5:27): "And he hath given him power to do judgment, because he is the son of man." Therefore, Christ as man is the book of life, and the same must be said as before.
3. A thing is called a book because it has received writing. But a thing is said to be receptive in so far as it contains material potency, which cannot exist in God. Therefore, nothing uncreated is called the book of life.
4. Since book means a kind of collection, it signifies distinction and difference. But, being most simple, an uncreated nature contains no diversity. Therefore, nothing in such a nature can be called a book.
5. In every book, the writing is something other than the book. Now, the writing in a book is made up of figures, and by means of these we know the things which are read in the book. However, the ideas by which God knows things do not differ from the divine essence. Consequently, His uncreated nature cannot be called a book.
6. But it was said that even though there is no real difference in the divine nature, there is nevertheless a conceptual difference.—On the contrary, a merely conceptual difference exists only in our mind. Consequently, if the difference which this book involves is only a conceptual difference, the book of life must exist only in our intellects, and hence will not be something uncreated.
7. The book of life seems to be God's knowledge of those who are to be saved. Moreover, the knowledge of the elect is contained in God's knowledge of vision. Now, since the soul of Christ sees in the Word all the things that God knows will His knowledge of vision, it seems that it also knows the number of the elect and all those who have been chosen. Therefore, the soul of Christ can be called the book of life; hence, the book of life means something created.

8. We read in Ecclesiasticus (24:32): "all these are the book of life..."; and the Gloss on this passage adds: "That is, the new and old testament." Now, the Old and New Testament are created. Therefore, the book of life means something created.

9. A book seems to get its name from the fact that something is written in it. Writing, however, involves some imperfection; hence, in its initial purity, our intellect is compared to "a page on which nothing has been written." But God's nature is far more pure and simple than our intellect. Hence, it cannot be called a book.

10. A book exists for someone to read. But God's nature cannot be said to be a book in the sense that He reads it. This is evident from Augustine's statement that its title, "Book of Life," does not mean that God has to read it in order to know something which He did not know previously. Similarly, it cannot be called a book in the sense that someone other than God reads it, because no one can read anything unless he finds some diversity of markings—for example, no one can read a blank piece of paper, because it is undifferentiated. Therefore, God's uncreated nature cannot be called a book.

11. From a book one does not receive knowledge of things as from their cause but as from a sign of them. Now, God does not receive

His knowledge of things, as it were, from a sign, but, as it were, from a cause. Therefore, God's knowledge cannot be called the book of life.

12. Nothing can be merely a sign of itself. Now, a book is a sign of truth. Consequently, since God is truth itself, He Himself cannot be called a book.

13. A book and a teacher are principles of knowledge in different ways. Now, all wisdom is said to come from God as from a teacher. Therefore, it does not come from Him as from a book.

14. A thing is represented differently in a mirror and in a book. Now, 'Wisdom (7:26) calls God a mirror because all things are represented in Him. Consequently, He cannot and should not be called a book.

15. Even those books that are copied from the original are called books. But the minds of men and angels, in some sense, copy God's mind when they receive knowledge of things from it. Consequently, if the divine mind is called the book of life, created minds should be similarly called; and thus it is not always something uncreated that is called the book of life.

16. The book of life seems to imply a representation of life and an exercise of causality over it. Now, all this belongs to Christ as man, because in Him, as in a pattern, is represented all life, both that of grace and that of glory. For this reason it was said to Moses (Exodus 25:40): "Look and make it according to the pattern that was shown thee in the mount." Moreover, Christ merited life for us. Therefore, Christ Himself, as man, can be called the book of life.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "We should know that there is a divine force which causes each one to remember his deeds, good or bad. Indeed, this divine power is called a book." Now, a divine force is something uncreated. Therefore, something uncreated is also called the book of life.

2'. In the same work, Augustine says: "The book of life is God's foreknowledge, which cannot be mistaken." But His foreknowledge is something uncreated. Therefore, the book of life is also something uncreated.

REPLY:

Applied to God, book can be used only metaphorically; thus, it is in this sense that the representation of life is called the book of life.

In this connection, it should be noted that life can be represented in two ways: first, as it is in itself, or, secondly, as it can be participated in by certain individuals. Furthermore, life taken in itself can be represented in two ways. This can be done, first, by means of instruction; and this kind of representation pertains to the sense of hearing, which, as said in *The Senses and the Sensed*, is the chief sense for learning. Taken in this meaning, therefore, the book of life signifies that which contains instructions on how one should live. Consequently, the Old and New Testaments are called the book of life. The second way of representing life in itself is by giving a model; and this kind of representation pertains to the sense of sight. Consequently, Christ Himself is called the book of life, because, by looking at Him as at a model, we can see how we must live in order to attain eternal life.

We are not speaking of the book of life in these senses, however, but only in the sense that the book of life is said to be the representation of those who are to attain eternal life, and whose names, according to a comparison drawn from human affairs, are said to be written down in this book.

For, in a state that is wisely ruled, anyone who becomes a citizen must do so according to the ordinances of its ruler. Hence, those who are to be admitted to citizenship are enrolled as being, as it were, participants in the state. By using this enrolment, the ruler of the state is guided in rejecting persons from and in admitting them to the fellowship of the citizens subject to him. Now, the citizens who are ruled most perfectly by divine providence form the society of the Church triumphant, which is also called the City of God in Scripture. Hence, the enrolment or representation of those who are to be admitted to that society is called the book of life. This is clear from Scripture's manner of speaking. For example, Luke (10:20) says: "Rejoice in this, that your names are written in heaven," that is, in the book of life; Isaias (4:3): "Everyone...shall be called holy... that is written in life in Jerusalem"; and in the Epistle to the Hebrews (12:22-23) we read: "But you are come...to the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to the company of many thousands of angels, and to the church of the first-born who are written in the heavens." It is necessary, therefore, to carry out the metaphor and say that from this enrolment the ruler of the society shall know those who are to be given life. The bestowal of life, of course, belongs to God alone. However, God is not guided by anything created, for He is a rule that is directed by nothing extrinsic to Himself. Consequently, the book of life, in the sense in which we are now using it, means some thing uncreated.

Answers to Difficulties:

1-2. Our answer is clear from what we have said above. For the Gloss and Gregory's statement concern the book of life in another sense, namely, as it means a model for living: any one who looks at it can tell whether or not he confirms to it.

3. When terms are applied to God, the general rule should be observed that in no respect can imperfection be contained in predicates applied to the divinity. Consequently, whatever implies matter, privation, or time must be removed. Now, that it receives markings from something extrinsic belongs to a book in so far as it is temporal and newly written. These notes are not included in the predicate when it is applied to God.

4. The very notion of book implies a difference existing between the things known by its means, because a book hands down the knowledge of many things. But that a book must have diversity to hand down knowledge of many things is a defect in the book. It would be much more perfect if it could teach by means of one thing all that it now explains by means of many

things. Consequently, since God is most perfect, the book of life is such that it shows many things by means of that which is one in the highest degree.

5. That the letters written in a book differ from the pages on which they are written is due to a defect of material books. For, because books are composite things, that which has is not the same as that which is had. Consequently, in God these ideas differ from His essence, not really, but only conceptually.

6. Although the distinction between the writing and that in which it is written is merely conceptual, the representation, which completes the notion of a book, is not only in our mind but also in God. Hence, the book of life is really in God.

7. As indicated above, the book of life directs God, who gives life, in His giving of life. Now, even though the soul of Christ knows all the elect, God is directed, not by Christ's human knowledge, but by His own uncreated knowledge, which is Himself. Hence, the knowledge possessed by the soul of Christ cannot be called the book of life in the sense in which we are speaking of it.

8. The reply is clear from what has been said.

9. Although there is no diversity but only the greatest purity in God, He is nonetheless compared to a book that has been written in, and not to the blank page to which our intellect has been compared. For our intelligence is compared to a blank page because it is in potency to all intelligible forms, and as yet has none of them actually. In God's intellect, however, all the forms of things exist in act, and in Him they are one. Consequently, in God the formal character of writing is compatible with His oneness.

10. God Himself reads the book of life, and others can read it in so far as they are allowed to do so. Augustine does not mean to deny that God reads the book of life; he denies only that He reads it in order to know what He previously did not know. Moreover, others can read the book of life, even though it is entirely simple, since it is possible for one and the same reality to be the intelligible character of many things.

11. One thing is a likeness of another in two ways. In the first way, it is the model for the other thing and thus its cause; second, it itself can be modeled upon the other, and thus be its effect and sign. Now, in the case of men, a book confirms to their knowledge, which, in turn, is caused by things. Consequently, they receive knowledge of things from a book, not as from a cause, but as from a sign. However, God's knowledge is the cause of things, since it contains the archetypes of all things. Hence, knowledge is received from the book of life as from a cause, and not as from a sign.

12. The book of life is uncreated truth itself as well as a likeness of created truth, just as a created book is a sign of truth.

13. In God, exemplary and efficient causality come to the same thing. Consequently, from the fact that He is an exemplary cause He can be called a book, and from the fact that He is the efficient cause of wisdom He can be called a teacher.

14. The representation a mirror gives differs from that which a book gives, because it refers directly to things while that of a book refers to things through the medium of knowledge. For the letters contained in a book are only signs of words, and these, in turn, are signs of concepts, which are likenesses of things. A mirror, however, reflects the forms of things. Yet in God the species of things are reflected in both ways, because He knows things and He knows that He knows them. Consequently, in God both the notion of mirror and the notion of book can be verified.

15. The minds of the saints can also be called books. This is clear from the Apocalypse (20:12): "And the books were opened"—which Augustine explains as meaning the hearts of the just. However, the saints minds cannot be called books of life in the sense in which we are taking this term. This is clear from what has been said.

16. Although Christ as man is an archetype and, in some sense, the cause of life, as man He is not the cause of the life of glory through His authority nor an archetype directing God in His bestowal of life. Consequently, Christ as man cannot be called the book of life.

ARTICLE II: IS THE BOOK OF LIFE PREDICATED OF GOD PERSONALLY OR ESSENTIALLY?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 8. See also readings given for preceding article.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is predicated personally, for

1. In the Psalms (39:8) we read: "In the head of the book it is writ ten of me..."and the Gloss explains: "That is, in the Father, who is my head." Now, in God nothing has a head except that which has a principle. But that which has a principle is a personal predicate in matters pertaining to God. Therefore, the book of life is a personal predication.

2. Just as word signifies knowledge proceeding from another, book also signifies this, because the writing in a book proceeds from a writer. Now, for the reason already given, word is predicated personally of God. Consequently, the book of life is also a personal predication.

3. It was said, however, that word implies a real procession, whereas book implies a procession only according to our way of understanding.—On the contrary, we can name God only from the things that exist here below. But, in our experience, a word coming from a speaker is really distinct from him, and so is a book really distinct from its author. For this reason, therefore, both terms imply a real distinction in God.

4. There is greater distance between one who speaks and his oral word than there is between him and the word within his heart; and an even greater distance is between him and a written word signifying the word within his heart. Consequently, if the divine Word, which, as Augustine says, resembles the word within the heart, is really distinct from the one who utters it, much more distinct will be a book, since this implies writing.

5. That which is attributed to a thing should belong to it according to all that belongs to its nature. Now, the notion of a book demands not only that it represent something but also that it be written by someone. Consequently, in matters concerning God, the word book is taken according as a book is something by another. Hence, it is predicated personally.

6. Just as the notion of a book includes its being read, so does it also include its being written. But, in so far as it is written, it is by another, and in so far as it is read, it is directed to another. Therefore, it belongs to the notion of a book to be to another and by another. Hence, the book of life is predicated personally.

7. Book of life signifies knowledge expressed by another. But what is expressed by another has its origin in another. Consequently, the book of life implies a relation of origin, and thus is a personal predication.

To the Contrary:

The book of life is predestination itself. This is clear from Augustine and the Gloss. But predestination is predicated of the divine essence, never of the divine Persons. Consequently, the book of life is similarly predicated.

REPLY:

Some say that the book of life is sometimes a personal, sometimes an essential predication: in so far as it is used of God according to the notion of writing, it is predicated personally, and in this usage it implies origin from another, for a book has to be written by another; but, in so far as it implies a representation of the things written in the book, it is predicated essentially.

This distinction, however, does not seem reasonable, because a term used of God is not predicated personally unless its meaning in connection with God implies a relation of origin. Moreover, with regard to words used in a transferred sense, a metaphor is not to be understood as indicating complete resemblance, but only some agreement in a characteristic belonging to the nature of the thing whose name is being applied. For example, the word lion is applied to God, not because of a resemblance between two natures possessing sensation, but because of a resemblance based on one property of the lion. Consequently, the book of life is not predicated of God according to what is common to all products of art, but only according to that which is proper to a book as a book. Now, to come from an author does not belong to a book as a book but only as it is a product of art; and, in a similar manner, a house is from a builder, and a knife is from a cutler. On the other hand, to represent the things written about in the book belongs to the notion of a book as such. Consequently, as long as this representation remains, the book remains a book, even though it is not written by another and is not a product of art. From this it is clear that book is applied to God, not in so far as a book is written by another, but in so far as a book represents the things which are written in it. Therefore, since representation is common to the entire Trinity, book is predicated, not personally of God, but only essentially.

Answers to Difficulties

- 1.** Words that are predicated essentially of God sometimes stand for the persons. Hence, God sometimes stands for the person of the Father, sometimes for the person of the Son, as when we say "God begets" or "God begotten." Similarly, even though book is predicated essentially, it can sometimes stand for the person of the Son. In this sense, in matters pertaining to divinity, the book of life can be said to have a head or principle.
- 2.** According to its intelligible character, the term word when used of God implies origin from another. This has already been discussed. But book does not imply the notion of origin when the term is applied to God. Hence, no parallel can be drawn.
- 3.** Although in the case of creatures a book really proceeds from a writer, just as a word does from a speaker, nevertheless, that procession is not implied by book as it is implied by word. For procession from a writer is not implied any more by book than a procession from a builder is implied by house.
- 4.** That argument would hold if the notion of the written word be longed to the very notion of book. This, however, is not true. Hence, the argument proves nothing.
- 5.** That argument holds for words that are used literally. But when words are used metaphorically, as book is used here, it is not necessary that the term predicated express of its subject everything implied by that term taken literally. Otherwise, God, who is called a lion in the metaphorical sense, would have to have claws and a mane.
- 6.** The reply to this difficulty is clear from what has been said.
- 7.** The same holds for the seventh difficulty.

ARTICLE III: CAN THE BOOK OF LIFE BE APPROPRIATED TO THE SON?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 8; III Sentences 31, 2, 2, sol. 1.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

- 1.** The book of life pertains to life. But life is attributed in Scripture to the Holy Spirit, as, for example, in John (6:64): "It is the spirit that quickened." Hence, the book of life should be appropriated to the Holy Spirit, not to the Son.
- 2.** In everything, the beginning is the most important. But the Father is called the head or the beginning of the book, as is clear in the Psalms (39:8), where we read: "In the head of the book it is written of me..." Therefore, the term book should be appropriated to the Father.
- 3.** That in which something is written has the proper nature of a book. Now, a thing is said to be written in the memory; hence, the memory has the nature of a book. But memory is appropriated to the Father, just as intelligence is to the Son, and will is to the Holy Spirit. Consequently, the book of life should be appropriated to the Father.
- 4.** The Father is the head of the book. But, as we read in the Psalms (39:8), in the head of the book there is writing about the Son. Consequently, the Father is the book of the Son. Therefore, the book [of life] should be appropriated to the Father.

To the Contrary:

- 1'.** Augustine says that the book of life is God's foreknowledge. But knowledge is appropriated to the Son: "... Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God" (1 Corinthians I: 24). Therefore, the book of life is also appropriated to the Son.
- 2'.** Book implies a representation, just as mirror, image, stamp, and, figure. But all these terms are attributed to the Son. Consequently, the book of life should also be appropriated to Him.

REPLY:

To appropriate means nothing else than to contract something common, making it something proper. Now, what is common to the entire Trinity cannot be appropriated to a single Person on the grounds that this belongs more to this Person than it does to another. Such an action would deny the equality of the Persons. However, appropriation may be made on the grounds that what is common nevertheless has a greater resemblance to what is proper to one person than it has to what is proper to another. For example, goodness resembles what is proper to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as love, because goodness is the object of love, and so is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Again, power is appropriated to the Father because power as such is a principle, and being the principle of all divinity is proper to the Father. Similarly, wisdom is appropriated to the Son, because it resembles what is proper to the Son, since the Son proceeds from the Father as His Word, and word describes an intellectual procession. Consequently, because the book of life pertains to knowledge, it should be appropriated to the Son.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Although life is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, knowledge of life is appropriated to the Son; and it is this that the book of life implies.

2. The Father is called the head of the book, not because the notion of book has more in common with Him than with the Son, but because the Son, to whom the name of book of life is appropriated, has His origin from the Father.

3. There is no inconsistency in something being appropriated to different persons if this is done under different formalities. For example, the gift of wisdom is appropriated to the Holy Spirit in so far as it is a gift, because love is the reason for all gifts, but it is also appropriated to the Son in so far as it is wisdom. Similarly, memory is appropriated to the Father in so far as it is a principle of understanding; but, in so far as it is a power of knowing, it is appropriated to the Son. Now, it is in the memory as a knowing power that a thing is said to be written in it. Hence, in this sense, memory can have the nature of a book. Consequently, being the book of life is appropriated more to the Son than to the Father.

4. Although being the book of life is appropriated to the Son, this also belongs to the Father, since it is a property of all the Persons, not of only one of them. Hence, there is no inconsistency in saying that something is written in the Father.

ARTICLE IV: IS THE BOOK OF LIFE THE SAME AS PREDESTINATION?

Parallel readings: See readings given for q. 7, a. 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Augustine says that the book of life is the predestination of those to whom eternal life is due.

2. We know God's attributes through their effects. But the effect of predestination is the same as that of the book of life, namely, final grace and glory. Therefore, predestination and the book of life are the same.

3. Whatever is predicated metaphorically of God should be reduced to what is predicated literally. Now, the book of life is predicated metaphorically of God, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, it should be reduced to something predicated literally of Him. However, it cannot be reduced to anything else except predestination. Therefore, the book of life is the same as predestination.

To the Contrary:

1'. A thing is called a book because something is written in it. But the notion of writing does not pertain to predestination. Consequently, predestination and the book of life are not the same.

2'. A book, of its very nature, implies no causality regarding the things to which it is referred. Predestination, however, implies causality. Therefore, it is not the same as the book of life.

REPLY:

As is clear from what has been said previously, the book of life is used of God because of its resemblance to the document which directs a chief of state in admitting persons to and excluding them from citizenship. Now, this document lies between two operations, for it is subsequent to the decision of the head of the state, who selects those whom he wishes to admit in preference to those whom he excludes, and it is anterior to the admission or exclusion. Moreover, this document is merely a kind of representation of his antecedent

decision. Similarly, the book of life is also nothing more than an inscription in the divine mind of God's predestination, for by this act of predestining God predetermines who are to be admitted to the life of glory. Moreover, His knowledge of this predestination is always with Him; and His knowledge that He has predestined some is, as it were, His predestination written in Him as in a book of life.

Considered formally, therefore, the book of life and predestination are not the same, even though, considered materially, the book of life is predestination just as we say that a certain book, considered materially, is the teaching of the Apostle because it contains the Apostle's teaching. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks when he says that the book of life is predestination.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The answer is clear from what was said above in the reply.
2. The book of life and predestination are related to the same effect but not in the same manner. Predestination regards that effect without any intervening medium; the book of life regards it through the medium of predestination. Similarly, the likenesses of things in our soul are direct likenesses; but the words written in a book indicate merely what the soul has received. Hence, a book is only mediately a sign of things.
3. The book of life can be reduced to something predicated literally of God; this something, however, is not predestination but that knowledge of predestination by which God knows that He has predestined certain persons.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

- 1'-2'. It is not difficult to answer these arguments.

ARTICLE V: IS THE BOOK OF LIFE SPOKEN OF IN RELATION TO UNCREATED LIFE?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 24, 1; III Sentences 31, I, 2, sol. 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. As Augustine says, the book of life is God's knowledge. But God knows His own life, just as He knows that of others. Consequently, the book of life concerns uncreated life also.
2. The book of life represents life, but not created life; for what is first does not represent what is second, but what is second represents what is first. Consequently, the book of life represents uncreated life.
3. What is predicated of several, but predicated primarily of one and secondarily of the others, is understood simply in its primary predication. Now, life is predicated primarily of God rather than of creatures, because His life, as Dionysius has shown, is the origin of all life. Therefore, since life is used simply in the phrase the book of life, it should be understood as referring to uncreated life.
4. Just as a book implies a representation, so also does a figure, especially when a book represents something by means of figures. But the Son is said to be the figure of the Father (Hebrews 1:3). Therefore, He can be said to be a book with respect to the life of the Father.

5. Book is predicated as being in a relation to that about which the book is written. But the Son is written about in the book of life, for we read in the Psalms (39: 8): "In the head of the book it is written of me..." "Now, the life of the Son is not created. Hence, the book of life is concerned with uncreated life.

6. A book and the subject treated there cannot be identical in regard to the same thing. Now, a creature is a book revealing God. Therefore, God cannot be a book revealing created life. Hence, the book of life can be spoken of only in relation to uncreated life.

7. Words, like books, pertain to knowledge. Now, Word is predicated primarily of the divine essence rather than of a creature, because, by uttering Himself, the Father utters all creatures. Consequently, the book of life is primarily concerned with uncreated life rather than with created life.

To the Contrary:

1'. According to Augustine, the book of life is predestination. However, predestination regards only creatures. Therefore, the book of life regards only creatures.

2'. A book represents a thing only by means of figures and likenesses. Now, God knows Himself, not by means of likenesses, but by means of His own essence. Therefore, He is not a book with respect to Himself.

REPLY:

As is clear from what has been said previously, the book of life is an enrolment which directs the one who confers life in his bestowal of it, in accordance with what has been preordained concerning a certain person. Therefore, the life from which the book of life is named has two aspects. The first is that this life is acquired through someone's grant; the second is that it follows upon the afore-mentioned enrolment which directs its being granted.

Neither of these features is found in uncreated life. God does not acquire His life of glory but has it by His very nature. Moreover, no knowledge precedes His life, but, according to our manner of understanding, His life precedes even His knowledge. Consequently, the book of life cannot be spoken of in relation to uncreated life.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Not all of God's knowledge is called the book of life, but only that concerning the life which the elect are to possess. This can be gathered from the words that follow the section quoted.

2. To represent a thing means to bear its likeness. There are two kinds of likenesses, however. The first kind, like the likeness in the practical intellect, produces a thing. Through a likeness of this kind, what is first can represent what is second. The second kind of likeness comes from the thing whose likeness it is. Through a likeness of this kind, what comes later represents what comes first, and not conversely. However, the book of life represents life, not by means of the second type of likeness, but by means of the first.

3. What is predicated simply is sometimes understood as applying to that about which it is predicated only secondarily, because some qualification has been added. For example, being [with the added qualification] in another is understood as signifying an accident. Similarly, life, because of the added qualification book, is understood as signifying created life, which is life only secondarily.

4. A figure represents its original as its principle, because a figure and an image are drawn from the archetype as from a principle. The book of life, however, represents life as something that it itself has caused. Now, it belongs to God the Father to be the principle of the

Son, who is the figure of the Father, but the life of the Father cannot have anything as its principle. Therefore, there is no parallel between life and a figure.

5. That text of the Psalms is understood of the Son according to His human nature.

6. A cause represents its effect, and the effect its cause. This is clear from what has been said. Accordingly, God can be called a book with respect to creatures, and creatures a book with respect to God.

7. By the force of its own proper signification, Word does not denote the principle of that which is expressed by the word; but the book of life as taken here does. Hence, the two are not similar.

ARTICLE VI: IS THE BOOK OF LIFE SPOKEN OF IN RELATION TO THE NATURAL LIFE OF CREATURES?

Parallel readings: [Summa Theol., 1, 24, 2; III Sentences 31, I, 2, sols. 1-2.](#)

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Natural life, as well as the life of glory, is represented in God's knowledge. Now, God's knowledge of the life of glory is called the book of life. Therefore, His knowledge of natural life should be similarly called.

2. God's knowledge contains all things according to the manner of life, because we read in John (1:3-4): "What was made, in Him was life..." Therefore, His knowledge should be called the book of life with respect to all things, especially living things.

3. Just as a person is preordained by God's providence to the life of glory, so is he also preordained to natural life. Now, as mentioned previously, the knowledge of those preordained to the life of glory is called the book of life. Therefore, the knowledge of those preordained to natural life also is called the book of life.

4. In its explanation of that verse in the Apocalypse (3:5), "I will not blot out his name out of the book of life," the Gloss reads: "The book of life is God's knowledge, in which all things are clear." Consequently, the book of life is said to concern all things, hence, even natural life.

5. The book of life is, as it were, knowledge of the life of glory. But the life of glory cannot be known unless natural life is also known. Therefore, the book of life likewise concerns natural life.

6. The word life has been taken from natural life and applied to the life of glory. Now, a thing is said more truly of that of which it is said properly than of that to which it is merely applied. Therefore, the book of life concerns natural life more than it concerns the life of glory.

7. What is more permanent and common is more noble. Now, natural life is more permanent than the life of glory or of grace. Similarly, it is more common, because natural life continues with the life of grace or of glory; but the opposite is not true. Therefore, natural life is more noble than the life of grace and glory. Hence, the book of life concerns the life of nature more than it concerns the life of grace or of glory.

To the Contrary:

1'. As Augustine says, the book of life is, in a sense, predestination. But predestination does not concern natural life. Hence, neither does the book of life.

2'. The book of life concerns the life which is given by God directly. Natural life, however, is given by God through the medium of natural causes. Therefore, the book of life is not about natural life.

REPLY:

The book of life, as mentioned previously, is that knowledge which directs the giver of life in His bestowal of it. Now, when we give anything, we need no direction unless it is necessary to separate those to whom bestowal is to be made from those to whom it is not to be made. Hence, the book of life concerns only that life which is to be granted by choice. Natural life, however, like all other natural goods, is supplied to all in general, according to each one's capacity. The book of life, therefore, does not concern natural life but only that life which, according to a choice made by God's will, is given to some and not to others.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although natural life and the life of glory are represented in God's knowledge, His knowledge of natural life does not fulfil the notion of the book of life as does His knowledge of the life of glory for the reason given.

2. The book of life gets its name, not from the fact that it has life, but because it is a book about the life to which some are preordained by God's election, and because the names of these persons are written down in it.

3. In His providence, God gives life to some as a thing due to their nature, but He grants the life of glory only according to the good pleasure of His will. Consequently, He gives natural life to everything which can receive it, but not the life of glory. Hence, there is no book of natural life as there is a book of the life of glory.

4. The Gloss is not to be understood as meaning that all things are clear—that is, all things are contained—in the book of life. It means, rather, that all which is written in it is clear, that is, all is determined.

5. The book of life implies, as has been said, not only knowledge of the life of glory but also God's choice—not, however, will respect to merely natural life.

6. The life of glory is less known to us than natural life is. Consequently, we come to know the life of glory after knowing natural life. Similarly, we name the life of glory from natural life, even though more of the nature of life belongs to the life of glory than belongs to natural life. This is true of all the names that we give God which are taken from creatures. Consequently, when the word life is used by itself, it need not be understood as necessarily referring to natural life.

7. The life of glory, taken by itself, is more permanent than natural life, because it makes natural life stable. Accidentally, however, natural life is more permanent than the life of grace; that is, it is more closely related to the living thing, to which natural life, but not the life of glory, is due by reason of its essence.

Moreover, while natural life is more common in one sense than the life of glory, in another sense it is less common. For a thing is said to be common in two senses. First, it is said to be common through effect or predication; that is, it is found in many things according to one intelligible character. In this sense, that which is more common is not more noble but more imperfect, as animal is, which is more common than man. Now, it is in this sense that natural life is more common than the life of glory. Second, a thing is said to be common after the manner of a cause; that is, it resembles a cause which, while remaining numerically one,

extends to many effects. In this sense, what is more common is more noble. For example, the preservation of a city is more noble than the preservation of a family. In this sense, natural life is not more common than the life of glory.

ARTICLE VII: DOES THE BOOK OF LIFE USED WITHOUT QUALIFICATION REFER TO THE LIFE OF GRACE?

Parallel readings: See readings given for preceding article.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does, for

1. As is evident from what Dionysius has written, what is in the effect is found in a nobler manner in the cause. Now, glory is the effect of grace. Consequently, the life of grace is more noble than the life of glory. Hence, the book of life concerns the life of grace more than it does the life of glory.
2. As mentioned earlier, the book of life is the enrolment of those who are predestined. But predestination, in general, is the preparation of grace and glory. Therefore, the book of life concerns, in general, the life of grace as well as the life of glory.
3. The book of life designates certain persons as citizens of that city in which there is life. But, just as some are made citizens of the heavenly Jerusalem through the life of glory, so some are made citizens of the Church militant through the life of grace. Therefore, the book of life concerns the life of grace as well as the life of glory.
4. What is predicated of many is understood as predicated without qualification of that of which it is predicated first. Now, the life of grace is prior to the life of glory. Therefore, when the book of life is mentioned, it is understood as referring to the life of grace.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. One who is in the state of grace possesses the life of grace without qualification. His name, however, is not said to be written in the book of life without qualification; it is written there only in a certain respect, namely, in so far as he is in the state of grace. Therefore, the book of life is not concerned simply with the life of grace.
- 2'. The end is more noble than the means to the end. But the life of glory is the end of grace. Therefore, it is more noble. Consequently, when used without qualification, life should be understood as referring to the life of glory. Hence, the book of life used without qualification is concerned only with the life of glory.

REPLY:

The book of life means the enrolment of someone who will obtain life as a kind of reward and possession, for men of this sort are customarily enrolled in something. Now, a thing is said to be a possession, properly speaking, when it can be had at one's command; and such a thing has no defects. Consequently, the Philosopher says that knowledge had about God "is not a human possession" but divine, because only God knows Himself perfectly, while man's knowledge of God is necessarily defective. Thus, life will be had as a possession when through life all the defects opposed to life are excluded. Now, this is what the life of glory does; it excludes all death, spiritual as well as physical, so that there remains not even the

possibility of dying. The life of grace does not do this. Consequently, the book of life does not concern the life of grace without qualification, but only the life of glory.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Certain causes are more noble than their effects, namely, the efficient, formal, and final causes. Hence, what exists in these causes exists in a more noble manner than what exists in their effects. On the other hand, matter is less perfect than its effects. Consequently, a thing exists in a material cause in a less noble manner than it does in the effect of this cause; for in matter it is incomplete and potential, but in the effect of the material cause its existence is actual.

Now, every disposition that prepares a subject to receive a perfection can be reduced to the material cause; and it is in this way that grace is the cause of glory. Consequently, life exists in glory in a more noble way than it does in grace.

2. Predestination does not concern grace except as grace is ordained to glory. Hence, to be predestined belongs only to those who have final grace, upon which glory follows.

3. Although those who possess the life of grace are citizens of the Church militant, the condition of the Church militant is not one in which life is possessed fully, because the possibility of dying still remains. Hence, the book of life is not spoken of in relation to these individuals.

4. Although in the line of generation, the life of grace is prior to the life of glory, nevertheless, in the line of perfection the life of glory is prior—just as the end is prior to the means to the end.

ARTICLE VIII: CAN WE SPEAK OF A BOOK OF DEATH AS WE SPEAK OF THE BOOK OF LIFE?

Parallel readings Summa Theol., 1, 24, I; III Sentences 31, I, 2, sols. 1-2.

Difficulties:

It seems that we can, for

1. In its comment on Luke (10:20), "Rejoice in this, that your names are written...", "the Gloss reads: "By means of his heavenly or earthly deeds, a person is, as it were, engraved on God's memory for ever." Now, just as a person is ordained to life through heavenly deeds, that is, through works of justice, so is he also ordained to death through earthly deeds, that is, through works of sin. Hence, as there is in God an enrolment of those ordained to life, so is there also in Him an enrolment of those ordained to death. Consequently, just as there is said to be a book of life in God, so should there also be said to be in Him a book of death.

2. The book of life is said to be in God only inasmuch as He has a list of those for whom He has prepared an eternal reward—a list resembling that which a ruler on earth has, containing the names of those whom he has decided to honour. But a ruler on earth has a list of punishments and tortures as well as a list of honours and rewards. Therefore, God also has a book of death.

3. Just as God knows the predestination by which He prepares some for life, so does He also know His reprobation by which He prepares others for death. Now, the knowledge which God

has of His predestination is called the book of life, as mentioned earlier. Therefore, His knowledge of reprobation should be called the book of death.

To the Contrary:

According to Dionysius, "We should not venture to say anything about God unless we can support what we are saying from Scripture." Now, we do not find anything in Scripture that refers to a book of death as it refers to the book of life. Therefore, we should not affirm the existence of a book of death.

REPLY:

A person's knowledge about matters written in a book is superior to his knowledge of other matters. Hence, in connection with God's knowledge of things, the term book is used of knowledge that is superior in kind to His knowledge of other truths.

Now, there are two kinds of knowledge in God, namely, knowledge of simple understanding and knowledge of approval. His knowledge of simple understanding concerns all things, both the good and the evil; but His knowledge of approval concerns only the good. Hence, the good are known to God in a more special way than the others; and for this reason they are said to be written in a book, while the evil are not. Consequently, a book of death is not spoken of as the book of life is.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Some explain "heavenly deeds" as meaning the labours of the contemplative life, and "earthly deeds" as meaning the labours of the active life. If a person performs one or the other, however, he is enrolled for life and not for death. Therefore, both enrolments pertain to the book of life and neither to a book of death. Others understand "earthly deeds" as meaning works of sin, which, taken by themselves, simply ordain a person to death, although he may, for another reason, be ordained to life inasmuch as he may rise again after his fall, more cautious and humble.

One might also answer—and this is the better explanation—that when a thing is said to be known by means of some other thing, this state merit can be understood in two ways. First, by means of may signify the cause of the knowledge on the part of the knower. This cannot be its meaning in the Gloss, however, because the works one does, whether they be good or bad, are not a cause of God's foreknowledge, of His predestination, or of His eternal reprobation. Second, by means of may signify the cause on the part of what is known. This is its meaning in the Gloss. For a person is engraved on God's memory by means of the works he has done, not because his works of the kind described are the cause of God's knowing him, but because God knows that on account of these works he will possess life or death.

It is clear from this that the Gloss is not speaking of that enrolment for life which pertains to the book of life and is on the part of God.

2. Things are written in a book so that they may be known forever. Men who are punished, however, are kept by their very punishments from being known by other men. Hence, their names are written down only temporally until the time when their punishment is inflicted upon them. But those who are thought worthy of honours and rewards have their names written down unconditionally in order that they may be kept, as it were, in everlasting memory.

3. God does not have a special knowledge of the reprobate as He has of the predestined. Hence, no comparison can be made.

QUESTION 8: The Knowledge of Angels

ARTICLE I: DO THE ANGELS SEE GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 12, I; 12., ad 56, 3; 6z, 1; I-II., 8; g, 1; II Sentences 4, 1, I; 23, 2, 2; iV Sentences 49, 2, 1; Contra Gentiles III, CC. 41, 49, 5', 54, 57; Quodibet X, 8, i In Matth., C. 5 (P. 10:53a); Comp. Theol., I, C. 104; 11, cc. 9-b; In Evang. Joannis, c. 1, lectura I, (P. 10:3bza); Q. D. De anima, 17, ad 10; In I Tim., c. 6, lectura 3 (P. b36)

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. We read in the Gospel according to St. John (1: 8): "No man hath seen God at any time." Commenting on this, Chrysostom writes:

"Not even the heavenly essences themselves, I mean the cherubim and seraphim, were able to see God as He is." But whoever sees God through His essence sees Him as He is. Angels, therefore, do not see God through His essence.

2. Commenting on that verse in Exodus (33:11), "And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face," the Gloss reads: "No man, no angel has ever seen the essence of God as it is." Consequently, our conclusion is the same as before.

3. According to Augustine, one desires a thing only if one does not have it. But in the first Epistle of St. Peter (1: 12), we read that "the angels desire to look upon God." Therefore, they do not see God through His essence.

4. Commenting on the first chapter of John, Chrysostom says: "Neither prophets, angels, nor archangels were able to see that which is God." Since that which is God is God's essence, our conclusion is the same as before.

5. Whatever is seen by the intellect is seen through a form. Consequently, if the intellect of an angel were to see the divine essence, it would have to see it through some form. Now, it could not see it through the divine essence itself, because the form by which the intellect understands makes the intellect to be in act and, consequently, is the act of the intellect. Hence, the divine essence and the intellect would be made one. But this cannot be said of the divine essence, which cannot become the constitutive part of anything. Therefore, when an angel knows God, he sees Him through the medium of some other form, and, consequently, does not see Him through His essence.

6. The intellect must be proportionate to the intelligible since the intelligible is a perfection of the one who understands. But there can be no proportion between the divine essence and an angelic intellect, for they are separated by an infinite distance, and there is no proportion between such widely separated things. Consequently, an angel cannot see God through His essence.

7. One thing can be made like another only in so far as it has received likeness of that other into itself. But by knowing God, an angelic intellect is made like God, for all knowledge takes place through assimilation. Consequently, an angel must know God through a likeness, and not through His essence.

8. Whoever knows a thing through its essence knows what that thing is. Now, as is clear from the writings of Dionysius and Damascene, one cannot know what God is, but only what He is not. No created intellect, therefore, can see God through His essence.

9. As Dionysius says, darkness is said to be in God because of the superabundance of His brightness and because He is hidden from all lights and concealed from all knowledge. Now, God's brightness exceeds not only our intellect but also the angelic intellect. Consequently, the brightness of the divine essence is hidden from the knowledge of angels.

10. Dionysius argues as follows: all cognition is about existing things. God, however, does not exist but is above existence. Therefore, He cannot be known except by transcendent knowledge, which is divine knowledge.

11. Dionysius says: "If a person seeing God understood what he saw, he did not see God but only one of the things belonging to Him." Therefore, no created intellect can see God through His essence.

12. The stronger sight is, the more it can see something at a distance. Consequently, what is infinitely distant cannot be seen except by a sight that has infinite power. Now, the divine essence stands at an infinite distance from any created intellect. Therefore, since no created intellect has unlimited power, no created intellect can see God through His essence.

13. For any kind of knowledge, a judgment is necessary. A judgment, however, is made only by a superior about something inferior. Therefore, since no intellect is superior to the divine essence, no created intellect will be able to see God through His essence.

14. Boethius says: "A judgment is the act of one who judges." Consequently, what is judged is related to the judgment as something passive. But the divine essence cannot be in the relation of passivity with respect to any created intellect. Therefore, a created intellect cannot see God through His essence.

15. Whatever is seen through its essence is reached by the intellect. But no intellect can reach that which stands at an infinite distance from it. Consequently, an angelic intellect cannot see God's essence, which stands at an infinite distance from it.

To the Contrary:

1'. In the Gospel according to St. Matthew (18:10) we read: "Their angels always see the face of my Father." Now, to see the face of the Father is to see His essence. Angels, therefore, see God through His essence.

2'. Beatified angels see God in the way in which we have been promised to see Him when we are beatified. But we will see God through His essence, as is clear from the first Epistle of St. John (3:2): "When he shall appear, we shall be like to him; because we shall see him as he is." Therefore, angels see God through His essence.

3'. Angels know the one who has made them. But the divine essence itself is the cause of angels. Therefore, angels see the divine essence.

4'. Whatever is seen is seen either through its essence or through a likeness. But God's likeness is not something other than His essence, because whatever is in God is God. Consequently, angels see God through His essence.

5'. The intellect is stronger when it knows than the will when it loves. Consequently, Augustine says: "The intellect goes first; the will act follows later or not at all." Now, angels love the divine essence. Therefore, they see it in a much higher degree.

REPLY:

Treating this question, some philosophers have erred by saying that no created intellect can see God through His essence; for they concentrated only on the distance lying between a created intellect and the divine essence. Since this position is heretical, it cannot be held.

It is clear that the beatitude of any intellectual creature consists in its most perfect operation. Now, the supreme element of any rational creature is his intellect. Consequently, the beatitude of any rational creature consists in the most noble act of his intellectual vision. The nobility of intellectual vision, however, comes from the nobility of what is understood, just as the Philosopher says that the most perfect operation of sight takes place when it is in good condition and is directed to the most beautiful of all those things that fall under its view. If in its most perfect vision a rational creature would not see the divine essence, then its beatitude would not be God Himself but something inferior to Him. This, however, is not possible, for the ultimate perfection of all things consists in their reaching their principle; and our faith tells us that God Himself immediately created all rational creatures. Hence, according to faith, all rational creatures who attain beatitude should see God through His essence.

Now, however, we must consider or understand how we can see God through His essence. In all vision there must be posited something by which the one who sees beholds what is seen. This medium is either the very essence of the thing seen, as is true in the case of God's knowledge of Himself, or some likeness of the thing seen, as is true in the case of a man seeing a stone. This is necessary, because the person who knows and the known should in some manner become one in the act of knowing. God's essence, however, cannot be seen by a created intellect by means of a likeness. For, in all cognition taking place through likeness, the perfection of cognition is determined by the conformity which the likeness has with that thing whose likeness it is; and I mean a conformity in representation, such as a species in the soul has with the thing outside the soul even though it does not have a conformity with it in real existence. Consequently, if a likeness represents a genus, but not a species, the thing is known according to the intelligible character of the genus but not according to that of the species. If the likeness were to fail to represent even the genus, however, it would represent the thing only according to a likeness which is merely analogous. In such a case, the thing would not be known even according to the intelligible character of the genus. This would happen, for example, if I were to know a substance through the likeness of an accident.

Now, any likeness of the divine essence that is received into a created intellect can have no proportion with the divine essence other than that of analogy. Consequently, knowledge which is had through such a likeness is not knowledge of God Himself through His essence. In fact, it is more imperfect than that which would be had if a substance were known through the likeness of an accident. Consequently, those persons who said that God is not seen through His essence taught that only a certain brightness of the divine essence will be seen, meaning by brightness a likeness of the uncreated light through which, they affirmed, God could be seen but which was unable to represent the divine essence—just as the light received by our eyes fails to represent the brightness of the sun, with the result that we cannot fix our vision upon the sun's brightness but can see only some of its brilliant rays. It remains, therefore, that that by which a created intellect sees God through His essence is the divine essence itself.

It is not necessary, however, for the divine essence to become the form of the intellect but only to become related to the intellect after the manner of a form. Consequently, just as one actual being results from matter and a form which is a part of the thing; so, with the necessary differences, the created intellect and the divine essence become one in the act of understanding when the intellect understands and the divine essence is understood through itself.

How it is possible for a separated essence to be joined to the intellect as a form has been shown by the Commentator. Whenever two things are received in something that can receive,

and one of them is more perfect than the other, the proportion of what is more perfect to that which is less perfect is like the proportion of a form to what it perfects—just as light is the perfection of colour when both are received in a transparent medium. Consequently, since a created intellect, because present in a created substance, is less perfect than the divine essence, the divine essence bears to it in some way the relation of a form as long as it exists in it. We can find some sort of example of this among natural things. A self-subsistent thing cannot be the form of any matter if it contains matter itself. For example, a stone cannot be the form of any matter. A self-subsistent thing lacking matter, however, can be the form of matter, as is clear in the case of the soul. Similarly and in some way or other, and even though it is pure act and has an act of being entirely distinct from the intellect, the divine essence becomes related to the intellect as its form in the act of understanding. For this reason, Peter Lombard says that the union of the body with a rational soul is, in a way, an example of the beatifying union of a rational spirit with God.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The statement, "This is seen as it is," can be understood in two ways. First, it can mean that the very mode of the thing's existence comes within one's vision, that is to say, the very mode of the thing's existence is seen along with the thing. It is in this way that God, as He is, is seen by angels and will be seen by the blessed; for they will see that His essence has that manner of being which it has. That verse in the first Epistle of John, "We shall see him as he is" (3:2), is to be understood in this sense. Second, however, it can mean that the manner mentioned determines the vision of the one who sees. In other words, the manner of the vision itself is the same as the manner of the essence of the thing seen. In this sense, no created intellect can see God as He is; for it is impossible for the mode of a created intellect's vision to be as sublime as the mode of God's existence. The statement of Chrysostom should be understood in this sense.

2-3-4. A similar reply should be given to the second, third, and fourth difficulties.

5. The form by which an intellect sees God when it sees Him through His essence is the divine essence itself. From this, however, it follows, not that the essence is that form which is a part of a thing in its existence, but only that in the act of knowing it has a relation similar to that of a form which is a part of a thing in its existence.

6. Properly speaking, a proportion is nothing else but a relation of a quantity to a quantity, such as arises when one quantity is equal to or three times another. The term proportion was then transferred to signify the relation of one reality to another. For example, even though no relation of quantity is involved, matter is said to be proportioned to form inasmuch as it is related to form as its matter. Similarly, a created intellect is proportionate to the sight of the divine essence inasmuch as, in some way, it is related to the latter as to an intelligible form, even though the perfections of the two are incommensurable because an infinite distance lies between them.

7. Assimilation is required for knowledge for this reason only, that the knower be in some way united to what is known. However, when the thing itself is united through its own essence to the intellect, the union is more perfect than if it had taken place through a likeness. Consequently, since the divine essence is united to the angelic intellect as its form, there is no need that the angelic intellect be informed by some likeness which would serve as a medium for knowing the divine essence.

8. The statements of Dionysius and of Damascene should be understood as referring to the vision had in this life, in which a person sees God through some form or other. Since this form falls short of representing the divine essence, the latter cannot be seen through it. All

that is known is that God transcends this intellectual representation of Him. Consequently, that which God is remains hidden; and this is the most exalted mode of knowledge that we can attain while we are in this life. Hence, we do not know what God is, but only what He is not. Nevertheless, the divine essence represents itself sufficiently. But when it becomes, as it were, the form of the intellect, the intellect knows not only what God is not but also what He is.

9. God's splendour proves too much for the intellects of persons in this life for two reasons. First, it lies beyond the grasp of their intellectual power. From this it follows that the perfection of our vision is not equal to the perfection of His essence, because what an action can accomplish is determined by the agent's perfection. Second, it transcends the form by which our intellects now understand. Consequently, God is not seen now through His essence, as is clear from what has been said. In the beatific vision, however, while God still transcends the power of a created intellect, and the perfection of our vision still does not equal the perfection of His being, He does not lie beyond the form by which He is seen. Consequently, that which is God will be seen.

10. Dionysius's argument proceeds from the knowledge had while in this life. This is had from forms in existing creatures, and, consequently, it cannot attain to what is transcendent. Such is not the case, however, of the vision had in heaven. His argument, therefore, is not pertinent to the problem at hand.

11. That statement of Dionysius should be understood as referring to the vision had in this life, wherein God is known through some created form. Our reason for saying this has been explained above.

12. A sense of sight must be very strong if it sees what is at some distance from it; for sight is a passive power, and the more perfect a passive potency is, the less is required to move it. Conversely, the more perfect an active power is, the more it can move. Again, a thing is more susceptible to being heated, the less heat it requires to become hot. But the more distant a thing seen is, the smaller is the visual angle; consequently, less of the thing seen comes to the sense of sight. However, if an equal form were to come from what is near and from what is far, the near object would not be seen less than the distant object would be. Now, even though an infinite distance lies between God and an angelic intellect, He is nevertheless joined to that intellect by His entire essence. Consequently, the cases are not similar.

13. There are two kinds of judgments. In the first, we judge how a thing should be; and this kind of judgment can be made only by one who is superior about what is inferior. In the second, we judge how things are; and this kind of judgment can be both about what is superior and about what is equal, for I am equally able to judge if one is standing or sitting, whether he be a king or a peasant. This second kind of judgment is found in cognition.

14. A judgment is not an action which passes out from the agent into an exterior thing which is then changed by it. Instead, it is an operation that remains as a perfection in the one who judges. Consequently, that about which the intellect or the sense judges need not be passive, even though it may be signified as passive. As a matter of fact, what is sensed and what is understood (the object of a judgment) are related to intellect and sense more like agents, inasmuch as the operations of sensation and understanding are in a certain sense passive.

15. A created intellect never attains the divine essence so as to be of the same nature. It does attain it, however, as an intelligible form.

ARTICLE II: DO THE INTELLECTS OF BEATIFIED ANGELS AND MEN COMPREHEND THE DIVINE ESSENCE?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 2, 2, ad 5-7; 20, 5; Summa Theol., I, 12, 7; I-II, 4, 3, ad 1; III, 10, 1; III Sentences 14, 2, 1; 27, 3, 2; IV Sentences 49, 2, 3; In Ephes., C. 5, lectura (P. i In I Tim., c. 6, lectura 3 (P. i De div. nom., c. 1, lects. 1-2 (P. 15:2611) seq., 269a seq.); De cantate, a. b, ad 5; in Evang. Joannis, c. 1, lectura II (P. bo:3Izb); Comp. Theol., I, c. io6; Contra Gentiles III,

Difficulties:

It seems that they do, for

- 1.** If what is simple is seen, the whole of it is seen. Now, the divine essence is simple. Therefore, when a beatified angel sees it, he sees the entire essence and consequently comprehends it.
- 2.** It was said, however, that even though the entire essence is seen, it is not seen entirely.— On the contrary, entirely signifies a certain mode, but every mode of the divine essence is the essence itself. Therefore, if the entire essence is seen, it will be seen entirely.
- 3.** The effectiveness of an action is measured by the form, which is the principle of action on the part of the agent. This is clear from the case of heat and the process of heating. Now, the form by which the intellect understands is the principle of intellectual vision. Consequently, the effectiveness of the intellect in seeing God will be as great as the perfection of the divine essence. Therefore, the intellect will comprehend the divine essence.
- 4.** Just as the most perfect way of knowing composite intelligible objects is to know them by demonstration, so also the most perfect way of knowing the in composite is to know what they are.

Now, every composite intelligible object known by demonstration is comprehended. Consequently, if one knows what a thing is, he comprehends it. But those who know God through His essence know what He is, since to know what a thing is, is to know its essence. Angels, therefore, comprehend the divine essence.

- 5.** In the Epistle to the Philippians (3: 12), we read: "But I follow after, hoping I may comprehend as I am also comprehended." But God perfectly comprehended the Apostle. The Apostle, therefore, was moving to a stage wherein he would perfectly comprehend God.
- 6.** The gloss on the passage cited immediately above says: "If I may comprehend that is, that I may know the immensity of God that surpasses any intellect." Now, God is incomprehensible only by reason of His immensity. Therefore, the blessed perfectly comprehend the divine essence.

To the Contrary:

- 1'.** In his commentary on Luke, Ambrose says: "No one has looked upon the abundance of goodness which lives in God. Neither mind nor eye has comprehended it."
- 2'.** In his treatment of the vision of God, Augustine says: "No one has ever comprehended the fullness of God, either will his bodily eyes or will his mind."
- 3'.** According to Augustine in the same work: "A thing is comprehended if its limits can be seen." Now, this is impossible in the case of God, for He is infinite. Consequently, He cannot be comprehended.

REPLY:

Properly speaking, one thing is said to be comprehended by another if it is included within it, for to comprehend means to apprehend some thing in all its parts simultaneously. This is, as it were, to include it in all its aspects. Now, what is included by another thing does not exceed it; instead, it is less than or at most equal to it. These principles pertain to quantity. Consequently, there are two modes of comprehension according to the two kinds of quantity, namely, dimensional (or extensive) quantity and virtual (or intensive) quantity. According to dimensional quantity, a cask comprehends will; according to virtual quantity, matter is said to comprehend form when nothing remains in the matter which has not been perfected by the form. It is in this latter manner that a knowing power is said to comprehend its object, namely, in so far as what is known lies perfectly under its cognition. When the thing known exceeds its grasp, then the knowing power falls short of comprehension.

This excess must be considered differently in the different powers. To the sensitive powers, the object is related not merely according to virtual quantity but also according to dimensional quantity; for, inasmuch as a sense is in space, the sensibles move it, not only in virtue of the quality of the proper sensibles, but also according to dimensional quantity. This is clear in the case of the common sensibles. As a result, comprehension by sense can be impeded in two ways. First, it can be impeded by an excess in the object considered from the standpoint of virtual quantity. For example, the eye is kept from comprehending the sun because the intensity of the sun's brightness, by which it is visible, exceeds the proportion of the eye's ability to see it. Second, it can be impeded by an excess according to dimensional quantity. For example, the eye is kept from comprehending the entire mass of the earth. Part of it the eye sees, part of it it does not. This, however, is not true of the first example given, for we see all the parts of the sun alike, but none of them as perfectly as they might be seen.

Now, the intelligible is related to intellect only indirectly according to dimensional or natural quantity, that is, only inasmuch as the intellect receives something from sense. Consequently, our intellect is similarly kept from comprehending what is infinite according to dimensional quantity, so that some of the infinite comes into the intellect, but some of it remains outside. The intelligible is not, however, directly related to the intellect according to dimensional quantity, since the intellect is a power that does not use a physical organ. Instead, the intelligible is related to intellect according to virtual quantity. Consequently, the intellectual comprehension of those things which are understood in themselves without dependence on sense is impeded only because of an excess according to virtual quantity. This occurs, for example, when what is known can be understood in a more perfect way than the intellect understands it. For example, a person can understand the following conclusion: "A triangle has three angles equal to two right angles," merely because of a probable reason, namely, the authority of another or because the proposition is commonly accepted. Such a person does not comprehend the proposition, not because he is ignorant of one part of it and knows another, but because that conclusion can be known by a demonstration which he does not yet know. Consequently, he does not comprehend the proposition simply because he has not grasped it perfectly.

Now, it is clear that there is no place for dimensional quantity in an angelic intellect, especially in its relation to the vision of God. Consequently, any equality or excess occurring here must be taken as involving virtual quantity only. Moreover, the perfection of the intelligibility of the divine essence lies beyond the grasp of angelic and all created intellects in so far as they have the power of knowing, because the truth by which the divine essence is knowable surpasses the light by which any created intellect knows. Consequently, it is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend the divine essence, not because it does not know some part of the essence, but because it cannot attain the perfect manner of knowing it.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The entire divine essence is seen by an angel, for there is nothing in it which he does not see. Consequently, the term entire is to be explained in a privative sense, not in a sense that would suppose parts. He does not, however, see the essence perfectly. Therefore, it does not follow that he comprehends it.
2. We can consider three modes in any vision. The first mode is that of the person who sees, taken absolutely; and it means the extent of his capacity. According to this, the intellect of an angel sees God entirely; for this statement means simply that an angel uses all the force of his intellect in seeing God. The second mode is that of the thing seen; and this mode is nothing other than the thing's quality. But, since quality in God is nothing other than His substance, His mode is His very essence. Consequently, angels see God entirely in this sense, too, for they see God's entire mode in the same way in which they see the entire essence. The third mode is that of the vision itself, which is a medium between the one seeing and the thing seen; and therefore it signifies the mode of the one seeing in his relation to the thing seen. In this sense, one person is said to see another entirely when his vision is total, as occurs when the mode of the vision is as perfect as the mode of the thing's visibility. As is clear from what was said above, one cannot see the divine essence entirely in this sense. In this respect, we are like one who knows that a proposition can be demonstrated but does not know the demonstration. Such a person knows the entire mode of its cognition, but he does not know it according to the complete mode in which it is knowable.
3. That reasoning follows when the form which is the principle of an action is united to the agent according to its complete mode. Such a union is necessarily true of all non-subsistent forms, whose very existence is to be in another. But, even though the divine essence is, in some way, like a form of the intellect, still, because it is seized by the intellect only according to the manner of the intellect seizing it, and because the action here is not only that of the form but also that of the agent, the action cannot be as perfect as the form which is the principle of the action, because of the defect on the part of the agent.
4. A thing whose definition is known is comprehended only if the definition itself is comprehended. It is possible, however, to know a thing or its definition without comprehending either; consequently, the thing itself is not comprehended. Moreover, even though an angel knows in some way what God is, still he does not comprehend this.
5. Vision of God had through His essence can be called comprehension in comparison with the vision had in this life, which does not attain God's essence. It is not, however, comprehension simply speaking, for the reason already given. Consequently, in the statements, "Hoping I may comprehend as I am also comprehended" and "I shall know even as I have been known," the word signifies a comparison of likeness, not of equality.
6. God's immeasurableness will be seen, but not in an immeasurable manner; for, as was said previously, His entire mode will be seen, but not entirely.

ARTICLE III: CAN AN ANGEL BY MEANS OF HIS OWN NATURAL POWERS ATTAIN THE VISION OF GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE?

Parallel readings; Summa Theol., I, 12, 4. See also readings given for q. 8, a. 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that he can, for

1. According to Augustine,¹ in their initial state in which, as many say, the angels had only natural powers, they saw in the Word all the creatures that were to be made. Now, this would not have been possible unless they saw the Word. Therefore, by means of its purely natural powers, an angelic intellect saw God in His essence.
2. We can understand what is less intelligible can understand what is more intelligible. Now, the divine essence is most intelligible, because it is most free of matter; and it is because of this condition that a thing becomes actually intelligible. Therefore, since an angelic intellect can by means of its purely natural powers understand other intelligible objects, it can will even greater reason also know the divine essence by means of its purely natural powers.
3. But it was said that, even though the divine essence if taken in itself is most intelligible, it is not most intelligible to an angelic intellect.—On the contrary, the fact that what is more visible in itself is not more visible to us is due to a defect in our sight. There is no defect, however, in an angelic intellect; for, as Dionysius says, an angel is "a pure, clean and spotless mirror." Consequently, that which is more intelligible in itself is more intelligible to an angel.
4. According to the Commentator, the principle laid down by Themistius, "This is more intelligible; therefore it is more understood," is applicable to intellects completely separated from matter. Now, an angelic intellect is of this nature. Therefore, the principle can be applied to it.
5. Surpassing visible brilliancy is less visible to our sense of sight because its very brilliancy harms sight. But surpassing intelligible brilliancy does not harm our intellect; indeed, it strengthens it. Consequently, that which is more intelligible in itself is more understood by the intellect.
6. To see God in His essence is an act of the intellect. But grace lies in the affective power. Grace, therefore, is not needed in order to see God through His essence. Consequently, angels were able to reach the vision of God merely through natural powers.
7. According to Augustine, since faith by its essence is present in the soul, it is also seen through its essence by the soul. Now, God by His essence is present to the soul and is present similarly to an angel and to all creatures whatsoever. Consequently, in his purely natural state an angel could see God in His essence.
8. According to Augustine, a thing is present in the soul in three ways: through union, through a notion, and through the presence of its essence. Now, if this division is consistent, it must have been made through opposites. Consequently, since God is present to an angelic intellect through His essence, He is not present to it through a likeness. Hence, God cannot be seen by an angel by means of a likeness. If an angel, therefore, can know God in some way merely by means of his natural powers, it seems that he knows Him through His essence naturally.
9. If a thing is seen in a material mirror, the mirror itself must be seen. Now, in the state in which they were created angels saw things in the Word as in a mirror. Consequently, they saw the Word.
10. But it was said that the angels were created not in a purely natural condition but with grace—either with sanctifying grace or with charisms.—On the contrary, just as the light of nature falls short of the light of glory, so also does the light of grace given in sanctifying grace and in charisms. Consequently, if persons possessing either of these graces could see God through His essence, they could, for a like reason, do the same in the state of pure nature.
11. Things are seen only where they are. Now, before things were created, they existed only in the Word. Consequently, when the angels came to know the things that were to be made, they knew them in the Word and thus saw the Word.

12. Nature does not fail in necessary matters. But to attain its end is one of the most necessary concerns of nature. Consequently, each and every nature has been provided for in such a way that it can attain its end. Now, to see God through His essence is the end for which a rational creature exists. Therefore, by its own purely natural powers a rational creature can attain this vision.

13. Superior powers are more perfect than inferior. Now, by means of their own natures, inferior powers can attain their objects. For example, senses can attain sensibles; the imagination, objects of imagination. Consequently, since God is the object of the intelligence, as is said in Spirit and Soul, it seems that an angelic intelligence can see God through its own natural powers.

14. But it was said that such a comparison cannot be made, because the objects of other powers do not exceed the powers themselves, but God exceeds all created intelligences on the contrary, no matter how much a created intelligence is perfected by the light of glory, God always infinitely surpasses it. Consequently, if "excess" prevented one from seeing God through His essence, no created intellect would ever be able to attain a state of glory in which it would see God through His essence. This, however, is absurd.

15. In Spirit and Soul, we read: "The soul is a likeness of all wisdom," but so is an angel, for the same reason. Now, things are known naturally by means of their likenesses. Consequently, an angel naturally knows those things which belong to wisdom. But, as Augustine says, wisdom is about divine matters. An angel, therefore, can come to see God through His essence by means of his natural powers.

16. In order that a created intellect see God through His essence, all that is required is that it be made like God. Now, by its very nature, the intellect of an angel is godlike. Consequently, it can see God through His essence by means of its own natural powers.

17. All knowledge of God is either as through a mirror or through His essence. This is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner, but then face to face." Now, in their natural condition angels do not know God as through a mirror, because, as Augustine says: "From the time they were created they enjoyed the eternal vision of the Word. They did not 'know the invisible things of God through things that are made.'" (This latter type of knowledge is "seeing through a glass.") Consequently, angels naturally see God through His essence.

18. We see a thing without a medium if we can think of it without thinking about something else. An angel, however, can by his natural knowledge think of God without thinking about any creature. Consequently, he can see God without any medium; and this is to see Him through His essence.

19. Augustine says that those realities which are in the soul in their essence are known by the soul through their essence. But the divine essence is in the soul in this manner. Therefore.

20. That which is not seen through its essence is seen through a species if it is seen at all. Now, the divine essence cannot be seen through a species, for a species is more simple than that of which it is the species. Consequently, since the divine essence is known naturally by an angel, it is known by him through its essence.

To the Contrary:

1'. To see God through His essence is life eternal. This is clear from the Gospel of St. John (17:3): "This is eternal life, etc." Now, one cannot attain eternal life through merely natural powers; for, as it is said in the Epistle to the Romans (6:23): "The grace of God is life

everlasting." Consequently, by merely natural powers, one cannot attain the vision of God through His essence.

2' Augustine says that, even though the soul is made to know God, it can be led to this act of knowledge only by the infusion of divine light. Consequently, no one can by his natural power see God through His essence.

3' Nature does not transcend its limits. Now, the divine essence surpasses any created nature. Consequently, the divine essence cannot be seen by any natural cognition.

REPLY:

In order that God be seen through His essence, the divine essence must be united with the intellect in some way as an intelligible form. However, what is to be perfected can be united with a form only after a disposition is present which makes the subject to be perfected capable of receiving such a form, because a definite act takes place only in a potency suitable for it. For example, a body is united with a soul as will its form only after it has been organized and disposed. Similarly, there must be some disposition produced in the intellect by which it is made perfectible by this form, the divine essence. This disposition is brought about by an intellectual light; and, were this light natural, an intellect could see God in His essence by its purely natural powers. It is impossible, however, for it to be natural, because the ultimate disposition for a form and the form itself must belong to one order. Consequently, if one is natural, so is the other. The divine essence, however, is not the natural intelligible form of a created intellect.

This is clear from the principle that act and potency always belong to one genus. Hence, potency in the genus of quantity has no relation to an act in the genus of quality; and, similarly, the natural form of a created intellect can belong only to that genus in which the potency of a created intellect exists. As a result, the form of the intellect can

not be a sensible form, since it belongs to another genus, but can be only an immaterial form belonging to the same genus as the intellect. Now, just as a sensible form lies below the genus of created intellectual powers, so does the divine essence lie above it. Consequently, the divine essence is not a form within the ambit of the natural power of the intellect. Therefore, that intellectual light by which a created intellect receives the ultimate disposition for union with the divine essence as will an intelligible form is not a natural light, but a supernatural light. And this is the light of glory of which the Psalmist speaks when he says (35:10): "In thy light we shall see light."

Therefore, the natural capacity of any intellect has a determinate relation to some created intelligible form. This relationship, however, differs in man and in angels, since in man it is to an intelligible form abstracted from sense (all man's knowledge has its origin in sense); however, in angels it is to an intelligible form not received from sense, and especially to that form which is their own essence. Consequently, the knowledge of God that an angel can naturally attain is simply that which he gets when he sees Him through his own substance. Hence, we read in The Causes: "An intelligence understands what lies above it through the mode of its own substance," because, inasmuch as it is caused by God, its substance is a certain likeness of the divine essence. The knowledge of God that man can naturally attain, however, is had through knowing Him by means of sensible form which, by the light of the active intellect, is abstracted from sensible conditions. Hence, in its commentary on the first chapter of the Epistle to the Romans (1:20), "For the invisible things of him, etc.," the Gloss states that men were given help toward knowing God by sensible creatures and by the natural light of reason. However, knowledge of God had by means of a created form is not vision of

Him through His essence. Consequently, neither man nor angel can attain the vision of God through His essence by their own purely natural powers.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. This statement of Augustine, that angels saw things in the Word, can be understood as referring to angels, not as they were immediately after their creation, but as they were when they were beatified. Or the reply might be given that, even though they did not see the Word through His essence when they were in a natural state, they saw Him in some way by means of a likeness existing within them, and it was from this knowledge that they were able to know creatures. Later, however, they knew them much more fully in the Word when they saw the Word through His essence, since, in so far as a cause is known, its effects are known by means of the cause.
2. Even though the divine essence, taken in itself, is most knowable, it is not most knowable to a created intellect, because it lies outside the order of the latter.
3. The angelic intellect is said to be a pure and spotless mirror without defect because in view of its genus it does not suffer from a defect of intelligible light as the human intellect does. The intelligible light of the human intellect is obscured to such an extent that it must be passive in regard to phantasms under the limitations of space and time and progress discursively from one thing to another. This is why Isaac says: "Reason is born in the shadow of intelligence" and why its intellectual power can grasp the quiddities only of intelligible created forms belonging to its own genus. But the angelic intellect is also found to be "dark" and defective in its relation to the divine essence, which lies outside its genus. Therefore, it falls short of seeing the divine essence, even though the latter in itself is most knowable.
4. This statement of the Commentator is understood as referring to knowledge of created intelligibles, not to knowledge of the uncreated essence. A created intelligible substance is in itself most intelligible, but is less intelligible to us for this reason, that it exceeds forms abstracted by sense, our natural means of knowledge. Similarly in fact, even to a much greater extent—the divine essence exceeds the created intelligible form by which angelic intellects know. Consequently, an angelic intellect understands the divine essence less [than created things] even though it is more intelligible in itself, just as our intellect knows less about an angelic essence than it does about sensible things, even though an angelic essence is more intelligible in itself.
5. Even though surpassing intelligible brilliancy does not harm the intellect but strengthens it, it sometimes lies beyond the representation of the form by which the intellect understands; and, for this reason, it hinders the intellect. Consequently, the following statement in the Metaphysics that the intellect is related to what is most manifest in nature "as the eye of the bat is to the light of the sun" is true.
6. For the vision of God through His essence, grace is not required as some kind of immediate disposition; but by grace man merits that the light of glory be given him, and through this he sees God in His essence.
7. Faith is known through its essence in so far as its essence is joined to the intellect as an intelligible form, and not for any other reason. But the divine essence is not joined to a created intellect in this manner during life. It merely sustains the intellect in its act of existence.
8. That division is made, not through opposing things, but through opposing formal concepts. Consequently, there is no reason why some thing cannot be in the soul in one manner, say, through its essence, and in another manner also, as through its likeness or image. For an

image and likeness of God exist in the soul, even though God is also present there through His essence.

9. The answer here is the same as that given to the first difficulty.

10. Neither sanctifying grace for charisms suffice for vision of God through His essence. Only perfected grace is sufficient, and this is the light of glory.

11. Even before things existed in their own natures they existed not only in the Word but also in the minds of angels. Consequently, they could be seen even though the Word was not seen through His essence.

12. As the Philosopher says, many degrees of perfection are found in things. The first and most perfect degree is that wherein a thing has its own goodness without the motion or the help of another, just as the most perfect health exists in one who is healthy by himself without the help of medicine. This is the degree proper to divine perfection. The second degree is that wherein one can attain perfect goodness with slight help or with a little motion, like a man who can keep his health with only a little exercise. The third degree is that wherein one acquires perfect goodness only through many motions, like a man who acquires perfect health only after much exercise. The fourth degree belongs to him who can never acquire perfect goodness, but can acquire only some goodness by means of many motions. The fifth degree belongs to him who cannot acquire any goodness at all and has no movement towards goodness. He is like a man who has an incurable disease and, consequently, does not take any medicine.

Now, irrational natures can in no way attain perfect goodness which is beatitude. They can attain only some imperfect goodness, their natural end, which they achieve through the force of their own natures. Rational creatures, however, can attain perfect goodness, that is, beatitude. Yet, in order to attain this, they need more things than lower natures need in order to obtain their ends. Consequently, even though rational creatures are more noble, it does not follow that they can attain their end by means of their own natural powers as lower natures do. For, to attain beatitude through one's own power belongs exclusively to God.

13. A similar reply should be given to this difficulty about the ordering of powers.

14. Even though a created intellect is never elevated by the light of glory to such an extent that the distance between it and the divine essence is no longer infinite, yet, as a result of this light, the intellect is united with the divine essence as with an intelligible form; and this union can happen in no other way.

15. By his natural powers an angel can know God through a likeness; but this knowledge is not the same as seeing God through His essence.

16. The natural conformity which an angelic intellect has with God is not such that it is proportioned to the divine essence as to an intelligible form. It consists rather in this, that an angelic intellect does not receive its knowledge of sensible things from sense as we do; and in other respects, too, the angelic intellect resembles God more than it resembles the human intellect.

17. A thing is seen in three different ways. First, it is seen through its essence, in the way in which a visible essence itself is joined to sight when the eye sees light. Second, it is seen through a species, as takes place when the likeness of a thing is impressed on my sense of sight when I see a stone. Third, it is seen "through a mirror"; and this takes place when the thing's likeness, through which it is known, is not caused in the sight by the thing itself directly but by that in which the likeness of the thing is represented, just as sensible species are caused in a mirror.

Now, to see God in the first manner is natural only to God. It lies above the nature of man and angel. To see God in the second manner is natural to an angel. To see God in the third manner, however, is natural to man himself, for he can come to know God from creatures inasmuch as they represent Him somehow or other. Consequently, the statement that all knowledge is either through an essence or through a mirror should be taken as referring to human knowledge. The knowledge which an angel naturally has of God lies between these two types.

18. An image of a thing can be considered in two ways. First, it can be considered in so far as it is a certain thing; and since as a thing it is distinct from that of which it is an image, under this aspect the motion of the cognitive power to the image will be other than its motion toward that of which it is an image. Second, it can be considered in so far as it is an image. Under this aspect, the motion toward the image will be the same as the motion toward that of which it is an image. Consequently, when a thing is known by means of a resemblance existing in its effect, the cognitive motion can pass over immediately to the cause without thinking about any other thing. This is the way in which the intellect of a person still in this life can think of God without thinking of any creature.

19. Those things which are in the soul in their essence and are united with it as intelligible forms are understood by the soul through their essences. The divine essence, however, is not present this way in the soul of one still in this life. Consequently, the argument proves nothing.

20. That argument is talking about species abstracted from things, and these must be more simple than the things themselves. A created [angelic] intellect, however, does not know God naturally through such a likeness, but only through a likeness imprinted by Him. Consequently, the argument proves nothing.

ARTICLE IV: DOES AN ANGEL, SEEING GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE, KNOW ALL THINGS?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 20, aa. 4-6; Summa Theol., I, 12, 8; 57,5; io6, 2, ad I; III, 20, 2 II Sentences II, 2, aa. 1— III Sentences i 2, sols. 2-4; IV Sentences 45, 3, I; 49, 2, 5; Contra Gentiles III, cc. 6, 5

Difficulties:

It seems that he does, for

- 1.** As Isidore says: "Angels see all things in the Word of God before they come into being."
- 2.** Every faculty of sight sees those things whose likenesses it has within it. But the divine essence, a likeness of all things, is joined to the angelic intellect as an intelligible form. Consequently, when an angel sees God through His essence he sees all things.
- 3.** If an angel does not know all things, this is because of a defect in his faculty of knowing or in its objects or in the medium of his cognition. But his lack of knowledge is not due to any defect in the angel's intellect, for, as Dionysius says, an angel "is a pure and spotless mirror." Nor is it due to any defect in the objects of this faculty, for all things are knowable in the divine essence. Finally, it is not due to any defect in the medium by which angels know, for the divine essence represents all things perfectly. Consequently, seeing God, an angel sees all things.

4. An angel's intellect is more perfect than the intellect possessed by a human soul. But the human soul has the power to know all things; for as is said in *The Soul*, it is "all things in some manner" since it is natural for it to know all things. Consequently, an angelic intellect can also know all things. Now, nothing is more effective in bringing an angelic intellect to the act of cognition than the divine essence. Therefore, when an angel sees the divine essence he knows all things.

5. As Gregory says, love in heaven is equated with knowledge, for there one's love is proportioned to his knowledge. But one who loves God will love in Him all things lovable. Consequently, one who sees God will see all things knowable.

6. If an angel, seeing God, does not see all things, then this is only because all the intelligibles are infinite. But an angel is not kept from understanding by the fact that the object of his intellect is infinite, for the divine essence itself is distant from him as something infinite from what is finite. Consequently, it seems that when an angel sees God he can see all things.

7. The knowledge one has in heaven is greater than that had by one on earth, no matter how much the knowledge of the latter is elevated. Now, all things can be revealed to one still on earth. That all things present can be revealed is clear from the case of Benedict, who, as Gregory says, was shown the whole world at once. That all future things can be revealed is also clear, since God reveals some future events to prophets; and, in the same way, He could reveal all of them to a prophet—and all past things, too. For an even better reason, therefore, an angel seeing God in the heavenly vision knows all things.

8. Gregory writes as follows: "What is there that they do not see when they see the one that sees all things?" Now, angels see God, who knows all things, through His essence. Consequently, angels know all things.

9. As regards knowledge, the power of an angel is not less than that of a soul. But Gregory says: "Every creature is small for a soul who sees the Creator." Therefore, every creature is small to an angel; thus, our conclusion is the same as before.

10. Spiritual light pours itself into the mind with greater force than physical light does into the eye. But, if physical light were the adequate cause of all colors, then in pouring itself into the eye it would manifest all colors. Consequently, since God Himself, who is spiritual

light and the perfect principle of all things, pours Himself into the mind of an angel who sees Him, by knowing God the angel will know all things.

11. Cognition is, as it were, a kind of contact between the knower and the knowable. Now, if a simple thing is touched, whatever there is in it is touched. But God is simple. Therefore, if He is known, all things are known, because all their intelligible characters exist within Him.

12. Knowledge of creatures does not belong to the substance of beatitude. Therefore, creatures seem to be related equally to the knowledge had in that state: one who is beatified knows either all creatures or none at all. But, since he knows some creatures, he must know them all.

13. Any potency that is not reduced to act is imperfect. But the intellect of an angel is in potency to the knowledge of all things; otherwise, it would be inferior to the human intellect, which has the power to become all things. Consequently, if an angel did not know all things in his state of beatitude, his knowledge would remain imperfect; but this seems repugnant to the perfection of beatitude, which takes away all imperfections.

14. If a beatified angel did not know all things, he would, since he is in potency to knowing all things, at one time know something which he did not know previously. Now, this is impossible; for, as Augustine says, "beatified angels' thoughts do not change"; and they would

change if angels came to know something of which they were previously ignorant. Consequently, beatified angels see all things when they see God.

15. The beatific vision is measured by eternity-, and for this reason is called eternal life. Now, since there is no "before" or "after" in eternity, these sequences are not in the beatific vision either. Hence, [in the vision] something cannot be known which was not known previously. Therefore, our conclusion is the same as before.

16. In the Gospel according to John (10:9), we read the following: "He shall go in, and go out, and shall find pastures." This is explained as follows in Spirit and Soul: "He shall go in to contemplate the divinity of the Saviour, and go out to gaze upon His humanity. In both he will find glorious refreshment." Now, our external sight will nourish itself perfectly upon the humanity of our Saviour, because nothing in His body will be hidden from it. Consequently, the eye of the mind will nourish itself similarly on His divinity, because it will be ignorant of nothing in His divinity, and so will know all things.

17. As is said in The Soul, an intellect that understands what is most intelligible does not understand what is less intelligible to a lesser degree but to a greater degree. Now, God is most intelligible. Hence, when an intellect sees God it sees all things.

18. One knows an effect especially by knowing its cause. Now, God is the cause of all things. Consequently, when an intellect sees God it knows all things.

19. Colors painted on a tablet, to become known by sight, would need only a light to shine upon them and make them actually visible. Now, through the illumination of the divine light, the representations of all things are actually intelligible in the divine essence. Consequently, when an intellect sees the divine essence, it sees all things by means of these representations of all things.

To the Contrary:

1'. We read the following in the Epistle to the Ephesians (3:10): "That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the principalities and powers in heavenly places through the church." Commenting on this passage, Jerome says that the angels learned the mystery of the Incarnation through the preaching of the Church. Consequently, they were ignorant of it before the preaching of the Church, even though they saw God through His essence. Therefore, when they saw God in His essence they did not know all things.

2'. Dionysius writes: "Many aspects of the mysteries are hidden from the celestial essences."

3'. Nothing is equal to another's extension according to dimensional quantity unless it has the same amount of dimensional quantity. Therefore, nothing is equal to another's extension in virtual quantity unless it has the same amount of efficacy. Now, an angelic intellect is not equal to the divine intellect in perfection. Consequently, it is impossible for an angelic intellect to embrace all things which the divine intellect embraces.

4'. Since angels have been made to praise God, they praise Him in so far as they know Him. But, as is clear from what Chrysostom has written, all angels do not praise Him equally. Therefore, some know more things in God than others. Nevertheless, even those who know less see God through His essence. Consequently, when they see God through His essence they do not see all things.

5'. Knowledge and joy belong to the substance of angelic beatitude. Now, the beatified angels can rejoice over something which they did not rejoice over previously, as, for example, the conversion of a sinner: "There shall be joy before the angels of God upon one..." (Luke 15: 10). Consequently, they can also know something which they did not know previously. Thus,

even though they see God through His essence, there are some things which they do not know.

6'. No created thing can be all-good or all-powerful. Therefore, no created thing can be all-knowing.

7'. God's knowledge infinitely surpasses that of a creature. Consequently, it is impossible for a creature to know all that God knows.

8'. In Jeremias (17:9- o) we read the following: "The heart is per verse... and unsearchable. Who can know it? I...the Lord." From this it seems that even though the angels see God through His essence, they nevertheless do not know the heart's secrets and, therefore, do not know all things.

REPLY:

In seeing His own essence, God knows some things, namely, the present, past, and future, will the knowledge of vision. Other things, namely, all those which He could make but which nevertheless do not exist, have not existed, and will not exist—these He knows will the knowledge of simple understanding. Now, it seems impossible that any creature seeing the divine essence should know all the things which God knows will His knowledge of simple understanding.

It is clear that the number of effects a person knows of a cause is in proportion to the perfection of his knowledge of that cause. For example, the more perfectly one knows a principle of demonstration, the more conclusions can he draw from it. Consequently, if an intellect is to know from its knowledge of a cause all the effects of that cause, it must attain a perfect knowledge of it and, consequently, must comprehend it. Now, as is evident from what has been said previously, it is impossible for a created intellect to comprehend the divine essence. Therefore, it is impossible for any created intellect in seeing the divine essence to know all the things that can be caused by it.

However, it is possible for a created intellect which sees God to know all that God knows will His knowledge of vision. Ail hold this is true of the soul of Christ. Opinion is split, however, about the others who see God through His essence. Some say that all angels and all the souls of the blessed necessarily know all things by seeing God's essence because they are like men who look into a mirror and see all that is reflected there. This opinion, however, seems to contradict the sayings of the saints, especially those of Dionysius, who expressly states that the lower angels rid themselves of their ignorance by the help of higher angels. Hence, we must assert that the higher angels know things of which the lower are ignorant, even though all angels without exception contemplate God.

Consequently, we answer that things do not exist in the divine essence as actually distinct; but, as Dionysius says, in God all things are one in the way in which many effects are united in one cause. Images reflected in a mirror, however, are actually distinct; consequently, the way in which all things are in the divine essence is more like the way in which effects are in a cause than that in which images are in a mirror. Moreover, one who knows a cause will know all the effects which that cause can produce only if he comprehends that cause, but such comprehension is impossible for a created intellect will regard to the divine essence. Hence, in seeing His essence God alone necessarily knows all the things that He can make. The same is true of the effects that can be produced by the divine essence: one knows more of these the more fully he sees God's essence. Consequently, the soul of Christ, which sees God more perfectly than all other creatures do, is said to know all things, present, past, and future. Other creatures, however, do not have this knowledge. Each one of them sees more or fewer effects of God in proportion to the knowledge he has of Him.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. As Peter Lombard points out, when one says that angels see all things in the Word before they come into being, his statement should not be understood as referring to all angels, but possibly only to the higher angels. Nor do these see all things perfectly, but, perhaps, only in general. Some things they know, as it were, only implicitly. Or one could also reply that many concepts can be drawn from one object, just as many demonstrations can be made about a triangle; and it is possible for one to know the definition of a triangle and still not know all the things that can be known about a triangle. Therefore, it is one thing to know all things, and another to know all that can be known about things.

However, it is sufficiently probable that all who see God through His essence know all creatures at least according to their species. This is what Isidore means when he says angels "know all- things in the Word before they come into existence," for coming into existence pertains to things, not to intelligible characters. It is not necessary, however, that an angel know all the intelligible characters of a thing when he knows it; and, even if he were to know all the natural properties which can be known by comprehending its essence, he would not know it according to all the formalities by which it falls under the ordering of divine providence, which ordains one thing to many events. It is about such things that the highest angels enlighten the lower. And this is what Dionysius means when he says that higher angels teach the lower about the intelligible characters of things.

2. That argument holds when sight is joined to a likeness according to the entire potentialities of that likeness. Then sight necessarily knows everything to which the likeness extends. However, a created intellect is not joined to the divine essence in this manner. Consequently, the argument does not hold.

3. The fact that an angel, seeing God, nevertheless does not see all things is due to a defect in his intellect, which is not united to the divine essence according to the total cognoscibility of the essence. But, as mentioned above, this defect is not contrary to the purity of the angelic intellect.

4. The ambit of a soul's natural power includes only those objects which can be understood by the light of the active intellect, and these are forms abstracted from sensible objects. Similarly, the natural power of an angelic intellect includes only those objects that are manifested to it by its own natural light, which is not, however, sufficient to manifest all the things hidden in the wisdom of God. Moreover, the soul receives knowledge of those things which it can know naturally only through a medium that is proportioned to itself. Consequently, even though two persons may apprehend a conclusion by one and the same medium, one will come to know it when the other, will a slower intellect, will not. Similarly, when angels see God's essence, a higher angel will know many things which a lower angel will not. However, the lower angel gets knowledge of these things through a medium that is more proportioned to Mm, namely, the light of the higher angel. Hence, it is necessary for one angel to enlighten another.

5. Affection tends toward things themselves, but intellect not only tends toward things but also divides them up into many concepts. Consequently, these concepts are understood but not loved. They can, however, be the principle of love or the reason for it. But, properly speaking, what is loved is the thing itself. Therefore, since the angels who see God through His essence know all creatures, they can love all creatures. But, because they do not apprehend all the intelligible aspects of creatures, they do not love creatures under all the aspects under which they can be loved.

6. Even though God is at an infinite distance from the angelic intellect, angels do not know God according to the mode of Him infinity, because they do not know Him infinitely. Consequently, it is not necessary that they know all the infinite things that He knows.

7. God could reveal to a person in this life so many things that he would know more about creatures than the intellect of one in heaven knows. Similarly, God could reveal to a person in a lower place in heaven as many things as one in a higher place knows—or even more things. But this is not the point of our present inquiry. The point is:

Does it follow that a created intellect knows all things from the fact that it sees God's essence?

8. Gregory's statement can be understood as referring to things that pertain to the substance of beatitude. Or one can reply that Gregory is speaking about the sufficiency of the medium, because the divine essence is a medium that is sufficient to make all things known. Gregory accordingly holds that it is not strange if one who sees the divine essence knows future things; but that he does not know all things comes from a defect in the intellect which does not comprehend it.

9. This statement declares that every creature is small for a soul seeing the divine essence; that is, from such a soul no creature is hidden because of its nobility. There can be another reason, however, why it might remain hidden, namely, the fact that it is not joined to the soul by a proportionate medium through which the soul could know it.

10. That argument would hold if a physical eye could take upon itself all the potentialities of physical light. In the problem proposed, this is clearly not the case.

11. When an intellect touches God by its cognition, it knows the whole of God, even though it does not know God wholly. Consequently, it does know all that is in God actually. It is not necessary, however, that the intellect know the relation God has to all His effects, for this would mean that it knew God in so far as He is the ultimate meaning of all of them.

12. Although the knowledge of creatures does not belong to the substance of beatitude as something that beatifies, nevertheless, some knowledge of creatures pertains to beatitude as being in a way necessary for some act which the beatified person has to perform. For example, to know all who have been placed under his care belongs to the beatitude of an angel. Similarly, it belongs to the beatitude of the saints to know those persons who implore their help and even to know those other creatures from which they ought to rise to the praise of God.

Or it might be said that, even if the knowledge of creatures pertains in no way at all to beatitude, it does not follow that all knowledge of creatures is equally related to the beatific vision. For, when a cause is known, some effects are known immediately in it while others still remain rather hidden. For example, some conclusions can be drawn immediately from principles of demonstration while others cannot be except by means of numerous media; and one cannot come to know the latter by himself but must be led to them by someone else. The same is true of knowing the intelligible reasons of effects in their relation to the divine essence: some are hidden but others are manifest. Consequently, when one sees the divine essence he sees some effects but not others.

13. A thing can be in potency to something else in two ways. First, it can be in natural potency; and it is in this way that a created intellect is in potency to knowing all those things that can be manifested to it by its own natural light. A beatified angel is ignorant of none of these things, for were he ignorant of these his intellect would be imperfect. Secondly, a thing can be in merely obediential potency; and it is in this way that a thing is said to be in potency to those things above its nature which God can nevertheless cause in it. If such things are not reduced from potency to act, the potency is not imperfect. Consequently, the intellect of a beatified angel is not imperfect if it does not know all the things which God could reveal to it.

Or one could reply that if a potency is ordered to two perfections, and if the second is the final cause of the first, then that potency would not be imperfect if it should have the second without the first—for example, if one were to have health without the help of medicine which causes health. Now, all knowledge of created things is ordered to the knowledge of God. Consequently, granted the impossible position that a created intellect did not know creatures but still knew God, it would not be imperfect. Moreover, an intellect that sees God and knows more creatures is not more perfect because of this knowledge of creatures but rather by the fact that it knows God more perfectly. For this reason, Augustine says: "Unhappy the man who knows all things," that is, created things, "but does not know You. Happy is he who knows You, even if he does not know creatures. Moreover, if he knows You and creatures, he is not happier on account of them, but his happiness comes from You alone."

14. Change in thought, which is not had in beatified angels, can be understood in two different senses. First, thought is said to change as a result of reasoning from effects to causes or from causes to effects. Now, this discursive thinking is proper to reason and is beneath the clarity of angelic intellects. Second, change in thought can mean succession in the things that are thought about; and here we should note that there cannot be any succession in the knowledge by which angels know things in the Word, because they know many different things in one medium. But there is succession with respect to those things which they know through innate species or through the illuminations of higher angels. Hence, Augustine says: "God moves spiritual creatures through time;" that is, they are changed in their affections.

15. The beatific vision is that by which God is seen through His essence and things are seen in God. There is no succession in this vision, nor do angels make any progress in it or in beatitude. But they can progress in their vision of things through innate species or through the illumination of superior angels; and this vision is measured, not by eternity, but by time—not by that time which is the measure of the first mobile thing's motion, about which the Philosopher speaks, but by non-continuous time, such as that by which creation is measured. This is nothing other than the difference between "before" and "after" in the creation of things or in the succession of acts of understanding had by angels.

16. Christ's body is finite and can be comprehended by physical sight. The divine essence, however, cannot be comprehended by spiritual sight, because it is infinite. Hence, no comparison can be made.

17. That argument would conclude if the intellect could know perfectly what is most knowable, namely, God Himself. Since this is not so, the argument does not hold.

18. As is clear from what we have said, this difficulty from causes and effects can be answered in a similar way.

19. The intelligible representations of things are not in God the way in which colors are on a tablet or wall. This is clear from what we have said above. Hence, the argument proves nothing.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

We concede these arguments, since their conclusions are true even though they are not reached as they should be.

ARTICLE V: IS THE VISION OF THINGS IN THE WORD HAD THROUGH LIKENESSES OF THEM EXISTING IN THE ANGELIC INTELLECTS?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 12, 9; III Sentences 14, I, sols. 4-5.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. All cognition takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the known. Therefore, if an angelic intellect knows things in the Word, it should know them by means of likenesses existing within itself.
2. A spiritual thing is related to spiritual sight as a physical thing is related to physical sight. But a physical thing is known by physical sight only by means of an impression of the thing existing within it. The same is true, therefore, of spiritual sight.
3. The glory had in heaven does not destroy nature; instead, it perfects it. Now, the natural cognition of angels takes place through species. Therefore, their knowledge in glory, which consists in their vision in the Word, takes place through likenesses of things.
4. All knowledge takes place through some form. But the Word can not be the form of the intellect, except perhaps the exemplary form, since He cannot be the intrinsic form of anything. Consequently, an angelic intellect must know the things that it knows in the Word through other forms.
5. It is clear from the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:4) that Paul in rapture saw the essence of God and there saw "secret words which it is not granted to man to utter." Now, he did not forget those words when he no longer saw the Word through His essence. Hence, he must have known them by means of some likenesses, which remained in his intellect. For the same reason, therefore, it seems that angels know through likenesses the things they know in the Word.
6. But it was said that when the Word departed from Paul, some traces of his vision remained in Paul's soul, that is, some impressions or likenesses by which he could remember the things that he saw in the Word—just as impressions are left on the senses even after the objects that have been sensed are no longer present.—On the contrary, a thing leaves a greater impression on another when it is present than when it is absent. Therefore, if the Word when absent left an impression on Paul's intellect, He also left an impression when He was present.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. Whatever is in God is God Himself. Consequently, when an angel sees God's essence he does not see it by means of a likeness, nor does he see through a likeness the ideas of things as they exist in God.
- 2'. The natures of things are reflected in the Word like images in a mirror. Now, all the things reflected in a mirror are seen by means of their one likeness there. Hence, all the things known in the Word are seen through the form of the Word.
- 3'. An angelic intellect is like a painted tablet, for, as said in The Causes, "every intellect is filled will forms." Now, other pictures are not added to a tablet that is already painted; hence, it is proved in The Soul that the possible intellect can receive all things because it is "like a tablet on which nothing has been written." Consequently, an angel cannot have any likenesses of those things which he knows in the Word.

REPLY:

All cognition takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the known. Now, whenever one thing is made like a second thing in so far as the second thing is like a third, then the first thing is also like the third. For example, if a son is like his father in so far as the father is like

the grandfather, then the son is like the grandfather. Now, one thing can be made like another in two ways: it can get this likeness immediately from the other, or it can get it by being assimilated to a third thing which is like the second. Cognition is had in two ways, also: we can know Socrates by seeing him either because our sense of sight is made like Socrates himself or because it is made like a picture of Socrates. In either case, the assimilation is sufficient for us to know Socrates.

I say, therefore, that, when a thing is known by means of the likeness of a second thing, that knowledge does not take place by means of some other likeness derived immediately from the thing known; and if the knower knows one and the same thing by means of its own likeness and also by means of its likeness to another thing, then these cognitions are different. This can be explained as follows.

Some knowing powers know only by receiving, not by forming something from what they have received. For example, the senses know merely those things whose species they receive and nothing more. Other powers, however, not only know what they receive, but can also form some other species from it. This is clearly the case of the imagination, which, having received the forms of gold and of mountain, forms a phantasm of a golden mountain. The same is true of the intellect, which, having comprehended the forms of genus and difference, forms the definition of a species. Consequently, when these powers know a thing through its likeness existing in another thing, it sometimes happens that a species other than that likeness is formed—a species which belongs immediately to the thing. For example, when I have seen a statue of Hercules, I can form another likeness which will belong immediately to Hercules; but this second act of knowing will be other than that by which I knew Hercules by his statue. If it were the same, then the same thing would happen in all other powers—which is manifestly absurd, because, when my external sense of sight sees Hercules in a statue, that knowledge does not take place through any other likeness than that of the statue.

Consequently, I say that the divine essence is itself a likeness of all things. Therefore, an angelic intellect can know things both through their likenesses and through the divine essence. But the act of knowledge by which it knows things through their likenesses is other than the act by which it knows things through the Word, even though those likenesses are caused by a conjunction of the angelic intellect to the Word either through operations of the angelic intellect (similar to those of the imagination) or, as seems more probable, through an outpouring from the Word.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Since the divine essence is a likeness of the things known through the Word, the angelic intellect's union with the divine essence makes it sufficiently assimilated to these things to know them.
2. The Word can imprint something on an angelic intellect, but, as was said, the knowledge that would result from this impression would be other than that which is had through the Word.
3. Even though the glory had in heaven does not destroy nature, it elevates it to a level which it could not reach by itself, namely, that level where it can see things through God's very essence without any likeness acting as a medium in this vision.
4. The Word is not the intrinsic form of a thing in the sense that it is part of a thing's essence. It is, however, a form within the intellect, since it is intelligible of its very nature.
5. When Paul no longer saw God's essence, he remembered the things he had known in the Word by means of likenesses of things that still remained with him.

6. Those likenesses which remained even when the Word had departed were imprinted when Paul saw the Word through His essence. But, as is clear from what has been said above, when Paul saw through the Word, the vision itself did not take place through these impressions.

ARTICLE VI: DOES AN ANGEL KNOW HIMSELF?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 56, 1; Contra Gentiles II, 98; III De anima, lectura 9, n. 721 seq., De causis, lectura 13 (P. 21:74)

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. As Dionysius says, angels do not know their own power. Now, if they knew themselves by means of their essence, they would know their power. Consequently, angels do not know their own essence.
2. If an angel knows himself, he knows himself, not through a likeness, but through his own essence; for, as is said in The Soul, "in those beings which exist without matter, the knower and the known are one and the same." But an angel cannot know himself by means of his own essence, since a thing is understood by means of a form within the intellect. Now, the essence of an angel cannot be the form of his own intellect, because the intellect itself inheres in his essence as its property or form. Consequently, an angel cannot know himself at all.
3. The same thing cannot be both active and passive, mover and moved, unless one of its parts is a mover or active and its other part is moved or passive. This is clear in the case of animals, as is shown in the Physics. But the knower and the known are related as active and passive. Consequently, it is impossible for an angel to know all of himself.
4. If an angel understands himself through his own essence, his essence must be the act of his intellect. But, unless it is pure act, no subsisting essence can be the act of anything else, for a material thing cannot be the form of another thing. Now, pure act of being belongs only to the divine essence. Consequently, an angel cannot know himself through his own essence.
5. A thing is understood only if it is stripped of matter and of the conditions of matter. But to be in potency is, in a way, a material condition which cannot be stripped from an angel. Consequently, an angel cannot understand himself.
6. If an angel understands himself through his own essence, his essence must be in his intellect. This, however, is impossible; for, as a matter of fact, his intellect is in his essence, and if one thing is in another, this other cannot be in it. Consequently, an angel does not know himself by means of his own essence.
7. The intellect of an angel is mixed with potentiality. Now, nothing is reduced from potency to act by itself. Consequently, since an intellect is reduced to the act of knowing by the known, it will be impossible for an angel to understand himself.
8. Every potency has the perfection of its activity determined by the essence in which it is rooted. Consequently, an angelic intellect can understand because of the power of its essence. Now, the same thing cannot be a principle of acting and of being acted upon; and, since that which is understood is, in a way, acted upon, it seems that an angel cannot know his own essence.

9. Demonstration is an intellectual act. But a thing cannot be demonstrated by means of itself. Therefore, an angel cannot understand himself by means of his essence.

10. There is the same reason for holding that the will reflects upon itself as that the intellect does. But the will of an angel reflects upon itself only by means of its natural love, which is a kind of natural habit. Consequently, an angel can know himself only by means of some habit, and, therefore, he cannot know himself by means of his essence.

11. Operation lies as a medium between what is active and what is passive. But the knower and the known are related as active and passive. Now, since there is nothing intermediate between a thing and it self, it seems impossible that an angel could know himself.

To the Contrary:

1'. As Boethius says, what a lower power can do a higher power can. But our soul can know itself. Therefore, it is even more true that an angel can know himself.

2'. As Avicenna says, the reason why our intellect, but not our senses, knows itself is that the senses use a physical organ but the intellect does not. Now, an angelic intellect is even further removed from a physical organ than our intellect is. Therefore, an angel also knows himself.

3'. Since the intellect of an angel is godlike, it greatly resembles God's intellect. But God knows Himself through His essence. Therefore, an angel knows himself also through his essence.

4'. The more proportionate an intelligible is to an intellect, the more the intellect can know it. Now, there is no intelligible more proportionate to an angelic intellect than its own essence. Therefore, it knows its essence in a very high degree.

5'. In The Causes it is said: "Whoever knows intellectually knows his own essence, and returns to it in a complete reflection." Therefore, angels can do this, for they know intellectually.

REPLY:

There are two types of action. One proceeds from the agent and goes out to an exterior thing, which it changes. An example of this type is illumination, which can properly be called an action. The second type of action does not go out to an exterior thing but remains in the agent as its perfection. Properly speaking, this is called operation. Shining is an example of this type.

Now, these two actions are at one in this, that both issue only from a thing which is actually existing and only in so far as it is in act. Consequently, a body does not shine unless it actually has light; and the same is true of its illuminating action.

The action of appetite, sense, and intellect is not, however, like the action that goes out to exterior matter; it is like the action that remains in the agent as its perfection. Consequently, in so far as he knows, a knower must be in act. It is not necessary, however, for the knower in knowing to become an efficient cause and for the known to become something passive; but inasmuch as one thing results from the knower and known, namely, an intellect in act, these two are but one principle of this act, which is understanding.

I say that one thing results from them inasmuch as what is understood is joined to the understanding either through its essence or through a likeness. Hence, a knower is not related as active or as passive except for another consideration; that is, activity or passivity is required to some extent in order that the intelligible be united to the intellect. Efficient causality is required, because the active intellect

makes species actually intelligible; change is required because the possible intellect receives intelligible species, and the senses, sensible species. But understanding follows upon this change or efficient causality as an effect follows upon a cause. Consequently, just as a bright body shines when light actually exists in it, so also does the intellect understand everything that is actually intelligible in it.

We must note, however, that there is no reason why a thing cannot be one thing actually and another potentially. For example, a transparent body is actually a body, but it is colored only potentially. Similarly, it is possible for a thing to be in act in the order of existence but only in potency in the order of intelligibility. Now, in beings there are grades of act and potency. One being, prime matter, is in potency only. Another, God, exists only actually. All other intermediate beings exist both actually and potentially. Similarly, in the genus of intelligibles, one being, the divine essence, is in act only; another, the possible intellect, is only in potency, and for this reason the Commentator says that the possible intellect in the order of intelligibles is like prime matter in the order of sensibles. All the angelic substances lie in between; for they have something of potency and of act, not only in the genus of being, but also in the genus of intelligibility.

Now, prime matter cannot perform any action unless it is perfected by some form (and even then that action is a kind of emanation from the form rather than from the matter); because things that actually exist can perform actions only in so far as they are in act. Similarly, our possible intellect can understand nothing before it is brought into act by an intelligible form. Only then can it understand that thing to which this form belongs. Moreover, it can understand itself only by means of an intelligible form that actually exists in itself. But, since the essence of an angel, which is in act in the genus of intelligibility, is present to it, an angelic intellect can understand this intelligible reality within itself, namely, its own essence—and not through any likeness of it but through the essence itself.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Angels know their power by comprehending it as it is in itself. They do not comprehend it, however, in so far as it has been modeled upon the eternal archetype, for this would involve comprehension of the archetype itself.
- 2.** Even though in the order of existence an angel's essence cannot stand in the relation of act to potency with respect to his intellect, in the order of understanding it is related to it as act is to potency.
- 3.** The knower and the known are not related as active and passive but as one principle of activity, as is clear from what has been said above, even though they may seem to be so related from our manner of speaking.
- 4.** Although an angel's essence is not pure act, it nevertheless is without matter. It is in potency merely in this respect, that it does not have its act of existence from itself. Consequently, there is no reason why it cannot be related to an angelic intellect as act in the order of understanding.
- 5.** A thing that is understood need not be stripped entirely of matter; for it is evident that natural forms are never understood without matter, since matter is included in their definition. They must, however, be stripped of individual matter, that is, matter that lies under determinate dimensions. There is no reason, therefore, why angels need be separated from the kind of potency which they possess.
- 6.** There is no reason why one thing cannot be in a second and the second in the first if this is in different ways, such as the ways in which a whole is in its parts and the parts are in the

whole. The same is true here: the essence of the angel is in his intellect as an intelligible is in a knower, and his intellect is in his essence as a power is in a substance.

7. The intellect of an angel is not in potency with respect to his essence. In this respect, it is always in act. But with respect to other intelligible objects his intellect can be in potency. It does not follow, however, that when his intellect is in potency it is always reduced to act by some other agent. This is true only when it is in essential potency, as a person is before he learns something. When it is in accidental potency the potency a person is in who has habitual knowledge but is not using it—then it can go into act by itself, except that it might be said that his intellect is reduced to act by his will, which moves it to actual consideration.

8. As is evident from what we have said above, that which is understood is not like something passive but like a principle of action. Consequently, the argument does not hold.

9. A thing can be the cause of knowing in two ways. First, it can be what is known. Thus, what is more known is the cause of cognizing what is less known; and in this way the medium of demonstration is a cause of understanding. Second, it can be the one who knows. Then the cause of knowledge is that which makes the intelligible to be present actually in the knower. Taken in this way, there is no reason why a thing cannot be known by means of itself.

10. Natural love is not a habit but an act.

11. The act of understanding is not a medium that stands as a reality between the knower and the known; it proceeds from the union of both.

ARTICLE VII: DOES ONE ANGEL KNOW ANOTHER?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 56, 2 107, 1; Contra Gentiles II, 98; II Sentences II, 2, 3; In I Cor., c. 1 lectura i (P. 1

Difficulties (First Series):

It seems not, for

1. As Dionysius says, even the angels themselves do not know their mutual relationships. Now, if one angel knew another, angels would know these. Consequently, one angel does not know another.

2. As is said in The Causes: "An intelligence knows what is above it in so far as that is its cause, and it knows what is below it in so far as that is its effect." But our faith does not teach that one angel is the cause of another. Consequently, one angel does not know another.

3. As Boethius says: "The universal is had in intellection, the singular in sensation." Now, since an angel is a person, he is, in a way, a singular. Consequently, it seems that one angel does not know another angel, because he knows merely through intellection.

Difficulties (Second Series):

1. It seems that an angel does not know another angel by means of the latter's essence, because that by which the intellect understands must be within the intellect. But the essence of one angel cannot come into the intellect of another; only God can be substantially present in the mind of an angel. Consequently, an angel cannot know another angel by means of the latter's essence.

2. It is possible for one angel to be known by all angels. Now, that by which a thing is known is joined to the one who knows. So if one angel were to know another angel by means of the

latter's essence, then the angel known could be in many places, because the angels who could know him might be in many places.

3. The essence of an angel is a substance; his intellect, being a power, is an accident. Now, a substance is not the form of an accident. Consequently, the essence of one angel cannot be for the intellect of another angel the form by which he knows.

4. A thing cannot be known to the intellect by its presence if it is separated from it. But the essence of one angel is separated from the intellect of another. Consequently, one angel is not known by another through the presence of his essence.

Difficulties (Third Series):

1. It seems that one angel cannot know another by knowing through his own essence, because the lower angels lie below the higher, as sentient creatures also do. Consequently, if a higher angel could know other angels by knowing his own essence, he could also know all sentient things in the same way, and not, as is said in The Causes, by means of forms.

2. One thing leads to the knowledge of another only in so far as it resembles that other. But the essence of one angel is only in generic agreement with that of another angel. Consequently, if one angel were to know another merely by knowing his own essence, then he would know that other only generically, and this would be imperfect knowledge.

3. That through which a thing is known is an intelligible representation of it. Now, if one angel knew all others by means of his own essence, then his own essence would be an intelligible representation of what is proper to all angels. But this property seems to belong to the divine essence alone.

Difficulties (Fourth Series):

1. It seems that one angel does not know another by means of a likeness or species existing within himself, because, as Dionysius says, angels are lofty intelligible lights. Now, a light is not known by means of a species, but only by means of itself. Therefore, an angel cannot be known by means of a species.

2. Every creature is a shadow. This is evident from Origen's commentary on that verse in the Gospel of St. John (1:5): "And the darkness [shadows] did not comprehend it." Now, a likeness of a shadow must itself be a shadow; a shadow, however, is not a principle that manifests but one that conceals. Hence, since an angel is a creature and is therefore a shadow, he cannot be known by means of a likeness. If he is known, he must be known by means of a God-given light existing within him.

3. An angel is closer to God than the rational soul is. Now, according to Augustine, the soul knows all things and judges about all things, not by means of any arts which the soul may have brought with it to the body, but by means of the connection it has with the eternal intelligible representations. Much more so, then, will one angel know another, not indeed by means of a likeness, but by means of an eternal intelligible representation.

Difficulties (Fifth Series):

1. It seems that one angel cannot know another even through an innate likeness. For an innate likeness is similarly related to what is present and to what is absent. Consequently, were one angel to know another by means of an innate likeness, he would not know when that angel was present and when he was absent.

2. God could make another angel. But an angel would not have within him the form of an angel that does not yet exist. Consequently, if, by his natural cognition, an angel knows other

angels only by of innate forms, the angels that exist now would not know by natural cognition an angel that would come into existence later.

Difficulties (Sixth Series):

1. It seems that one angel cannot know another through forms impressed by immaterial beings, as the sense knows through forms received from sensible things, because, if this were true, then the lower angels would not be known by the higher, since higher angels do not receive any influence from the lower.

Difficulties (Seventh Series):

1. It seems that one angel cannot know another even through abstracted forms, such as the agent intellect abstracts from phantasms, because then the lower angels would not know the higher.

From all this it seems that one angel does not know another.

To the Contrary (First Series):

1'. In The Causes we read: "Every intelligence knows the things that do not undergo corruption and are not measured by time." Now, angels are incorruptible and outside of time. Consequently, one angel is known by another.

2'. Likeness is a cause of knowledge. But one angel has more in common with the intellect of another than material things have. Consequently, since angels know material things, it is even truer to say they know other angels.

3'. The essence of one angel is more proportionate to the intellect of another than the divine essence is. But, since angels see God through His essence, it is even truer to say that they can know the essences of other angels.

4'. As is said in The Intelligences: "Any substance that is immaterial and free from composition can know all things"; and this is proved in The Soul, where it is shown that the intellect is free from composition "and so can know all things." Now, to be free from matter and composition belongs especially to angels. Consequently, they know all things, and one knows another.

To the Contrary (Second Series):

1'. It seems that one angel can know another by means of the latter's essence. For Augustine says that angels show what they have seen "by one spirit mingling with another." But such a mingling is possible only if one spirit can be joined to another by means of his essence. Consequently, one angel can be joined to another by means of his essence, and thus, through his essence, be known by that other.

2'. Knowledge is an act. Now, contact is sufficient for action. Since there can be spiritual contact between one angel and another, one angel can know another by means of the latter's essence.

3'. The intellect of one angel has more in common with the essence of another angel than with the likeness of a material thing. But the intellect of an angel can be informed by the likeness of a material thing so that it knows it. Consequently, the essence of one angel can be the form whereby the intellect of another can know him.

4'. According to Augustine, intellectual vision is had of those things whose likenesses are the same as their essences. Now, one angel knows another only by means of intellectual vision. Consequently, he does not know that angel by means of a likeness other than that angel's essence. Hence, the same must be said as was said previously.

REPLY:

There can be no doubt that one angel knows another, because every angel is an actually intelligible substance, since he is entirely free from matter. Now, an angelic intellect does not receive from sensible things. Consequently, it understands these immaterial intelligible forms by directing itself immediately to them. If we consider what various writers have said, however, there seem to have been different opinions about the mode of angelic knowledge.

According to the Commentator, in substances separated from matter the form in the intellect does not differ from the form outside of it. Now, in the case of men the form of a house existing in the mind of an architect is other than the form of the house existing outside his mind; however, this is because the exterior form is in matter, while the form of the artistic conception is without matter. But, since angels are substances and immaterial forms, as Dionysius says, it seems to follow that the form by which one angel is known by another is the same as the essence by which the former substantially exists. This mode of knowledge, however, does not seem to be possible in all cases. For the form by which an intellect understands is more noble than that intellect, since it is its perfection. With this in mind, the Philosopher proves that God does not know anything outside Himself, since its form would perfect His intellect and consequently be more noble than God Himself. Therefore, if higher angels were to know lower angels by means of the essences of the latter, it would follow that these essences were more perfect and more noble than the intellects of the higher angels. This, however, is impossible.

One might say, perhaps, that such a way would present no difficulties as far as the knowledge of higher angels by the lower is concerned, that is, a lower angel could know a higher by means of the latter's essence; and this seems to be in agreement with Dionysius, who taught that angels seem to be divided into "intelligible and intellectual substances," the higher called intelligible, the lower, intellectual. For he also taught that the higher angels are "like food" to the lower, and this statement can be understood as meaning that the essences of the higher angels are forms by which the lower angels understand.

This opinion, too, might be supported by those philosophers who say that the higher intelligences create the lower; for thus they could assert that a higher angel is in some way intimately linked with the lower, being, as it were, the cause that keeps the lower in existence. We, however, can ascribe such action only to God, who is substantially present in the minds of men and of angels. Moreover, the form by which an intellect understands should be within an intellect that is in act. Consequently, we cannot say that any spiritual substance, except God, is seen by another by means of his essence.

That other philosophers did not think one angel could be seen by another by means of his essence is clear to anyone reading their works. For example, the Commentator says that that which the mover of Saturn understands about the mover of the first sphere is different from that which the mover of Jupiter understands about him. Now, this could be true only if that by which each of them understands [is different]. And this would not be possible if each of them knew the mover of the higher sphere by means of the latter's essence. More over, we read in The Causes that "a lower intelligence knows what is above it according to the manner of its own substance," not according to the manner of the higher substance; and Avicenna says that "the presence of the intelligences within us" means merely the effects they have caused within us, not that they are in the intellect through their own essence.

Now, the words of the Commentator, cited above, are to be taken in the following way. When a substance separated from matter knows itself, it is not necessary that the form in its intellect be other than the form by which it substantially subsists, since the form by which such thing substantially subsists is actually intelligible because of its complete freedom from matter.

The words of Dionysius are likewise not to be taken in the sense assigned to them above. Rather, he calls the same angels intelligible and intellectual, or he calls the higher angels intelligible and the food of the lower because the lower angels understand by means of the light given by the higher.

From what others have written, however, it seems that one angel sees another by means of his essence, that is, by means of his own essence. This is what Augustine seems to have intended when he wrote: "As the mind collects notions of physical things through the physical senses, so also does it collect notions of spiritual things through it self." This seems to be true of an angelic mind, for, by knowing itself, it knows other angels. In support of this, one could cite The Causes where it is said: "An intelligence understands what is above and below itself by means of the mode of its own substance."

This explanation does not seem to be sufficient, however; for, since all knowledge takes place through assimilation, by knowing his own essence one angel would know only as much about another angel as his essence resembled the latter's. Now, one angel resembles another only according to their common nature. Hence, it would follow that the knowledge one angel would have about another would not be complete; and it would be very incomplete according to the opinion of those who hold that there are many angels in one species. This view, however, might be supported to some extent by those who hold that each angel is specifically different; for, by knowing his own essence, each angel would know perfectly what an intellectual nature is, and, having known this perfectly, he would know all the grades an intellectual nature could have. Now, the different species of angels are distinguished only according to grades of perfection found in intellectual natures; consequently, by seeing his own essence, one angel could conceive of the individual grades of perfection found in intellectual natures, and, by means of these conceptions, have complete knowledge of all other angels.

In this way, we could save the opinion of those who say that one angel knows another by means of a form he has acquired—if, indeed, the afore-mentioned conceptions could be called acquired forms. It would be as though whiteness understood itself, and, by knowing perfectly the nature of colour, knew all species of colour distinctly, according to their grades—even all individual colors, too, supposing that there were only one member to a species.

But this explanation does not seem sufficient either, because, even though there is only one angel in every species, nevertheless, in any particular angel there will be a difference between what belongs to him according to the intelligible constitution of his specific nature and what belongs to him as an individual, for example, his own particular operations. According to this theory, these special operations could in no way be known by another angel. Moreover, the words of Augustine do not mean that a mind can know other things through itself as through a medium, but merely as through a knowing power, as material things are known through the senses.

We must consequently take another explanation and say that one angel knows other angels by means of their likenesses existing within his intellect. These, however, are not abstracted or imprinted by the other angels, or acquired in any way, but are imprinted by God who creates them. Angels know material things also by means of these likenesses. This will become clearer in the following answers.

Answers to Difficulties (First Series):

1. Angels know their order one to another considered in itself, but they do not comprehend it as it stands under God's providence; for this would mean that they could comprehend providence itself.

2. The relation of cause and effect is a source of intelligibility only inasmuch as the effect bears some resemblance to its cause and vice versa. Consequently, if we admit the existence of an angel's likeness within another angel without admitting that one angel is the cause or effect of another, we will still have a sufficient basis for knowledge, since knowledge takes place through assimilation.

3. That statement of Boethius should be understood as referring to particular material things that fail under the senses. An angel, however, is not a particular of this type. Consequently, the argument proves nothing.

Answers to Difficulties (Second and Third Series):

We concede those arguments that prove one angel does not know another by means of either his own essence or that of the other angel. still, one could make some kind of a reply to them.

Answers to Difficulties (Fourth Series):

We must reply, however, to those arguments that prove one angel does not know another by means of a likeness.

1. It is possible to have a likeness even of light. This can be weaker than light, like colour, which in a certain sense is a similitude of light, or one more perfect than light, like the light in a substance that illumines. Moreover, since angels are called lights inasmuch as they are forms which are actually intelligible, it is not inconsistent to say that the likenesses they have of other angels exist in a more sublime manner in the higher angels and in a less sublime manner in the lower.

2. When one says that every creature, taken in itself, is a shadow or false or nothing, this is not because its essence is dark or false, but because whatever act of existence, light, or truth it has it has from another being. Consequently, only considered apart from what it has from another is it nothing, darkness, and falsity.

3. The soul is united with the eternal representations inasmuch as there are certain imprints of these on our mind, such as the principles we know naturally and by which we judge all things. In angels these imprints are the likenesses by which they know things.

Answers to Difficulties (Fifth Series):

An angel knows another angel, not by means of a likeness that has been abstracted or imprinted upon his mind, but by means of one that is innate and leads him to the knowledge of the other angel—indeed, to a knowledge not only of the other's essence but also of all his accidental qualities. By means of this likeness, therefore, he knows when the other angel is present or absent.

[No answers are given for the next three difficulties.]

Answers to Contrary Difficulties (First Series):

We concede the arguments proving that one angel knows another.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties (Second Series):

We must reply, however, to the arguments proving that one angel is known by another by means of the essence of the angel known.

1'. That knowledge Augustine speaks about should be understood as referring not to essences but to operations by which a higher spirit enlightens a lower.

2'. From what we have said previously, it is clear that the knower and the known are related not as active and passive but as two things from which arises one principle of knowing.

Consequently, for knowledge it is not enough that contact take place between the knower and the known. It is necessary, rather, that the intelligible be united to the knower like a form, either by means of its own essence or by means of a likeness.

3' Even though the essence of one angel has more in common with the intellect of another angel than with the likeness of a material thing, because they both participate in one nature, nevertheless, they do not have more in common in regard to that relationship which must exist between a perfection and what is to be perfected. Similarly, a soul has more in common with another soul than it has with a body; yet one soul is not the form of another soul, though it is the form of a body.

4' This statement of Augustine can be explained in two ways. It can mean that Augustine is talking about that intellectual vision by which a created spirit sees himself or God or other things which are within him through their essences. For it is evident that, even though a stone is known by the soul, it is not present in the soul by its essence.

Or this statement can be taken as referring to the thing known, not to the form by which it is known. Now, exterior accidents, which are the object of sense and of imagination, are merely likenesses of a thing, not the thing itself. The object of the intellect, however, is "the quiddity of a thing," that is, its essence, as is said in *The Soul*. Consequently, the likeness of the thing in the intellect is a direct likeness of the thing's essence, but the likeness which is in a sense or in the imagination is merely that of its accidents.

ARTICLE VIII: DOES AN ANGEL KNOW MATERIAL THINGS THROUGH FORMS OR BY KNOWING HIS OWN ESSENCE?

Parallel readings: *De veritate*, 10, 4; *Summa Theol.*, 1, q. 1, 84, 2; 87, 1; I-II, 50, 6; 51, 1, ad 2; II Sentences 3., 1; *Contra Gentiles* II, 98.

Difficulties:

It seems that he knows them by knowing his own essence, for

1. A thing can be known sufficiently by knowing what it is modeled upon. Now, in the opinion of Clement, a philosopher mentioned in *The Divine Names*, lower beings are modeled upon higher. Consequently, the essences of material things are modeled upon angels. Angels, therefore, know material things by means of their own essences.

2. Material things are known better in the divine essence than they are in their own natures, because there they shine forth more brightly. Now, the essence of an angel is closer to the divine essence than material things are. Consequently, material things can be known better in the essences of angels than in their own nature; and since we human beings know material things in their own nature, still truer is it that angels know them all simply by looking at their own essences.

3. The light of the angelic intellect is more perfect than the light of the active intellect of our soul. Now, we know all material things in the light of this intellect because it is the act of all intelligibles. Consequently, it is even truer to say that, by knowing their own light, angels know all material things.

4. Since an angel knows material things, he must know them either by their species or by knowing his own essence. However, he does not know them through species not through particular species, because an angel is completely free from matter; and not through universal

species, because then he would not have perfect knowledge of things in their individuality. Consequently, he knows material things by means of his own essence.

5. If physical light could know itself, it would know all colors, because it is the act of all colors. Therefore, since an angel is a spiritual light, by knowing himself he can know all material things.

6. An angel's intellect lies halfway between the divine and the human intellect. Now, the divine intellect knows all things by means of the divine essence, and a human intellect knows all by means of species. Consequently, the intellect of an angel will know at least some things by knowing his essence.

7. Dionysius says: "Scripture asserts that angels have knowledge of things that are on earth, by seeing them, not through sense, but through the power and nature of their godlike minds." Hence, it seems that they know material things by knowing their own power and nature.

8. If a physical mirror could know and if the species of material things were not reflected in it, it would know them by means of its own essence. But species of material things are not reflected in the intellect of angels, as is evident from the writings of Dionysius. And since an angel, as Dionysius also says, is a kind of mirror, if he knows material things, he must know them by means of his own essence.

9. The knowing power of angels is more perfect than the natural power of material things. Now, many of the powers of material things can attain their objects by their own means, without anything being added to them. It is much more true, therefore, to say that the intellect of an angel knows material things by means of his essence and without any species.

10. An angel's ability to know is much greater than fire's ability to burn. But fire can burn combustible material without that material entering into the fire. So, likewise, an angel knows through itself without the presence of a cognoscible species within it.

To the Contrary:

1' It is stated in The Causes that "every intelligence is filled with forms." Moreover, it is said in the same work that "forms exist in an intelligence in an intelligible manner." Consequently, an intelligence knows things by means of these forms and not by means of its essence.

2' The essence of an angel has more in common with another angel than with a material thing. But an angel cannot know other angels by knowing his own essence. Therefore, he cannot know material things by knowing his own essence.

3' That which is the principle of unity cannot be the principle of distinction. Now, the essence of an angel is the principle of his unity, for it is by means of his essence that an angel is one. Therefore, his essence cannot be the principle of knowledge about things distinct from him.

4' Nothing except God is that which it has. But an angel has intellectual power. Therefore, he is not intellectual power. Much less is he that by which he understands. Consequently, he does not understand things by means of his essence.

REPLY:

All knowing takes place by means of assimilation, and likeness existing between two things is caused by their agreement in a form. Now, since unity in an effect shows unity in a cause, and, since, in consequence, no matter what genus any form may belong to, one must get back to the one first principle of that form, two things can resemble each other for two reasons only: either one is the cause of the other or both have been caused by one cause that has

imprinted the same form upon both. Using this principle, we say that angels know material things in a manner different from that in which philosophers say that angels know them.

For we do not say that angels cause material things. God is the creator of all things, visible and invisible. Consequently, a likeness of the things of nature cannot be within an angel unless it comes from Him who is the cause of material things. Now, whatever one does not have from himself but from another is over and above his own essence. For this reason, Avicenna proves that the act of being of anything except the First Being is something other than its essence, because all things have their act of existence from another. Consequently, the likenesses of material things existing within an angel must be other than his essence and must be imprinted there by God. Now, the intelligible representations of material things existing in the divine mind are life and light: they are life inasmuch as they come forth to constitute things in their act of existence, as the form of an artistic conception comes forth to constitute a product of art; they are light inasmuch as they cause impressions, resembling themselves, on the minds of angels.

Philosophers, however, have asserted that angels are the creators of material things. But logically, according to this position, angels should know material things, not by means of their own essences, but by means of forms added to them. For the likeness of an effect is in its cause only in the manner in which the power to produce that effect is there. Now, as is said in The Causes, "An intelligence gives existence to inferior things only by means of God's power existing within it"; and for that reason the author calls this operation divine. Consequently, this power does not belong to the intelligence as flowing from the principles of its essence, but is something over and above its essence. Therefore, even if material things were caused by an angel, their likenesses would be over and above his essence.

It is clear, therefore, no matter what position is taken, that an angel does not know material things by means of his own essence but only by means of their forms existing within him.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. According to its formal nature, an archetype implies a relation of causality to the things modeled upon it; for an archetype is a thing that something else is made to imitate. Consequently, in the passage cited, Dionysius finds fault with Clement's opinion, and holds that the archetypes of things should be called intelligible representations of things, existing in God. However, if an archetype is taken in a broader sense as meaning a thing that is represented in some way by another thing, then angels' essences can also be called the archetypes of material things. But the divine essence is the archetype of each and every thing in its individuality, because it contains the exemplary ideas of all things. Similarly, an angelic essence is a likeness of a material thing in its individuality because of the form which the angel possesses of it; though this form is not the same as his essence, as is true of the idea in God.

2. The divine essence is infinite. Hence, far from being included in any genus, it contains, as Dionysius, Aristotle, and Averroes say, the perfections of all genera. Consequently, it can be a likeness of all things in their individuality, and through it all things can be known perfectly. The essence of an angel, however, is confined within a particular genus. Consequently, it cannot be, in itself, a likeness of all material things. Hence, to know a thing with all its individual characteristics, an angel must be given a likeness of it, which is over and above his essence.

3. All things are not known by means of the agent intellect as though by a likeness sufficient for us to know all things. For the agent intellect is not the act of all intelligible forms in the sense that it is this or that form, but only in so far as these forms are intelligible. For all things

are said to be known by means of the agent intellect as through an active principle of knowing.

4. An angel knows things neither through particular species nor through universal species that are universal forms abstracted from the senses. Instead, he knows them through universal species which represent both universals and particulars. This will become clearer from our discussion later on.

5. Were physical light to know itself, it would not for that reason know all colors determinately. It would know them only in so far as they are visible. Otherwise, even the eye would see all colors by seeing light; and this is clearly false.

6. Since the angelic intellect lies halfway between the divine and the human intellect, it knows things other than itself by means of forms added to its essence; and, in this respect, it falls short of the divine intellect. However, it knows itself by means of its own essence, and, in this respect, it surpasses the human intellect.

7. This statement of Dionysius should not be understood as meaning that an angel's power and nature are the medium by which he knows other things, but that his man of knowing follows the characteristics of his nature and power and not the characteristics of the natures of the things he knows. This is clear from the fact that he knows material things in an immaterial manner, and sense-objects without the aid of any senses.

8. Even if a physical mirror knew itself, it would by no means know other things simply by knowing its own essence. It would know things only by knowing forms reflected in itself. Moreover, it would make no difference whether these forms were received from things or were innate in the mirror.

9. The knowing power of an angel is ordered to a more sublime act than is the natural power of a material thing. Consequently, even though it may need more help, it remains a more perfect and more noble power.

10. A knower is not related to the known as what burns is related to the combustible. In this second case, one is active and the other passive; but a knower and the known are related as one principle of knowing inasmuch as the act of knowing in some way comes into being from the known and the knower. This is clear from what was said previously. Hence, the argument proves nothing.

ARTICLE IX: ARE THE FORMS BY WHICH ANGELS KNOW MATERIAL THINGS INNATE OR RECEIVED FROM THINGS?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., 1, 2; II Sentences 3., Contra Gentiles II, 96.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are not innate, for

1. Speculative knowledge differs from practical inasmuch as practical knowledge is directed to things, while speculative is derived from things. Now, as Damascene says, angels do not make material things; consequently, they do not have practical but only speculative knowledge. Their knowledge, therefore, is taken from things, and not from innate species.

2. In the Epistle to the Ephesians (3:10) we read: "That the manifold wisdom of God may be known to the principalities and power in heavenly places through the church." Jerome

understood this to mean that the angels learned the mystery of the Incarnation from the Apostles. Now, knowledge had through innate species is not received from others. Consequently, angels knowledge is not had through innate species.

3. Angels innate species are equally related to the present and future. Their knowledge, however, is not equally related to the present and future, because they know the present but are ignorant of the future. Consequently, their knowledge is not had through innate species.

4. Angels have distinct knowledge of material things. Now, distinct knowledge of things can be had only through that which is a principle of distinction, because the principle of being and that of knowing are the same. But the principle of distinction in material things is their form. Consequently, the knowledge angels have of material things must be through forms received from things.

5. Things that are innate or naturally inborn remain always the same. Angels knowledge, however, does not remain always the same, for they know things now which they did not know previously; and, for this reason, Dionysius says that some angels have to be freed of their ignorance. Hence, their knowledge is not had by means of innate forms.

6. The forms that exist within angels are universal. But, as is said in *The Soul*: "A universal is either nothing or posterior [to something]." Consequently, those forms are either nothing or posterior to things, since they are received from them.

7. A thing is known only in so far as it is in the knower. Consequently, if an angel knows material things, these very things must be in his intellect by means of forms which they have imprinted there.

8. The intelligible light in angels is more powerful than that in a human soul. But we can abstract species from phantasms by means of the light of the active intellect. Therefore, an angel can to an even greater degree abstract forms from sense-objects.

9. A superior power can do what an inferior can. Now, our soul, which is inferior to angels, can confirm itself to things by producing forms within itself that are neither innate nor received from things. For example, our imagination can form a phantasm of a golden mountain, which it has never seen. For a much better reason, therefore, an angel can confirm himself to things present to him and know them in this manner. Thus, there will be no need for him to know material things by means of innate species; he can know them by means of species which he will make within himself.

To the Contrary:

1' According to Dionysius, angels do not gather their knowledge by means of sense, or from things subject to division. Therefore, they do not know by means of forms received from things.

2' The superiority of angels over all physical things is greater than that of higher bodies over lower. But, because of their nobility, higher bodies do not receive any influence from the lower. Consequently, much less will angelic intellects receive forms from physical things in order to understand them.

REPLY:

Taking as already proved that angels know material things not by means of their own essence but by means of forms, we can now consider three opinions about these forms.

Some say that the forms by which angels know material things are received from them. This, however, is impossible; for an intellect that receives forms from things is related to them in two ways, as something active and as something passive_taking active and passive in their

broad meaning. Now, forms of material things are only potentially, not actually, intelligible when they are in the senses or in the imagination, because they are not entirely stripped of matter. Consequently, an intellectual action is required in order that they become actually intelligible. For this reason, we must necessarily affirm the existence of an active intellect within ourselves.

Moreover, even when these forms have been made intelligible, we cannot understand things through them unless they are truly united to our intellect in such a way that the knower and the known become one. Consequently, our intellect must receive the forms of these things; and so, in a way, it is passive in their regard in so far as all reception is a kind of passivity.

Now, just as a form is related to matter as act is to potency, so also is something active similarly related to something passive, because a thing acts in so far as it is in act, and is passive in so far as it is in potency. Moreover, since a definite act has a definite relation to a definite potency, a definite passivity corresponds to a definite agent and vice versa—just as matter and form are mutually related. Consequently, what is active and what is passive must belong to the same class, for potency and act divide every class of being that there is. For example, "the white" is not passive with respect to "the sweet" (except in directly) but only with respect to "the black."

Now, material things and intelligibles belong to entirely different genera; for, as the Philosopher says, those things that do not have matter do not belong to the same genus as those that do. Consequently, it is not possible for a material thing to be passive immediately in relation to the intellect or to act upon the intellect. The Creator of our nature has therefore provided us with powers of sensation, in which forms exist in a mode between intelligibility and materiality. They have this in common with intelligible forms, that they are forms without matter, and this in common with material forms, that they are not yet stripped of material conditions. Hence, there can be activity and passivity between material things and the sense faculties in their own proper way, and, similarly, between the sense faculties and the intellect.

Therefore, if the intellect of an angel were to receive forms from material things, it would have to have sense powers and, consequently, a body naturally united to it. This opinion seems to make angels animals (an actual opinion of certain Platonists) and to have them receive forms from material things. Moreover, it contradicts the authority of the saints and right reason itself.

Consequently, others say that angels do not know by means of forms received from things or by means of innate forms, but angels are able to conform to anything present to them. These persons hold that knowledge of a thing follows from a conformity of this kind. Their opinion, however, seems to be of little value, because one thing can be confirmed to another only if the form of the latter becomes present within it. Now, it cannot be said that the essence of an angel by its own activity becomes the form of a material thing, because its essence retains a single formal character. Hence, the form by which an angel conforms himself to a thing is something added to his essence and was previously in him potentially, because an angel could not have confirmed himself to a thing unless he was previously in potency to such a conformity. Indeed, nothing is reduced from potency to act except by that which is in act. Consequently, in an angel, we should assume that forms must pre-exist by which he can reduce himself from being potentially confirmable to being actually confirmed, as our imagination forms a new species, say, of a mountain of gold, from species it had previously, namely, of mountain and of gold, and as our intellect forms the definition of a species from the forms it has of genus and of differentia. Hence, we must return to the position holding that forms pre-exist in angels; and these are either innate or received from things.

As a result, it seems that we must say what the third opinion says an opinion more widespread and closer to the truth namely, that angels know material things by means of innate forms. Therefore, just as from the eternal archetypes existing in the mind of God come the material forms by which things subsist, so also do the forms of all things come from God to the minds of angels in order that they may know things. Hence, an angelic intellect excels our intellect as a thing possessing a form excels matter that is formless. Our intellect may be compared to a tablet on which nothing has been written, but that of an angel, to a painted tablet or to a mirror in which the intelligible characters of things shine forth.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That difference between speculative and practical knowledge is not essential but accidental; that is, it arises only in so far as these knowledges are human. Man knows things which he has not made only by means of forms received from things. The case is otherwise with angels, however, because they have the forms of things given them from the moment of their creation.

2. The mystery of the Incarnation was known by angels before it was known by men. Indeed, as Dionysius says, men learned of it from angels, who knew this mystery of the Incarnation, hidden from the world for ages; and, as Augustine explains, God revealed this mystery to the princes and powerful ones of this world through the church of the angels, which is in heavenly places. What is said there about the Church should therefore be taken as referring to the church of angels, as Augustine explains—even though Jerome seems to say the contrary.

However, Jerome's words are not to be understood in the sense that angels acquire knowledge from men. He meant that while the Apostles were announcing the things that had taken place and had been previously predicted by the prophets, the angels understood them more fully, just as they know the present more fully than the future—a point that will be clarified later.

3. Even though the angels do not know any future events, they know events when they take place. From this it does not follow, however, that they receive species from the things which they know. For knowing takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the known. Hence, a person will receive new knowledge of a thing in so far as he is assimilated to it in a new manner. This happens in two ways: either through his own motion or through the motion of another with respect to a form which he already possesses.

Similarly, he begins to know something new in one way by newly receiving a form for the first time from an object which he now knows. This happens with us. Or the object known arrives for the first time at a form already in the knower; and this is how angels have new knowledge of present things that previously were future. For example, if a man did not yet exist, an angelic intellect would not yet be assimilated to him by means of the form of man which it has within itself; but, when he comes into existence, the angelic intellect begins to assimilate itself to him by means of this form, without any change being made within itself with respect to that object.

4. Just as it is not the form by which a thing exists but only a likeness of it that is in the intellect, so also distinct knowledge of things does not demand that the very principles of distinction themselves be in the knower but that their likenesses be there. Moreover, as far as distinct knowledge is concerned, it makes no difference where these likenesses come from.

5. Without acquiring new intelligible forms, an angelic intellect can have new understanding in two ways. First, as was mentioned before, it can have new understanding by something being newly assimilated to those forms [which it already has]. Second, it can be strengthened by some stronger light, enabling it to draw more knowledge from the same forms. Similarly, when the light of prophecy operates from forms already existing in the imagination,

knowledge is received which could not be received by means of the natural light of the active intellect.

6. The Philosopher's statement should be taken as referring to the universal as it exists in the understanding, by which we understand things in nature. This universal is received from things. But even the universal existing in our understanding is prior, not posterior, to artificial things, because we produce artificial things by means of universal forms of art already existing within us. In a similar way, God produces creatures by means of eternal archetypes; and, from these, forms flow down into the angels intellects. Hence, it follows that the forms in angels intellects are posterior, not to things, but only to the eternal archetypes

7. The known is in the knower in the same way, whether its form, existing in the knower, has been received from the thing known or not. Consequently, the argument does not touch the problem.

8. No proportion exists between the light of an angelic intellect and sensible things that is such as to allow the latter to be rendered intelligible by means of this light. This is clear from what has been said. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.

9. The soul does not produce forms within itself unless some forms already exist there. Consequently, as is clear from what has been said, the argument does not hold.

ARTICLE X: DO HIGHER ANGELS KNOW BY FORMS MORE UNIVERSAL THAN THOSE BY WHICH LOWER ANGELS KNOW?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 3; 89, I; II Sentences 3, 3, Contra Gentiles II, 98; Q. D. De anima., ad 5; 18; De causis, lectura 10 (P. 2I:737a).

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. The higher angels knowledge is more perfect than the lower angels'. Now, what is known by universal knowledge is less perfectly known than what is known by particular knowledge. Consequently, the higher angels do not know by means of forms that are more universal.

2. If the knowledge of the higher angels is more universal than that of the lower angels, this universality pertains either to their causal operations or to the object of their knowledge. It does not, however, pertain to their operations, for, as Damascene says, the higher angels do not make things; nor does it pertain to the object of their knowledge, for both higher and lower angels know the things of nature. Consequently, the higher angels knowledge is not more universal.

3. If the higher angels know all that the lower do but through more universal forms, these forms in the higher angels intellects must extend to more things. However, one and the same thing cannot represent the individual characteristics of many things. Therefore, the higher angels would not know things in their individual natures, and so their knowledge would be less perfect than that had by lower angels. This, however, is absurd.

4. As Dionysius says, the knowledge of angels is determined by the power and nature of the knower. Now, the nature of a higher angel is more in act than a lower angel's nature is. Consequently, his knowledge is also more in act. But universal knowledge is in potency, and particular knowledge is in act. Therefore, higher angels know through forms that are less universal.

To the Contrary:

1' According to Dionysius, higher angels, such as the Cherubim, have higher and more universal knowledge. Lower angels have only particular and inferior knowledge.

2' In The Causes it is said that "the higher intelligences contain forms that are more universal."

3' Higher angels possess greater simplicity than the lower do. Consequently, their forms are also more simple and, therefore, more universal, for what is more universal possesses greater simplicity.

REPLY:

That which is in potency to many is made determinate to one by act. Consequently, form and act are found to be principles of union, but potency is found to be the principle of multiplicity and division. Now, since the ability of a thing to operate comes from its being in act, the more united a power is, the more it is able to act. Consequently, the higher a power is, the fewer the things it needs for its operation, even though it extends to many things. We see that this is generally true of productive and knowing powers. For, even though a master art, such as architecture, by one form directs all the operations coming within its scope, in these operations the subordinate workmen are directed by diverse arts. The same is true of the cognoscitive powers. A person with a higher intelligence is ready, from a few principles he has within himself, to proceed to various conclusions which those with a less acute intelligence cannot reach without considerable illustrated explanation and without knowing the proximate principles of these conclusions.

Now, since in God there is pure act and a most perfect power, He can do all things, and know all things most perfectly by means of one thing, His own essence. Moreover, as was previously explained, the representations of intelligible things flow from God into the angels, not in order that the angels may cause things, but in order that they may know them. Consequently, the more act and less potency there is in an angel, the fewer are the emanations he receives, and the stronger is his power to know. According to this principle, therefore, the higher angels know through forms more universal than those by which the lower know.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. To know something "by universal knowledge" can be understood in two ways. First, it can refer to what is known. If taken this way, then to know something by universal knowledge means to know the universal nature of an object. In this sense, the argument is true, because, if only the universal nature of a thing is known, the thing is known less perfectly than it would be were it known in its individuality. Secondly, the phrase can refer to the medium of cognition. Then to know a thing by universal knowledge, that is, by a medium which is universal, is more perfect, as long as this knowledge extends to the individuality of the thing.

2. These forms are said to be more universal with respect to knowledge, not because they cause the knowledge of more things, but because a higher intellect, perfected by a few of them, can nevertheless know the same number of things—even more perfectly. For example, a higher angel might know all species of animals by means of one form of animal, but a lower angel would not know them except through many forms. Besides this, a higher angel can draw out many more intelligible characters from the same things.

3. What is one cannot be the intelligible representation of many in their individuality if it is merely equal to them. However, if it excels them, then it can represent their individual characteristics, because, within its own one form, it contains the individual characteristics of each of the elements which these objects have separately. In a similar manner, God's essence

is the intelligible representation of all things in their individuality, for, as Dionysius says, in this one form there pre exists all that is found separately in creatures.

Similarly, since the forms in the intellects of angels, being closer to God, excel things, it is not inconsistent to say that one form within an angelic intellect is an intelligible representation of many things in their individuality, according as this form has different relationships to different things, just as the divine essence is the proper representation of many things in their individuality according to its different relationships to things; and from these relationships an angel can have many ideas. The forms in our intellects, however, are received from things. Hence, they do not excel things, and are, as it were, equal to them as far as representation goes, even though they may excel them in mode of being because their act of existence is immaterial. Consequently, one form in our intellect cannot be the intelligible representation of many things in their individuality.

4. The answer is the same as for the first difficulty.

ARTICLE XI: DO ANGELS KNOW SINGULARS?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 10, 5; 19, 2; Summa Theol., I, q7, 2; 8ç, 4 II Sentences IV Sentences 50, 1, Contra Gentiles II, 100; Quodibet VII, I, 3; Q. D. De anima, 20; De subst. sep., c. 14 (Perr. I: nn. 81-84).

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. According to Boethius: "The universal is known in intellection, the singular, in sensation." But angels do not know except through intellection. Therefore, they do not know singulars.
2. But it was said that this statement referred to our intellect, not to that of an angel.—On the contrary, because it is immaterial, our intellect cannot understand singular things. Consequently, it is our material powers of knowing, such as sense and imagination, that know singulars. But an angel's intellect is more immaterial than man's. Hence, it does not know singulars.
3. All knowledge takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the known. Now, an angel's intellect cannot be assimilated to a singular in its singularity because a singular gets its singularity from matter, and an angel's intellect is entirely removed from matter and from the conditions of matter. Consequently, the intellect of an angel does not know singulars in their singularity.
4. According to the Philosopher, the principle of being and the principle of knowing are one and the same. But the principle of being for a singular is an individuated form. Hence, this is the principle of knowing the singular. An angelic intellect, however, receives [forms] without matter and the conditions of matter which individuate forms. Therefore, it receives only universals, and not singulars.
5. Whatever is received into another is there after the manner of the recipient. Now, an angelic intellect has a simple and immaterial mode of being. Consequently, the likenesses of particular things existing in an angel's intellect are there immaterially and simply, and therefore universally. Hence, by their means, he does not know singulars.
6. Different kinds of things cannot be distinctly known in their differences by the same medium. They must be known by separate media, because things known by a common medium are known only in so far as they are one. Now, any form abstracted from matter is

common to many particular things. Through such a form, therefore, distinct particulars cannot be known distinctly in their individuality. In an angelic intellect, however, there is no form that is not immaterial. Hence, an angel can in no way know singulars.

7. A universal is opposed to a singular for the reason that it is in the intellect while the singular is outside it. Now, a universal is never outside the intellect. Hence, a singular is never inside it, and, consequently, cannot be known by it.

8. No power ever goes beyond its object. Now, as is said in *The Soul*, the object of the intellect is a quiddity stripped of matter. Therefore, since a singular essence is realized in sensible matter, it cannot be known by the intellect.

9. What is known with certainty cannot change, because intellectual knowledge is the same whether the object be absent or present. But, as is said in *the Metaphysics*, certitude cannot be had about things that can change, because such things can become absent. Now, singulars can change, for they are subject to motion and variation. Consequently, they cannot be known by the intellect; and the same must be said as previously.

10. The form within the intellect is more simple than the intellect itself, just as a perfection is more simple than what is perfected. Now, an angelic intellect is immaterial. Therefore, its forms are immaterial. But its forms are not individual unless they are material. Consequently, those forms are universal, and not principles for knowing singulars.

11. As is said in *the Metaphysics*, because it is the principle by which the measured is known, a measure must be homogeneous with the measured. Therefore, a species, which is a principle of knowledge, must be homogeneous with the thing that it makes known. But, being immaterial, the form within an angelic intellect is not homogeneous with a singular. Through such a form, therefore, an angel cannot know a singular.

12. The power had in glory surpasses power had by nature. There

fore, the power of knowing possessed by a glorified human intellect surpasses the natural power had by an angel. But the intellect of a beatified man does not know individual things on earth, for, as Augustine says, the dead—even the saints—do not know what the living, even their sons, are doing. Consequently, angels cannot know singulars by means of their natural knowledge.

13. Were an angel to know singulars, he would know them through either singular or universal species. But he cannot know them through singular species, because then he would have to have within himself as many species as there are singulars. Singulars, however, are potentially infinite. This is evident if one grants that the world will continue in the future as it has in the past—a possibility clearly within God's power. But then there would be an infinite number of forms in an angel's intellect; and this is impossible. Likewise, an angel cannot know singulars by means of universals, because in that case he would not have distinct knowledge of individuals, and this would mean that he knew them imperfectly. But imperfect knowledge is not to be attributed to angels. Consequently, angels do not know singulars.

To the Contrary:

1'. No one can guard what he does not know. But angels guard individual men. This is clear from the Psalms (90: li): "For he hath given his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways." Therefore, they know singulars.

2'. As is clear from Augustine, one can love only what he knows. Now, since angels have charity, they love individual men—even their sensible bodies, for these, too, are to be loved out of charity. Therefore, angels also know men.

3'. According to the Philosopher,⁸ one who knows the universal knows the particular; but the opposite is not true. Now, angels know the universal causes of things. Hence, they also know singulars.

4'. As Boethius says, whatever a lower power can do a higher power can. But man's sensitive and imaginative powers know singulars. Therefore, it is even truer to say that the intellectual power of an angel knows them.

REPLY:

Some have erred in this matter by saying that angels do not know singulars. Such a position is contrary to faith, denying as it does the custody of angels over men, as well as opposed to right reason, because, if angels did not know things which we know, their knowledge would, at least in this respect, be less perfect. This would occasion a remark similar to that made by Aristotle, to the effect that God would be most stupid if He were ignorant of disharmony that others knew about.

Once we have excluded this error, we find there are four ways proposed by different philosophers to explain how angels know singulars. Some say that angels know singulars by abstracting species of singulars from things, just as we know singulars by means of our senses. But this position is utterly irrational. First of all, as is clear from Dionysius and Augustine, as well as from what has been said above, angels do not receive their knowledge from things. Second, even granting that they do receive it from things, the forms received would be in an angelic intellect immaterially according to the manner of the intellect receiving them. Consequently, the same difficulty would remain: How could they, by these forms, know singular things, which are individuated by matter?

Avicenna proposed another theory and said that God and angels know singulars universally, not individually meaning that a thing is known individually when it is known as it is here and now, and under all its individuating conditions, and universally, when it is known merely according to its universal principles and universal causes. For example, one knows this eclipse individually when he perceives it with his senses, universally when he foretells it from the motions of the heavens. According to this theory, angels would know singulars universally in a similar fashion; and, because they knew all the universal causes, they would be ignorant of nothing in individual effects. This manner of knowing, however, does not seem to be sufficient; for we assert that angels know singulars even with respect to those things which belong to their singularity, just as they also know men's individual actions and other things of this sort that pertain to the care of a guardian.

Hence, a third theory has been proposed by others, namely, those who say that angels have within themselves universal forms of the entire order of the universe. These forms were given angels at the moment of creation, and they apply them to this or to that singular. In this way, they know singulars by means of universal forms. But this theory also seems to be inconsistent, because one thing cannot be applied to another unless that other has been already known previously in some way. For example, we can apply our universal knowledge to singulars which pre-exist in our sensitive knowledge. In angels, however, there is no knowledge other than intellectual in which the knowledge of singulars could pre-exist and so make it possible for the universal forms of their intellect to be applied to singulars. From this it is clear that the application of the universal to the particular demands intellectual knowledge of singulars in angels as a prerequisite; it can not cause such knowledge.

Hence, it is more probable to say with the fourth theory that the forms within the intellects of angels can cause knowledge, not only of universals, but also of particulars, without there being any need of such application. This, however, is not true of our intellectual forms, which are related to things in two ways: first, as the cause of things, like the forms of the practical

intellect; second, as caused by things, like the forms of the speculative intellect, by which we speculate about natural things. By means of the forms of the practical intellect, however, an artisan makes only a form. Hence, the forms of the practical intellect are likenesses merely of forms; and because every form as a form is universal, an artisan can have only universal knowledge of his product by means of the form of his artistic conception. Knowledge of it as a singular he acquires by means of his senses, just as anyone else does. But were he to make both the matter and the form by means of the forms of his artistic conception, then the latter would be an archetype of both form and matter, and, by its means, he could know the products of his art, not only universally, but also individually, because matter is the principle of individuation.

Forms in the speculative intellect, however, arise in us to some extent as the result of the action of things. Now, all action comes from the form. Hence, as far as the power of the agent is concerned, the form that comes to us from things is a likeness only of the form. True, it is also a likeness of material conditions, but this is because it is received in a material organ, which receives in a material way; consequently, it retains some conditions of matter. This is why sense and imagination know singulars. But, since the intellect receives in a manner that is entirely immaterial, the forms within the speculative intellect are likenesses of things only with respect to their forms.

However, the intelligible archetypes existing in God have a causal relation not only to things but also to their matter. Hence, they are likenesses of things in both respects. For this reason, God knows a thing through them not only in its universal nature by knowing the form, but also in its singularity by knowing its matter. Moreover, just as natural things come from the divine intellect according to both their form and matter, which constitute them in being, so do the forms within the angelic intellects come from God in order that angels might know both. Consequently, angels know things both in their singularity and universality by means of innate forms since these are similar to the creative forms, namely, the archetypes existing in the divine mind; yet these innate ideas do not create things.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** The statement of Boethius refers to our intellect, which receives forms from things, not to the angelic intellect, which receives forms immediately from God. The reason for this has already been given.
- 2.** Because the forms received in an angelic intellect are more immaterial than those in our intellect, they are by that very fact more powerful. Consequently, they represent a thing not only according to its formal, but also according to its material, principles.
- 3.** Between the knower and the known there is needed a community, not of nature, but of representation. It is evident that that form of a stone existing within the soul has a far different nature from the form of a stone existing in matter, but, inasmuch as it represents the stone, it is a principle which can lead to knowledge of it. Hence, even though the forms within an angelic intellect are immaterial by their own nature, nothing prevents that intellect from being assimilated by means of them to things in regard to their matter as well as in regard to their forms.
- 4.** A form is a principle of a thing's being. But it need not be substantially present in an intellect in order to be a principle for knowing the thing; its similitude in the intellect would suffice. For in the soul there is not the form by which a stone exists but only a likeness of that form. Hence, what is necessary is not that the form by which an angelic intellect knows a singular be individuated, but that it be a likeness of the form that is individuated.

5. Forms in an angelic intellect are immaterial; yet they are likenesses of material things, just as are the ideas existing in God, which are much more immaterial. Thus, by their means, singulars can be known.
6. One species can be an intelligible representation of different things in their individuality if it excels them. This is clear from what has been said. Through a medium that is merely equal, however, distinct things cannot be known distinctly.
7. Although it is true that the universal has its act of existence in the intellect, the universal is not the only thing that exists in the intellect. Hence, in this reasoning, the fallacy of the consequent occurs.
8. By means of that species stripped of matter, which the angelic intellect has within itself, it can also understand the material conditions of a thing. This is clear from what has been said.
9. By means of the species which it has within itself, an angelic intellect knows a singular, not only according to its substance, but also according to all its accidents. Therefore, it can know a singular no matter how many its accidental variations may be. Consequently, the fact that a singular may vary does not take certitude away from angelic cognition.
10. Our answer to this can be taken from our replies above.
11. In so far as a measure is a principle for knowing the thing measured, it must belong to the same genus as the latter does, but not in all respects. It is evident, for example, that an elbow length is a measure for cloth, but all it has in common with the cloth is quantity; however, this is enough for it to be a measure for cloth. Similarly, the form in an angelic intellect need not have the same mode of existence that a singular existing outside the soul has, since the singular has a material existence, and the afore-mentioned form is immaterial.
12. Saints in glory know in the Word the things that are happening here. This is very clear from what Gregory has written. Moreover, this statement of Augustine should be taken as referring to the natural state. Nor is there any parallel between an angel and a soul, because an angel naturally has forms given to him at creation, and, by means of these, he knows singulars.
13. Forms in an angelic intellect are neither singular, like the forms in imagination or sense, because they are entirely separated from matter, nor universal, as our intellectual forms are, which can represent only a universal nature. Although they exist immaterially in themselves, they nevertheless indicate and express a universal nature and particular conditions.

ARTICLE XII: DO ANGELS KNOW THE FUTURE?

Parallel readings; Summa Theol., 1,57,3; 86,4; II-II, 95, 1; I Sentences 38, 1,5; II Sentences 7, 2, 2; in Isaiam, c. 3 (P. 14:445a); Contra Gentiles III, 154; Quolibet VII, I, 3, ad 1; De spir. creat., a. g, ad Q. D. De anima, 20, ad De malo, 6, 7; Comp. Theol., I, C. 134.

Difficulties:

It seems that they do, for

1. Angels know things by means of innate forms. Now, these forms are related equally to the present and future. Consequently, since angels know present things by their means, they also will know the future.
2. Boethius says that God is able to foreknow future contingent events infallibly, because His vision, being measured by eternity, is entirely simultaneous. But the beatific vision is likewise

entirely simultaneous, since it is measured by participated eternity. Consequently, beatified angels know future contingent events.

3. According to Gregory, when the soul severs its connection with the body, it knows the future by means of its own subtle nature. Now, an angel is completely free of any connection with a body, and its nature is most subtle. Therefore, they can know the future.

4. The possible intellect in our soul is in potency to the knowledge of all things, and hence to the knowledge of the future. Now, as was said above, the potentialities of an angelic intellect are completely actuated by means of innate forms. Angels, therefore, have knowledge about future events.

5. Those who have providence over a person should also have fore knowledge of the things affecting that person. But, as our guardians, the angels have been entrusted with our providence and care. Consequently, they must know things in the future that affect us.

6. The angelic intellect excels the human. Now, a human intellect can know future events which have determined causes in nature. Therefore, an angelic intellect can know even those future contingent events which, not having any determined causes, can happen in either of two ways.

7. We are differently related to knowing the future than we are to knowing the present, because we receive our knowledge from things, and, consequently, things must exist before we can know them. Angels, however, do not receive their knowledge from things. Therefore, they are equally related to knowing the future and the present. Consequently, our original thesis stands.

8. Intellectual knowledge does not include time, because it abstracts from the "here and now," and so is equally related to all time. Now, the only knowledge an angel has is intellectual. Consequently, an angel is equally related to knowing the present, past, and future. Hence, we conclude as before.

9. An angel knows more than a man does. But in the state of innocence man knew future events. This is clear from Genesis (2: 24): "Adam said... 'Wherefore a man shall leave father and mother...'"

Therefore, angels also know the future.

To the Contrary:

1'. In Isaiah (41:23) we read: "Shew the things that are to come hereafter: and we shall know that ye are gods." Thus, knowledge of the future is a sign of divinity. However, angels are not gods. Therefore, they do not know the future.

2'. Knowledge with certitude can be had only of those things which have determinate truth. But, as is clear from interpretation, future contingent events do not belong to this class of things. Consequently, they are not known by angels.

3'. Future events can be known only through a species of an artistic conception like that by which an artist knows the things he is going to make, or in their causes, as a future cold spell is known in the signs and positions of the stars. But angels do not know the future by means of artistic conceptions, because they do not make anything, nor do they know future things in their causes, since future contingent events are not determined in their causes. If they were, they would be necessary. There are no means, therefore, by which angels know future contingent events.

4'. Hugh of St. Victor says that angels were shown what they should do, not what would happen to them in the future. It is even less true, therefore, to say that they know other future events.

REPLY:

Anything that is known in another thing is known according to the manner in which it exists in that other. Now, some future events are determined in their proximate causes in such a way as to happen necessarily from them, for example, tomorrow's rising of the sun. Future effects of this sort can be known in their causes. Other future effects, however, do not exist so determinately in their causes that something else might not happen; their causes are merely disposed more to one effect than to another; and these effects are contingent events, which happen more or less often as the case may be. As a consequence, effects of this type cannot be known in their causes with infallibility, but only with conjectural certitude. Moreover, other future effects come from causes that are indifferently related to opposite effects; and these effects, especially those that depend upon free choice, are called "contingent to opposites."

Now, as the Commentator proves, an effect cannot come from a cause indifferent to opposites and in a certain respect in potency, unless this cause is determined to one effect more than to another by means of another cause. Consequently, an effect of this sort cannot be known in any way through causes indifferent to opposites if these causes be taken merely by themselves. Yet, if we consider these causes, which are indifferent to opposites, together with those things that incline them more to one effect than to another, we can get some conjectural certitude about their effects. For example, we can conjecture about future effects depending upon free choice by considering men's habits and temperaments, which incline them to one course of action.

But all these future effects, no matter what their proximate causes may be, exist determinately in the first cause, which by its presence sees them all, and by its providence gives a determinate character to each. Now, the angels see the divine essence and, by means of innate forms, know all things and all natural causes. By their natural knowledge, therefore, they can foreknow by their innate forms only those future events which have determinate existence in a natural cause, whether this cause be merely one thing or a collection of many things—for an effect may be contingent with respect to one cause but necessary with respect to a concurrence of many. And since angels know all natural causes, some effects that seem contingent to us, who consider only a few causes, are known as necessary by the angels, who consider all their causes. Indeed, if angels could comprehend God's providence, they would know all future events with certainty. None of them, however, comprehends His providence perfectly; but because some of them see it more perfectly than others do, they know more future events in the Word, even those coming from causes indifferent to opposites, than others know.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Species within an angelic intellect are not related equally to the present and future, because things that are present are actually similar to the forms existing within the angels and, consequently, can be known by their means. Things that are future, however, are not yet similar to these forms and thus, as explained earlier, cannot be known through them.

2. Angels are related indifferently to the knowledge of the present and future as far as the vision by which they see things in the Word is concerned. Yet it does not follow that they know all future events in the Word, because they do not comprehend the Word.

3. As Augustine tells us, some asserted that "the soul has powers of divination in itself." He refuted this opinion on the grounds that, if the soul could foretell the future by its own means, it would always know future events; but we know that, even if the soul does have foreknowledge at some times, it is unable to know the future whenever it wishes. Consequently, it

must need some help in order to know the future. It can be helped by a higher spirit, created or uncreated, good or evil. Moreover, while it is burdened with the weight of a body and fixes its attention on sense-objects, it is less capable of receiving such thoughts. Hence, when it withdraws from the senses, either in sleep or in sickness or by any other way, it thereby becomes more susceptible to the influence of the higher spirit. So, being severed in this manner from its physical connections, the soul foreknows the future with the help of a revelation by a higher spirit, who can reveal these future things, because, as has been said, he knows them either by his natural knowledge or in the Word.

4. There are two kinds of potency. One is natural and can be reduced to act by a natural agent. This potency in angels is completely actuated by innate forms. It is not according to this kind of potency, however, that our possible intellect is in potency to knowing all future things. But there is another potency, obediential potency, according to which the Creator can cause whatever He wants to cause in a creature. The possible intellect is in this kind of potency to the knowledge of all future things, that is, all things can be divinely revealed to it. However, the obediential potency of the angelic intellect is not totally actuated by means of innate forms.

5. It is not necessary for one who has providence over some persons to foreknow future events. It is enough for him to foresee what might happen so he can take proper steps against it.

6. An angelic intellect surpasses a human intellect inasmuch as it knows more contingent effects that exist determined in their causes and these with greater certitude. It does not necessarily surpass it in the respect touched upon in the objection.

7. The reply here should be the same as that given to the first difficulty.

8. By means of his intellectual knowledge, an angel knows things which are here and now, even though he himself is free from space and time. This is clear from what has been said. Hence, it should not occasion surprise if he should know the present in a manner different from that by which he knows the future. For he knows them differently, not because he has a different relation to them, but because, as explained previously, they are differently related to him.

9. In his state of innocence, man did not know future contingent events except in their causes or in the Word, just as angels know them. This is clear from what has been said.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

To the extent that these difficulties are contrary to the truth, an answer will be found in what has been said in this article.

ARTICLE XIII: CAN ANGELS KNOW THE HEART'S SECRETS?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, a. Resp. de art. (Declar. XLII quaest.), a. 38 (P. 16:163); Resp. de art. 36 (Declar. XXXVI quaest.), a. 36 (P. 16:175); De malo, 16, 8; in I Cor., c. 2, lectura 2 (P. 13:

Difficulties:

It seems that they can, for

1. To cleanse is the duty of angels. But the impurity from which we are cleansed is in our conscience. Therefore, angels know our consciences.

2. As the body receives its shape from its figure, so does the intellect receive its shape from the species of that which it actually thinks about. Now, when the eye sees a body, it simultaneously sees the body's shape. Therefore, when an angel sees another angel's intellect, he sees its thought.

3. Since the species in an intellect are actually intelligible, they are more intelligible than the forms existing in material things, which are merely potentially intelligible. Now, angels understand the forms of material things by means of forms which they have within themselves. Consequently, it is even truer that they understand the forms within our intellect; hence, they know our thoughts.

4. Man never knows without a phantasm. But angels know the phantasms in our imagination. Consequently, Augustine says: "The spiritual likenesses of material things existing within our soul are known to spirits, even to unclean spirits." Therefore, angels know our thoughts.

5. By means of the forms he has within himself an angel can know whatever he can do by these forms. Now, an angel can make an impression on our intellect by enlightening and cleansing us. Therefore, it is even truer that he can know our thoughts.

6. Augustine says: "Demons sometimes learn men's dispositions will the greatest case, not only when they are expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought and expressed by the soul through certain signs in the body." Now, there is no thought that does not leave a trace on the body. Consequently, the demons know all our thoughts, and much more so do the angels.

7. Commenting on that verse in the Epistle to the Romans (2: 15), "...their thoughts between themselves accusing or also defending one another," Origen says that this passage should be understood as referring to thoughts which, during their existence, left marks on those who had them. Consequently, every thought leaves some mark on the soul. Now, this mark cannot be unknown to an angel, because he sees the whole soul. Hence, angels know our thoughts.

8. Angels know effects in their causes. Now, as Augustine says, knowledge proceeds from the mind, and actual understanding proceeds from habitual knowledge. Consequently, since angels know our mind, they know what we know and what we are actually thinking.

To the Contrary:

1'. 'We read the following in Jeremias (17:9-10): "The heart is per verse... and unsearchable. Who can know it? I... the Lord...

Therefore, it belongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.

2'. The following is found in the Psalms (7: 10): "The searcher of hearts and reins is God." It seems, therefore, that God alone can search our hearts.

REPLY:

Of themselves angels cannot see the thoughts of the heart directly; for, in order that the mind actually think something, the will must make an intention moving the mind to act will respect to its mental species. This is clear from what Augustine has said. Now, an angel cannot naturally know the motion in the will of another person, be cause he naturally knows by means of forms that have been given him, and these are likenesses of things existing in nature. The motion of the will, however, has no dependence on or connection will any natural cause. It is the divine cause alone that can influence the will. Consequently, the will's motion and the heart's thoughts can be known, not by any likenesses of natural things, but only in the divine essence, which leaves its imprint on the will. Thus, angels cannot know the thoughts of the heart directly, but only if they are revealed to them in the Word.

Sometimes, however, an angel can indirectly come to know the heart's thoughts, and this can happen in two ways. First, it happens inasmuch as a motion in the body results from an actual thought, as when one is affected by joy or sadness from what he thinks, and his heart is moved in some way or other. By this means, even doctors can sometimes know what a heart is experiencing. Second, an angel can know thoughts in so far as a person gains or loses merit from what he is actually thinking; for thus the doer's or thinker's condition is some how changed for good or for evil, and angels can know this change in his condition. But this gives only a general knowledge of what was thought, because, as a result of many different thoughts, a person can merit or demerit, be joyful or sorrowful, in the same way.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** That cleansing of which Dionysius speaks should be understood as being from ignorance, not from the impurity of sin.
- 2.** From one species which the intellect has within itself, many distinct thoughts arise just as we can think many different things about man from the one species we have of man. Consequently, even if an angel sees our intellect shaped to the species of man, it does not follow that he knows determinately what the heart is thinking about.
- 3.** We do not actually think of all the things whose species we have within us, because sometimes species are in us only in the state of habit. Consequently, from the fact that the species in our intellects are seen by angels it does not follow that they know our thoughts.
- 4.** By means of the same phantasms, our reason can direct its thought to different objects. Consequently, even should one know the phantasms by which the soul thinks, it would not follow that he knew the thoughts themselves. Thus, Augustine says: "If demons could see cleanly a man's internal thought, arising from his virtues, they would not tempt him."
- 5.** As a consequence of an angel's action, we may be made capable of thinking certain things; but in order to think something actually, we must make an act of the will, and this by no means depends upon an angel. Consequently, even though angels can know our intellect's power, that is, the power by which we can speculate about intelligible things, it does not follow that they know our actual thoughts.
- 6.** Bodily motion, found in the passions of the soul, does not follow all knowledge but only practical knowledge. For, as is said in *The Soul*, when we consider something speculatively, we are related to the things we are considering "as though we were looking at them in pictures." Moreover, even when bodily motion does take place, it indicates thought only in a general way, as we have said.
- 7.** Those marks are nothing other than merits or demerits; and from these, thoughts can be known only in a general way.
- 8.** Even though angels know our mind and our habitual knowledge, it does not follow that they know what we are actually thinking, because many actual thoughts can arise from one thing known habitually.

ARTICLE XIV: CAN ANGELS KNOW MANY THINGS AT THE SAME TIME?

Parallel readings; *Summa Theol.*, I, 1 10; 8, 2; 8 II Sentences 3., C. (L, II, for.

Difficulties.

It seems that they can, for

1. Augustine says: "In heaven we shall behold all our knowledge at the same time by one glance." But angels see now in the manner in which we will see in heaven. Therefore, angels now actually understand many things at the same time.
2. An angel understands that a man is not a stone. Now, whoever understands this understands man and stone at the same time. Angels, therefore, understand many things at the same time.
3. An angel's intellect is stronger than the common sense. But the common sense apprehends many things at the same time, because its object is number, whose parts are many unities. Consequently, it is even truer to say that an angel can know many things simultaneously.
4. That which belongs to an angel by reason of his natural power belongs to him no matter by what medium he understands. Now, in virtue of his nature it belongs to an angel to understand many things. For this reason, Augustine says: "The spiritual power of an angelic mind can will case intellectually comprehend at the same time all that it wills." Therefore, no matter whether an angel knows things in the Word or through individual species, he still can know many things at one time.
5. The intellect and the intelligible are mutually related. Now, one intelligible can be grasped simultaneously by distinct intellects. Therefore, one intellect can focus on distinct intelligibles simultaneously.
6. Augustine says: "Our mind always remembers, understands, and wills itself." The same is true of an angelic mind. Now, an angel sometimes understands things other than himself. Therefore, when this happens, he understands many things at the same time.
7. The relation of the intellect to the intelligible is the same as that of knowledge to the knowable. But one who knows can know many things at the same time. Consequently, the intellect can understand many things at the same time.
8. An angel's mind is much more spiritual than air. But because of air's spirituality, many distinct forms, such as black and white, can exist in it simultaneously. For example, a black thing and a white thing can be so situated that lines drawn from the eyes of different people to these things will intersect at one point, through which the species of black and of white will pass simultaneously. Therefore, it is even truer to say that an angelic intellect can be simultaneously actuated by distinct forms. Hence, it can know many things at once.
9. The intellect is reduced to the act of understanding by means of species which it has within itself. Now, many species exist simultaneously in an angelic intellect, for, as is said in The Causes: "an intelligence is filled with forms." Consequently, an angel understands many things at the same time.
10. Many things can be understood at the same time in so far as they are one. But all intelligibles are one in so far as they are intelligible. Therefore, all intelligibles can be understood at the same time by an angel.
11. More distance lies between the divine essence and created forms than between one created form and another. Now, angels understand simultaneously through the divine essence and through a created form, because they always see things in the Word, and, unless they knew things at the same time through innate species, they would never understand them by means of these species. Much more possible is it, then, for an angel to understand by means of different created innate forms at the same time and in this way understand many things simultaneously.

12. If an angel did not understand many things at the same time, before and after would be found in the action by which he understands this and the thing. But every action in which before and after are found involves time; and, therefore, the characteristic action of an angel would be circumscribed by time. This is contrary, however, to The Causes, where we read: "An intelligence is a thing whose substance and operation are above time."

13. The reason for our intellect's not being able to know many things simultaneously seems to be this, that it understands things dependently on time and space. Neither of these, however, belongs to an angelic intellect, because it does not receive from the senses. Consequently, it can understand many things at the same time.

14. Since forms in the intellect are second perfections, they are accidental forms. Now, many accidental forms can exist in the same subject if they are not contraries, as whiteness and blackness are. Therefore, an angel's intellect can also be informed by many different forms at the same time, as long as they are not contraries. Thus, it can know many things at the same time.

15. Music and grammar are forms belonging to one genus; and they can simultaneously inform the soul of a person who has both habits. It is possible, therefore, for an intellect to be informed simultaneously by different forms. Hence, the conclusion is the same as before.

16. By understanding that it understands, an angelic intellect is aware that it understands something other than itself. Therefore, it simultaneously understands itself and something else. Thus, it can understand many things at the same time.

17. An angelic intellect is of itself indifferently related to all the forms existing within it. Therefore, it understands either through all of them at the same time or through none of them at all. The latter alternative is impossible; hence, it understands through all of them at one time. Thus, it understands many things simultaneously.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Philosopher says: "It may happen that we have habitual knowledge of many things, but we have actual understanding of only one."

2'. As Augustine says, an intention is required before a thing can be considered actually. But, since intention is a motion, it cannot be directed to different objects, because one motion can have only one end-term. Consequently, an angel cannot know many things at the same time.

3'. As a body receives its shape from figure, so does the intellect receive its shape from the species of that which it actually understands, as Algazel says. Now, one body cannot be shaped by different figures simultaneously. Consequently, an intellect, too, cannot be shaped simultaneously by different species. Therefore, it cannot know many things at the same time.

4'. Just as [an angel], when understanding things in their own nature, understands them through distinct forms, so also, when understanding them in the Word, he understands them through distinct intelligible representations. Therefore, he cannot understand many things simultaneously either in their own nature or in the Word.

5'. A thing's power cannot be greater than its substance. Now, an angel's substance cannot be in many places at the same time. Hence, his intellectual power cannot understand many things at the same time.

6'. A thing which extends to many things contains some composition. But an angel's intellect is simple. Therefore, it cannot extend to the simultaneous understanding of many things.

REPLY:

All that an intellect understands it understands by means of some form. Consequently, keeping in mind the kinds of forms by which an angel understands, we must now consider whether or not he can understand many things at one time.

It should be observed, therefore, that some forms belong to one genus, others belong to different genera, and the forms belonging to different genera are related to different potencies. Now, as the Philosopher says, the unity of a genus is determined by the unity of matter or of potency. Consequently, it is possible for the same subject to be perfected simultaneously by forms belonging to different genera, because then the one potency would not be terminating in different acts but differently. For example, if a body is both white and sweet at the same time, it has whiteness in it in so far as it shares the nature of the transparent medium, and sweetness in so far as it shares the nature of the moist. But forms belonging to one genus are related to one potency, whether they be contraries (as blackness and whiteness) or not contraries (as triangle and square).

Now, these forms are said to be in a subject in three ways. In the first, they exist only potentially and, consequently, simultaneously, because one potency has for its object different forms of one genus and their contraries. In the second, they exist in imperfect act, so that they are coming into being. In this manner, they can also exist simultaneously. This is evident in the case of one who becomes white; for, during the whole period of alteration, whiteness inheres in him as some thing coming into being, and blackness as something going out of being. In the third, they exist in perfect act, as whiteness does when the whitening process is finished. In this manner, it is impossible for two forms belonging to the same genus to be present simultaneously in the same subject, because the same potency would have to terminate in different acts; and this is just as impossible as it is for one lime, beginning from one point, to be terminated at different points.

It should understand, therefore, that all intelligible forms belong to one genus, even if the things, whose forms they are, belong to different genera, because all intelligible forms are related to an intellectual potency. Consequently, in the intellect they can all simultaneously exist in potency, as well as in incomplete act—a mean between potency and perfect act. This latter condition is that had by a species which is present habitually, for habit is a mean between potency and act.

But many species cannot exist simultaneously in perfect act in an intellect, because, in order to understand actually, an intellect must be in perfect act with respect to that species by which it understands. Hence, it is impossible for the intellect to understand actually according to different forms taken together at one time. Therefore, all the different things which it understands by different forms cannot be understood at one time, but all that is understood by the same form will be understood at one time. Consequently, an angelic intellect can understand simultaneously all that it understands through the one essence of the Word, but the things it understands through innate forms (which are numerous) it cannot understand simultaneously if its understanding is through different forms. Any angel, however, through the same form, can understand many things, at least all the singulars of a species by means of one form of that species. Indeed, the higher angels can understand more through one species than the lower angels can. Hence, they are more able to understand many things at one time.

We should remember, however, that a thing can be one in one respect and many in another. For example, a continuum is actually one but potentially many. Now, if the intellect or sense is directed to a thing of this sort in so far as it is one, it is seen at one time, but if the same powers are directed to it in so far as it is many (and this would be to consider each part by itself), then the whole could not be seen simultaneously. Similarly, when our intellect considers a proposition, it considers many things as one. Hence, in so far as the things are one, many things are understood at one time when the one proposition made up of them is

understood; but, in so far as they are many, they cannot be understood at one time, because this would mean that the intellect can simultaneously turn itself to understanding the intelligible characters of each one of them taken in itself. Consequently, the Philosopher says: "I mean, however, by understanding things 'together or 'apart in an affirmation or negation that they are not understood in succession but as one thing." For they cannot be understood simultaneously in so far as a relation of distinctness exists between them, but they can be understood simultaneously in so far as they are united in one proposition.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Augustine is speaking of knowledge had by the blessed. In this they know all things in the Word.
2. As is clear from what has been said, when an angel, knowing a man, knows that he is not a stone, he knows many things as one.
3. The same answer should be given here as was given to the second difficulty.
4. The nature of an angelic mind is such that it can know many things through one form. Thus, by turning to that species, it can, when it wishes, understand at one time all that it knows through that species.
5. No part of the intellect itself is in the intelligible, but something of what is understood is in the intellect. Consequently, the argument for many things being understood simultaneously by one intellect is not the same as that for one thing being understood by many intellects.
6. Augustine himself later explains" that his statement, "Our mind always remembers, understands, and wills itself," refers to internal memory. Consequently, our soul does not always actually understand itself. An angelic mind, however, always understands itself actually. This is due to the fact that an angelic mind understands itself through its essence, which always informs it. Our act of understanding, however, might be said to depend in a certain sense on the intention of our will. Nevertheless, even though an angel's mind in some way understands itself and some other thing, it does not simultaneously understand many things except as they are one. This will be clear from the following.

If any two things are so related that one of them is the reason why the other can be understood, one of them will be, as it were, formal, the other, as it were, material. Thus, those two constitute one intelligible, because matter and form constitute one thing. Consequently, when the intellect understands one thing through another, it understands only one intelligible. This is evidently the case with sight. For light is that by which colour is seen, and so is related to colour, in a manner of speaking, as its formal element. Thus, colour and light constitute only one visible thing and are seen simultaneously by sight. Now, an angel's essence is his means for knowing all that he knows, even though it is not a perfect means and, for this reason, needs forms to be given it. For he knows all things according to the mode of his substance, as The Causes states, and according to his power and nature, as Dionysius says. Consequently, when he understands himself and other things, he cannot understand many things except as they are one.

7. Knowledge is a habit, knowing is an act. Now, many forms can exist in the intellect at the same time habitually, but not in perfect act, as is clear from what has been said. Hence, one can know many things together, but he cannot understand many things at one time.
8. Those forms are not in the air except in the stage of coming-to-be, for they are in it as in a medium of transmission.
9. Many species exist simultaneously in an angel's intellect, but they are not in perfect act.

10. All things are one in so far as they are intelligible, and so they can be understood at the same time in so far as they are intelligibles. This takes place when their intelligibility is understood.

11. The divine essence is the cause of the intelligibility of all the angel's innate forms, because they are, as it were, modeled upon it. One innate form, however, is not the cause of the intelligibility of another. Hence, there is no parallel.

12. Any operation essentially involves time if it needs some future thing to complete its species. This is evidently the case with motion, which does not have a complete species until it is carried through to a term, because the motion which would end at mid-point would be specifically different from that which would terminate at the extreme. On the other hand, operations which have their complete species immediately are not measured by time except for another reason. Examples of such are understanding, sensing, and the like. For this reason, the Philosopher says that delight is not in time. By exception, however, these operations can be in time, in so far as they are joined to motion by existing in natures subject to time, namely, physical natures which come into and go out of existence. Our sensitive powers use organs, which are of this nature, and our intellect receives from them. But it is clear that an angel's act of understanding involves time neither intrinsically nor extrinsically. Therefore, there is no before and after in an act by which he understands one intelligible. Nevertheless, this does not prevent a number of operations from being ordered according to before and after.

13. The reason given in the objection is not the entire reason for our possible intellect's not being able to understand many things at one time. The entire reason has been given above.

14. Accidental forms, if not contrary, can exist simultaneously in the same subject if they are related to different powers, but not if they belong to one genus and are related to the same power. This is clear if we consider triangles and squares.

15. Since music and grammar are habits, they are not complete acts, but, as it were, forms standing halfway between potency and act.

16. The knower and the actually known are in some way one. Hence, when anyone understands that he understands something, he understands many things as one.

17. The angelic intellect is not similarly related to all the forms it has within itself, because sometimes it is in perfect act with regard to one form but not with regard to the others. This takes place by means of the will, which reduces the intellect from this potency to act. Consequently Augustine says in the statement quoted earlier that an angel understands when he wills.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. It may happen that only one thing can be understood as one at one time and through one form, but this does not prevent many things from being understood as one at one time or through one form.

2'. Virtual quantity is ascertained by comparing the power with its objects. Consequently, just as a body can, by its different parts, touch different things by means of its dimensional quantity, so can a power be applied to different things according to its different relation to them, as long as it has been perfected in act, just as fire can warm different things on all sides at the same time. Similarly, an intellect perfected by a form can be simultaneously directed to the different things to which that form's representative power extends. There may be many intelligible characters in the thing to which the intellect is directed, but there will be only one species in the intellect because of the intellect's unity with the form.

3' The intellect does not understand many things at one time if, to understand them, it must be shaped by many different forms.

4' The intelligible characters in the divine ideas differ only in so far as things have different relations to them. Hence, they are one through the divine essence. This is not true of the innate forms possessed by the angels.

5' When one says that a thing's power cannot be greater than its substance, this statement should not be understood as meaning that nothing belongs to its power that does not belong to its substance, but rather that the strength of a power is determined by the mode of the substance. For example, if a substance is material, its power will act in a material way.

6' The more simple a thing's virtual quantity, the greater is the number of objects to which it extends; but the more simple its dimensional quantity, the smaller the number of objects to which it extends. Consequently, extension to many things by reason of dimensional quantity is a sign of composition, but extension by reason of virtual quantity is a sign of simplicity.

ARTICLE XV: IS ANGELS KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS DISCURSIVE?

Parallel readings: *De veritate*, 15, 1; *Summa Theol.*, I, 58, aa. 3-4; 79, 8; 85, 5; *De malo*, 16, 6, ad 1 s. c.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Whoever knows one thing through another knows it discursively. Now, angels know one thing through another when they see creatures in the Word. Hence, their knowledge of things is discursive.

2. Just as we know some things and not others, so do angels also know some things and not others. This is clear from what has been said. But we are able to learn what we do not know by means of what we do know. Therefore, since angels possess more profound intellects than we, it seems that they, too, can come to a knowledge of what they do not know by means of what they know already. This, however, is discursive knowledge. Therefore, an reason from one thing to another.

3. No motion can be detected in intellection other than that by which the mind passes from one thing to another. Now, angels are moved when they understand, and that is why Dionysius says that the motion of angels will respect to the good and the beautiful is circular, oblique, and horizontal, just as that of our own souls is. Therefore, angels, as well as our own souls, understand discursively.

4. As Augustine says, demons know the heart's thoughts by means of the movements that appear on the body. But this is to know the cause through the effect; it is also to reason from one thing to another. Therefore, demons know things by reasoning from one thing to another; and, by the same argument, angels also know in this manner, because the same kind of natural cognition is found in both angels and demons.

5. Maximus says that our souls roll many things together, just as angels do. Now, to roll many things together means to compare them. Therefore, angels know things by way of comparison.

6. Angels know natural causes and effects as perfectly as we do. Now, we see effects in causes and causes in effects. Therefore, angels do the same. Consequently, they make comparisons, just as we do.

7. All knowledge had through experience is knowledge had by a process of comparison, because, as said in the Metaphysics, it is based on experience, and the general apprehension results from the memory of many individual events. Now, as Augustine says, through their long experience demons come to know many things about natural effects. Therefore, demons possess knowledge that is the result of comparison.

To the Contrary:

1'. All discursive knowledge is had by reasoning either from the universal to particulars or from particulars to the universal, for all reasoning is reduced to syllogizing and induction. But, as Dionysius says, angels do not acquire divine knowledge from what is divisible or from senses, nor are they led to these particular things from some thing common. Therefore, there is no discursive knowledge in angels.

2'. Man is said to be rational inasmuch as he reasons by inquiring. As is clear from Dionysius, however, angels are not called rational but intellectual. Therefore, angels do not know discursively.

3'. As said in Spirit and Soul: "Reasoning is a search made by the reason." But in angels there is no reason, because, as is clear from the same work, reason is put into the definition of the human soul as being one of its properties. Therefore, angels neither reason nor have discursive knowledge.

4'. We read the following in Spirit and Soul: "It belongs to the same person to know the natures of visible things and to investigate invisible things." Now, the first type of knowledge belongs to man because of his senses, and the second type, too, for the same reason. Therefore, it seems that the second type of knowledge does not belong to angels, because they do not have senses.

5'. Maximus the Commentator writes that angels do not circle about a number of existing things as our souls do. Now, souls are said to circle about a number of existing things in so far as they reason from one thing to another. Therefore, angels do not know discursively.

REPLY:

Properly speaking, to discourse is to come to the knowledge of one thing through another. There is a difference, however, between knowing something in another and knowing it from another. For when one thing is known in another, the knower is, by one motion, directed to both. This is clearly the case when a thing is known in another as in an intelligible form. This kind of knowledge is not discursive. More over, in this regard, it makes no difference whether the thing be seen in its own species or in a different one; for sight is not said to know discursively when it sees a stone either by means of a species received from the stone itself or by seeing the stone's species reflected in a mirror.

A thing is said to be known from another, however, when the motion to both is not the same, but the intellect is first moved to one and from this is moved to the other. Consequently, discourse takes place here, as it evidently takes place in demonstrations. For the intellect is first directed only to principles, then it is directed through the principles to conclusions. From the moment of their creation, however, the intellects of angels are perfected by innate forms giving them all the natural knowledge to which their intellectual powers extend, just as the matter of celestial bodies is completely terminated by its form, will the result that it no longer remains in potency to another form. For this reason, The Causes states: "An intelligence is

filled will forms. Now, it would not be filled will forms unless its entire potentialities were actuated by forms. Therefore, an intelligence is ignorant of none of the things that it can know naturally.

But because our intellect shares in a defective intellectual light, it is not actuated will regard to all the intelligibles which it can know naturally. It remains perfectible, for could it reduce itself from potency to act had not its knowledge will respect to some things been actuated by nature. Consequently, there necessarily are some things in our intellect which it knows naturally, namely, first principles—even though in us this knowledge is not caused unless we receive something through our senses. Therefore, the relation of our intellect to those principles is similar to that which an angel has to all that he knows naturally. And since the knowledge we have of principles is the highest form of our knowledge, it is evident that on this summit of our nature we reach to some extent the lowest point of an angel's. For, as Dionysius says "The divine wisdom has linked the boundaries of the first creatures to the place where the second begin." Consequently, just as we know principles by simple intuition without discourse, so do the angels know all they know in the same fashion. This is why they are called "intellectual," and why our habit of principles has the same name

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Angels know creatures in the Word without any discourse, as things are known in their likenesses.
2. Angels are not ignorant of any of the things whose knowledge they can arrive at naturally; but they are ignorant of some things that surpass their natural knowledge. By themselves, they cannot arrive at a knowledge of these through discourse, but they need divine revelation. Our intellect, however, does not know all that it can know naturally. Hence, from the things it knows it can arrive at what it does not know. But, it cannot arrive at unknown things, such as matters of faith, that surpass our natural powers of knowing.
3. The motion of which Dionysius speaks is not taken to mean the passage from one thing to another. It is motion merely in that sense in which all operations are called motions, just as understanding and sensing are called motions. Consequently, Dionysius distinguishes three kinds of motions in souls and in angels as regards their knowledge of God: circular, oblique, and straight—using these as metaphors. Now, circular motion is perfectly uniform, because all the parts of a circle are equidistant from its center, and because it cannot be said that one part of a circular motion is its beginning or end more than any other. Straight motion, however, is not uniform, because as a line its parts are not equidistant from a designated point, and as motion it has a designated beginning and end. Oblique motion possesses uniformity in so far as it agrees will circular motion, but lacks uniformity in so far as it agrees will straight motion.

Now, there is not the same manner of uniformity and non-uniformity in an angel and in a soul. Consequently, Dionysius distinguishes between these motions as found in each. In the act of knowing God, an angel does not direct his cognition to many different things but fixes it on God alone. In this regard, he is said to be moved about God, as it were, in a circular motion, because he does not arrive at God as at the end of cognition that had its beginning from some principle of cognition, but [his knowledge is] like a circle, without a beginning or end. Hence Dionysius says that angels are moved "in a circular motion which is simple, without beginnings, and rich with everlasting illuminations of the good and the beautiful."

These divine illuminations coming into the minds of the angels are to be understood as though they were lines coming from the center of a circle to its circumference and in some way constituting the substance of the circumference. Then, the knowledge which G has of

Himself is compared to the center of the circle, and the knowledge which the angel has of God is compared to the circle itself, which imitates the unity of its center but fails short of achieving it.

Non-uniformity in an angel's knowledge of God is not to be found in the knowledge itself but only in its communication, that is, in so far as he passes on his knowledge of God to others. This action Dionysius assigns to the angels straight movement, saying: "Their motion is straight when, passing directly over all things, they go forth to provide for all who are entrusted to them." Moreover, he calls that motion of theirs oblique which is, as it were, made up of both of the afore-mentioned motions—the motion which occurs when, remaining united to God in knowledge, they go forth in action to lead others back to Him. Hence, he says: "They are moved obliquely when, while caring for those who have less, they nevertheless remain unmoved in uninterruptible union with the cause of union."

However, uniformity and non-uniformity are also found in the soul's knowledge of God, because a soul is moved towards God in three ways. In the first, by looking upon the visible things that have been made, the soul sees the invisible things of God. This motion is straight. Consequently, Dionysius says: "The motion of the soul is straight when the soul goes forth to the things which lie around it, and from external things, as from varied and multiple signs, is lifted up to simple and unified contemplation. The soul is moved toward God in a second way by the illuminations it receives from Him. These, however, it receives in accordance with its own mode of existence, that is, they are veiled in sensible figures. For example, Isaiah saw "the Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated" (Isaiah 6:1). This motion is oblique, having something of uniformity from God's illumination and something of non-uniformity from the sensible figures. Hence, Dionysius says: "The soul is moved obliquely in so far as it is illumined by divine thoughts according to its nature—not, indeed, intellectually and intuitively, but rationally and discursively." Moreover, the soul is moved in a third way when it turns away from all sense objects by thinking of God as being above all things, even above itself. In this way, it is separated from any non-uniformity, and therefore it is circular motion. Hence, Dionysius says: "The circular motion of the soul takes place when, withdrawing from external things, the soul enters into itself and reflects by its intellectual powers. Finally, it is made uniform and enters into union with its united powers. In this way, it is led to that which is above all things."

4. Angels see thoughts hidden in hearts by means of bodily movements, just as causes are seen without discourse by means of their likeness in their effects. However, this does not mean that angels need to reason discursively when they know these motions for the first time, because, as soon as sensible things come into being, they become similar to forms in the angels and so are known by the angels. Hence, without discourse, angels know new sensible things.

5. That rolling together does not mean comparison, but rather a kind of circular union of the soul with itself, and of the angel with itself.

6. [Angels] see causes in their effects and effects in their causes, not by reasoning discursively, as it were, from one thing to another, but in the manner in which a thing is seen in its image, without any discourse being needed.

7. Demons experiential knowledge is not had by making comparisons but by seeing effects in their causes or causes in their effects in the manner described. The longer they have existed, the greater the number of effects they know of a given cause. Thus, they come to know, in some way, more about a cause, not intensively but extensively, the more they see its power manifested in effects.

ARTICLE XVI: SHOULD MORNING KNOWLEDGE BE DISTINGUISHED FROM EVENING KNOWLEDGE IN ANGELS?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 8, aa. 6-7; 62, 1, ad 64, 1, ad II Sentences 12, I, 3; In Ephes., C. 3, lectura 3; De potentia 4., ad 2, 8, 10, 12-21, 24-25.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. There are shadows in the morning and evening. In an angelic intellect, however, there are no shadows; for, as Dionysius says, angels are very bright mirrors. Therefore, in angels morning knowledge should not be distinguished from evening knowledge.
2. According to Augustine, that knowledge is called morning knowledge by which an angel knows in the Word the things that are to be created; and that is called evening knowledge by which he knows things in their own natures. Now, angels do not know things differently before they exist than after they exist, since their intellects are like God's intellect and do not receive their knowledge from things. Therefore, their morning knowledge should not be distinguished from their evening knowledge.
3. Evening knowledge is that by which things are known in their own nature. But things are known in their own nature in the Word, because the Word represents things in their individuality even more expressly than the forms within the angels do. Therefore, since morning knowledge is knowledge in the Word, it seems that angel's evening knowledge should not be distinguished from their morning knowledge.
4. We read in Genesis (1:5): "And there was evening and morning one day." Now, as Augustine says, day is taken there as meaning angels knowledge. Consequently, angels morning and evening knowledge are one and the same.
5. The light of morning grows until noon. However, knowledge of things had in the Word cannot grow into another, fuller knowledge. Therefore, knowledge of things in the Word cannot properly be called morning knowledge. Hence, angels morning and evening knowledge cannot be distinguished by the fact that one is knowledge of things in the Word, the other, knowledge of them in their own nature.
6. Knowledge of things that are to be created comes before that of things that are already created. Now, evening knowledge comes before morning knowledge, as is clear from the words of Genesis (1:5): "There was evening and morning one day." Consequently, it is not proper to distinguish evening knowledge from morning knowledge so that the former means knowledge of things already made, and the latter, of things to be made.
7. Augustine compares the knowledge of things in the Word to the knowledge had from an artistic concept, and that of them in their own nature to the knowledge had from the work of art itself. He also compares these two types of knowledge to the knowledge had of a line which is mentally conceived and to that which is had of a line written in dust. But these distinctions do not involve different genera of knowledge. Consequently, knowledge of things in the Word and in their proper nature are not two types of knowledge. Hence, morning and evening knowledge are not distinct.
8. As soon as he was created, an angel knew will morning knowledge. However, he did not know the Word, because he was not created in the state of beatitude, and the sight of the Word is the act of beatitude. Consequently, knowledge of things in the Word is not morning knowledge. Hence, we conclude as before.

9. But it has been said that, even though an angel did not know the Word through its essence, he knew it through sortie created likeness and, therefore, did know things in the Word.—On the contrary, all knowledge through created forms is obscure, because all creatures, taken in themselves, are shadowy. But evening knowledge is obscure knowledge. Therefore, to know things in the Word, or to know the Word in the manner just described, would not be morning but evening knowledge.

10. Augustine says: "When a mind, strong and vigorous, sees that first truth, it forgets all other things." Therefore, when it sees the Word, it sees nothing else in it. Consequently, the morning knowledge of angels cannot be called the knowledge of things in the Word.

11. Morning knowledge is clearer than evening knowledge. But knowledge of things had in the Word is less clear than that of things in their own nature, because things are in the Word only in a certain respect, but in their own nature without any qualification. It is better, however, to know a thing where it exists simply than to know it where it exists only in a certain respect. Consequently, a distinction cannot be made whereby knowledge of things had in the Word will be called morning knowledge, and that of things in their own nature, evening knowledge.

12. Knowledge had from a thing's individual immediate causes is more perfect than that had from a general cause. But God is the general cause of all things. Consequently that knowledge by which things are known in the Word is more imperfect than that by which they are known in their own nature.

13. Things are known in the Word as in a mirror. But things are known more perfectly in themselves than in a mirror. Consequently, they are known more perfectly in their own nature than in the Word. Hence, the same must be said as before.

To the Contrary:

Augustine distinguishes these types of knowledge in the manner described.

REPLY:

The expression "morning and evening knowledge" was introduced by Augustine so that he could hold that the things we read about as having been made in the first six days were really completed without any succession of time. Consequently, he wanted those days to be understood as referring, not to distinct times, but to distinct angelic cognitions. For, just as the presence of physical light on things here below makes a day in the temporal sense, so does the presence or operation of light from an angelic intellect on created things make a day in the spiritual sense. Consequently, as many days can be distinguished as there are relations from angelic intellects to the different classes of things to be known. Taken in this way, the order of a day would not be an order of time but an order of nature, and this would be found in angelic knowledge according to the order that the known things have to each other, that is, according as one thing is prior by nature to another. Moreover, just as morning is the beginning of a temporal day and evening its end, so the beginning and end of an angel's knowledge of some one thing would be determined by the order in that thing. Now, the beginning of anything is to be found in the cause from which it issues; its end, in the thing itself, because it is in this that the action of the productive cause terminates. Hence, the first knowledge to be had of a thing is that in which it is considered in its cause, the eternal Word. For this reason, the knowledge of things in the Word is called morning knowledge. The last knowledge to be had of a thing is that in which it is known in itself. This is called evening knowledge.

It should be understood, however, that that distinction can have two meanings. First, it can refer to a distinction in the thing known; second, it can refer to a distinction in the medium of

knowledge. Taking the distinction in the first way, we can say that a thing is said to be known in the Word when the being it has in the Word is known; and it is said to be known in its own nature in so far as the being which it has in itself is known. But this way of understanding causes difficulties, because the being which it has in the Word is not other than that of the Word itself, since, as Anselm says, the creature in the Creator is simply the creative essence. Hence, to know a creature in the Word in this manner is to know, not the creature, but rather the Creator. Consequently, this distinction between morning and evening knowledge must be referred to the medium of knowledge. Accordingly, a thing will be said to be known in the Word when it is known in its own nature through the Word; and it will be said to be known in its own nature when it is known by means of some created forms proportioned to created things, as things are known [angels] by innate forms or by acquired forms—if, indeed, angels did know by acquired forms, but it would make no difference as far as the present problem is concerned.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The figure of evening and morning in angelic knowledge is not based on the fact that there are shadows in the morning and evening of a temporal day, but, as has been said, on the fact that these two have the nature of a beginning and end. Or it can be said that all intellects, being created from nothing, are shadowy in comparison with the brightness of God's intellect. They do, however, have some brightness in so far as they imitate His intellect.
2. In the Word the angels know in the same way the things that are to be created and the things already created. But the way in which they know in the Word the things to be created differs from the way in which they know the individual natures of things already created when they know these latter by means of a similitude within them selves. It is according to this difference that their morning and evening knowledge are distinguished.
3. Even though things are more expressly represented in the Word than they are by the forms within an angel's intellect, nevertheless, these forms are more proportioned to things and, in a way, confirmed to them. Hence, this kind of knowledge, and not knowledge in the Word, is said to be of things in their own nature.
4. Just as one general science contains within itself different particular sciences by which different conclusions can be known, so also all the knowledge an angel has, being in some sense a whole, contains within itself morning and evening knowledge as, in a way, its parts—as a temporal day has morning and evening for its parts.
5. It is not necessary that spiritual things be like material things in all respects; Hence, knowledge of things in the Word is not called morning knowledge because it grows into greater knowledge, but, as has been said, because of its relation to an inferior knowledge.
6. Morning knowledge comes before evening knowledge if we consider the natural ordering found in one and the same thing. But, if we consider different things, evening knowledge of what is prior precedes morning knowledge of what is posterior, that is, as long as knowledge is considered from the viewpoint of what is prior and posterior in the things known. Consequently, in Genesis, evening is put before morning, because the work of the first day was light, which Augustine understands as a spiritual light enkindled by knowledge of the Word. By their natural knowledge, however, angels first knew themselves in themselves, and, having known themselves, they did not remain there to enjoy their own selves and, as it were, make themselves their own ends (for then they would have become "night"—as angels who sinned); instead, they turned their knowledge back to the praise of God. Hence, from contemplation of themselves angels turned to a contemplation of the Word, in whom existed the morning of the following day, inasmuch as the angels received knowledge in the Word of

the creature that was to follow, namely, the firmament. Therefore, just as we see that in continuous time the same now belongs to two times, that is, it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future, so morning knowledge of the second day is the end of the first day and the beginning of the second, and so on until the seventh day is reached.

7. The knowledge had of a work of art from its artistic concept is not the same as that had from the thing already made. The first knowledge is universal only; the second can also be particular, as, for example, when I look at a particular house that has been made.

Besides, there is no parallel at all, because created art is more proportioned and confirmed to artificial things than uncreated art is to created things.

8. At the moment of his creation, an angel was not beatified and did not see the Word through His essence. Hence, he did not have morning knowledge, but first he had evening knowledge and from this progressed to morning. For this reason, the first day is expressly said not to have had a morning, but began as evening, and from evening passed into morning. The reason for this was that that spiritual light, namely, the angelic substance, made on the first day, knew himself as soon as he was made. This was his evening knowledge. Then he turned this knowledge to the praise of the Word, and in the Word his knowledge became morning knowledge. This is why Genesis (2:5) says: "And there was evening and morning one day."

9. Evening and morning knowledge must be distinguished with respect to the medium of knowledge, not with respect to the thing that is known. Knowledge of the Creator through creatures, therefore, is evening knowledge, just as, conversely, knowledge of creatures through the Creator is morning knowledge. To this extent, the argument is correct.

10. A strong mind intent on divine things is said to forget other things, not in the sense that it does not know them, but in the sense that it no longer esteems them. For, when we see God's majesty, we consider as of little value creatures that previously seemed to be of very great worth.

11. Knowledge of things in the Word is more perfect than that of them in their own nature, because the Word expresses each one of them more clearly than a created species does. Moreover, the state merit that things exist more truly in themselves than they do in the Word can be understood in two ways. First, it can mean that the existence they have in themselves is more perfect than that which they have in the Word. But this is false, because in themselves they have a created act of existence, and in the Word, uncreated being. Consequently, the existence they have in themselves is existence only in a certain sense as compared with that which they have in the Word; Second, it can mean that the thing can be its individual self more perfectly in its own being than in the Word. This, to a certain extent, is true. For in itself a thing is material (at least materiality belongs to the nature of some things); in the Word, however, it is not material. There is merely a likeness of the thing's matter and form in the Word. Although it is true that a thing in so far as it is such and such exists only in a certain fashion in the Word, nevertheless, it is known more perfectly through the Word than through itself, even in so far as it is such and such a thing. The reason for this is that a thing's own nature is more perfectly represented in the Word than it is in itself, and this despite the fact that it exists more truly in itself when it exists according to its own mode of existence. For knowledge follows the representation of the form. Hence, even though a thing is not in the soul except in a qualified sense, that is, by its likeness, it is known simply as a thing.

12. God Himself is the proper and immediate cause of each and every thing, and, as Augustine says, in some way He is more closely united to each thing than the thing is to itself.

13. Forms do not flow into things from a mirror; rather, they flow into a mirror from things. From the Word, however, forms flow into things. Consequently, no parallel can be drawn between knowledge of things had from a mirror and that of them had in the Word.

ARTICLE XVII: IS AN ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE ADEQUATELY DIVIDED INTO MORNING AND EVENING KNOWLEDGE?

Parallel readings: See readings given for preceding article.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

- 1.** Augustine says that evening knowledge is that by which things are known in themselves, morning knowledge, that whereby things are referred to the praise of the Creator. Thus, morning knowledge seems to be distinguished from evening by means of distinguishing between related and non-related. But, besides this division of knowledge of creatures in themselves into knowledge related and not related to the Word, there is another knowledge of creatures—a knowledge that differs more from creatures than one of them differs from another—namely, the knowledge of creatures in the Word. Therefore, the division of angels knowledge into morning and evening is not adequate.
- 2.** Augustine says that a creature has three existences: one in the Word, a second in its own nature, a third in the mind of an angel. Now, the first two existences are included by morning and evening knowledge. Hence, the third should be included by a third type of knowledge.
- 3.** Morning and evening knowledge are distinguished by this, that the first is knowledge of things in the Word, the second, knowledge of them in their own nature. They are also distinguished in so far as one is the knowledge of things to be created, the other, of things already created. This latter division, however, can be further divided in four ways. First, we can speak of knowing in the Word the things that will be created; second, of knowing in the Word things already created; third, of knowing in their own nature the things that are already created; fourth, of knowing in their own nature things that will be created. The last division, however, seems to be a useless addition, because a thing cannot be known in its own nature before it exists. At any rate, there should be at least three kinds of angelic knowledge. Hence, the twofold division is inadequate.
- 4.** Angels morning and evening knowledge get their names from their resemblance to a temporal day. Now, in a temporal day, noon lies between morning and evening. Therefore, a noonday knowledge should be placed between morning and evening knowledge.
- 5.** Angels know not only creatures but the Creator Himself. But angels knowledge is divided into morning and evening only will reference to their knowledge of creatures. Consequently, we must assign a third knowledge to angels that is other than their morning and evening knowledge.
- 6.** Morning and evening knowledge pertain only to knowledge had by grace; otherwise, bad angels would also have morning or evening knowledge. This does not seem true, however, because there is no day for demons, and evening and morning are parts of a day. Consequently, since angels natural knowledge is other than that which they have as a result of grace, it seems that we must assign a third type of knowledge to them.

To the Contrary:

Morning and evening knowledge are divided according to created and uncreated. Now, there is no mean between these two. Therefore, there is none between morning and evening knowledge.

REPLY:

We may speak of morning and evening knowledge in two ways. First, we may speak of them simply in so far as they are knowledge. No mean can fail between the two types of knowledge, considered in this manner. For, as said previously, morning is distinguished from evening knowledge by means of the medium of knowing. If the medium is created, it causes evening knowledge, no matter how it is had. If the medium is uncreated, it causes morning knowledge. And there can be no mean between created and uncreated.

On the other hand, if we consider the nature of morning and evening alone, then a mean can fall between the two for two reasons. First, morning and evening are parts of a day; and, according to Augustine, "day" exists in angels by means of the illuminating effects of grace. Consequently, morning and evening do not extend beyond the knowledge good angels have because of grace. Hence, their natural knowledge will be a third type. Second, evening as evening ends will morning, and morning ends will evening. Hence, not any knowledge of things in their own nature can be called evening knowledge, but only that which is referred to the praise of the Creator, because, in

this sense, evening returns to morning. Consequently, the knowledge demons have of things is neither morning nor evening. Therefore, these terms can be applied only to the knowledge angels have as a result of grace, and this knowledge is found only in the beatified angels.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Knowledge of things in their own nature is always evening knowledge. Its relation to knowledge in the Word does not make it morning, but makes it merely terminate in morning knowledge. Consequently, it should not be said that an angel has morning knowledge because he refers the knowledge he has of things in their own natures to the Word, as though this knowledge, being thus related, is morning knowledge. Rather, it is because he refers this knowledge that he merits to receive morning knowledge.

2. That argument proceeds as though morning were distinguished from evening knowledge on the part of the thing known. Then there would be three kinds of knowledge based on the three kinds of intelligible existence things have. However, morning is distinguished from evening knowledge entirely on the basis of the medium of knowledge, which is either created or uncreated, and the existence of things can be known through either of these mediums. Hence, there is no need for postulating a third kind of knowledge.

3. All knowledge had in the Word is called morning knowledge, whether the thing known is already created or not. The reason for this is that such knowledge is similar to God's knowledge who will out difference of manner knows all things before they are created just as He knows them after they are created.

However, all knowledge of things in the Word is of them as they are to be created whether they are already created or not. Consequently, are to be created does not signify time but merely the fact that a creature has to leave the hands of its Creator. It is like the knowledge had of a work of art by means of an artistic conception: it concerns the thing in its coming to be, even after the thing has been made.

4. Augustine calls that knowledge morning which is in full light and, for this reason, includes noon. Consequently, he sometimes calls it day knowledge, sometimes morning knowledge. Or, one could reply that all the intellectual knowledge had by angels is mixed with shadows

as far as the knower is concerned. Consequently, no knowledge had by an angelic intellect should be called noonday knowledge, but only that by which God knows all things in Himself.

5. The Word and things in the Word are known by the same knowledge. Hence, knowledge of the Word is also called morning knowledge. This is evident, because the seventh day, which signifies the day when God rested in Himself, has a morning. Hence, morning knowledge is had in so far as an angel knows God.

6. The answer is clear from what has been said.

QUESTION 9: The Communication of Angelic Knowledge

ARTICLE I: DOES ONE ANGEL ILLUMINE ANOTHER?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 106, x; x 1; II Sentences 9, I, 2; Ix, 2, 2; Comp. Theol., I, c. 126.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. As Augustine says, only God can perfect a mind. But the illumination of an angel is, in a way, perfecting of the mind of the person illumined. Hence, only God can illumine an angel.

2. There are no lights in angels other than those of nature and of grace. Now, one angel does not illumine another by the light of nature, because every angel has his powers directly from God, nor does one angel illumine another by the light of grace, because grace also comes directly from God alone. Consequently, one angel cannot illumine another.

3. As a body is related to material light, so is a spirit related to spiritual light. Now, a body illuminated by a very bright light is not illuminated simultaneously by a weaker light. For example, air illuminated by the light of the sun is not illuminated at the same time by the moon. Consequently, since God's spiritual light surpasses any created light more than the light of the sun surpasses that of a star or of a candle, it seems one angel is not illumined by another, simply because all angels are illumined by God.

4. If one angel illumines another, he does this either through a medium or directly. But he cannot do it directly, because then he would have to be joined directly to the angel he is to illumine; and only God can be joined to minds in this manner. On the other hand, he cannot illumine another angel through a medium. He cannot illumine by means of a material medium, because such a medium cannot receive a spiritual light. Nor can he illumine by means of a spiritual medium, because this medium would have to be an angel, and then an infinite series would arise, and illumination would be utterly impossible, for it is impossible to pass through an infinite. And, if we finally arrive at a point where one angel directly illumines another, this has already been shown to be impossible. Consequently, it is impossible for one angel to illumine another.

5. If one angel illumines another, he does this by giving him either his own light or some other light. But he does not do it in the first manner, because, in that case, one and the same light would be in two different illuminated beings; nor does he do it in the second manner, because that light then would have to be made by the higher angel; and from this it would

follow that he created that light, since such a light is not made out of matter. Therefore, it seems that one angel does not illumine another.

6. If one angel is to be illumined by another, then the illumined angel must be reduced from potency to act, because to be illumined is a kind of becoming. But whenever a thing is reduced from potency to act, something in it must undergo corruption. Now, since nothing in angels can corrupt, it seems that one angel is not illumined by another.

7. If one angel is illumined by another, the light which one gives to the other is either a substance or an accident. Now, it cannot be a substance, because, as Aristotle says, when a substantial form is added to a thing, it changes the species of the thing, just as an added unit changes the species of a number; hence, it would follow that an angel, by the fact of being illumined, would undergo a specific change. Similarly, this light cannot be an accident, because an accident does not extend beyond its subject. Hence, one angel does not illumine another.

8. Our sensible and intellectual vision needs light, because its object is only potentially visible and potentially intelligible, but, by means of light, becomes actually visible and actually intelligible. Now, the object of angelic knowledge is actually intelligible, because it is the divine essence itself or co-created species. Consequently, angels do not need intellectual light in order to know.

9. If one angel illumines another, he illumines him with respect to either natural or gratuitous knowledge. However, he does not illumine him with respect to natural knowledge, because the natural knowledge had by both higher and lower angels is made perfect through innate forms; nor does he illumine him with respect to the gratuitous knowledge by which angels know things in the Word, because all angels see the Word directly. Consequently, one angel does not illumine another.

10. For intellectual knowledge, all that is required is an intelligible form and an intelligible light. Now, one angel does not give another angel intelligible forms, which are co-created, nor does he give him an intelligible light, because every angel is illumined by God, as we read in Job (25: 3): "Is there any numbering of his soldiers? and upon whom shall not his light arise?" Therefore, one angel does not illumine another.

11. The purpose of illumination is to dispel darkness. But there is no darkness or obscurity in angelic knowledge. Consequently, the Gloss reads: "In the region of intelligible substances,"—clearly a reference to the regions where angels dwell—"the mind sees truth clearly, without any corporeal images, and not obscured by the mists of false opinion." Hence, one angel is not illumined by another.

12. An angelic intellect is more noble than the active intellect of our soul. But the active intellect of our soul only illumines; it is never illumined. Therefore, angels are not illumined.

13. We read the following in the Apocalypse (21:23): "And the city hath no need of the sun, nor of the moon, to shine in it. For the glory of God hath enlightened it..." The Gloss expounds this text as referring to the principal and minor Doctors of the Church. Therefore, since an angel is already a citizen of that city, he is illumined only by God.

14. If one angel illumines another, he does this either through the abundance of the light given to him by his nature or through the abundance of light given him gratuitously. Now, one angel cannot illumine another through the abundance of his natural light, because the angel who fell belonged to the highest angels, and possessed the highest natural gifts, which, as Dionysius says, remained with him in their full strength. Consequently, a demon would be able to illumine an angel, and this is clearly absurd. Nor does one angel illumine another.

through the abundance of light given him gratuitously, because some men still living possess more grace than the lower angels do; in deed, because of their grace, they will be elevated to the ranks of the higher angels. Hence, a man still living could illumine an angel, and this is equally absurd. Therefore, one angel does not illumine another.

15. Dionysius says: "To be illumined is to receive divine knowledge." Now, divine knowledge can be only that knowledge which is about God or divine things; and, in either case, angels can receive such knowledge only from God. Consequently, one angel does not illumine another.

16. Since the potency of an angelic intellect is entirely terminated by means of innate forms, these forms suffice for an angel to know all that he can know. Consequently, an angel should not need to be illumined by a higher angel in order to know something.

17. All angels, or at least those belonging to different orders, differ specifically from one another. Now, nothing is illumined by a light belonging to another species; for example, a material thing is not illumined by a light that is spiritual. Therefore, one angel is not illumined by another.

18. The light of an angel's intellect is more perfect than the light of our active intellect. But the light of our active intellect suffices for us to know all the species we receive from our senses. Therefore, the light of an angel's intellect is also sufficient for an angel to know all his innate species; consequently, no other light need be added to him.

To the Contrary:

1'. Dionysius says that the angelic hierarchy is divided into "those who are illumined and those who illumine." Therefore.

2'. Just as there is a hierarchy among men, so is there a hierarchy among angels. This is clear from what Dionysius has written. Now, among men, superiors enlighten inferiors. For example, St. Paul says in the Epistle to the Ephesians (3:8-9): "To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace, to preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to enlighten all men..." Therefore, superior angels likewise illumine inferior angels.

3'. Spiritual light is more efficacious than material light. But higher bodies illumine lower bodies. Therefore, higher angels illumine lower angels.

REPLY:

We should discuss intellectual light in terms of its resemblance to material light. Now, material light is a medium by which we can see things, serving our sense of sight in two ways: first, it makes things actually visible that were previously only potentially visible; second, its nature helps the sense of sight to see. Consequently, light must be in the very composition of the organ.

Similarly, intellectual light can be said to be the power of knowing which the intellect possesses, or even that thing by which another thing becomes known to us. There are two ways, therefore, in which a person can be illumined by another: first, his intellect can be strengthened for the acts of knowledge; second, it can be guided by something to the knowledge of some other thing. Both of these actions are found together in the intellect; and we have a clear case of both of them happening together when the medium which a person mentally conceives strengthens his intellect to see some things which it previously could not see.

Accordingly, one intellect is said to be illumined by another in so far as the latter gives it some medium of knowledge, which strengthens it, and enables it to know some things which

it previously could not know. Now, among men this takes place in two ways. First, it takes place through speech, as happens when a teacher, by what he says, gives some medium to his student that strengthens the latter's intellect, enabling him to know things which he previously could not. In this sense, a teacher is said to enlighten his pupil. Second, a person can be given a sensible sign, and this can lead him to the knowledge of some truth. In this sense, according to Dionysius, priests are said to enlighten the people, inasmuch as they display and administer to them the mysteries which lead them to divine truths.

Angels, however, do not arrive at the knowledge of divine truths by means of sensible signs; nor do they receive intellectual media in a successive and discursive way, as we do, but immaterially. This is also what Dionysius held; for, when showing how the higher angels are illumined, he writes: "The highest essences, the angels, contemplate, [not] by gazing on symbols that can be known by the senses or intellect, nor by being led to God by the elaborations found in the Scriptures, but by being filled with the higher light of spiritual knowledge. Consequently, for one angel to be illumined by another means simply this, that, through something seen in a higher angel, a lower angel's intellect is strengthened to know other things.

This can take place in the following manner. Just as among bodies, higher bodies are, as it were, act with respect to lower bodies (as fire is, will respect to air), so a higher spirit is act, as it were, will respect to lower spirits. Now, every potency is strengthened and made perfect by being joined to its act. For this reason, lower bodies are preserved in higher bodies, which are the place of the former. Similarly, therefore, the lower angels can be strengthened by their being connected with the higher, and this connection takes place through intellectual intuition. For this reason, the lower angels are said to be illumined by the higher.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Augustine is speaking of that ultimate perfecting by which the mind is perfected with grace; and grace comes directly from God.
- 2.** The illumining angel does not make a new light of grace or of nature; he merely shares his light. For, since whatever is known is understood by means of an intellectual light, the known as known includes in its notion a shared intellectual light that has the power to strengthen the intellect. This is evident if we consider the teacher who gives his pupil a medium of demonstration in which the light of the active intellect is contained as in an instrument; for, as the Commentator says, first principles are quasi-instruments of the active intellect; and the same is true of all second principles which contain their own means of demonstration. Consequently, when a higher angel shows his knowledge to another angel, the intellect of the latter is strengthened so that it knows what it previously did not. Hence, no new light of nature or of grace comes into existence in the enlightened angel, but the light that was there previously is strengthened by the light contained in the higher angel's knowledge.
- 3.** Material and spiritual light are not entirely similar. For all bodies can be illumined by any material light whatsoever, since all material light is equally related to all visible forms; but not all spirits can be illumined by any light whatsoever, because not all lights contain intelligible forms in the same manner. The supreme light contains intelligible forms that are more universal. Consequently, it is not sufficient for an inferior intellect to be illumined by a higher light, since such an intellect is proportioned to receive its knowledge through forms that are more particular. To be led to the knowledge of things, this intellect must be illumined by an inferior light, as, of course, takes place in the case of men. For example, a metaphysician knows all things in their universal principles. A doctor, however, considers things especially in their particulars; hence, he does not take his principles directly from a metaphysician but directly from a philosopher of nature, whose principles are less general than those of a

metaphysician. However, the natural philosopher, who considers things more universally than the doctor does, can take the principles for his science directly from the metaphysician. Consequently, since the intelligible characters of all things are united in the highest degree in the light of the divine intellect, as in single most universal principle, the lower angels are not proportioned to receive knowledge through such a light, unless there is joined to them the light of the higher angels, in whom the intelligible forms are made less universal.

4. An angel illumines another angel, sometimes through a medium, sometimes without a medium. Illumination through a medium (which is, of course, spiritual) takes place, for example, when a very high angel illumines an angel that stands halfway in the angelic hierarchy, and when the latter, by means of the light given him by the first, illumines an angel in the lowest part of the hierarchy. On the other hand, illumination without a medium takes place when, for example, a superior angel illumines an angel existing immediately below him in the hierarchy. It is not necessary that the angel who illumines be directly joined to the mind of the angel who is enlightened; the two are joined together simply by the fact that one intuitively knows the other directly.

5. The medium that is known by the lower angel is numerically the same as that which is known by the higher; but the knowledge which the higher angel has of that medium is other than that which the lower angel has. Consequently, in some sense, it is the same light, and, in another sense, it is another light. But even in the sense that it is another light it does not follow that it is created by the higher angel, because things which do not exist substantially do not, properly speaking, come into existence, just as they do not exist substantially. For example, as we read in the Metaphysics, it is not colour but a colored thing that comes into existence. Consequently, the angel's light does not come into existence, but the illumined angel, from being potentially enlightened, becomes actually enlightened.

6. Just as no form is removed but only the privation of light, namely, darkness, is removed when material illumination takes place, so does a similar removal take place in spiritual illumination. Consequently, it is not necessary for any corruption to take place when spiritual illumination occurs. There is merely a removal of a negation.

7. That light by which an angel is said to be illumined is not one of his essential perfections but a second perfection, which is reduced to the genus of accidents. Moreover, it does not follow that the accident extends beyond its subject, because the knowledge by which the higher angel is enlightened is not numerically the same as that which is in the lower angel. Their knowledge is the same merely in so far as it has the same nature and belongs to the same species, just as the light which is in illuminated air and that which is in the illumining sun is specifically, but not numerically, the same.

8. It is true that through light a thing which was potentially intelligible becomes actually so, but this can happen in two ways. First, it may be that that which is in itself only potentially intelligible becomes actually intelligible. This happens in our knowledge. But in this respect an angelic intellect does not need light, for it does not abstract species from phantasms. Secondly, it may be that that which is potentially intelligible to some particular knower becomes actually intelligible to him. This takes place, for example, when the higher substances become actually intelligible to us, that is, when we arrive at knowledge of them by reasoning. It is for such knowledge that an angel's intellect needs light, that is, so it can be led to the actual knowledge of those things which it knows only potentially.

9. The illumination by which one angel illumines another does not concern those things that belong to angels' natural knowledge, because, in that case, all the angels would have perfect natural knowledge from the moment when they first existed—unless we held that the higher angels caused the lower, and this position is contrary to faith. It concerns, rather, the

knowledge that is revealed to angels and the things that surpass their natural knowledge, for example, mysteries pertaining to the Church in heaven or on earth. Hence, Dionysius also speaks of a hierarchical action among angels. Moreover, it does not follow from the fact that all angels see the Word that, whatever the higher angels see there, the lower also see.

When one angel is enlightened by another, new species are not infused into him, but, by the very same species which he had previously, his intellect is strengthened through a higher light, and, in the manner described, it is enabled to know more things. Similarly, when our intellect is strengthened by divine or angelic light, from the same phantasms it can come to know more things than it could know if left unaided.

11. Although there is no obscurity or error in angels' intellects, angels do not know things which surpass their natural powers of knowing. For this reason, they need light.

12. No matter how material a thing is, it does not receive something else according to what is formal in itself, but only according to what is material in it. For example, our soul does not receive an illumination according to its active intellect but only according to its possible intellect. Similarly, material things do not receive impressions according to their own forms but merely according to their own matter. Yet our possible intellect is more simple than any material form. Similarly, an angel's intellect is illumined only with respect to that which it possesses potentially even though it is more noble than our active intellect, which is not illumined.

13. That text should be understood as referring to the things that belong to the knowledge the blessed have. Without any intermediary God illumines all angels about these things.

14. The illumination of which we are speaking takes place through the light of grace, which perfects natural light. Moreover, it would not follow that a man, still in this life, could illumine an angel, because he possesses greater grace only virtually, not actually. He has merely grace, by which he can merit a more perfect state, just as, in the same sense, a colt, immediately after birth, is said to have greater strength than an ass, even though its strength is actually less.

15. When we say that to be illumined is to receive divine knowledge, this knowledge is called divine merely because it has its origin in a divine enlightenment.

16. Innate forms are sufficient for an angel to know all that he can know naturally; but, to know those things that are above his natural powers, he needs a higher light.

17. It is not necessary for the intelligible lights existing in angels, who are specifically different, to be specifically different themselves. For example, colour existing in bodies that are specifically different is nevertheless specifically the same. The same principle is especially true of the light of grace, which is specifically the same both in men and in angels.

18. The light of the active intellect is sufficient for us to know those things that can be known naturally; but, to know other things, we need a higher light, such as that of faith or of prophecy.

ARTICLE II: IS AN INFERIOR ANGEL ALWAYS ILLUMINED BY A SUPERIOR ANGEL OR IS HE SOMETIMES ILLUMINED DIRECTLY BY GOD?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 107; II Sentences 3, 1, ad 4; 9, I, 2, ad 3-4.

Difficulties:

It seems that he is illumined directly by God, for

1. An inferior angel is in potency to receiving grace in his will and illuminations in his intellect. Now, he receives only as much grace from God as he is capable of receiving. Therefore, he receives only as much illumination from God as he is capable of receiving. Consequently, he is directly illumined by God, and not through an intermediate angel.
2. Just as superior angels stand midway between God and the inferior angels, so do the inferior angels stand midway between superior angels and men. Now, the superior angels sometimes illumine us directly. For example, a Seraph illumined Isaias (Isaias 6:6). Consequently, the inferior angels also are sometimes illumined directly by God.
3. Just as there is a definite order of spiritual substances, so is there also a definite order of material substances. But God's power some times acts directly on material things, passing over intermediate causes. For example, He sometimes raises a person from the dead without the co-operation of a celestial body. Consequently, He sometimes illumines inferior angels without the services of superior angels.
4. Whatever a lower power can do a high power can. Therefore, if higher angel can illumine a lower angel, God can certainly illumine the lower angel directly. Hence, it is not necessary that God's illuminations should always be given to lower angels by means of higher.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. Dionysius says that God has established an unchangeable law that lower beings be led back to God through the mediation of higher beings. Consequently, God never directly illumines lower angels.
- 2'. Just as angels are, by their very nature, superior to bodies, so are the higher angels, by their very nature, superior to the lower. Now, in matters related to God's rule over material things, He never causes anything to happen without the ministry of His angels. This is clear from what Augustine has written. Consequently, God likewise never causes anything to happen in lower angels without the ministry of the higher.
- 3'. Lower bodies are not moved by higher except through media. For example, the earth is moved by the heavens through the mediation of air. Now, the order of spirits resembles that of bodies. Consequently, the highest spirits do not illumine the lower except by means of intermediate spirits.

REPLY:

Because of His goodness, God communicates His perfections to creatures according to their capacity. Consequently, He shares His goodness with them, not only so that they will be good and perfect themselves, but also so that they can, with God's help, give perfection to others. Now, to give perfection to other creatures is the most noble way of imitating God. Hence, Dionysius says: "The most God-like of all actions is to cooperate with God." On this principle rests the ordering of angels, according to which some illumine others.

There have, however, been several opinions on this ordering. Some think that this order is so firmly fixed that nothing can happen outside of it, and it is always and in all cases preserved. Others, however, concede that this ordering is stable, but say that, while events usually happen according to it, it is sometimes passed over by the action of necessary causes—as when, by God's dispensation, even the natural course of things is changed, and a new cause springs into being, as clearly takes place in miracles.

But the first opinion seems to be more logical for three reasons. First, it belongs to the dignity of higher angels that the lower should be illumined through them. It would detract from their

dignity if the lower angels were sometimes illumined without their ministry. Second, the closer beings are to God, who is most unchangeable, the more unchangeable should they themselves be. For this reason, bodies here below, standing at a great distance from God, are sometimes defective in their natural action, while celestial bodies always preserve the motion prescribed by their natures. Consequently, it does not seem reasonable that the ordering of celestial spirits, who are closest to God, should sometimes be changed. Third, God does not make any change in the things of nature except for something better, namely, for something pertaining to grace or glory. But there is no state higher than the states of glory by which the orders of angels are distinguished from each other. Therefore, it does not seem reasonable that matters concerning the order of angels should sometimes be changed.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** God gives grace and illuminations to angels according to their capacity. This difference, however, that, because grace pertains to the will, He gives grace to all of them directly; for there is no ordering in angels' wills whereby one could act upon another. But God's illuminations descend from Him to the lowest angels by means of the angels standing at the top and middle of the hierarchy.
- 2.** Dionysius gives two answers to this difficulty. First, the angel that was sent to cleanse the lips of the prophet belonged to the inferior angels, but, by equivocation, was called a Seraph since he cleansed the prophet's lips by burning them with a glowing coal brought from the altar by tongs; hence, he was said to be a Seraph only because he burned or set on fire. Dionysius' second answer is that this angel, belonging to a lower order, cleansed the lips of the prophet because he did not intend to summon him to himself but to God and a higher angel since he acted by the power of both. This is why he showed the prophet the higher angel and God. Similarly, a bishop is also said to absolve a person when a priest absolves by the bishop's authority. Following this interpretation, we need not say that this angel was called a Seraph by equivocation or that a Seraph illumined the prophet directly.
- 3.** The course of nature can have a more noble state; hence, it is proper for it to be changed at times. But there is nothing more noble than the state of glory. Therefore, no parallel can be drawn.
- 4.** It is not because of any defect in God's power or in that of the higher angels that God and the higher angels illumine the lower through the mediation of angels between them and the lower angels. This order is kept merely to preserve the dignity and perfection of all; and this demands that many co-operate with God in the same action.

ARTICLE III: DOES ONE ANGEL CLEANSE ANOTHER WHEN HE ILLUMINES HIM?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 106, 2, ad I; I-II, 112, I, ad 3; II Sentences 3, 3.2. See also readings given for q. 9, a. 5.

Difficulties:

It seems that he does not, for

- 1.** To be cleansed is to be freed from impurity. But there is no impurity in angels; consequently, one angel cannot cleanse another.

2. But it was said that this cleansing is not from sin but from ignorance or lack of knowledge.—On the contrary, since such ignorance cannot be the result of any sin in the beatified angels, for they have no sin, it must be the result of nature. Now, those things that are natural cannot be removed while the nature remains. Consequently, an angel cannot be freed of his ignorance.

3. Illumination dispels darkness. Now, the only darkness which makes sense in regard to angels is the darkness of ignorance or of lack of understanding. Consequently, if their ignorance is removed when they are cleansed, their being cleansed and their being illumined come to the same thing, and the two should not be distinguished.

4. But it was said that illumination is referred to the end-term, while cleansing is referred to the initial term.—On the contrary, in no way of taking them is there found a term that is other than the end-term or the initial term. Consequently, if those two hierarchical actions, purgation and illumination, are distinguished according as one is referred to the initial term and the other to the end-term, a third hierarchical action cannot be posited; but to deny such a third action is to oppose Dionysius, who places the action of perfecting third.

5. As long as a thing is in the state of progression, it is not yet perfect. But, as the Master of the Sentences says, angels knowledge grows in some way until judgment day. Hence, at the present time, one angel cannot perfect another.

6. Illumination is the cause of perfecting, just as it is the cause of cleansing. Now, a cause must be prior to its effect. Therefore, just as illumination precedes perfection, so does it also precede purgation if the purgation be from ignorance.

To the Contrary:

Dionysius distinguishes and orders these actions in this manner, saying: "The hierarchical order is such that some angels are cleansed, others do the cleansing, some are illumined, others illumine, some are perfected, others do the perfecting."

REPLY:

In angels those three actions pertain merely to their reception of knowledge; for this reason Dionysius says: "Purgation, perfection, and illumination are the reception of divine knowledge." However, the distinction between them should be understood in the following manner. Two terms can be found in any generation or change, namely, the initial term and the end-term. Both, however, are found in different ways in different changes.

In some changes the initial term is something contrary to the perfection to be acquired. For example, blackness is the contrary of the whiteness acquired when a thing becomes white. On the other hand, sometimes the perfection to be acquired does not have a contrary directly, but the dispositions existing in the subject before the change are contrary to the dispositions ordered to the perfection to be introduced. This condition is found, for example, when a soul is infused into a body. Again, it sometimes happens that nothing is presupposed for the introduction of the form except a privation or negation. For example, in air that is to be illumined only darkness precedes; and this is removed by the presence of light.

Similarly, there is at times only one end-term. For example, the end term of the process of whitening is whiteness only. At other times, there are two end-terms, one of which is directed to the other. This is clearly the case when elements undergo change: one end-term is a disposition which demands a form, the other is the substantial form itself.

Now, in the reception of knowledge, we find the diversity mentioned above with respect to its initial term, because sometimes, before a person receives knowledge, there exists in him an

error contrary to it. Again, at times there are in him beforehand only contrary dispositions, such as impurity of soul, an immoderate occupation will sense objects, or something of this nature. Again, at other times, there may be in him beforehand only a privation or negation of the knowledge, such as exists in us whose knowledge increases from day to day. It is in this last-named sense that we should understand the initial term of illumination in angels.

Moreover, we find that there are two end-terms in the reception of knowledge. The first is that by which the intellect is perfected in order to know something. This end-term may be either an intelligible form, an intelligible light, or any medium of cognition whatsoever. The second end-term is the knowledge itself, which follows; and this is the final term in the reception of knowledge.

In angels, cleansing takes place through the simple removal of ignorance in the manner described; for this reason Dionysius says: "To receive divine knowledge is to be cleansed of ignorance." The illumination, however, takes place in the first end-term. Hence, Dionysius also says that angels are illumined in so far as something is manifested to them "through a higher illumination." Finally, "perfection" takes place in the ultimate end-term; and, for this reason, Dionysius says: "They are perfected by the light of resplendent knowledge." In other words, illumination and perfection are understood to differ as the in forming of the sense of sight by a species of what is seen differs from the knowledge of the thing seen.

Drawing an analogy from the principles laid down above, Dionysius writes that the order of the deacons is to purify neophytes in the faith, that of priests is to illumine them, and that of bishops, to perfect them. He said this because deacons exercise their office over catechumens and those possessed by the devils; and, in these persons, there are dispositions contrary to illumination which are removed by the deacons ministry. The duty of priests, however, is to teach and communicate the mysteries of the faith to the people; for these are, as it were, means for leading us to God. Finally, the duty of bishops is to uncover the spiritual riches that were concealed in the mystical symbols.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** As Dionysius says, the cleansing of angels is to be understood as a cleansing, not from any impurity, but from lack of knowledge.
- 2.** A negation or defect is said to be natural in two senses. In the first, it is said to be natural because the presence of such a negation is, as it were, due to nature. For example, not having an intellect is natural to an ass. Now, this kind of natural defect is never removed as long as the nature itself remains. In the second sense, however, a negation is said to be natural because to have some certain perfection is not due to nature. This kind of a negation is found especially when a faculty of the nature is notable to acquire a perfection of the sort mentioned. Such natural defects can be removed. For example, the ignorance boys have is removed, and our lack of glory is removed by the bestowal of glory. Similarly, the ignorance angels have can be removed.
- 3.** Illumination and cleansing are related to each other in the acquisition of knowledge by angels as generation and corruption are related in the acquisition of a natural form. Needless to say, generation and corruption are one in so far as they are in one subject, but they differ in their formal character.
- 4.** The reply is clear from what has been said.
- 5.** In our proposition, perfection is not taken as referring to all the knowledge an angel has, but only to a single act of knowledge; and he is perfected by this when he is led to the knowledge of some particular thing.

6. Just as form is, in some way, the cause of matter inasmuch as it gives matter actual existence, so, in some way, matter is the cause of form inasmuch as it sustains the form. Similarly, the things coming from form are, in a certain sense, prior to those coming from matter, but in the case of some the opposite is true. Now, because privation is related to matter, the removal of the privation is naturally prior to the introduction of the form according to the order in which matter is prior to form, namely, the order of generation. But the introduction of the form is prior according to that order in which the form is prior to matter, namely, the order of perfection. The same argument can be applied to the orders of illumination and perfection.

ARTICLE IV: DOES ONE ANGEL SPEAK TO ANOTHER?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 107, I; io8, 5, ad 5; io8, 6; 109, II Sentences 1, 2, 3; in I Cor., c. 13, lectura 1.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. Commenting on the words of Job (28: 17), "Gold or crystal can not equal it," Gregory says: "In heaven everyone will be seen by others as now he does not even see himself." But while on earth a person does not have to speak to himself in order to know his own idea. Consequently, in heaven it will not be necessary for him to speak to another so that he can know it. Hence, speech is unnecessary for beatified angels.
2. In the same passage, Gregory writes: "When one's face is seen, in the same instant, his conscience will be penetrated." Therefore, in heaven speech is not required for one person to know another's concept.
3. Referring to angels, Maximus writes as follows: "When spiritual creatures meet and leave each other, one knows far more clearly what the other wishes to convey than were they to speak to each other. For, in some way, they silently discuss things and communicate their thoughts to each other." Now, since silence is opposed to speech, angels know what other angels want to signify, without having to speak.
4. All speech takes place through signs. Now, a sign must be some thing that can be sensed, because, as is said in the Sentences: "A sign is that which, besides impressing a species upon the senses, makes something else known." Consequently, since angels do not receive their knowledge from sensible things, they do not receive it by means of signs, and, hence, not through speech.
5. A sign seems to be something that is more known to us but less known according to nature. Accordingly, the Commentator distinguishes between a demonstration through a sign and a perfect demonstration, the latter being a demonstration which is causal. Now, angels do not receive their knowledge from things posterior in nature, consequently, not from signs. Hence, they do not receive knowledge by means of speech.
6. In all speech the speaker must arouse his listener to attention to his words, which, in our case, are produced by the voice of the speaker. But to listen to words of this kind is impossible for an angel. Therefore, speech is likewise impossible for him.
7. As Plato says, speech was given to us so we could know signs of others wills. But one angel knows the signs of another angel's will by knowing himself, because these signs are spiritual, and, by the same knowledge, an angel knows all spiritual things. Hence, since one

angel knows the spiritual nature of another angel by knowing himself in the same way he knows his will. Therefore, he has no need of speech.

8. The forms within an angelic intellect are ordered to the knowledge of things, as in God the intelligible characters of things are ordered to their production, for angels intellectual forms resemble these characters. Now, all things and whatever exists in a thing, whether it be interior or exterior, are produced by means of these intelligible characters. Therefore, when an angel knows another angel by means of the forms within his own intellect, he also knows all that is within that angel; and, as a consequence, he knows that angel's thought. Hence, the same must be said as before.

9. We have two kinds of speech, namely, internal and external. Now, we do not say that there is external speech in angels, because, if this were true, angels would have to form vocal speech to speak to each other. However, as Anselm and Augustine say, "Internal speech is nothing other than thought." Therefore, it is not necessary to assert that there exists in angels any kind of speech other than thought.

10. Avicenna says that we speak because we have a multitude of desires. This evidently arises from our many needs, because, as Augustine remarks, we desire a thing only if we do not have it. Now, since we cannot say that angels need many things, we cannot say that they speak to one another.

11. One angel cannot know another's thought through its essence, because it is not present through its essence, to the other's intellect. Hence, he must know the other's thought by means of a species. Now, of himself, an angel is able to know, by means of innate species, all that naturally exists in another angel. For the same reason, therefore, through these same species he knows all that takes place by the will of the other angel. Hence, it does not seem necessary to affirm the existence of speech in angels in order that one can make his thought known to another.

12. Signs and nods are directed to the sense of sight, not to that of hearing, but speech is directed to the sense of hearing. Now, angels indicate their thought "by signs and nods," for this is how the Gloss explains that verse in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1:1): "If I speak will the tongues of men and of angels..." Therefore, angels do not use speech to communicate.

13. Speech is a motion of a cognitive power. Now, the motion of a cognitive power terminates in the soul, not in something outside. Therefore, through speech, an angel is not directed to the manifestation of his thought to another angel.

14. In all speech something unknown should be manifested by means of what is known. For example, we manifest our concepts by means of sensible sounds. Now, we cannot say that this is possible for angels, because, as Dionysius says, the nature of an angel, naturally known by other angels, has no shape. Hence, there is nothing in an angel's nature that can be used to indicate what is not known about it. Consequently, for angels speech is impossible.

15. Angels are spiritual lights. But when light is seen it totally manifests itself. Therefore, when an angel is seen, whatever is in him is totally known. Consequently, there is no need for speech among angels.

To the Contrary:

1'. We read in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:1): "If I speak will the tongues of men and of angels..." Now, tongues would be useless were there not speech. Consequently, angels speak.

2'. As Boethius says, what a lower power can do a higher power also can. Now, men can reveal their thoughts to other men. Therefore, angels can do the same. However, to reveal one's thought means to speak it. Hence, angels possess speech.

3'. Damascene says: "In their discourses, which are not oral, angels tell each other what their wills are, and also what are their plans and their thoughts." Now, discourse can be had only through speech. Therefore, angels possess the power of speech.

REPLY:

There must be some kind of speech among angels, for, as we proved earlier, one angel does not have direct and particular knowledge of what lies hidden in the heart of another; consequently, an angel must have some way of manifesting his thought to another. This way can be called angelic speech, for what we call speech in our own case is simply the manifestation of an interior word, which we mentally conceive.

We can understand how angels manifest their concepts to one another if we study the resemblance their speech has to things in nature, because, as Boethius says, forms in nature are quasi-images of immaterial things. Now, we find that a form exists in matter in three ways. First, it can exist imperfectly, that is, in a mode halfway between potency and act. This, for example, is how forms exist that are coming into existence. Second, it can exist in perfect act; and I mean a perfection such that the being having it is perfected in itself. Third, it can exist in perfect act in such a way that the being having the form also can communicate this perfection to another. Some things are bright themselves, but cannot illumine other things.

Intelligible forms exist in the intellect in a similar way. First, they can exist, as it were, halfway between potency and act, as a form possessed habitually. Second, they may exist in perfect act with respect to the knower. This is true when a knower actually thinks according to a form which he has within himself. Third, they may exist with a relation to some other being; and their transition from one being to the other (a transition, as it were, from potency to act) is made through the will. For the will of an angel causes him to turn actually to the forms he possesses, as it were, habitually; and, similarly, it makes his intellect actually more perfect with respect to the form within him, so that the angel is perfected, not only by this intellectual form itself, but also by the relation it has to another angel. When this takes place, his thought is perceived by the other angels; and, in this sense, one angel is said to speak to another.

We would have the same way of speaking if our intellect could be directed to intelligibles without having to have recourse to media; but, because it is the nature of our intelligence to receive from the senses, sensible signs are used to express our interior concepts, and by these signs we manifest our heart's thoughts.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Gregory's statement can be understood of both physical and spiritual vision; for in heaven, after the bodies of the saints have been glorified, a saint will be able to see with his physical eyes the interior of another's body—something which is now impossible. It will be possible then, because glorified bodies will in some way be transparent. For this reason, Gregory compares them to glass. Similarly, one will be able to see with his spiritual eyes whether or not another person has charity, and, if so, how much he possesses—something which is like will impossible now. From this it does not follow, however, that one will be able to know the actual thoughts of another, because these depend on the will.

2. The conscience is said to be penetrated, but this is with respect to its habits, not to its actual thoughts.

3. In this statement, silence is opposed to oral speech such as we have, not to spiritual speech such as angels have.
4. A thing cannot be called a sign in the proper sense unless one can come to know something else as if by reasoning from it. In this sense, signs do not exist among angels, because, as we proved in the previous question, angels knowledge is not discursive. The signs we use are sensible, because our knowledge, which is discursive, has its origin in sense-objects. But we commonly call anything a sign which, being known, leads to the knowledge of something else; and for this reason an intelligible form can be called a sign of the thing which is known by its means. It is in this sense that angels know things through signs; and thus one angel speaks to another by means of signs, that is, through a species which actuates his intellect and puts it perfectly in relation to the other.
5. Although it is true that in natural things, whose effects are more known to us than their causes are, a sign is that which is posterior in nature, the notion of a sign, even properly speaking, is not such that a sign need be prior or posterior in nature, but only that it must be known previously by us. For this reason, at times we take effects as signs of causes, as when we judge health from the pulse, and at other times we take causes as signs of effects, as we take the dispositions of heavenly bodies as signs of stormy weather and rain.
6. When angels turn to others, as long as they put some of their intelligible forms into an actual relation to these others, the angels may be said to be arousing others attention to them.
7. It is true that an angel knows all spiritual things with the same kind of knowledge, that is, intellectually. But whether the knowledge of a thing comes through knowing oneself or through knowing some thing else concerns, not the type of knowledge, but only the manner in which this knowledge has been received. Hence, even if one angel knows the nature of another angel by knowing himself, it does not follow that he also knows the speech of the other in the same manner, because the thought of one angel is not as intelligible to another as his nature is.
8. That reasoning would follow if the intellectual forms in an angel were as efficacious for the knowledge of things as the intelligible characters of things in God are for their production. But this is not true, since a creature is not in any respect equal to God.
9. Although angels do not speak exteriorly as we do, namely, through sensible signs, they do speak exteriorly in another manner. The direction of their thoughts to other angels can be called exterior angelic speech.
10. A multitude of desires is said to be the cause of speech merely because desires give rise to a multitude of concepts and these concepts could be expressed only by signs that differ greatly. Now, animals have just a few concepts, which they can express by a few natural signs. But, since angels have many concepts, they need speech. However, their having many concepts is a sign of no desire other than that of one angel's wanting to communicate his mental conception to another angel; and this desire is not a sign that he is imperfect.
11. One angel knows the thought of another through the innate species by which he knows that other angel, because through this same species he knows all that he knows about the other angel. Consequently, as soon as one angel relates himself to another angel according to an act of some form, the other angel knows his thought; and this depends on the will of the first angel. But the knowability of the angelic nature does not depend on the will of the angel. Therefore, angels do not need speech to know the nature of other angels but only to know their thoughts.
12. According to Augustine, sight and hearing differ only exteriorly. Interiorly, in the mind, they are one and the same, because, in the mind, seeing and hearing do not differ. They differ

only as they are in the external senses. Consequently, in angels, who have only minds, there is no difference between seeing and hearing. However, angelic speech gets its name from its resemblance to what takes place in us, for we receive our knowledge from others through our sense of hearing. Moreover, we can distinguish between angelic nods and signs in the following way: the species may be called signs, and the reference of the species to others, nods. But the very ability to do this is called their speech.

13. Speech is a motion of a cognitive power; however, the motion is not in the cognition but in the manifestation of the cognition. Hence, this motion must have an order to another being. For this reason, the Philosopher also says: "Speech exists in order that one can signify something to another."

14. The essence of an angel does not have a material shape, but his intellect is, as it were, shaped by its intelligible forms.

15. Physical light manifests itself because of a natural necessity. Consequently, it manifests itself in the same way in regard to everything it contains. An angel, however, possesses a will; and his concepts can not be manifested unless his will commands that they be manifested. This is why an angel needs speech.

ARTICLE V: DO THE INFERIOR ANGELS SPEAK TO THE SUPERIOR?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 107, aa. 2-3; In I Cor., C. 13, *lectura* 1.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. In its explanation of that verse in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13: 1), "If I speak with the tongues of men and of angels," the Gloss reads as follows: "These tongues are the means by which the superior angels tell the inferior angels what they are first to learn about the will of God." Consequently, speech, an act of the tongue, belongs only to the higher angels.

2. Whenever anyone speaks, something takes place in his listener. Now, in the higher angels, nothing can take place that is caused by the lower, because the higher are not in potency with respect to the lower; rather, the opposite is true, since the superior angels have more act and less potency. Consequently, the lower angels cannot speak to the higher.

3. To the notion of thought speech adds that of infusing knowledge. But the lower angels cannot infuse anything into the higher angels, because in that case they would be acting upon them, and this is impossible. Therefore, the lower do not speak to the higher angels.

4. To illumine is simply to manifest something unknown. Now, angelic speech is for the manifestation of something unknown. Therefore, angelic speech is an illumination. Hence, since inferior angels do not illumine superior angels, it would seem that they also do not speak to them.

5. The angel to whom another angel speaks is in potency to knowing what is expressed in the speech, and, by means of this speech, he comes to know it actually. Consequently, the angel speaking reduces the one spoken to from potency to act. Now, this is not possible for inferior angels with respect to superior angels, because in that case the inferior angels would be more noble. Hence, inferior angels do not speak to superior angels.

6. One person teaches another if he tells him something that he did not know. Consequently, if inferior angels speak to superior angels about their concepts, which the superior are ignorant of, it would seem that they teach the superior angels, and thus perfect them, since, as Dionysius says, to teach is to perfect. But this would be contrary to the hierarchical order, according to which inferior angels are perfected by superior.

To the Contrary:

Gregory says: "God speaks to angels, and angels speak to God." On the same principle, therefore, superior angels can talk to the inferior, and inferior to the superior.

REPLY:

To resolve this question satisfactorily, we must consider how, in angels, illumination differs from speech; and this can be done in the following way. An intellect falls short of knowing something for two reasons. First, the knowable object may be absent. For example, we do not know what has happened in past times or in remote places, if these happenings have not come to our attention. Second, there may be a defect in the intellect. That is, the intellect may not be strong enough to arrive at those truths which it already has in its possession, as, for instance, the intellect has all conclusions within itself in possessing first principles naturally known, but it does not know those conclusions unless it is strengthened by exercise or instruction. Properly speaking, therefore, speech is that by which a person is led to the knowledge of the unknown, because, through speech, something becomes present to him that would otherwise be absent. We have an evident example of this in our own case when one person shows another what the other did not see, and thus, in some sense, makes this thing present to him by means of speech. On the other hand, illumination takes place when the intellect is merely strengthened to know something above that which it already knew. We have explained this previously.

It should be noted, however, that both angels and men can have speech without illumination, because sometimes a thing is shown to us through speech only, and this does not strengthen our intellect in any way for knowing more. For example, one can recite to me merely a historical narrative, or one angel can reveal merely his thought to another angel; such matters can be equally known or not known by one having a strong intellect as well as by one having a weak intellect. But illumination in angels and men always has speech joined to it. For we illumine another person inasmuch as we give him some means by which his intellect is strengthened to know something, and this strengthening takes place through speech. In angels, this must also take place through speech, because the superior angel has his knowledge about things through forms that are more universal. Consequently, the inferior angel is not proportioned to receive knowledge from the superior unless the latter in some way distinguishes and divides his knowledge by conceiving within himself that about which he wishes to illumine in such a way that it will be comprehensible to the lower angel, and by manifesting this concept to him when he illumines him.

Consequently, Dionysius says: "In its providence, every intellectual essence divides and multiplies what it understands by one form, given to it by a godlike being, so that these divisions may act as guiding analogies for those below." The same is true of the teacher who, seeing that his pupil cannot grasp things which he himself knows in the same way in which he knows them, makes a special effort to distinguish and multiply his knowledge by means of examples, so that his pupil will grasp his knowledge in this manner.

Hence, we must admit that angelic speech joined with illumination is found only when superior angels speak to inferior; but the other type of angelic speech is used both when inferior angels speak to superior and when superior speak to inferior.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The Gloss is referring here to angelic speech joined with an illumination.
2. The angel who speaks causes nothing in the angel to whom he is speaking. A change does take place, however, in himself; and, by reason of this change, he is known in the manner described above. Hence, there is no necessity for the angel speaking to infuse something into the one he is addressing.
3. The answer just given also solves the third difficulty.
4. The reply is evident from what has been said.
5. It is true that the angel to whom another angel speaks becomes an actual knower from being a potential knower; however, this takes place, not because he is reduced from potency to act, but because the angel who is speaking reduces himself from potency to act by making himself, will respect to some form, in perfect act according to an ordering to the other angel.
6. Properly speaking, teaching is applied only to those things which perfect an intellect. However, the fact that one angel knows the thoughts of another does not pertain to his intellectual perfection, just as it does not pertain to the perfection of my intellect if I learn about things that are not present to me and in no way concern me.

ARTICLE VI: IS A DETERMINATE LOCAL DISTANCE REQUIRED IN ORDER THAT ONE ANGEL CAN SPEAK TO ANOTHER?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 107,4; *II Sentences* I 2, 3, ad 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Whenever arrival and departure are involved, there is necessarily a determinate distance. But, as Maximus says, angels see each other's thoughts as they approach and depart from one another. Therefore.
2. According to Damascene, an angel is where he operates. Consequently, if he speaks to another angel, he must be where his listener is; hence, some determinate distance is involved.
3. We read in Isaias (6:3): "They cried one to another." Now, the only reason for making cries is that a distance separates us from the one to whom we are speaking. Therefore, it seems that distance impedes the speech of angels.
4. Speech must be carried from the one speaking to the one listening. Now, this is not possible unless local distance separates the angel speaking from the one listening, because spiritual speech cannot be carried by a material medium. Therefore, local distance impedes the speech of angels.
5. If Peter's soul were on earth, it would know the events taking place here; but, since it is in heaven, it does not. Hence, the gloss of Augustine on Isaias (63: i6), "Abraham hath not known us," says: "The dead"—even the saints—"do not know what the living are doing" their own sons. Consequently, local distance impedes the cognition of a separated soul, and, by the same reasoning, that of angels, and also their speech.

To the Contrary:

The greatest possible distance separates paradise from hell; but the blessed and the damned can see each other, especially before the day of final judgment. This is clear from Luke's account of Lazarus and the rich man (Luke 16:19-31). Consequently, no local distance impedes the cognition of a separated soul or that of an angel. By the same reasoning, it does not impede angels speech.

REPLY:

An agent acts according to its manner of existing. Hence, things that are material and circumscribed by place have actions that are material and circumscribed by place; and things that are spiritual act in a spiritual manner only. Consequently, because an angel as a knower is in no way circumscribed by place, the action of his intellect has no relation to place. Hence, since his speech is an operation of his intellect, local distance or proximity does not affect it. Therefore, one angel can understand the speech of another, whether that other be in a near or distant place—in the sense in which we say that angels are in place.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That arrival and departure should be understood, not according to place, but according to the angels turning w one another.
2. The statement that an angel is where he operates is to be under stood as referring to an operation which he carries out on some body; and this operation gets its place from that in which it terminates. Angelic speech, however, is not an operation of this kind. Hence, the argument does not follow.
3. The cries which the Seraphim are said to have made signify rather the magnitude of the things they spoke about, namely, the unity of God's essence and the trinity of the persons; for they said: "Holy, Holy, Holy, the Lord God of hosts..."(Isaias 6:3).
4. As already stated, the angel addressed does not receive anything from the one speaking; but, through species within himself, he knows the other angel as well as what he is saying. Consequently, there is no need of positing a medium by which something could be carried from one angel to another.
5. Augustine is speaking about the natural knowledge souls have. Through this, not even the saints can know what takes place here on earth. They can know these events, however, by means of the glory they have received. Gregory states this explicitly when commenting on that verse in Job (14:21): "Whether his children come to honor or dishonor, he shall not understand." But angels have a natural knowledge that is more perfect than that of the separated soul. Hence, no parallel can be drawn between a soul and an angel.

ARTICLE VII: CAN ONE ANGEL SPEAK TO ANOTHER IN SUCH A WAY THAT OTHERS WILL NOT KNOW WHAT HE IS SAYING?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., I, 107, 5.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

For angelic speech, all that is required is an intelligible species and a turning to another angel. But, if that species and turning are known by one angel, so they are also known by another. Therefore, what an angel says is equally perceived by all.

2. Using the same "nods," one angel can speak to all the angels. Consequently, if an angel knows the speech by which another angel addresses him, he will also know the speech by which he addresses others.

3. Whoever sees an angel perceives the species by which that angel understands and speaks. But angels always see one another. Therefore, one angel always knows what another is speaking, whether that angel is speaking to him or to some other angel.

4. If a man speaks, he is heard equally by all those standing at the same distance from him, unless there is some defect in one of the hearers, that is, if he is hard of hearing. Now, sometimes another angel is by nature or locally closer to the angel speaking than is the angel is being addressed. Therefore, the angel speaking is heard by others than those whom he addresses.

To the Contrary:

It seems inconsistent to assert that the angels cannot do something which we can do. But a man can confide to another what he has conceived in his heart in such a way that it remains hidden from others. Consequently, an angel is also able to speak to another without letting others know what he is saying.

REPLY:

As is clear from what was said previously, the thought of one angel comes to the knowledge of another after the manner of spiritual speech from the fact that the latter angel is actuated by a species not only subjectively but also will reference to the former; and this occurs by the will of the speaker.

Now, it is not necessary that things subject to the will should be related to all in the same way, but only as the will determines. Hence, spiritual speech is not related to all angels equally, but only as the will of the angel who is speaking shall determine. Consequently, if, by his own will, an angel is actualized will respect to some intellectual species which he has directed to only one other angel, his speech will be known by that angel only; and, if his species has an order to several, several angels will know it.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. In angelic speech the turning or direction required is not one that is known but one that makes known. Hence, when one angel turns to another, his turning makes the other know his thought.

2. In general, there is one "nod" by which an angel speaks to all angels; but, in particular, there are as many "nods" as there are turnings to the different angels. Consequently, every angel knows according to the "nod" made to him.

3. Even though one angel sees another, he does not necessarily see the species by which the other angel is actually thinking, unless that other angel turns to him.

4. Human speech makes another person hear by an action physically necessary, namely, by driving air to the ear of the listener. But, as explained previously, this does not take place in angelic speech. Here, everything depends on the will of the angel speaking.

QUESTION 10: The Mind

ARTICLE I: IS THE MIND, AS CONTAINING WITHIN ITSELF THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY, THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL OR ONE OF ITS POWERS?

Parallel readings: I Sentences 3,4, Summa Theol., 1,54, 3; 79, 1; 93,7; Q. D. de spir. creat., n; Q. D. de anima, 12.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is the essence of the soul, for

1. Augustine says: "The terms mind and spirit are not taken relatively," but denote the essence, and nothing but the essence, of the soul. Therefore, the mind is the essence of the soul.
2. Different classes of powers of the soul are found only in its essence. But the appetitive and intellective are different classes of powers of the soul. For The Soul gives five most general classes of powers of the soul: vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellective. But the mind includes within it appetitive and intellective powers, for Augustine puts understanding and will in the mind. It seems, then, that the mind is not a power, but the very essence of the soul.
3. Augustine says: "We are in the image of God by the fact that we exist, that we know that we exist, and that we love this knowledge and this existence." He also bases the attribution of the likeness of God in us upon knowledge, mind, and love. Since, then, loving is the act of love, and knowing is the act of knowledge, it seems that existence is the act of the mind. But existence is the act of essence. Therefore, the mind is the very essence of the soul.
4. Mind has the same nature in angels and in us. But the very essence of an angel is its mind. For this reason Dionysius frequently calls angels divine or intellectual minds. Therefore, our mind, also, is the very essence of our soul.
5. Augustine says: "Memory, understanding, and will are one mind, one essence, one life." Therefore, as life belongs to the essence of the soul, so does mind.
6. An accident cannot be the source of a substantial distinction. But, by his possession of mind, man is substantially distinguished from brute animals. So, mind is not an accident. But a power of the soul is a property of the soul, according to Avicenna, and so it belongs to the class of accident. Therefore, mind is not a power, but the very essence of the soul.
7. Acts specifically different do not come from one power. But, as is clear from Augustine, acts specifically different—namely: remembering, understanding, and willing come from the mind. Therefore, mind is not a power of the soul, but its very essence.
8. One power is not the subject of another power. But mind is the subject of the image of the Trinity, which is constituted by the three powers. Therefore, mind is not a power, but the essence of the soul.
9. No power contains in itself other powers. But the mind includes understanding and will. Therefore, it is not a power, but the essence.

To the Contrary:

1'. Powers of the soul are its only parts. But mind is the higher part of the soul, as Augustine says. Therefore, mind is a power of the soul.

2'. The essence of the soul is common to all the powers, because all are rooted in it. But mind is not common to all the powers, because it is distinguished from sense. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul.

3'. We cannot speak of highest and lowest in the essence of the soul. But there are highest and lowest in mind. For Augustine divides mind into higher and lower reason. Therefore, mind is a power of the soul and not its essence.

4'. The essence of the soul is the principle of life. But mind is not the principle of life, but of understanding. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul, but one of its powers.

5'. A subject is not predicated of an accident. But mind is predicated of memory, understanding, and will, which are in the soul as in a subject. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul.

6'. According to Augustine, the relation of the soul to the image does not arise from the whole soul, but only from part of it, namely, the mind. Therefore, the mind does not denote the whole soul, but a part of it.

7'. The name mind (*mens*) seems to have been attributed [to the soul] from the fact that it remembers (*memini*). But memory refers to a power of the soul. Therefore, mind also denotes a power and not the essence.

REPLY:

The term mind (*mens*) is taken from the verb measure (*mensurare*). For a thing of any genus is measured by that which is least and first in its genus, as is clear from the Metaphysics. So, the word mind is applied to the soul in the same way as understanding is. For understanding knows about things only by measuring them, as it were, according to its own principles. But, since it signifies reference to act, understanding designates a faculty of the soul. But a power or faculty lies between essence and activity, as Dionysius says.

Since, however, the essees of things are not known to us, and their powers reveal themselves to us through their acts, we often use the names of the faculties and powers to denote the essences. But, since knowledge of a thing comes only from that which is proper to it, when an essence takes its name from one of its powers, it must be named according to a power proper to it. It is commonly true of powers that that which can do more can do less, but not conversely. So, a man who can carry a thousand pounds can carry a hundred, as is said in Heaven and Earth. Hence, if a thing is to be classified by its power, it must be classified according to the utmost of its power.

Now, among souls, the soul in plants has only the lowest level of power, and so is classified according to this when it is called nutritive or vegetative. The soul of a brute animal, however, reaches a higher level, that of sense, and so its soul is called sensitive, or, sometimes, even simply sense. But the human soul reaches the highest level which there is among powers of soul and takes its name from this, being called intellective or, sometimes, also understanding and mind, inasmuch as from the intellective soul such power naturally arises, as is proper to the human soul above other souls.

It is clear, then, that in us mind designates the highest power of our soul. And since the image of God is in us according to that which is highest in us, that image will belong to the essence of the soul only in

far as mind is its highest power. Thus, mind, as containing the image of God, designates a power of the soul and not its essence. Or, if we take mind to mean essence, it means it only inasmuch as such a power flows from the essence.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Mind is not taken to mean essence, as essence is contrasted with power, but as absolute essence is distinguished from that which is relatively so called. Thus, mind is distinguished from knowledge of itself in this, that through knowledge mind is referred to itself, but mind itself is an absolute term. Or we can say that mind is taken by Augustine to mean the essence of the soul along with this power.

2. There are two ways of classifying powers of the soul: first, according to their objects; and second, according to their subjects, or, what comes to the same thing, according to their manner of acting. If we classify them according to their objects, we have the five classes of powers of the soul mentioned above. However, if we classify them according to their subjects or manner of acting, there are three classes of powers of the soul: vegetative, sensitive, and intellective. For the activity of the soul can be related to matter in three ways.

In the first of these, the relation is such that the activity is performed as a natural activity. The source of this kind of activity is the nutritive power, and the exercise of the acts of this power takes place through active and passive qualities, just as other material activity does. In the second way, the relation is such that the activity of the soul does not reach matter itself, but only the conditions of matter, as in the activity of the sensitive power. For, in sense, the species is received without matter, but with the conditions of matter. In the third way, the relation is such that the activity of the soul is beyond both matter and the conditions of matter. The intellective part of the soul acts in this way. According to these different divisions of powers of the soul, two powers of the soul can belong to the same or different classes when compared with each other. For, if sensible appetite and intellectual appetite, which is will, are considered with reference to their object, both belong to the same class, because the good is the object of both.

But, if we view them with reference to their manner of acting, they belong to different classes, for we classify the lower appetite as sensitive, and the higher as intellective. For, just as the sense grasps its object under the material conditions it has here and now, so, too, the sense appetite tends toward its object in the same way, and thus to a particular good. But the higher appetite is directed to its object after the manner in which the understanding perceives. So, with reference to manner of acting, will belongs to the intellective class.

The manner of acting follows the state of the agent, for, as the agent is more perfect, so its activity is more perfect. Therefore, if we consider powers of this kind as they issue from the essence of the soul, which is, as it were, their subject, we find that will is on an equal footing with understanding, whereas the lower appetite, which is divided into the concupiscible and irascible, is not. Therefore, mind can include both understanding and will without thereby being the essence of the soul. Thus, mind denotes a certain class of powers of the soul, the group in which we include all the powers which withdraw entirely from matter and the conditions of matter in their activity.

3. According to Augustine and other saints, the image of the Trinity is attributed to man under diverse formulae, and there is no need that the members of one formula correspond to those of another. This is clearly the case when Augustine makes the image of the Trinity follow mind, cognition, and love, and also memory, understanding, and will. Now, although will and love are parallel, as are understanding and cognition, it is not necessary that mind parallel memory, for mind includes all three which are given in the other way of attributing this likeness.

Similarly, the attribution of Augustine referred to in the objection differs from the two we have just mentioned. So, there is no need for existence to relate as proper act to mind, in so far as it is mind, although loving so relates to love and knowing so relates to knowledge.

4. Angels are called minds not because the mind or understanding of an angel, in so far as it designates a power, is its essence, but because they have no other powers of the soul except those which are included in the mind, and, so, are completely mind. Our soul, however, since it is the act of the body, has other powers which are not included in the mind, namely, sensitive and nutritive powers. So, soul cannot be called mind as an angel can.

5. Living adds something to existing, and understanding something to living. But, for something to have the image of God in it, it must reach the highest kind of perfection to which a creature can aspire.

So, if a thing has existence only, as stones, or existence and life, as plants and beasts, these are not enough to preserve the character of image. To have the complete character of image the creature must exist, live, and understand. For in this it has most perfectly the generic likeness to the essential attributes.

Therefore, since in applying the image mind takes the place of the divine essence, and memory, intellect, and will take the place of the three Persons, Augustine attributes to mind those things which are needed for the image in creatures when he says: "Memory, understanding, and will are one life, one mind, and one essence." Still, it is not necessary to conclude from this that in the soul mind and life mean the same as essence, for to be, to live, and to understand are not the same thing in us as they are in God. Nevertheless, these three are called one essence since they flow from the one essence of the mind, one life because they belong to one kind of life, and one mind because they are included in one mind as parts in the whole, just as sight and hearing are included in the sensitive part of the soul.

6. Since, according to the Philosopher, we do not know the substantial differences of things, those who make definitions sometimes use accidental differences because they indicate or afford knowledge of the essence as the proper effects afford knowledge of a cause. Therefore, when sensible is given as the constitutive difference of animal, it is not derived from the sense power, but the essence of the soul from which that power comes. The same is true of rational, or of that which has mind.

7. Just as we do not understand that the sensitive part of the soul is a single power over and above the particular powers contained in it, but, rather, a kind of potential whole, including all those powers as parts, so, too, mind is not a single power over and above memory, understanding, and will, but a kind of potential whole including these three. In the same way, we see that the power of house building embraces those of cutting the stones and building the wall. The same holds true for the other powers.

8. *Mind*, when taken for the power itself, is not related to understanding and will as subject, but as whole to parts. But, if it is taken for the essence of the soul, in so far as such a power naturally flows from it, mind does denote the subject of the powers.

9. A single particular power does not contain many powers, but there is nothing to prevent a general power from embracing many powers as parts, just as one part of the body includes many organic parts, as the hand includes the fingers.

ARTICLE II: IS THERE MEMORY IN THE MIND?

Parallel readings: *De veritate*, 19, r; I Sentences 3, 4, 1; III Sentences 26, I, 5, ad IV Sentences 3., sol. 2, ad 4; 50, 1, 2 *Quodlibet* III, 9, 21; XII, 9, 1 *Contra Gentiles* II, 74 I Cor., c. 13, *lectura* 3; *Summa Theol.*, I, 6; I-II, 67, 2; *De memor. et re* 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that there is not, for

1. According to Augustine, that which we share with brute animals does not belong to the mind. But memory is common to us and to brute animals, as is also clear from Augustine. Therefore, memory is not in the mind.
2. The Philosopher says that memory does not belong to the intellective but to the primary sensitive faculty. Therefore, since mind is the same as understanding, as is clear from what has been said above, memory does not seem to be part of the mind.
3. Understanding and all that belong to understanding abstract from space and time. Memory, however, does not so abstract, for it deals with a definite time, the past. For memory concerns things past, as Cicero says. Therefore, memory does not pertain to mind or understanding.
4. Since in memory we retain things that are not being actually apprehended, it follows that, wherever there is memory, there must be a difference between apprehension and retention. But it is in sense only, and not in understanding, that we find this difference. The two can differ in sense because sense makes use of a bodily organ. But not everything that is retained in the body is apprehended. But understanding does not make use of a bodily organ, and so retains things only according to the mode of understanding. So, these things have to be actually understood. Therefore, memory is not part of understanding or mind.
5. The soul does not remember until it has retained something. But before it receives from the senses, which are the source of all our knowledge, any species which it can retain, it already has the character of image [of the Trinity]. Since memory is part of that image, it does not seem possible for memory to be in the mind.
6. In so far as mind has the character of image of God, it is directed toward God. But memory is not directed toward God, since it deals with things that belong to time. But God is entirely beyond time. Therefore, memory is not in the mind.
7. If memory were part of the mind, the intelligible species would be maintained in the mind as they are in the angelic mind. But the angels can understand by turning their attention to the species which they have within them. Therefore, the human mind should be able to understand by turning its attention to the species it retains, without referring to phantasms. But this is obviously false. For, no matter to what degree one has scientific knowledge as a habit, if the organ of the power of imagination or memory is injured, this knowledge cannot be made actual. This would not result if the mind could actually understand without referring to powers which use organs. So, memory is not part of the mind.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. The Philosopher says that the intellective soul, not the whole soul, is the place of the species. But it belongs to place to preserve what is kept in it. Therefore, since the preservation of the species belongs to memory, memory seems to be part of understanding.
- 2'. That which has a uniform relation to all time is not concerned with any particular time. But memory, even in its proper acceptation, has a uniform relation to all time, as Augustine says and proves with the words of Virgil, who used the names memory and forgetfulness in their proper sense. Therefore, memory is not concerned with any particular time, but with all time. So it belongs to understanding.
- 3'. Strictly speaking, memory refers to things past. But understanding deals not only with what is present, but also with what is past. For the understanding judges about any time,

understanding man to have existed, to exist in the future, and to exist now, as is clear from The Soul. Therefore, memory, properly speaking, can belong to understanding.

4'. As memory concerns what is past, so foresight concerns what is in the future, according to Cicero. But foresight, properly speaking, belongs to the intellectual part. For the same reason memory does, too.

REPLY:

According to the common usage, memory means a knowledge of things past. But to know the past as past belongs to that which has the power of knowing the now as now. Sense is this power. For under standing does not know the singular as singular, but according to some common character, as it is man or white or even particular, but not in so far as it is this man or this particular thing. In a similar way, under standing does not know a present and a past thing as this present and this past thing.

Since memory, taken strictly, looks to what is past will reference to the present, it is clear that memory, properly speaking, does not belong to the intellectual part, but only to the sensitive, as the Philosopher shows." But, since intellect not only understands the intelligible thing, but also understands that it understands such an intelligible thing, the term memory can be broadened to include the knowledge by which one knows the object previously known in so far as he knows he knew it earlier, although he does not know the object as in the past in the manner earlier explained. In this way all knowledge not received for the first time can be called memory.

This can take place in two ways, either when there is continuous study based on acquired knowledge without interruption, or when the study is interrupted. The latter has more of the character of past, and so it more properly participates in the nature of memory. 'We have an example of this when we say that we remember a thing which previously we knew habitually but not actually. Thus, memory belongs to the intellectual part of our soul. It is in this sense that Augustine seems to understand memory, when he makes it part of the image of the Trinity. For he intends to assign to memory everything in the mind which is stored there habitually without passing into act.

There are various explanations of the manner in which this can take place. Avicenna holds that the fact that the soul has habitual knowledge of anything which it does not actually consider does not come from this, that certain species are retained in the intellectual part. Rather, he understands that it is impossible for the species not actually considered to be kept anywhere except in the sensitive part, either in the imagination, which is the storehouse of forms received by the senses, or in the memory, for particular apprehensions not received from the senses. The species stays in the understanding only when it is actually being considered. But, after the consideration, it ceases to be there. Thus, when one wants actually to consider something again, it is necessary for new intelligible species to flow from the agent intelligence into the possible intellect.

However, it does not follow, according to Avicenna, that the new consideration of what was known previously necessarily entails learning or discovering all over again, for one retains a certain aptitude through which he turns more easily to the agent intellect to receive the species flowing from it than he did before. In us, this aptitude is the habit of scientific knowledge. According to this opinion, memory is not part of the mind because it preserves certain species, but because it has an aptitude for receiving them anew.

But this does not seem to be a reasonable explanation. In the first place, since the possible intellect has a more stable nature than sense, it must receive its species more securely. Thus, the species can be better preserved in it than in the sensitive part. In the second place, the agent intelligence is equally disposed to communicate species suitable for all the sciences. As a consequence, if some species were not conserved in the possible intellect, but there were in

it only the aptitude of turning to the agent intellect, man would have an equal aptitude for any intelligible thing. Therefore, from the fact that a man had learned one science he would not know it better than other sciences. Besides, this seems openly opposed to the opinion of the Philosopher, who commends the ancients for holding that the intellective part of the soul is the place of the species.

Therefore, others say that the intelligible species remain in the possible intellect after actual consideration, and that the ordered arrangement of these is the habit of knowledge. In this classification the power by which our minds retain these intelligible species after actual consideration will be called memory. This comes closer to the proper meaning of memory.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** The memory which we have in common with brute animals is that in which particular intentions are preserved. This is not in the mind; only the memory in which intelligible species are kept is there.
- 2.** The Philosopher is speaking of the memory which deals with the past as related to a particular present in so far as particular. This is not in the mind.
- 3.** The answer to the third difficulty is clear from what has just been said.
- 4.** Actual apprehension and retention differ in the possible intellect, not because the species are there somehow in a bodily manner, but only in an intelligible way. However, it does not follow that one understands according to that species all the time, but only when the possible intellect becomes that species perfectly in act. Sometimes it has the act of this species incompletely, that is, in some way between pure potency and pure act. This is habitual knowledge. The reduction from this to complete act takes place through the will, which, according to Anselm, is the mover of all the powers.
- 5.** Mind has the character of image [of the Trinity] especially in so far as it is directed to God and to itself. It is present to itself and God is present to it before any species are received from sensible things. Furthermore, mind is not said to have the power of memory because it actually preserves something, but because it has the power to preserve something.
- 6.** The answer to the sixth difficulty is clear from what has been said.'
- 7.** No power can know anything without turning to its object, as sight knows nothing unless it turns to colour. Now, since phantasms are related to the possible intellect in the way that sensible things are related to sense, as the Philosopher points out, no matter to what extent an intelligible species is present to the understanding, understanding does not actually consider anything according to that species without referring to a phantasm. Therefore, just as our understanding in its present state needs phantasms actually to consider anything before it acquires a habit, so it needs them, too, after it has acquired a habit. The situation is different with angels, for phantasms are not the object of their understanding.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

- 1'.** The authority cited can prove only that memory is in the mind in the way we have mentioned, not that it is there properly.
- 2'.** We must understand Augustine's statement to mean that memory can deal with present objects. However, it can never be called memory unless something past is considered, at least past will reference to cognition itself. It is in this way that we say someone, who is present to himself, forgets or remembers himself because he retains or does not retain the past knowledge about himself.

3'. In so far as understanding knows temporal differences through common characters, it can thus make judgments according to any difference of time.

4'. Foresight is in the understanding only according to general considerations about the future. It is applied to particular things through the mediation of particular reason which must act as the medium between general reason, which is the source of movement, and the move merit which follows in particular things, as is clear from what the Philosopher says.

ARTICLE III: IS MEMORY DISTINGUISHED FROM UNDERSTANDING AS ONE POWER FROM ANOTHER?

Parallel readings: I Sentence 3,4, I; Contra Gentiles 11, 74; Summa Theol., I, 7; 93, 7, ad 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. Different acts belong to different powers. But the possible intellect and memory, as part of the mind, are said to have the same act, to preserve the species. For Augustine assigns this function to memory and the Philosopher assigns it to the possible intellect. Therefore, memory is not distinguished from understanding as one power from another.

2. To receive something without paying attention to any difference of time belongs properly to understanding, which abstracts from the here and now. But memory pays no attention to difference of time, for, according to Augustine, memory deals indifferently with things present, past, and future. Therefore, memory is not distinguished from understanding.

3. According to Augustine, intelligence can be taken in two ways. According to the first, we are said to understand that which we actually think. According to the second, we are said to understand that which we do not actually consider. But intelligence, in the meaning of understanding only that which we actually think, is understanding in act. This is not a power, but the activity of a power; hence, it is not distinguished from memory as a power from a power. But, in so far as we understand those things which we do not actually consider, understanding is not in any way distinguished from memory, but belongs to it. This is clear from Augustine: "If we look to the inner memory of the mind by which it remembers itself, to the inner understanding by which it understands itself, and to the inner will by which it loves itself, where these three are always together, whether they are thought about or not, we will see that the image of the Trinity belongs only to the memory." Therefore, understanding is in no way distinguished from memory as a power from a power.

4. Someone may say that intelligence is a power through which the soul is able actually to think, and so, also, that the intelligence through which we are said to understand only when we are thinking is distinguished from memory as one power from another the contrary, it belongs to the same power to have a habit and to use that habit. But to understand when not thinking is to understand habitually, whereas to understand when thinking is to use the habit. Therefore, to understand when not thinking and to understand when thinking belong to the same power. And so, for this reason, understanding does not differ from memory as one power from another.

5. In the intellective part of the soul there are only the cognoscitive and motive, or affective, powers. But the will is the affective or motive; understanding, the cognoscitive. Therefore, memory is not a different power from understanding.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says that "the soul partakes of the image of God in this, that it can use reason and understanding to know and see God." But the soul can see through its powers. Therefore, the image in the soul is considered according to its powers. But the image in the soul is considered according to the presence of memory, understanding, and will in the soul. Therefore, these three are three distinct powers.

2'. If these are not three powers, there must be one of them which is act or activity. But act is not always in the soul, for one does not always actually understand or will. Therefore, these three will not always be in the soul, and consequently the soul will not always be in the image of God, contrary to Augustine.

3'. There is a certain equality among these three which portrays the equality of the divine Persons. But there is no equality among act, habit, and power, because power embraces more than habit and habit more than act. For many habits belong to one power, and many acts can come from one habit. Therefore, one of these cannot be habit and another act.

REPLY:

We must say that the image of the Trinity in the soul can be predicated in two ways: one in which there is perfect imitation of the Trinity, the other in which the imitation is imperfect.

For the mind perfectly imitates the Trinity in this, that it actually remembers, actually understands, and actually wills. This is so because in the uncreated Trinity the middle Person is the Word. Now, there can be a word only with actual cognition. Hence, it is according to this kind of perfect imitation that Augustine puts the image in memory, understanding, and will. In it, memory refers to habitual knowledge, understanding to actual cognition which proceeds from the habitual knowledge of memory, and will to the actual movement of the will which proceeds from thought. This appears expressly from what he says in *The Trinity*: "Since the word cannot be there," in the mind, "without thought; for everything which we speak we think with that internal word which belongs to the language of no people, the image is found especially in those three: memory, intelligence, and will. Intelligence I now call that by which we understand when thinking; I call that will which joins this offspring [thought] with its parent [intelligence]."

We have the image in which there is imperfect imitation when we designate it according to habits and powers. It is thus that Augustine bases the image of the Trinity in the soul upon memory, knowledge, and love. Here, mind means the power; knowledge and love, the habits existing in it. In place of knowledge he could have said habitual intelligence, for both can be taken in the sense of habit. This is clear from *The Trinity*, where he says: "Can we correctly say that the musician knows music, but he does not now understand it because he is not now thinking about it, or that he now understands geometry because he is now thinking about it? This opinion is obviously absurd." So, in this sense, knowledge and love, taken as habitual, belong only to memory, as is clear from the authoritative citation from Augustine in the objections.

But, since acts have radical existence in powers, as effects in their causes, even perfect imitation according to memory, understanding in act, and will in act can in the first instance be found in the powers through which the soul can remember, actually understand and will, as the citation from Augustine shows. Thus, the image will be based upon the powers, though not in the sense that in the mind memory could be some power besides the understanding. This is clear from what follows.

Diversity of objects is the source of differentiation of powers only when the diversity comes from those things which of themselves belong to the objects, in so far as they are objects of

such powers. Thus, hot and cold in something colored do not, as such, differentiate the power of sight. For the same power of sight can see what is colored, whether hot or cold, sweet or bitter. Now, although mind or understanding can in a certain way know what is past, still, since it relates indifferently to knowledge of present, past, and future, the difference of past and present is accidental to what is intelligible, in so far as it is intelligible. For this reason, although memory can be in the mind in a certain way, it cannot be there as a power distinct of itself from other powers in the way in which philosophers speak of the distinction of powers. In this way, memory can be found only in the sensitive part, which is referred to the present as present. For this reason, a higher power than that of sense is needed if it is to relate to the past.

Nevertheless, although memory is not a power distinct from intelligence, taken as a power, the Trinity is still in the soul if we consider those powers in so far as the one power of understanding has an orientation to different things, namely, habitually to keep the knowledge of something, and actually to consider it. It is in this way that Augustine distinguishes lower from higher reason, according to an orientation to different things.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although memory as belonging to the mind is not a power distinct from the possible intellect, there is a distinction between memory and possible intellect according to orientation to different things, as we have said.
2. The same answer can be given to the four following difficulties.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

- 1'. In the passage cited, Augustine is not talking about the image which is in the soul according to perfect imitation. This is present when the soul actually imitates the Trinity- by understanding It.
- 2'. In the soul there is always an image of the Trinity in some way, but not always according to perfect imitation.
- 3'. Between power, act, and habit there can be equality inasmuch as they are referred to one object. Thus, the image of the Trinity is in the soul inasmuch as it is directed to God. Still, even in the ordinary way of speaking about power, habit, and act, there is an equality among them. However, this equality does not follow the distinctive character of the nature, because activity, habit, and power have the act of existence in different ways. But it does follow the relation to act according to which we consider the quantity of these three. It is not necessary to consider only one act numerically, or one habit, but habit and act in general.

ARTICLE IV: DOES THE MIND KNOW MATERIAL THINGS?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, I, 8 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. The mind knows things only by intellectual cognition. But, according to the Gloss: "Intellectual sight is that which embraces those things which have no likenesses which are not identical with themselves." Since, then, material things cannot exist in the soul of themselves, but only through representations similar to them, yet really different from them, it seems that the mind does not know material things.

2. Augustine says: "Through the mind we know things which are neither bodies nor likenesses of bodies." But material things are bodies and have bodily likenesses. Therefore, they are not known by the mind.

3. The mind, or intellect, is capable of knowing the quiddity of things because the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said in The Soul. But the quiddity of material things is not corporeity; otherwise, it would be necessary for all things which have quiddities to be corporeal. Therefore, the mind does not know material things.

4. Mental cognition follows upon form which is the principle of knowing. But the intelligible forms in the mind are altogether immaterial. So, through them, the mind is notable to know material things.

5. All cognition takes place through assimilation. But there is no assimilation possible between the mind and material things, because likeness depends on sameness of quality. However, the qualities of material things are bodily accidents which cannot exist in the mind. Therefore, the mind cannot know material things.

6. The mind knows nothing except by abstracting from matter and the conditions of matter. But material things, as physical beings, can not be separated from matter even in the mind, because matter is part of their definition. Therefore, the mind cannot know material things.

To the Contrary:

1'. Objects of natural science are known by the mind. But natural science is concerned with material things. Therefore, the mind knows material things.

2'. Each person is a good judge—in fact, as Aristotle says, the best judge—of those things of which he has knowledge. But, as Augustine notes, it is by the mind that these less perfect beings are judged. Therefore, these less perfect beings, which are material, are understood by the mind.

3'. Through sense we know only material beings. But mental cognition is derived from sense. Therefore, the mind also knows material things.

REPLY:

All cognition follows some form which is the principle of cognition in the knower. Such a form can be considered under two aspects: either with relation to the being it has in the knower, or in the reference it has to the thing it represents. Under the first aspect, it causes the knower actually to know. Under the second, it limits the cognition to some definite knowable object. Therefore, the manner of knowing a thing conforms to the state of the knower, which receives the form in its own way. It is not necessary that the thing known exist in the manner of the knower or in the manner in which the form which is the principle of knowing exists in the knower. From this it follows that nothing prevents us from knowing material things through forms which exist immaterially in our minds.

There is a difference on this point between the human mind, which derives forms from things, and the divine or angelic minds, which do not draw their cognition from things. In the mind which depends on things for knowledge, the forms exist because of a certain action of things on the soul. But, since all action is through form, the forms in our minds first and mainly refer to things which exist outside our soul according to their forms. These forms are of two kinds. Some forms involve no determined matter, as line, surface, and so forth. Others do involve a special matter, as all natural forms.

Therefore, knowledge of forms implying no matter does not give knowledge of matter, but the knowledge of natural forms gives some knowledge of matter, in so far as it is correlative to

form. For this reason, the Philosopher says that first matter is knowable through analogy, and that the material thing itself is known through the likeness of its form, just as, by the very fact of knowing snubness, snub nose is known. But in the divine mind there are forms of things from which the existence of things flows.

And this existence is common to form and matter. So, those forms are directly related to matter and form without the mediation of one to the other. So, too, angelic intellect has forms similar to the forms of the divine mind, although in angels the forms are not the causes of things. Therefore, our mind has immaterial knowledge of material things, whereas the divine and angelic minds have knowledge of the same material things in a way at once more immaterial and yet more perfect.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The text cited in the first objection can be explained in two ways. In the first place, it can be taken to refer to intellectual sight will reference to all that is included in its scope. Taken in this way, intellectual sight is taken to refer only to those things which have no likenesses which are not identical with themselves. This is not to be understood of the likenesses by which we see things in intellectual sight, for these are a kind of means of knowing. What is known by intellectual sight is the things themselves, not their representations. This differs from bodily (sensitive) vision and spiritual (imaginative) vision. For the objects of imagination and sense are certain accidents from which the shape or image of a thing is made up. But the object of the intellect is the very essence of the thing, although the intellect knows the essence of the thing through its likeness, as through a cognoscitive medium, and not through an object which is known first.

A second explanation would be that the text cited refers to intellectual sight in so far as it surpasses the imaginative and sensitive powers. Following this line of thought, Augustine, from whose words the comment in the Gloss is taken, wishes to differentiate three types of sight, designating the higher by that in which it surpasses the lower. Thus it is said that spiritual sight takes place when through certain likenesses we know things which are absent. Spiritual (imaginative) sight can nevertheless relate to things seen as present. But imagination outstrips sense, inasmuch as it can also see things absent. Hence, this is attributed to it as a sort of property. Similarly, intellectual sight surpasses imagination and sense because it can reach things that are essentially intelligible through their essence. So, Augustine makes this a sort of property of intellectual vision, although it can also know material things which are knowable by means of their likenesses. For this reason Augustine says: "Through the mind judgment is passed even upon those lower types of being, and those things which are not bodies and do not have forms of a bodily kind are known."

2. The answer to the second difficulty is clear from the first response.

3. If corporeity is taken of body in so far as it is in the category of quantity, it is not the quiddity of a physical thing, but an accident of it; namely, triple dimension. But, if it is taken of body in so far as it is in the category of substance, then corporeity designates the essence of a physical thing. Nevertheless, it will not follow from this that every quiddity is corporeity, unless one would say that quiddity, by its very nature as quiddity, has the same meaning as corporeity.

4. Although in the mind there are only immaterial forms, these can be likenesses of material things. For it is not necessary that the likeness and that of which it is the likeness have the same manner of existing, but only that they agree in intelligible character, just as the form of man in a golden statue need not have the same kind of existence as the form of man in bones and flesh.

5. Although bodily qualities cannot exist in the mind, their representations can, and through these the mind is made like bodily things.
6. Intellect knows by abstracting from particular matter and its conditions, as from this flesh and these bones. It does not have to abstract from common matter. Hence, it can study the physical form in flesh and bones, although not in this flesh and these bones.

ARTICLE V: CAN OUR MIND KNOW MATERIAL THINGS IN THEIR SINGULARITY?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 2, 5-6; I Sentences 36, 1, 1; II Sentences, 3, 3, ad 1; IV Sentences 50, I, 3; Quolibet VII, 1, 3; XII, 8, li; Contra Gentiles I, 63 & 65; Summa Theol., I, 14, 11, ad 1; 86, x; Q. D. de anima, 20; 111 de anima, 8, nn. 705-719; De princ. individ., nn. 3-4.

Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

1. Since the singular has existence through matter, things are called physical which have matter in their definition. But the mind, even though it is immaterial, can know physical things. For the same reason it can know singular things.
2. No one can correctly decide about things and use them properly unless he knows them. But the will man through his mind decides correctly about singular things and uses them properly; for example, his family and his possessions. Therefore, we know singular things will our mind.
3. No one knows a composition unless he knows the components. But the mind makes this conjunction: "Socrates is man." No sense would be able to do so, since it does not perceive man in general. Therefore, the mind knows singular things.
4. No one can command any act without knowing the object of that act. But the mind, or reason, commands acts of the concupiscible power and the irascible power, as is clear in the Ethics. Therefore, since the objects of these are singular things, the mind can know singular things.
5. According to Boethius, a higher power can do anything the lower power can. But the sensitive powers, which are lower than the mind, know singulars. Therefore, the mind can know singulars much more fully.
6. The higher a mind is, the more general is its knowledge, as is clear from Dionysius. But the angelic mind, though higher than the human mind, knows singulars. So, the human mind knows them much more fully.

To the Contrary:

We understand the universal, but sense the singular, as Boethius says.

REPLY:

As is clear from what has been said, human and angelic minds know material things in different ways. For the cognition of the human mind is directed, first, to material things according to their form, and, second, to matter in so far as it is correlative to form. However, just as every form is of itself universal, so correlation to form makes us know matter only by universal knowledge. Matter thus considered is not the principle of individuation. Designated matter, existing under definite dimensions and considered as singular, is, rather, that principle

because form receives its individuation from such matter. For this reason, the Philosopher says: "The parts of man are matter and form taken generally, whereas the parts of Socrates are this form and this matter."

From this it is clear that our mind is notable directly to know singulars, for we know singulars directly through our sensitive powers which receive forms from things into a bodily organ. In this way, our senses receive them under determined dimensions and as a source of knowledge of the material singular. For, just as a universal form leads to the knowledge of matter in general, so an individual form leads to the knowledge of designated matter which is the principle of individuation.

Nevertheless, the mind has contact with singulars by reason of something else in so far as it has continuity with the sensitive powers which have particulars for their object. This conjunction comes about in two ways. First, the movement of the sensitive part terminates in the mind, as happens in the movement that goes from things to the soul. Thus, the mind knows singulars through a certain kind of reflection, as when the mind, in knowing its object, which is some universal nature, returns to knowledge of its own act, then to the species which is the principle of its act, and, finally, to the phantasm from which it has abstracted the species. In this way, it attains to some knowledge about singulars.

In the other way, this conjunction is found in the movement from the soul to things, which begins from the mind and moves forward to the sensitive part in the mind's control over the lower powers. Here, the mind has contact with singulars through the mediation of particular reason, a power of the sensitive part, which joins and divides individual intentional likenesses, which is also known as the cogitative power, and which has a definite bodily organ, a cell in the center of the head. The mind's universal judgment about things to be done can not be applied with a particular act except through the mediation of some intermediate power which perceives the singular. In this way, there is framed a kind of syllogism whose major premise is universal, the decision of the mind, and whose minor premise is singular, a perception of the particular reason. The conclusion is the choice of the singular work, as is clear in *The Soul*.

The angelic mind, since it knows material things through forms that immediately refer to matter as well as to form, knows by direct vision not only matter in general, but also matter as singular. So, also, does the divine mind.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The operation by which we know matter through the analogy which it has to form is sufficient for knowledge of physical reality, but not for knowledge of the singular thing, as is clear from what has been said.
2. The way man arranges singulars by the mind only through the mediation of the cogitative power whose function it is to know particular intentions, as is clear from what has been said.
3. The intellect makes a proposition of a singular and a universal term since it knows the singular through a certain reflection, as was said.
4. The intellect or reason knows universally the end to which it directs the act of the concupiscible power and the act of the irascible power when it commands them. It applies this universal knowledge to singulars through the mediation of the cogitative power, as has been said.

j The higher power can do what the lower power can, but not always in the same way. Sometimes it acts in a higher way. Thus, intellect can know what sense knows, but in a way that is superior. For sense knows these things according to their material dispositions and

external accidents, but intellect penetrates to the intimate nature of the species which is in these individuals.

6. Cognition of the angelic mind is more universal than cognition of the human mind, because, by the use of fewer media, it reaches more things. Nevertheless, it is more effective than the human mind for knowing singulars, as is clear from what has been said.

ARTICLE VI: DOES THE HUMAN MIND RECEIVE KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSIBLE THINGS?

Parallel readings: De Ver., 19, 1; Quodibet VIII, 2,3; Summa Theol., 1, 84,6; Q. D. de anima, I Comp. Theol., cc. 81-82.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. Action and passion cannot take place between things unless both are material, as is clear from Boethius, and also from the Philosopher. But our mind does not share in matter will sensible things. Therefore, sensible things cannot act on our mind to imprint knowledge on it.

2. What a thing is, is the object of intellect, as is said in The Soul. But the quiddity of a thing is not perceived by any sense. Therefore, mental cognition is not received from sense.

3. When speaking of the way in which we acquire cognition of intelligible things, Augustine says: "They were there" that is, intelligibles in our mind, "before I learned them, but they were not in my memory." Therefore, it seems that intelligible species are not received in the mind from the senses.

4. Augustine proves that the soul can love only what it knows. But one loves a science before he learns it, as is clear from the eagerness with which he seeks this knowledge. Therefore, before he learns such a science, he has some acquaintance with it. So, it seems that the mind does not receive knowledge from sensible things.

5. Augustine says: "The body does not make the image of the body in the spirit. Rather, the spirit itself will a wonderful swiftness which is ineffably far from the slowness of the body makes in itself the image of the body." Therefore, it seems that the mind does not receive intelligible species from sensible things but constructs them in itself.

6. Augustine says that our mind judges about bodily things through non-bodily and eternal principles. But principles received from the senses are not of this kind. Therefore, it seems that the human mind does not receive knowledge from sensible things.

7. If the mind receives knowledge from sensible things, it must do so because the species received from sensible things set the possible intellect in motion. But such species cannot influence the possible intellect. For, when they are in the imagination, they are not intelligible actually, but only potentially, and so cannot set the possible intellect in motion. The intellect, however, is moved only by something actually intelligible, just as the power of sight is moved only by something actually visible. Similarly, something existing in the agent intellect can not move the possible intellect, because the agent intellect does not receive species. If it did, it would not differ from the possible intellect. Again, these representations do not actuate the possible intellect by existing in it, for a form already adhering in a subject does not set the subject in motion, but is, as it were, at rest in it. Finally, they do not cause movement in the possible intellect by existing of themselves, for intelligible species are not substances, but

belong to the class of accidents, as Avicenna says. Therefore, in no way can our mind receive knowledge from sensible things.

8. The agent is more noble than the patient, as is clear from Augustine and from the Philosopher. But the receiver is related to that which it receives, as a patient is related to the agent. Since, therefore, the mind is much more noble than sensible things and the senses themselves, it cannot receive knowledge from them.

9. The Philosopher says that the soul comes to acquire knowledge and prudence by coming to rest. But the soul cannot receive knowledge from sensible things unless it be somehow set in motion by them. Therefore, the soul does not receive knowledge from sensible things.

To the Contrary:

1'. As the Philosopher says, and as experience proves, one who lacks a sense is deprived of one kind of knowledge, as the blind have no knowledge of colors. This would not happen if the soul received knowledge from a source other than the senses. Therefore, the soul receives knowledge from sensible objects through the senses.

2'. At first, all our cognition consists in the knowledge of first undeducible principles. But the cognition of these arises in us from sense, as is clear from the Posterior Analytics. Therefore, all our knowledge arises from sense.

3'. Nature does nothing to no purpose and does not fail in necessary matters. But senses would have been given to the soul to no purpose unless the soul received cognition from things through them. Therefore, our mind receives knowledge from sensible things.

REPLY:

The views of the ancients on this question are manifold. Some held that our knowledge derived completely from an external cause separated from matter. There are two explanations of this position.

Some, as the Platonists, held that the forms of sensible things existed apart from matter and so were actually intelligible. According to them, real individuals come about through the participation by sensible matter in these forms, and the human mind has knowledge by sharing in them. Thus, these forms are the principle of generation and knowledge, as the Philosopher says. But the Philosopher has adequately confuted this position by showing that sensible forms must exist in sensible matter, and that sensible matter in general is necessary for the understanding of physical forms, just as there is no snub without nose.

For this reason, others, bypassing separated forms of sensible things, demanded only intelligences, which we call angels, and made separated substances of this sort the sole source of our knowledge. Accordingly, Avicenna holds that just as sensible forms are not received into sensible matter except through the influence of the agent intelligence, so, too, intelligible forms are not imprinted on human minds except by the agent intelligence, which for him is not a part of the soul, but a separated substance. However, the soul needs the senses to prepare the way and stimulate it to knowledge, just as the lower elements prepare matter to receive form from the agent intelligence.

But this opinion does not seem reasonable, because, according to it, there is no necessary interdependence of the human mind and the sensitive powers. The opposite seems quite clear both from the fact that, when a given sense is missing, we have no knowledge of its sensible objects, and from the fact that our mind cannot actually consider even those things which it knows habitually unless it forms some phantasms. Thus, an injury to the organ of imagination hinders consideration. Furthermore, the explanation just given does away with the proximate

principles of things, inasmuch as all lower things would derive their intelligible and sensible forms immediately from a separated substance.

A second explanation has been given by those who make an inferior cause the complete source of our knowledge. There are also two explanations of this position. Some held that human souls had within themselves knowledge of all things, but that this cognition was darkened by union with the body. Therefore, they said that we need assiduous use of the senses to remove the hindrance to knowledge. Learning, they said, is nothing but remembering, as is abundantly clear from the way in which those things which we have seen and heard make us remember what we formerly knew. But this position does not seem reasonable. For, if the union of soul and body is natural, it cannot wholly hinder natural knowledge. And if this opinion were true, we would not be subject to the complete ignorance of those objects which demand a sense faculty of which one is deprived. This Opinion would fit in with the theory that holds that souls were created before bodies and later united to them. Then, the conjunction of body and soul would not be natural, but only an accidental accretion to the soul. This opinion must be rejected on the score both of faith and philosophic tenets. Other proponents of this second opinion said that the soul is the cause of its own knowledge. For it does not receive knowledge from sensible things as if likenesses of things somehow reached the soul because of the activity of sensible things, but the soul itself, in the presence of sensible things, constructs in itself the likenesses of sensible things. But this statement does not seem altogether reasonable. For no agent acts except in so far as it is in act. Thus, if the soul formed the likenesses of all things in itself, it would be necessary for the soul to have those likenesses of things actually within itself. This would be a return to the previous opinion which held that the knowledge of all things is naturally present in the human soul.

Therefore, the opinion of the Philosopher is more reasonable than any of the foregoing positions. He attributes the knowledge of our mind partly to intrinsic, partly to extrinsic, influence. Not only things separated from matter, but also sensible things themselves, play their part. For, when our mind is considered in relation to sensible things outside the soul, it is found to be related to them in a twofold manner. In one way, it is related as act to potency, to the extent that things outside the mind are only potentially intelligible. The mind itself, however, is intelligible in act, and it is on this basis that the agent intellect, which makes potentially intelligible things actually intelligible, is held to be included in the soul. In another way, it is related to things as potency to act, inasmuch as determined forms of things are only potentially in our mind, but actually in things outside the soul. In this respect our soul includes the possible intellect, whose function it is to receive forms abstracted from sensible things and made actually intelligible through the light of the agent intellect. This light of the agent intellect comes to the soul from the separated substances and especially from God as from its first source.

Accordingly, it is true that our mind receives knowledge from sensible things; nevertheless, the soul itself forms in itself likenesses of things, inasmuch as through the light of the agent intellect the forms abstracted from sensible things are made actually intelligible so that they may be received in the possible intellect. And in this way all knowledge is in a certain sense implanted in us from the beginning (since we have the light of the agent intellect) through the medium of universal conceptions which are immediately known by the light of the agent intellect. These serve as universal principles through which we judge about other things, and in which we foreknow these others. In this respect, that opinion is true which holds that we previously had in our knowledge those things which we learn.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Sensible forms, those, namely, which are abstracted from sensible things, cannot act on our mind unless they are rendered immaterial through the light of the agent intellect, and thus in some way are made homogenous with the possible intellect on which they must act.
2. A higher and lower power do not operate in the same way even in respect to the same thing, but the higher power acts more nobly. Thus, when sense knows a thing through a form received from things, it does not know it so effectively as the intellect. Sense is led through it to a knowledge of the external accidents; the intellect reaches to the bare quiddity of the thing, distinguishing it from all material dispositions. Thus, when the mental knowing is said to take its origin from sense, this does not mean that sense apprehends all that the mind knows, but that, from those things which sense apprehends, the mind is led on to something more, just as the intellectual knowledge of sensible things leads to knowledge of divine things.
3. The statement from Augustine refers to that precognition by which we know particulars in universal principles. In this sense it is true that what we learn is already in our soul.
4. One can love scientific knowledge before he acquires it in so far as he has some general acquaintance with it by sight, or by knowing its usefulness, or in some other way.
5. The soul is to be understood to fashion itself in this sense, that the forms which arise from the activity of the agent intellect determine the possible intellect, as has been said. And in this sense, too, the imaginative power can fashion the forms of different sensible objects, as especially appears when we imagine things which we have never perceived by sense.
6. The first principles of which we have innate cognition are certain likenesses of uncreated truth. When we judge about other things through these likenesses, we are said to judge about things through unchangeable principles or through uncreated truth. Nevertheless, we should refer this statement of Augustine to higher reason, which confines itself to the contemplation of eternal truths. Although this higher reason is first in dignity, its operation is subsequent in time: "For the invisible things of him [God]... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Romans 1: 20).
7. In the reception through which the possible intellect receives species from phantasms, the phantasms act as instrumental and secondary agents. The agent intellect acts as the principal and first agent. Therefore, the effect of the action is received in the possible intellect according to the condition of both, and not according to the condition of either one alone. Therefore, the possible intellect receives forms whose actual intelligibility is due to the power of the agent intellect, but whose determinate likeness to things is due to cognition of the phantasms. These actually intelligible forms do not, of themselves, exist either in the imagination or the agent intellect, but only in the possible intellect.
8. Although the possible intellect is simply more noble than the phantasm, nothing prevents the phantasm from being more noble in a certain respect, namely, that it is actually the likeness of such a thing, whereas this likeness belongs to the possible intellect only potentially. Thus, in a certain sense, we can say that the phantasm acts on the possible intellect in virtue of the light of the agent intellect, just as colour can act on sight in virtue of bodily light.
9. The rest in which knowledge is achieved eliminates the movement of material passions. It does not eliminate movement and passion in general sense, inasmuch as all receiving is called passion and movement. In accord with this, the Philosopher says in *The Soul*: "Intellection is a kind of passion."

ARTICLE VII: IS THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY IN THE MIND AS IT KNOWS MATERIAL THINGS OR ONLY AS IT KNOWS ETERNAL THINGS?

Parallel readings: I Sentences 3, 4, Summa Theol., I, 8.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not only as the mind knows eternal things, for

1. As Augustine says: "When we look for the Trinity in our soul, we look for It in the whole soul without separating the activity of reason concerning temporal things from the contemplation of things eternal." But mind has the character of image only as it has the Trinity in it. Therefore, the mind has the character of image not only in so far as it applies itself to the contemplation of eternal things, but also in so far as it engages in activity concerning temporal things.
2. We consider the image of the Trinity in the soul in so far as the equality and origin of the persons are represented there. But the equality of the persons is better represented in the mind as knowing things of time than as knowing eternal things, since the latter are infinitely above the mind, whereas the mind is not infinitely above things of time. The origin of the persons, too, is displayed in cognition of things of time as well as in cognition of things eternal, for in both instances knowledge proceeds from the mind and love proceeds from knowledge. Therefore, it has the character of image of the Trinity not only in so far as it knows eternal things, but also in so far as it knows temporal things.
3. Likeness is in the power of loving, but the image is in the power of knowing, as is said in the Sentences. But our mind knows material things before it knows things eternal, since it goes from material things to eternal things. It also knows material things more perfectly, since it has a comprehensive grasp of temporal things, but not of things eternal. Therefore, the image is in the mind more according to temporal things than according to eternal things.
4. The image of the Trinity in the soul somehow follows its powers, as has been said above. But the powers are related indifferently to all the objects to which they are directed. Therefore, the image of God is in the mind will reference to any of its objects.
5. Something seen in itself is seen more perfectly than something seen in its likeness. But the soul sees itself in itself; whereas in this life it sees God only in a likeness. Therefore, it knows itself more perfectly than it knows God. So, we should look for the image of the Trinity in the soul rather as it knows itself than as it knows God, since the image of the Trinity is in us according to that which is most perfect in our nature, as Augustine says.
6. The equality of the persons is represented in our mind in this, that memory, understanding, and the whole will each grasp the others, as is clear from Augustine. But this mutual comprehension shows forth the equality only in so far as they grasp themselves will reference to all objects. Therefore, the image of the Trinity is in the powers of the mind by reason of all their objects.
7. As the image is in the power of knowing, so charity is in the power of loving. But charity looks not only to God, but also to the neighbour. Thus, there is a double act of charity: love of God and love of the neighbour. Therefore, the image, also, is in the mind not only as it knows God, but also as it knows creatures.
8. The powers of the mind in which the image resides are made perfect by certain habits, according to which the deformed image is said to be re-formed and made perfect. But the

powers of the mind do not need habits inasmuch as they are related to things eternal, but only to things temporal. For we have habits in order that powers may be regulated according to them. But there can be no error in things eternal to need regulation, but only in temporal things. Therefore, the image is more in the mind as it knows temporal things than as it knows eternal things.

9. The uncreated Trinity is represented in the image of the mind especially according to consubstantiality and equality. But these two are also found in the sensitive power, because the sensible thing and sense are made actually one, and the sensible species is received in the senses only according to their capacity. Therefore, the image of the Trinity is in the sensitive power, and so, a fortiori, it is in the mind as it knows temporal things.

Metaphorical expressions are accepted according to certain likenesses, for, according to the Philosopher, every term used figuratively is applied according to some likeness. But the application to God through metaphor is taken rather from certain sensible creatures than from the mind itself. This is evidently what Dionysius does when speaking of the rays of the sun. Therefore, some sensible creatures can be said to have the character of image more than the mind. And so, there seems to be nothing to prevent the mind, as knowing temporal things, from having the character of image.

11. Boethius says that forms which exist in matter are images of those things which exist without matter. But forms existing in matter are sensible forms. Therefore, sensible forms are images of God Himself. Thus, the mind, as knowing them, seems to have the character of image of God.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "The trinity which is found in a lower science should not be called or be thought to be the image of God, although it does belong to the inner man." But a lower science is that according to which the mind considers temporal things, and is thus distinguished from wisdom, which refers to eternal things. Therefore, the image of the Trinity is not to be found in the mind according to its knowledge of temporal things.

2'. The parts of the image, considered according to their order, should correspond to the three persons. But the order of the persons does not appear in the mind as it knows temporal things. For, in knowing temporal things, understanding does not proceed from memory, as the Word from the Father, but memory rather proceeds from understanding, for we remember those things which we have previously understood. Therefore, the image is not in the mind as it knows things of time.

3'. Augustine, having given that division of the mind (into contemplation of things eternal and activity concerning temporal things), says: "Not only the Trinity, but also the image of God, exists only in that part which is concerned with contemplation of eternal things. Even if we could find a trinity in that which is derived from activity about things of time, we still would not find the image of God there." Thus, we conclude as before.

4'. The image of the Trinity always exists in the soul, but knowledge of temporal things does not, since it is acquired. Therefore, the image of the Trinity is not in the soul as it knows temporal things.

REPLY:

Likeness brings the character of image to completion. However, for the character of image not every likeness is sufficient, but the fullest likeness, through which something is represented according to its specific nature. For this reason, in bodies we look for the image more in their shapes, which are the proper marks of species, than in colors and other accidents. There is a

likeness of the uncreated Trinity in our soul according to any knowledge which it has of itself, not only of the mind, but also of sense, as Augustine clearly shows. But we find the image of God only in that knowledge according to which there arises in the mind the fuller likeness of God.

Therefore, if we distinguish the knowledge of the mind according to objects, we find in our mind a threefold knowledge. There is the knowledge by which the mind knows God, by which it knows itself, and by which it knows temporal things. In the knowledge by which the mind knows temporal things there is no expressed likeness of the uncreated Trinity, either according to adaptation or according to analogy. It is not according to the first, because material things are more unlike God than is the mind itself. Thus, the mind does not become fully confirmed to God for being informed by knowledge of these material things. Nor yet is it according to analogy, for a temporal thing, which begets knowledge, or even actual understanding of itself in the soul, is not of the same substance as the mind, but some thing extraneous to its nature. Thus, the consubstantiality of the uncreated Trinity cannot be represented through it.

But in the knowledge by which our mind knows itself there is a representation of the uncreated Trinity according to analogy. It lies in this, that the mind, knowing itself in this way, begets a word expressing itself, and love proceeds from both of these, just as the Father, uttering Himself, has begotten the Word from eternity, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from both. But in that cognition by which the mind knows God the mind itself becomes confirmed to God, just as every knower, as such, is assimilated to that which is known.

But there is a greater likeness through conformity, as of sight to colour, than through analogy, as of sight to understanding, which is related to its objects in a way similar to that of sight. Consequently, the likeness of the Trinity is clearer in mind, as knowing God, than as knowing itself. Therefore, properly speaking, the image of the Trinity is in the mind primarily and mainly, in so far as the mind knows God, and it is there in a certain manner and secondarily, in so far as the mind knows itself, especially when it considers itself in so far as it is the image of God. As a result, its consideration does not stop with itself, but goes on to God. There is no image in the consideration of temporal things, but a kind of likeness of the Trinity, which can partake more of the character of vestige. Such is the likeness which Augustine attributes to the sensitive powers.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. There is indeed a trinity in the mind, as it applies itself to activity concerned with temporal things. But this trinity is not called the image of the uncreated Trinity, as is clear from what Augustine adds to that passage.

2. The equality of the divine persons is better represented in the knowledge of eternal than of temporal things. For we should not look for equality between object and power, but between one power and another. Moreover, although there is greater inequality between our mind and God than between our mind and a temporal thing, yet between the memory which our mind has of God and actual understanding and love of God there is greater equality than between the memory it has of temporal things and the understanding and love of them. For God is knowable and lovable of Himself and is understood and loved by the mind of each to the degree in which He is present to the mind. His presence in the mind is memory of Him in the mind; thus, intelligence is proportioned to the memory of Him, and will or love is proportioned to this intelligence.

However, physical things as such are not intelligible or lovable and so there is not this equality in the mind with reference to them. Neither is there the same order of origin, since

these are present to our memory because we have understood them, and so memory arises from understanding rather than conversely. The opposite of this takes place in the created mind will reference to God from whose presence the mind participates in intellectual light so that it can understand.

3. Although the knowledge which we have of physical things is prior in time to that which we have of God, the latter is prior in dignity. And the fact that we know physical reality better than we know God offers no difficulty, because the least knowledge which can be had about God surpasses all knowledge about creatures. The nobility of knowledge depends on the nobility of the thing known, as is clear from *The Soul*. For this reason, the Philosopher puts the little knowledge which we have of heavenly things before all the knowledge which we have about things here below.

4. Although powers extend to all their objects, their capacity is measured by the highest thing which they can reach, as appears in Heaven and Earth. Therefore, that which belongs to the highest perfection of the powers of the mind, namely, to be in the image of God, is attributed to them will reference to the most noble object, which is God.

5. Although the mind knows itself more perfectly than it knows God, the knowledge which it has of God is more noble, and through it the mind becomes more confirmed to God, as has been said. Therefore, it is rather according to this that the mind is in the image of God.

6. Although the equality belongs to the image which is in our mind, it is not necessary to consider the image will respect to everything, will reference to which some equality is found in it, since many other things are needed for an image. Hence, the argument does not follow.

7. Although charity, which brings the image to completion, looks to the neighbour, it does not do so as to its principal object, since only God is its principal object. For charity loves nothing in one's neighbour except God.

8. The powers of the image, even in so far as they are related to God, are made perfect through certain habits, as faith, hope, charity, wisdom, and others like these. For, although in these eternal things there is no error on their part, there still can be error on the part of our understanding in its knowledge of these. The difficulty in knowing them comes not from them, but from us, as is said in the Metaphysics.

9. There is no identity of substance between sense and the sensible thing, because the sensible thing is outside the essence of the senses. Nor is there equality, for sometimes the visible thing is not always seen to the full extent of its visibility.

10. With reference to the effectiveness of their causality, certain irrational creatures can in some way become more like God than even rational creatures. This appears in the sun's rays, by which everything in lower bodies is caused and renewed. In this way, it is like the divine goodness which causes all things, as Dionysius says, still, according to properties inhering in it, the rational creature is more like God than any irrational creature.

That metaphorical expressions are more frequently taken from irrational creatures and applied to God is due to their dissimilarity. This is done because, as Dionysius says, what belongs to less noble creatures is more frequently transferred to God to remove all occasion for error. For the transfer made from noble creatures could bring about the belief that those things which are applied metaphorically were to be understood properly. No one can think this about less noble things.

11. Boethius makes material forms images, not of God, but of immaterial forms, that is, of the ideal natures existing in the divine mind, from which material forms arise will a perfect likeness.

ARTICLE VIII: DOES THE MIND KNOW ITSELF THROUGH ITS ESSENCE OR THROUGH SOME SPECIES?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 8, 6; Contra Gentiles II, 75; III, 46; Summa Theol., I, 14, 2, ad 87, I; Q. D. de anima, i6, ad 8; II de anima, 6, nn. 304-308; III de anima, 9, flfl. 72l, 724-726.

Difficulties:

It seems that it knows itself through some species, for

1. As the Philosopher says: "Our intellect understands nothing without a phantasm." But it cannot receive a phantasm of the very essence of the soul. Therefore, our mind must understand itself through some other species abstracted from phantasms.
2. Those things which are seen through their essence are most certainly apprehended without error. But many err about the human mind, for some say it is air, others fire, and hold many other foolish opinions about it. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence.
3. It was said that through its essence the mind sees that it exists, but can err in the investigation of its nature.—On the contrary, to know something through its essence is to know what it is, for the essence of a thing is the same as its quiddity. Therefore, if the soul saw itself through its essence, everyone would unerringly know the essence of his soul, which is obviously false.
4. Our soul is a form joined to matter. But every form of this kind is known through abstraction of the species from matter and from material conditions. Therefore, the soul is known through an abstracted species.
5. Understanding is not an act of the soul alone, but of the composite, as is said in The Soul. But every such act is common to soul and body. Therefore, there must always be something from the body in understanding. But this would not be if the mind saw itself through its essence without any species abstracted from the bodily senses. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence.
6. The Philosopher says that the intellect understands itself just as it understands other things. But it does not understand other things through its essence, but through species. Therefore, it does not understand itself through its essence.
7. Powers are known through their acts, and acts through their objects. But the essence of the soul can be known only when its powers are known, for what a thing can do manifests the nature of the thing. Therefore, it has to know its essence through its acts and through the species of its objects.
8. As sense is related to what is sensible, so understanding is related to what is intelligible. But there has to be some distance between sense and the sensible. For this reason, the eye cannot see itself. Therefore, there also has to be some distance in intellectual vision, will the result that mind can never understand itself through its essence.
9. According to the Philosopher, in a demonstration we should not proceed in a circle, because it would follow that a thing would become known through itself. Thus, it would follow that it would exist before itself and be better known than itself, which is impossible. But, if the mind sees itself through its essence, that which is known and that through which it is known will be the same. Therefore, the same untenable conclusion would follow, for something would exist before itself and be better known than itself.

10. Dionysius says that the soul knows the truth of existing things in a sort of circle. However, a circular movement is from the same thing to the same thing. Therefore, it seems that the soul goes out from itself in its understanding, and through things outside returns to knowledge of itself. Thus, it does not understand itself through its essence.

11. While the cause remains, the effect remains. Therefore, if the mind saw itself through its essence because its essence is present to it, it would always see it, for it is always present to it. Therefore, since it is impossible to understand many things at once, the mind would never understand anything else.

12. Things that follow have more composition than those which come earlier. But understanding follows existing. Therefore, there is more composition in the understanding of the soul than in its existence. But, in the soul, that which exists is not the same as that by which it exists. Therefore, that in the soul by which it understands will not be the same as that which is understood. Thus, the mind does not see itself through its essence.

13. The same thing under the same aspect cannot be form and that which is informed. But, since the understanding is a power of the soul, it is a kind of form of its essence. Therefore, the essence of the soul cannot be the form of the understanding. Therefore, the mind does not see itself through its essence.

14. The soul is a subsistent substance. However, intelligible forms are not of themselves subsistent. Otherwise, knowledge, which is made up of these intelligible forms, would not be classified as an accident. Therefore, the essence of the soul cannot have the character of intelligible form by which the mind sees itself.

15. Since acts and movements are distinguished in their terms, intelligible things which belong to the same species are understood according to their species in the same way. But the soul of Peter belongs to the same species as that of Paul. Therefore, the soul of Peter understands itself just as it understands Paul's soul. But it does not understand Paul's soul through its essence, for it is not present to it. Therefore, it does not understand itself through its essence.

16. Form is simpler than that which is informed through the form. But the mind is not simpler than itself. Therefore, it is not informed by itself. Consequently, since it is informed by that through which it knows, it will not know itself through itself.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "Mind knows itself through itself because it is incorporeal. For, if it does not know itself, it does not love itself."

2'. The Gloss on the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12: 2) reads: "By that sight which is called intellectual, those things are known which are not bodies and do not have any forms like bodies, as mind itself and every disposition of the soul." The same Gloss adds: "Intellectual sight contains those things which have no likenesses not identical will themselves." Therefore, the mind does not know itself through something not identical will it.

3'. In The Soul we read: "In things separated from matter, that which understands and that by which it is understood are the same." But the mind is an immaterial thing. Therefore, it is understood through its essence.

4'. Everything which, as intelligible, is present to the understanding is understood by the understanding. But the essence of the soul is present to understanding in an intelligible manner, for it is present to it through its truth. Truth, however, is the reason for understanding

as goodness is the reason for loving. Therefore, the mind understands itself through its essence.

5'. The species through which something is understood is simpler than that which we understand through it. But the soul does not have any species simpler than itself to be abstracted from it. Therefore, the soul does not understand itself through a species, but through its essence.

6'. All knowledge takes place through an assimilation of the knower to the thing known. But there is nothing else more like the soul than essence. Therefore, it understands itself through nothing else but its essence.

7'. That which is a cause by which other things are made knowable is not known through anything other than itself. But the soul is a cause which makes other physical things knowable, for they are intelligible inasmuch as we make them intelligible, as the Commentator says. Therefore, the soul is understood only through itself.

8'. According to the Philosopher, knowledge about the soul is most certain. But that which is more certain is not known through that which is less certain. Therefore, we do not have knowledge of the soul through something other than itself.

9'. Every species through which our soul understands is abstracted from sensible things. But there is no sensible thing from which the soul can abstract its own quiddity. Therefore, the soul does not know itself through any likeness.

10'. As physical light makes all things actually visible, so the soul through its light makes all material things actually intelligible, as is clear from *The Soul*. But physical light is seen through itself and not through any likeness of itself. Therefore, the soul, too, is understood through its essence and not through any likeness.

11'. As the Philosopher says, the agent intellect "does not at one time understand and at another not understand, but always understands." But it is only itself which it understands at all times. This would not be possible if it understood itself through a species abstracted from the senses, for thus it would not understand itself before the abstraction. Therefore, our mind understands itself through its essence.

REPLY:

When we ask if something is known through its essence, we can understand the question in two ways. In the first, "through its essence" is taken to refer to the thing known, so that we understand that a thing is known through its essence when its essence is known, and that it is not known through its essence when not its essence but only certain of its accidents are known. In the second way, it is taken to refer to that by which something is known, so that we thus understand that something is known through its essence because the essence itself is that by which it is known. It is in this sense that we ask here if the soul understands itself through its essence.

For a clear understanding of this question we should observe that each person can have a twofold knowledge of the soul, as Augustine says. One of these is the knowledge by which the soul of each man knows itself only will reference w that which is proper to it. The other is that by which the soul is known will reference to that which is common to all souls. This latter, which concerns all souls without distinction, is that by which the nature of the soul is known. However, the knowledge which each has of his soul, in so far as it is proper to himself, is the knowledge of the soul as it exists in this individual. Thus, it is through this knowledge that one knows whether the soul exists, as when someone perceives that he has a

soul. Through the other type of knowledge, however, one knows what the soul is and what its proper accidents are.

With reference to the first type of cognition we must make a distinction, because one can know something habitually or actually. Concerning the actual cognition by which one actually considers that he has a soul, I say that the soul is known through its acts. For one perceives that he has a soul, that he lives, and that he exists, because he perceives that he senses, understands, and carries on other vital activities of this sort. For this reason, the Philosopher says: "We sense that we sense, and we understand that we understand, and because we sense this, we understand that we exist." But one perceives that he understands only from the fact that he understands something. For to understand something is prior to understanding that one understands. Therefore, through that which it understands or senses the soul arrives at actual perception of the fact that it exists.

Concerning habitual knowledge I say this, that the soul sees itself through its essence, that is, the soul has the power to enter upon actual cognition of itself from the very fact that its essence is present to it. This is like the case of one who, because he has the habit of some knowledge, can by reason of the presence of the habit perceive those things which fall under that habit. But no habit is required for the soul's perception of its existence and its advertence to the activity within it. The essence alone of the soul, which is present with the mind, is enough for this, for the acts in which it is actually perceived proceed from it.

But, if we speak of the knowledge of the soul when the human mind is limited to specific or generic knowledge, we must make another distinction. For the concurrence of two elements, apprehension and judgment about the thing apprehended, is necessary for knowledge. Therefore, the knowledge by which the nature of the soul is known can be considered with reference to apprehension and with reference to judgment.

If, then, we consider this knowledge with reference to apprehension, I say that we know the nature of the soul through species which we abstract from the senses. For our soul holds the last place among intellectual things, just as first matter does among sensible things, as the Commentator shows. For, as first matter is in potency to all sensible forms, so our possible intellect is in potency to all intelligible forms. Thus, it is, in fact, pure potency in the order of intelligible things, as matter is in the order of sensible reality. Therefore, as matter is sensible only through some added form, so the possible intellect is intelligible only through a species which is brought into it.

Hence, our mind cannot so understand itself that it immediately apprehends itself. Rather, it comes to a knowledge of itself through apprehension of other things, just as the nature of first matter is known from its receptivity for forms of a certain kind. This becomes apparent when we look at the manner in which philosophers have investigated the nature of the soul.

For, from the fact that the human soul knows the universal natures of things, they have perceived that the species by which we understand is immaterial. Otherwise, it would be individuated and so would not lead to knowledge of the universal. From the immateriality of the species by which we understand, philosophers have understood that the intellect is a thing independent of matter. And from this they have proceeded to a knowledge of the other properties of the intellectual soul. Thus, the Philosopher says: "The intellect is intelligible just as other intelligible things are." The Commentator also affirms this in his explanation: "Intellect is understood through an intention in it, just as other intelligible things." This intention is nothing but the intelligible species. But this intention is in the intellect as actually intelligible. In other things, however, it is not actually but only potentially intelligible.

But, if we consider the knowledge which we have of the nature of the soul in the judgment by which we decide that it exists in such a way, as we had apprehended from the deduction

mentioned above, we have knowledge of the soul inasmuch as "we contemplate inviolable truth. This is the truth from which we define to the best of our power not the kind of mind each man has, but the kind of mind it ought to be according to eternal norms," as Augustine says. We see this inviolable truth in its likeness which is impressed on our mind to the extent that we naturally know some things as self-evident. We examine all other things with reference to these, judging of them according to these.

Thus it is clear that our mind knows itself in some way through its essence, as Augustine says, and in some way through an intention or species, as the Philosopher and the Commentator say; and, more over, in some way in the contemplation of inviolable truth, as Augustine says. In this way, then, one must answer both sets of reasons.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Our understanding can actually understand nothing before it abstracts from phantasms. Nor can it have habitual knowledge of things other than itself, which are not within it, before the abstraction just mentioned, because species of other intelligible things are not innate in it. However, its essence is innate in it, so that it does not have to obtain it from phantasms, just as it is not the essence of matter which is received from the natural agent, but only its form, which is related to physical matter as intelligible form is related to sensible matter, as the Commentator says. Therefore, before the mind abstracts from phantasms, it has habitual knowledge of itself, by which it can perceive that it exists.
- 2.** No one has ever made the mistake of not perceiving that he was alive, a fact which belongs to the knowledge by which one knows in its singularity what goes on in his soul. It is according to this knowledge that the soul is said to be habitually known through its essence. Many, however, do fall into error regarding knowledge of the specific nature of the soul, and on this point the conclusion of the objection is true.
- 3.** From this the answer to the third difficulty is clear.
- 4.** Although the soul is joined to matter as its form, it is not so dominated by matter that it becomes material, and thus not actually intelligible, but only potentially intelligible by abstraction from matter.
- 5.** The objection holds for actual knowledge, according to which the soul perceives its existence only by perceiving its act and object, as has been said.
- 6.** The citation from the Philosopher should be taken as referring to the intellect's understanding of what it is and not to the habitual knowledge which it has of the fact that it exists.
- 7.** The seventh difficulty must be answered in like manner.
- 8.** Sensitive activity is brought to completion through the action of the sensible thing on the sense. This is action which is connected with position and therefore needs a definite distance. Intellectual activity is not limited to any position. Therefore, in this way they are not alike.
- 9.** There are two ways in which we can say a thing is known by means of something else. In the first, from knowledge of another thing one arrives at knowledge of the thing in question. In this way conclusions are said to be known from principles. A thing cannot be known by means of itself in this way. In the second way, a thing is said to be known by means of something else in the sense that it is known in that something. In this case, an act of cognition distinct from that in which the thing is known is not required in order that the medium in which the thing is known might itself be known. So, there is nothing to prevent something

from being known by means of itself in this way, as knows Himself by means of Himself. Thus, in some way the soul, too, knows itself through its essence.

10. We do find a circle in the knowledge of the soul, in so far as it seeks the truth of existing things by reasoning. Hence, Dionysius says this in order to show how the knowledge of the soul falls short of the knowledge of an angel. The circularity is observed in this, that reason reaches conclusions from principles by way of discovery, and by way of judgment examines the conclusions which have been found, analyzing them back to the principles. Therefore, this difficulty is not to the point.

11. Just as it is not necessary always actually to understand that of which we have habitual knowledge through species existing in the understanding, so, too, it is not necessary always actually to understand the mind, knowledge of which is habitually in us because its essence is present to our understanding.

12. "That by which a thing is understood" and "that which is understood" are not related to each other as "that by which a thing is" and "that which is." For existence is the act of a being, but understanding is not the act of that which is understood but of that which understands. Hence, "that by which a thing is understood" is related to that which understands as "that which is to that by which it is." And, therefore, just as in the soul "that which is," is different from "that by which it is," so that by which it understands, that is to say, the intellective power, which is the source of the act of understanding, is different from its essence. However, it does not necessarily follow from this that the species by which a thing is understood must be different from that which is understood.

13. The intellective power is a form of the soul will reference to its act of existing, for it has existence in the soul as a property in a subject. But there is nothing to prevent the opposite of this from being true will reference to the act of understanding.

14. The knowledge by which the soul knows itself is not classified as an accident in so far as it is the source of habitual knowledge, but only as an act of cognition which is an accident. Thus, Augustine also says that knowledge is in the mind substantially in so far as the mind knows itself.

15. The objection holds for the knowledge of the soul by which it is known according to the nature of the species in which all souls share.

16. When the mind understands itself, the mind is not itself the form of the mind, because nothing in its own form. But it does follow the manner of form, inasmuch as the action by which it knows itself terminates at itself. Hence, it is not necessary for it to be simpler than itself, unless, perhaps, according to the manner of understanding, in so far as that which is understood is taken as simpler than the intellect itself which understands, and is thus considered as a perfection of the intellect.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. We must understand these words of Augustine to mean that the mind knows itself through itself, since from itself the mind has the power to enter upon the act by which it actually knows itself, by perceiving that it exists. Similarly, from the species habitually retained in the mind, there results in the mind the power actually to consider the thing. But the mind can perceive what its own nature is only from the consideration of its object, as has been said.

2'. The words of the Gloss which read: "Intellectual sight contains those things..." are to be referred to the object of knowledge rather than to that by which it is understood. This is clear from a consideration of what is said about other kinds of sight. For the same Gloss reads: "Through bodily sight bodies are seen; through spiritual sight (that is, sight of imagination)

likenesses of bodies are seen; through intellectual sight those things which are neither bodies nor likenesses of bodies are seen." If this were referred to that by which we understand, there would be no difference between bodily sight and spiritual sight (that of imagination), because even bodily sight takes place through the likeness of a body. For the stone is not in the eye, but a likeness of the stone.

But between the kinds of sight mentioned there is this difference, that bodily sight terminates at the body itself, whereas the sight of imagination terminates at the image of the body, as at its object. So, also, when it is said that intellectual sight embraces things which have no likenesses not identical with themselves, this does not mean that spiritual sight does not take place through species which are not the same as the things understood, but that intellectual sight does not terminate at the likeness of a thing but at the very essence of the thing. For, as by bodily sight one sees a body itself without seeing a likeness of the body, although he sees through a likeness of the body, so in intellectual sight one sees the very essence of a thing without seeing the similitude of the thing, although sometimes he sees that essence through some likeness, as is clear from experience. For, when we understand the soul, we do not construct a likeness of the soul and look at it, as happens in imagination. Rather, we study the essence of the soul itself. Nevertheless, this does not deny that this sight takes place through a species.

3^o. What the Philosopher says should be understood of an intellect which is altogether separated from matter, as the intellects of angels. And this is the way in which the Commentator explains the passage. However, it should not be applied to the human intellect; otherwise, it would follow that speculative science would be the same as the thing known. But this is impossible, as the Commentator also concludes.

4^o. The soul is present to itself as intelligible, in the sense that it can be understood, but not in the sense that it is understood through itself, but from its object, as has been said.

5^o. The soul is not known through a species abstracted from it, but through the species of its object, which becomes its form in so far as it actually understands. Hence, the reason does not follow.

6^o. Although our soul is most like itself, it cannot be the principle of knowing itself in the manner of an intelligible species, just as first matter cannot. The reason for this is that our understanding occupies position in the order of intelligible things similar to that of first matter in the order of sensible things, as the Commentator says.

7^o. The soul is the cause why other things are knowable not in so far as it is a means of knowing, but in so far as physical things are made intelligible through the activity of the soul.

8^o. Knowledge about the soul is most certain in this, that each one experiences within himself that he has a soul and that acts of the soul are within him. But it is very difficult to know what the soul is. Hence, the Philosopher adds: "It is extremely difficult to get any assurance about it."

9^o. The soul is not known through a species abstracted from sensible beings, as though that species were understood to be a likeness of the soul. Rather, from a study of the nature of the species abstracted from sensible things we discover the nature of the soul in which such a species is received, just as matter is known from form.

10^o. Physical light is seen through itself only in so far as it is the reason for the visibility of visible things and a kind of form making them actually visible. Now, we see the light which exists in the sun only through its likeness which exists in our sight. For as the specific nature of stone is not in the eye, but its likeness, so the form of light which is in the sun cannot be the

same form that is in the eye. Similarly, we understand the light of the agent intellect, in so far as it is the reason for the intelligible species, making them actually intelligible.

11' What the Philosopher says can be explained in two ways, according to the two opinions about the agent intellect. For some have held that the agent intellect is a separated substance, one of a number of intelligences. According to this it always actually understands, as the other intelligences do.

Others hold that the agent intellect is a power of the soul. According to this it is said that the agent intellect is not a power which some times understands and sometimes does not, because the cause of understanding at some times and not at others does not come from it, but from the possible intellect. For, in every act by which man understands, the action of the agent intellect and that of the possible intellect concur. Moreover, the agent intellect does not receive anything from outside. Only the possible intellect does so. Hence, with reference to the requirements for our thought, there is nothing on the part of the agent intellect to keep us from always understanding, but there is on the part of the possible intellect, for it is brought to completion only through intelligible species abstracted from the senses.

ARTICLE IX: IS IT THROUGH THEIR ESSENCE OR THROUGH SOME LIKENESS THAT OUR MIND KNOWS HABITS WHICH EXIST IN THE SOUL?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 23, 1, Quodibet VIII, 2, 4; Summa Theol., I, 87, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it knows them through their essence, for

- 1.** The Gloss on this passage, "I know a man..." in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2) reads: "We do not see love in one way in the species through which it exists when it is present, and in another way in some image similar to it when it is not present. But it is perceived in so far as it can be discerned by the mind, more by one, less by another." Therefore, love is perceived by the mind through its essence and not through some likeness of it. This is true of every other habit for the same reason.
- 2.** Augustine says: "What is as present to knowledge as that which is present to the mind?"² But habits of the soul are present to the mind through their essence. Therefore, they are known by the mind through their essence.
- 3.** The cause of the perfection of a thing has that perfection in an even higher degree. But habits of the mind are the cause whereby other things which fall under the habits are known. Therefore, habits are known by the mind especially through their essence.
- 4.** Everything which the mind knows through its likeness arises in sense before it arises in the mind. But a habit of the mind never arises in sense. Therefore, these habits are not known by the mind through a likeness.
- 5.** The closer a thing is to the mind, the more it is known by the mind. But habit is closer to the intellective power of the mind than act, and act is closer than object. Therefore, the mind knows habit more than act or object. So, it knows habit through its essence and not through acts or objects.
- 6.** Augustine says that the mind and art are known by the same kind of sight. But the mind is known through its essence by the mind. Therefore, art, also, is known through its essence, and so are the other habits of the mind.

7. The true is related to understanding as the good is related to affection. But the good is not in affection through some likeness of itself. Therefore, neither is the true known by understanding through some likeness. Therefore, whatever understanding knows it knows through essence and not through a likeness.

8. Augustine says: "Faith is not seen by its possessor in the heart in which it is," as the soul of another man is seen from movements of the body; "rather, certain knowledge dings to it, and consciousness proclaims. Therefore, according to this, knowledge of the mind clings to faith in so far as consciousness proclaims it. But consciousness proclaims faith in so far as it is present in it. Therefore, faith is known by the mind in so far as it is present in the mind through its essence.

9. Form is most exactly proportionate to that of which it is the form. But habits exist in the mind as forms of the mind. Therefore, they are most exactly proportionate to the mind. Consequently, our mind knows them immediately through their essence.

10. Understanding knows the intelligible species which is in it, not through another species, but through its essence. Otherwise, there would be an infinite series. But this is so only because these species inform the understanding. Since understanding is informed in a similar way through habits, it seems that the mind knows them through their essence.

11. The mind knows habits only by intellectual vision. But intellectual vision concerns those things which are seen through their essence. Therefore, habits are seen by the mind through their essence.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "Behold in the fields and caves and numberless caverns of my memory, full beyond reckoning, there are innumerable sorts of things, [present] either through images, as those of all bodies, or through actual presence, as that of the arts, or through I know not what notions, as those of affections of the mind which memory retains even when the mind is not acted upon." From this it seems that affections of the mind are not known through their essence, but through some notions of them; and for the same reason neither are habits of the virtues, which group themselves around affections of this kind.

2'. Augustine says: "We have another sense of the interior man which surpasses that sense," the bodily, "and through which we perceive just and unjust things, the former through an intelligible species, the latter through its privation." But he calls just and unjust things the habits of virtues and vices. Therefore, habits of virtues are known through a species and not through their essence.

3'. Understanding knows through its essence only that which is present in the understanding. But habits of virtues are not present in the understanding, but in the affective part. Therefore, they are not known through their essence by the understanding.

4'. Intellectual vision is superior to bodily sight. Therefore, it entails greater distinction. But in bodily sight the species through which something is seen is always different from the thing seen through it. Therefore, habits, which are seen through intellectual vision, are not seen by the mind through their essence, but through some other species.

5'. We desire only what we know, as Augustine proves. But some people who do not have habits of the soul desire them. Therefore, they know those habits, but not through their essence since they do not have them. Therefore, they know them through a species of them.

6'. Hugh of St. Victor says that eye can have three meanings in man. There can be the eye of reason, the eye of intelligence, and the eye of flesh. We see God with the eye of intelligence

which, Hugh says, was plucked out after the fall. We see physical things with the eye of flesh, which has remained intact after the fall. We know intelligible created things with the eye of reason, which has become blurry since the fall, for we know intelligible things only partially and not entirely. But everything that is seen only partially is not known through its essence. Therefore, since habits of the mind are intelligible, it seems that the mind does not see them through their essence.

7'. God is much more present to the mind through His essence than habits are, for He is innermost in everything. But God's presence in the mind does not make our mind see God through His essence. Therefore, habits, too, are not seen by the mind through their essence, although they are present in it.

8'. Intellect, which potentially understands, needs something to reduce it to act, if it is actually to understand. And it is by reason of this that intellect does actually understand. But the essence of a habit, in so far as it is present to the mind, does not reduce intellect from potency to act, for, if it did, things would necessarily be understood as long as they were present in the soul. Therefore, that by which habits are understood is not their essence.

REPLY:

Knowledge of habits, as that of the soul, is twofold. One knowledge is that by which one knows whether he has a habit. The other is that by which one knows what a habit is. Nevertheless, these two types of knowledge relate to habits in a way different from that in which they relate to the soul. For the knowledge by which one knows he has a habit presupposes the knowledge by which he knows what that habit is. For I cannot know that I have chastity unless I know what chastity is. This is not the case with the soul. For many know that they have a soul without knowing what the soul is.

The reason for such diversity is this, that we perceive that habits as well as the soul exist in us only by perceiving acts of which the soul and habits are the principles. And by its essence a habit is the principle of a certain kind of act. Thus, if we know a habit as the principle of such an act, we know what it is. Accordingly, I know what chastity is if I know it is that through which one refrains from illicit thoughts in matters of sex. But the soul is a principle of acts not through its essence, but through its powers. Thus, from a perception of the acts of the soul we perceive that the principle of such acts, for example, of movement and of sense, is in the soul. Nevertheless, we do not know the nature of the soul from this.

Accordingly, in so far as we know that habits exist, there are, then, two things which we have to keep in mind when we speak of them: the apprehension of the habit and the judgment we form about it. For apprehension we must get knowledge of the habits from objects and acts. The habits themselves cannot be grasped through their essence, because the power of any faculty of the soul is limited to its object. For this reason its activity is directed first of all and principally to its object. It extends only through a kind of return to those things by which it is directed to its object. Thus, we see that sight is first directed to colour, but is directed to the act of seeing only through a kind of return, when, in seeing colour, it sees that it sees. But this return is incomplete in sense and complete in understanding which goes back to know its essence by a complete return.

As is said in *The Soul*, in this life our understanding is related to phantasms as sight is related to colors, not, however, so that it knows phantasms as sight knows colors, but that it knows the things which the phantasms represent. Thus, the activity of our understanding is directed, first, to the things which are grasped through phantasms, then returns to know its act, and then goes further to the species, habits, powers, and the essence of the mind itself. For these are not related to understanding as primary objects, but as those things by which understanding attains its object.

Moreover, we have judgment about each one of these according to that which is its measure. And the measure of any habit is that to which the habit is ordained. This object has a triple relation to our knowledge. For, sometimes, it is obtained from sense, either from sight or hearing, as when we see the usefulness of grammar or medicine, or we hear it from others, and from this usefulness we know what grammar or medicine is. Sometimes it is inherent in natural knowledge, as is abundantly clear in the habits of virtues, whose ends natural reason proposes. Sometimes it is divinely infused, as appears in faith, hope, and other infused habits of this kind. In both of these latter, uncreated truth is taken into account, because even natural knowledge arises in us from divine enlightenment. Hence, the judgment in which knowledge about the nature of a habit is brought to completion takes place either according to that which we receive by sense or according to a comparison with uncreated truth.

There are two things to be considered in the knowledge by which we know whether habits are present in us: habitual knowledge and actual knowledge. From the acts of the habits which we experience within us we actually perceive that we have the habits. For this reason, the Philosopher says that we should take pleasure attendant on a work as a sign of habits.

But, with reference to habitual knowledge, habits of the mind are said to be known through themselves. For the cause of habitual knowledge is that by which someone is rendered capable of entering into the act of knowing the thing which is said to be known habitually. From the very fact that habits are in the mind through their essence, the mind can enter upon actual perception of the existence of the habits within it, in so far as through the habits which it has it can enter upon acts in which the habits are actually perceived.

But, in this, habits of the cognitive and affective parts differ. For a habit of the cognitive part is the source both of the very act by which the habit is received and also of the knowledge by which it is perceived. For the actual knowledge proceeds from the cognitive habit, whereas a habit of the affective part is the source of that act from which the habit can be perceived but not of the knowledge by which it is perceived.

Thus, it is clear that a habit of the cognitive part is the proximate source of knowledge of it because it is present in the mind through its essence. However, a habit of the affective part is, as it were, a remote source, for such a habit does not have within it the cause of knowledge but of that from which knowledge is received. Therefore, Augustine says that arts are known through their presence, but affections of the soul are known through certain conceptions.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. What is said in the Gloss should be taken as referring to the object of knowledge and not to the means of knowing. For, when we know love, we consider the very essence of love and not some likeness of it, as happens in imagination.
2. The mind knows nothing better than that which is within it, for this reason, that it does not have within itself something of the things outside of it in order to proceed from this to knowledge of those things. But the mind can issue into actual cognition of those things which are within it from the things which are present to it internally, even though these are known through some other things.
3. Habit is not the cause of knowing other things as something which is the source of knowledge of other things, once it is known itself, as principles are the cause of knowing conclusions. Rather, from a habit the soul acquires a perfection ordered to knowledge of something. Thus, it is not a univocal cause of the things known, as when one thing which is known is the cause of the knowledge of something else which is known, but an equivocal cause, which does not receive the same name. For example, it is like whiteness which makes a thing white although it itself is not white, but that by which something is white. In like

manner, a habit, as such, is not the cause of knowledge, as that which is known, but as that by which something is known. Therefore, it is not necessary that it be better known than those things which are known through the habit.

4. A habit is not known by the soul through a species of it abstracted from sense, but through the species of those things which are known through the habit. And habits are known as the source of knowledge in the cognition of these other things.

5. Although habit is closer to power than act is, act is closer to the object which constitutes that which is known. Power, however, constitutes the source of knowing. Therefore, act is known before habit, but habit is more a source of knowing.

6. Art is a habit of the intellectual part and, as far as habitual knowledge goes, it is perceived by one who has it just as the mind is perceived, that is, through its presence.

7. Movement or activity of the cognitive part realizes its perfection within the mind itself, and, therefore, for a thing to be known, there must be some likeness in the mind. This is especially true if, as an object of knowledge, it is not joined to the mind through its essence. But movement or activity of the affective part begins from the soul and terminates at things. Therefore, a likeness of the thing by which it is informed is not required in the affection as it is in the understanding.

8. Faith is a habit of the intellectual part; hence, from the very fact that it is in the mind, it bends the mind to an act of understanding, in which faith itself is seen. However, this is not the case with other habits, which are in the affective part.

9. Habits of the mind have the greatest proportion to it, as form has a proportion to subject, and perfection to perfectible. However, the proportion is not that of object to power.

10. Understanding does not know the intelligible species through its essence or through any species of the species, but, in knowing the object of which it is the species, it knows the species through a kind of reflection, as has been said.

11. The answer to this can be found above.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. In the passage cited, Augustine distinguishes three ways of knowing. One of these concerns things which are outside the soul, and about which we cannot have knowledge from the things which are within us. To know these things outside, images or likenesses of them must be formed within us.

A second way deals with those things which are in the intellectual part. He says that these are known by reason of their presence, because it is from them that we enter upon the act of knowing. And in this act those things which are the principles of understanding are known. Therefore, he says that arts are known by reason of their presence.

The third way refers to those things which belong to the affective part, and the reason for knowing these is not in the understanding, but in the affections. Therefore, they are known as through an immediate principle, not by their presence, which is in the affections, but through the knowledge or definition of it which is in the understanding. Yet, by their presence, habits of the affective part are also a remote principle of knowledge in so far as they elicit acts in which understanding knows them. As a result, we can in a sense also say that they are known by reason of their presence.

2'. That species through which justice is known is not something other than the very notion of justice through the privation of which injustice is known. Moreover, this species or notion is

not something abstracted from justice, but it is that which, as a specific difference, is the ultimate perfection of its being.

3'. Understanding, properly speaking, is not an activity of the intellect, but of the soul through the intellect, just as to make warm is not an activity of heat, but of fire through heat. Nor again are those two parts, understanding and affection, to be thought of as distinguished according to position, as sight and hearing, which are acts of organs. Therefore, that which is in affection is also present to the understanding soul. For this reason, through understanding, the soul returns to know not only the act of the understanding but also the act of the affections. In a similar way, through the affections it returns to seek and desire not only the act of the affections but also the act of the understanding.

4'. The distinctness (*discretio*) which has a bearing on the perfection of knowledge is not the state of being distinct (*discretio*) by which that which is understood is distinct from that by which it is understood, for, thus, the divine cognition by which God knows Him self would be most imperfect. Rather, it is the discernment (*discretio*) by which that which is known is [as] distinct from everything else.

5'. Those who do not have habits of the mind do not know these habits by that knowledge in which one perceives that they exist in himself, but by that in which one knows what they are, or perceives that they exist in others. This is not through presence, but in another way, as has been said.

6'. The eye of reason is said to be blear in relation to created intelligible things in so far as it actually understands nothing without getting something from sensible things, to which intelligible things are superior. Therefore, it does not have all that is needed to know intelligible things. Nevertheless, nothing prevents those things which are in reason from immediately tending through their essence toward acts in which they are understood, as has been said.

7'. Although God is more present to our mind than habits are, still, from objects which we naturally know, we cannot see the divine essence as perfectly as we see the essence of habits, for habits have a proportion to the objects and acts and are their proximate principles. We cannot say this about God.

8'. Although the presence of a habit in the mind does not make the mind actually know that habit, it does cause the mind to be actually perfected through the habit by which the act is elicited. And the habit is known from this.

ARTICLE X: CAN ONE KNOW THAT HE HAS CHARITY?

Parallel readings: I Sentences i 2, 4; II Sentences 23, 1., ad r; IV Sentences, r, 3, sol. 2; 21, 2, 2, ad 2 2 Cor., c. 12, lectura 2; c. 13, lect. Summa Theol., I—II, 112, 5.

Difficulties:

It seems that he can, for

1. What is seen through its essence is perceived with greatest certainty. But, as Augustine says, charity is seen through its essence by him who has it. Therefore, charity is perceived by him who possesses it.

2. Charity causes pleasure principally in its acts. But habits of the moral virtues are perceived through the pleasures which they cause in acts of the virtues, as is clear from what the Philosopher says. Therefore, charity is perceived by one who has it.

3. Augustine says: "One knows the love by which he loves better than the brother whom he loves." But he knows with greatest certainty that the brother whom he loves exists. Therefore, he also knows with greatest certainty that the love by which he loves exists within him.

4. The attraction of charity is stronger than that of any other virtue. But one is certain that he has other virtues in himself because he has an inclination to their acts. For it is hard for one who has the habit of justice to do what is unjust, but easy to do what is just, as is said in the Ethics. And anyone can perceive this facility within him. Therefore, he can also perceive that he has charity.

5. The Philosopher says that it is impossible for us to have the most noble habits and for them to be hidden from us. But charity is the most noble habit. Therefore, it would be inconsistent to say that one who has charity does not know that he has it.

6. Grace is spiritual light. But this light is perceived with greatest certainty by those who are bathed in it. Therefore, those who have grace perceive with greatest certainty that they have it. The same should be said for charity, without which one does not have grace.

7. According to Augustine, no one can love something which he does not know. But one loves the charity within him. Therefore, he knows that charity exists in him.

8. The unction [of God] teaches all that is necessary for salvation. But to have charity is necessary for salvation. Therefore, one who has charity knows that he has it.

9. The Philosopher says: "Virtue is more certain than any art." But one who has an art knows that he has it. So, also, when one has a virtue, and, thus, when one has charity, which is the greatest of the virtues, he knows that he has it.

To the Contrary:

1'. Ecclesiastes (9: 1) reads: "Yet man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred." But he who has charity is worthy of divine love according to Proverbs (8: 17): "I love them that love me." Therefore, no one knows that he has charity.

2'. No one can know with certainty when God comes to dwell in him. Job (9: i 1) says: "If he come to me, I shall not see him." But God dwells in man through charity, for the first Epistle of St. John (4:16) says: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God and God in him." Therefore, no one can know with certainty that he has charity.

REPLY:

One who has charity can surmise that he has charity from probable signs, as when he sees that he is ready to undertake spiritual works, and that he effectively hates evil, as also through other things of this sort which charity effects in a man. But one cannot know with certainty that he has charity unless it be revealed to him by God.

The reason for this, as is clear from what has been said earlier, is that the knowledge by which one knows that he has a habit presupposes the knowledge by which he knows what the habit is. What a habit is, however, cannot be known unless one bases his judgment about it upon that to which that habit is ordained, which is the measure of that habit.

But that to which charity is ordained cannot be comprehended, because its immediate object and end is God, the highest good, to whom charity unites us. Hence, one cannot know from

the act of love which he perceives within him whether he has reached the stage where he is united to God in the way which is needed for the nature of charity.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Charity is seen through its essence, in so far as through its essence it is the source of the act of love, in which both are known. Thus, through its essence, also, it is a source of its knowledge, although a remote source. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that it be perceived with certainty, for the act of love which we perceive in ourselves, in so far as it is perceptible, is not an adequate indication of charity because of the similarity between natural love and infused love.
2. The pleasure which remains in an act by reason of charity can also be caused by some acquired habit. Therefore, it is not a sufficient indication to show that charity is present because we do not perceive a thing with certainty from common marks.
3. Although the mind knows most certainly the love with which it loves a brother, in so far as it is love, it does not know as certainly that it is charity.
4. Although the inclination with which charity tends to action is a source of perceiving charity, it is not enough for perfect perception of charity. For no one can perceive that he has a given habit unless he knows perfectly that to which the habit is ordained, for it is through this that he judges about the habit. In charity this cannot be known.
5. The Philosopher is speaking of habits of the intellectual part, which, if they are perfect, cannot be concealed from those who have them, because certainty belongs to their perfection. Hence, anyone who knows, knows that he knows, since to know is to perceive the cause of a thing, that it is the cause of it, and that it cannot be other will. Similarly, one who has the habit of the understanding of principles knows that he has that habit. But the perfection of charity does not consist in certitude of knowledge but in strength of affection. Therefore, the case is not the same.
6. When we are speaking metaphorically, we should not apply the likeness to every detail. Thus, grace is not compared to light in so far as it plainly pours itself out on spiritual vision as physical light does on bodily vision. Rather, the comparison lies in this, that grace is the source of spiritual life as light of the heavenly bodies is a source of bodily life in things here below, as Dionysius says. This holds also for other likenesses.
7. "To have charity" can be understood in two ways. In one it has the force of a statement; in the other, the force of a term. It has the force of a statement, for instance, when one says: "it is true that some one has charity." It is used with the force of a term when we predicate something about the phrase "to have charity" or about its meaning. However, it does not belong to the affections to join or divide, but only to be drawn to things themselves, for good and evil are its conditions. Therefore, when one says: "I love," or "I want to have charity," the phrase "to have charity" is taken in the sense of a term, as though I said: "This is what I want, to have charity." Now, nothing prevents us from this. For I know what it is to have charity, even if I do not have it. Thus, even one who does not have charity desires to have charity. Nevertheless, it does not follow that one knows that he has charity, taking this with the force of a statement, affirming that he does have charity.
8. Although it is necessary to have charity to be saved, it is not necessary to know that one has charity. In fact, it is generally more advantageous not to know, because thus solicitude and humility are preserved. The saying, "The unction of God teaches all that is needed for salvation," should be understood as referring to all that has to be known for salvation.

9. Virtue is more certain than any art will the certainty of tendency to one thing, but not will the certainty of knowledge. For virtue, as Cicero says, "tends to one thing in the manner of a nature. But nature reaches a single end more surely and more directly than art does. It is in this sense, too, that virtue is said to be more certain than art, and not in the sense that one perceives virtue in himself more surely than art.

ARTICLE XI: CAN THE MIND IN THIS LIFE SEE GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE?

Parallel readings III Sentences 27, 3, 1 35, 2, 2, sol. 2; IV Sentences 49, 2, Quodibet I, 1; Contra Gentiles III, 47; 2 Cor., c. 12, lectura 1; Summa Theol., I, 12, II; II—II, 180, 5; 175, 4-5; In Joan., C. 1, lectura II.

Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

1. In Numbers (12:8) it is said of Moses: "For I speak to him mouth to mouth: and plainly and not by riddles doth he see the Lord." But to see God without riddles is to see Him through His essence. There fore, since Moses was still a wayfarer, it seems that someone in this life can see God through His essence.

2. Gregory's gloss on Exodus (33:20), "For man shah not see me and live," says: "The glory of God everlasting can be seen will the keenness of contemplation by some living in this flesh but growing in priceless virtue." But the glory of God is His essence, as is said in the same gloss. Therefore, one living in this mortal flesh can see God through His essence.

3. Christ's understanding was of the same nature as ours. But the conditions of this life did not prevent His understanding from seeing God through His essence. Therefore, we, too can see God in this life through His essence.

4. In this life God is known by means of intellectual sight. Hence, Romans (1:20) says: "For the invisible things of him... are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." But the sight of understanding is that through which things are seen in themselves, as Augustine says. Therefore, our mind can see God in this life through His essence.

5. The Philosopher says: "Our soul in a certain sense is all things," because sense is all sensible things and understanding is all intelligible things. But the divine essence is most intelligible. Therefore, our understanding even according to the conditions of this life, about which the Philosopher is speaking, can see God through His essence, just as our sense can perceive all sensible things.

6. As there is boundless goodness in God, so, too, there is boundless truth. But the divine goodness, even though it is boundless, can be loved in itself by us in this life. Therefore, the truth of His essence can be seen in itself in this life.

7. Our understanding has been made to see God. If it cannot see God in this life, this is only because of some veil. This is twofold, a veil of guilt and of creaturehood. The veil of guilt did not exist in the state of innocence, and even now is taken away from the saints. The second Epistle to the Corinthians (3:18) says: "But we all beholding the glory of the Lord w open face..." Now, the veil of creaturehood, as it seems, cannot keep us from seeing the divine essence, because God is deeper within our mind than any creature. Therefore, in this life our mind sees God through His essence.

8. Everything that is in another is there according to the mode of the one receiving. But God is in our mind through His essence. Since, therefore, intelligibility itself is the mode of our mind, it seems that the divine essence is in our mind as intelligible. So, our mind understands God through His essence in this life.

9. Cassiodorus says: "The soundness of the human mind understands that unapproachable glory." But our mind is made sound through grace. Therefore, the divine essence, which is unapproachable glory, can be seen in this life by one who has grace.

10. As the being which is predicated of all things stands first in universality, so the being by which all things are caused, that is to say, God, stands first in causality. But the being which is first in universality is the first concept of our understanding even in this life. Therefore, in this life we can immediately know through His essence the being which is first in causality.

11. For sight there must be one who sees, something seen, and an intention. But we have these three in our mind with reference to the divine essence. For our mind itself is naturally capable of seeing the divine essence, since it was made for this. And the divine essence is present in our mind. Nor is an intention lacking, for, whenever our mind turns to a creature, it also turns to God, since in the creature there is a likeness of God. Therefore, our mind can see God through His essence in this life.

12. Augustine says: "If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where, I ask, do we see this? Surely, I do not see it in you, nor you in me, but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds." But the unchangeable truth is the divine essence, in which nothing can be seen unless it itself is seen. Therefore, we see the divine essence in this life, and we see all truth in it.

13. Truth, as such, is knowable. Therefore, the highest truth is most knowable. But this is the divine essence. Therefore, even in the conditions of this life we can know the divine essence as most knowable.

14. Genesis (32:30) says: "I have seen the Lord face to face." And, as the Gloss comments: "The face of God is the form in which the Son did not consider it robbery to be equal to God." But the form is the divine essence. Therefore, Jacob saw God through His essence in this life.

To the Contrary:

1'. In the first Epistle to Timothy (6: r6) we read: "Who inhabits light inaccessible, whom no man hath seen nor can see."

2'. On Exodus (3:20), "For a man will not see me and live," the gloss of Gregory says: "God could be seen by those living in this flesh through limited images; He could not be seen through the unlimited light of eternity." But this light is the divine essence. Therefore, no one living in this life can see God through His essence.

3'. Bernard says that, although God can be entirely loved in this life, He cannot be entirely understood. But, if He were seen through His essence, He would be entirely understood. Therefore, He is not seen through His essence in this life.

4'. As the Philosopher says, our intellect understands in space and time. But the divine essence transcends all space and time. Therefore, our intellect cannot see God through His essence in this life.

5'. The divine essence is farther away from the gift of it than first act from second act. But, sometimes, when one sees God in contemplation through the gift of understanding or wisdom, the soul is separated from the body with reference to sense activities, which are second acts. Therefore, if the soul would see God through His essence, it must be separated from the body,

even in so far as it is the first act of the body. But this does not happen as long as man is in this life. There fore, in this life no one can see God through His essence.

REPLY:

An action can belong to someone in two ways. In one way it is such that the principle of that action is in the doer, as we see in all natural actions. In the other way it is such that the principle of that activity or movement is from an extrinsic principle, as happens in forcibly imposed movements and also in miraculous works, such as giving sight to the blind, resuscitation of the dead, and things of this sort which take place only through divine power.

In this life, the vision of God through His essence cannot belong to our mind in the first way. For, in natural knowledge, our mind looks to phantasms as objects from which it receives intelligible species, as is said in *The Soul*.¹s Hence, everything it understands in the present life, it understands through species of this sort abstracted from phantasms. But no species of this sort is sufficient to represent the divine essence or that of any other separated essence. For the quiddities of Sensible things, of winch intelligible species abstracted from phantasms are likenesses are essentially different from the essences of even Created immaterial substances, and much more from the divine essence. Hence, by means of the natural knowledge, which we experience in this life, our mind cannot see either God or angels through their essence. Nevertheless angels can be seen through their essence by means of intelligible species different from their essence, but the divine essence cannot, for it transcends every genus and is outside every genus. As a result, it is impossible to find any created species which is adequate to represent it.

Thus, if God is to be seen through His essence, He must be seen through no created species, but His very essence must become the intelligible form of the understanding which sees Him. This cannot take place unless the created intellect is disposed for it through the light of glory. And in thus seeing God through His essence by reason of the disposition of infused light, the mind reaches the end of its course, which is glory, and so is not in this life.

Moreover, just as bodies are subject to the divine omnipotence, so, too, are minds. Hence, just as it can cause some bodies to produce effects, the dispositions for which they do not have within themselves, as it made Peter walk on water without giving him the gift of agility, so it can bring it about that the mind be united to the divine essence in the present life in the way in which it is united to it in heaven will out being bathed in the light of glory.

When, however, this takes place, the mind must leave off that mode of knowing in which it abstracts from phantasms in the same way that a corruptible body is not actually heavy at the same time that it is miraculously given that act of agility. Therefore, those to whom it is given to see God through His essence in this way are withdrawn completely from activity of the senses, so that the whole soul is concentrated on seeing the divine essence. Hence, they are said to be in a state of rapture, as if by virtue of a higher power they were separated from that which naturally belongs to them.

Therefore, in the ordinary course of events, no one sees God through His essence in this life. And if it is miraculously granted to some to see God through His essence before the soul is completely separated from mortal flesh, such are, nevertheless, not altogether in this life, for they are without the activity of the senses, which we use in the state of mortal existence.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. According to Augustine, from those words Moses is shown to have seen God through His essence in a rapture, as we are told of Paul in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2), in order that the law giver of the Jews and the teacher of the Gentiles might be equal in this respect.

2. Gregory is speaking about men who grow in keenness of contemplation to the point that they see the divine essence in rapture. Hence, he adds: "He who sees the wisdom which is God entirely dies to this life."

3. It was unique in Christ that at the same time He was a wayfarer and a possessor [the beatific vision]. This belonged to Him because He was God and man. As a result, everything which related to human nature was under His control, so that each power of soul and body was affected in the way in which He determined. Hence, bodily pain did not hinder contemplation of the mind, nor did delight of the mind lessen bodily pain. Thus, His understanding, which was illumined by the light of glory, saw God through His essence in such a way that the glory did not affect the lower parts. In this way He was at once a wayfarer and a possessor of the beatific Vision. This cannot be said of others, in whom there is some necessary diffusion from the higher powers to the lower, and in whom the higher powers are drawn down by the strong passions of the lower powers.

4. In this life God is known by means of intellectual sight, yet not will the result that we know what He is, but only what He is not. To this extent we know His essence, understanding that it stands above everything. Such cognition, however, takes place through certain likenesses. The statement from Augustine should be taken as referring to that which is known and not to that by which it is known, as is clear from what has been said.

5. Even in this life our understanding can in a certain manner know the divine essence, not that it knowledge it is, but only what it is not.

6. We can love God directly without having loved anything else first, although sometimes we are drawn to invisible things through love of other things which can be seen. In this life, however, we can not know God directly without first knowing something else. The reason for this is that the activity of affection begins where the activity of understanding ends, since affection follows understanding. But the understanding, going from effects to causes, finally arrives at some sort of knowledge of God, by knowing what He is not. Hence, affection is directed to that which is presented to it through the understanding, without having to go back through all the intermediate things through which the understanding passed.

7. Although our understanding has been made to see God, it cannot see God by its own natural power, but through the light of glory infused into it. Therefore, even though every veil is taken away, it is still not necessary to see God through His essence if the soul is not enlightened will the light of glory. For this lack of glory will be an obstacle to seeing God.

8. Along will intelligibility, which it has as a property, our mind also has existence in common will other things. Hence, although God is in it, it is not necessary that He be there always as an intelligible form, but as giving existence, just as He is in other creatures. More over, although He gives existence to all creatures alike, He gives each creature its own mode of existence. Furthermore, in the sense that He is in all of them through essence, presence, and power, He is seen to exist differently in different things, and in each one according to its own mode.

9. Soundness of mind is twofold. There is one by which the mind is healed from sin through the grace of faith. This soundness makes the mind see that unapproachable glory in a mirror and obscurely. The other, which will come through glory, is a remedy for all sin, punishment, and distress. This soundness makes the mind see God face to face. These two kinds of sight are distinguished in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face."

10. The being which is most extensive in universality does not exceed the proportion of anything, since it is essentially identified will everything. Therefore, it is perceived in the

knowledge of anything whatsoever. But the being which is first in causality exceeds all other things and has no proportion to them. Hence, it cannot be known adequately through knowledge of any other thing. Therefore, in this life, in which we understand through species abstracted from things, we have adequate knowledge of being in general, but not of uncreated being.

11. Although the divine essence is present to our understanding, still, as long as our understanding is not made perfect by the light of glory, it is not joined to it as an intelligible form which it can understand. For the mind itself does not have the faculty of seeing God through His essence before it is illumined with the aforesaid light. Thus, the faculty of seeing and the presence of what is seen are lacking. Again, the intention is not always present, for, although some likeness of the Creator is found in creatures, still, whenever we look at a creature, we do not consider it as a likeness of the Creator. Hence, it is not necessary that our intention always reach God.

12. As the Gloss on Psalms (11:2) says: "Truths are decayed."

Many truths are imprinted on human minds," by the one uncreated truth, "just as from one face many faces appear in different mirrors," or in one broken mirror. According to this, we are said to see some thing in uncreated truth when we judge about something through the likeness of uncreated truth reflected in our mind, as when we judge of conclusions through self-evident principles. Hence, it is not necessary that we see uncreated truth through its essence.

13. The highest truth, in so far as it exists in itself, is most knowable. But in our regard it happens to be less knowable to us, as is clear from the Philosopher.¹⁸

14. This citation is explained in two ways in the Gloss. In one way it is taken to refer to the sight of imagination. Thus, the interlinear Gloss says: "I have seen the Lord face to face. This does not mean that God can be seen, but that he saw the form in which God spoke to him." It is explained differently in Gregory's gloss, as referring to intellectual sight, by which saints have seen divine truth in contemplation, not, indeed, knowing what it is, but what it is not. Hence, Gregory says: "He saw by perceiving the truth, for he does not see how great the truth itself is, since the closer he approaches to it, the farther he thinks he is from it. For, unless he saw the truth in some way, he would not perceive that he was notable to see it." And he adds: "This sight, which comes through contemplation, is not firm and permanent, but, as a kind of imitation of sight, is called the face of God. For, since we recognize a person by his face, we have knowledge of God the face of God."

ARTICLE XII: IS GOD'S EXISTENCE SELF-EVIDENT TO THE HUMAN MIND, JUST AS FIRST PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION, WHICH CANNOT BE THOUGHT NOT TO EXIST?

Parallel readings: I Sentences 3, 1,z; In Boet. de Trinit., 1, 3, ad 6; Contra Gentiles I, w- III, 38; Q. D. de pot., 7, 2, ad 11; Summa Theol., 1, 2, 1; In Psalm., 8.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Those things which it is given us to know naturally are self-evident. But "knowledge of God's existence is naturally given to every body," as Damascene says. Therefore, it is self-evident that God exists.

2. "God is that than which nothing greater can be thought," as Anselm says. But that which cannot be thought not to exist is greater than that which can be thought not to exist. Therefore, God cannot be thought not to exist.

3. God is truth itself. But no one can think that truth does not exist, because, if it is declared not to exist, it follows that it exists. For, if truth does not exist, it is true that truth does not exist. Therefore, no one can think that God does not exist.

4. God is His own existence. But it is impossible to think that a thing is not predicated of itself, for example, that man is not man. Therefore, it is impossible to think that God does not exist.

5. All things desire the highest good, as Boethius says. But only God is the highest good. Therefore, all things desire God. But what is not known cannot be desired. Therefore, that God exists is a notion common to all. Therefore, He cannot be thought not to exist.

6. First truth surpasses all created truth. But some created truth is so evident that it is impossible to think that it does not exist, as for instance, the truth of the proposition that affirmation and denial can not both be true at the same time. Therefore, much less can it be thought that uncreated truth, which is God, does not exist.

7. God has existence more truly than the human soul has. But the soul cannot think that it does not exist. Therefore, much less can it think that God does not exist.

8. Before anything existed it was true that it would exist. But truth exists. Therefore, before it existed it was true that it would exist. But this is true only because of truth. Therefore, it is impossible to think that truth did not always exist. But God is truth. Therefore, it cannot be thought that God does not exist or has not always existed.

9. It was said that there is a fallacy in this argument, will an equivocation on "simply" and "in some respect." For that truth would exist before it did exist does not state a truth simply, but only in some respect. Thus, we cannot conclude that truth exists simply.—On the contrary, there is the fact that everything which is true in some respect is reduced to something which is true simply, just as every imperfect thing is reduced to something perfect. Therefore, if the fact that truth would exist was true in some respect, something had to be true simply. Thus, it was simply true to say that truth existed.

10. God's proper name is He Who Is, as is clear from Exodus (3:14).

But it is impossible to think that being is not. Therefore, it is also impossible to think that God is not.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Psalmist says (Ps. 13:1): "The fool hath said in his heart, 'There is no God.'"

2'. It was said that the fact that God exists is self-evident habitually to the mind, but it is possible actually to think that He does not exist.— On the contrary, in our inner reason we cannot hold the opposite about those things which we know by a natural habit, such as first principles of demonstration. If, therefore, the contrary of the proposition, God exists, could actually be held, that God does exist would not be habitually self-evident.

3'. Those things which are self-evident are known without passing from things which are caused to their causes. For they are known as soon as the terms are known, as is said in the Posterior Analytics. But we know God only by looking at what He has made, according to Romans (1:20): "For the invisible things of him,... by the things that are made..." Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

4'. We cannot know the existence of a thing without knowing what it is. But in this life we cannot know what God is. Therefore, that He exists is not evident to us, much less self-evident.

5'. That God exists is an article of faith. But an article of faith is something that faith supplies and reason contradicts. But things which reason contradicts are not self-evident. Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

6'. There is nothing more certain for a man than his faith, as Augustine says. But doubt can arise in us about matters of faith and, so, about anything else. Thus, it can be thought that God does not exist.

7'. Knowledge of God belongs to wisdom. But not everybody has wisdom. Therefore, it is not evident to everybody that God exists. Therefore, it is not self-evident.

8'. Augustine says: "The highest good is discerned only by the most purified minds." But not everybody has a most purified mind. Therefore, all do not know the highest good, namely, that God exists.

9'. It is possible to think of one of the things between which reason distinguishes without the other. Thus, we can think that God exists without thinking that He is good, as is clear from Boethius. But, in God, existence and essence differ in reason. Therefore, we can think of His essence without thinking of His existence. We conclude as before.

10'. It is the same thing for God to be God and to be just. But some are of the opinion that God is not just and say that evil pleases God. Therefore, some can think that God does not exist. Thus, that God exists is not self-evident.

REPLY:

There are three opinions on this question. Some have said, as Rabbi Moses relates, that the fact that God exists is not self-evident, nor reached through demonstration, but only accepted on faith. The weakness of the reasons which many advance to prove that God exists prompted them to assert this.

Others, as Avicenna, say that the fact that God exists is not self evident, but is known through demonstration still others, as Anselm, are of the opinion that the fact that God exists is self-evident to this extent, that no one in his inner thoughts can think that God does not exist, although exteriorly he can express it and interiorly think the words which he expresses it. The first opinion is obviously false. For we find that the existence of God has been proved by the philosophers with unimpeachable proofs, although trivial reasons have also been brought forth by some to show this.

Each of the two following opinions has some truth. For something is immediately evident in two ways: in itself and to us. That God exists, therefore, is immediately evident in itself, but not to us. Therefore, to know this it is necessary in our case to have demonstrations proceeding from effects. This is clear from what follows.

For a thing to be immediately evident in itself, all that is needed is that the predicate pertain to the nature of the subject. For then the subject cannot be considered without it appearing that the predicate is contained in it. But for something to be immediately evident with reference to us, we have to know the meaning of the subject in which the predicate is included. Hence it is that some things are immediately evident to everybody, as, for instance, when propositions of this sort have subjects which are such that their meaning is evident to every body, as every whole is greater than its part. For anyone knows what a whole is and what a part is. Some

things, however, are immediately evident only to those well trained minds, who know the meaning of the terms, whereas ordinary people do not know them.

It is in this sense that Boethius says: "There are two types of common notions. One is common to everybody, for example, if you take equal parts from things that are equal.... The other is found only in the more educated, for example, that non-bodily things are not in a place. Ordinary people cannot see the truth of this, but the educated can." For the thought of ordinary people is unable to go beyond imagination to reach the nature of incorporeal things.

Now, existence is not included perfectly in the essential nature of any creature, for the act of existence of every creature is something other than its quiddity. Hence, it cannot be said of any creature that its existence is immediately evident even in itself. But, in God, His existence is included in the nature of His quiddity, for in God essence and existence are the same, as Boethius says. And that He is and what He is are the same, as Avicenna says. Therefore, it is immediately evident in itself.

But, since the essence of God is not evident to us, the fact of God's existence is not evident to us, but has to be demonstrated. In heaven, however, where we shall see His essence, the fact of God's existence will be immediately evident to us much more fully than the fact that affirmation and denial cannot both be true at the same time is immediately evident to us now. Since, therefore, each part of the question is true to some extent, we must answer both sides.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Knowledge of God's existence is said naturally to be implanted in everybody, because in everyone there is naturally implanted some thing from which he can arrive at knowledge of the fact of God's existence.

2. The reasoning would follow if God were not self-evident because of something connected with Himself. The possibility, however, of thinking that He does not exist is now due to something in us, who are incapable of knowing those things which are most evident in themselves. Hence, the fact that God can be thought of as not existing does not prevent Him from being that than which nothing greater can be thought.

3. Truth is based on being. Hence, as it is self-evident that being exists in general, so it is also self-evident that truth exists. However, that there is a first being which is the cause of every being is not immediately evident to us until it is accepted on faith or proved by a demonstration. Consequently, neither is it self-evident that the truth of all things derives from some first truth. Hence, it does not follow that God's existence is self-evident.

4. If it were immediately evident to us that the divine nature is God's existence, the argument would follow. However, at present it is not immediately evident to us, since we do not see God through His essence, but need a demonstration or faith to hold this truth.

5. The highest good is desired in two ways. In one, it is desired in its essence, a way in which not everything desires highest good. In the other way, it is desired in its likeness, in which manner all things desire the highest good, for nothing is desirable except in so far as some likeness of the highest good is seen in it. Hence, we cannot conclude from this that God's existence, which is essentially the highest good, is self-evident.

6. Although uncreated truth surpasses every created truth, nothing prevents created truth from being more evident to us than uncreated truth. For those things which are less evident in themselves are more evident to us, according to the Philosopher.

7. To think that something does not exist can be taken in two ways. In one, it is taken to mean that these two things are grasped at the same time. In this sense, there is nothing to prevent one from thinking that he does not exist, just as he thinks that at one time he did not exist.

However, in this sense, we cannot at the same time conceive that something is a whole and that it is less than a part of itself, for one of these excludes the other.

In the other way, it is taken to mean that assent is given to what is thus conceived. In this sense, no one can assent to the thought that he does not exist. For, in thinking something, he perceives that he exists.

8. Before present things existed, it had to be true that they would exist only on the supposition that something existed at the time when it was said that this would exist. But, if we lay down the impossible condition that at one time nothing existed, then, on the basis of such an hypothesis, nothing is true except only materially. For not only existence but also non-existence is the subject matter of truth, for we can speak truth about being or non-being. Thus it follows that there will be truth at that time only materially and so in same respect.

9. It is necessary to reduce that which is true in some respect to that which is true or truth simply if it is presupposed that truth exists, but not otherwise.

10. Although the name of God is He Who Is, this is not immediately evident to us. Hence, the argument does not follow.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. According to Anselm, that the fool said in his heart: "There is no God," means that he thought these words, and not that he could think this in his inner reason.

2'. That God exists is self-evident and not self-evident in the same way will reference to habit and to act.

3'. That we can know God only from what He has made is due to the inadequacy of our knowledge. Hence, this does not keep Him from being immediately evident in Himself.

4'. To know that a thing exists, it is not necessary to know what it is by definition, but only what is meant by the name.

5'. That God exists is not an article of faith but the preamble to an article of faith, unless we understand something else along with God's existence, for example, that He has unity of essence will trinity of Persons, and other things such as this.

6'. Matters of faith are known with greatest certainty in so far as certainty means firmness of adherence. For the believer clings to nothing more firmly than those things which he holds by faith. But they are not known with greatest certainty in so far as certainty implies repose of understanding in the thing known. For the believer's assent to what he believes does not come from the fact that his understanding concludes to the things believed by virtue of any principles, but from the will, which influences the understanding to assent to what is believed. Hence it is that in matters of faith, movements of doubt can arise in one who believes.

7'. Wisdom consists not only in knowing that God exists, but in attaining to a knowledge of what He is. But in this life we can know this only in so far as we know what He is not. For one who knows something in so far as it differs from all other things approaches the knowledge by which one knows what it is. It is to this knowledge, too, that the citation from Augustine¹⁷ which follows is taken to refer.

8'. The answer to the eighth difficulty is clear from the seventh response.

9'. Those things which have been distinguished by reason cannot always be thought of as separated from each other, although they can be considered separately. For, although it is possible to think of God without considering His goodness, it is impossible to think that God

exists and is not good. Hence, although in God that which exists and existence are distinguished in reason, it does not follow that it is possible to think that He does not exist.

10^o. God is known not only in the works which proceed from His justice, but also in His other works. Hence, granted that someone does not know Him as just, it does not follow that he does not know Him at all. Nor is it possible for anyone to know none of His works, since being in general, which cannot be unknown, is His work.

ARTICLE XIII: CAN THE TRINITY OF PERSONS IN GOD BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON?

Parallel readings: I Sentences 3, I, 4; in Boet. De Trinit., j, 4; Summa Theol., I, 32, 1; Ad Rom., e. 1, lect. 6.

Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

1. The Gloss explains the passage, "The invisible things of God... by the things that are made..." (Romans I: I 3), in this way: "In visible things refer to the person of the Father; eternal power to the person of the Son; divinity to the person of the Holy Spirit." There fore, by natural reason we can arrive at a knowledge of the Trinity from creatures.

2. We know will natural knowledge that the most perfect power and the source of all power are in God. Therefore, we must attribute the first power to Him. But the first power is generative power. There fore, according to natural reason we can know that there is generative power in God. But, once generative power is postulated in God, the distinction of persons necessarily follows. Therefore, by natural knowledge we can know the distinction of persons.

That generative power is the first power was proved in this way: The order of powers follows the order of operations. But the first operation of all is to understand, for there is proof that an intellectual agent exists first, and in such an agent there is understanding, according to the manner of understanding, before willing or doing. There fore, intellective power is the first of the powers. But intellective power is generative power, since every understanding begets its likeness in itself. Therefore, generative power is the first of the powers.

3. Every equivocal is reduced to the univocal as every multitude is reduced to unity. But the procession of creatures from God is an equivocal procession, since creatures do not have the same name and definition as God. Therefore, according to natural reason we must assert that there pre-exists in God a univocal procession according to which God proceeds from God. Given this, there follows the distinction of the persons in God.

4. One of the glosses says that there has been no sect which has erred about the person of the Father. But it would be a very serious error about the person of the Father to say that he did not have a Son. Therefore, even the schools of philosophers who came to know God by natural reason have held Father and Son in God.

5. As Boethius says, equality precedes every inequality. But there is inequality between Creator and creature. Therefore, we must say that there was some equality in God before this inequality. But there cannot be equality in Him unless there is distinction, for nothing is equal to itself, just as nothing is like itself, as Hilary says Therefore, according to natural reason, we must assign distinction of persons to God.

6. Natural reason comes to the conclusion that there is the greatest joy in God. But "there is not the greatest enjoyment of any good without a companion," as Boethius says. Therefore, by natural reason we can know that there are distinct persons in God, and that by reason of their companionship there is joyful possession of goodness.

7. Natural reason reaches the Creator from the likeness in the creature. But the likeness of the Creator is seen in the creature will reference not only to the essential attributes but also to the properties of the persons. Therefore, by natural reason we can arrive at the proper_ ties of the persons.

8. Philosophers have had knowledge of God only from natural reason. But some philosophers⁶ have attained to knowledge of the Trinity. Thus, it is said in Heaven and Earth: "Through this number," three, "we have applied ourselves to admiration of the grandeur of the creator." Therefore.

9. Augustine relates that the philosopher Porphyry taught that there was God the Father and the Son begotten by Him. Augustine also says that he found in certain books of Plato the prologue of St. John's Gospel, from "In the beginning was the Word" down to, but not including, "The Word was made flesh." The distinction of the persons is clearly shown in these words. Therefore, by natural reason one can reach knowledge of the Trinity.

10. From natural reason, philosophers would have also conceded that God can say something. But to say something in God implies the utterance of the Word and the distinction of persons. Therefore, the trinity of persons can be known by natural reason.

To the Contrary:

1. Hebrews (11:1) says: "Faith is the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things that appear not." But those things 'which are known by natural reason are things that appear. Therefore, since the Trinity belongs to the articles of faith, it seems that it cannot be known by natural reason.

2. Furthermore, Gregory says: "Belief does not have merit when human reason offers evidence for it." But it is in belief especially in the Trinity in which the merit of our faith consists. Therefore, it can not be known by natural reason.

REPLY:

The trinity of persons is known in two ways. In the first, it is known according to the properties by which the persons are distinguished. When these are known, the Trinity in God is really known. The second way is through essential notes which are appropriated to the persons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, and goodness to the Holy Spirit. But it is impossible to know the Trinity perfectly through notes like these, for, even if in our minds we prescind from the Trinity, those things would remain in God. But, once the Trinity is presupposed, attributes of this type are appropriated to the persons because of a certain likeness to properties of the persons. With natural knowledge it is possible to know the things which are thus appropriated to the persons, but it is not at all possible to know the proper ties of the persons.

The reason for this is that it is impossible for an action outside the range of the instruments of an agent to proceed from that agent. Thus, it is impossible to build will the art of the blacksmith, for this effect is outside the range of the instruments of the smith. Moreover, as the Commentator says, in us first principles are, as it were, instruments of the agent intellect, and in virtue of its light, natural reason thrives in us. Hence, our natural reason cannot attain to knowledge of any of those things which are outside the range of first principles.

But knowledge of first principles arises from sensible objects, as is clear from the Philosopher. But we cannot proceed from sensible things to knowledge of the properties of the persons in the way one reaches causes from effects. For everything that has the nature of cause in God pertains to His essence, since through His essence He is the cause of things. However, the properties of the persons are relations, through which the persons are related not to creatures, but to each other. Hence, we cannot attain to the properties of the persons by natural knowledge.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That explanation of the Gloss is taken as referring to the things which are appropriated to the persons, not to the properties.
2. It can be made sufficiently clear from natural reason that intellective power is the first of the powers, but it cannot be shown that this intellective power is generative power. For, since in God the one who understands, the act of understanding, and what is understood is the same thing, natural reason does not force us to say that God, in understanding, begets something distinct from Himself.
3. Every multiplicity supposes some unity and every e supposes univocity, but every equivocal generation does not presuppose univocal generation. Rather, if we follow natural reason, the opposite is true, for equivocal causes are essential causes of a species. Hence, they exert causality on the whole species. But univocal causes are not essential causes of a species, but only in this or that individual. Consequently, a univocal cause does not exert causality will reference to the whole species. Otherwise, it would be its own cause, which is impossible. Therefore, the argument does not follow.
4. That Gloss should be taken of heretical sects which have sprung up in the Church. Accordingly, the sects of the gentiles are not included among them.
5. Even without supposing the distinction of persons, we can affirm equality in God, in so far as we say that His goodness is actual to His wisdom. Another answer can be based on a consideration of the two elements of equality, the cause of the equality and its terms. Unity is the cause of equality, but some number is the cause of other proportions. Hence, according to this consideration, equality precedes in equality, as unity precedes number. But the terms of equality are many. And these are not assumed to be prior to the terms of inequality. Otherwise, duality would have to precede every unity, for equality is first found in duality, but between unity and duality there is in actuality.
6. What Boethius says should be understood of those things which do not have within them perfect goodness, but one needs the support of the other. For this reason, enjoyment is not complete without a companion. But God has within Himself the fullness of joy. Hence, there is no need to posit companionship for the fullness of His enjoyment.
7. Although some aspects of creatures are like the properties of the persons, we cannot conclude from these likenesses that they are found in God in the same way. For the things which are distinguished in creatures are in the Creator without distinction.
8. Aristotle did not intend to put the number three in God, but he wanted to show the perfection of the number three from the fact that the ancients made use of it in sacrifices and prayers.
9. We should take the words of those philosophers as referring to things appropriated to the persons, not to properties.

10. From natural reason, philosophers have never thought that God speaks in so far as speaking implies distinction of persons, but only in so far as it is applied essentially to God.

QUESTION 11: The Teacher

ARTICLE I: CAN A MAN OR ONLY GOD TEACH AND BE CALLED TEACHER?

Parallel readings: II Sentences, 2, ad 4; 28., ad Contra Gentiles II, Summa Theol., I, 117, I; De Unit. intell., 5, nn. 50-5 I.

Difficulties:

It seems that only God teaches and should be called a teacher, for 1. In St. Matthew (23:8) we read: "One is your master"; and just before that: "Be not you called Rabbi." On this passage the Gloss comments: "Lest you give divine honor to men, or usurp for your selves what belongs to God." Therefore, it seems that only God is a teacher, or teaches.

2. If a man teaches, he does so only through certain signs. For, even if one seems to teach by means of things, as, when asked what waking is, he walks, this is not sufficient to teach the one who asks, unless some sign be added, as Augustine proves. He does this by showing that there are many factors involved in the same action; hence, one will not know to what factor the demonstration was due, whether to the substance of the action or to some accident of it. Furthermore, one cannot come to a knowledge of things through a sign, for the knowledge of things is more excellent than the knowledge of signs, since the knowledge of signs is directed to knowledge of things as a means to an end. But the effect is not more excellent than its cause.

Therefore, no one can impart knowledge of anything to another, and so cannot teach him.

3. If signs of certain things are proposed to someone by a man, the one to whom they are proposed either knows the things which the signs represent or he does not. If he knows the things, he is not taught them. But if he does not know them, he cannot know the meanings of the signs, since he does not know the things. For a man who does not know what a stone is cannot know what the word stone means. But if he does not know the meaning of the terms, he cannot learn any thing through the signs. Therefore, if a man does nothing else to teach than propose signs, it seems that one man cannot be taught by another.

4. To teach is nothing else than to cause knowledge in another in some way. But our understanding is the subject of knowledge. Now, sensible signs, by which alone, it would seem, man can be taught, do not reach the intellective part, but affect the senses Only. Therefore, man cannot be taught by a man.

5. If the knowledge is caused by one person in another, the learner either had it already or he did not. If he did not have it already and it was caused in him by another, then one man creates knowledge in another, which is impossible. However, if he had it already, it was present either in complete actuality, and thus it cannot be caused, for what already exists does not come into being, or it was present seminally (*secundum rationes seminales*). But such seminal principles can not be actualized by any created power, but are implanted in nature by God alone, as Augustine says. So, it remains true that one man can in no way teach another.

6. Knowledge is an accident. But an accident does not change the subject in which it inheres. Therefore, since teaching seems to be nothing else but the transfer of knowledge from teacher to pupil, one cannot teach another.

7. The Gloss, on Romans (10: 17), "Faith then cometh by hearing," says: "Although God teaches man interiorly, the preacher proclaims it exteriorly." But knowledge is caused interiorly in the mind, not exteriorly in the senses. Therefore, man is taught only by God, not by another man.

8. Augustine says: "God alone, who teaches truth on earth, holds the teacher's chair in heaven, but to this chair another man has the relation which a farmer has to a tree." But the farmer does not make the tree; he cultivates it. And by the same token no man can be said to teach knowledge, but only prepare the mind for it.

9. If man is a real teacher, he must teach the truth. But whoever teaches the truth enlightens the mind, for truth is the light of the mind. If, therefore, man does teach, he enlightens the mind. But this is false, for in the Gospel according to St. John (1:9) we see that it is God who "enlightened every man that cometh into this world." Therefore, one man cannot really teach another.

10. If one man teaches another, he must make a potential knower into an actual knower. Therefore, his knowledge must be raised from potency to act. But what is raised from potency to actuality must be changed. Therefore, knowledge or wisdom will be changed. However, this is contrary to Augustine, who says: "In coming to a man, wisdom is not itself changed, but changes the man."

11. Knowledge is nothing else but the representation of things in the soul, since knowledge is called the assimilation of the knower to the thing known. But one man cannot imprint the likeness of things in the soul of another. For, thus, he would work interiorly in that man, which God alone can do. Therefore, one man cannot teach another.

12. Boethius says that teaching does no more than stimulate the mind to know. But he who stimulates the understanding to know does not make it know, just as one who incites someone to see will the eyes of the body does not make him see. Therefore, one man does not make another know. And so it cannot properly be said that he teaches him.

13. There is no scientific knowledge without certitude. Otherwise, it is not scientific knowledge but opinion or belief, as Augustine says. But one man cannot produce certitude in another by means of the sensible signs which he proposes. For that which is in the sense faculty is less direct than that which is in the understanding, while certainty is always effected by the more direct. Therefore, one man cannot teach another.

14. The intelligible light and a species are all that are needed for knowledge. But neither of these can be caused in one man by another. For it would be necessary for a man to create something, since it seems that simple forms like these can be produced only by creation. Therefore, one man cannot cause knowledge in another and, so, cannot teach.

15. As Augustine says, nothing except God alone can give the mind of man its form. But knowledge is a form of the mind. Therefore, only God can cause knowledge in the soul.

16. Just as guilt is in the mind, so is ignorance. But only God cleanses the mind of guilt, according to Isaiah (43:25): "I am he that blots out thy iniquities for my own sake." Therefore, God alone cleanses the mind of ignorance. And, so, only God teaches.

17. Since science is certain knowledge, one receives science from him whose words give him certainty. However, hearing a man speak does not give anyone certainty. Otherwise, anything that one person says to another would of necessity be clearly certain. Now, one reaches

certitude only when he hears the truth speaking within him. And to be certain, he takes counsel will this interior voice even about those things which he hears from men. Therefore, not man but the truth speaking within, which is God, teaches.

18. No one learns through the words of another those things, which, if asked, he would have answered, even before the other spoke. But even before the teacher speaks, the pupil, upon being questioned, would answer about the matters which the teacher proposes. For he would be taught by the words of the teacher only in so far as he knew that matters were such as the teacher claimed. Therefore, one man is not taught by the words of another.

To the Contrary:

1'. In the second Epistle to Timothy (1:11) we read: "Wherein I am appointed a preacher... and teacher of the gentiles." Therefore, man can be a teacher and can be called one.

2'. In the second Epistle to Timothy (3:14) it is said: "But continue thou in those things which thou has learned, and which have been committed to thee." of this the Gloss says: "From me as from a true teacher." We conclude as before.

3'. In one place in Matthew (23:8,9) we find: "One is your Father" and "One is your master." But the fact that God is our Father does not make it impossible for man truly to be called father. Likewise, the fact that God is our teacher does not make it impossible for man truly to be called teacher,

4'. The Gloss on Romans (10:15), "How beautiful over the mountains..." reads: "They are the feet who enlighten the Church." Now, it is speaking about the Apostles. Since, then, to enlighten is the act of a teacher, it seems that men are competent to teach.

5'. As is said in the Meteorology, each thing is perfect when it can generate things like itself. But scientific knowledge is a kind of perfect knowledge. Therefore, a man who has scientific knowledge can teach another.

6'. Augustine says that just as the earth was watered by a fountain before the coming of sin, and after its coming needed rain from the clouds above, so also the human mind, which is represented by the earth, was made fruitful by the fountain of truth before the coming of sin, but after its coming it needs the teaching of others as rain coming down from the clouds. Therefore, at least since sin came into the world, man is taught by man.

REPLY:

There is the same sort of difference of opinion on three issues: on the bringing of forms into existence, on the acquiring of virtues, and on the acquiring of scientific knowledge.

For some have said that all sensible forms come from an external agent, a separated substance or form, which they call the giver of forms or agent intelligence, and that all that lower natural agents do is prepare the matter to receive the form. Similarly, Avicenna says that our activity is not the cause of a good habit, but only keeps out its opposite and prepares us for the habit so that it may come from the substance which perfects the souls of men. This is the agent intelligence or some similar substance.

They also hold that knowledge is caused in us only by an agent free of matter. For this reason Avicenna holds that the intelligible forms flow into our mind from the agent intelligence.

Some have held the Opposite opinion, namely, that all three of those are embodied in things and have no external cause, but are only brought to light by external activity. For some have held that all natural forms are in act, lying hidden in matter, and that a natural agent does nothing but draw them from concealment out into the open. In like manner, some hold that all the habits of the virtues are implanted in us by nature. And the practice of their actions

removes the obstructions which, as it were, hid these habits, just as rust is removed by filing so that the brightness of the iron is brought to light. Similarly, some also have said that the knowledge of all things is con-created with the soul and that through teaching and the external helps of this type of knowledge all that happens is that the soul is prompted to or considers those things which it knew previously. Hence, they say that learning is nothing but remembering. But both of these positions lack a reasonable basis. For the first opinion excludes proximate causes, attributing solely to first causes all effects which happen in lower natures. In this it derogates from the order of the universe, which is made up of the order and connection of causes, since the first cause, by the pre-eminence of its goodness, gives other beings not only their existence, but also their existence as causes. The second position, too, falls into practically the same difficulty. For, since a thing which removes an obstruction is a mover only accidentally, as is said in the Physics, if lower agents do nothing but bring things from concealment into the open, taking away the obstructions which concealed the forms and habits of the virtues and the sciences, it follows that all lower agents act only accidentally. Therefore, in all that has been said we ought to hold a middle Position between these two, according to the teaching of Aristotle. For natural forms pre-exist in matter not actually, as some have said, but only in potency. They are brought to actuality from this state of potency through a proximate external agent, and not through the first agent alone, as one of the opinions maintains. Similarly, according to this opinion of Aristotle, before the habits of virtue are completely formed, they exist in us in certain natural inclinations, which are the beginnings of the virtues. But afterwards, through practice in their actions, they are brought to their proper completion.

We must give a similar explanation of the acquisition of knowledge. For certain seeds of knowledge pre-exist in us, namely, the first concepts of understanding, which by the light of the agent intellect are immediately known through the species abstracted from sensible things. These are either complex, as axioms, or simple, as the notions of being, of the one, and so on, which the understanding grasps immediately. In these general principles, however, all the consequences are included as in certain seminal principles. When, therefore, the mind is led from these general notions to actual knowledge of the particular things, which it knew previously in general and, as it were, potentially, then one is said to acquire knowledge.

We must bear in mind, nevertheless, that in natural things something can pre-exist in potency in two ways. In one, it is in an active and completed potency, as when an intrinsic principle has sufficient power to flow into perfect act. Healing is an obvious example of this, for the sick person is restored to health by the natural power within him. The other appears in a passive potency, as happens when the internal principle does not have sufficient power to bring it into act. This is clear when air becomes fire, for this cannot result from any power existing in the air.

Therefore, when something pre-exists in active completed potency, the external agent acts only by helping the internal agent and providing it with the means by which it can enter into act. Thus, in healing the doctor assists nature, which is the principal agent, by strengthening nature and prescribing medicines, which nature uses as instruments for healing. On the other hand, when something pre-exists only in passive potency, then it is the external agent which is the principal cause of the transition from potency to act. Thus, fire makes actual fire of air, which is potentially fire.

Knowledge, therefore, pre-exists in the learner potentially, not, however, in the purely passive, but in the active, sense. Otherwise, man would not be able to acquire knowledge independently. Therefore, as there are two ways of being cured, that is, either through the activity of unaided nature or by nature with the aid of medicine, so also there are two ways of acquiring knowledge. In one way, natural reason by itself reaches knowledge of unknown

things, and this way is called discovery; in the other way, when someone else aids the learner's natural reason, and this is called learning by instruction.

In effects which are produced by nature and by art, art operates in the same way and through the same means as nature. For, as nature heals one who is suffering from cold by warming him, so also does the doctor. Hence, art is said to imitate nature. A similar thing takes place in acquiring knowledge. For the teacher leads the pupil to knowledge of things he does not know in the same way that one directs himself through the process of discovering something he does not know.

Now, in discovery, the procedure of anyone who arrives at the knowledge of something unknown is to apply general self-evident principles to certain definite matters, from these to proceed to particular conclusions, and from these to others. Consequently, one person is said to teach another inasmuch as, by signs, he manifests to that other the reasoning process which he himself goes through by his own natural reason. And thus, through the instrumentality, as it were, of what is told him, the natural reason of the pupil arrives at a knowledge of the things which he did not know. Therefore, just as the doctor is said to heal a patient through the activity of nature, so a man is said to cause knowledge in another through the activity of the learner's own natural reason, and this is teaching. So, one is said to teach another and be his teacher. This is what the Philosopher means when he says: "Demonstration is a syllogism which makes someone know." But, if someone proposes another things which are not included in self-evident principles, or does not make it clear that they are in accordance with them, he will not cause knowledge in the other but, perhaps, opinion or faith, although even this is in some way caused by inborn first principles, for from these self-evident principles he realizes that what necessarily follows from them is to be held with certitude, and that what is contrary to them is to be rejected completely, and that assent may be given to or withheld from whatever neither follows necessarily from nor is contrary to self-evident principles. Now, the light of reason by which such principles are evident to us is implanted in us by God as a kind of reflected likeness in us of the uncreated truth. So, since all human teaching can be effective only in virtue of that light, it is obvious that God alone teaches interiorly and principally, just as nature alone heals interiorly and principally. Nevertheless, both to heal and to teach can still be used in a proper sense in the way we have explained.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Since our Lord had ordered the disciples not to be called teachers, the Gloss explains how this prohibition is to be understood, lest it be taken absolutely. For we are forbidden to call man a teacher in this sense, that we attribute to him the pre-eminence of teaching, which belongs to God. It would be as if we put our hope in the wisdom of men, and did not rather consult divine truth about those things which we hear from man. And this divine truth speaks in us through the impression of its likeness, by means of which we can judge of all things.
2. Knowledge of things is not produced in us through knowledge of signs, but through knowledge of things more certain, namely, principles. The latter are proposed to us through signs and are applied to other things which were heretofore unknown to us simply, although they were known to us in some respect, as has been said. For knowledge of principles produces in us knowledge of conclusions; knowledge of signs does not.
3. To some extent we know the things we are taught through signs, and to some extent we do not know them. Thus, if we are taught what man is, we must know something about him beforehand, namely, the meaning of animal, or of substance, or at least of being itself, which last concept cannot escape us. Similarly, if we are taught a certain conclusion, we must know beforehand what the subject and predicate are. We must also have previous knowledge of the

principles through which the conclusion is taught, for "all teaching comes from pre-existing knowledge," as is said in the Posterior Analytics. Hence, the argument does not follow.

4. Our intellect derives intelligible likenesses from sensible signs which are received in the sensitive faculty, and it uses these intelligible forms to produce in itself scientific knowledge. For the signs are not the proximate efficient cause of knowledge, but reason is, in its passage from principles to conclusions, as has been said.

5. In one who is taught, the knowledge did not exist in complete actuality, but, as it were, in seminal principles, in the sense that the universal concepts which we know naturally are, as it were, the seeds of all the knowledge which follows. But, although these seminal principles are not developed to actuality by any created power, as though they were infused by a created power, that which they have in a primitive way and virtually can develop into actuality by means of the activity of a created power.

6. We do not say that a teacher communicates knowledge w the pupil, as though the knowledge which is in the teacher is numerically the same as that which arises in the pupil. It is rather that the knowledge which arises in the pupil through teaching is similar to that which is in the teacher, and this was raised from potency into act, as has been said.

7. As the doctor is said to cause healing, although he works exteriorly, while nature alone works interiorly, so man is said to teach the truth, although lie declares it exteriorly, while God teaches interiorly.

8. When Augustine proves that only God teaches, he does not intend to exclude man from teaching exteriorly, but intends to say that God alone teaches interiorly.

9. Man can truly be called a true teacher inasmuch as lie teaches the truth and enlightens the mind. This does not mean, however, that lie endows the mind with light, but that, as it were, he co-operates with the light of reason by supplying external help to it to reach the perfection of knowledge. This is in accordance with Ephesians (3: 8-9): "To me, the least of all the saints, is given this grace...to enlighten all men..."

10. Wisdom is twofold, created and uncreated. Man is said to be endowed with both and to improve himself by advancing in them. Uncreated wisdom, however, cannot be changed in any way, whereas in us created wisdom can be changed for some extrinsic reason, though not by reason of anything intrinsic to it. We can consider this capacity for change in two ways. In one way, according to the relation which it has to eternal things, and in this way it is entirely unchangeable. In the other, according to the existence which it has in the subject, it is changed for some extrinsic reason when the subject which has wisdom in potency is changed into a subject having it in act. For the intelligible forms in which wisdom consists are both likenesses of things and forms perfecting the understanding.

11. In the pupil, the intelligible forms of which knowledge received through teaching is constituted are caused directly by the agent intellect and mediately by the one who teaches. For the teacher sets before the pupil signs of intelligible things, and from these the agent intellect derives the intelligible likenesses and causes them to exist in the possible intellect. Hence, the words of the teacher, heard or seen in writing, have the same efficacy in causing knowledge as things which are outside the soul. For from both the agent intellect receives intelligible likenesses, although the words of the teacher are more proximately disposed to cause knowledge than things outside the soul, in so far as they are signs of intelligible forms.

12. Intellectual and bodily sight are not alike, for bodily sight is not a power which compares, so that among its objects it can proceed from one to another. Rather, all the objects of this sight can be seen as soon as it turns to them. Consequently, anyone who has the power of sight can look at all visible things, just as one who has a habit of knowledge can turn his

attention to the things which he knows habitually. Therefore, the seeing subject needs no stimulus from another to see some thing, unless, perhaps, someone else directs the subject's attention to some object by pointing it out or doing something of the sort.

But, since the intellective power can compare, it proceeds from some things to others. As a result, it does not have the same relation to all intelligible objects of consideration. Rather, the mind sees certain things immediately, those which are self-evident, in which are contained certain other things which it can understand only by using reason to unfold those things which are implicitly contained in principles. Thus, before the mind has the habit, it is not only in accidental potency to know these things, but also essential potency. For the mind needs a mover to actualize it through teaching, as is said in the Physics. But a man who already knew something habitually would not need this. Therefore, the teacher furnishes the pupil's intellect with a stimulus to knowledge of the things which he teaches, as an indispensable mover, bringing the intellect from potentiality to actuality. But one who shows some thing to bodily sight prompts it to action as a nonessential mover. And one who has the habit of knowledge can in this way receive a stimulus from someone to consider something.

13. The whole certainty of scientific knowledge arises from the certainty of principles. For conclusions are known with certainty when they are reduced to the principles. Therefore, that something is known with certainty is due to the light of reason divinely implanted within us, by which God speaks within us. It comes from man, teaching from without, only in so far as, teaching us, he reduces conclusions to the principles. Nevertheless, we would not attain the certainty of scientific knowledge from this unless there were within us the certainty of the principles to which the conclusions are reduced.

14. Man, teaching from without, does not infuse the intelligible light, but he is in a certain sense a cause of the intelligible species, in so far as he offers us certain signs of intelligible likenesses, which our understanding receives from those signs and keeps within itself.

15. When it is said that nothing but God can form the mind, this is understood of its basic form, without which mind would be considered formless, no matter what other forms it had. This is the form by which it turns toward the Word and clings to Him. It is through this alone that rational nature is called formed, as is clear from Augustine.

16. Guilt is in the affections, on which only God can make an impression, as will appear later. But ignorance is in the understanding, on which even a created power can make an imprint. For the agent intellect impresses the intelligible species on the possible intellect, and through the mediation of this latter, scientific knowledge is caused in our soul by sensible things and by the teaching of man, as has been said.

17. One has the certainty of scientific knowledge, as has been said, from God alone, who has given us the light of reason, through which we know principles. It is from these that the certainty of scientific knowledge arises. Nevertheless, scientific knowledge can in a certain sense be caused in us by man, as has been said.

18. Before the teacher speaks, the pupil would, if asked, answer about the principles through which he is taught, but not about the conclusions which someone is teaching him. Hence, he does not learn the principles from the teacher, but only the conclusions.

ARTICLE II: CAN ONE BE CALLED HIS OWN TEACHER?

Parallel readings; Summa Theol., I, 117, 1, ad. See also parallels given for preceding article.

Difficulties:

It seems that he can, for

1. An activity should be ascribed more to the principal cause than to the instrumental cause. But in us the agent intellect is, as it were, the principal cause of the knowledge which is produced in us. But man who teaches another is, as it were, an instrumental cause, furnishing the agent intellect with the instruments by means of which it causes knowledge. Therefore, the agent intellect is more the teacher than another man. If, then, because of what a speaker says we call him the teacher of the one who hears him, the hearer should in a much fuller sense be called his own teacher because of the light of the agent intellect.
2. One learns something only in so far as he acquires certain knowledge. But such certitude is in us by reason of the principles which are naturally known in the light of the agent intellect. Therefore, the agent intellect is especially fitted to teach. We conclude as before.
3. To teach belongs more properly to God than to man. Hence, it is said in Matthew (23:8): "For one is your master." But God teaches us in so far as He gives us the light of reason, by means of which we can judge about everything. Therefore, we should attribute the activity of teaching especially to that light. The same conclusion follows as before.
4. It is more perfect to learn something through discovery than to learn it from another, as is clear in the Ethics. If, therefore, a man is called a teacher in virtue of that manner of acquiring knowledge by which one learns from another so that the one is called the teacher of the other, he should with much greater reason be called a teacher in virtue of the process of acquiring knowledge through discovery, and so be called his own teacher.
5. Just as one is inspired to virtue by another and by himself, so also he gets to know something by discovering for himself and by learning from another. But those who attain to works of virtue without having another as an instructor or a lawgiver are said to be a law unto themselves, according to Romans (2: 14): "For when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law...they are a law to themselves." Therefore, the man who acquires knowledge by himself ought also to be called his own teacher.
6. The teacher is a cause of knowledge as the doctor is a cause of health, as has been said. But a doctor heals himself. Therefore, one can also teach oneself.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. The Philosopher says that it is impossible for one who is teaching to learn. For the teacher must have knowledge and the learner must not have it. Therefore, one cannot teach himself or be called his own teacher.
- 2'. The office of teacher implies a relation of superiority, just as dominion does. But relationships of this sort cannot exist between a person and himself. For one is not his own father or master. Therefore, neither can one be called his own teacher.

REPLY:

Through the light of reason implanted in him and without the help of another's instruction, one can undoubtedly acquire knowledge of many things which he does not know. This is clear of all those who acquire knowledge through discovery. Thus, in some sense one can be a cause of his own knowledge, but he cannot be called his own teacher or be said to teach himself.

For in physical reality we find two types of active principles, as is clear from the Philosopher. Now, there is one type of agent which has within itself everything which it produces in the effect, and it has these perfections in the same way as the effect, as happens in univocal

agents, or in a higher way than the effect, as in equivocal causes. Then, there is a certain type of agent in which there pre-exists only a part of the effect. An example of this type is a movement which causes health, or some warm medicine, in which warmth exists either actually or virtually. But warmth is not complete health, but a part of it. The first type of agent, therefore, possesses the complete nature of action. But those of the second type do not, for a thing acts in so far as it is in act. Hence, since it actually contains the effect to be produced only partially, it is not an agent in the perfect sense.

But teaching implies the perfect activity of knowledge in the teacher or master. Hence, the teacher or master must have the knowledge which he causes in another explicitly and perfectly, as it is to be received in the one who is learning through instruction. When, however, knowledge is acquired by someone through an internal principle, that which is the active cause of the knowledge has the knowledge to be acquired only partially, that is, in the seminal principles of knowledge, which are the general principles. Therefore, properly speaking, we cannot call a man teacher or master because of such causality.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although to some extent the agent intellect is more the principal cause than another's teaching, the knowledge does not pre-exist in it completely, as it does in the teacher. Hence, the argument does not follow.
2. A like solution should be given to the second difficulty.
3. God knows explicitly everything which man is taught by Him. Hence, the character of teacher can suitably be applied to God. The case is not the same with the agent intellect, for the reason already given.
4. For the one learning a science, to learn it by discovery is the more perfect way of acquiring the knowledge, because it shows that he is more skilful in the acquisition of knowledge. However, for the one causing the knowledge, it is more perfect to cause it by means of instruction. For a teacher who knows the whole science explicitly can teach it to a pupil more readily than the pupil himself could learn it from his own rather general knowledge of the principles of the science.
5. A law has the same relation to matters of action as a principle has to speculative matters, but not the same as a teacher. Consequently, if he is a law unto himself, it does not follow that he can be his own teacher.
6. A doctor heals in so far as he has health, not actually, but in the knowledge of his art. But the teacher teaches in so far as he has knowledge actually. Hence, he who does not have health actually can cause health in himself because he has health in the knowledge of his art. However, it is impossible for one actually to have knowledge and not to have it, in such a way that he could teach himself.

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ARTICLE III: CAN A MAN BE TAUGHT BY AN ANGEL?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 9,2, ad Contra Gentiles III, 81; Quodlibet IX, 4, 10; Summa Theol., III, 1; Q. D. de malo, 16, 12.

Difficulties:

It seems that he cannot, for

1. If an angel teaches, he teaches either from within or from without. But he does not teach from within, for only God can do that, Augustine says. Nor can he teach from without, as it seems, for to teach from without is to teach by means of some sensible signs, as Augustine

also says. But angels do not teach us through sensible signs of this sort, unless, perhaps, they appear in a sensible form. Therefore, they do not teach us unless they so appear, an occurrence which is outside the ordinary course of nature, through a miracle, as it were.

2. It was said that angels teach us from without in some manner, inasmuch as they make an impression on our imagination.—On the contrary, a species impressed on the imagination does not suffice for actually imagining unless an intention is present, as is clear from what Augustine says. But an angel cannot bring about an intention in us, since intention is an act of will, on which only God can make an impression. Therefore, an angel cannot teach us even by making an impression on our imagination, since we cannot be taught by means of our imagination unless we actually imagine something.

3. If we are taught by angels who do not appear to us in sensible form, this can happen only if they enlighten our understanding, which, it seems, they cannot do. For they do not give it the natural light, which, since it is concreated along with the mind, is from God alone, nor the light of grace, which only God infuses. Therefore, angels can not teach us unless they appear in visible form.

4. Whenever anyone is taught by another, the learner must examine the concepts of the teacher, so that in this way the pupil's mind may reach science through the same reasoning process which the teacher's mind uses. But a man cannot see the concepts of an angel. For he does not see them in themselves, just as he does not see the concepts of another man. In fact, he sees them much less since they are more unlike his own. Nor, again, does he see them in sensible signs, unless perhaps when the angels appear in sensible form, a possibility which we are not now considering. Therefore, angels are unable to teach us in any other way [that is, except by appearance in sensible form].

5. To teach us is the task of Him who "enlightens every man who comes into this world," as appears in the Gloss on Matthew (23:8): "One is your master Christ." But this does not refer to an angel, but only to the uncreated light, as is clear from John (1:9). Therefore.

6. Whoever teaches another leads him to the truth, and so causes truth in his soul. But only God causes truth, for, since truth is an intelligible light and a simple form, it does not come into existence gradually, and so can be produced only through creation, which is attributed to God alone. Since, therefore, angels are not creators, as Damascene says, it seems that they cannot teach.

7. An unfailing illumination can come only from an unfailing source of light, since the subject ceases to be illuminated when the light leaves. But an unfailing illumination is needed in teaching, for scientific knowledge concerns necessary things, which always exist. Therefore, teaching comes only from an unfailing light. But the light of angels is not of this kind, since their light fails unless it is divinely conserved. Therefore, an angel cannot teach.

8. In John (1:38), when Jesus asked: "What seek you?" the two disciples of John answered: "Rabbi, (which is to say, being interpreted, Master,) where dwellest thou?" On this the Gloss reads: "They showed their faith by this name." Another gloss reads that He asked them not because He did not know, but that they might gain merit by their reply. And when He asked what they sought, they told Him a person, not a thing. From all this we gather that in that answer they confessed that He was a person and showed their faith by this confession. In doing this they gained merit. But the Christian faith is worthy of merit because we acknowledge that Christ is a divine Person. Therefore, to be a teacher pertains only to a divine Person.

9. Whoever teaches must disclose the truth. But, since truth is an intelligible light, it is better known to us than an angel is. Therefore, we are not taught by an angel, since that which is better known is not communicated through that which is less well known.

10. Augustine says: "Our mind is formed immediately by God without the interposition of any creature." But an angel is a creature and, so, in the formation of the human mind does not stand between God and the human mind, as something higher than the mind and lower than God. Thus, man cannot be taught by an angel.

11. As our affections reach God Himself, so our understanding can attain to the contemplation of His essence. But God himself forms our affections directly through the infusion of grace without the mediation of an angel. Therefore, He also forms our understanding through instruction without an intermediary.

12. All knowledge takes place through some species. Therefore, if an angel is to teach a man, he has to cause in him some species through which the man will know. But he can do this only by creating the species (and an angel has no power at all to do this, as Damascene intends or by illuminating the species which are in the phantasms, so that intelligible species may result from these in the human possible intellect. This latter seems to be a return to the error of those philosophers who make a separated substance of the agent intellect, whose task it is to illuminate the phantasms. Thus, an angel cannot teach.

13. The intellect of an angel differs more from man's intellect than the human intellect differs from the human imagination. But the imagination cannot receive that which is in the human intellect. For the imagination can receive only particular forms, such as the intellect does not contain. Therefore, the human intellect, also, is unable to receive those forms which are in the angelic mind. And thus, man cannot be taught through an angel.

14. The light by which something is enlightened should be proportioned to the things which are illumined, as physical light is proportioned to colors. But, since angelic light is purely spiritual, there is no proportion between it and our phantasms, which are in some sense physical, inasmuch as they are retained in a bodily organ. Therefore, angels cannot teach us by illuminating our phantasms, as has been said.

15. Everything which is known is known either through its essence or through some likeness. But an angel cannot cause the knowledge through which the human mind knows things through their essence. For thus, the virtues and other things which are contained in the soul would have to be imprinted by angels, since such things are known through their essence. Similarly, angels cannot cause the knowledge of those things which are known through their likenesses, since the things to be known are closer to these likenesses which are in the knower than an angel is. Therefore, an angel can in no way cause knowledge in a man, and this is to teach.

16. As Augustine clearly shows, a farmer is not called a creator even though he stimulates nature from without to produce natural effects. For equal reason, angels ought not be called teachers or masters, although they stimulate the understanding of man to acquire knowledge.

17. Since an angel is superior to man, if he teaches, his instruction must be better than human instruction. But this cannot be, for man can teach about those things which have determinate causes in nature. But angels cannot teach him about other things, such as future contingents, for the natural knowledge of the angels themselves does not extend to these things, since God alone knows such future events. Therefore, angels cannot teach men.

To the Contrary:

1'. Dionysius says: "I see that angels were first taught the divine mystery of the humanity of Christ, and then through them the gift of knowledge came down to us."

2'. A higher agent can do what a lower agent can, and much more nobly, as is clear from Dionysius. But the human order is lower than the angelic order. Therefore, since one man can teach another, an angel can do this with much greater reason.

3'. The order of divine wisdom exists more perfectly in spiritual substances than in bodily substances. But it is part of the order of lower bodies that they receive their perfections as the result of the influence of higher bodies. Therefore, lower spirits also, namely, human spirits, receive their perfection from the influence of higher spirits, that is to say, angels.

4'. Everything which is in potentiality can be developed to actuality through that which is in actuality; and that which is less in actuality can be developed through that which is more completely in actuality. But the angelic intellect is more in actuality than the human intellect. Therefore, the human intellect can be developed to the actuality of knowledge through the angelic intellect. And thus an angel can teach man.

5'. Augustine says that some receive the doctrine of salvation directly from God, some from an angel, and some from man. Therefore, not only God but angels and men teach.

6'. That which shines its light, as the sun, and one who opens a window which obstructed the light, are both said to illuminate the house. But, although only God infuses the light of truth into the mind, an angel or a man can remove something which prevented perception of light. Therefore, not only God but an angel or a man can teach.

REPLY:

An angel influences a man in two ways. In one way the action follows our way of acting, when, for instance, an angel appears to man in a sensible form, either taking on a body or in some other way, and instructs the man by means of sensible speech. We are not now investigating angelic teaching of this sort, for in this way an angel teaches no differently than a man does. The other way in which an angel influences us is the angelic way of acting, that is, invisibly. The purpose of this investigation is to find out how man can be taught in this way by an angel.

We must bear in mind that, since an angel is between God and man, due order requires that he should have an intermediate mode of teaching, lower than God's but higher than man's. We can see in what sense this is true only if we see how God teaches and how man teaches.

To show this we must bear in mind that there is this difference between understanding and bodily sight, namely, that, for the purposes of knowing, all the objects of bodily sight are equally near to it. For a sense is not a power which compares, so that it has to reach one of its objects by means of another. But, for the purposes of knowing, all intelligible things are not equally near to the intellect. Rather, some can be seen immediately, and some can be seen only by examining other principles. Therefore, man gains knowledge of things he does not know through two things: intellectual light and self-evident primary concepts. The latter have the same relation to the intellectual light of the agent intellect as tools to the craftsman.

Now, God in a most excellent way causes man's knowledge in both of these ways. For God adorned the soul itself with intellectual light and imprinted on it the concepts of the first principles, which are, as it were, the sciences in embryo, just as God impressed on other physical things the seminal principles for producing all their effects.

But, since in the order of nature each man shares equally in the specific nature of intellectual light, he cannot in any way be the cause of knowledge in another by causing or increasing that light in him. But he does in a sense cause knowledge in another man as regards the new knowledge which is caused by self-evident principles. He does this, not as one who gives knowledge of the principles, but as one who shows certain sensible signs to the external

senses, and thus brings into actuality that which was contained in the principles implicitly and in a certain sense in potentiality, as was said above.

But, since by nature an angel has intellectual light more perfectly than man, he can cause man to know in both ways, in a manner lower than God, but higher than man. For, as regards the light, although he cannot infuse the intellectual light, as God does, he can strengthen the infused light to make man see more perfectly. For that which is imperfect in a given genus has its power intensified when it is brought in contact with that which is more perfect in that genus. Thus, in bodies, we see that the body which is given position is strengthened by the body giving it position, which is related to it as actuality to potentiality, as is said in the Physics.

As regards principles, too, an angel can teach a man, not, it is true, by giving him knowledge of the principles, as God does, nor by proposing to him under sensible signs the manner in which the conclusions are deduced from the principles, as man does, but by forming in his imagination certain species which can be formed by stimulating the corporeal organ. This is clearly what happens with persons sleeping and with the insane, who experience different phantasms according to the diversity of vapors which rise to the head. And in this way, by means of contact with another spirit, it is possible for an angel to use images of this sort to show what he himself knows to the person with whom he has come in contact, as Augustine says.

Answers to Difficulties:

2. An angel who teaches invisibly teaches interiorly, it is true, in comparison with the instruction of a man who proposes his instruction to the external senses. But in comparison with the teaching of God, who works within the mind by infusing light, the teaching of an angel is classed as external.

2. Although an intention of the will cannot be forced, still an intention of the sensitive part can be forced. For just as, when someone is pricked, he has to pay attention (*intendere*) to the hurt, so, too, will all the other sensitive powers which use a bodily organ. And this attention (*intentio*) is enough for the imagination.

3. An angel does not infuse the light of grace or the light of nature, but strengthens the divinely infused light of nature, as has been said.

4. As in physical things there is an univocal agent, which imprints a form in the same way it has it, and an equivocal agent, which has it in a way different from that in which it imprints it, so also in teaching. For one man teaches another as a kind of univocal agent, and thus communicates knowledge to the other in the same way that he himself has it, by proceeding from causes to the effects. It is for this reason that the concepts of the teacher must be conveyed to the learner through some signs. But an angel teaches as a kind of equivocal cause, for he knows intuitively that which man learns through a process of reasoning. Hence, an angel does not teach a man in such a way that the concepts of the angel are disclosed to the man, but the result is rather this, that the man is made to know in his own way those things which the angel knows in a far different way.

5. Our Lord is speaking of that kind of teaching which befits God alone, as is clear from the Gloss on this passage. 'We do not ascribe this kind of teaching to an angel.'

6. He who teaches does not cause the truth, but knowledge of the truth, in the learner. For the propositions which are taught are true before they are known, since truth does not depend on our knowledge of it, but on the existence of things.

7. Although the knowledge which we get through teaching may be concerned with things that do not cease to be, the knowledge itself can cease to be. Hence, it is not necessary for the

illumination of teaching to come from an unfailing light. Or, if it is from an unfailing light as its first principle, this does not entirely exclude a created light capable of failing, from being able to exist as a mediate principle.

8. A certain progression in faith appears in the disciples of Christ, so that at first they respected Him as a will man and a teacher, and later listened to Him as God teaching them. Hence, a gloss a little further on says: "Since Nathanaël knew that Christ, though absent, saw what he had done in another place, which is a sign of the God head, he acknowledged that Christ was not only a teacher, but also the Son of God."

9. An angel does not make an unknown truth appear by manifesting its own substance, but by proposing another truth better known, or by strengthening the light of the understanding. Hence, the argument does not follow.

10. It is not Augustine's intention to say that the nature of the angelic mind is not more excellent than that of the human mind, but that angels are not between God and the human mind in such a way that the human mind receives the ultimate form of its perfection by being united to an angel, as some have held. They say that the final beatitude of man consists in this, that our understanding is united to an intelligence whose beatitude is union with God Himself.

11. There are in us some powers which are constrained by their subject and object, as the sensitive powers, which are stimulated both by excitation of the organ and by the strength of their object. But our understanding is not constrained by its subject, since it does not use a bodily organ. Rather, it is constrained by its object, because the effectiveness of a demonstration forces one to assent to a conclusion. However, the affections are constrained neither by their subject nor their object, but move toward one thing or another by reason of their own inclination. Hence, only God, who acts interiorly, can make an impression on the affections. But a man or an angel can, to a certain extent, make an impression on our understanding by representing to the mind the objects by which our understanding is constrained.

12. An angel does not create the species in our mind nor directly illuminate the phantasms. But our understanding can more effectively enlighten phantasms when an angelic light is united to the light of our understanding. Even if an angel did immediately illuminate the phantasms, it still would not follow from this that the opinion of those philosophers would be true. For, although it is the task of the agent intellect to illuminate the phantasms, it could still be said that this is not a function which belongs to it alone.

13. The imagination can receive those things which are in the human understanding, but in a different manner. Similarly, the human understanding in its own manner can receive those things which are in the angelic understanding. But, although the human understanding is more like the imagination by reason of their common subject in so far as both are powers of the one soul, it is more like the angelic intellect by reason of their common genus, for both are immaterial powers.

14. There is nothing to prevent something spiritual from being capable of exercising an influence on something physical, for nothing prevents things which are lower from being acted upon by things which are higher.

15. An angel is not the cause of man's knowledge in so far as a man knows things through their essence, but in so far as he knows things through their likenesses. This does not mean that an angel is closer to things than their likenesses are, but that he makes the likenesses of things appear in the mind either by moving the imagination or strengthening the light of understanding.

i 6. To create implies first causality, which belongs to God alone; to make implies causality in general; to teach implies the same general causality will reference to knowledge. Thus, only God is called Creator, but God, angels, and men can be called makers and teachers.

17. Just as an angel knows more than man, even about those things which have determinate causes in nature, so he can teach more than man. And the things which an angel does teach he can teach in a more excellent way. Hence, the argument does not follow.

ARTICLE IV: IS TEACHING AN ACTIVITY OF THE CONTEMPLATIVE OR THE ACTIVE LIFE?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 35, I, 3, sol. s, ad Summa Theol., II—II, j8i, 3; Contra retrahentes a religionis ingressu, C. 7, ad 7.

Difficulties:

It seems to be an activity of the contemplative life, for 1. "There is no active life where there is no body," as Gregory says. But there is teaching where there is no body, for even angels, who have no bodies, teach, as has been said. Therefore, it seems that teaching pertains to the contemplative life.

2. Gregory says: "One engages in the active life in order to arrive at the contemplative later." But teaching does not precede contemplation, but follows it. Therefore, teaching does not pertain to the active life.

3. Gregory also says that the active life "sees less while it is engaged in work." But one who teaches must of necessity see more than one who simply contemplates. Therefore, teaching pertains more to the contemplative than to the active life.

4. It is the same perfection which makes each thing perfect in itself and enables it to give others a perfection like its own. Thus it is by reason of one and the same warmth that fire itself is warm and gives warmth to other things. But one's own perfection in meditation on things of God belongs to the contemplative life. Therefore, teaching, which is the communication of this same perfection to another, belongs to the contemplative life.

5. The active life is occupied with temporal things. But teaching is occupied mainly with things eternal, for the teaching of these latter is more excellent and more perfect. Therefore, teaching does not pertain to the active, but to the contemplative life.

To the Contrary:

1'. Gregory says: "The active life consists in giving bread to the hungry, and in teaching the ignorant the word of wisdom."

2'. The works of mercy are part of the active life. But teaching is counted among the spiritual works of mercy. Therefore, it is part of the active life.

REPLY.

The contemplative and the active life are distinguished from each other by their subject matter and that to which they are ordained. For the subject matter of the active life is temporal affairs, with which human acts are concerned. But the intelligible natures of things, on which the one contemplating meditates, are the subject matter of the Contemplative life. This diversity of subject matter arises from a diversity of the end to be attained, just as in all other

things the requirements of the end to be attained prescribe certain conditions in the subject matter.

For the end toward which the contemplative life, as we are now examining it, is ordained is the consideration of truth, of that truth, I say, which is uncreated, considered in the manner possible to the one contemplating it. 'We see this truth imperfectly in this life, but perfectly in the life to come. Hence, Gregory says that the contemplative life begins here in order to be made perfect in the life to come. But the end toward which the active life is directed is the activity which is directed to the help of our neighbour.

Moreover, in the act of teaching we find a twofold subject matter, and as an indication of this, two accusatives are used as objects of the verb which expresses the act of teaching. This is so because the subject which one teaches is one kind of subject matter of teaching, and the one to whom the knowledge is communicated is another type of subject of teaching. Accordingly, by reason of the former, teaching pertains to the contemplative life, but by reason of the latter it is part of the active life. But, if we consider the end toward which it is directed, teaching seems to be a part only of the active life, because its last subject matter, in which it reaches the end proposed to it, is a subject will which the active life is concerned. Therefore, although it is in some sense a function of the contemplative life, as is clear from what has been said, it is more properly a work of the active than of the contemplative life.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. There is no active life where there is no body, inasmuch as toil is connected with its exercise, and inasmuch as it relieves the infirmities of our neighbours. It is in this sense that Gregory says: "The active life is laborious because it works in the sweat of its brow; two things which will not be in the future life." Nevertheless, there is still hierarchical activity among the heavenly spirits, as Dionysius says, and the manner of the activity is different from the active life which we now lead in this life. Hence, the teaching which will exist there is far different from the teaching here.
2. As Gregory says: "Just as the good disposal of our life leads us to try to pass from the active life to the contemplative, in like manner the minds of many can usefully turn back from the contemplative to the active life so that the name which the contemplative life has kindled in their minds may lead them to live the active life more perfectly." Still, we must bear in mind that the active life precedes the contemplative in regard to those acts which have a subject matter in which the contemplative life has no part at all, but the active life must follow the contemplative in those acts which receive their subject matter from the contemplative life.
3. The insight of the teacher is a source of teaching, but teaching itself consists more in the communication of the things seen than in the vision of them. Hence, the insight of the teacher belongs more to action than to contemplation.
4. This argument proves that the contemplative life is a source of teaching just as heat is the source of the act of warming, and is not itself that activity. For we see that the contemplative life is the source of the active life in so far as it directs it, just as, conversely, the active life disposes for the contemplative.
5. The solution is clear from what has been said, for teaching and the contemplative life have the first type of subject matter in common, as has been said above.

QUESTION 12: Prophecy

ARTICLE 1: IS PROPHECY A HABIT OR AN ACT?

Parallel readings: Quodibet XII, 17, 26; Contra Gentiles III, 154; 1 Cor., c. 14, lectura 6; Q. D. de pot., 6,4; Summa Theol., I-II, 68, 3, ad 3; II-II, 171, 2 176, 2, ad 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not a habit, for

- 1.** As the Commentator says, a habit is that by which one performs an activity when he wants to. But the prophet cannot make use of prophecy when he wants to, as is clear of Eliseus in the fourth Book of Kings (3: 14, 15), who, on being questioned by the king, could not give him an answer without calling the minstrel, so that the hand of the Lord might come upon him. Therefore, prophecy is not a habit.
- 2.** Whoever has a cognitive habit can consider the subject matter of that habit without receiving anything from another. For one who needs an instructor for this does not yet have the habit. But a prophet cannot examine the subject matter of prophecy unless each event is revealed to him. Hence, in the fourth Book of Kings (4:27) Eliseus said of the woman whose son was dead: "Her soul is in anguish, and the Lord hath hid it from me, and bath not told me." Therefore, prophecy is not a cognitive habit. Nor can it be a different habit, for prophecy belongs to cognition.
- 3.** It was said that the prophet needs a habit to be able to know those things which are divinely shown him.—On the contrary, divine speech is more efficacious than human speech. But no habit is needed for one to understand from human speech that something will take place. Therefore, there seems much less need of a habit to perceive the revelation by which God speaks to the prophet.
- 4.** A habit suffices for the knowledge of the whole subject matter of that habit. But by the gift of prophecy one is not taught everything that can be prophesied. For, as Gregory says and proves by examples: "Sometimes the spirit of prophecy inspires the mind of the one prophesying for present events and not at all for the future, and sometimes touches it for the future and not for the present." Therefore, the gift of prophecy is not a habit.
- 5.** It was said that the subject matter of the gift of prophecy is not everything which can be prophesied but only that for the revelation of which the gift is given.—On the contrary, an inpouring can be limited only by that which gives it or by that which receives it. But the one receiving the inpouring of the gift of prophecy imposes no limitation to prevent it from extending to everything which can be prophesied, for the human intellect is capable of knowing all that can be prophesied. Nor is it limited by the one who gives it, for His liberality is infinite. Therefore, the gift of prophecy extends to everything which can be prophesied.
- 6.** The affective part of the soul is so constituted that the one influx of grace frees the soul from all guilt. Therefore, the intellective part, also, is such that the influx of the one light of prophecy will cleanse the soul from all ignorance of things that can be prophesied.
- 7.** A freely given habit is more perfect than an acquired habit. But an acquired habit extends to many acts. Therefore, if prophecy is a freely given habit, it, too, will extend not to only one of the things which can be prophesied, but to all of them.

8. If we had one habit for each conclusion, those habits would not be joined together in the habit of one complete science, unless the conclusions had some connection in so far as they are deduced from the same principles. But future contingents of this sort and other things which prophecy concerns, do not have any interconnection, as the conclusions of a single science have. Therefore, it follows that, if prophecy is a habit, and if the gift of prophecy extends to only one of the things prophesied, there will be in one prophet as many habits of prophecy as there are things which he knows can be prophesied.

9. It was said that the habit of prophecy, once infused, extends to all that can be prophesied, but still a new revelation is needed to disclose certain species. On the contrary, the infused habit of prophecy ought to be more perfect than the habit of an acquired science, and the prophetic light ought to be more perfect than the natural light of the agent intellect. But will the power of the light of the agent intellect and will the habit of a science, plus the added assistance of the power of imagination, we can form as many species as we need for the actual consideration of those things to which the habit extends. Therefore, if a prophet has a habit, he can do this much more readily without a new disclosure of any species.

10. As the Gloss reads: "Prophecy is a divine inspiration, which announces the outcomes of things will immutable truth." But inspiration does not signify a habit, but an act. Therefore, prophecy is not a habit.

11. According to the Philosopher, seeing is a kind of passivity. Therefore, sight is a passive operation. But prophecy is a kind of sight, for, according to the first Book of Kings (9:9): "He that is now called a prophet, in times past was called a seer." Therefore, prophecy is not habit, but rather a passive operation.

12. According to the Philosopher, a habit is "a quality which is hard to change." But prophecy is easily changed, since it does not remain in the prophet at all times but only now and then. As the Gloss on Amos (7:14), "I am not a prophet," says: "The spirit does not give prophecy to the prophets at all times, but only now and then. And when they are enlightened, they are rightly called prophets." Gregory also says: "Sometimes the spirit of prophecy fails prophets and it is not always at the service of their minds, for, when they do not have it, they know that it is a gift when they do have it." Therefore, prophecy is not a habit.

To the Contrary:

1' According to the Philosopher, there are three things in the soul: powers, habits, and passive operations. But prophecy is not a power, for, then, everyone would be a prophet, since the powers of the soul are common to all. Similarly, it is not a passive operation, for they exist only in the sensitive part of the soul, as is said in the Physics. Therefore, it is a habit.

2' Everything which is known is known through some habit. But the prophet knows the things which he declares; he does not know them, however, by reason of a natural or an acquired habit. Therefore, he knows them by some infused habit, which we call prophecy.

3' If prophecy is not a habit, this is so only because the prophet can not see everything else which can be prophesied, unless he receives a new inspiration. But this does not prevent it from being a habit, for one who has a habit of common principles cannot consider the particular conclusions of some particular science unless he receives in addition some habit of the particular science. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent prophecy from being a common habit, which still demands a new revelation for the knowledge of the individual things to be prophesied.

4' Faith is the habit of everything which must be believed, yet one who has the habit of faith does not immediately have distinct knowledge of each matter of belief, but needs instruction to know the articles of faith distinctly. Therefore, although prophecy is a habit, there still is

need of divine revelation, as a kind of speech, for the prophet to know distinctly what is to be prophesied.

REPLY:

As is said in the Gloss: Prophecy is called sight, and the prophet is called seer." This is clear from the first Book of Kings (9:9), as was mentioned earlier." still, not every sight can be called prophecy, but only the sight of those things which are far beyond our ordinary knowledge. As a result, the prophet is said to be not only one who speaks from afar (*procul fans*), that is, one who announces, but also one who sees from afar (*procul videns*), from the Greek *phanos*, which is an appearing.

However, since everything which is revealed is revealed under some light, as can be seen in Ephesians (5:73), those things which are revealed to man beyond the ordinary course of knowledge must be made manifest by a higher light. This is called the prophetic light and by receiving it one is made a prophet.

However, we must bear in mind that a thing can be received in someone in two ways. In one, it is received as a form which remains in the subject; in the other, it is received after the manner of a transient impression. Thus, pallor exists as a quality in one who has this colour naturally or from some serious accident, but exists as a transient impression in one who suddenly turns white from some fear. Similarly, physical light is in the stars as a quality of the stars, since it is a form remaining in them. But it is in air as a transient impression, since air does not retain light, but only receives it by being placed in the path of a shining body.

Accordingly, in human understanding there is a light which is a quality or permanent form, namely, the essential light of the agent intellect, by reason of which our soul is called intellectual. But the prophetic light in the prophet cannot be this. For whoever knows certain objects by means of intellectual light, which has become a property in him, existing there as a form, must have stable knowledge of those things. And this cannot be unless he sees them in a principle in which they can be known. For, as long as the things known are not reduced to their principles, the knowledge is not established as certain, but is apprehended by him as having some probability, inasmuch as it has been spoken by others. Hence, for each thing he must receive word from others. Thus, if someone did not know how to deduce the conclusions of geometry from the principles, he would not have the habit of geometry, but would apprehend whatever he knew of the conclusions of geometry as one who believes his teacher. Hence, he would have to be instructed on each point, for he would not be able securely to proceed from some points to others without making a resolution to first principles.

Now, God Himself is the principle in which we can know future contingents and other things which exceed natural knowledge and will which prophecy deals. Hence, since the prophets do not see God's essence, they cannot know the things which they see prophetically by a light which is a kind of habitual form inhering in them, but they have to be taught each thing individually. Thus it is that the prophetic light must not be a habit, but must exist in the soul of the prophet in the manner of a transient impression, as the light of the sun exists in the air. And, as the light remains in the air only when the sun is shining, so the previously mentioned light remains in the mind of the prophet only when it is actually being divinely inspired.

And thus it is that the saints, when they talk about prophecy, speak of it as a transient impression and call it an inspiration or a kind of touch by which the Holy Spirit is said to touch the heart of the prophet. They also speak of prophecy with other words of this kind. And thus it is clear that, as far as the prophetic light is concerned, prophecy cannot be a habit.

But we must remember that in bodily things, after something has undergone a transient impression, even after the impression has left, it is rendered more apt to undergo the

impression, as water, once warmed, is warmed more easily afterwards when it has become cold, and a man, after he has been sad many times, is saddened more easily. Hence, the mind, when it has been under the influence of a divine inspiration, even after that inspiration has gone, remains more fit to receive it again, just as the mind remains more devout after devout prayer. It is for this reason that Augustine says: "Lest the mind which begins to grow lukewarm from cares and occupations become altogether cold and its fire die out completely, unless it is frequently enkindled, at set hours we call our mind back to the business of prayer."

Hence, the mind of the prophet, after it has received a divine inspiration one or more times, remains more apt to receive the inspiration again, even after the actual inspiration has ceased. And this aptitude can be called the habit of prophecy, just as Avicenna says that in us habits of science are nothing but certain aptitudes of our soul ordained for the reception of the illumination of the agent intelligence and the intelligible species flowing forth from it into our soul. How it cannot properly be called habit, but an aptitude or disposition by reason of which one is called a prophet even when he is not actually being inspired. Nevertheless, lest an argument be built on the strength of the word, habit, we will uphold both sides and answer both sets of reasons.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The definition given fits habit in the strict sense, and in this sense the previously mentioned aptitude of prophesying cannot be called a habit. Nevertheless, taken in this way, the aptitude of our soul to receive something from the agent intelligence can also be called a habit, according to Avicenna, for in his opinion that reception is natural. Thus, according to him, one who has an aptitude has the power to receive when he so wishes, for a natural influx does not fail when the matter is disposed. But the influx of prophecy depends on the divine will alone; hence, it is not in the power of a prophet to use prophecy, no matter how great an aptitude he has for it in his mind.
2. If prophetic light existed in the mind as a habit of knowledge about things to be prophesied, a prophet would not need new revelation to know anything that can be prophesied. But he does need new revelation, because that light is not a habit. The aptitude itself to perceive the light is like a habit, and without this light things to be prophesied cannot be known.
3. Beyond the perception of the divine speech by which God talks interiorly to the prophet, and which is nothing but the enlightening of his mind, no habit is needed to perceive interiorly what has been said. But an aptitude seems to have a greater effect toward the perception of this speech, the more noble the speech is and the more its Perception surpasses the natural powers.
4. The solution to the fourth difficulty is clear from what has been said.
5. The prophetic light, once infused, does not give knowledge of all that can be prophesied, but only of those things for the knowledge of which it is given. This limitation does not come from lack of power in the giver, but from the ordination of His wisdom, which distributes to each as He wishes.
6. All mortal sins have this in common, that through any one of them man is separated from God. Hence, grace, which joins man to God, frees him from every mortal sin, but not from every venial sin, for venial sins do not separate him from God. But things which can be prophesied have a connection among themselves only in the order of God's wisdom. Hence, one can be seen without another by those who do not see divine wisdom completely.
7. An infused habit is more perfect than an acquired habit according to its genus, namely, by reason of its origin and by reason of the object which it is given to attain, which is higher than

that to which an acquired habit is ordained. But nothing prevents an acquired habit from being more perfect in the manner in which it is possessed or perfected. Thus, it is clear that through the infused habit of faith we do not see the matters to be believed as perfectly as we see the conclusions of the sciences through the acquired habit of a science. Similarly, although the prophetic light is infused, still it does not exist as perfectly in us as the acquired habits. This also attests to the dignity of infused habits, for, since they are so excellent, human weakness cannot fully possess them.

8. The reasoning would conclude correctly if the light will which the mind of the prophet is flooded were a habit, but not if we hold that this habit or quasi habit is an aptitude for perceiving the aforesaid light, since this one thing could render a man apt to be enlightened about anything.

9. We will treat later of the way in which the species have to be formed anew for prophetic revelation.

10. Although inspiration does not signify a habit, it cannot be proved from this that prophecy is not a habit. For it is customary to define habits through their acts.

11. According to the Philosopher, to see can be taken in two ways: actually and habitually. Hence, sight can mean the act or the habit.

12. Prophetic light is not a quality which is hard to change, but something transient. It is in this sense that the authoritative citations mentioned speak. But that aptitude which remains for perceiving the illumination again is not easily changed; in fact, it remains a long time unless there is a great change in the prophet, through which such an aptitude is taken away.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. Since acts arise completely from habits, they are therefore reduced to habit in that division of the Philosopher. Or they are also reduced to passive operations, since passive operations are acts of the soul, as to be angry or to desire.

But prophecy, in so far as it refers to the sight of the prophet, is an act of the mind; in so far as it refers to the light, which is received suddenly and in a passing manner, it is like a passive operation, inasmuch as a reception in the intellective part is called a passive operation, for to understand is a kind of passivity, as is said in *The Soul*. Or it can be said that, if the members of the division are taken strictly, that division of the Philosopher does not adequately comprehend everything which is in the soul, but only that which relates to moral matters, about which the Philosopher is thinking, as is clear from the examples will which he there explains himself.

2'. Not everything which is known is known by some habit, but only that of which we have perfect knowledge. For there are in us imperfect acts, which do not come from habits.

3'. In the demonstrative sciences there are certain general things in which particular conclusions are contained virtually, as it were in embryo. Hence, one who has the habit of those general things is only in remote potency to the particular conclusions, and this potency needs a mover to reduce it to act. But in things to be prophesied there is no such connection requiring that some knowledge be deduced from other prior knowledge in such a way that one possessing the knowledge involved in the prior habits would possess in a confused way the knowledge involved in the subsequent habits. Hence, the argument does not follow.

4'. Our understanding is perfected in different ways by prophecy and by faith. For prophecy perfects understanding in itself, and thus it is necessary that the prophet be able to see distinctly those things for which he has the gift of prophecy. But faith perfects our under

standing in the affective order, for the act of faith is an act of the understanding commanded by the will. Hence, through faith the understanding is only prepared to assent to those things which God orders to be believed. It is for this reason that faith is likened to hearing, but prophecy to sight. And thus it is not necessary for one who has the habit of faith to know all the matters of belief distinctly, as one who has the habit of prophecy must know distinctly all that is to be prophesied.

ARTICLE II: DOES PROPHECY DEAL WITH CONCLUSIONS WHICH CAN BE KNOWN SCIENTIFICALLY?

Parallel readings: Contra Gentiles III, 15 In Isaiam, 1; Summa Theol., II-II, 171, 3; In Psalm. 50; Ad Rom., C. 12, lectura 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. Prophecy is "the inspiration which announces the outcomes of things will immutable truth." But the outcomes of things are called future contingents, and the conclusions of the demonstrative sciences do not concern matters of this sort. Therefore, there cannot be prophecy about such things.
2. Jerome says that prophecy is "a sign of divine foreknowledge." But foreknowledge refers to the future. Since, therefore, futures, especially future contingents, which prophecy seems mainly to deal with, cannot be the conclusions of any science, it seems that prophecy can not deal with conclusions scientifically knowable.
3. Nature does not provide superfluities nor fail in necessary matters. Much less does God, whose activity is most wisely disposed. But to know the conclusions of the demonstrative sciences man has another way than prophecy, namely, through self-evident principles. Therefore, if things of this sort were known through prophecy, it would seem to be superfluous.
4. A different manner of generation is an indication of diversity of species. Thus, as the Commentator says, mice begotten from seed cannot be of the same species as mice begotten from decaying matter. But men naturally reach conclusions of the demonstrative sciences from self-evident principles. Therefore, if there are some men who receive knowledge of the demonstrative sciences in another way, as through prophecy, they will be of another species and will be called men equivocally, which seems absurd.
5. The demonstrative sciences deal with those things which relate indifferently to every time. But prophecy does not have a similar relation to every time, in fact, "sometimes the spirit of the prophets stirs the heart of a prophet for the present and not for the future, and sometimes just the opposite," as Gregory says. Therefore, prophecy does not deal with those things about which there is scientific knowledge.
6. The mind of the prophet and the mind of anyone else do not relate in the same way to those things which are known through prophecy. But in things which are known through demonstration the judgment of the prophet and of anyone else who knows it is the same, and neither is preferred to the other, as Rabbi Moses says. Therefore, prophecy does not deal with those things which are known through demonstration.

To the Contrary:

1'. We believe the prophets only in so far as they are inspired by the spirit of prophecy. But we have to give belief to those things writ ten in the books of the prophets even though they treat of conclusions of scientific knowledge, as in Psalms (135:6): "Who established the earth above the waters," and whatever else there is of this sort. There fore, the spirit of prophecy inspires the prophets even about conclusions of the sciences.

2'. As the grace of miracles relates to the performance of deeds which are beyond the power of nature, so the gift of prophecy relates to the knowledge of things which surpass natural knowledge. But through the grace of miracles there take place not only things which nature cannot do, as to give sight to the blind and to raise the dead, but also things which nature can do, as to cure those with fevers. There fore, through the gift of prophecy one can know not only those things to which natural knowledge does not extend, but also things to which natural knowledge does extend, and conclusions of the sciences are among these latter. Thus, it seems that prophecy can treat of them.

REPLY:

In all things which exist for the sake of an end the matter is deter mined according to the exigency of the end, as is clear in the Physics. But the gift of prophecy is given for the use of the Church, as is clear in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:7): "And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto profit." The letter adds many examples among which prophecy is numbered. Therefore, all those things the knowledge of which can be useful for salvation are the matter of prophecy, whether they are past, or future, or even eternal, or necessary, or contingent. But those things which cannot pertain to salvation are outside the matter of prophecy. Hence, Augustine says: "Although our authors knew what shape heaven is, [the spirit] wants to speak through them only that which is useful for salvation." And to the Gospel of St. John (16:13), "But when he, the Spirit of truth, is come, he will teach you all truth," the Gloss adds: "necessary for salvation."

Moreover, I say necessary for salvation, whether they are necessary for instruction in the faith or for the formation of morals. But many things which are proved in the sciences can be useful for this, as, for instance, that our understanding is incorruptible, and also those things which when considered in creatures lead to admiration of the divine wisdom and power. Hence, we find that mention of these is made in Holy Scripture.

However, we should bear in mind that, since prophecy is knowledge of things which are far away, it does not have the same relation to all the things we have mentioned. For some things are far from our knowledge because of the things themselves and some are such because of something in us.

Future contingents are beyond us because of the things themselves, for they are unknown because they lack existence, since they neither exist in themselves nor are determined in their causes. But the things beyond us because of something in us are those which we have difficulty knowing because of our own inadequacy and not because of the things themselves, since they are the most knowable and the most perfect beings, such as things which are intelligible by nature, and especially things which are eternal.

Now, what belongs to a thing in itself belongs to it more truly than that which belongs to it by reason of something else. Hence, since future contingents are more truly beyond our knowledge than anything else, they seem, therefore, to belong especially to prophecy. And they pertain to it so much that, in the definition of prophecy, they are given as the special matter of prophecy. Thus: "Prophecy is a divine inspiration which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth." And even the name of prophecy seems to be taken from this.

Thus, Gregory says: "Prophecy is so called because it predicts the future. When it speaks of the present or the past, it loses the character of its name."

Now, among those things which are beyond us because of some thing in us there is likewise a difference which we must consider. For some things are beyond us because they surpass all human knowledge, as that God is three and one, and other such things. These are not conclusions of the sciences.

Some things, however, are beyond us because they surpass the knowledge of some men, but not human knowledge simply. In this class there are those things which the educated know through demonstration, but which the uneducated do not grasp will natural knowledge, although they are sometimes elevated to them by divine revelation. These things do not belong to prophecy simply, but will reference to men of this type. Thus, conclusions which are demonstrated in the sciences can belong to prophecy.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The outcomes of things are put in the definition of prophecy as the most proper matter of prophecy, but not as the whole matter of prophecy.
2. Similarly, prophecy is called a sign of foreknowledge by reason of its principal matter.
3. Although conclusions of the sciences can be known in another way than through prophecy, it is not superfluous for them to be shown by prophetic light, for through faith we cling more firmly to what the prophets say than we do to the demonstrations of the sciences. And in this, too, the grace of God is praised and His perfect knowledge is shown forth.
4. Natural causes have determinate effects, since their powers are finite and limited to one type of effect. Therefore, it is necessary that those things which are brought into being by different natural causes according to different ways of generation be specifically different. But, since the divine power is infinite, it can without the work of nature produce effects specifically the same as those which nature produces. Hence, if those things which can be known naturally are divinely revealed, it does not follow that those who receive knowledge in a different way are specifically different.
5. Although prophecy sometimes concerns things which are separated as belonging to different divisions of time, it sometimes concerns those things which are true for all times.
6. Rabbi Moses does not mean that a revelation could not be made to a prophet of those things which are known through demonstration, but that, as soon as they are known by a demonstration, it makes no difference whether there is prophecy about them or not.

ARTICLE III: IS PROPHECY NATURAL?

Parallel readings: *Contra Gentiles* III, 1; *Summa Theol.*, I, 86, 4; II-II, 172, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. The cognition of one who is awake is preferable to that of one who is sleeping. But it is natural for people who are asleep to foresee the future, as is clear in the divinations of dreams. Therefore, will much greater reason some can see the future naturally while awake. But this is the office of the prophet. Therefore, one can naturally be a prophet.

2. But it was said that the cognition of one who is awake is better for judgment, but the cognition of one who is asleep is better for reception. On the contrary, the cognoscitive power can judge of something in so far as it receives its species. Therefore, judgment follows reception and, where the reception is better, the judgment is also more perfect. Thus, if one who is asleep is better in receiving, he ought also to be better in judging.

3. Our understanding is hampered in sleep only from without, namely in so far as it depends on sense. But the judgment of our understanding does not depend on sense, since the operation of our understanding depends on sense in so far as it receives from sense. But judgment follows reception. Therefore, the judgment of our understanding is not hampered in sleep. Hence, the distinction given seems to be of no importance.

4. What belongs to something because it is kept free from something else belongs to it by reason of its nature, just as brightness, which is natural to iron, comes to it because the iron is kept free from rust. But, as Augustine shows by many examples, it belongs to the soul to see the future in so far as it is cut off from the senses of the body. Therefore, it seems natural for the human soul to foresee the future. Thus, we conclude as before.

5. Gregory says: "Sometimes the very power of souls foresees some thing by its subtlety, for sometimes souls about to leave the body know through revelation things to come." But the things which the soul can see because of its subtlety it sees naturally. Therefore, the soul can naturally know future things, and so naturally have prophecy, which consists especially in foreknowledge of the future.

6. It was said that the futures which the soul foresees by natural knowledge are those which have fixed causes in nature, but that prophecy deals with other futures.—On the contrary, those things which depend on free will do not have fixed causes in nature. But those things which the soul foresees from its subtlety depend altogether on free will, as is clear from the example of Gregory, who tells of a man who, when he was sick and his burial in a certain church had been arranged for, arose as he neared death, dressed, and predicted that he wanted to go by the Appian Way to the Church of St. Sixtus. When he died a short while later, as his funeral procession was going out along the Appian Way, they suddenly decided to bury him in the Church of St. Sixtus, since it was a long way to the church where they were supposed to bury him. And they did this without knowing what he had said. As Gregory adds, he would not have been able to predict this if the power and subtlety of his soul had not foreseen what would happen to his body. Therefore, man can naturally foresee those futures which are independent of non-free causes. The same conclusion follows as before.

7. From natural causes we cannot perceive the meaning of those things which do not take place naturally. But astrologers perceive the meanings of prophecies from the movements of the heavenly bodies. Therefore, prophecy is natural.

8. In natural science the philosophers discuss only those things which can happen naturally. But Avicenna discusses prophecy. Therefore, prophecy is natural.

9. For prophecy, as Avicenna says, only three things are needed: clearness of intelligence, perfection of the imaginative power, and power of soul so that external matter obeys it. But these three things can be had naturally. Therefore, one can naturally be a prophet.

10. But it was said that our understanding and imagination can naturally be brought to the point where they have foreknowledge of natural future events, but that prophecy does not deal with these. — On the contrary, those things which depend on lower causes are said to be natural. But Isaiah (38:1) foretold that Ezechias would die, and he did this on the basis of [the expected outcome of] the order of created causes, as the Glass on that passage states. Therefore, prophecy is the foreknowledge of natural future events.

11. To the things which are brought into existence divine providence grants the possession of those things without which they could not be preserved in existence, as in the human body it put members will which food can be taken and digested, without which mortal life would not be maintained. But the human race cannot be maintained without society, for one man is not sufficient unto himself in the necessities of life. Hence, man is "naturally a political animal," as is said in the Ethics. But society cannot be maintained without justice, and prophecy is the rule of justice. Therefore, human nature is endowed with the ability naturally to arrive at prophecy.

12. In any class there is that which is most perfect in that class. But among men the most perfect is the prophet, who transcends the others in that which is higher in man, his intellect. Therefore, man can naturally arrive at prophecy.

13. The properties of God are farther from the properties of creatures than the properties of future things are from present things. But man can reach the knowledge of God by natural knowledge through the properties of creatures, according to Romans (1:20): "For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world..." Therefore, from the things which now exist man can arrive at the knowledge of future things. Thus, he can be a prophet naturally.

14. It was said that future things are more remote in knowledge although God is more remote in being.—On the contrary, the principles of being and of knowing are the same. Therefore, that which is more remote in being is more remote in knowledge.

15. Augustine distinguishes three kinds of goods: "insignificant, important, and ordinary." But prophecy is not numbered among the insignificant goods, for the goods of this sort are bodily goods. Nor is it classed among the most important goods, for these are those by which we live rightly and which no one can abuse. And this does not seem to fit prophecy. Therefore, it remains that prophecy belongs to the ordinary goods, which are the natural goods of the soul. Thus, prophecy seems to be natural.

16. Boethius says that in one sense all that "can act or be acted upon" is called nature. But for someone to be a prophet he must undergo some spiritual change, which consists in the reception of the prophetic light, as was said above. Therefore, it seems that prophecy is natural.

17. If to act is natural for the agent and to receive is natural for that which is acted upon, the act of receiving must be natural. But it is natural for God to infuse the perfection of prophecy into men. For by His very nature He is good, and it is natural for the good to communicate itself. Likewise, it is natural for the human mind to receive things from God, since its nature is made up only of those things which it receives from God. Therefore, the reception of prophecy is natural.

18. There is a natural active potency corresponding to every natural passive potency. But in the human soul there is a natural potency for the reception of the light of prophecy. Therefore, there is also some natural active potency through which one is brought to the act of prophecy. Therefore, it seems that prophecy is natural.

19. Naturally, man has more perfect knowledge than other animals. But some animals are naturally prescient of those future things which especially concern them. This is clear of ants, who have fore knowledge of future rains, and of some fishes, which foretell future storms. Therefore, man, also, ought to be naturally prescient of those things which concern him. Thus, it seems that man naturally can be a prophet.

To the Contrary:

1' In the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:21) is said: "For prophecy came not by the will of man at any time: but the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit."

2' That which depends on an external cause does not seem to be natural. But prophecy depends on an external cause, for the prophets read in the mirror of eternity. Therefore, it seems that prophecy is not natural.

3' Those things which are in us naturally are within our power. "But it was not in the power of a prophet to possess the spirit of predicting the future," as is clear from the Glossi² on the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:19): "We have the more firm prophetic word." Therefore, prophecy is not natural.

4' Things which are natural happen as the more common occurrence. But prophecy exists in very few men. Therefore, it is not natural.

REPLY:

A thing is called natural in two ways. In one it is so called because its active principle is natural, as it is natural for fire to be borne aloft. It is so called in another way when nature is the source not of any of its dispositions whatever, but of those which are a necessity for such a perfection. In this way, the infusion of the rational soul is called natural, inasmuch as through the activity of nature the body is given disposition which is a necessity for the reception of the soul.

Some, 13 then, were of the opinion that prophecy is natural in the first sense, for they said: "The soul had in itself a power of divination," as Augustine relates. But in the same place he rejects that, for, if that were so, then the soul would be able to have foreknowledge of the future whenever it so wished. And this is clearly false.

Furthermore, the falsity of this is manifest because the nature of the human mind cannot naturally be the source of any knowledge to which it cannot arrive by means of self-evident principles, which are the prime instruments of the agent intellect. It cannot arrive at a knowledge of future contingents from these principles, except, perhaps, by studying some natural signs, as the doctor foresees that health or death will come, or a meteorologist foresees the storm or fair weather. But such knowledge of future things is not ascribed to divination or prophecy, but to technical knowledge.

Hence, some have said that prophecy is natural in the second sense. For nature can bring man to such a state that he will have to receive foreknowledge of futures through the action of some higher cause. Indeed, this opinion is true of a certain type of prophecy, but not, however, of that type which the Apostle numbers among the gifts of the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 12:10).

And so, to see the difference between these types we should keep in mind that, before they exist, future contingents pre-exist in two ways, that is, they are contained in the divine foreknowledge and in the created causes, by whose power they will be brought into existence. In these two the futures pre-exist in a doubly different manner. The first difference is this, that all that pre-exists in created causes pre-exists in the divine foreknowledge, but not conversely. For God holds within Himself the principles which will determine some future things without infusing them into created things. An example of this is the principles which will determine those things which happen miraculously by the divine power alone, as Augustine says.

The second is this, that some things pre-exist in created causes changeably, since the power of the cause which is directed to bringing about such an effect can be hindered by some event. But all future things are in the divine foreknowledge unchangeably, for futures are objects of the divine foreknowledge not only as regards the order of their causes to those futures, but also as regards the outcome of that order or the event.

Accordingly, there are two ways in which foreknowledge of the future can be caused in the human mind. One is derived from the pre existence of futures in the divine mind. It is this prophecy that is called a gift of the Holy Spirit, and it is not natural. For those things which are executed by the divine power without natural intermediary causes are not said to be natural, but miraculous. Now the revelation of futures of this sort takes place without intermediary natural causes, for they are not revealed in so far as the principles which determine future things exist in created causes, but in so far as they exist in the divine mind, from Which they flow into the mind of the prophet.

In the second way it is derived from the power of created causes, in so far as certain movements can be impressed on the human imaginative power, for instance, by the power of the heavenly bodies, in which there pre-exist some signs of certain future events. And, in so far as it is natural for the human understanding, as inferior, to receive instruction from the illumination of the separated intellects, and to be raised up to the knowledge of other things, prophecy can be called natural in the sense which was mentioned.

But this natural prophecy differs in three ways from that about which we are now speaking. It differs, first, in this, that the prophecy of which we speak gets its foreknowledge of future things immediately from God, although an angel can be an intermediary inasmuch as he acts in virtue of the divine light. But natural prophecy is due to the proper activity of second causes. Second, it differs in this that natural prophecy extends only to those future things which have determinate causes in nature, but the prophecy of which we speak relates indifferently to all things. Third, they differ in this, that natural prophecy does not foresee infallibly, but predicts those things which are true for the most part, whereas the prophecy which is a gift of the Holy Spirit foresees the future infallibly. Hence, it is called a sign of the divine foreknowledge, Since it foresees with that infallibility with which future things are foreseen by God.

This threefold difference can be noted in the definition of Cassiodorus. The first difference is in the word "divine"; the second is in the general phrase, "outcomes of things"; and the third in the words, "which will immutable truth."

But two of the differences the first and second, remain in prophecy. So far as it deals with things which are necessary, as those which can be known with scientific knowledge. For by natural prophecy man does not receive immediately from God the knowledge of the things which are known scientifically but gets it through the mediation of second causes, and through the activity of second causes acting with their natural power. Nor, again, does such knowledge extend to all things which are necessary, but only to those which can be known through first principles. For the power of the light of the agent intellect does not extend any farther and is not naturally elevated to other things as divine prophecy is raised to certain things which are beyond natural knowledge, such as that God is three and one and other things of this sort.

In this matter the third difference has no place, for both kinds of prophecy give the prophet knowledge of necessary conclusions of this kind as unchangeably and certainly as if they were known through the principles of demonstration. Furthermore, the mind of man is elevated by both prophecies so that it understands in a way similar to the separated substances, who understand the principles and the conclusions with the utmost certainty in a simple intuition without deducing one from the other.

Again, both prophecies differ from dreams and visions, in so far as we call a dream an apparition which comes to a man who is asleep and a vision one which comes to a man who is awake but carried out of his senses, because in both the dream and the simple vision the soul is fettered completely or partially by phantasms which are seen in such a way that the soul

completely or partially clings to them as to things which are true. But, although in both prophecies some phantasms may be seen in sleep or in a vision, the soul of the prophet is not under the control of those phantasms, but knows through the prophetic light that the objects which it sees are not things, but likenesses of them with some meaning. And it knows their meaning for, as is said in Daniel (10:1): "There is need of understanding in a vision."

Thus it is clear that natural prophecy is midway between dreams and divine prophecy. Hence it is that a dream is said to be a part of or an instance of natural prophecy, as also, that natural prophecy is an imperfect likeness of divine prophecy.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. There are two things to be considered in knowledge: reception and judgment about that which is received. Accordingly, in the matter of judgment the cognition of one who is awake is preferable to that of one who is asleep, for the judgment of one who is awake is free, whereas the judgment of one who is asleep is fettered, as is said in *Sleeping and Wakefulness*. But the cognition of one who is asleep is preferable for reception, because internal impressions from external movements can be received better when the senses are at rest. This is so whether they come from the separated substances or from the heavenly bodies. Thus we can understand in this sense that which is said of Balaam in Numbers (24:16): "who falling," that is, sleeping, "hath his eyes opened."

2. Judgment does not depend only on the reception of the species, but also on the examination of the matter to be judged with reference to some principle of knowledge, just as we judge about conclusions by analyzing them back to principles.

Therefore, when the exterior senses are bound in sleep, the interior powers are, as it were, free from the bustle of the external senses and can better perceive the internal impressions made on the understanding or the imagination by a divine or angelic light, or by the power of the heavenly bodies, or by anything else, just as it seems to one who is asleep that he is eating something sweet when thin phlegm flows across his tongue. But, since the senses are the first source of our knowledge, we must in some way reduce to sense everything about which we judge. Hence, the Philosopher says that the sensible visible thing is that at which the work of art and nature terminates, and from which we should judge of other things. Similarly, he says that the senses deal with that which is outermost as the understanding deals with principles. He calls outermost those things which are the term of the resolution of one who judges. Since, then, in sleep the senses are fettered, there cannot be perfect judgment so that a man is deceived in some respect, viewing the likenesses of things as though they were the things themselves. However, it sometimes does happen that one who is asleep knows that some of these are not things, but the likenesses of things.

3. The judgment of our understanding does not depend on sense in such a way that the act of understanding takes place by means of a sensible organ. However, it does need the senses as that which is last and outermost to terminate its analysis.

4. Some have held that the rational soul "has within itself some power of divination," as Augustine says. But he himself rejects this in that same place, for, if this were so, the soul would be prepared to foresee futures when it so desired. And this is obviously false. For the soul at times sees the future when it is carried out of its senses, not because this belongs to it by reason of its natural power, but because it is thus rendered more fit to perceive the impressions of those causes which can give some foreknowledge of the future.

5. Subtlety of soul, which Gregory says is a cause of foreknowledge of futures, should be taken to mean that aptitude of the soul to receive something from the separated substances, not only in the order of grace, in so far as things are revealed to holy people by angels, but

also in the order of nature, in so far as lower intellects in the order of nature are naturally fitted to receive perfection from the higher intellects, and in so far as human bodies are subject to the impressions of the heavenly bodies, in which there is a provision for some future events. The soul by its subtlety foresees these events through certain likenesses left in the imagination by the impression of the heavenly bodies.

6. Although free choice is not subject to natural causes, natural causes sometimes do facilitate or hinder the things which are done by free choice, as in the case mentioned ram or excessive heat could engender weariness in those who were carrying the bier, so that they would not carry it to the assigned place. And we could get foreknowledge of these happenings by means of the heavenly bodies.

7. Since human bodies are under the influence of the heavenly bodies, from the movements of the heavenly bodies we can perceive some indication of any disposition of the human body. Since, there fore, a certain constitution or disposition of the human body is a kind of prerequisite for natural prophecy, it is not inappropriate that an indication of natural prophecy be received from the heavenly bodies. But no indication of the prophecy which is a gift of the Holy Spirit is thus received.

8. Those philosophers who have treated of prophecy were notable to treat of the prophecy about which we are now speaking, but only of natural prophecy.

9. One of those three things cannot naturally belong to the soul, namely, that it have such power that external matter would be under its control, since, as Augustine says: "The matter in bodies is not subject to the arbitrary will even of the angels themselves." Thus, on this point, what Avicenna or any other philosopher says cannot be held. The other two things which the objection deals with, in so far as they arise naturally in man, can cause natural prophecy, but not the prophecy of which we are talking.

10. Although only those things which fail under the influence of natural causes can be revealed through natural prophecy, nevertheless, not only other things but those, too, can be known through divine prophecy.

11. The society of men, in so far as it is ordained to eternal life as its end, can be preserved only through the justice of faith, of which prophecy is the source. Hence, Proverbs (29: 18) says: "When prophecy shall fail, the people shall be scattered abroad." But, since this end is supernatural, the justice, which is ordained to this end, and the prophecy, which is its source, will both be supernatural. But the justice through which human society is ruled in its ordination to the civil good can be had adequately through natural principles implanted in man. Hence, it is not necessary for prophecy to be natural.

12. By reason of the nobility of man there can be found in the human race a perfection so becoming that it could be produced only by a supernatural cause. But irrational creatures are not capable of such perfection. Therefore, it is not necessary that that which is most perfect in the human race should be obtained by the power of nature. This is necessary only for that which is most perfect according to the order of nature, not for that which is most perfect according to the order of grace.

13. A thing can be known in two ways: with reference to its existence, and with its quiddity-. But, since the properties of creatures from which we get our knowledge are extremely remote from the proper ties of God, thence it is that we cannot have quidditative knowledge of God. However, since creatures depend on God, by looking at creatures we can know that God exists. But, since the things which now exist do not depend on future things, but do have similar properties, cannot therefore know from present things whether certain future things

will follow from them. However, we can know what their nature and properties will be if they should exist.

14. God is more remote from creatures than one creature is from another in His manner of existing, but not in the relation which exists between the principle of existing and that which has existence from such a principle. Therefore, by means of creatures we can know that God exists, but we cannot know His quiddity. It is just the opposite will the knowledge of future contingents by means of present or past things.

15. Prophecy is classified among the greatest goods, since it is a free gift. For, although it does not act as an immediate principle of meritorious action to make one live properly, the whole of prophecy is directed to the virtuous life. Nor, again, does one misuse prophecy in such a way that the misuse itself is an act of prophecy, as when some one misuses a natural power. For one who uses prophecy to seek gain or the favour of men has, indeed, a good act of prophecy, which is to know hidden things and w announce them, but the abuse of this good is an act of cupidity or some other vice. Nevertheless, although one does not misuse prophecy as a principle of action, he does misuse it as an object. In a similar way, those who are proud of their virtues misuse them, although the virtues are counted among the greatest goods.

16. We do not say that something is natural if it comes from nature taken in any sense, but taken in the third meaning which Boethius gives it there, namely, inasmuch as nature is "the principle of motion" and rest in the thing in which it is, and the essential, not the accidental, principle. Otherwise it would be necessary to say that all activities, receptions, and properties are natural.

17. To communicate His goodness is natural for God in the sense that it is in harmony with His nature and not in the sense that He communicates it because of some necessity of His nature. For such communication is made by the divine will in keeping with the order of wisdom which distributes His goods to all in an orderly way. It is also natural for a creature to receive from God not any goodness, but that which belongs to its nature, as to be rational belongs to man but not to a stone or an ass. Hence, if some perfection is received in man by reason of divine power, it is not necessary for it to be natural to man when it exceeds what is due to human nature.

18. In human nature there is a passive potency for the reception of prophetic light, which is not natural but only obediential, like the potency which is in physical nature for those things which happen miraculously. Hence, it is not necessary to have a natural active potency corresponding to such a passive potency.

19. Brute animals can be prescient only of those future events concerning them which depend on the movement of the heavens. And by the impressions of the heavens their imagination is stirred to do some thing which is an appropriate sign of the future. This kind of imprint has more place in brutes than in men because, as Damascene says, brutes "are more acted upon than acting." Hence, they follow the impressions of the heavenly bodies completely. Man, however, who has free will, does not act in this way. Nor should a brute be called prescient of the future on this account, although a sign of some future event can be drawn from its activity. For it does not act to give any sign of the future, as though it knew the reason for its activity; rather, it is led on by a natural instinct.

ARTICLE IV: IS SOME NATURAL DISPOSITION NEEDED FOR PROPHECY?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, II-II, 172, 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Every perfection which in its reception must confirm to the disposition of the receiver requires some definite disposition in the receiver. But prophecy is such a perfection, as is clear from Amos (1: 2), "The Lord will roar from Sion," on which the Gloss says: "it is natural, he says, for all who want to compare one thing to another to use comparisons taken from those things which they have experienced and among which they have been brought up. For example, sailors compare their enemies to storms, and loss to shipwreck. And shepherds liken their fear to the roaring of a lion, and call their enemies lions, bears, and wolves. Thus, the prophet, who was a shepherd, likens the fear of God to the roaring of a lion." Therefore, prophecy requires some definite disposition in human nature.
2. Perfection of the imagination is needed for prophecy, since prophecy operates through the sight of imagination. But to have perfection of the power of imagination its organ must be in good condition and properly disposed. Therefore, a natural disposition is needed for prophecy.
3. A natural hindrance is stronger than one which comes from without. But some passions which are aroused from without interfere with prophecy. Thus, Jerome says: "At that time when the marital act is performed the presence of the Holy Spirit will not be given, even though the one who fulfils the duty of procreation seems to be a prophet." Nor is this due to guilt, for there is no guilt in the marital act, but to the passion of the concupiscence connected with it. Therefore, an indisposition of the natural constitution is a much greater hindrance, tending to make it impossible for one to become a prophet.
4. Nature has an ordination to grace as grace has to glory. But the perfection of grace in one who would arrive at glory is a prerequisite for glory. Therefore, a natural disposition is prerequisite for prophecy and the other free gifts.
5. The contemplation in prophecy is higher than that in acquired scientific knowledge. But the contemplation in acquired scientific knowledge is hindered if the natural constitution lacks the proper disposition, for some are so unfit by reason of their natural constitution that they can hardly, if ever, progress far enough to acquire scientific knowledge. Therefore, if the natural constitution lacks the proper disposition, it is a much greater hindrance to the contemplation in prophecy.
6. As is said in Romans (13: 1): "The things which are from God have order in them." But the gift of prophecy is from God. Therefore, He dispenses it in an orderly manner. But there would be no orderly distribution if it were given to someone who had not the proper disposition to possess it. Therefore, prophecy requires a natural disposition.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. That which depends solely on the free choice of the giver does not require any disposition in the receiver. But prophecy is such a gift, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:11), which, after it has listed prophecy and other gifts of the Holy Spirit, adds:
"But all these things one and the same Spirit worked, dividing to everyone as he will." And the Gospel of St. John (3:8) says: "The Spirit breathed where he will." Therefore, a natural disposition is not needed to have prophecy.
- 2'. The Apostle says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (I: 27—28): "The weak things of the world hath God chosen, that he may confound the strong. And the base things of the world and things that are not, that he might bring to naught things that are." Therefore, no disposition in the subject is a necessary prerequisite for the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

3' Gregory says: "The Holy Spirit fills the boy harpist and makes him a prophet; He fills the shepherd who is railing at the sycamore trees and makes him a prophet." Therefore, the gift of prophecy does not require any disposition in him to whom it is given, but its bestowal depends on the divine will alone.

REPLY:

There are two things to be considered in prophecy: the gift of prophecy itself, and the use of such a gift once received.

The gift itself of prophecy, which exists beyond the capacity of man, is given by God and not through the power of some created cause, although natural prophecy is produced in us by the power of some created cause, as has been said earlier.

But between the operation of a creature and that of God there is this difference, that, to bring about an effect, God's activity does not need matter or any material disposition, for by His activity He produces not only the form but also the matter. However, He does not make the form without matter or without a disposition, but He can make matter and form together in one operation, or He can transform the matter, however unfit, to the proper disposition which is needed for the perfection which He gives. This is clear in resuscitation of a dead man, for the dead body is altogether unfit to receive the soul. Yet by the one divine action the body receives the soul and the disposition for the soul. But matter and the disposition of the matter are required for the activity of a creature, for a created power cannot make whatever it wishes from anything.

It is clear, then, that natural prophecy requires the proper disposition of the natural constitution, but the prophecy which is the gift of the Holy Spirit does not need this. However, it does require that the natural disposition which is suitable for prophecy be given will the gift of prophecy.

But the use of any prophecy is within the power of the prophet. It is in keeping with this that the first Epistle to the Corinthians (14:32) says: "And the spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets." Therefore, one can prevent himself from using prophecy. And the proper disposition is a necessary requirement for the proper use of prophecy, since the use of prophecy proceeds from the created power of the prophet. Hence, a definite disposition is also required.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Certain dispositions are unconnected with prophecy, and these are not changed in the prophet by the divine activity, but prophecy proceeds in harmony with these dispositions. For it is indifferent to prophecy, whether the thing prophesied be represented under one likeness rather than another. However, God takes away from the prophet the dispositions which oppose prophecy and gives him the dispositions which are necessary.

2. Perfection of the imagination is needed for prophecy, but it is not necessarily needed beforehand. For God Himself, who infuses the gift of prophecy, can improve the constitution of the organ of the imaginative power, as He can make blind eyes see clearly.

3. Strong passions of this sort draw the attention of reason completely to themselves and, consequently, withdraw it from the study of spiritual things. Therefore, strong passions of anger or sorrow or pleasure hinder the use of prophecy in one who has received the gift of prophecy. Thus, the unfitness of the natural constitution would be a hindrance, unless it were somehow remedied by the divine power.

4. The application of the proposed likeness is limited to this, that as grace is added to nature, so glory is added to grace. But there is no likeness in all respects, for grace merits glory, but nature does not merit grace. Therefore, the merit of grace is prerequisite for glory, but the disposition of nature is not prerequisite for the reception of grace.

5. In some sense, acquired scientific knowledge is caused by us. But it is not in our power to improve the constitution of the organs of the soul, as it is within the divine power, which infuses the gift of prophecy. So, they are not alike.

6. The gift of prophecy is dispensed by God in a most orderly way. The orderly distribution of this gift also entails conferring it at times on those who seem least disposed for it, so that it will thus be attributed to the divine power and, as the first Epistle to the Corinthians (3:29) says: "That no flesh should glory in his sight."

ARTICLE V: IS MORAL GOODNESS REQUIRED FOR PROPHECY?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, II-II, 172, 4; In Joan., C. 11, *lectura* 7.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. In Wisdom (7:27) we read: "Through prophecies [She] conveyed herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets." But only those who have moral goodness are the friends of God. As the Gospel of St. John (34:23) says: "If anyone love me, he will keep my word." Therefore, one who does not have moral goodness is not appointed a prophet.

2. Prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit does not dwell in a sinner. As Wisdom (3:5) says: "For the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful." Therefore, the gift of prophecy cannot exist in a sinner.

3. That which one cannot put to an evil use cannot exist in a sinner. But no one can put prophecy to an evil use for, since the act of prophecy is from the Holy Spirit, if someone put it to an evil use, sin and the Holy Spirit would be causes of the same act. And this cannot be. Therefore, prophecy cannot exist in a sinner.

4. The Philosopher says: "If prophecy through dreams comes from God, it is unfitting for Him to give it to any but the best men." But it is clear that the gift of prophecy is from God alone. Therefore, it is unfitting to say that it is given to any but the best men.

5. Plato says that it belongs to that which is best to produce what is best. But prophecy is more suitable in a good man than in a bad one. Therefore, since God is best, He will never give the gift of prophecy to evil men.

6. We find a likeness of the divine activity in the activity of nature. Hence, Dionysius compares the divine goodness to the light of the sun, because of the similarity of their effects. But natural activity gives more perfections to the things which are more disposed, as the more permeable bodies receive more light from the sun. Therefore, since the good man is more disposed to receive the gift of prophecy than the evil man, it seems that it should be given much more to good men than to evil men. But it is not given to all good men. Therefore, it should not be given to any evil man.

7. Grace is given to elevate nature. But nature should be elevated more in good men than in evil men. Therefore, the grace of prophecy should be given to good men rather than to evil men. We conclude as before.

To the Contrary:

- 1'**. Balaam is said to have been a prophet, yet he was evil.
- 2'**. In the Gospel of St. Matthew (7:22), this statement is the mouth of the damned: "Lord, have not we prophesied name...?" Therefore, prophecy can exist in evil men.
- 3'**. Whoever does not have charity is evil. But prophecy can exist in one who does not have charity, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:2) which says: "And if I should have knowledge and should know all mysteries...and have not charity..." Therefore, prophecy can exist in a sinner.

REPLY:

Man's goodness consists in charity, through which he is united to God. Therefore, whatever can exist without charity, can be found indifferently in good men and in evil men. For the divine goodness is held in high esteem chiefly for this, that it uses both good and evil men to implement its designs. Therefore, it gives to both good and evil those gifts which do not have a necessary dependence on charity. Now, prophecy does not have any necessary connection with charity for two reasons. First, because prophecy is in the understanding and charity is in the affections. But the understanding has priority over the affections, and, thus, prophecy and the other perfections of the understanding do not depend on charity. And for this reason faith, prophecy, knowledge, and everything else of this sort can exist in good men and in evil men.

The second reason is that prophecy is given to a person for the profit of the Church and not for himself. But it does happen that someone who is not good in himself and united to God by charity can be of profit to the Church in some fashion. Thus, prophecy, the working of miracles, ecclesiastical ministries, and all the other things of this sort, which contribute to the benefit of the Church, are sometimes found apart from charity, which alone makes men good.

However, we must bear in mind that some of the sins by which charity is lost hinder the use of prophecy, and some do not. For, since sins of the flesh draw the mind entirely away from things spiritual, by the very fact that one is given to sins of the flesh he is rendered unfit for prophecy. For the mind must have supreme competence in things spiritual to have the revelation of prophecy. But spiritual sins do not to the same extent interfere with the mind's competence in spiritual things. Therefore, it happens that one who is a slave to spiritual sins, but not to those of the flesh, or even to the endless cares of this life, which withdraw the mind from its spiritual competence, can be a prophet.

And, therefore, Rabbi Moses says that entanglement in the pleasures and cares of this world is a sign that one is a false prophet. And this agrees with what we read in the Gospel of St. Matthew (7:15): "Beware of false prophets," and a little later (7:16): "By their fruits you shall know them." The Gloss on this passage reads that this must be understood of those sins "which are in plain sight," and the foremost of these are the sins of the flesh, for spiritual sins lie hidden within.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Wisdom enters the soul in two ways. In one way, it so enters that the very wisdom of God dwells in the soul. This makes the man holy and a friend of God. In the other way, it enters only in its effects. In this way it does not have to make the man holy or a friend of God. It is in this second way that it enters the minds of the evil men whom it makes prophets.
- 2.** Although prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit is not given with the gift of prophecy, but only with the gift of charity. Hence, the reasoning does not follow.

3. There is never an evil use of prophecy in the sense that the act itself of prophecy, in so far as it comes from prophecy, is evil. For, when someone directs the act of prophecy toward some evil end, the act itself of prophecy is good and comes from the Holy Spirit, but the direction of that act toward an improper end does not come from the Holy Spirit, but from the perverse will of man.

4. The Philosopher intends to say that those things which are given by God depend on the will of the giver, and this will cannot be unreasonable. Hence, if the foreknowledge of the future which takes place in dreams were from God, some discrimination would appear in its infusion. But there is no discrimination there, since such divination takes place in anybody, and this shows that divination of dreams comes from nature. But we find discrimination in the gift of prophecy, for it is not given to everybody, even though they have this or that disposition, but only to those whom the divine will chooses. Nevertheless, these are not apt subjects or the best subjects simply in them selves. They are, however, apt subjects in so far as they perform the function of the prophet to the extent which the divine wisdom judges to be fitting.

5. That God is best appears in this, that He knows how to make good use not only of good men, but also of evil men. Hence, if he makes evil prophets perform the good functions of prophecy, this in no way detracts from His supreme goodness.

6. Not every good man is more fit to become a prophet than every sinner. For -some who lack charity have minds more fit to perceive spiritual things, since they are free from carnal affections and worldly cares and are gifted with a natural clarity of understanding. And, on the other hand, some who have charity are occupied with worldly business, are busy begetting children, and do not have a naturally acute understanding. Therefore, because of these and similar conditions, the gift of prophecy sometimes is given to some evil men and denied to some good men.

7. Through the grace of prophecy man's nature receives an elevation ordained not directly to the participation of glory, but to the utility of others. However, in good men, nature rather receives an elevation ordained to the obtaining of glory from the grace which makes its recipient pleasing to God. Hence, the reasoning does not follow.

ARTICLE VI: DO THE PROPHETS SEE IN THE MIRROR OF ETERNITY?

Parallel readings: In Isaiam, cc. 1,6; Summa Theol., II-II, 173, I.

Difficulties:

It seems that they do, for

1. The Gloss on Isaias (38: 1), "Take order will thy house," says: "Prophets read in the book of the foreknowledge of God, in which all things are written." But the book of the foreknowledge of God seems to be nothing else but the mirror of eternity, in which all the forms of things shine forth from eternity. Therefore, the prophets see in the mirror of eternity.

2. But it was said that the prophets are not said to read in the book of foreknowledge or see in the mirror of eternity in a material sense, as if they saw the mirror or the book itself, but in a causal sense, for their knowledge of prophecy is derived from that book or mirror.— On the contrary, the prophets are said to see in the mirror of eternity or in the book of foreknowledge in this sense, that a kind of privileged knowledge is attributed to these prophets. But no privilege of knowledge is signified by saying that some knowledge is derived from the eternal

mirror or from the book of divine foreknowledge, since all human knowledge is derived from that source, as Dionysius clearly shows. Therefore, the prophets are not said to see in the mirror of eternity in the sense that they derive knowledge from it, but in the sense that when they see the mirror itself, they see other things in it.

3. Nothing can be seen except where it is. But future contingent things, according to the unchangeable truth will which they are seen by the prophets, exist only in the divine foreknowledge. Therefore, the prophets see them only in the foreknowledge of God. Thus, we reach the same conclusions as before.

4. It was said that future contingent things are indeed in God as their source, but flow thence through certain species to the human mind, where they are seen by the prophet.—On the contrary, whatever is received in a thing exists there according to the manner of that which receives it and not according to its own manner. But the mind of the prophet is changeable. Therefore, future contingent things cannot be received in it in their unchanging truth.

5. That which is proper to the divine knowledge can be known only in God. But to know futures is proper to God, as is clear from Isaias (41:23): "Shew the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall say that ye are gods." Therefore, future contingent things can be seen by the prophets only in God.

6. Avicenna says that sometimes the mind of man is elevated so high that it is united to the world of foreknowledge. But the human mind has its highest elevation in the knowledge of prophecy. Therefore, it seems that it is so united to the world of foreknowledge that future things are seen in the very foreknowledge of God.

7. As the philosophers tell us, the end of human life is the union of man's mind with a higher world, which is the world of the intelligible substances. But it would hardly fit in with what we know if man did not reach his end. Therefore, at some time man's mind will be united with the intelligible substances, the highest of which is the divine essence, in which everything shines forth. Therefore, the prophet, who among men has the mind which receives the loftiest elevation, will have his mind united with the divine essence, which seems to be the mirror of eternity. The same conclusions follow as before.

8. If there should be two mirrors, one higher and the other lower, and the likenesses come into the lower from the higher, one who sees the species in the lower mirror is not said to see them in the higher, although his sight is in a way derived from the higher mirror. But the species of future things come into the mind of the prophet from the divine mind, as into a lower mirror from a higher mirror. Therefore, the fact that the prophet sees in his own mind species received from the divine mind does not force us to say that he sees them in the divine mind, but rather in his own mind. But his own mind is not the mirror of eternity, but a mirror dependent on time. Therefore, if the prophets see only in their own minds, as has just been said, we should not say that they see in the mirror of eternity, but in a mirror which is dependent on time, although derived from the eternal mirror.

9. But it was said that someone is said to see not only in the thing illumined by the sun, but also in the sun itself, in so far as he sees by reason of the illumination of the sun.—On the contrary, the likenesses of visible things do not exist in the sun, yet this seems to pertain to the nature of a mirror. Therefore, it seems that to see something in the sun does not mean the same as to see it in a mirror.

10. The sight by which we see God as the object of beatitude is more lofty than that by which we see Him as an intentional likeness of things, for the former makes one blessed, and the latter does not. But man living in this life can be raised up to see God as the object of beatitude by a loftier elevation, namely, that by which the mind is altogether transported out

of the senses, as happens in rapture. Therefore, the mind of a prophet can be raised up to see the divine essence as the intentional likeness of things by a lesser elevation without rapture. Thus, the prophet can see things in the mirror of eternity.

11. The difference between the divine essence as considered in itself and as the likeness of something else, is greater than the difference between the divine essence as the likeness of one thing and as the likeness of another. For God is farther from any creature than one creature is from another. But one can see God in so far as He is the intentional likeness of one thing without seeing Him in so far as He is the likeness of something else. Otherwise, it would be necessary for all who saw God to know everything. Therefore, one can see God as the intentional likeness of some things without seeing His essence in itself. Therefore, those who do not see God through His essence can see in the mirror of eternity. And this seems especially to belong to the prophets.

12. Augustine says that the minds of some are elevated in such a manner that they look at the unchangeable intelligible natures in the highest citadel of all reality. But the minds of the prophets seem to have the most lofty elevation. Therefore, it seems that those things which they see prophetically they see in the very citadel of all reality, that is to say, in the divine essence. The same conclusion follows as before.

13. A thing can be judged only by that which is superior to it, as is clear from Augustine. But the prophets judge about the unchangeable truths of reality. Therefore, it is not possible for them to judge of these things through anything transitory and changeable, but through the unchangeable truth, which is God Himself. Thus, we reach the same conclusion as before.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Gloss on the Gospel of St. Luke (10: 24), "Many kings and prophets..." says that the prophets and just men saw the glory of God from afar, through a mirror darkly. But one who sees in the eternal foreknowledge of God does not see darkly. Therefore, prophets did not see in the divine foreknowledge, which they saw the mirror of eternity.

2'. Gregory says: "As long as we live in this mortal flesh, no one advances so far in the power of contemplation that he fixes the eyes of his mind on that incomprehensible beam of light. For we do not now see the omnipotent God in His brightness, but the soul looks off some something beneath that brightness. Strengthened by this sight, it advances and later reaches the glory of His sight. It was thus that the prophet Isaias (6:1), when he confessed that he had seen the Lord, said immediately: 'I saw the Lord sitting...' and added: 'and the things beneath him filled the temple, because, as has been said, when the mind advances in contemplation, it does not fix its gaze on what He is, but on that which is below Him.'" From this it is clear that Isaias and the other prophets did not see anything in the eternal mirror.

3'. No evil man can see in the eternal mirror, for Isaias (26: 10) says, according to a variant reading: "Let the wicked man be carried away, lest he see the glory of God." But some evil men are prophets. Therefore, prophetic vision does not take place in the eternal mirror.

4'. The prophets have distinct knowledge of the things which they see prophetically. But, since the eternal mirror is entirely uniform, it does not seem to be the kind of thing in which one could perceive many things separately. Therefore, there is no prophetic sight in the eternal mirror.

5'. We do not see something in a mirror which is in contact with the sense of sight, but in a mirror which is at a distance. But the mirror of eternity is in contact with the mind of the prophet, since God is in everything by His essence. Therefore, the mind of the prophet cannot see in the eternal mirror.

REPLY:

Properly speaking, a mirror exists only in material things. But in spiritual things something is called a mirror in a transferred sense, because of the likeness taken from the material mirror. Thus, in spiritual things we have that a mirror in which other things are represented, just as the forms of visible things appear in a material mirror.

Therefore, some say that the divine mind, in which all the intelligible characters of things shine forth, is a kind of mirror, and that it is called the mirror of eternity because it is eternal, inasmuch as it has eternity. Accordingly, they say that that mirror can be seen in two ways. It can be seen either through its essence, as the object of beatitude, and in this way it is seen only by those who have beatitude in its fullness or in some respect, as those in a rapture. Or it can be seen in so far as the likenesses of things are reflected in it, and in this way it is properly seen as a mirror. And they say that the mirror of eternity was seen in this way by the angels before they received beatitude, and by the prophets. But this opinion seems unreasonable on two scores.

First, these intentional likenesses of things reflected in the divine mind are not really anything different from the divine essence itself. But the likenesses and intelligible natures of this sort are distinguished in it in so far as it is related differently to different creatures. Therefore, to know the divine essence and the intentional likenesses reflected in it is nothing else than to know the divine essence in itself and in relation to other things. But one knows something in itself before knowing it as related to something else. Hence, the vision by which God is seen as the intentional likeness of things presupposes that vision by which He Himself is seen as an essence, in so far as He is the object of beatitude. Thus, it is impossible for someone to see God as the species of things and not to see Him as the object of beatitude. Second, the intentional likeness of one thing is found in another in two ways. In the first way, it is there as pre-existing before the thing of which it is the likeness, and, in the second, as arising from the thing itself. Accordingly, that in which the likenesses of things appear as existing before the things cannot properly be called a mirror, but, rather, an exemplar. But that in which likenesses of things are caused by the things themselves can be called a mirror.

Accordingly, it has never been said by the saints that God is the mirror of things, because there are in God the intentional likenesses or intelligible natures of things, but that created things themselves are the mirror of God, according to the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13: 12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." And it is thus, too, that the Son is called the mirror of the Father, inasmuch as the species of Divinity is received in Him from the Father, according to Wisdom (7:26): "For she is the brightness of eternal light and the unspotted mirror of God's majesty."

But when the Masters say that the prophets see in the mirror of eternity, we should not take this to mean that they see the eternal God Himself in so far as He is the mirror of things, but that they see some thing created, in which the eternity of God is portrayed. Thus, we understand that the mirror of eternity is not itself eternal, but represents eternity. For it belongs to God to have the same certain knowledge of the future as He has of the present, as Boethius says, because His sight is measured by eternity, in which everything is simultaneous. Hence, all times and all that take place in them are present to His sight at once.

Accordingly, in so far as the knowledge of the future is reflected in the mind of the prophet from that divine sight by means of the prophetic light and through the species in which the prophet sees, those species together with the prophetic light are called the mirror of eternity, since they represent the divine sight in so far as in eternity it sees all future events as present.

Therefore, we must concede that the prophets see in the mirror of eternity, but not that they see the eternal mirror as the first set of difficulties seemed to show. Therefore, we must answer them in order.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The metaphor which says that the prophets read in the book of fore knowledge means that the book of divine foreknowledge is a source of the knowledge of the future in the mind of the prophet, just as reading a book is the source of knowledge in the mind of the reader of the things which are written in the book. It does not mean that the prophet sees the very foreknowledge of God as one who reads a material book sees the material book.

Or we can say that the knowledge which is caused in the mind of the prophet is called the mirror of eternity, that is, something which represents eternity. Thus, it can be called the book of foreknowledge in a material sense, since the foreknowledge of God is to some extent copied in that knowledge.

2. Although all knowledge is derived from the divine foreknowledge, not all knowledge represents it in such a way that its eternity makes us see even future things as present. Hence, not any knowledge can be called a mirror of eternity. But in this we see the privileged nature of the knowledge of the prophets.

3. The intelligible natures of future contingent things exist according to unchangeable truth in the divine mind as in their source, but they flow thence to the mind of the prophet. Hence, in the revelation which he receives the prophet can have unchangeable knowledge of future things.

4. A form which is received follows the manner of the receiver in some respects, in so far as it has existence in the subject. For it is there materially or immaterially, uniformly or variably, according to the requirements of the subject receiving it. But the form which is received in some respects draws the subject to its own mode of being, in so far as, for instance, the excellences which belong to the nature of the form are communicated to the receiving subject. For in this way the subject is perfected and ennobled through the form. And in this way the corruptible body is made immortal by reason of the glory of immortality, and similarly, by the light of unchangeable truth the mind of the prophet is raised up to see changeable things in their unchangeable truth.

5. Since knowledge of the future is proper to God, it therefore can be received only from God. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for everyone who learns the future from God to see God Himself.

6. According to that philosopher, the mind of the prophet is united to the world of the intelligences or foreknowledge, not in the sense that it sees these intelligences themselves, but in the sense that it shares in their foreknowledge from their illumination.

7. According to the faith, too, the end of human life is for man to be united with a higher world. But man reaches this end only in heaven, not in this life.

8. Although the mirror in which the prophet sees is dependent on time, it represents the eternal foreknowledge of God. And in this sense he sees in the mirror of eternity.

9. Although the sun cannot be called the mirror of visible things, visible things can in some way be called the mirror of the sun, in so far as the brightness of the sun shines in them. Thus, too, the knowledge caused in the mind of the prophet is called the mirror of eternity.

10. The sight by which God is seen as the intentional likeness of things is more perfect than that by which He is seen as the object of beatitude. For the latter presupposes the former and

shows that it is more perfect. For one who can see the effects in the cause sees better than one who sees only the essence of the cause.

11. The relation by which God is referred to one creature does not presuppose the relation by which He is referred to another the way the relation by which He is referred to a creature presupposes the essence of God taken absolutely. Thus, the argument does not follow.

12. We should not apply Augustine's words to the sight of the prophets, but to the vision of the saints in heaven, or of those who, in this life, see in the manner of heaven, as Paul did when enraptured (2 Cor. 12:1-13).

13. Prophets judge about the unchangeable truth of future events by means of uncreated truth, not because they see it, but because they are enlightened by it.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

We concede the reasons to the contrary in so far as they state that the prophets do not see the eternal God Himself, although they do see in the mirror of eternity, as we have said. But the last two arguments do not conclude correctly, for, although there is complete uniformity in God, nevertheless, in Him things can be known distinctly inasmuch as He is the proper exemplar of each one. Similarly, although mirror is transferred from material to spiritual things, in this transfer we do not apply all the conditions of the material mirror, so that all of these conditions have to be found in the spiritual mirror. Rather, we take it only according to the act of representing.

ARTICLE VII: DOES GOD IN THE REVELATION MADE TO A PROPHET IMPRINT ON THE MIND OF THE PROPHET NEW SPECIES OF THINGS OR ONLY INTELLECTUAL LIGHT?

Parallel readings: I Cor., c. 84, Iect. 1; 4 Isaiam, I; Summa Theol., II-II, 173, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that Fie imprints only intellectual light without the species, for

1. The Gloss on the first Epistle to the Corinthians (14:2): says that one is called prophet because of intellectual sight alone. But intellectual sight does not refer to things through likenesses of the things, but through their very essences, as is said in the same Gloss.² Therefore, in prophetic sight no species are imprinted on the mind of the prophet.

2. Our understanding abstracts from material conditions. If, therefore, in the intellectual sight which constitutes prophecy some likenesses are produced, those likenesses will not be involved with material conditions. Therefore, through them the prophet will not be able to know particular things, but only universals.

3. Prophets have in their minds no species of those things which are revealed to them. Thus, Jeremias, who prophesied the burning of Jerusalem, had in his soul a species of that city received from sense, and, similarly, he had a species of fire burning, which he had frequently seen. If, then, other species of the same things are imprinted by God on the mind of the prophet, it follows that there would be in the same subject two forms with the same specific nature. But this is incorrect.

4. The sight by which one sees the divine essence is more powerful than the sight by which one sees the species of anything else whatever. But the sight by which one sees the divine essence is not enough to acquire knowledge of all things whatever. Otherwise those who saw the divine essence would see everything. Therefore, no matter what species are imprinted on the mind of the prophet, they will not be able to cause the prophet to know reality.

5. It is not necessary for the divine action to produce in the prophet that which anyone can do of his own power. But through the power of imagination, which joins and divides the images received from things, anyone can form in his mind the species of anything whatever. Therefore, it is not necessary for the species of things to be impressed by God on the soul of the prophet.

6. Nature works through the shortest way possible; much more so does God, whose works have even better order. But the shorter way is to bring the prophet to some knowledge of things by means of the species which are in his soul, rather than by other newly imprinted species. Therefore, it does not seem that any species are imprinted anew.

7. The gloss of Jerome on Amos (1:2) reads: "Prophets use likenesses of things with which they are familiar." But this would not be if their visions took place through newly imprinted species. Therefore, no new species, but only the prophetic light, is imprinted on the soul of the prophet.

To the Contrary:

1'. It is not through light, but through a species of something visible, that sight receives the determination to know some definite visible object. Likewise, it is not through the light of the agent intellect, but through an intelligible species, that the possible intellect receives the determination to know intelligible objects. Therefore, since the knowledge of the prophet receives a determination to some things which he did not know before, it seems that the infusion of light without the impression of species is not sufficient.

2'. Dionysius says: "It is impossible for the divine radiance to shine on us unless it is shrouded with a variety of sacred veils." But for him figures are veils. Therefore, intelligible light is showered on the prophet only with figurative likenesses.

3'. The infusion of light is uniform in all the prophets. But not all the prophets receive uniform knowledge, since some prophesy of the present, some of the past, and some of the future, as Gregory says. Therefore, there is not only the infusion of prophetic light but the impression of certain species by which the knowledge of the various prophets is distinguished.

4'. The prophet receives the prophetic revelation through internal speech made to him by God or by an angel. This is clear to anyone who looks at the writings of all the prophets. But all speech takes place through some signs. Therefore, prophetic revelation takes place through some likenesses.

5'. The sight of the imagination and of the understanding are higher than bodily sight. But when bodily sight takes place supernaturally, a new bodily species is shown to the eyes of the one who sees, as is evident in the case of the hand of one writing on the wall which appeared to Baltassar (Daniel 5:5). Therefore, it is much more necessary for new species to be imprinted on the sight of the imagination and the understanding when these take place supernaturally.

REPLY:

Prophecy is a kind of supernatural knowledge. But two things are required for knowledge: reception of the things known, and judgment of what is received, as we have said previously. Accordingly, knowledge is supernatural sometimes only in reception, sometimes only in judgment, and sometimes in both.

However, one is not called a prophet if this knowledge is supernatural only in reception, just as Pharaoh, who supernaturally received a sign of abundance and famine under the figures of oxen and ears of corn (Genesis 41:25—36), was not called a prophet. But, if some one has supernatural judgment or judgment and reception together, he is called a prophet.

Now, supernatural reception can take place only through the three kinds of sight: through bodily sight, when certain things are shown to the bodily eyes by the divine power, as the hand of one writing was shown to Baltassar (Daniel 5:5); through the sight of imagination, when by the divine power some figures of things appear to the prophets, as the boiling cauldron appeared to Jeremias (1:13) and horses and mountains to Zacharias (6:1-6); and through intellectual sight, when something is shown to the understanding in a way which surpasses its natural capacity.

But, since the human understanding is in natural potency to all the intelligible forms of sensible things, no matter what intelligible species arise in the understanding, there will be no supernatural reception; as there was supernatural reception in bodily vision when it saw things which were not formed naturally, but only by the divine power in order to reveal something. Similarly, there was supernatural reception in the sight of imagination when it saw some likenesses not received from the senses, but fashioned through some force of the soul. But our understanding receives supernaturally only when it sees through their essence the intelligible substances themselves, such as God and the angels. For it cannot reach this by virtue of its nature.

But the last of these three supernatural receptions surpasses the mode of prophecy. Hence, we read in Numbers (12:6-8): "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. But it is not so with my servant Moses and plainly, and not in riddles and figures doth he see the Lord." But to see God in His essence, as He is seen in rapture or by the blessed, or to see other intelligible substances through their essence, surpasses the mode of prophetic sight.

But the first supernatural reception, which takes place through bodily sight, is lower than prophetic reception. For in this reception the prophet is not given preference over anyone else, since all can equally see a species which God fashions for sight. Therefore, the supernatural reception which is proper to prophecy is the reception of the sight of imagination. Thus, every prophet has either only supernatural judgment of those things which are seen by another, as Joseph did about the things which Pharaoh saw (Genesis 41, 25-36), or reception through the sight of imagination together with judgment.

Therefore, supernatural judgment is given to the prophet through the light infused in him which gives his understanding strength to judge. For this no species are required, but for reception there must be a new formation of species, whether to produce in the mind of the prophet species which were not there previously, as the species of colors might be imprinted on one born blind, or by the divine power to set in order and join the pre-existing species in a way which is capable of signifying the things which should be shown to the prophet. We must concede that revelation is made to the prophet in this way not only through the light, but also through species; but sometimes it is according to the light alone.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although only he who has intellectual sight is called a prophet, yet, not only intellectual light pertains to prophecy, but also the sight of imagination, in which suitable species can be formed to represent singular things.
2. The solution to the second difficulty is clear from the first response.
3. The prophet does not need a new infusion of the species of those things which he has seen, but only an orderly grouping of the species retained in the storehouse of the imaginative power, which can suitably designate the thing to be prophesied.
4. The divine essence, in so far as it exists in itself, represents all things whatsoever more explicitly than any species or figure does. But, since the sight of the one who looks at it is overcome by the loftiness of that essence, the one who sees the essence does not see all that it represents. But the species imprinted on the imagination are proportioned to us; hence, from them we can come to knowledge of things.
5. Just as one who receives knowledge from signs reaches the things themselves by way of the signs, so, conversely, one who uses signs to express something must know the thing represented before he can form the symbol. For one cannot use fitting signs for things which he does not know. Therefore, although any man can by his natural power form any images whatever, only one who knows the future events to be symbolized can form figures to represent them properly. This formation of images in the sight of imagination takes place supernaturally in the prophet.
6. The species pre-existing in the imaginative power of the prophet, in so far as they exist there, are not capable of signifying future things. Therefore, they must be reshaped into something else by the divine power.
7. The species pre-existing in the imagination of the prophet are, as it were, the elements of that sight of imagination which is revealed by the divine power, since it is somehow made up of them. Thus it is that the prophet uses the likenesses of things with which he is familiar.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

But, since prophetic revelation does not always take place through species, as has been said, we must answer the arguments given to the contrary.

- 1'. Although the knowledge of the prophet receives no determination to some particular thing from the intellectual light when he receives supernatural judgment alone, his knowledge does receive its determination from species seen by someone else, as Joseph's knowledge received its determination from the species seen by Pharaoh, or from any species seen by Joseph himself without supernatural aid.
- 2'. When the rays of divine light shine on the prophet, they are always veiled in figures, not in the sense that species are always infused, but that these rays are always combined with the pre-existing species.
- 3'. The revelation which the prophets receive is also differentiated by reason of the intellectual light, which some perceive more fully than others, and by reason of the species, which either exist beforehand or are received anew by the prophet himself or by another.
- 4'. As Gregory says: "God speaks to the angels by the very act by which He shows His invisible secrets to their hearts," and he adds that He speaks to holy souls by infusing certainty in them. Thus, in speech with which God is said to have spoken to the prophets in Holy Scripture, we consider not only the species of things which are imprinted, but also the light which is given, by which the mind of the prophet is made certain of something.

5' Since the sight of understanding and imagination are higher than bodily sight, through them we know not only things which are present, but even things which are absent, whereas will bodily sight we perceive only things which are present. Therefore, the species of things are stored in the imagination and the understanding, but not in the senses. Consequently, for bodily sight to be supernatural new bodily species must always be formed. But this is not needed for the sight of imagination or understanding to be supernatural.

ARTICLE VIII: DOES ALL PROPHETIC REVELATION TAKE PLACE THROUGH THE MEDIATION OF AN ANGEL?

Parallel readings: In Matth., 2; Contra Gentiles III, 154; in Isaiam, 6; Summa Theol., II-II, 172, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

- 1.** As Augustine says, the minds of some are so elevated that they do not see the unchangeable natures through an angel, but in the highest citadel of reality itself. But this seems especially to belong to the prophets. Therefore, their revelation does not take place through the mediation of an angel.
- 2.** The gifts of the Holy Spirit and the infused habits come directly from God. But prophecy is a gift of the Holy Spirit, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12: 10). It is also a kind of infused light. Therefore, it is from God without the mediation of an angel.
- 3.** The prophecy which proceeds from a created power is natural prophecy, as has been said. But an angel is a creature. Therefore, prophecy which is not natural but the gift of the Holy Spirit is not produced through the mediation of an angel.
- 4.** Prophecy takes place through the infusion of light and the imprinting of species. But it seems that neither of these can take place through an angel. For the angel would have to be the creator either of the light or of the species, since these cannot be made from anything pre-existing. Therefore, prophetic sight does not take place through the mediation of an angel.
- 5.** In the definition of prophecy we read that prophecy is a divine revelation or inspiration. But, if it took place through the mediation of an angel, it would be called angelic and not divine. Therefore, it does not take place through the mediation of angels.
- 6.** Wisdom (7:27) says that the divine wisdom, "through nations convened herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets." Therefore, one is made a prophet directly by God Himself, and not through an angel.

To the Contrary:

- 1'** Moses seems to have been higher than the other prophets, as is clear in Numbers (11: 16—17, 25; 12:3, 6—8) and Deuteronomy (34: 10). But God made the revelation to Moses through the mediation of an gels. Hence, it is said in Galatians (3:19): "(the law) being ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator:" and in Acts (7: 38) Stephen said of Moses: "This is he that was in the Church in the wilderness, will the angel who spoke to him on Mount Sinai, and will our fathers." Therefore, the other prophets will much greater reason received their revelation through the mediation of an angel.
- 2'** Dionysius says: "Our glorious fathers received divine visions through the mediation of the celestial powers."

3' Augustine says that all appearances made to the fathers in the Old Testament took place through the ministration of the angels.

RE PLY:

Two things concur in effecting prophetic revelation: the illumination of the mind and the formation of the species in the imaginative power.

Therefore, the prophetic light itself, by which the mind of the prophet is enlightened, comes from God as its primary source. Nevertheless, the human mind is strengthened and to some extent prepared for its proper reception by the angelic light. For, since the power of the divine light is most simple and most universal, there is no proportion between it and reception of it by the human soul in this life, unless it is limited and specified through union with the angelic light, which is narrower in scope and more commensurate with the human mind.

But the formation of the species in the imaginative power must be attributed properly to the angels, since the whole of bodily creation is under the direction of the spiritual creation, as Augustine proves. Now, the imaginative power uses a bodily organ; hence, the formation of species in the imaginative power is part of the work proper to the angels.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** As has been said earlier, Augustine's words are to be taken as referring to the vision of heaven or to the sight of rapture, but not to prophetic sight.
- 2.** Prophecy is numbered among the gifts of the Holy Spirit by reason of the prophetic light, which, it is true, is directly infused by God. Still, the ministration of the angels assists in its proper reception.
- 3.** That which a creature performs by its own power is in some way natural, but that which a creature performs not of its own power, but in so far as it is moved by God or is an instrument of the divine activity, is supernatural. Hence, the prophecy which takes its origin from an angel according to the natural knowledge of the angel is natural prophecy. But that which takes its origin from an angel in so far as the angel receives revelation from God is supernatural prophecy.
- 4.** An angel does not create light in the human understanding or species in the imaginative power. But God uses the activity of the angel to strengthen the natural light in the human understanding. In this way an angel is said to illuminate man. Also, since an angel has the power to move the organ of phantasy, it can fashion the sight of imagination in the way which befits prophecy.
- 5.** Activity is not attributed to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as a bench is not called the effect of the saw, but of the carpenter. Similarly, since an angel is the cause of prophetic revelation only as a divine instrument using the revelation received from God, the prophecy should not be called angelic, but divine.
- 6.** The divine wisdom, in transferring itself to the soul, brings about some effects without the mediation of the ministration of the angels, as the infusion of grace, through which one is made a friend of God. But nothing hinders it from bringing about some other effects through the mediation of the aforesaid ministration. And, transferring itself to holy souls in this way, it makes prophets through the mediation of an angel.

ARTICLE IX: DOES A PROPHET ALWAYS LOSE SENSE- CONSCIOUSNESS WHEN HE IS TUNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE SPIRIT OF PROPHECY?

Parallel readings: [Summa Theol., II-II, 173, 3.](#)

Difficulties:

It seems that he does, for

- 1.** Numbers (12:6) says: "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear in a vision or I will speak to him in a dream." But as the Gloss says, prophecy takes place "through dreams and visions" when it takes place "through those things which seem to be said or done." But when there is an appearance of those things which seem to be said or done and they are not actually said or done, a man is transported out of his senses. Therefore, the sight of prophecy is al ways in a prophet who is transported out of his senses.
- 2.** When one power is applied intensely to its activity, another power must be withdrawn from its activity. But in the sight of prophecy the interior powers, that is, the intellect and the imagination, are intensely applied to their activities, since prophetic sight is the most perfect thing which they can reach in this life. Therefore, in prophetic sight the prophet is always withdrawn from the activity of the exterior powers.
- 3.** Intellectual sight is more noble than the sight of imagination, and this latter is more noble than bodily sight. But combination will that which is less noble detracts somewhat from the perfection of the more noble. Therefore, intellectual sight and the sight of imagination are more perfect when they are not combined will bodily sight. Therefore, since they reach their highest perfection in this life in prophetic sight, it seems that they are not at all combined will bodily sight in such a way that the prophet would make use of bodily sight together will them.
- 4.** The senses are more remote from the understanding and the imagination than lower reason is from higher reason. But the consideration of higher reason, by which one devotes himself to the contemplation of eternal things, withdraws man from the consideration of lower reason, by which man employs himself in things temporal. With much more reason does the prophetic sight of the understanding and the imagination withdraw man from bodily sight.
- 5.** One and the same power cannot apply itself to many things simultaneously. But, when one is using his bodily senses, his understanding and imagination are occupied will those things which are seen bodily. Therefore, one cannot at the same time occupy himself will this and will those things which appear in prophetic sight apart from the senses of the body.

To the Contrary:

- 1'.** The first Epistle to the Corinthians (14:32) says: "The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets." But this would not be so if the prophet lost sense-consciousness, for then he would not have control over himself. Therefore, prophecy does not take place in a man who has lost sense-consciousness.
- 2'.** Through the sight of prophecy one receives certain and inerrant knowledge of things. But in those who are transported out of their senses, either in a dream, or in some other way, the knowledge is mixed will error and is uncertain. For they hold fast to likenesses of things as if they were the things themselves, as Augustine says. Therefore, prophecy does not take place when one loses sense-consciousness.
- 3'.** If we posit this, we seem to fall into the error of Montanus, who said that the prophets spoke as insane people who did not know what they were saying.

4'. As the Gloss says, prophecy sometimes takes place through words and deeds: "Through deeds, as the ark of Noe signified the Church, and through words, as those which the angels spoke to Abraham." But it is clear that Noe, when building the ark, and Abraham, when conversing with angels and serving them, were not transported out of their senses. Therefore, prophecy does not always take place through transport out of the senses.

REPLY:

Prophecy has two acts: one is principal, namely, sight, and the other is secondary, namely, announcing.

The prophet does the announcing either by words or even by deeds, as is clear in Jeremias (13:5), inasmuch as he put his girdle near the river to rot. But in whichever of the two ways the prophetic announcing is made, it is always made by a man not transported out of his senses, for such an announcing takes place through certain sensible signs. Hence, the prophet doing the announcing has to use his senses for his announcement to be perfect. Otherwise, he would make the announcement like an insane person.

But in the sight of prophecy two things concur, as we have said earlier, namely, judgment and the proper reception of the prophecy. Now, when the prophet is divinely inspired, so that only his judgment is supernatural, and not his reception, such inspiration does not require transport out of the senses, for the judgment of the understanding is more perfect according to its nature in one who has the use of his senses than in one who does not have the use of them.

But the supernatural reception proper to prophecy is in the sight of imagination, and in order to see this vision human power is enraptured by some spirit and transported out of the senses, as Augustine says. The reason for this is that the power of imagination is mainly intent on the things which are received through the senses, as long as one uses his senses. Hence, its primary attention can be transferred to those things which are received from another source only when the man is transported out of his senses. Hence, whenever prophecy takes place according to the sight of imagination, the prophet must be transported out of his senses.

But this transport happens in two ways. In one it is from some cause in the soul, and in the other, from a physical cause. It comes from a physical cause when the external senses become dull either because of sickness or because of the vapors occurring in sleep, which ascend to the brain and deaden the organ of touch. It comes from a cause in the soul when a man, from too much attention to the objects of the understanding or the imagination, is altogether abstracted from the external senses.

However, transport from the bodily senses never takes place in a prophet through sickness, as happens in epileptics and those who are mad, but only through a properly disposed physical cause, as through sleep. Therefore, prophecy which takes place with the sight of imagination always comes either in a dream, when one is deprived of sense-consciousness through a properly disposed physical cause, or in a vision, when the transport comes from some cause in the soul.

Nevertheless, between the prophet in his transport out of the senses, whether it be through a dream or through a vision, and all others who are carried out of their senses, there is this difference, that the mind of the prophet is enlightened about those things which are seen in the sight of imagination. Consequently, he knows that they are not things, but in some way the likenesses of things about which his judgment is certain because of the light of the mind. Therefore, it is clear from this that the inspiration of prophecy takes place sometimes with transport out of the senses and sometimes without it. Hence, we must answer both sets of difficulties.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. In those words our Lord wanted to show the pre-eminence of Moses over the other prophets in supernatural reception. For Moses was raised to the sight of the very essence of God in itself. But every thing which the prophets have received they have received only in the likenesses belonging to dreams or visions. Nevertheless, the judgment of the prophet is not by means of the likenesses belonging to dreams or visions. Hence judgment of prophecy takes place without transport out of the senses.
2. When an interior power applies itself to the sight of its object, if there is perfect attention, it is cut off from exterior sight. But no matter how perfect the judgment of the interior power is, it does not will draw from exterior activity, for it is the duty of the internal power to judge of the external. Hence, the judgment of that which is higher is ordained to the same thing as the exterior activity. Therefore, they do not hinder each other.
3. This argument follows for the sight of the intellect and the imagination according to reception, but not according to judgment, as has been said.
4. The powers of the soul hinder each other in their operations because they are rooted in the one essence of the soul. Hence, the closer the powers are to each other, the more they naturally hinder each other if they are directed toward different objects. Hence, the argument does not follow.
5. This argument follows for supernatural reception of the imaginative or intellectual power, but not for judgment.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

- 1'. The Apostle is speaking of the announcing of prophecy, for it is in the power of free choice to announce or not to announce those things about which he is inspired. However, as concerns the revelation, the prophet himself is subject to the spirit, for the revelation does not take place as the prophet wishes, but as the revealing spirit wishes.
- 2'. It is from the light of prophecy that the mind of the prophet is so enlightened that even in the transport out of his senses he has a true judgment about those things which he sees in the dream or vision.
- 3'. Montanus erred on two points. First, he took away from the prophets the light of mind by which they have true judgment about the things which they have seen. Second, he said that, when they were announcing, they were carried out of their senses, as happens with those who are mad, or with those who talk in their sleep. But this does not follow from the above position.
- 4'. The fact that prophecy is said to take place through words or deeds is to be referred more to the announcing of prophecy than to prophetic sight.

ARTICLE X: IS PROPHECY SUITABLY DIVIDED INTO PROPHECY OF PREDESTINATION, FOREKNOWLEDGE, AND THREATS?

Parallel readings: in Matth., 1; in Jerem., 18; Summa Theol., II-II, 174, I.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. When the Glass divides prophecy, it says: "One type of prophecy is according to foreknowledge, and this must be fulfilled in every way according to the meaning of the words. Behold a virgin shall conceive (Isaias 7:14) belongs to this type. The other kind of prophecy is a threat, as: 'Yet forty days, and Nineveh shall be destroyed (Jonas 3:4). This is not fulfilled in the superficial meaning of the words, but in the meaning of a tacit construction put on the words.'" Therefore, it seems that the third division which Jerome made of prophecy of predestination is superfluous.
2. That which is a property of all prophecy should not be set down as a member dividing prophecy. But to be according to divine fore knowledge is a property of all prophecy, for, as the Glass reads: "The prophets read in the book of fore knowledge." Therefore, prophecy according to foreknowledge should not be set down as a division of prophecy.
3. Since foreknowledge is a more general term than predestination, inasmuch as it is part of its definition, foreknowledge can be divided from predestination only with reference to those things in which the extension of foreknowledge is greater than that of predestination. But it is with respect to evil things that the extension of foreknowledge is greater than that of predestination, for there is foreknowledge of these and not predestination. But there is both foreknowledge and predestination of good things. Therefore, when there is said to be one prophecy of predestination and another of foreknowledge, this means that one concerns good acts and the other evil. But as far as dependence on free will is concerned, there is no difference between good and evil. Therefore, there is no difference at all between these two kinds of prophecy which Jerome distinguishes when he says: "The prophecy of predestination is that which is fulfilled without our free choice, but the prophecy of foreknowledge is that in which our free choice is involved."
4. As Augustine says, predestination concerns goods connected with salvation. But our merits, also, which depend on free choice, are numbered among these goods. Therefore, our free choice is involved in prophecy of predestination. Thus, Jerome made a poor division.
5. Only three things can be considered in prophecy: that from whom it is, that in which it is, and that about which it is. But there is no distinction in that from whom it is, for all prophecy is from one source, the Holy Spirit. Nor is there any difference in that in which it is, for the human spirit is the subject of prophecy. And those things which prophecy concerns are only good and evil things. Therefore, prophecy should be divided only into a division with two members.
6. Jerome says that the prophecy, "Behold a virgin shall conceive" (Isaias 7:14; Matthew 1:23), is a prophecy of predestination. But, for the fulfilment of that prophecy, free choice played a part in the assent of the Blessed Virgin. Therefore, the prophecy of predestination has free will involved in it, and, thus, it does not differ from the prophecy of foreknowledge.
7. Every declaration about something future which we do not know will exist, is either false or doubtful to the one making the declaration. But through the prophecy containing a threat one predicts that some thing will exist, as for example, the destruction of some city. Since this declaration is neither false nor doubtful because there is neither falsity nor doubt in the Holy Spirit, who is the author of the prophecy, this has to be foreknown at least by the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the prophecy containing a threat is not distinct from the prophecy of fore knowledge.
8. When something is predicted according to the prophecy containing a threat, the prediction should be interpreted conditionally or unconditionally. If conditionally, it is not said to belong to prophecy, which consists in a kind of supernatural knowledge, for even natural reason can know that some things will happen if certain conditions are fulfilled. Therefore, it must be interpreted unconditionally. Accordingly, either the prophecy is false, or the outcome is as

predicted. And this must be known beforehand by God. Therefore, prophecy containing a threat should not be distinguished from the prophecy of foreknowledge.

9. In Jeremias (17:18, 24—27) there is a similar rule for the fulfilment of divine promises and threats, for the threats are recalled when the nation against whom the threat was made repents of its sins, and similarly the promise ceases when the nation to whom it was made leaves the path of justice. Therefore, just as one makes the prophecy containing a threat a division of prophecy, he ought to make the prophecy containing a promise a fourth division.

10. Isaias (38:1) spoke prophetically to Ezechias: "Take order will thy house, for thou shalt die..." This is not a prophecy of predestination, for that kind must be fulfilled in every way even apart from our free choice. Again, it is not a prophecy of foreknowledge because God did not have foreknowledge of this future event, otherwise there would have been falsity in His foreknowledge. Similarly, it does not belong to prophecy containing a threat, since the event was predicted unconditionally. Therefore, there must be a fourth class of prophecy.

11. It was said that this was predicted to happen according to the lower causes, and thus was a prophecy containing a threat.—On the contrary, by the art of medicine man can know the lower causes of the death of a sick man. Therefore, if Isaias predicted this only according to lower causes, either he did not predict it prophetically, or prophetic prediction does not differ from the prediction of a doctor.

12. Every prophecy deals with things either by viewing the higher causes or by viewing the lower causes. If we take the previously mentioned prophecy as conditional, since it is according to some causes, namely, lower causes, there is equal reason to say that all prophecy is conditional. Thus, all prophecy will have the same character as the prophecy containing a threat.

13. Although the prophecy of threatening is not fulfilled "in the superficial meaning of the words, nevertheless it is fulfilled in the meaning of the tacit construction put on the words," as Cassiodorus says. Thus, Jonas words, "Ninive shall be destroyed" (Jonas 3:4), were fulfilled according to Augustine, for, "although the walls of Ninive remained standing, its evil ways were wiped out." But the fulfilment of prophecy, not according to the exterior superficial meaning of the words, but according to their spiritual sense, takes place in the prophecy of predestination and of foreknowledge. We see this in Isaias (54:11): "I will lay thy foundations with sapphires, Jerusalem," and in Daniel (2:45): "the stone was cut out of the mountain without hands, and broke in pieces the statue," and in many other similar passages. Therefore, prophecy containing a threat should not be distinguished from the prophecy of foreknowledge and predestination.

14. If likenesses of future things are shown to someone, he still is not called a prophet unless he understands the things signified through these likenesses. Thus, Pharaoh was not called a prophet when he saw the ears of corn and the cattle, "for there is need of understanding in a vision," as Daniel (10:1) says. But those through whom the divine threats are made understand what they declare only according to the superficial meaning of the words, for they are not enlightened about the things which are signified through the words. This is clear in the case of Jonas, who understood that Ninive was to be overturned materially. Hence, he grieved as though his prophecy were not fulfilled when the city was not overturned but mended its ways. Therefore, one should not on this account be called a prophet, and, thus, threatening should not be made a species of prophecy. Hence, the distinction previously mentioned seems no distinction at all.

To the Contrary:

The opposite appears from the Gloss on Matthew (1:23): "Behold a virgin shall conceive." Here, the above division is given and explained.

REPLY:

Prophecy is derived from the divine foreknowledge, as has been said above. But we must bear in mind that God knows futures differently from all others who have foreknowledge of them. For there are two things to consider in the knowledge of the future: the order of the causes to the future effects and the outcome or execution of this order in the actual procession of the effects from their causes.

Accordingly, no matter what created power has some knowledge of the future, its knowledge reaches only the order of the causes. Thus, a doctor is said to foreknow future death in so far as he knows that natural principles have an ordination to death. And a meteorologist is said to foresee future rains and winds in the same way. Hence, if these causes are such that their effects can be impeded, the event which is thus foreseen to happen does not always come to pass.

But God knows the future not only by reason of the order of the causes, but also in the very outcome or execution of that order. The reason for this is that His vision is measured by eternity, which comprehends all times in one indivisible present. Thus, in one simple glance He sees that to which the causes are ordered and how that order is fulfilled or obstructed. But this is impossible for a creature whose gaze is limited to a determined time. Hence, He knows those things which exist at that time. And at the time when futures are still future they exist only in the order of their causes, and hence, we can know them only in this way. Consequently, it is clear to all who consider it correctly that when we are said to foresee the future we have knowledge more of present things than of the future. And, so, it remains proper to God alone to have true foreknowledge of future events.

Therefore, prophecy is derived from divine foreknowledge some times by reason of the order of the causes and sometimes by reason of the execution or fulfilment of that order. Therefore, when prophetic revelation concerns only the order of the causes, it is called prophecy containing a threat. For, then, all that is revealed to the prophet is that according to the things which now exist such a person is ordained to this or that.

The fulfilment of the order, however, takes place in two ways. Sometimes it comes from the activity of the divine power alone, as the resuscitation of Lazarus, the conception of Christ, and things of this sort. And the prophecy of predestination follows this divine activity, for, as Damascene says: "Those things which God predestines are not in our power." Hence, predestination is called a kind of preparatory action on the part of God. Now, preparatory action concerns that which one will do himself and not what someone else will do.

Some things, however, are brought to completion by the operation of other causes, whether natural or voluntary. These things, in so far as they are accomplished through other causes, are not predestined, but they are nevertheless foreknown. Hence, prophecy of these things is said to be according to foreknowledge. However, since prophecy takes place for the sake of men, the prophecy of foreknowledge especially concerns those things which men do by their free will. For this reason Jerome puts aside other created causes and makes mention only of free will when referring to the prophecy of foreknowledge.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The threefold division which Jerome makes is reduced to a two fold division, as has been said, because one division looks to the order of causes and the other to the outcome of that order. This is the division which Cassiodorus held. But Jerome subdivided the second member; thus, Cassiodorus gave two members of the division and Jerome three. Cassiodorus

also took foreknowledge in its generality, for it refers to all existing things, whether they come about through created or uncreated power. But Jerome took foreknowledge will a certain restriction, inasmuch as it concerns only those things about which there is no predestination by reason of themselves, that is to say, those things which come to pass by created power.

2. Every prophecy has divine foreknowledge as its root. But, since there is knowledge of the order and the outcome in divine foreknowledge, one kind of prophecy is derived from the one of these and one from the other. However, the foreknowledge of God is properly called foreknowledge in so far as it looks to an outcome which is future. For the order to the outcome is in the present; hence, of it there is knowledge rather than foreknowledge. Thus, not that prophecy which looks to the order, but only that which deals with the outcome, is said to take place according to foreknowledge.

3. Foreknowledge is taken here in contrast with predestination in so far as foreknowledge has a broader extension than predestination. Now, foreknowledge has a broader extension than predestination not only in evil things, if predestination be taken strictly, but also in all good things which do not take place exclusively by the divine power. Hence, the argument does not follow.

4. Our merit is from grace and from free will. However, it belongs to predestination only in so far as it comes from grace, which is from God alone. Hence, that which is from our free will is said to belong to predestination for some extrinsic reason.

5. Here, prophecy is distinguished according to the things of which it treats. This is not according to good and evil, for differences of this sort are related by some extrinsic reason to the future thing which is known through prophecy, but rather according to that which concerns the order or the outcome of the order, as has been said.

6. The consent of the Blessed Virgin intervened in the conception of Christ as something which removed a hindrance and not as an operative cause. For it was not fitting that so great a benefit be given to one who was unwilling.

7. We can say that something will exist not only from the fact that it will exist in this way, but also from the fact that it is so ordained in its causes that it will thus exist. For it is in this way that a doctor says: "That man will be cured or will die." And, if the event prove otherwise, he does not speak falsely. For at that time this was about to take place from the order of the causes, although it was possible for this to be impeded. Then, that which beforehand was going to take place in the event will not take place. For this reason the Philosopher says: "One who is about to enter will not enter." And according to this the threat of the prophet is neither false nor doubtful, although what he has predicted does not come to pass.

8. If the prophecy containing a threat is referred to the ordination of causes to which it directly looks, it is consequently free from all condition. For it is absolutely true that it is so ordained in the causes that this happen. But, if it is referred to the event to which it looks directly, it must be understood under this condition: if the cause acts. Nevertheless, it is supernatural, because we cannot know by natural knowledge that precisely such or such a punishment is deserved according to divine justice, even if the cause does exist, namely, if the wickedness remain.

9. We take the prophecy containing a promise as belonging to the prophecy containing a threat because both have the same intelligible nature. However, this nature is better expressed in prophecy containing a threat, because threats are more frequently revoked than promises, for God is more inclined to be merciful than to punish.

10. That prophecy was a prophecy containing a threat, and although the condition was not stated explicitly, that threat should be interpreted under the implicit condition: if such an order of things continues.

11. Lower causes include not only natural causes, which doctors can know beforehand, but also meritorious causes, which are known from divine revelation alone. Likewise, the natural causes of health or death can be known much more perfectly by divine revelation than by human ingenuity.

12. Higher causes, which are the intelligible natures of things [represented] in the divine foreknowledge, never fail of fulfilment of their effects, as lower causes do. Therefore, the outcomes of things are known absolutely in the higher causes, but only conditionally in lower causes.

13. Although in the prophecy of predestination and of foreknowledge the truth to be fulfilled is presented under some likenesses, no literal sense is understood by reason of those likenesses, but the literal sense is grasped according to those things which are signified through the likenesses, as happens in all metaphorical expressions. Hence, in such prophecies we find no truth in the likenesses, but only in those things which are declared through the likenesses.

But, in the prophecy containing a threat, the literal sense of the words of the prophet is considered according to those likenesses of the things which will come to pass, because those likenesses are not given only as likenesses but as things. Hence, that which will come to pass and is represented through likenesses of this sort does not belong to the literal sense, but to the mystical sense. Thus, when it is said that Ninive will be destroyed, material destruction belongs to the literal sense, but destruction of evil ways belongs to the moral sense. By reason of the order of causes we see some truth in the literal sense itself, as has been said.

14. The ears of corn and the cattie were not shown in Pharaoh's dream as things, but only as likenesses. Therefore, Pharaoh, who saw only those likenesses, had no understanding of any thing and for this reason was not a prophet. But Jonas, to whom it was said: "Ninive shall be destroyed," had some understanding of a thing, namely, of the ordination of merits to destruction, even though, perhaps, he had no foreknowledge of the other thing, namely, the conversion. Thus, he was not a prophet in that which he did not understand. Nevertheless, Jonas and the prophets who threatened knew that the prophecy they foretold was not a prophecy according to foreknowledge, but according to threat. Hence, it is said in Jonas (4: z): "Therefore I went before to flee into Tharsis: for I know that thou art a gracious and merciful God."

ARTICLE XI: IS THERE UNCHANGEABLE TRUTH IN PROPHECY?

Parallel readings: *Contra Gentiles* III, 154; *Summa Theol.*, II—II, 171, 6; 172, 5, ad 3; 172,6, ad 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that there is not, for

1. Since unchangeable truth is put in the definition of prophecy, if it belongs to prophecy at all, it must belong to it for some intrinsic reason. But future contingent things, about which we have prophecy, are not unchangeable for any intrinsic reason, but only in so far as they are referred to the divine foreknowledge, as Boethius says. Therefore, unchangeable truth should not be attributed to prophecy as part of its definition.

2. That which is fulfilled only if some changeable condition exists does not have unchangeable truth. But there is a prophecy, that containing a threat, which is fulfilled only if there exists a changeable condition, namely, persistence in justice or wickedness, as we see this in Jerernias (18:8). Therefore, not all prophecy possesses unchangeable truth.

3. The Gloss on Isaias (38:1) reads: "God reveals His sentence (*sententia*) but not His chosen plan (*consilium*) to the prophets." But His sentence is changeable, as is said in the same place. Therefore, prophecy does not possess unchangeable truth.

4. If prophecy contains unchangeable truth, this happens because of the prophet who sees it, or because of the thing which is seen, or because of the eternal mirror by reason of which it is seen. But its source is none of these. Not the seer, for human knowledge is changeable. Not the thing which is seen, for that is contingent. Finally, not the divine foreknowledge or mirror, for this does not impose necessity on things. Therefore, prophecy in no way contains unchangeable truth.

5. It was said that divine foreknowledge does not impose a necessity which makes it impossible for the outcome to be different, but nevertheless the outcome which was foreknown will not be different, and that in this way prophecy contains unchangeable truth. For, according to the Philosopher, that is called unchangeable which cannot be changed, or is changed with difficulty, or simply does not change. On the contrary, granted the occurrence of what is possible, nothing impossible follows. If, therefore, that which is foreknown and prophesied can vary, then, if we assume that it does vary, nothing impossible follows. But it does follow that prophecy possesses changeable truth. Therefore, prophecy does not necessarily contain unchangeable truth.

6. The truth of a proposition follows the condition of the thing, for: "A statement is true or false as the thing is or is not," as the Philosopher says. But the things about which there is prophecy are contingent and changeable. Therefore, the prophetic statement contains changeable truth.

7. An effect is called necessary or contingent from the proximate cause, not from the first cause. But the proximate causes of the things of which we have prophecy are changeable causes, although the first cause is unchangeable. Therefore, prophecy does not possess unchangeable, but changeable, truth.

8. If prophecy possesses unchangeable truth, it is impossible for something to be prophesied and not happen. But it is impossible for what has been prophesied not to have been prophesied. Therefore, if prophecy has unchangeable truth, that which has been prophesied must necessarily happen. Thus, prophecy will not concern future contingent things.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Gloss says: "Prophecy is divine inspiration or revelation which announces the outcomes of things with immutable truth."

2'. "Prophecy is a sign of divine foreknowledge," as Jerome says. But things which are foreknown are necessary in so far as they are subjects of foreknowledge. Therefore, the things prophesied are also necessary in so far as there is prophecy about them. Therefore, prophecy has unchangeable truth.

3'. God's knowledge about changeable things can be unchangeable, for He does not obtain it from things. But in the same way prophetic knowledge is not received from the things themselves. Therefore, prophecy has unchangeable truth about changeable things.

REPLY:

In prophecy there are two things to consider, the things prophesied and the knowledge which is had of those things. And the order of the causes in these two is different. For the things prophesied come immediately from changeable causes as from their proximate cause, but from the unchangeable causes as from their remote cause. Prophetic knowledge, on the other hand, comes from the divine foreknowledge as its proximate cause and depends on the things prophesied not as a proximate cause, but only as a sign of these things.

Moreover, the necessity and contingency of every effect depends on the proximate cause and not on the first cause. Hence, the things prophesied are changeable, but the prophetic knowledge is unchangeable, just as is the divine foreknowledge from which it is derived as a copy from the pattern. For, just as the necessity of the truth of the understanding causes necessary truth in the statement which is a sign of understanding, so also the immutable divine foreknowledge causes unchangeable truth in the prophecy which is its sign.

But the way in which God's foreknowledge can be unchangeably true about changeable things is explained in another question, on God's knowledge. Consequently, it is not necessary to repeat it here, since the whole immutability of prophecy depends on the immutability of the divine foreknowledge.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Nothing prevents something from being in another thing for an extrinsic reason, if that thing is taken in itself, and yet being in the thing for an intrinsic reason, if it is taken together with something else. Thus, to be moved belongs to man for an extrinsic reason, but, in so far as he is running, it belongs intrinsically to a man. So also, to be unchangeable does not belong intrinsically to the thing which is prophesied, but belongs to it only inasmuch as it is prophesied. Therefore, it is fittingly included in the definition of prophecy.

2. The prophecy containing a threat fully possesses unchangeable truth, for it does not deal with the outcomes of things, but with the order of the causes to the outcomes, as has been said. And this order, predicted by the prophet, must necessarily be, although sometimes the events do not follow.

3. That eternal disposition of God which never changes we call the chosen plan of God. For this reason Gregory says: "God never changes His chosen plan." Sentence, however, is that to which causes are ordained. Moreover, sentences are handed down in trials according to the merits of the cases (*causae*). However, sometimes that to which the causes (*causae*) are ordained is arranged by God from eternity. And, then, God's chosen plan and sentence are the same. But, sometimes, causes are ordained to something which is not arranged by God from eternity. Then, God's chosen plan and sentence are directed to different things. Therefore, there is mutability in the sentence which looks to lower causes, but there is always immutability in the chosen plan.

Sometimes, then, a sentence which is in conformity with the chosen plan is revealed to the prophet. In this case, the prophecy possesses unchangeable truth even with reference to the outcome. Sometimes, however, there is revealed a sentence which is not in conformity with the chosen plan. In this case, there is unchangeable truth with reference to the order, but not with reference to the outcome, as we have said.

4. The eternal mirror gives immutability to prophecy, not because it imposes necessity on the things prophesied, but because it makes the prophecy about contingent things necessary just as it itself is necessary.

5. Given that something has been prophesied according to foreknowledge, although in itself it is possible for it to fail to exist, still, granted that it is said to be foreknown, it is then

impossible for it not to exist. For, from the fact that it is established as foreknown, it is established that it will be so, since foreknowledge looks to the outcome.

6. The truth of a proposition follows the condition of the thing when the knowledge of the one proposing the truth has its origin from things. However, this is not so in our case.

7. Although the proximate cause of the thing prophesied is changeable, the proximate cause of the prophecy itself is unchangeable, as has been said. Therefore, the argument does not follow.

8. We should pass like judgment on the failure of what is prophesied to come to pass and on the failure of what is foreknown to come to pass. To what extent this should be conceded and to what extent it should be denied is treated in the question on God's knowledge.¹⁰

ARTICLE XII: IS THE PROPHECY WHICH IS ACCORDING TO THE SIGHT OF UNDERSTANDING ALONE HIGHER THAN THAT WHICH HAS THE SIGHT OF UNDERSTANDING TOGETHER WITH IMAGINATION?

Parallel readings: Summa Theol., II—II, 174, 2-3; III, 30, 3, ad 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. Prophecy which has the sight of understanding along with imagination includes that which has the sight of understanding alone. Therefore, the prophetic sight which has both is better than that which has only one. For that which embraces something surpasses that which it embraces.

2. The more abundantly the light of understanding is in a prophecy, the more perfect it is. But, because of the fullness of the light of understanding in prophecy, there is an overflow from the understanding into the imagination, so that the sight of imagination is produced there. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of imagination added to it is more perfect than that which has the sight of understanding alone.

3. It is said of John the Baptist that he is a prophet and "more than a prophet" (Matt. 1, 1:9). But this is stated because he saw Christ not only through his understanding or imagination, as the other prophets did, but also physically pointed him out. Therefore, prophecy which includes bodily sight is combined is the most noble, and for the same reason that to which the sight of imagination is added is more noble than that which has the sight of understanding alone.

4. The more fully a thing contains the differences which make up the intelligible nature of the species, the more perfect it is. But the differences which constitute prophecy are sight and declaration. Therefore, the prophecy which includes declaration seems to be more perfect than that which does not have it. But the declaration cannot take place without the sight of imagination, because the one who declares a prophecy must have in his imagination the words he is going to speak. Therefore, the prophecy which includes the sight of imagination and of understanding is more perfect.

5. The Gloss on "Yet by the Spirit he speaketh mysteries" (1 Cor. 1: 2) says: "One who by spirit alone sees the likenesses of the things signified is less a prophet, and one who is granted only the understanding of them is more a prophet, but he is most a prophet who excels in both." Thus, we conclude as before.

6. As Rabbi Moses says, prophecy begins in the understanding and is completed in the imagination. Therefore, prophecy which has the sight of imagination is more perfect than that which has only the sight of understanding.

7. Weakness of the light of understanding betrays an imperfection of the prophecy. But the fact that prophetic sight does not overflow into the imagination seems to come from weakness of the light of understanding. Therefore, prophecy which has the sight of imagination seems to be more perfect.

8. To know a thing as it is in itself and as the sign of something else is more perfect than to know it only in itself. Therefore, for the same reason it is more perfect to know a thing as it is represented in a sign than to know it only in itself. But, in the prophecy which has the sight of imagination and that of understanding, the thing prophesied is known not only in itself but also as it is represented by the images. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of imagination is more noble than that which contains only the sight of understanding, in which one understands the things prophesied only in themselves and not as represented in a sign.

9. Dionysius says: "It is impossible for the divine radiance to shine on us unless it is shrouded with a variety of sacred veils." But, for him veils are the imagery of the imagination, in which the purity of the light of understanding is, as it were, shrouded. Therefore, in every prophecy there must be imagery of the imagination either formed by man or introduced by God. Now, the imagery introduced by God seems to be more noble than that formed by man. Therefore, those prophecies seem to be most noble in which God at the same time infuses the light of understanding and the imagery of the imagination.

10. As Jerome says, the prophets are distinguished from the writers of sacred books. But, of those whom he calls the prophets, all, or almost all, received revelation under the imagery of imagination. But many of those whom he calls writers of sacred books received revelation without imagery. Therefore, those to whom revelation is given according to the sight of understanding and imagination are more properly called prophets than those to whom revelation is given according to the sight of understanding only.

11. According to the Philosopher, our understanding is related to the first causes of things, which naturally are most knowable, "just as the eye of the owl is related to the light of the sun." But the eye of the owl can look at the light of the sun only when it is darkened to some extent. Therefore, our understanding, too, understands divine things when they are dimmed to some extent, and therefore seems to understand them in this way under certain likenesses. Consequently, the sight of understanding will not be more certain than that of imagination, since both take place under likenesses. Hence, it seems that the addition of the sight of imagination to that of understanding does not lessen the nobility of the latter. Thus, that prophecy which takes place under both sights is either of greater dignity or at least of equal dignity.

12. That which can be understood is related to the understanding as that which can be imagined is related to the imagination. But that which can be imagined is apprehended by the imagination only through the mediation of a likeness. Therefore, what can be understood is apprehended by the understanding only in the same way. Thus, we conclude as before.

To the Contrary:

1^o. The Gloss says: "There is another kind of prophecy which is of greater dignity than the others, that in which one prophesies by means of the inspiration of the Holy Spirit alone and apart from every outside help of action or word or vision or dream." But the prophecy which has the sight of imagination joined to it takes place with the help of a dream or a vision. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of understanding alone is more noble.

2'. Everything which is received into a thing is received there according to the manner of the receiver. But the understanding, in which something is received by the sight of understanding, is more noble than the imagination, in which it is received by the sight of imagination. Therefore, prophecy which takes place according to the sight of understanding is more noble.

3'. Where there is sight of understanding there can be no deception, for one who is mistaken does not understand, as Augustine says. However, the sight of imagination contains a great mixture of falsity. Hence, in the Metaphysics it is given as a kind of source of falsity. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of understanding is more noble.

4'. When one power of the soul recedes from its activity, another is strengthened in its activity. Therefore, if the power of imagination is completely inactive in some prophecy, the sight of understanding will be stronger. Therefore, the prophecy will also be more noble.

5'. The acts of the powers are related to each other just as the powers are. But understanding not joined to imagination, as in the angels, is more noble than understanding joined to imagination, as in men. Therefore, the prophecy which contains the sight of understanding without the sight of imagination is more noble than that which has both.

6'. Assistance in an action shows imperfection in the agent. But the sight of imagination is given in the Gloss as a help to prophecy. Therefore, the prophecy which has the sight of imagination is more imperfect.

7'. The more remote light is from darkness or clouds, the brighter it is. But the imagery of imagination is, as it were, clouds which darken the light of understanding. For this reason Isaac says that human reason, which abstracts from phantasms, has its origin in the shadow of intelligence. Therefore, prophecy which has the light of understanding without images is more perfect.

8'. The whole nobility of prophetic knowledge consists in this, that it imitates God's foreknowledge. But prophecy which has no sight of imagination imitates divine foreknowledge, in which there is no imagination, more than that which has the sight of imagination. Therefore, that which does not have the sight of imagination is more noble.

REPLY:

Since the nature of a species is made up of the nature of the genus and the nature of the difference, the dignity of the species can be estimated from either of these. Likewise, according to these two considerations certain things sometimes surpass each other in dignity. In so far as the nature of the species is concerned, that in which the difference formally constituting the species exists more nobly, always participates more perfectly in the nature of the species. But, absolutely speaking, sometimes that in which the nature of the genus is more perfect is more noble and sometimes that in which the nature of the difference exists more perfectly is more noble.

For, since the difference adds some perfection to the nature of the genus, the excellence which comes from the difference makes the thing more noble absolutely. Thus, just as in the species of man, who is a rational animal, he is more noble absolutely who is more gifted in rationality than one who is more gifted in the things which refer to the animal nature, as the senses, movement, and other things of this sort.

However, when the difference implies a certain imperfection, then that which has the nature of the genus more completely is more noble absolutely. This is clear in faith, which is an obscure knowledge, namely, of things which are not seen. For one who has a large share of the nature of the genus of faith and is deficient in the difference (as one of the faithful who has some understanding of matters of belief and in a way already sees them) has a faith

simply more noble than one who has less knowledge. Nonetheless, as far as the nature of faith is concerned, he has it more properly who does not at all see the things which he believes.

The same is true in prophecy. For prophecy seems to be a knowledge which is shadowy and mixed with darkness, as the second Epistle of St. Peter (I: 10) has: "We have the more firm prophetic word: whereunto you do well to attend, as to a light that shined in a dark place." This, too, the very name prophecy shows, for prophecy is called a kind of sight from afar. And things which are seen clearly are seen, as it were, from nearby.

Therefore, if we compare the types of prophecy on the basis of the difference which completes the essence of prophecy, we find that the prophecy in which there is admixture of the sight of imagination possesses that nature of prophecy more perfectly and more properly. For in this the knowledge of prophetic truth is darkened.

But if we compare prophecies according to the attributes of the nature of the genus, namely, knowledge or sight, we see that we have to make a distinction. For all perfect knowledge has two elements, reception and judgment about that which is received. Now, in prophecy, judgment about that which is received is according to the understanding alone, but reception is according to the understanding and the imagination. Sometimes, therefore, there is no supernatural reception in prophecy, but only supernatural judgment. Thus, the understanding alone is enlightened without any sight of imagination. Perhaps Solomon's inspiration was of this nature, since by a divine impulse he made more certain judgments than the rest of us about human actions and the natures of things, which we perceive naturally.

But, sometimes, there is also supernatural reception, and this takes place in two ways. For there is either reception by the imagination, as when images of things are formed by the divine power in the spirit of the prophet, or reception by the understanding, as happens when the understanding is so clearly flooded with knowledge of the truth that it does not grasp the truth from the likeness of any images, but in fact can form images for itself from the truth it has seen. And it uses these because of the nature of our understanding. But there can be no prophecy in which there is reception without judgment. Hence, no one can have sight of imagination without that of understanding.

Thus, it is clear that the pure sight of understanding, which has judgment alone without supernatural reception, is inferior to that which has judgment and the reception of imagination. But the sight of understanding which has judgment and supernatural reception is more noble than that which has judgment and the reception of imagination. In this respect we must concede that prophecy which contains the sight of understanding alone is more worthy than that which has sight of imagination joined to it.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although the prophecy which consists of both sights does also have sight of understanding, it does not include the prophecy which consists of the sight of understanding alone, because the latter has the sight of understanding more nobly than the former, since in it the perception of the light of understanding is sufficient for reception and judgment, whereas in the other it is sufficient only for judgment.

2. In both types of prophecy the prophetic light descends from the understanding to the imagination, but in different ways. For in the type of prophecy which is said to contain the sight of understanding alone we perceive the whole fullness of the prophetic revelation in the understanding. Thereupon, because of the nature of our understanding, which cannot understand without phantasms, images are suitably formed in the imaginative power as the one who understands wishes. But in the other type of prophecy the whole fullness of

prophetic revelation is not received in the understanding, but partly in the understanding, in so far as there is judgment, and partly in the imagination, in so far as there is reception.

Hence, the sight of understanding is more complete in the prophecy which contains only the sight of understanding. For the deficiency of the light received in the understanding causes it, in a sense, to fail to some extent from the intelligible purity into the imagery of imagination, as happens in dreams.

3. That John pointed out Christ physically does not belong to prophetic sight in the way we are now speaking about the comparison of prophecy. Rather, it belongs to the declaration of prophecy. Also, that he saw Christ bodily did not give him prophecy of a more perfect nature, but was a concession greater than prophecy given him by God. Hence, Luke (10:24) says: "Many prophets and kings have desired to see the things that you see."

4. Declaration through words or deeds is common to both kinds of prophecy, for even the prophecy which has the sight of understanding alone can be declared according to images which [the prophet] freely forms.

5. That Gloss speaks of one who in his understanding has only judgment about those things which are received by another, as Joseph had only judgment about the things which Pharaoh had seen and he himself did not receive [of] what would happen. Thus, the argument does not reach any conclusion about the prophecy which has the sight of understanding alone. And it is of things that we are now speaking.

6. On this point we do not follow the opinion of Rabbi Moses, for he holds that the prophecy of David was below that of Isaiah and Jeremiah, which is the opposite of what holy men say. Still, there is some truth in what he says, because the judgment is not completed unless the things about which we are to judge are brought forward. Hence, in the prophecy in which the light of understanding is perceived only in order to make a judgment, there is only the light itself, which does not cause determinate knowledge of anything until some things about which we must judge are put before it, whether these are received either from the light itself or from another. Thus, the sight of understanding is perfected through the sight of imagination as what is common is determined through that which is particular.

7. It is not always weakness of the light of understanding which is the source of prophecy according to the sight of understanding alone. But sometimes it is caused by a very complete reception of the understanding, as we have noted. Therefore, the argument does not follow. **8.** A sign as such is a cause of knowledge. The thing which is represented is that which is known through something else. But, just as that which is known in itself and makes other things known is known in a more noble way than that which is known only in itself, so also, on the other hand, that which is known through itself and not through something else is known in a more noble way than that which is known through something else. Thus, principles are known in a more noble way than conclusions, and therefore, the case is just the opposite with the sign and the thing signified. Hence, the argument does not follow.

9. Although images imprinted by God are more noble than images formed by a man, the reception of knowledge which is in the mind from God is more noble than that which takes place through the forms of imagination.

10. Those who have prophecy according to visions of imagination are more especially called prophets in the above-mentioned distinction, for in them there is a fuller character of prophecy even by reason of the difference. They, however, are called sacred writers who had only intellectual visions supernaturally, whether in judgment alone or in judgment and reception together.

11. Although our intellect understands divine things through certain likenesses, still, because these are immaterial, they are more noble than the likenesses of imagination. Hence, the sight of understanding, also, is more noble.

12. A thing cannot be imaginable through its essence as it can be intelligible through its essence, for the imagination concerns only material things. Yet, it cannot receive anything except without matter. Consequently, it is always necessary for the imagination to attain an object not through its essence, but through its likeness. But understanding receives things immaterially, and so, knows not only material things, but also immaterial things. Hence, it knows some things through their essence and some through likenesses.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

The response to the difficulties to the contrary is easily seen, in so far as they conclude to something false.

ARTICLE XIII: ARE THE GRADES OF PROPHECY DISTINGUISHED ACCORDING TO THE SIGHT OF IMAGINATION?

Parallel readings: IV Sentences 49, 2, 7, ad 2; 2 Cor., c. 13, lectura 4; Summa Theol., II-II, 174, 3.

Difficulties:

And it seems that they are, for

1. Prophecy is more noble where the reception of the thing prophesied is more noble. But, sometimes, the reception of the thing prophesied takes place through the sight of imagination. Therefore, grades of prophecy can be distinguished according to the sight of imagination.

2. A more perfect medium of knowing produces more perfect knowledge. It is for this reason that scientific knowledge is more perfect than opinion. But the likenesses of imagination are a medium of knowing in prophecy. Therefore, where the sight of imagination is more noble, the grade of prophecy will be higher.

3. In all knowledge which takes place through a likeness the knowledge is more perfect where the likeness is more explicit. But in prophecy the imagery of imagination is made up of the likenesses of the things about which there is revelation of prophecy. Therefore, where the sight of imagination is more perfect, the grade of prophecy is higher.

4. Since the prophetic light descends from the understanding to the imagination, when the light in the understanding of the prophet is more perfect, the sight of imagination is the more perfect. Therefore, different grades of the sight of imagination show different grades of the sight of understanding. But where the sight of understanding is more perfect, the prophecy is more perfect. Therefore, grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the sight of imagination.

5. It was said that diversity of the sight of imagination does not distinguish species of prophecy and, therefore, grades of prophecy are not distinguished according to it.—On the contrary, every warm element is of the same species, but doctors distinguish warmth into first, second, third, and fourth grades. Therefore, the distinction of grades does not require the distinction of species.

6. Greater and less do not constitute distinct species. But even the sight of understanding is distinguished in prophecy only according to the more or less perfect reception of the prophetic

light. Therefore, difference in the sight of understanding does not constitute distinct species of prophecy and so it does not constitute distinct grades of prophecy according to the response just given. Thus, there would not be grades in prophecy if it were distinguished neither according to the sight of understanding nor the sight of imagination. Therefore, it remains that grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the sight of imagination.

To the Contrary:

- 1'.** Only the sight of understanding, and not the sight of imagination, makes one a prophet. Therefore, neither are grades of prophecy distinguished according to the sight of imagination.
- 2'.** That which is distinguished by reason of something intrinsic is distinguished according to that which is formal to it. But in prophecy the sight of understanding is formal and the sight of imagination is, as it were, material. Therefore, grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the sight of understanding and not according to the sight of imagination.
- 3'.** The Visions of imagination frequently vary in the same prophet, for sometimes he apprehends revelation in one way and sometimes in another. Therefore, it does not seem possible to distinguish grades of prophecy according to the sight of imagination.
- 4'.** Prophecy is related to the things prophesied just as scientific knowledge is related to the things known. But the sciences are distinguished according to the things known, as is said in *The Soul*. Therefore, prophecy is distinguished according to the things prophesied and not according to the sight of imagination.
- 5'.** According to the Gloss, prophecy consists in "words and deeds, dreams and visions." Therefore, grades of prophecy should not be distinguished more according to the sight of imagination to which visions and dreams belong than according to words and deeds.
- 6'.** Miracles also are needed for prophecy. Hence, when Moses was sent by the Lord (Exodus 3:11-13), he sought a sign. And in Psalms (73:9) we read: "Our signs we have not seen, there is now no prophet...." Therefore, grades of prophecy should not be distinguished according to the sight of imagination rather than according to signs.

REPLY:

When two things combine to make up something, and one of them is more important than the other in the composite which they constitute, we can consider grades of comparison according to that which is primary and according to that which is secondary. But a high degree of that which is primary shows an absolute pre-eminence, whereas a high degree of that which is secondary shows a pre-eminence in some respect and not absolutely, unless the high degree of that which is secondary is a sign of a high degree of that which is primary.

Thus, for human merit, charity, as that which is primary, unites with an external work, as that which is secondary. However, absolutely speaking, that is to say, with reference to the essential reward, we judge merit to be greater when it proceeds from greater charity. And the magnitude of the work makes for greater merit in so far as it refers to some accidental reward, but not absolutely, except in so far as it shows intensity of charity, according to what Gregory says: "Love of God, if it exists, does great things."

Therefore, since prophecy is achieved through the joint activity of both the sight of understanding and that of imagination, the former functioning as the principal factor, and the latter in a secondary capacity, it follows that pre-eminence of the sight of understanding should be the basis for judging one grade of prophecy as absolutely superior. However, pre-eminence of the sight of imagination shows grade of prophecy to be higher in some respect,

and not absolutely, unless to the extent that perfection of the sight of imagination exhibits perfection of the sight of understanding.

But we cannot perceive determinate grades of the sight of understanding, because the fullness of the light of understanding is displayed only through certain signs. Hence, we must distinguish grades of prophecy according to those signs. And in this way there are four bases on which we can distinguish grades of prophecy.

The first is according to the elements which are necessary for prophecy. Now, prophecy has two acts: sight and declaration. For sight, however, two things are needed: judgment, which is in the understanding, and reception, which is sometimes in the understanding and sometimes in the imagination. But for declaration something is needed in the one declaring, namely, a certain boldness so that he will not be afraid to speak the truth because of the opponents of the truth. In this sense the Lord said to Ezechiel (3:8-9): "Behold I have made thy face stronger than their faces: and thy forehead harder than their foreheads..., fear them not, neither be thou dismayed at their presence." And something else is needed in the thing to be declared, namely, a sign through which the truth of the thing declared is made known. Thus, Moses received a sign from God in order that he might be believed.

But, since the place of declaration in prophecy is not primary but only secondary, the lowest grade of prophecy exists in one in whom there is a certain boldness or readiness to say or do something without having a revelation. This would be the case if we say that there was a grade of prophecy in Samson, taking prophecy in a broad sense in which every supernatural influx is reduced to prophecy. The second grade will be that in which the prophet has the sight of understanding only according to judgment, as in Solomon. The third grade is that in which one has the sight of understanding together with that of imagination, as in Isaias and Jeremias. The fourth is that in which the prophet has the very fullness of the sight of understanding in judgment and reception, as in David.

A second basis on which grades of prophecy can be distinguished is the disposition of the one prophesying. Thus, since prophecy takes place in a dream or in a vision when one is awake, as we read in Numbers (12:6), the grade of prophecy which takes place when one is awake is more perfect than that which takes place in a dream. This is so both because the understanding is better disposed for judging when one is awake and because the transport from sensible things does not take place naturally, but comes from the perfect concentration of the inner powers on the things which God is disclosing.

A third basis is the manner of perceiving these things, for the more distinctly the things prophesied are signified, the higher is the grade of prophecy. But no signs portray anything more distinctly than words. Therefore, when one perceives words expressly indicating the thing prophesied, as we read of Samuel in the first Book of Kings (3:1) the grade of prophecy is higher than when certain figures which are likenesses of the things are shown to us, as the boiling caldron which was shown to Jeremias (1:13). From this it is clearly shown that the prophetic light is better grasped in its power when the things to be prophesied are exhibited according to more distinct likenesses.

The fourth basis is the one who makes the revelation. For the grade of prophecy is higher when he who speaks is seen than when one only hears the words, whether in a dream or in a vision. For this shows that the prophet approaches closer to the knowledge of him who reveals. And the grade of prophecy is higher when he who speaks is seen under the guise of an angel than when he is seen in the form of a man, and even higher if he should be seen in the image of God, as in Isaias (6: 1): "I saw the Lord sitting..." For, since revelation of prophecy descends from God to an angel and from the angel to man, the reception of prophecy is manifestly fuller, the more it approaches the first source of prophecy.

Answers to Difficulties:

We must concede the arguments which show that grades of prophecy are distinguished according to sight of imagination in the manner we have explained. And we must not say that diversity of grade requires distinction of species.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. The answer to the first difficulty is clear from what has been said.

2'. When something is distinguished according to species, the distinction must be made according to that which is formal. But if there is distinction of grades within the same species, it can be according to that which is material, as animal is distinguished according to male and female, which are material differences, as is said in the Metaphysics.

3'. Since prophetic light is not something abiding in the prophet, but a kind of transient impression, it is not necessary for the prophet always to possess the same grade of prophecy. In fact, revelation comes to him sometimes according to one grade and sometimes according to another.

4'. Since some things which are more noble are at times known less perfectly, as when there is opinion about things divine and scientific knowledge about creatures, we cannot derive grades of prophecy from the things prophesied. This is especially true when the things which are to be declared are revealed to the prophet according to the demands of the disposition of those for whose sake the prophecy is given.

Still, it can be said that grades of prophecy are distinguished according to the things prophesied, but, because of their great diversity, we cannot thus assign definite grades of prophecy, except perhaps in a general way, as if we should say that the grade is higher when some thing about God is revealed than when something about creatures is revealed.

5'. The words and deeds treated in this objection do not belong to the revelation of prophecy, but to the declaration which takes place according to the disposition of those to whom it is declared. Consequently, we cannot distinguish grades of prophecy according to this.

6'. The grace of working miracles differs from prophecy, yet it can be reduced to prophecy inasmuch as the truth of the prophet is shown forth through miracles. Hence, in this respect the grace of working miracles is better than prophecy, just as scientific knowledge which gives the reason is better than scientific knowledge which gives the fact. For this reason the grace of working miracles is put before the grace of prophecy in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12: 10).

Therefore, he is the most distinguished prophet who has prophetic revelation and also works miracles. However, if he works miracles without prophetic revelation, he is not more noble in what belongs to the nature of prophecy, although, perhaps, all things considered, he is more noble. But such a one is numbered among those in the lowest grade of prophecy, just as one who has only the boldness to do some thing.

ARTICLE XIV: WAS MOSES MORE OUTSTANDING THAN OTHER PROPHETS?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 12,, ad 1; In Isaiam., 6; Summa Theol., II-II, 174, 4.

Difficulties:

It seems that he was not, for

1. Gregory says: "As there has been a growth age by age, there has been an increase in the knowledge about God." Therefore, the later prophets were more outstanding than Moses.
2. The Gloss reads: "David was the most outstanding of the prophets." Therefore, Moses was not the most outstanding.
3. Greater miracles were worked through Josue, who made the sun and the moon stand still (Josue 10:13), than through Moses. Greater miracles were also worked through Isaias, who made the sun go back ward (Isaias 38:8). Therefore, Moses was not the greatest prophet.
4. In Ecclesiasticus (48:4—5) there is this said of Elias: "Who can glory like to thee who raisedst up a dead man from below...?" Thus, we conclude as before.
5. In Matthew (11:11), we read of John the Baptist: "There bath not risen among them that are born of women a greater than John the Baptist." Therefore, Moses was not greater than he. Thus, we conclude as before.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. Deuteronomy (34:10) says: "And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses."
- 2'. Numbers (12:6—7) says: "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. But it is not so will my servant Moses who is most faithful in all my house." From this it is clear that he is given preference over the other prophets.

REPLY:

Among the prophets, eminence can, according to various criteria, be attributed to some in a qualified way, but speaking without qualification, Moses was the greatest of them all. For in him the four things necessary for prophecy were present in a most outstanding manner. First, the sight of understanding was most eminent in him, and through this he was lifted up to see the very essence of God, as is said in Numbers (12:8): "And plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord." Moreover, this sight of his did not take place through the mediation of an angel, as it did in other prophetic visions. Hence, in the same place in Numbers (12:8) we read: "For I speak to him mouth to mouth." And Augustine says this plainly.

Second, the sight of imagination existed in Moses most perfectly because he had it, as it were, at will. Hence, we read in Exodus (33:11): "And the Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend." We can also note in this another excellence will reference to the sight of imagination, that he not only heard the words of the one revealing, but saw Him, and this not in the shape of a man or an angel, but as God Himself; not in a dream, but when awake. We read this of none of the other prophets.

Third, his declaration was most outstanding because all who were before him taught their families as one teaches a lesson, but Moses was the first who spoke for the Lord, saying: "The Lord says this." And he spoke to the whole people and not to one family. Nor did he declare something for the Lord in such a way that his hearers should give heed to what another previous prophet said, as the prophets by their preaching led the people to observe the law of Moses. Hence, the preaching of previous prophets was a preparation for the law of Moses, and this law was the foundation of the preaching of subsequent prophets. Fourth, he was more outstanding in the matters which refer to the declaration of prophecy. For, as regards miracles, he worked signs for the conversion and teaching of a whole race, whereas other prophets worked particular miracles for special persons and special tasks. Hence, we read in Deuteronomy (34: 10): "And there arose no more a prophet in Israel like unto Moses whom

the Lord knew face to face"; as for pre-eminence of revelation: "In all the signs and wonders, which he sent by him to do in the land of Egypt to Pharaoh, and to all his servants" (Deuteronomy 34:11); and "Great miracles, which Moses did before all Israel" (Deuteronomy 34:12). He also showed himself most outstanding in boldness, for will only a rod he went down into Egypt, not only to preach the words of the Lord, but also to scourge Egypt and to free his people.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. We should take what Gregory says as referring to the things which pertain to the mystery of the Incarnation. Later prophets received more explicit revelations about these than Moses did. However, they did not receive more explicit revelations of the Divinity, about which Moses was most fully taught.
2. David is called the most outstanding of the prophets because he prophesied most clearly about Christ without any vision of imagination.
3. Although those miracles were greater than the miracles of Moses in the substance of what was done, the miracles of Moses were greater in the manner in which they were performed because they were performed for the whole people and for the instruction of the people in a new law and for their liberation. These other miracles were for particular tasks.
4. The pre-eminence of Elias is noted especially in this, that he was preserved from death and was more outstanding than many other prophets in boldness, by reason of which he did not fear the rulers of his times, and in greatness of miracles, as appears from the same place in Ecclesiasticus (48:4).
5. When Moses is put before the other prophets, we should understand this as referring to prophets of the Old Testament, for, at that time especially, when the world awaited the coming of Christ, to whom all prophecy was ordained, prophecy was in its proper environment. John, however, belongs to the New Testament. Hence, Matthew (11:13) has: "For all the prophets and the law prophesied until John." However, there is a clearer revelation in the New Testament; the second Epistle to the Corinthians (3:18) has: "But we all, beholding the glory of the Lord will open face..." Here, the Apostle distinctly puts himself and the other apostles ahead of Moses. Nevertheless, granted that no man was greater than John the Baptist, it does not follow from this that no prophet had a higher grade of prophecy than he, for one can be greater in prophecy and less in merit, since prophecy is not a gift of sanctifying grace.

QUESTION 13: Rapture

ARTICLE 1: WHAT IS RAPTURE?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 13, 2, ad 9; 2 Cor., c. 12, lectura 1; Summa Theol., II-II, 175, 1.

The Masters describe it in this way: "Rapture is elevation, by the power of a higher nature, from that which is according to nature to that which is contrary to nature."

Difficulties:

It seems that rapture is unsuitably described, for

1. Augustine says: "Man's understanding knows God naturally." But, in rapture, man's understanding is raised to a knowledge of God. Therefore, it is not raised to that which is contrary to nature, but to that which is according to nature.
2. A created spirit depends more on the uncreated spirit than a lower body depends on a higher body. But impressions from higher bodies are natural to lower bodies, as the Commentator says. Therefore, elevation of the human spirit, even though it takes place in virtue of a higher nature, is only natural.
3. The Gloss on Romans (1 1:24), "Contrary to nature [thou] wert grafted into the good olive tree," reads that God, the author of nature, "does nothing contrary to nature," since that which each one receives from the source of all rule and order of nature is the nature for it. But the elevation of rapture is from God, who is the creator of human nature. Therefore, it is not against nature but according to it.
4. It was said that it is against nature because it is done in a divine manner and not in the manner of human spirit.—On the contrary, Dionysius says: "We see the justice of God in this that He distributes [His goods] to all things according to the measure of their worth." But God cannot do anything contrary to His justice. Therefore, He does not give a thing something which is not according to its manner of being.
5. If man's manner is changed in some respect, it is not changed in such a way that man's proper good would be taken away. For, as Augustine says, God is not the cause of man's deterioration. But man's proper good is to live according to reason and to act in a voluntary way, as is clear in Dionysius. Therefore, since violence is contrary to what is voluntary and does away with the good of reason (for necessity causes sorrow since it is contrary to the will, as is said in the *Metaphysics* it seems that God brings about no violent elevation in man contrary to nature. Now, this is what seems to take place in rapture, as the very name implies, and as the previously mentioned description points out in the words, "by the power of a higher nature."
6. According to the Philosopher, excessive intensity of sensible objects destroys the senses, but excessive intensity of intelligible objects does not destroy the understanding. Now, the senses fail of knowledge of intense sensible objects because they are destroyed by them. Therefore, the understanding can know intelligible objects naturally no matter how intense they are. Hence, no matter to what intelligible objects the mind of man is raised up, the elevation will not be contrary to nature.
7. Augustine says that angels and souls have similar natures but dissimilar duties. Now, it is not contrary to the nature of an angel to know the things to which man is raised in rapture. Therefore, for man, the elevation of rapture is not contrary to nature.
8. If any movement is natural, arrival at the term of the movement will also be natural, since no movement is infinite. But the mind of man is naturally moved toward God. This is clear from the fact that it rests only when it has reached God. Hence, Augustine says: "You made us for Thee, Lord; and our heart is not at rest until it rests in Thee." Therefore, the elevation by which the mind reaches God, as happens in rapture, is not contrary to nature.
9. It was said that it is not natural for the human mind to be drawn to God by reason of the mind itself, but by reason of an ordination of God. Thus, it is not natural simply.—On the contrary, a lower nature does not engage in activity or tend toward any end except by reason of a divine ordination. It is for this reason that every natural work is called a work of intelligence. Nevertheless, we say that the movements and activities of natural things are simply natural. Therefore, to be drawn toward God should also be judged simply natural if it is natural to the mind by reason of a divine ordination.

10. The soul, in so far as it exists in itself and is thus called a spirit, is prior to the soul as joined to the body and, accordingly, called a soul. But the activity of the soul as a spirit is to know God and the other separated substances. But, in so far as it is joined to the body, its activity is to know corporeal and sensible things. Therefore, the capacity of the soul to know intelligible things is prior to that to know sensible things. Since, therefore, it is natural for the soul to know sensible things, it is also natural for it to know divine intelligible things. Thus, we conclude as before.

11. The ordination of a thing to its final end is more natural than the ordination to the means, for the ordination to the means exists because of the ordination to the final end. But sensible things are the means by which we reach the knowledge of God, as we see in Romans (1:20): "For the invisible things of him...are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made." But the knowledge of sensible things is natural to man. Therefore, knowledge of intelligible things is also natural. We conclude as before.

Nothing that takes place by a natural power can be said to be unconditionally contrary to nature. But certain things, as herbs or stones, have natural powers to release the mind from the senses, so that wonderful visions are beheld. This is what seems to happen in rapture. Therefore, rapture is not an elevation contrary to nature.

To the Contrary:

The Gloss on the passage in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12: 2), "I know a man in Christ," says: "Rapture, that is exaltation contrary to nature..."Therefore, rapture is an elevation contrary to nature.

REPLY:

Just as everything else has a certain activity which is natural to it in so far as it is this thing, fire or a stone, for example; so, too, man as man has a certain activity which is natural to him.

Now, in physical reality the natural activity of a thing may be modified in two ways. In one, the change arises from a deficiency of its proper power, whatever be the source of such a deficiency, whether an extrinsic or an intrinsic cause. Thus, an abnormal fetus is produced because of a lack of formative power in the seed. In the other way, the change arises from the activity- of the divine power, whose will all nature obeys. This happens in miracles, as when a virgin conceives or a blind man is made to see. Similarly, man's natural and proper activity can be modified in two ways.

Man's proper activity, however, is to understand through the mediation of sense and imagination. For the activity by which he fixes on intellectual things alone, passing over all lower things, does not belong to man as man, but in so far as something divine exists in him, as is said in the Ethics. Moreover, the activity by means of which he grasps only sensible things apart from understanding and reasoning does not belong to him as man, but according to the nature which he has in common with the brute animals. Therefore, when man is transported out of his senses and sees things beyond sense, his natural mode of knowing is modified.

Sometimes, this change takes place because of some deficiency in man's proper power, as happens with insane people and others who are mentally deranged. This kind of transport out of their senses is not an elevation but rather a debasing of man. Sometimes, however, such transport takes place through the divine power, and then it is properly an elevation. For, since the agent makes that which is passive like itself, the transport which takes place by the divine power, and which is above man, has an ordination to something higher than that which is natural to man.

Thus, in the foregoing description of rapture, which defines it as movement, "elevation" gives its genus, and "by the power of a higher nature" gives the efficient cause. "From that which is according to nature to that which is contrary to nature" gives the starting point and the term of the movement.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. One can know God in many ways: through His essence, through sensible things, or through intelligible effects. We have to make a similar distinction about that which is natural to man. For something is contrary to nature and according to nature for one and the same thing according to its different states, because the nature of the thing is not the same when it is in the state of becoming and when it has complete existence, as Rabbi Moses says. Thus, full stature and other things of the kind are natural to man when he has reached maturity, but it would be contrary to nature for a boy to have full stature at birth.

Thus, it must be said that to know God in some fashion is natural for the human intelligence according to any state. But in the beginning, that is, in this life, it is natural for it to know God through sensible creatures. It is also natural for it to reach the knowledge of God through Himself when it reaches its full perfection, that is, in heaven. Thus, if in this life it is raised to the knowledge of God which it will have in heaven, this will be contrary to nature, just as it would be contrary to nature for a baby boy to have a beard.

2. Nature can be taken in two ways: in particular, as proper to each thing, and in general, as embracing the whole order of natural causes. For this reason a thing is said to be according to nature or contrary to nature in two ways: in one, will reference to nature in particular; in the other, will reference to nature in general. Thus, every deficiency, decay, and the weakness of old age is contrary to nature in particular, but, according to nature in general, it is natural for everything which is composed of contraries to decay.

Therefore, since the universal order of causes is so ordained that lower things should be moved by those which are higher, all move merit which takes place in lower nature because of the impressions of what is higher, whether this be in physical or in spiritual things, is natural according to universal nature, but not according to particular nature unless the impression made on the lower nature by the higher nature is such that the very impression is its nature. Thus, it is clear how the effects which God brings about in creatures can be called according to nature or contrary to nature.

3. The answer to the third difficulty is clear from this. Or else we should say that that elevation is called contrary to nature because it is contrary to the ordinary course of nature, as the Gloss explains.

4. Although God never acts contrary to justice, He sometimes does do something beyond justice. For a thing is contrary to justice when something one deserves is taken away from him. This is clear in human dealings when someone robs another. But, if out of liberality one gives what is not deserved, this is not contrary to justice, but beyond it. Accordingly, when in this life God raises a human mind above its proper level, He does not act contrary to justice, but beyond it.

5. By the very fact that a man's work has a meritorious value it must be under the direction of reason and the will. But the good which is imparted to a work in rapture is not of this sort. Hence, it is not necessary that it proceed from the human will, but only from the divine power. Nevertheless, we cannot call it violence in every respect, unless in the sense that we say there is violent movement when a stone is thrown down faster than it would fall by its natural motion. Nevertheless, properly speaking, "that is violent in which that which is passive contributes nothing," as is said in the Ethics.

6. Understanding and sense have this in common, that both fail of perfect perception of an excessively intense object, although both perceive something of it. The difference lies in this, that sense is destroyed by an excessively intense sensible object, so that afterwards it cannot know lesser sensibles, but understanding is strengthened through reception of an excessively intense intelligible object, so that afterwards it can know lesser intelligible objects better. Hence, the authoritative statement of the Philosopher cited above is not to the point.
7. Angels and souls are said to be equal in nature only in relation to the state of final perfection in which men will be like angels in heaven, as is said in Matthew (22:30), or in so far as they share in intellectual nature, although it is more perfect in the angels.
8. Arrival at the term of natural movement is natural, not in the beginning or middle of the movement, but at the end. Hence, the argument does not follow.
9. Activities of physical things which come from a divine ordination are said to be natural when the sources of these activities are implanted in things in the way in which their natures are. However, God does not ordain the elevation of rapture for man in this way. Hence, they are not alike in this respect.
10. That which is prior in the intention of nature is sometimes subsequent in time, as actuality relates to potentiality in the same receiving subject, for to be in act is prior in nature, although in time one and the same thing is first in potentiality before it is in actuality. In like manner, the activity of the soul, in so far as it is a spirit, is prior relative to the intention of nature, but subsequent in time. Hence, if one activity takes place at the time for another activity, this is contrary to nature.
11. Although the ordination to the means is because of the ordination to the final end, it is only through the means that one arrives naturally at the final end. If it happens otherwise, the arrival is not natural. And it is thus in the case in question.
12. The transport out of the senses which is brought about by the power of physical things is classified with that transport which takes place because of a deficiency of the proper power. For the nature of those things is such that they can effect a transport out of the senses only in so far as they deaden the senses. Hence, it is clear that such transport from sense is foreign to rapture.

ARTICLE II: DID PAUL SEE GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE WHEN HE WAS ENRAPTURED?

Parallel readings: IV Sentences 49, 2, 7, ad 2 Cor., c. 12, lectura 1-2; Summa Theol., I, 12, I ad 2; II-II, 175, 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that he did not, for

1. The Gloss on Ephesians (4: i8), "Having their understanding darkened....," says: "Everyone who understands is enlightened with an inner light." Therefore, if the understanding is raised up to see God, it must be enlightened by some light proportionate to this kind of sight. But the only such light is the light of glory, of which Psalms (35: 10) says: "In thy light we shall see light." Therefore, God can be seen through His essence only by an intellect enjoying beatitude. And, since Paul was not glorified when he was enraptured, he could not see God through His essence.

2. It was said that in that state Paul did enjoy beatitude.—On the contrary, perpetuity is of the nature of beatitude, as Augustine says. But that state did not remain in Paul forever. Therefore, he did not enjoy beatitude in that state.

. From the glory in the soul glory overflows into the body. But Paul's body was not glorified. Therefore, neither was his mind enlightened by the light of glory. And, so, he did not see God through His essence.

4. It was said that by seeing God through His essence in that state he was made blessed, not without qualification, but only in a qualified way. On the contrary, all that is needed for one to be blessed in all respects is the act of glory and the gift of glory, which is the principle of that act. Thus, Peter's body would have been glorified if, along with being held up on the water, he had also had within him agility, which is the principle of this act. But splendor, the principle of the vision of God, which is the act of glory, is the gift of glory. Therefore, if Paul's mind saw God through His essence and was enlightened by the light which is the source of this vision, he was glorified without qualification.

5. While he was enraptured Paul had faith and hope. But these are incompatible with the vision of God through His essence, for faith concerns things that appear not, as is said in Hebrews (11:1), and: "What a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" as is said in Romans (8:24). Therefore, he did not see God through His essence.

6. In heaven, charity is not a principle of merit. But in his rapture Paul was capable of meriting, since his soul had not yet been separated from the corruptible body, as Augustine says. Therefore, he did not have the charity proper to heaven. But where there is the vision proper to heaven, which is perfect, there also is the charity proper to heaven, which is perfect, for one loves God to the extent that he knows about God. Therefore, Paul did not see God through His essence.

7. The divine essence cannot be seen without joy, as Augustine says. Therefore, if Paul saw God through His essence, he took delight in that sight. Accordingly, he did not will to be separated from it, nor, on the other hand, did God cut him off from it against his wishes. For, since God is most generous, He does not on His part withdraw His gifts. Therefore, Paul would never have been cut off from that state. But he was cut off. Therefore, he did not see God through His essence.

8. No one who has a good because of merit loses it without sin. Therefore, since to see God through His essence is a good which one has because of merit, no one who sees God through His essence can be cut off from this sight unless he should happen to sin. But this can not be said of Paul, who says in Romans (8:38, 39): "For I am sure that neither death, nor life,... shall... separate us..." We conclude as before.

9. When Paul is said to be enraptured, there is also question of the difference between his rapture and the deep sleep of Adam and the rapture of John the Evangelist, in which he says he "was in the spirit" (Apocalypse I: 10), and the "ecstasy of mind" which Peter had (Acts 1).

To the Contrary:

From what Augustine says and from the 0 we see clearly that Paul saw God through His essence when he was enraptured.

REPLY:

Concerning this, some have said that Paul, when he was enraptured, did not see God through His essence, but will a vision midway between the vision had in this life and the vision had in heaven. We can take this intermediate vision to mean the kind of vision which is natural to an

angel, such that he would see God, not, indeed, through His essence will natural knowledge, but through intelligible species, in so far as he considers his own essence, which is an intelligible likeness of the uncreated essence, according to the saying of The Causes that an intelligence knows what is above it in so far as it is caused by it. According to this, Paul, when enraptured, is conceived of as having seen God through the refulgence of some intelligible light in his mind. However, the knowledge of this life, which is through the mirror and obscurity of sensible creatures, is natural to man. And the knowledge of heaven, by which we see God through His essence, is natural only to God. But this opinion is contrary to what Augustine says, for he states expressly that, when Paul was enraptured, he saw God through His essence.

Nor is it likely that a minister of God to the Jews of the Old Testament would see God through His essence, as appears from Numbers (12:8): "Plainly and not by riddles and figures doth he see the Lord," and that this would not be granted to the minister of the New Testament, the Teacher of the Gentiles. This is especially true since the Apostle himself argues in this way: "For if the ministration of condemnation be glory, much more the ministration of justice aboundeth in glory" (2 Cor. 3:9).

Still, he did not have beatitude without qualification, but only in some respects, although his mind was enlightened with supernatural light to enable it to see God. This will become clear from the example of physical light. For, in some things, we find the light from the sun as an abiding form, as though it had become connatural to them, as in the stars, rubies, and things of this sort. But, in other things, the light from the sun is received as a passing impression, as light in the air. For the light does not become a form abiding in the air, as though connatural to it, but passes when the sun leaves.

In like fashion, also, the light of glory is infused into the mind in two ways. In one, it follows the mode of a form which becomes connatural and abiding. This makes the mind blessed without qualification, and is the manner in which it is infused in the blessed in heaven. In the other way, the mind receives the light of glory as a passing impression. It was in this way that Paul's mind was enlightened with the light of glory when he was enraptured. The very name shows that this took place quickly (*raptim*) and in passing.

Hence, he was not glorified without qualification, nor did he have the gift of glory, since that splendor did not become a property in him. For this reason it did not flow down from the soul to the body, nor did he remain in this state permanently.

Answers to Difficulties:

1-4. The response to the first four objections is clear from what has been said.

5. When full vision comes, faith leaves. Hence, in so far as Paul had the vision of God through His essence, he did not have faith. Now, he had the vision of God through His essence by way of act, not according to the habit of glory. Consequently, he had faith not in act but habitually, and hope likewise.

6. Although Paul was then in a state in which he could merit, he did not actually merit, for, just as he had the act of vision possessed by those in heaven, so he had the act of charity possessed by those in heaven. Nevertheless, some say that, although he had the vision of those in heaven, he did not have the act of charity of those in heaven. For, although his understanding was rapt, his affections were not. But this is clearly contrary to what the Gloss on "He was caught up into paradise" (2 Cor. 12:4), says: "That is, into that tranquility which those who are in the heavenly Jerusalem enjoy." II But enjoyment takes place through love.

7. That the vision did not remain in Paul was due to the nature of the light which illumined his mind, as is clear from what has been said.

8. Although in the blessed the vision of God is due to merit, at that time it was not given to Paul as a reward of merit. Hence, the reasoning does not follow. However, it should be noted that these last two objections bring no better argument against the fact that Paul saw God through His essence than against the fact that he saw Him in any way which surpassed the common manner of sight.

9. In the Scriptures, transport of mind, ecstasy, and rapture are all used in the same sense and indicate some raising up of the mind from sensible things outside of us toward which we naturally turn our attention, to things which are above man. This takes place in two ways. For, at times, this transport from things outside is taken to refer to attention only, as when someone makes use of the external senses and things about him, but his whole attention is engaged in contemplating and loving things divine. Such is the state of anyone who contemplates and loves things divine in transport of the mind, whether ecstasy or rapture. For this reason Dionysius says: "Divine love brings about ecstasy." And Gregory, speaking of contemplation, says: "One who is rapt in order that he may understand the things within closes his eyes to visible things."

Ecstasy or rapture or transport of the mind take place in another way, and the names are more generally used in this sense, when one is also deprived of the use of his senses and sensible things in order to see certain things supernaturally. Now, a thing is seen supernaturally when it is seen beyond sense, understanding, and imagination, as we said in the question on prophecy.

Therefore, Augustine distinguishes two kinds of rapture. There is one in which the mind is carried out of the senses to the vision in the imagination. This is what happened to Peter and to John the Evangelist in the Apocalypse, as Augustine says. There is another in which the mind is at once transported out of the senses and out of the imagination to an intellectual vision. This happens in two ways.

In one, the intellect understands God through certain intelligible communications, and this is proper to angels. Adam's ecstasy was of this sort, as the Gloss on Genesis (2:21) says: "The correct interpretation of this ecstasy is that it was given so that Adam's mind might become a member of the heavenly court and, entering into the sanctuary of God, might understand the last things." In the other way, the understanding sees God through His essence. It was for this that Paul was enraptured, as we have said.

ARTICLE III: CAN ONE IN THIS LIFE HAVE HIS UNDERSTANDING RAISED TO SEE GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE WITHOUT BEING CARRIED OUT OF HIS SENSES?

Parallel readings: De veritate, b, II; IV Sentences 49, 2, 7, ad Quodibet I, 1; 2 Cor., C. 12, lectura I; Summa Theol., II-II, 175,4; 180, 5; In Joan., c. I, lect. 11.

Difficulties:

It seems that he can, for

1. Man's nature is the same in this life and after the resurrection. For, if it were not specifically the same, numerically the same man would not arise. But after the resurrection

the saints will see God mentally through His essence and no transport out of the senses will take place. Therefore, the same thing is possible for those in this life.

2. But it was said that, since the body of one in this life is corruptible, it weighs down the understanding so that it cannot be drawn freely to God unless it is carried out of the senses of the body. And this corruption will be gone after the resurrection. On the contrary, nothing is hindered, just as nothing suffers, except through the activity of its contrary. But bodily corruption does not seem to be opposed to the act of understanding, since understanding is not an act of the body. Therefore, corruption of the body does not prevent the understanding from being drawn freely to God.

3. It is certain that Christ took on our mortality and the corruption which is a punishment for us. But His understanding enjoyed the sight of God continuously, although He was not always transported out of his external senses. Therefore, corruption does not make it impossible for the understanding to be drawn to God without being transported out of the senses.

4. After Paul had seen God through His essence, he remembered the things which he had seen in that vision. Otherwise, if he had not remembered them, he would not have said: "He heard secret words, which it is not granted to man to utter" (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore, while he saw God through His essence, something was being imprinted on his memory. But memory belongs to the sensitive part of man, as the Philosopher plainly shows. Therefore, when in this life someone sees God through His essence, he is not entirely transported out of his bodily senses.

5. The sensitive powers are closer to each other than the intellectual powers are to the sensitive powers. But the imagination, which is one of the sensitive powers, can actually grasp any of its objects whatever without being cut off from the external senses. Therefore, the understanding, too, can actually see God without being cut off from the sensitive powers.

6. That which is according to nature does not require for its existence anything which is contrary to nature. But it is natural for the human understanding to see God through His essence, since it was created for this. Therefore, since transport out of the senses is contrary to nature for man, inasmuch as sensitive cognition is natural to him, it seems that he does not require transport from the senses as a prerequisite to see God through His essence.

7. Only those things which are joined together can be cut off from each other. But intelligence, whose object is God, as is said in Spirit and Soul, does not seem to be joined to the bodily senses but rather seems extremely distant from them. Therefore, for man to see God through His essence by means of intelligence he does not need to be cut off from the senses.

8. Paul seems to have been raised up to the sight of God so that there would be a witness of the glory which is promised to the saints. Hence, Augustine says: "Why should we not believe that it was God's will to show to this great Apostle, the Teacher of the Gentiles, that life which is to be lived forever after this life? [God did this] while Paul was raised in rapture to that most lofty sight." But, after the resurrection, in that vision of the saints which will be given to those who see God in the next life, there will be no transport out of the bodily senses. Therefore, it seems that this kind of transport did not take place in Paul either, when he saw God through His essence.

9. During their sufferings and torments the martyrs inwardly perceived something of the divine glory. Hence, Vincent says: "Behold, I am already raised on high, and from above the world I look down on all your distinguished men, O tyrant." And in other records of the sufferings of the saints we read many passages which seem to have the same tenor. But it is obvious that there was no withdrawal from the senses in these people. Otherwise, they would

not have felt the pain. Therefore, there is no transport out of the senses in order for one to share in the glory by which God is seen through His essence.

10. The practical understanding is closer than the speculative understanding to the activity which has sensible things as its object. But, as Avicenna says, it is not necessary for the practical understanding always to pay attention to man's operations which are concerned with sensible objects. Otherwise, the best harpist would seem to be the worst if it were necessary for him to give artistic reflection to each stroke of the strings. For, in such a case, there would be too much interruption of the sounds, which would hurt the proper melody. Therefore, it is far less necessary for the speculative understanding to pay attention to man's operations which concern sensible things. Thus, it remains free to be drawn to any act of understanding, even to the divine essence itself, while the sense powers are engaged in sensible activities.

11. While Paul saw God through His essence, he still had faith. But it belongs to faith to see darkly through a mirror. Therefore, while Paul saw God through His essence, at the same time he saw darkly through a mirror. But this obscure knowledge is through a mirror and through sensible things. Therefore, while he saw God through His essence, he also gave his attention to sensible things. The conclusion is the same as before.

To the Contrary:

1'. As Augustine says, and is quoted in the Gloss on the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2): "No man who sees God, as He is in Himself, lives the mortal life which we live in the bodily senses. But unless one in some way dies to this life, either leaving the body completely, or so turning away and cutting himself off from the bodily senses that will good reason he does not know whether he is in the body or outside of it, he is not enraptured and transported to that vision.

2'. The Gloss on the second Epistle to the Corinthians (5:73), "Whether we be transported in mind, it is to God," says: "He calls ecstasy that by which the mind is raised to an understanding of heavenly things, so that in some sense lower things drop from the memory. All the saints to whom secrets of God which surpass this world have been revealed were in this ecstasy." Therefore, it is necessary for everyone who sees God through His essence to be withdrawn from the consideration of lower things, and, consequently, also from the use of the senses with which we see only lower things.

3'. The Gloss on Psalms (67:28), "There is Benjamin, a youth in ecstasy of mind," says: "Benjamin, (that is, Paul), in ecstasy, that is, with his mind unconscious of the bodily senses, as when he was carried up into the third heaven." But the third heaven means vision of God through His essence, as Augustine says. Therefore, the vision of God through His essence requires loss of consciousness of the bodily senses.

4'. The activity of an understanding which is raised to see the essence of God is more effective than any activity of the imagination. But, sometimes, a man is transported out of the bodily senses because of the intensity of the activity of the imagination. Therefore, he should be transported out of them with much greater reason when he is lifted up to the vision of God.

5'. Bernard says: "Divine consolation is sensitive and will not be given to those who admit any other." So, for the same reason, the divine vision does not tolerate sight of anything else along with it. Therefore, neither does it tolerate the use of the senses along with it.

6'. The greatest cleanness of heart is needed to see God through His essence, according to Matthew (5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart." But the heart is sullied in two ways, namely, by the contamination of Sin, and by phantasies of material things. This is clear from what Dionysius says: "Those [celestial essences] should be considered pure, not in the sense that they are free of unclean stains and defilements (in which he refers to uncleanness because of

guilt, which never existed in the blessed angels), nor in the sense that they are receptive of phantasies of material things" (in which is included the uncleanness which comes through phantasies, as is clear from Hugh of St. Victor. Therefore, the mind of one who sees God through His essence must be transported not only out of the external senses, but also out of the internal phantasms.

7'. In the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1:10) we read: "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be put away." But, here, "perfect" refers to the vision of God through His essence, and "imperfect" refers to vision through a mirror darkly, which is through sensible things. Therefore, when one is raised to the vision of God through His essence, he must be deprived of the vision of sensible things.

REPLY:

As is clear from the authoritative statement of Augustine, a man living in this mortal body cannot see God through His essence, unless he is made unconscious of the bodily senses. We can see the reason for this from two things. First, from that which is common to the understanding and the other powers of the soul, for will all the powers of the soul we find that, when the act of one power becomes intense, the act of another is either weakened or entirely suppressed. Thus, it is clear that, when one is giving very close attention to the activity of sight, his hearing does not perceive the things which are being said, unless, perhaps, their force attracts the sense of the hearer to them.

The reason for this, as Augustine proves, is that attention is needed for the act of any cognoscitive power. Moreover, one's attention can not be given to many things at once, unless they are related to one another in such a way that they can be taken as one, just as the motion or activity of a thing cannot have two termini not related to each other. Hence, since there is one soul, in which all cognoscitive powers are rooted, the attention of one and the same soul is needed for the acts of all the cognoscitive powers. Therefore, when the soul gives complete attention to the act of one power, the man is cut off from the act of another power.

But for the understanding to be raised up to the vision of the divine essence, the whole attention must be concentrated on this vision, since this is the most intensely intelligible object, and the understanding can reach it only by striving for it with a total effort. Therefore, it is necessary to have complete abstraction from the bodily senses when the mind is raised to the vision of God.

Second, we can find a reason for this in that which is proper to the understanding. For, since we know things in so far as they are in act, and not in so far as they are in potency, as is said in the Metaphysics, the understanding, which holds the highest place in knowledge, properly deals with immaterial things, which are most in act. Hence, every intelligible thing is either free from matter or separated from it by the activity of the understanding. Therefore, the freer the understanding is of contact, as it were, with material things, the more perfect it is.

For this reason, the human understanding, which reaches material things by considering phantasms from which it abstracts intelligible species, has less efficacy than the angelic understanding, which always considers purely immaterial forms. Nevertheless, in so far as the purity of intellectual knowledge is not wholly obscured in human understanding, as happens in the senses whose knowledge cannot go beyond material things, it has the power to consider things which are purely immaterial by the very fact that it retains some purity.

Therefore, if it is ever raised beyond its ordinary level to see the highest of immaterial things, namely, the divine essence, it must be wholly cut off from the sight of material things at least during that act. Hence, since the sensitive powers can deal only with material things, one

cannot be raised to vision of the divine essence unless he is wholly deprived of the use of the bodily senses.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. After the resurrection the beatified soul will be joined to the body in a different way from that in which it is now united to it. For, in the resurrection, the body will be entirely subject to the spirit to such an extent that the properties of glory will overflow from the spirit into the body. Hence, they will be called spiritual bodies.

Moreover, when two things are united and one of them has complete control over the other, there is no mixture there, since the one falls completely under the power of the other which rules it. Thus, if one drop of water is poured into a thousand jars of will, the purity of the will is not at all impaired. Therefore, in the resurrection there will be no defilement of the understanding and its power will not be weakened in any way by any union whatsoever with the body. Hence, even without transport out of the bodily senses, it will contemplate the divine essence. However, the body is not now subject to the spirit in this way, and, therefore, the reasoning does not have the same force.

2. Our body is corruptible because it is not fully subject to the soul. For, if it were fully subject to the soul, immortality would also overflow into the body from the immortality of the soul, as will happen after the resurrection. It is for this reason that the corruption of the body oppresses the understanding. Although in itself it is not directly opposed to the understanding, its cause impairs the purity of the understanding.

3. From the fact that Christ was God and man, He had full power over all the parts of His soul and over His body. Hence, as Damascene says, by the power of the Godhead He permitted each power of the soul to do that which is proper to it in so far as it fitted in with our redemption. Thus, it was not necessary for Him to have an overflow from one power to another, nor for one power to be deprived of its act because of the intensity of the act of another power. Consequently, the fact that His understanding saw God did not necessitate any transport out of the bodily senses. However, it is different with other men, in whom redundancy or interference of one power with another necessarily follows from the intimate connection of the powers of the soul with one another.

4. After Paul had stopped seeing God through His essence, he remembered what he had known in that vision by means of certain species which remained in his understanding and were relics, so to speak, of the previous vision. For, although he saw the very Word of God through His essence, and from the vision of that essence knew many truths, (and thus neither for the Word Himself nor for the things which he saw in the Word did this vision take place through any species, but only through the essence of the Word), nevertheless, by reason of the vision of the Word, certain likenesses of the things which he saw were imprinted on his understanding. And with these likenesses he could see afterwards the things which he had previously seen through the essence of the Word. Later, by applying these intelligible species to the individual intentions or forms which were stored in his memory or imagination, he could remember the things which he had seen previously, and this even through the activity of memory, which is a sensitive power. Thus, it is not necessary to hold that in the act of seeing God something took place in his memory, which is part of the sensitive power, but only in his mind.

5. Although transport from the external senses does not arise from every act of imaginative power, the transport mentioned above does take place when the act of the imagination is very intense. Similarly, it is not necessary that transport out of the senses take place because of every act of understanding; nevertheless, it does come about through the most intense act, which is the vision of God through His essence.

6. Although it is natural for the human understanding at some time to reach the vision of God through His essence, it is not natural for it to reach this in the conditions of this life, as we have said. For this reason the conclusion does not follow.

7. Although our intelligence, will which we grasp things divine, does not combine with the senses in the process of perception, it does combine with them in the process of judging. Hence, Augustine says:

"Through the light of our intelligence we judge even of the lower things and we perceive things which are neither bodies nor bear forms like those of bodies." Therefore, our intelligence is said at times to abstract from the senses when it does not make judgments concerning them, but focuses its attention on the vision of heavenly things alone.

8. The essence of the beatitude of the saints consists in the vision of the divine essence. Hence, Augustine says: "Vision is the whole reward." For this reason one could be a suitable witness of that beatitude because he had seen the divine essence. Still, it would not be necessary for him to experience all the privileges which belong to the blessed. But, from that which he did experience, he could also know the other things. For he was not enraptured to become blessed, but to be a witness of beatitude.

9. In their sufferings the martyrs perceived something of divine glory, not as if they drank it at its source, as do those who see God through His essence, but, rather, they were refreshed by a sprinkling of that glory. Hence, Augustine says: "There," where God is seen through His essence, "the blessed life is drunk from its source. From that source some of it is sprinkled on this human life, so that in the temptations of this world that life may be lived temperately, justly, bravely, and prudently."

10. The speculative understanding is not forced to turn its attention to the activities in which one is occupied with sensible things, but it can busy itself with other intelligible things. Moreover, the intensity of the act of speculation can be so great that it is altogether abstracted from sensible activity.

11. Although in that act Paul had the habit of faith, he did not have the act of faith.

ARTICLE IV: HOW GREAT AN ABSTRACTION IS REQUIRED FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING TO BE ABLE TO SEE GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 10, 11; Quodlibet I, 1; 2 Cor., c. 12, lectura I; Sum. Theol., I, 12, II; II—II, 175, 5; In Joan., c. 1, lectura 11

Difficulties:

And it seems that there has to be an abstraction from the very union by which the soul is united to the body as its form, for

1. The powers of the vegetative soul are more material than the powers of the sensitive soul. But for our understanding to see God through His essence it must abstract from the senses, as has been said. Therefore, abstraction from the acts of the vegetative soul is much more urgently required for the purity of that vision. But this abstraction cannot take place where there is brute life as long as the soul is united to the body as its form. For, as the Philosopher says: "In animals the process of nutrition is always going on." Therefore, for the vision of the divine essence there must be an abstraction from the union by which the soul is united to the body as its form.

2. The gloss of Augustine on Exodus (33:20), "For man shall not see me and live," says: "This shows that God cannot appear as He is to this life of corruptible flesh. But He can in the other life, which one can live only by dying to this life." The gloss of Gregory reads: "He who sees the wisdom which is God dies entirely to this life." But death is the result of the separation of the soul from the body to which it was united as its form. Therefore, there has to be a complete separation of the soul from the body in order to see God through His essence.

3. "For a living thing, its act of life is its act of existence," as is said in The Soul. But the act of existence of a man who is alive arises from the union of his soul with his body as its form. But Exodus (33:20) says: "For man shall not see me and live." Therefore, as long as the soul is united to the body as its form, he cannot see God through His essence.

4. The union by which the soul is united to the body as its form is stronger than that by which it is united to the body as a mover. From this latter union arise the activities of the powers and the activities which are carried on through bodily organs. But this latter union hinders the vision of the divine essence, for which there must be abstraction from the bodily senses. Therefore, the first union will interfere with it much more, and thus it will be necessary to dissolve it.

5. Since powers flow from the essence and are rooted in it they are not raised to a level higher than that of their essence. Therefore, if the essence of the soul is united to a material body as its form, it is not possible for the power of understanding to be raised to things which are altogether immaterial. We conclude as before.

6. Greater contamination results in the Soul from its connection with the body than from its union with a bodily likeness. But for the mind to see God through His essence, it must be purified of bodily likenesses, which are perceived through imagination and sense, as has been said. Therefore, for the soul to see God through His essence, it must with much greater reason be separated from the body.

7. In the second Epistle to the Corinthians (5:6, 7) we read: "While we are in the body, we are absent from the Lord. (For we walk by faith, and not by sight.)" Therefore, as long as the soul is in the body, it cannot see God as He is in Himself.

To the Contrary:

1'. The gloss of Gregory on the passage from Exodus (33:20), "For man shall not see me and live," says: "The splendor of the eternal God can be seen by some who live in this flesh, but who are growing in priceless virtue." But the splendor of God is His essence, as the same gloss says. Therefore, it is not necessary to have complete separation of soul from body to see the essence of God.

2'. Augustine says: "The soul is enraptured not only to the vision of imagination, but also to the vision of understanding, through which the truth itself is clearly seen. Meanwhile, it has been carried out of its senses less than in death, but more than in sleep." Therefore, to see the uncreated truth of which Augustine is speaking there is no need to dissolve the union whereby the soul is united to the body as its form.

3'. The same thing is clear from these words of Augustine: "It is not beyond belief that even that lofty degree of revelation"—to see God through His essence—"was given to some holy men before they were dead and their corpses ready for burial." If Therefore, while the soul is still united to the body as its form, it can see God.

REPLY:

To see the divine essence, which is the most perfect act of understanding, there must be an abstraction from those things which of their nature interfere with the excessive intensity of the act of understanding and which are hindered by this same intensity. This happens in some things because of something intrinsic to the act itself, and in others merely for some extrinsic reason.

The activities of sense and understanding interfere with each other by reason of the acts themselves, inasmuch as attention is needed for both activities, and also because the understanding in some fashion enters into the sensible activities since it receives something from the phantasms. Thus, the purity of the understanding is contaminated to some extent by sense activities, as we have said. But no attention is needed for the union of the soul to the body as its form, since this union does not depend on the will of the soul, but on nature.

In the same way, the purity of the understanding is not directly contaminated by such a union. For the soul is not joined to the body as its form through the mediation of its powers, but through its essence, since nothing stands as a medium between matter and form, as is proved in the Metaphysics. Furthermore, the essence of the soul is not united to body in such a way that it follows the condition of the body completely, as other material forms, which are, as it were, completely engulfed in matter to such an extent that only material power or activity can proceed from them. Now, from the essence of the soul there proceed not only the forces and powers which are in some sense bodily, as the existent acts of the bodily organs, that is, the sensitive and vegetative powers, but also the powers of understanding, which are completely immaterial and not the existent acts of any body or part of a body, as is proved in The Soul.

From this it is clear that the powers of our understanding do not proceed from the essence of the soul in so far as it is united to the body, but, rather, in so far as it stays free of the body and is not entirely bound down to it. In this sense the union of the soul with the body does not extend to the activity of the understanding and so cannot interfere with its purity. Hence, if we consider what is intrinsic to the acts, the dissolution of the union by which the soul is united to the body as its form is not a necessary condition for the activity of the understanding, no matter how intense.

In like manner, there is no need for the suppression of the activities of the vegetative soul. For the activities of this part of the soul are really natural, as is clear from the fact that they are brought to full perfection by the power of the active and passive qualities, namely, the warm and the cold, the moist and the dry. For this reason they obey neither reason nor will, as is clear in the Ethics. Thus, it is plain that attention is not needed for actions of this kind, and so it is not necessary to turn our attention from intellectual activity because of the acts of these qualities.

In like manner, the activity of the understanding has nothing to do with the activities of this sort, since it receives nothing from them, because they are not related to knowledge and because the understanding does not use any bodily instrument which would have to be sustained through the activities of the vegetative soul, as is the case with the organs of the sensitive powers. Thus, the purity of our understanding is in no way impaired through the activities of the vegetative soul. From this it is clear that, if we consider merely what is intrinsic to the acts themselves, the activity of the vegetative and the activity of the intellectual soul do not hinder each other.

Nevertheless, one of these can interfere with the other for some extrinsic reason; for example, in so far as the understanding receives something from the phantasms, which are in bodily organs, which must be nourished and sustained through the activity of the vegetative soul. Thus, because of the acts of the nutritive power variation may occur in the disposition of the organs, and, consequently, in the activity of the sensitive power from which the understanding

receives something. Thus, the activity of the understanding itself is hindered for an extrinsic reason. This is plain during sleep and after eating. On the other hand, also, the activity of understanding interferes with the activity of the vegetative soul in this way, inasmuch as the activity of the power of imagination is needed for the activity of understanding. And intensity of the imagination requires the co-operation of heat and the [animal] spirits. Thus, the act of the nutritive power is hindered by the intensity of contemplation. But this plays no part in the contemplation by which God's essence is seen, since such contemplation does not need the activity of the imagination.

From this it is clear that abstraction from the acts of the vegetative soul or any impairment of those acts is not in any way required for the vision of God through His essence. All that is required is abstraction from the acts of the sensitive powers.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although the powers of the vegetative soul are more material than the powers of the sensitive soul, still, along with them they are more remote from the understanding and so are less able to interfere with the intensity of the understanding or be hindered by it.

2. "To live" can be taken in two senses. In one, it means the very act of existence of that which is living, which rests on the union of the soul to the body as its form. In the other sense, "to live" is taken to mean the activity of life. Thus the Philosopher distinguishes living into understanding, sensing, and the other activities of the soul.

Similarly, since death is the loss of life, we must distinguish it in like manner. Thus, sometimes it means the loss of that union by which the soul is joined to the body as its form, and sometimes it means the loss of the vital activities. For this reason Augustine says: "One dies to this life to some extent whether he leaves the body entirely, or whether he is transported out of the senses of the body and made unconscious of them." Death is thus understood in the glosses which have been cited, as is plain from the words following the quotation from the gloss of Gregory: "He who sees the wisdom which is God dies entirely to this life, so that he may not be held back by love of it."

3. The solution to the third difficulty is clear from what has just been said.

4. Since the union by which the soul is united to the body as its form is stronger, it follows that it is less possible to withdraw from it.

5. The reasoning would conclude correctly if the essence of the soul were so united to the body that it were entirely bound down to the body. But we have already said that this is false.

6. Although the bodily likeness which is necessary for the activity of the imagination and the senses is more immaterial than the body itself, it has a closer relation to the activity of the understanding. Thus, it is more able to hinder it, as we have said.

7. What the Apostle says should be applied to our existence in the body not only by reason of the union of the soul with the body as its form, but also by reason of our use of the bodily senses.

ARTICLE V: WHAT DID THE APOSTLE KNOW AND NOT KNOW ABOUT HIS RAPTURE?

Parallel readings: 2 Cor., c. 12, lectura 1; Summa Theol., II-II, 175, 6; 180, 5.

Difficulties:

It seems that he knew whether his soul was in the body, for

i. He knew this better than any of those who followed. But many commonly agree that during the rapture Paul's soul was united to his body as its form. Therefore, with much greater reason Paul knew this.

2. In the rapture Paul knew what he saw and will what vision he saw it. This is clear from the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2), because he says: "I know a man... caught up to the third heaven." Therefore, he knew what that heaven was, whether it was something corporeal or spiritual, and he knew whether he saw it spiritually or corporeally. But it follows from this that he knew whether he saw it while in the body or out of it. For bodily vision cannot take place except through the body, and the vision of understanding is always with the body. Therefore, he knew whether he was in the body or out of it.

3. As Paul himself says, he knew "a man [who was] caught up to the third heaven" (2 Cor. 12:2). But man means that which is made up of the union of the body and the soul. Therefore, he knew that the soul was united to the body.

4. He himself knew that he was enraptured, as is clear from what he says. But dead people are not said to be enraptured. Therefore, he knew that he was not dead. Therefore, he knew that his soul was joined to his body.

5. As Augustine says, in the rapture he saw God with that vision with which the saints in heaven see God. But the souls of the saints in heaven know whether they are in the body or out of it. Therefore, the Apostle also knew this.

6. Gregory says: "What is there that they do not see who see Him who sees everything?" This seems to refer especially to the things which pertain to those who are seeing. But whether it is united to the body or not has very special pertinence to the soul. Therefore, the soul of Paul knew whether it was united to the body or not.

To the Contrary:

In the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:2) it says: "I know a man in Christ above fourteen years ago, whether in the body, I know not, or out of the body, I know not; God knoweth." Therefore, he did not know whether he was in the body or out of the body.

REPLY:

There are many opinions on this point. For some have understood the Apostle to say that what he did not know was not whether he was in the body or not, but whether the rapture was one of the soul and the body together, so that he was carried bodily to heaven, as we read in Daniel (14:35) that Habacuc was transported, or whether it was a rapture of the soul alone, that is, in the visions of God, as is said in Ezechiel (40:2): "In the visions of God he brought me into the land of Israel." And Jerome adopts this interpretation of a certain Jew when he says: "Finally, our Apostle, too, did not dare to assert that he was caught up in body, but said: 'Whether in body or out of the body, I know not...'"

Augustine, however, disapproves of this interpretation. For it is clear from the words of the Apostle that he himself knew that he was caught up to the third heaven. Therefore, it is clear that that to which he was transported was truly heaven, and not some likeness of heaven.

For, if he had wanted to mean that, when he said he was caught up to heaven, he was transported in order to see a likeness of heaven in his imagination, he could have asserted in the same way that he was transported in the body, that is, to a likeness of this body. Thus, it would not have been necessary to distinguish between what he knew and what he did not

know, since he would know both equally, that is, that he was in heaven and that he was transported in the body, that is, to a likeness of the body, as happens in dreams.

Therefore, he knew for certain that that to which he was transported was really heaven. Therefore, he knew whether it was a body or something incorporeal. For, if it was a body, he was transported to it bodily, but, if it was something incorporeal, he could not be transported to it bodily.

Therefore, it remains that the Apostle did not doubt whether he was enraptured bodily or only spiritually, but knew that he was transported to that heaven only in his understanding. However, he did have doubts whether in that rapture his soul was in his body, or not. Some others concede this, but say that, although during the rapture the Apostle did not know this, he did, nevertheless, know it afterwards, surmising it from the vision which he had had. For in the rapture his whole mind was given over to things divine, and he did not perceive whether his soul was in his body or not. But this opinion, too, is openly opposed to what the Apostle says. For, as he distinguishes what he knew and did not know, so he distinguishes the present from the past. And he speaks of the man enraptured, as in the past, fourteen years before, but he admits, as in the present, that he knows something and does not know something. Therefore, fourteen years after that rapture he still did not know whether he was in the body or not when the rapture took place.

Hence, others have said that he did not know either during the rapture or after it whether his soul was in the body to some extent and not completely. For they say that he knew both then and afterwards that his soul was united to the body as its form, but did not know whether it was so united to it that it could receive something from the senses. Or, according to others, he did not know whether the nutritive powers exercised their activities by means of which the soul takes care of the body.

But this, too, does not seem to fit the words of the Apostle, for he said with no reservations that he did not know whether he was in the body or out of it. Furthermore, it would not seem very much to the point to say that he did not know whether the soul was in the body in this way or that way, when these did not cut the soul off entirely from the body.

Therefore, we have to say that he simply did not know whether his soul was united to the body or not. This is the conclusion which Augustine reaches after a long investigation, when he says: "Perhaps, then, we should conclude that he was ignorant of this matter: while he was transported to the third heaven, was he in the body—that is, as the soul of one awake, or asleep, or in ecstasy and completely unconscious of the bodily senses, is in the body when the body is said to be alive—or did he leave the body completely so that the body lay dead until, the vision finished, the soul returned to the dead members, and he was not as one awaking from sleep or returning to his senses from the transport of ecstasy, but as one completely dead returning to life?"

Answers to Difficulties:

1. As Augustine says: "The Apostle doubts whether he was in the body or out of it. Hence, if he is in doubt, which of us dares to be certain?" Thus, Augustine leaves the question undecided. When later writers take a stand on this question, they are speaking with probability rather than with certitude. For, since it could happen that one would be enraptured in the way the Apostle says he was enraptured while his soul remained united to the body, as is clear from what has been said, it is more probable that it did remain united to the body.

2. The reason given here holds against the interpretation of the words of the Apostle first given, in which he is considered to have doubted not about the state of the one enraptured,

that is, whether the soul was united to the body, but of the manner of the rapture, namely, whether the rapture was bodily or only spiritual.

3. Through synecdoche, sometimes only a part of man is called man, especially the soul, which is the more noble part of man. Yet this can also be taken to mean that the one who he says was enraptured was not a man during the rapture, but was a man fourteen years later, that is, when the Apostle said this.

4. Granted that in that state the soul of the Apostle was separated from the body, that separation was not due to any natural mode of acting, but to the divine power which transported the soul out of the body, not to have it remain separated permanently, but for a time, and to this extent one can be said to be enraptured, although not every dead person can be said to be enraptured.

5. As Augustine says: "When the Apostle was carried out of the senses of the body to the third heaven and paradise, he certainly fell short of the full and perfect knowledge of things which the angels have, in so far as he did not know whether he was in the body or out side of it. And, so, this will not be lacking when this corruption puts on incorruption in the resurrection of the dead." Thus, it is clear that his vision was to some extent more imperfect than the sight of the blessed, although in some respects it was like theirs.

6. Paul was not transported to see God in order to have beatitude without qualification, but to be a witness of the beatitude of the saints and of the divine mysteries which were revealed to him. Consequently, he saw in the vision of the Word only those things the knowledge of which the rapture was ordained to communicate. Thus, he did not see everything as the blessed do, especially after the resurrection. For, then, as Augustine adds to the words already cited: "all things will be plain, and there will be no falsity nor ignorance."

QUESTION 15: Faith

ARTICLE I: WHAT IS BELIEF?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 23, 2, 2, sol. J; Ad Hebr., c. 11, lectura 2; Summa Theol., II—II, 2, 1.

Difficulties:

Augustine says, and the Gloss on the second Epistle to the Corinthians (3:5), "Not that we are sufficient to think..." repeats: "to believe is to think will assent." But this description does not seem to fit in with our other knowledge, for

1. The knower is distinguished from the believer, as is clear from Augustine. But the knower, precisely as knowing, thinks something over and gives assent to it. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that "belief is thought will assent."

2. Such thought (*cogitatio*) implies some inquiry, for so to think (*cogitare*) is, as it were, to shake together (*coagitare*), that is, to separate and compare one thing with another. But inquiry is not part of the concept faith, for Damascene says: "Faith is consent without inquiry." Therefore, it is wrong to say that "belief is thought will assent."

. Belief is an act of the understanding. But assent seems to belong to the affections, for we are said to consent to something with the affections. Therefore, assent has no place in belief.

4. We do not say that a person is thinking [discursively] unless he is actually considering something, as is clear from Augustine. But even one who is not actually considering something is said to believe, for example, one of the faithful who is asleep. Therefore, to believe is not to think in this way.

5. A simple light is the principle of simple knowledge. But faith is kind of simple light, as is clear from Dionysius. Therefore, belief, which is from faith, is simple knowledge, and so it is not [discursive] thought, which means knowledge involving comparison.

6. Faith, as is commonly said, assents to the first truth because of itself. But one who gives assent to something after comparison does not accept it because of itself, but because of the other thing with which he compared it. Therefore, in the act of believing there is no comparison and, consequently, no [discursive] thought.

7. Faith is said to be more certain than every science and all knowledge. But principles, because of their certitude, are known without [discursive] thought or comparison. Therefore, belief, also, takes place without such thought.

8. A spiritual power has greater efficacy than a bodily power. Therefore, a spiritual light has greater efficacy than a bodily light. But an external bodily light gives the eye the perfection immediately to perceive visible bodies for which the inborn light was insufficient. So the spiritual light, coming from on high, gives the intellect the perfection to know without comparison and [discursive] thought even those things which our natural reason cannot reach. And, so, in belief there is no [discursive] thought.

. Philosophers assign the cogitative power to the sensitive part of man. But belief belongs only to the mind, as Augustine says. Therefore, belief is not thought.

REPLY:

Augustine has given a satisfactory description of belief, since such a definition shows forth the nature of belief and distinguishes it from all other acts of understanding. This is clear in the following. For, according to the Philosopher, our understanding has a twofold operation. There is one by which it forms the simple quiddities of things, as what man is, or what animal is. This operation of itself does not involve truth or falsity, just as phrases do not. The second operation of the understanding is that by which it joins and divides concepts by affirmation or denial. Now, in this operation we do find truth and falsity, just as we do in the proposition, which is its sign. Belief, however, does not occur in the first operation, but only in the second, for we believe what is true and disbelieve what is false. For this reason, also, the first operation of the understanding is called imagination of the understanding and the second faith, even among the Arabians, as is clear from the words of the Commentator.

The possible intellect, however, as far as its own nature is concerned, is in potency to all intelligible forms, just as first matter of itself is in potency to all sensible forms. Therefore, it has no intrinsic determination which necessitates joining rather than dividing concepts, or the converse. Now, everything which is undetermined with reference to two things is not limited to one of them unless by some thing which moves it. But only two things move the possible intellect: its proper object, which is an intelligible form, that is, a quiddity, as is said in *The Soul*, and the will, which moves all the other powers, as Anselm says. In this way, then, our possible intellect is related differently to the extremes of a contradictory proposition.

For, sometimes, it does not tend toward one rather than the other, either because of a lack of evidence, as happens in those problems about which we have no reasons for either side, or because of an apparent equality of the motives for both sides. This is the state of one in doubt, who wavers between the two members of a contradictory proposition.

Sometimes, however, the understanding tends more to one side than the other; still, that which causes the inclination does not move the understanding enough to determine it fully to one of the members. Under this influence, it accepts one member, but always has doubts about the other. This is the state of one holding an opinion, who accepts one member of the contradictory proposition with some fear that the other is true.

Sometimes, again, the possible intellect is so determined that it adheres to one member without reservation. This happens sometimes because of the intelligible object and sometimes because of the will. Furthermore, the intelligible object sometimes acts mediately, sometimes immediately. It acts immediately when the truth of the propositions is unmistakably clear immediately to the intellect from the intelligible objects themselves. This is the state of one who understands principles, which are known as soon as the terms are known, as the Philosopher says. Here, the very nature of the thing itself immediately determines the intellect to propositions of this sort. The intelligible object acts mediately, however, when the understanding, once it knows the definitions of the terms, is determined to one member of the contradictory proposition in virtue of first principles. This is the state of one who has science.

Sometimes, however, the understanding can be determined to one side of a contradictory proposition neither immediately through the definitions of the terms, as is the case with principles, nor yet in virtue of principles, as is the case with conclusions from a demonstration. And in this situation our understanding is determined by the will, which chooses to assent to one side definitely and precisely because of something which is enough to move the will, though not enough to move the understanding, namely, since it seems good or fitting to assent to this side. And this is the state of one who believes. This may happen when someone believes what another says because it seems fitting or useful to do so.

Thus, too, we are moved to believe what God says because we are promised eternal life as a reward if we believe. And this reward moves the will to assent to what is said, although the intellect is not moved by anything which it understands. Therefore, Augustine says: "Man can do other things unwillingly, but he can believe only if he wills it."

It is clear from what has just been said that assent is not to be found in that operation of the understanding by which it forms the simple quiddities of things, for there is no truth or falsity there. For we are not said to assent to anything unless we hold it as true. Likewise, one who doubts does not have assent, because he does not hold to one side rather than the other. Thus, also, one who has an opinion does not give assent, because his acceptance of the one side is not firm. The Latin word *sententia* (judgment), as Isaac and Avicenna say, is a clear or very certain comprehension of one member of a contradictory proposition. And *assentire* (assent) is derived from *sententia*. Now, one who understands gives assent, because he holds with great certainty to one member of a contradictory proposition. Such a one, however, does not employ discursive thought, because he fixes on one side without any process of comparison. One who has scientific knowledge, however, does use discursive thought and gives assent, but the thought causes the assent, and the assent puts an end to the discursive thought. For by the very act of relating the principles to the conclusions he assents to the conclusions by reducing them to the principles. There, the movement of the one who is thinking is halted and brought to rest. For in scientific knowledge the movement of reason begins from the understanding of principles and ends there after it has gone through the process of reduction. Thus, its assent and discursive thought are not parallel, but the discursive thought leads to assent, and the assent brings thought to rest.

But, in faith, the assent and the discursive thought are more or less parallel. For the assent is not caused by the thought, but by the will, as has just been said. However, since the understanding does not in this way have its action terminated at one thing so that it is

conducted to its proper term, which is the sight of some intelligible object, it follows that its movement is not yet brought to rest. Rather, it still thinks discursively and inquires about the things which it believes, even though its assent to them is unwavering. For, in so far as it depends on itself alone, the understanding is not satisfied and is not limited to one thing; instead, its action is terminated only from will out. Because of this the understanding of the believer is said to be "held captive," since, in place of its own proper determinations, those of something else are imposed on it: "bringing into captivity every understanding..." (2 Cor. 10:5). Due to this, also, a movement directly opposite to what the believer holds most firmly can arise in him, although this cannot happen to one who understands or has scientific knowledge.

Accordingly, it is thus by assent that belief is distinguished from the operation through which the understanding sees simple forms, that is, quiddities; thus, too, it is distinguished from doubt and opinion. It is by discursive thought, however, that it is distinguished from understanding, and by the fact that assent and discursive thought are, as it were, parallel and simultaneous, that it is distinguished from scientific knowledge.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The answer to the first difficulty is clear from the reply.
2. Faith is called a consent without inquiry in so far as the consent of faith, or assent, is not caused by an investigation of the understanding. Nonetheless, this does not prevent the understanding of one who believes from having some discursive thought or comparison about those things which he believes.
3. The will looks to a power which precedes it, namely, the intellect, but the intellect does not. Therefore, assent properly belongs to the intellect, because it means an absolute adherence to that to which assent is given. Consent (*consentire*) belongs properly to the will, because consent is to think something (*sentire*) along with something else (*simul cum alio*). And it is so called in relation to, or in comparison with, something which went before.
4. Since habits are known through their acts, and are themselves the source of their acts, habits are thus sometimes given the names of the acts. For this reason the names of acts sometimes are taken in their proper sense, that is, as referring to the acts themselves, and sometimes as referring to the habits. Belief, therefore, as meaning the act of faith, always includes actual consideration. However, when it is taken for the habit of belief, it does not. It is in this sense that one who is asleep is said to believe, in so far as he has the habit of faith.
5. In faith there is some perfection and some imperfection. The firmness which pertains to the assent is a perfection, but the lack of sight, because of which the movement of discursive thought still remains in the mind of one who believes, is an imperfection. The perfection, namely, the assent, is caused by the simple light which is faith. But, since the participation in this light is not perfect, the imperfection of the understanding is not completely removed. For this reason the movement of discursive thought in it stays restless.
6. The argument given proves or concludes that discursive thought is not the cause of the assent of faith, but not that it does not accompany the assent of faith.
7. Certitude can mean two things. The first is firmness of adherence, and will reference to this, faith is more certain than any understanding [principles] and scientific knowledge. For the first truth, which causes the assent of faith, is a more powerful cause than the light of reason, which causes the assent of understanding or scientific knowledge. The second is the evidence of that to which assent is given. Here, faith does not have certainty, but scientific

knowledge and understanding do. It is because of this, too, that understanding has no discursive thought.

8. The argument given would conclude correctly if we had perfect participation in that spiritual light, as we will in heaven, where we shall see perfectly the things which we now believe. But now, the things which are known because of that light do not clearly appear, because of our defective participation in that light, and not because of the power of the spiritual light itself.

9. The cogitative power is that which is highest in the sensitive part of man, and, thus, sense in some way comes in contact with the intellective part so that it participates in something of that which is lowest in the intellective part, namely, discursive reason. This is in accord with the rule of Dionysius that contact is established where the lower begins and the higher leaves off. For this reason, also, the cogitative power is called the particular reason, as is clear from the Commentator. This exists only in man; in brutes, its place is taken by the natural judgment [of instinct]. Therefore, reason as a faculty, which is in the intellective part, sometimes receives its name from discursive thought because of the similarity of operation.

ARTICLE II: WHAT IS FAITH?

Parallel readings: [Summa Theol., II-II, 1.](#)

Difficulties:

The Apostle says (Hebrews 11:1) that faith is "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence [*argumentum*] of things that appear not." This seems to be incorrect, for

1. No quality is a substance, but faith is a quality since it is a virtue, which is a good quality... Therefore, faith is not a substance.

2. Spiritual being is added to natural being and is its perfection. For this reason it should be similar to it. But in man's natural being the substance of his being is called the very essence of the soul, which is first act. But a power, which is the principle of second act, is not called the essence. So, also, in spiritual being neither faith nor any virtue should be called the essence, for a virtue is a proximate principle of operation and so perfects the power. Grace should rather be called the essence, for spiritual being comes from grace as from its first act, and grace perfects the very essence of the soul.

3. It was said that faith is called substance because it is first among the virtues.—On the contrary, virtues can be considered in three ways: with reference to their habits, to their objects, and to their powers. But with reference to their habits faith is not prior to the others, for this definition seems to give the definition of faith only in so far as it is formed (*formata*). For it is only in this way that it is a foundation, as Augustine says. All freely given habits, however, are infused at the same time. Likewise, faith seems to have no priority over the others with reference to their objects. For faith does not strive more for the true itself, which seems to be its proper object, than charity does for the highest good, or hope does for that which is hardest to attain, or for God's greatest generosity. Nor is faith prior with reference to their powers, for every freely given virtue seems to look to the affections. Therefore, faith is in no way prior to the others, and so it should not be called the foundation or the substance of the others.

4. Things to be hoped for exist in us through charity rather than through faith. Therefore, this definition seems to fit charity better than faith.

5. Since hope is begotten of faith, as is clear from the Glass, if one defines hope correctly, faith must be included in its definition. Hop; however, is included in the definition of the thing to be hoped for. Now, if the thing hoped for is included in the definition of faith, we shall have a circle in our definitions; but this is illogical because thus something would be prior to, and better known than, itself. For the thing itself would then be put in its own definition, since definitions are used in place of the names of things. Hence, in defining a thing there would be an unending process.
6. Different habits have different objects. But the theological virtues have the same thing for their end and object. Therefore, in the theological virtues there must be different ends for the different virtues. But the thing to be hoped for is the proper end of hope. Therefore, it should not be included in the definition of faith either as its end or its object.
7. Faith is brought to perfection through charity rather than through hope, and so it is said to be formed through charity. Therefore, in the definition of faith we should include the object of charity, which is the good or what is to be loved, rather than the object of hope, which is the thing to be hoped for.
8. Faith refers especially to the articles of faith. However, not all these articles, but only one or two, "the resurrection of the body and life everlasting," refer to things to be hoped for. Therefore, the thing to be hoped for should not be included in the definition of faith.
9. Argument (*argumentum*) is an act of reason. But faith pertains to those things which are above reason. Therefore, faith should not be called an argument.
10. In the soul there is a twofold movement, one from the soul and one to the soul. In the movement to the soul the principle is extrinsic; in that from the soul, it is intrinsic. Now, the same principle cannot be intrinsic and extrinsic. Therefore, the same principle of movement cannot be to the soul and from the soul. However, cognition takes place through a movement to the soul, but affection through a move merit from the soul. Therefore, neither faith nor anything else can be the principle of affection and cognition. For this reason it is illogical to put in the definition of faith something pertaining to affection: "the substance of things hoped for," and something pertain to cognition: "evidence of things that appear not."
11. One habit cannot belong to different powers. But the affective and the intellective are different powers. Since, then, faith is one habit, it cannot pertain to cognition and affection. We conclude as before.
12. Each habit has one act. Since, therefore, two acts are included in the definition of faith, namely, to make things hoped for subsist in us, in so far as it is called "the substance of things hoped for," and to convince the mind, in so far as it is called "the evidence of things that appear not," this does not seem a satisfactory description.
13. Understanding is prior to the affections. But that which is called "the substance of things hoped for" pertains to the affections, while that which is added in the words, "evidence of things that appear not," belongs to understanding. Therefore, the parts of the aforesaid definition are not in their proper order.
14. Evidence is said to be that which convinces the mind to assent to something. But the mind is convinced to give assent to things because they become apparent to it. Therefore, the object, which is said to be "evidence of things that appear not," seems to involve a contradiction.
15. Faith is a sort of knowledge. But all knowledge takes place in so far as something appears to the knower, for something appears in sensitive as well as in intellectual knowledge. Therefore, it is illogical to say that faith is "of things that appear not."

REPLY:

According to some, when the Apostle gave this definition, he did not want to show what faith is, but what faith does. However, it seems that we should rather say that this description is a very complete definition. It is such, not in the sense that it is given according to the required form of a definition, but because in it there is sufficient mention of everything which is necessary for a definition of faith. For, sometimes, even when dealing with philosophers themselves, it is enough to mention the principles of syllogisms and definitions because, once they have them, it is a simple matter to reduce them to due form according to the rules of the art. This is clear from three considerations.

First, from the fact that it mentions all the principles on which the nature of faith depends. For the state of the believer, as has been said above, is such that the intellect is determined to something through the will, and the will does nothing except in so far as it is moved by its object, which is the good to be sought for and its end. In view of this, faith needs a twofold principle, a first which is the good that moves the will, and a second which is that to which the understanding gives assent under the influence of the will.

Man, however, has a twofold final good, which first moves the will as a final end. The first of these is proportionate to human nature since natural powers are capable of attaining it. This is the happiness about which the philosophers speak, either as contemplative, which consists in the act of wisdom, or active, which consists first of all in the act of prudence, and in the acts of the other moral virtues as they depend on prudence.

The other is the good which is out of all proportion to man's nature because his natural powers are not enough to attain to it either in thought or desire. It is promised to man only through the divine liberality: "The eye hath not seen,..." (1 Cor. 2:9). This is life everlasting. It is because of this good that the will is inclined to give assent to those things which it holds by faith. Thus the Gospel according to St. John (6:40) reads: "Everyone who seeth the Son, and believeth in him may have life everlasting."

But nothing can be directed to any end unless there pre-exists in it a certain proportion to the end, and it is from this that the desire of the end arises in it. This happens in so far as, in a certain sense, the end is made to exist inchoatively within it, because it desires nothing except in so far as it has some likeness of the end. This is why there is in human nature a certain initial participation of the good which is proportionate to that nature. For self-evident principles of demonstrations, which are seeds of the contemplation of wisdom, naturally pre-exist in that good, as do principles of natural law, which are seeds of the moral virtues.

For this reason also, for man to be ordained to the good which is eternal life, there must be some initial participation of it in him to whom it is promised. However, eternal life consists in the full knowledge of God, as is clear from John (17:3): "Now this is eternal life..." Consequently, we must have within us some initial participation of this supernatural knowledge. We have it through faith, which by reason of an infused light holds those things which are beyond our natural knowledge.

Now, in composite things whose parts have an order, it is customary to call the first part the substance of the whole thing, for in that part there is a beginning of the whole. Examples of this are the foundation of a house and the hull of a ship. In keeping with this, the Philosopher says: "If being were one whole, its first part would be substance." Similarly, faith is called "the substance of things hoped for," inasmuch as it is for us an initial participation of the eternal life for which we hope by reason of the divine promise. And in this way mention is made of the relation between faith and the good which moves the will in its determination of the intellect.

But the will, under the movement of this good, proposes as worthy of assent something which is not evident to the natural understanding. In this way it gives the understanding a determination to that which is not evident, the determination, namely, to assent to it. Therefore, just as the intelligible thing which is seen by the understanding determines the understanding, and for this reason is said to give conclusive evidence (*arguere*) to the mind; so also, something which is not evident to the understanding determines it and convinces (*arguere*) the mind because the will has accepted it as something to which assent should be given. For this reason another reading has proof (*convictio*) [in place of evidence (*argumentum*)], for it convinces the intellect in the aforesaid manner. So, in the words, "evidence of things that appear not," mention is made of the relation of faith to that to which the understanding assents.

And, so, in the words, "of things that appear not," we have the subject matter or object of faith; in "evidence" we have the act; and in "the substance of things to be hoped for" we have the ordination to the end. From the act we can understand the genus, that is, habit, which is known through the act, and the subject, that is, the mind. And nothing else is needed for the definition of a virtue. Consequently, from what has been said, we can establish a definition scientifically, and say: "Faith is a habit of our mind, by which eternal life begins in us, and which makes our understanding assent to things which are not evident."

The second sign that this is a good definition is that through it we can distinguish faith from everything else. For by the words, "of those things that appear not," faith is distinguished from scientific knowledge and understanding. By the word "evidence" it is distinguished both from opinion and doubt, in which the mind is not convinced, that is, is not determined to one thing. This also distinguishes it from all habits which are not cognitive. By the words, "substance of things to be hoped for," it is distinguished from faith in the will sense, namely, that by which we are said to believe that about which we have an opinion which we hold tenaciously, or to believe on the testimony of some man. This also distinguishes it from prudence and from the other cognitive habits, which are either not ordained to things hoped for, or, if so ordained, do not include an initial participation in us of the things hoped for.

The third sign that this is a good definition derives from this, that anyone wanting to define faith will have to include the whole definition or some part of it in other words. For, when Damascene says: "Faith is the substance [*hypostasis*] of those things that are hoped for, and the proof of those things which are not seen," he obviously is saying the same thing as the Apostle. When he adds: "Unshakeable and irreproachable hope of those things which have been announced to us by God, and of the fulfilment of our petitions," he is explaining what had been included in the words, "substance of things to be hoped for." For the things primarily to be hoped for are the rewards promised us by God, and, secondarily, whatever else we seek from God which is necessary for the former and about which our faith gives us certain hope. This hope cannot fail, and so it is called "unshakeable." Nor can it be justly censured as vain, and so it is called "irreproachable."

Augustine's statement: "Faith is the virtue by which what is not seen is believed"; and Damascene's: "Faith is a consent without inquiry"; and Hugh of St. Victor's: "Faith is a certainty of the mind about things absent which is more than opinion, but less than scientific knowledge," all mean the same as the Apostle's words: "Evidence of things that appear not." Yet, it is said to be "less than scientific knowledge" because faith does not have vision as science does, although it has the same firm adherence. And yet it is said to be "more than opinion" because of the firmness of the assent. Thus, it is said to be "less than science" in so far as it refers to "things that appear not," and "more than opinion" in so far as it refers to conviction (*argumentum*). For the rest, what we have said is explanation enough.

Moreover, when Dionysius says: "Faith is the solid foundation of those who believe, establishing them in the truth, and the truth in them," he is saying the same thing that the Apostle says in the words: "substance of things to be hoped for." For knowledge of the truth is a thing to be hoped for, since "beatitude is nothing else than rejoicing over the truth," as Augustine says.'

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Faith is called a substance, not because it is in the category of substance, but because it has a certain similarity to substance, namely, in so far as it is the initial participation and a kind of foundation of the whole spiritual life, just as substance is the foundation of all beings.
2. The Apostle wanted to compare faith with those things which are outside of us, and not with what is within us. However, even though the essence of the soul in its natural being is that which is first and is substance with reference to the powers, habits, and everything consequent upon substance which inheres in it, nevertheless, the relation to external things is not primarily in the essence but in the powers. Likewise, this relation is not found in grace, but in virtue, and primarily in faith. Hence, it could not be said that grace was the substance of things to be hoped for, but that faith was.
3. Faith precedes the other virtues, with reference to its object, the power in which it inheres, and its habit. With reference to its object it takes precedence, not because it has a stronger inclination toward its object than the other virtues toward theirs, but because it is natural for its object to cause movement before the objects of charity and the other virtues. This is evident because it is only through understanding that a good causes movement, as is said in *The Soul*, but the true does not need any movement of appetite to set the understanding in motion. Consequently, the act of faith is naturally prior to the act of charity. Similarly, the habit is also prior, although, when faith is formed (*formata*), they are simultaneous. For the same reason the cognitive power is naturally prior to the affective. Now, faith belongs to the cognitive part, as is clear from the fact that its proper object is the true and not the good. But faith does in a certain sense have its fulfillment in the will, as will be shown later.
4. As is clear from what has already been said, the initial participation of things to be hoped for is not produced in us by means of charity, but by faith. Besides, charity is not evidence, so this description does not fit it at all.
5. Since that good which inclines us to faith surpasses reason, it has no time. Therefore, the Apostle used the circumlocution, that which is to be hoped for, in its stead. This happens frequently in definitions.
6. Every power has an end, which is its own good, but not every power refers to the character of end or good in so far as it is good. Only the will does this. Hence it is that the will moves all the other powers, because all movement begins from an intending of the end. Therefore, although the true is the end of faith, the true does not express the character of end. Consequently, not the true, but something pertaining to the affections ought to be taken as the end of faith.
7. A thing to be loved can be present or absent, but a thing to be hoped for must be absent. Romans (8:24) says: "For what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" Since, then, faith concerns what is absent, its end is more properly characterized by the thing to be hoped for than by the thing to be loved.
8. An article [of faith] is the subject matter of faith. But the thing to be hoped for should be considered not as its subject matter, but as its end. Thus, the reasoning does not follow.

9. Evidence (*argumentum*) has many meanings. Sometimes it means the very act of reason proceeding from principles to conclusions. And since the whole force of the proof (*argumentum*) consists in the middle term, the middle term is therefore sometimes called the argument (*argumentum*). Thence it is that the preface of a book is sometimes called the argument, because in it there is a sort of brief foretaste of the whole work that follows. Again, since something is made to appear through evidence and the principle by which something appears is light, the light itself, by which it is known, can be called evidence.

And faith is called evidence in these four ways. It is used in the first sense, in so far as reason assents to something because it was said by God. Thus, assent in the believer is caused by the authority of the speaker, since even in dialectical matters there is a proof (*argumentum*) from authority. In the second way, faith is called the evidence of those things which do not appear, in so far as the faith of the faithful is a means of proving the existence of what does not appear, or in so far as the faith of our fathers is a means of making us believe, or in so far as faith in one article is the means to faith in another, as the resurrection of Christ is to the general resurrection, as is clear from the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1: 12). In the third way, faith is a brief foretaste of the knowledge which we shall have in the future. In the fourth way, faith is evidence with reference to the light of faith through which we know what is to be believed. Faith, however, is said to surpass reason, not because there is no act of reason in faith, but because reasoning about faith cannot lead to the sight of those things which are matters of faith.

10. The act of faith consists essentially in knowledge, and there we find its formal or specific perfection. This is clear from its object, as has been said. But, with reference to its end, faith is perfected in the affections, because it is by reason of charity that it can attain its end. The beginning of faith, too, is in the affections, in so far as the will determines the intellect to assent to matters of faith. But that act of the will is an act neither of charity nor of hope, but of the appetite seeking a promised good. From this it is clear that faith is not in two powers as in its subjects.

11. The answer to the eleventh difficulty is clear from the answer to the tenth.

12. When we say "substance of things to be hoped for," we are not dealing with the act of faith, but only with its relation to its end. The act is indicated by the reference to the object, when we say "evidence of things that appear not."

13. That to which the understanding gives assent does not move the understanding by its own power, but by the influence of the will. As a result, the good which moves the affective part has the role of first mover in the act of faith, but that to which the understanding gives assent is like a mover which is moved. Therefore, in the definition of faith we first give its reference to the good of the affections before the reference to its proper object.

14. Faith does not convince the mind or satisfy (*arguere*) it so as to assent because of the evidence of the thing, but because of the influence of the will, as was said. Therefore, the reasoning does not follow.

15. Knowledge can have two meanings: sight or assent. When it refers to sight, it is distinguished from faith. Thus, Gregory says: "Things seen are the object not of faith, but of knowledge. According to Augustine, those things "which are present to the senses or the understanding" are said to be seen. But those things are said to be present to the understanding which are not beyond its capacity.

But, in so far as there is certainty of assent, faith is knowledge, and as such can be called certain knowledge and sight. This appears in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:12): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner." And this is what Augustine says: "If it is not un

fitting to say that we know that also which we believe to be most certain, it follows from this that it is correct to say that we see with our minds the things which we believe, even though they are not present to our senses."

ARTICLE III: IS FAITH A VIRTUE?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 23, 2, 4, sol. I; 3, 1, sol. 2; Ad Rom., c. 1, lectura 6; Summa Theol., I-II, 6 II-II, 5; Q. D. de virt. in comm., 7.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. Virtue is distinguished from knowledge. So, virtue and knowledge are classified in different genera, as is clear from the Topics.¹ But faith

is contained under the genus of knowledge. Therefore, it is not a virtue.

2. It was said that, as ignorance is a vice because it is caused by a neglect of knowledge, so faith is a virtue because it resides in the will of the believer.—On the contrary, the mere fact that something is the result of guilt does not make it possible to put guilt in its definition. Otherwise, punishment, as such, would have guilt in its definition. Therefore, ignorance cannot be called a vice because it arises from the vice of neglectura. For the same reason, faith cannot be called a virtue because it is consequent upon the will.

3. Virtue is so called because of its relation to the good. For virtue is "that which makes its possessor good, and makes his work good," as is said in the Ethics. But the object of faith is the true, not the good. Therefore, faith is not a virtue.

4. It was said that the true which is the object of faith is the first truth, which is also the highest good, and, so, faith fulfils the definition of virtue.—On the contrary, in the distinction of habits and acts we must consider the formal distinction of objects, not their material distinction. Otherwise, sight and hearing would be the same power because the same thing happens to be audible and visible. But, no matter how much the good and the true are identified in reality; formally, one aspect founds the concept of its truth and another of its goodness. Therefore, a habit which is directed toward the true, as such, is distinguished from that habit which is directed toward the good as such. Thus, faith is distinguished from virtue.

5. The mean and the extremes are in the same genus, as is clear from the Philosopher. But faith is a mean between scientific knowledge and opinion, for Hugh of St. Victor says that faith is "a certainty of mind which is more than opinion and less than scientific knowledge." But neither opinion nor science is a virtue. So, neither is faith.

6. The presence of the object does not destroy the habit of a virtue. But, when the object of faith, which is first truth, is present to our minds so that we see it, we will not have faith but vision. Therefore, faith is not a virtue.

7. "Virtue is the fullest development of a power," as is said in Heaven and Earth. But faith is not the fullest development of a human power, because it is capable of something fuller, plain sight. Therefore, faith is not a virtue.

8. According to Augustine, through the virtues the acts of powers are made easier. Faith, however, does not make the act of understanding easier, but rather hinders it, because by it

our understanding is made captive, as is said in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (20: 5). Therefore, faith is not a virtue.

9. The Philosopher divides virtues into intellectual and moral. This division is made according to immediate differences, because the intellectual is that which is in the part which is essentially rational, and the moral is that which is in the part which is rational by participation. There is no other sense in which we call understand rational; nor can human virtue be in any but the rational part taken in some sense. But faith is not a moral virtue, because, then, its subject matter would be actions and emotions. Nor is it an intellectual virtue, because it is not any of those five virtues which the Philosopher gives. For it is not wisdom, or understanding, or science, or art, or prudence. Therefore, faith is not a virtue at all.

10. That which belongs to a thing because of something extrinsic to it is not in that thing essentially, but accidentally. Faith, however, is not fittingly called a virtue except because of something else, as has been said, namely, because of the will. Therefore, to be a virtue belongs accidentally to faith; hence, faith cannot be classified as a species of virtue.

11. There is more perfect knowledge in prophecy than in faith. But prophecy is not classified as a virtue. Therefore, neither should faith be called a virtue.

To the Contrary:

1'. Virtue is a disposition of something perfect to that which is best. But this fits faith, for faith orders man to beatitude, which is that which is best. Therefore, faith is a virtue.

2'. Every habit by which one is given strength to act and endurance to suffer is a virtue. But faith is of this nature, for "faith worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Faith also makes the faithful strong in resisting the devil, as is said in the first Epistle of Peter (5:9). Therefore, faith is a virtue.

3'. Hugh of St. Victor says that there are three sacramental virtues by which we receive our initiation [the Church]: faith, hope, and charity. We conclude as before.

REPLY:

Everybody agrees that faith is a virtue. For a proof of this we should note that virtue by its very name means the completion of an active power. Now, there are two kinds of active powers, one whose action terminates in something performed outside the agent, as the action of the power of building terminates in the edifice; and the other, whose action does not terminate outside of the agent, but remains within him, as sight remains within one who sees, as the Philosopher says. In these two kinds of powers completion is taken in different senses. Since acts of the first type of power are not in the maker, but in what is made, as the Philosopher says, the completion of the power is to be considered in reference to that which is done. Thus, the power of one who carries burdens is said to consist in this, that he carries a very heavy burden, as is evident from Heaven and Earth; and the power of one who builds consists in this, that he makes a very good house. However, since the act of the other type of power remains in the agent and not in anything produced, the completion of that type of power is conceived according to its mode of acting, namely, that it act well and fittingly. And it is because of this that its act is called good. And so it is that in this type of power we call virtue that which makes the work good.

But the philosopher considers one thing as final good and the theologian another. For the philosopher considers as final good that which has a proportion to the human powers and exists in the act of himself. Thus, he says that happiness is an activity. Therefore, according to the philosopher, a good act, whose principle is called a virtue, is said to be good without

qualification in so far as it is in conformity with the potency as that which perfects it. Consequently, when the philosopher finds any habit which elicits such an act, he calls it a virtue, whether it be in the intellective part, as science, understanding of principles, and intellectual virtues of this sort, whose acts are the good of the power itself, namely, to consider the true; or whether it be in the affective part, as temperance, bravery, and the other moral virtues.

But the theologian considers as the final good that which is beyond the capacity of nature, namely, everlasting life, as has been said. Thus, he does not consider the good in human acts without qualification, because he puts the end not in the acts themselves, but in the disposition to that good which he makes the end. He says that only that act is completely good which has a proximate relation to the final good, that is, an act which merits eternal life. He says that every such act is an act of virtue, and every habit properly eliciting such an act he calls a virtue.

However, an act can be called meritorious only if it lies within the power of the agent. For it is necessary for one who merits to present something. Nor can he present something unless it is in some way his own, that is, from himself. Now, an act lies within our power, in so far as it belongs to our will, whether as elicited by the will, as to love and to will, or as commanded by the will, as to walk and to talk. Hence, with reference to any such act, we can posit as a virtue that which elicits perfect acts of this type.

As has been said above, there is assent in belief only by reason of the command of the will. Therefore, it depends on the will according to its very nature. It is for this reason that to believe can be meritorious, and that faith, which is the habit eliciting the act of believing, is a virtue for the theologian.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Knowledge and science are not distinguished from virtue taken simply, but from moral virtue, which is more commonly called virtue.
2. Although the fact that something is caused by a virtue or a vice is not enough to put virtue or vice in its definition, the fact that it can be commanded by a virtue or a vice is enough to make an act be the act of a vice or virtue.
3. The good toward which a virtue gives an ordination should not be taken as the object of some act; rather, that good is the perfect act itself, which the virtue elicits. And, although the true differs from the good in its intelligible content, the act of considering the true is a good of the understanding, and to give assent to first truth on its own account is a good worthy of merit. Consequently, faith, which is ordained to this act, is called a virtue.
4. The answer to the fourth difficulty is clear from the third response.
5. Neither scientific knowledge nor opinion, but only faith, can be called a virtue in the sense in which we are now speaking of virtue. For faith is not a mean between science and opinion with reference to that which concerns the will, and it is according to this that it is classified as a virtue in the way we have mentioned. For in science and opinion there is no inclination because of the will, but only because of reason. If, however, we are talking about them with reference only to knowledge, neither opinion nor faith would be a virtue, since they do not have perfect knowledge. Only science has this.
6. First truth is the proper object of faith only under the character of non appearing, as is clear from the definition of the Apostle, where it is said that the proper object of faith is that which does not appear. Consequently, when first truth is present, it loses its character of object.

7. Faith is said to be the fullest development of a power in so far as it adds to the power that which is needed to elicit a good and meritorious act. For a virtue really to be a virtue, however, it does not have to elicit the best act possible from that power, for in the same power there may be several virtues, one of which elicits an act more noble than another, as magnificence over liberality.

8. In any two things which are ordained to each other the perfection of the lower is for it to be subject to the higher, as the concupiscible which is subject to reason. Because of this, the habit of a virtue is said to make it easy for the concupiscible power to act, not in the sense so that it makes it pursue concupiscible objects without restraint, but because it brings it perfectly under the dominion of reason. Similarly, the good of understanding itself is to be subject to the will which adheres to God. Thus, faith is said to help the understanding in so far as it makes it captive under such a will.

9. Faith is not an intellectual or moral virtue, but a theological virtue. And, although the theological virtues have the same subject as moral and intellectual virtues, they have a different object. For the object of the theological virtues is the last end itself, whereas the object of the other virtues is the means to the end. Therefore, the theologians propose certain virtues which concern the end itself. But the philosophers do not do this, because the end of human life which the philosophers study does not transcend the power of nature. Hence, man's pursuit of that end is the result of a natural inclination, and to pursue that end he does not need to be elevated by any habits, as he does to pursue the end considered by the theologians, which transcends the power of nature.

10. Faith is in the intellect only in so far as it is commanded by the will, as is clear from what has been said. Hence, although that which comes from the will can be said to be accidental to the intellect, it is still essential to faith. The same holds for the rational element, which is accidental to the concupiscible, but essential to temperance.

11. Prophecy does not depend on the will of the prophet, as is said in the second Epistle of St. Peter (1: 21). Faith, however, is to some extent dependent on the will of the believer. Therefore, prophecy cannot be called a virtue as faith can.

ARTICLE IV: WHAT IS THE SUBJECT IN WHICH FAITH EXISTS?

Parallel readings: [I-II Sentences 23, 2, 3, sol. 1](#); [Summa Theol., II-II, 4, 2](#).

Difficulties:

It seems to be not the cognitive, but the affective, part, for

1. All virtue seems to exist in the affective part, since virtue is a kind of "well-ordered love," as Augustine says. But faith is a virtue. Therefore, it exists in the affective part.

2. Virtue implies some perfection, since it is "the disposition of something perfect to that which is best," as is said in [the Physics](#). But, since faith has some perfection and some imperfection, the imperfection derives from the cognitive element and the perfection derives from the volitional element, namely, that it holds firmly to things invisible. Therefore, in so far as it is a virtue, it is in the affective part.

3. Augustine says: "Although a child does not have the faith which is in the will of those who believe, he has the sacrament of faith." From this we clearly see that faith is in the will.

4. Augustine says: "The Apostle's words, 'Or what hast thou that thou hast not received? (1 Cor. 4:7), refer to the faith which is in the wills of those who believe." We conclude as before.
5. A disposition and its perfection seem to belong to the same thing. But faith is a disposition for glory, which is in the affective part. Therefore, faith, also, is in the affective part.
6. Merit resides in the will, because only the will is master of its acts. But the act of faith is meritorious. Therefore, it is an act of the will, and so it would seem that faith resides in the will.
7. It was said that faith is in both the affective and the cognitive parts. On the contrary, one habit cannot belong to two powers. Faith, however, is one habit. Therefore, it cannot be in the affective and cognitive parts, which are two powers.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. A habit which perfects a power has the same object as the power. Otherwise, the act of the power and of the habit could not be one. But faith has the same object, not as the affective part, but as the cognitive part, since the object of both is the true. Therefore, faith is in the cognitive part.
- 2'. Augustine says that faith is the "enlightening" of the mind for the first truth. But to be enlightened pertains to the cognitive part. Therefore, faith is in the cognitive part.
- 3'. If faith is said to be in the will, it is so only because we believe willingly. But, in like manner, all the activities of the virtues take place in us knowledge, as is clear from the Ethics. Therefore, for the same all the virtues would be in the cognitive part, which is obviously false.
- 4'. Through grace, which is in the virtues, the image which is in the three powers of memory, intelligence, and will is refashioned. But the three virtues which primarily have reference to grace are faith, hope, and charity. Therefore, one of these is in the intelligence. It is evident, however, that neither hope nor charity is there. So, faith is there.
- 5'. The cognitive power has the same relation to that which can or cannot be proved, as the affective power has to that which can or can not be approved. But the virtue by reason of which we approve that which, according to human reason, should not be approved is in the affective part. This virtue is charity, by which we love our enemies, a thing which naturally seems something not to be approved. Therefore, faith, by which we prove or assert that which to reason seems incapable of proof, is in the cognitive part.

REPLY:

There are many different opinions about this question. For some have said that faith is in both the affective and cognitive powers. But this cannot be true at all if it means that it is in both equally. For each habit must have one act, and one act cannot belong equally to two powers. Seeing this, some of these people say that faith is principally in the affective power. But this does not seem to be true, since to believe implies some "thought," as is clear from Augustine. Thought, however, is an act of the cognitive part. Faith is also in some sense called scientific knowledge and sight, as was said above. And all of these belong to the cognitive power.

Others say that faith is in the understanding, but the practical understanding, because they say the practical understanding is that to which desire tends, or which desire follows, or which inclines to a work. And these three are found in faith. It is because of desire that one is inclined to faith, for we believe what we will. Desire itself also follows faith, inasmuch as the act of faith in some sense produces the act of charity. It also leads to a work, for "faith...worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6).

But these people do not seem to understand what the practical understanding is. For the practical understanding is the same as the operative understanding. Hence, only extension to a work makes an understanding practical. Reference to desire, however, either antecedent or consequent, does not withdraw the understanding from the category of speculative understanding. For, unless one were attracted to speculating about the truth, there would never be any pleasure in the act of speculative understanding. And this is contrary to the Philosopher, who says that the purest pleasure is in the act of speculative understanding. Nor does every reference to a work make the understanding practical, because simple speculation can be for someone the remote occasion of doing something. Thus, a philosopher contemplates the immortality of the soul, and from this, as from a remote cause, he takes occasion to do something. But, to be practical, the understanding must be the proximate rule of action, as that by which one studies the thing to be done, the methods of operation, and the causes of the work. It is evident, however, that the object of faith is not a truth which can be produced, but the uncreated truth, which can be an object only of speculative understanding. Consequently, faith is in the speculative understanding, although it is the remote occasion of doing something. For this reason, also, activity is attributed to it only through the mediation of charity.

We must bear in mind, nevertheless, that it is not in the speculative understanding absolutely, but only in so far as it is subject to the will. Similarly, temperance is in the concupiscible power only in so far as it participates to some extent in reason. For, since the good of the act of a power requires its subjection to a higher power by following its command, it is necessary not only that the higher have the perfection to command or direct correctly, but that the lower have the perfection to obey promptly. Hence, he who has right reason, but an uncontrolled concupiscible appetite, does not have the virtue of temperance, because he is harassed by his passions, even though he is not led astray by them. Consequently, he does not perform the act of virtue with the ease and pleasure which are needed for virtue. But, to have temperance, the concupiscible appetite itself must be perfected by a habit so that it is subject to the will without any difficulty. It is in this way that the habit of temperance is said to be in the concupiscible appetite. Similarly, for the understanding promptly to follow the command of the will, there must be a habit in the speculative understanding itself. This is the divinely infused habit of faith.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That passage of Augustine should be understood of the moral virtues, about which he is there speaking. Or it can be said that we are speaking of the virtues with reference to their form, which is charity.
2. The cognitive part has some perfection in so far as it obeys a will which clings to God.
3. Augustine is talking about the act of faith, which, indeed, is said to be in the will not as in a subject, but as in a cause, in so far as it is commanded by the will.
4. The same holds for the fourth difficulty.
- ç. It is not necessary for disposition and habit to be in the same subject except when the disposition itself becomes the habit. This is evident in members of the body, in which an effect results in one member because of the disposition in another member. Something similar happens in the powers of the soul, for the perfection of knowledge in the understanding follows from a good disposition of the imagination.
6. Not only the act which the will elicits, but also that which it commands, is called an act of the will. Therefore, there can be merit in both, as is clear from what has been said.

7. There cannot be one habit belonging equally to two powers, but there can be a habit of one power in so far as it has an ordination to another. And this is the case with faith.

ARTICLE V: IS CHARITY THE FORM OF FAITH?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 23, 3, 1, sol. 1; Summa Theol., II—11, 4, 3; 23, 8; Q. D. de car., 3.

Difficulties:

And it seems that it is not, for

1. One of two things which are distinguished from each other as opposites cannot be the form of the other. But faith and charity are distinguished from each other as opposites. Therefore, charity is not the form of faith.

2. It was said that they are distinguished from each other as Opposites in so far as they are considered in themselves, but that charity is the form of faith in so far as they are directed to the one end which they merit by their acts.—On the contrary, two of the causes are extrinsic, namely, agent and end; and two are intrinsic, form and matter. Now, two diverse things can have one common extrinsic principle, but they do not on this account have one common intrinsic principle. Therefore, we cannot conclude from the ordination of faith and charity to one end that charity is the form of faith.

3. It was said that charity is not an intrinsic but an extrinsic form, a kind of exemplary form.—On the contrary: The facsimile takes its species from the exemplar. Hence, Hilary says: "The image is not of a different species from the thing which is represented." But faith does not take its species from charity. Therefore, charity cannot be the exemplary form of faith.

4. Every form is either substantial, or accidental, or exemplary. But charity is not the substantial form of faith, for, if it were, it would be an integral part of faith. Nor is it an accidental form, for faith thus would be more noble than charity, since the subject is more noble than the accident. Nor is it the exemplary form, because charity then would be able to exist without faith, since the exemplar can exist without the facsimile. Therefore, charity is not the form of faith.

5. Reward is proportionate to merit. But our reward consists principally in three gifts: vision, which takes the place of faith; possession, which takes the place of hope; and enjoyment, which corresponds to charity. However, our reward consists mainly in vision, and, so, Augustine says: "Vision is the whole reward." Therefore, merit and reward should both be attributed to faith. Therefore, in so far as they are ordained to acquiring merit, faith seems rather to be the form of charity, rather than charity that of faith.

6. For every subject of perfectibility there is one corresponding perfection. But the form of faith is grace. Therefore, charity is not its form, since charity is not the same as grace.

7. The Gloss on "Abraham begot Isaac" (Matt. I: 2) says: "Faith begot hope, and hope, charity." This is taken as referring to acts, not to habits. Therefore, the act of charity depends on the act of faith. Now, a form does not depend on that of which it is the form, but the opposite. Therefore, charity is not the form of faith in so far as faith is ordained to a meritorious act.

8. Habits are distinguished through their objects. But the objects of faith and charity are diverse, namely, the good and the true. Therefore, the habits are formally distinct, too. But

every act is from a form. Therefore, the acts of those habits are diverse. Consequently, charity cannot be the form of faith even in its ordination to act.

9. Charity is the form of faith in so far as it forms faith; therefore, if it forms faith only through an ordination to its act, charity will not be the form of faith, but its act.

10. The Apostle says: "And now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three" (2 Cor. I 3:13). Here, faith, hope, and charity are distinguished as opposed to each other. But he seems to be talking about formed faith, for formless faith is not considered to be a virtue, as will be said later. Therefore, formed faith is distinguished from charity, and, so, charity cannot be the form of faith.

11. For an act to be an act of virtue it must be morally good and voluntary. But reason is the principle of a morally good action, just as the will is the principle of a voluntary action. Therefore, something from reason is needed for an act of virtue, just as something from the will is needed. Therefore, just as charity, which is in the will, is the form of the virtues, so faith, which is in the reason, is also their form. Therefore, one should not be called the form of the other.

12. The same source gives a thing both life and its form. But spiritual life is attributed to faith, as is clear in Habacuc (2:4): "But my just man liveth by faith." Therefore faith, rather than charity, should be said to form the virtues.

i3. The act of faith is formed in one who has grace. But it is possible for the act of faith of such a man to have no relation to charity. Therefore, the act of faith can be formed without charity. So, charity does not seem to be the form of faith even will reference to its act.

To the Contrary:

1'. That without which faith is formless is the form of faith. But without charity faith is formless. Therefore, charity is the form of faith.

2'. Ambrose says: "Charity is the mother of all the virtues and forms all of them."

3'. A virtue is said to be formed in so far as it is able to elicit a meritorious act. But no act can be meritorious and acceptable to God unless it proceeds from love. Therefore, charity is the form of all the virtues.

4'. The form of a thing is that from which it gets its power to act. But faith gets its power to act from charity, for "faith...worketh by charity" (Gal. 5:6). Therefore, charity is the form of faith.

REPLY:

On this question there are different opinions. Some have said that grace itself is the form of faith and of the other virtues, but no other virtue is a form except in so far as, in their opinion, grace is essentially identified with virtue. But this cannot be. For, whether grace and virtue differ essentially or only conceptually, grace refers to the essence of the soul and virtue to a power. And, although the essence is the root of all the powers, all the powers do not proceed from the essence in the same way. For some powers are naturally prior to others and move them. Consequently, it is necessary for habits in the lower powers to be formed through the habits which are in the higher powers. Thus, the formation of the lower virtues should come from some higher virtue and not immediately from grace.

Hence, it is commonly admitted that charity, as a sort of pre eminent virtue, is the form of the other virtues, not only in so far as it is the same as grace or is inseparably connected with it, but also from the very fact that it is charity. And in this way, also, it is said to be the form of faith.

We should understand the manner in which faith is formed by charity in the following way. For, whenever there are two principles of motion or action will an ordination to each other, that in the effect which is due to the higher agent is, as it were, formal, and that which is from the lower agent is, as it were, material. This is clear in both physical things and moral matters.

For in the act of the nutritive power the power of the soul acts as first agent, and fiery heat acts as an instrumental agent, as is said in *The Soul*. And in flesh, which is produced by nutrition, the assembling of the parts, or dryness, or something of this sort, which comes from fiery heat, is material with reference to the species of flesh, which comes from the power of the soul. Similarly, when reason commands the lower powers, such as the irascible and concupiscible appetites, that in the habit of the concupiscible appetite which is from that appetite, namely, a certain inclination to some use of desirable things, is, as it were, material in temperance; whereas the order, which is of reason, and the rectitude, are formal. And the same holds in the other moral virtues. For this reason some philosophers have called all virtues, sciences, as is said in *the Ethics*.

Since, therefore, faith is in the understanding in so far as the understanding is moved and commanded by the will, that which is from knowledge is material in faith, but its formation must be received from the will. Accordingly, since charity is a perfection of the will, faith is formed by charity. And for the same reason so are all the other virtues, in so far as they are studied by the theologian, that is, in so far as they are principles of meritorious acts. Now, no act can be meritorious unless it is voluntary, as has been said." And, so, it is evident that all the virtues which the theologian is concerned are in the powers of the soul in so far as they are moved by the will.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Charity is not called the form of faith in the way in which a form is part of an essence. For in that way it could not be distinguished from faith. It is called form in so far as faith acquires some perfection from charity. This is also the manner in which the higher elements in the universe are said to be the form of the lower elements, as air of water and water of earth, as is said in *the Physics*.
2. The answer to the second difficulty is clear from the first response.
3. The manner in which charity is called form approximates the manner in which we call an exemplar a form. For what there is of perfection in faith is derived from charity, so that charity has essentially what faith and the other virtues have by participation.
4. Since the habit of charity is not intrinsic to faith, it cannot be called either its substantial or its accidental form. But it can in a certain way be called an exemplary form. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that charity be able to exist without faith. For faith is not patterned on charity in so far as that which constitutes it faith is concerned, for in this way faith precedes charity in regard to the merely cognitional element of faith; rather, it is patterned on charity only in so far as faith is perfect. Hence, nothing prevents faith from being prior to charity in this regard, and charity from being unable to exist without it, while in some other respect charity may be the exemplar of faith which it always informs, in so far as faith is always present to it. But that which results in faith from charity is intrinsic to faith. We shall say later in what way this is accidental or substantial to faith.
5. Will and understanding precede each other in different ways. For the understanding precedes the will in the process of reception, since, if something is to move the will, it must first be received into the understanding, as is clear in *The Soul*. But, in causing motion or in acting, the will is prior, for every action or motion comes from a striving for a good. It is for

this reason that the will, whose proper object is the good in its character as good, is said to move all the lower powers.

Reward, however, expresses the idea of reception, but merit expresses the idea of action. Hence it is that the whole reward is attributed mainly to the understanding, and vision is called the whole reward, because the reward begins in the understanding and is brought to completion in the affections. Merit, however, is attributed to charity, because the will, which charity perfects, is the first mover in the performance of meritorious works.

6. It is impossible for one thing to have many perfections in the same order. Now, grace is the first [that is, remote] perfection of the virtues, but charity is their proximate perfection.

7. The act of faith which precedes charity is an imperfect act awaiting completion from charity. For faith is prior to charity in one respect and subsequent to it in another, as has been said.

8. This difficulty proceeds correctly for the act of faith as it is in itself, but not as it is perfected by charity.

9. When a higher power is perfect, some of its perfection is found in the lower power. And, so, when charity is in the will, its perfection in some manner flows over into the intellect. So, charity forms not only the act of faith, but faith itself.

10. In those words the Apostle seems to be speaking of these habits without considering the character of virtue in them, but, rather, looking at them in so far as they are certain gifts and perfections. For this reason, in the same context he mentions prophecy and certain other charisms, which are not classified as virtues.

Even if he is speaking of them in so far as they are virtues, the reasoning does not proceed correctly. For division into opposites some times takes place between things, one of which is the cause or perfection of the other. Thus, local motion is distinguished from other types of motion, although it is, nevertheless, the cause of the others. So, charity is distinguished from the other virtues, although it is their form.

11. Reason can be considered in two ways. In one, it is taken in itself; in the other, in so far as it regulates the lower powers. In so far as it regulates the lower powers it is perfected through prudence. Thus it is that all the other moral virtues, by which the lower powers are perfected, are formed through prudence as by a proximate form. But faith perfects reason taken in itself, in so far as it considers the truth. Consequently, it does not belong to faith to form the lower virtues, but itself to be formed by charity, which forms the other virtues, even prudence itself, inasmuch as prudence itself, because of the end which is the object of charity, reasons about means to the end.

12. Something common is especially attributed to a thing in two ways, either because it is most perfectly appropriate to it, as we attribute knowledge to the understanding; or because it is first found there, as life is attributed to the plant soul, as is clear in *The Soul*, because life makes its first appearance in its acts. Spiritual life is, therefore, attributed to faith because spiritual life makes its first appearance in the act of faith, although its completion comes from charity, which for this reason is the form of the other virtues.

13. In one who has charity there can be no act of virtue not formed by charity. For, either the act will be directed to the proper end, and this can be only through charity in one who has charity, or the act is not directed to the proper end, and so is not an act of virtue. Consequently, it is not possible for an act of faith to be formed by grace and not by charity, since grace has no ordination to act except through the mediation of charity.

ARTICLE VI: IS FORMLESS FAITH A VIRTUE?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 13, 3, 1, sol. 2; Summa Theol., II-II, 4, 4-5.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. That which faith obtains from charity cannot be essential to faith itself, since faith can exist without it. But a thing is not put in a genus by reason of something accidental to it. Therefore, faith is not put in the genus of virtue by reason of its formation by charity. So, it is a virtue without the form of charity.
2. Only a virtue or a vice is opposed to a vice. But the vice of unbelief is not opposed to formless faith as to a vice. Therefore, it is opposed to it as to a virtue. We conclude as before.
3. It was said that unbelief is opposed only to formed faith.—On the contrary, habits must be opposed whose acts are opposed. But the acts of formless faith and unbelief, namely, assent and dissent, are opposed. Therefore, formless faith is opposed to unbelief.
4. A virtue seems to be nothing else but a habit which tends to perfect some power. But our understanding is perfected through formless faith. Therefore, it is a virtue.
5. Infused habits are more noble than acquired habits. But acquired habits, such as the habits of life in a society, are called virtues even apart from charity according to their classification by the philosophers. Therefore, the formless habit of faith, since it is an infused habit, is a virtue with much greater reason.
6. Augustine says that all the virtues except charity can exist without grace. Therefore, unformed faith, which exists without grace, is a virtue.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. All the virtues are connected with each other, so that a person who has one of them has all of them, as Augustine says. But formless faith is not connected with the others. Therefore, it is not a virtue.
- 2'. There are no virtues in the evil spirits. But there is formless faith in the evil spirits, for "the devils also believe" (James 2:19). Therefore, formless faith is not a virtue.

REPLY:

If we take virtue in its proper sense, formless faith is not a virtue. The reason for this is that virtue, properly speaking, is a habit capable of eliciting a perfect act. However, when an act depends on two powers, it cannot be said to be perfect unless the perfection is found in both powers. This is evident in the moral as well as the intellectual virtues. For knowledge of conclusions requires two things: an understanding of principles, and reasoning, which draws the conclusions from the principles. Therefore, whether one is mistaken or has doubts about principles, or whether there is some defect in his reasoning, or he does not grasp the force of the reasoning, in all these cases he will not know the conclusions perfectly. Consequently, he will not have scientific knowledge, which is an intellectual virtue. Similarly, the proper act of the concupiscible power depends on reason and the concupiscible power. Hence, if reason is not perfected by prudence, no matter what inclination to the good is in the concupiscible power, it cannot have its perfect act. For this reason there can be neither temperance nor any other moral virtue without prudence, as is said in the Ethics.

Since, therefore, the act of believing depends on the understanding and the will, as is clear from what has been said, such an act cannot be perfect unless the will is made perfect by charity and the understanding by faith. Thus, formless faith cannot be a virtue.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Something can be accidental to a thing in so far as its natural constitution is concerned and essential to it will reference to its morality, that is, in so far as it is a virtue or a vice. Such a relation exists between eating and its due end or any other proper circumstance. Similarly, that which faith receives from charity is accidental to faith in its natural constitution, but essential to it will reference to its morality. Therefore, through charity it is put in the genus of virtue.
2. Vice is opposed not only to perfect virtue, but also to that which is imperfect among the virtues. Thus, intemperance is contrary to the natural aptitude for good which is in the appetite. And, so, unbelief is opposed to formless faith.
3. We concede the third difficulty.
4. Formless faith does not bring the understanding to a perfection sufficient for virtue, as is clear from what has been said.
5. The philosophers do not consider virtues as the principles of meritorious acts. Therefore, habits not formed by charity can be virtues for them, though not for the theologian.
6. Augustine takes virtue in the broad meaning of all habits which give the perfection needed for praiseworthy acts. We can also say that Augustine did not mean that habits existing without grace should be called virtues, but that, although some habits, which are virtues when grace is present, remain after grace leaves, it does not follow that they are then virtues.

ARTICLE VII: IS THE HABIT OF FORMLESS FAITH THE SAME AS THAT OF FORMED FAITH?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 23, 3, 4, Sol. 1, sol. Ad Rom., C. 1, lectura 6; Summa Theol., 11—11, 4, 4.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. When grace comes, it has as much influence on one who believes as on one who does not believe. But, when the unbeliever is converted, the habit of faith is infused in him together with grace. Therefore, there is a similar infusion in the believer [is, when he is reinstated in grace]; hence, the habit of formed faith is different from the habit of formless faith.
2. Formless faith is the principle of servile fear. But formed faith is the principle of holy or initial fear. But, when holy or filial fear arrives, servile fear is driven out. Therefore, also, when formed faith comes, formless faith is driven out. So, it is not the same habit for both.
3. As Boethius says, accidents can cease to exist, but they can in no way undergo alteration. But the habit of formless faith is an accident. Therefore, it cannot undergo alteration so that it becomes itself the formed habit.
4. When life comes, what is dead leaves. But formless faith, which is "without works is dead," as is said in James (2:26). Therefore, when charity, which is the principle of life, comes, formless faith is removed, and, so, does not become formed.

5. One thing does not result from two accidents. But formless faith is an accident. Therefore, it cannot unite with charity to make one thing, as would seem to be necessary if formless faith itself became formed.

6. Any things which differ generically also differ specifically and numerically. But formless faith and formed faith differ generically, since one is a virtue and the other is not. Therefore, they also differ specifically and numerically.

7. Habits are distinguished according to their acts. But formless faith and formed faith have different acts: to tend toward God by faith, to believe on God's word, or in God. Therefore, they are different habits.

8. Different habits are lost by different vices, since each is lost because of its opposite, and each thing has only one opposite. But formed faith is lost through the sin of fornication, but formless faith is not, for it is lost only through the sin of unbelief. Therefore, formed and formless faith are different habits.

To the Contrary:

1'. James (2:20, 26) says: "Faith without works is dead" and the Gloss adds: "by which [works] it lives once more." Therefore, the very formless faith which was dead is formed and comes to life again.

2'. Things are not differentiated except by those things which are outside of their essences. But charity is outside of the essence of faith.

Therefore, the habit of faith is not differentiated because it has or does not have charity.

REPLY:

There are different opinions on this matter, for some say that a habit which was formless never becomes formed, but that a new habit, formed faith, is infused with grace. When it arrives, the habit of formless faith leaves. But this cannot be, for a thing is expelled only by its opposite. If, therefore, the habit of formed faith drove out the habit of formless faith, since it is not contrary to it except by reason of its formlessness, it would be necessary that the very formlessness belong to the essence of formless faith. Thus, it would be essentially an evil habit and could not be a gift of God.

Furthermore, when someone sins mortally, grace and formed faith are taken away. Still, we see that faith remains. Nor can it be shown that, as they say, the gift of formless faith is given them again, because then, from the very fact that someone had sinned, he would be made fit to receive a gift from God.

Others therefore say that the habit is not taken away, but just the act of formless faith is removed with the coming of charity. But neither can this stand, for thus the habit would remain idle. Furthermore, since the act of formless faith has no essential contrariety to the act of formed faith, it cannot be hindered by it. Nor, again, can it be said that both acts and habits are there together, for formed faith can perform every act which formless faith performs. Thus, the same act would come from the two powers, which is not reasonable.

Hence, we must say with the others that formless faith stays when charity comes, and is itself formed. In this way only the formlessness is removed. This can be seen from what follows. For in powers or habits we can see two sources of differentiation: objects and different ways of acting. Diversity of objects differentiates habits essentially, in the manner sight differs from hearing, and chastity from bravery. But, with reference to their manner of acting, powers or habits are not differentiated according to their essence, but according to completeness and incompleteness. For the fact that one sees more or less clearly, or performs chaste actions

more or less readily, does not differentiate the power of sight or the habit of chastity, but does show that the power and habit are more perfect and less perfect.

Now, formed faith and formless faith do not have different objects, but only different ways of acting. For formed faith, assents to first truth with a perfect will, whereas formless faith does the same with an imperfect will. So, formed faith and formless faith are not distinguished as two different habits, but as a perfect habit and an imperfect habit. Consequently, since the same habit, which formerly was imperfect, becomes perfect, the very habit of formless faith later becomes formed.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Grace does not have less effectiveness when infused into one who has faith than when infused into one who has not faith. But the fact that it does not cause another habit of faith in one who already has faith is due to an extrinsic reason, namely, because it finds the habit already there. This is like the case in which one who is ignorant is taught by the instruction of the teacher, while one who knows does not acquire a new habit but is strengthened in the knowledge he had before.
- 2.** The arrival of charity does not expel servile fear in its substance as a gift, but only with reference to its servility. Similarly, it is only with reference to its formlessness that faith is formed when grace arrives.
- 3.** Although an accident cannot undergo alteration, the subject of the accident can be altered with reference to some accident. That accident is said to be altered in this way, as whiteness increases or decreases when the subject is altered with reference to whiteness.
- 4.** When life comes, it is not necessary for that which is dead to leave, but for death to leave. Hence, not formless faith but only the formlessness is removed through charity.
- 5.** Although one thing cannot arise from two accidents, one accident can be perfected through another, as colour through light. In this way faith is perfected through charity.
- 6.** Formless and formed faith are not said to differ according to genus, as though they were things existing in different genera. Rather, they are as the perfect, which attains to the character of the genus, and the imperfect, which has not yet attained to it. Thus, it is not necessary that they differ numerically, just as the embryo and the animal do not have to differ numerically.
- 7.** To believe on God's word, to believe in God, and to tend toward God by faith do not indicate different acts, but different circumstances of the same act of virtue. For in faith something derives from knowledge, inasmuch as faith is evidence. In this way the act of faith is said to believe on God's word when there is question of the principle of this evidence. For one who believes something is moved to assent because it was said by God. But, when there is question of the conclusion to which he assents, he is said to believe in God. For first truth is the proper object of faith. With reference to what derives from the will, the believer in his act of faith is said to tend toward God by faith. Moreover, it is not completely an act of virtue unless it has all three of these circumstances.
- 8.** By fornication and other sins except unbelief formed faith is lost, not with reference to the substance of the habit, but only with reference to its form.

ARTICLE VIII: IS FIRST TRUTH THE PROPER OBJECT OF FAITH?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 24, 1, sol. I; Summa Theol., II-II, 1, 1; Q. D. de spe, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. Faith is explained in the Creed. But in the creed there are included many things which refer to creatures. Therefore, first truth is not the only object of faith.
2. It was said that those things in the Creed which refer to creatures belong to faith non essentially and secondarily.—On the contrary, by its nature the consideration of a science extends to everything within the power of the proper means from which it proceeds. But the means of faith is belief in God when He says something. For a believer is moved to assent because he thinks something was said by God. But we should believe God's word not only about first truth, but about any truth. Therefore, any truth is of itself the subject matter and object of faith.
3. Acts are distinguished through their objects. But the act of faith and the vision of God in Himself are different acts. Therefore, since the object of the aforesaid vision is first truth itself, that will not be the object of the act of faith.
4. First truth is related to faith as light is to sight. But, of itself, light is not an object of sight; rather, colour in act is, as the Philosopher says. Therefore, first truth is not the essential object of faith.
5. Faith deals with propositions, for these alone can be true and an object of someone's assent. But first truth is not a proposition. Therefore, the object of faith is not first truth.
6. If first truth were the essential object of faith, nothing which refers entirely to creatures would pertain to faith. But the resurrection of the body refers entirely to creatures, and still is numbered among the articles of faith. Therefore, first truth is not the only essential object of faith.
7. Just as the visible is the object of sight, so the credible is the object of faith. But many other things besides first truth are credible. Therefore, first truth is not the essential object of faith.
8. Things related are known with the same act of knowledge because one is included in the understanding of the other. But Creator and creature are thus related. Therefore, any cognitive habit which has the Creator as its object will have the creature as its object. So, first truth cannot alone be the object of faith.
9. In any knowledge the object is that to which the process leads us. That through which the process leads us to the object is the means. But in faith, by reason of first truth we are led to assent to certain truths about God and creatures, in so far as we believe God to be truthful. Therefore, first truth does not have the role of object of knowledge, but of means to knowledge.
10. Faith, like charity, is a theological virtue. But charity has not only God, but also the neighbour, for its object. Hence, there are two commandments of charity concerning love of God and of the neighbour. Therefore, faith, also, has for its object not only first truth but also created truth.
11. Augustine says that in heaven we shall see things themselves, though here we look at the images of things. But the sight of faith belongs to this life. Therefore, the sight of faith takes place through images. But the images through which our understanding sees are created things. Therefore, the object of faith is created truth.

Faith is a mean between scientific knowledge and opinion, as is clear from the definition of Hugh of St. Victor. But scientific knowledge and opinion deal with a proposition. Therefore, faith does, also. Hence, first truth, which is a concept, cannot be its object.

13. Prophetic revelation, through which things divine are announced to us, seems to be a source of faith. But the object of prophecy is not first truth, but, rather, created things, which are subject to determinate temporal differences. Therefore, first truth is not the object of faith.

14. Contingent truth is not first truth. But at least one truth of faith is a contingent truth. For it was contingent that Christ suffer, since it depended on His free will and that of those who killed Him. Nevertheless, we have faith in the passion of Christ. Therefore, first truth is not the proper object of faith.

15. Faith, properly speaking, is concerned only with propositions. But first truth is in certain articles of faith without the complexity of a proposition, as when we say: God, who suffered, or God, who died. Therefore, first truth is not there considered as the object of faith.

16. First truth has a double relation to faith: as that which bears witness, and as that with which faith is concerned. In so far as it bears witness, it cannot be called the object of faith, for under this aspect it is outside the essence of faith. Nor is it the object of faith in so far as it is that with which faith is concerned, for, thus, any proposition formed about first truth would be an object of faith. And this is evidently false. Therefore, first truth is not the proper object of faith.

To the Contrary:

1'. Dionysius says that faith is "concerned with the simple and never changing truth." But only first truth is such. Therefore.

2'. A theological virtue has the same thing for its end and its object. But the end of faith is first truth, the plain sight of which faith merits. Therefore, its object, too, is first truth.

3'. Isidore says that an article [of the Creed] is the perception of divine truth. But faith is contained in the articles [of the Creed]. Therefore, divine truth is the object of faith.

4'. As charity is related to the good, so faith is related to the true. But the essential object of charity is the highest good, because charity loves God and the neighbour because of God. Therefore, the object of faith is first truth.

REPLY:

The essential object of faith is first truth. This should be understood from the following. Only that habit has the character of virtue whose act is always good. Otherwise, a virtue would not be the perfection of a power. Accordingly, since the act of our understanding is good because it considers the true, it must be impossible for a habit existing in the understanding to be a virtue unless it is such that by it one infallibly speaks the truth. For this reason opinion is not an intellectual virtue, whereas scientific knowledge and understanding of principles are, as is said in the Ethics.

However, faith cannot thus stand as a virtue, deriving from the evidence of things, since it deals with things which do not appear. Consequently, it must derive this infallibility from its adherence to some testimony in which the truth is infallibly found. But, just as every created being of itself is empty and liable to fail, unless it is supported by uncreated being, so all created truth is liable to fail except in so far as it is regulated by uncreated truth. Hence, to assent to the testimony of a man or an angel would lead infallibly to the truth only in so far as we considered the testimony of God speaking in them. Consequently, faith, which is classified as a virtue, must surpass the truth of man's own understanding and thus make it embrace that truth which is in the divine knowledge. In this way, through the simple and never changing truth the believer is freed from the instability and multiplicity of error, as Dionysius says.

Now, the truth of the divine knowledge is so constituted that it be long first and foremost to the uncreated thing itself, but to creatures somehow subsequently, in so far as by knowing itself it knows every thing else. Hence, faith, which through assent unites man to divine knowledge, has God as its principal object, and anything else as a consequent addition.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. All those things included in the Creed which refer to creatures are matters of faith only in so far as something of first truth is connected with them. For the passion itself is not an object of faith except in so far as we believe that God suffered, nor is the resurrection an object of faith except in so far as we believe that it took place through divine power.
2. Although we must believe everything because of the divine testimony, the divine testimony, like the divine knowledge, first and foremost refers to itself, and subsequently to other things. As is said in John (8: 18): "I am one that gives testimony of myself, and the Father that sent me giveth testimony of me." Thus, faith is principally- about God, and about other things in consequence of this.
3. First truth, in so far as it appears in its proper form, is the object of the vision of heaven. But, in so far as it does not appear, it is the object of faith. So, although the object of both acts is the same thing in reality, it differs in intelligible aspect. The object thus formally different makes the species of the act different.
4. In some sense light is the object of sight and in another sense not. For, since light is seen by our sight only if through reflection or in some other way it is united to a body having a surface, it is not called the essential object of sight. This is, rather, colour, which is always in a body having a surface. However, in so far as nothing can be seen except by reason of light, light itself is said to be the first visible thing, as the Philosopher says. Similarly, first truth is primarily and essentially the object of faith.
5. The thing known in so far as it exists in itself outside the knower is said to be the object of knowledge, although knowledge of such a thing takes place only through that which arises from it in the knower. In this way, the colour of a stone, which is the object of sight, is known only through its species in the eye. Accordingly, first truth, which is in itself simple, is the object of faith. But our understanding receives it in its own manner by means of the composition [judgment]. Thus, our understanding, by giving assent as true to the composition which is made in judgment, tends toward first truth as toward its object. Thus, nothing prevents first truth from being the object of faith, although faith treats of propositions.
6. The resurrection of the body and other things of this sort also pertain to first truth in so far as they are caused by divine power.
7. Everything worthy of belief must belong primarily to first truth and, secondarily, to created things because God bears witness to them, as is evident from what has been said. Other things worthy of belief are not the object of the faith with which we are now dealing.
8. The Creator is not the object of faith under the aspect of Creator, but under the aspect of first truth. Consequently, it is not necessary for creatures to be an essential object of faith. For it does not follow, from the fact that the knowledge of master and slave, as such, is the same, that whoever knows something about the master knows something about the slave.
9. Although we are led to creatures by reason of first truth, through it we are led mainly to first truth itself, since it gives witness primarily about itself. So, in faith, first truth acts both as means and object.

10. In the neighbour, charity loves only God. Therefore, it does not follow from this that the object of charity is anything other than the highest good.

11. The representations through which faith looks at something are not the object of faith, but that through which faith tends toward its object.

12. Although faith deals with a proposition in so far as we are concerned, it nevertheless deals with a simple truth in so far as there is question of the object to which we are led through faith.

13. Although prophecy has for its subject matter created and temporal things, it has the uncreated reality for its end. For all the prophetic revelations, even those made about created things, are ordained to make us know God. Therefore, prophecy leads to faith as to its end. Nor is it necessary for faith and prophecy to have the same object or subject matter. And if at times faith and prophecy deal with the same thing, still they do not treat it under the same aspect. Thus, the ancients had prophecy and faith about the passion of Christ. However, the prophecy had reference to that which was temporal in it, and faith to that which was eternal in it.

14. Faith does not concern the passion except in so far as it is connected with eternal truth, as the passion is considered with reference to God. For, although the passion, considered in itself, is contingent, still, as it falls under the divine foreknowledge, and as faith and prophecy concern it, it has changeless truth.

15. The subject of a proposition acts as matter for the whole proposition. So, although in such propositions, when we say that God has suffered, only the subject denotes something uncreated, the whole proposition is said to have something uncreated as its subject matter. Thus, it does not deny that faith has first truth for its object.

16. First truth is called the object of faith only in so far as faith concerns it. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that every proposition made about God be something to be beloved, but only that to which divine truth bears witness. Similarly, mobile body is the subject of the philosophy of nature, yet not every proposition that can be formed about mobile body is subject to scientific knowledge, but only those which are proved from the principles of the philosophy of nature. Moreover, in faith the witness of first truth acts as a principle does in scientific demonstrations

ARTICLE IX: CAN FAITH DEAL WITH THINGS WHICH ARE KNOWN AS SCIENTIFIC CONCLUSIONS?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 24, 2, sol. Ad Hebr., c. 11, Lect. 1; Summa Theol., I-II, 67, II-II, 1,.

Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

1. Anything which can be proved by a necessary argument can be known as a scientific conclusion. But, according to Richard of St. Victor, everything which must be believed has not only a probable argument, but also a necessary argument. Therefore, we can have scientific knowledge about things believed.

2. The divinely infused light of grace is more powerful than the light of nature. But we do not only believe, but know and understand, those things which are shown to us through the natural light of reason. Therefore, we also know and do not only believe those things which are made known to us through the divinely infused light of faith.

3. The testimony of God is more certain and effective than that of a man, no matter how much he knows. But one who proceeds [to conclusions] on the basis of the statement of someone who has scientific knowledge, himself achieves scientific knowledge, as is clear in the subalternate sciences, which borrow their principles from the sub alternating sciences. Therefore, will much greater reason we have scientific knowledge of matters of faith, since they are based on divine testimony.

4. Whenever the understanding is forced of necessity to assent to something, it has scientific knowledge of those things to which it assents. For inference from what is necessary produces scientific knowledge. But one who believes necessarily assents to matters of faith, for St. James says (2: 19): "The devils also believe and tremble." This cannot be due to their will, since their will cannot do anything praise worthy. So, they must necessarily give assent to matters of faith. Therefore, there can be scientific knowledge about matters of faith.

5. Those things which are known naturally are objects of scientific knowledge or are known with greater certainty than such objects. But "the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in us," as Damascene says. Faith, however, is ordained to knowledge of God. Therefore, matters of faith can be objects of scientific knowledge.

6. Opinion is farther from scientific knowledge than faith is. But we can have scientific knowledge and opinion about the same thing, as happens when one knows one and the same conclusion through a demonstrative and a dialectical syllogism. Therefore, there can be scientific knowledge and faith about the same thing.

7. That Christ was conceived is an article of faith. But the Blessed Virgin know this from experience. Therefore, the same thing can be known and believed.

8. That God is one is included among objects of faith. But philosophers give demonstrative proof of this. Therefore, it can be known scientifically. So, we can have faith and scientific knowledge about the same thing.

9. That God exists is an object of faith. However, we do not believe this because it is acceptable to God, for no one can think that some thing is pleasing to God unless he first thinks that there is a God to whom it is pleasing. Hence, the judgment by which one thinks that God exists precedes the judgment by which he thinks something is pleasing to God. Nor can the former cause the latter. But we are led to believe something which we do not know through that which we believe is pleasing to God. Therefore, that God exists is believed and known.

To the Contrary:

1'. First truth is the principal subject matter or object of faith. But man cannot have scientific knowledge about first truth, that is, about God, as we see from Dionysius. Therefore, we cannot have faith and scientific knowledge about the same thing.

2'. It is by reason that scientific knowledge is made perfect. But reason destroys faith, "for faith deserves no merit when human reason offers it proof." Therefore, faith and scientific knowledge do not engage the same object.

3'. The first Epistle to the Corinthians (13: 10) says: "But when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be put away." The knowledge of faith is in part, that is, is imperfect; but the knowledge of science is perfect. Therefore, science destroys faith.

REPLY:

According to Augustine: "We believe those things which are not present to our senses, if the witness which is offered for them seems suitable. However, we see those things which are present either to the senses of the mind or of the body."

This difference is quite clear with reference to the things which are present to the senses of the body, for among these it is evident what is present to them and what is not. But it is more obscure when we say something is present to the senses of the mind. Yet those things are said to be present to the understanding which do not exceed its capacity, so that the gaze of understanding may be fixed on them. For a person gives assent to such things because of the witness of his own understanding and not because of someone else's testimony. Those things, however, which are beyond the power of our understanding are said to be absent from the senses of the mind. Hence, our understanding cannot be fixed on them. As a result, we cannot assent to them on our own witness, but on that of someone else. These things are properly called the objects of faith.

Consequently, the object of faith is that which is absent from our understanding. (We believe that which is absent, but we see that which is present, as Augustine says. For "not present" we can say "the thing which does not appear," that is, the thing not seen, for, as Hebrews (11:1) says: "faith is the evidence of things that appear not." Now, whenever the determinate principle of the proper object is lacking, the act also must necessarily cease. Hence, as soon as some thing begins to be present or to appear, it cannot be an object of an act of faith. Whatever things we know with scientific knowledge properly so called we know by reducing them to first principles which are naturally present to the understanding. In this way, all scientific knowledge terminates in the sight of a thing which is present. Hence, it is impossible to have faith and scientific knowledge about the same thing.

We must note, however, that a thing can be the object of belief in two ways. In one it is such absolutely, that is, it exceeds the intellectual capacity of all men who exist in this life, for instance, that there is trinity and unity in God, and so on. Now, it is impossible for any man to have scientific knowledge of these. Rather, every believer assents to such doctrines because of the testimony of God to whom these things are present and by whom they are known.

A thing is, however, an object of belief not absolutely, but in some respect, when it does not exceed the capacity of all men, but only of some men. In this class are those things which we can know about God by means of a demonstration, as that God exists, or is one, or has no body, and so forth. There is nothing to prevent those who have scientific proofs of these things from knowing them scientifically, and others who do not understand the proofs from believing them. But it is impossible for the same person to know and believe them.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** For everything which must be believed, if it is not self-evident, there is an argument which is not only probable but necessary, "yet our diligence may not uncover that argument," as Richard adds. So, for us, the arguments for matters of faith are unknown, although they are known to God and to the blessed who have vision and not faith about these things.
- 2.** Although the divinely infused light is more powerful than natural light, in our present state we do not share it perfectly, but imperfectly. Therefore, because of this defective participation, through that infused light itself we are not brought to the vision of those things for the knowledge of which it was given us. But we will have it in heaven when we will share that light perfectly and in the light of God we will see light.
- 3.** One who has a subalternate science does not perfectly possess the character of knowing unless his knowledge is united in some way with the knowledge of one who has the subalternating science. Nonetheless, the one who knows on the lower level is not said to have

scientific knowledge about those things which he presupposes, but about the necessary conclusions which are drawn from the presupposed principles. In this sense, also, one who believes can be said to have scientific knowledge about those things which he concludes from the articles of faith.

4. It is not their wills which bring demons to assent to what they are said to believe. Rather, they are forced by the evidence of signs which convince them that what the faithful believe is true. However, these signs do not cause the appearance of what is believed so that the demons could on this account be said to see those things which are believed. Therefore, belief is predicated equivocally of men who believe and of the demons. And faith does not result in them from any infused light of grace as it does in the faithful.

5. God is an object of faith, not will reference to what is naturally known about God, but will reference to that which surpasses natural knowledge.

6. It does not seem possible for a person simultaneously to have scientific knowledge and opinion about the same thing, for opinion includes a fear that the other part [the contradiction] is true, and scientific knowledge excludes such fear. Similarly, it is impossible to have faith and scientific knowledge about the same thing.

7. The Blessed Virgin could know that her Son was not conceived as a result of sexual intercourse. She could not, however, know what power caused that conception, but believed the angel who said: "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee,..." (Luke 1:35).

8. We do not say that the proposition, God is one, in so far as it is proved by demonstration, is an article of faith, but something presupposed before the articles. For the knowledge of faith presupposes natural knowledge, just as grace presupposes nature. But the unity of the divine essence such as is conceived by the faithful, that is to say, together with omnipotence, providence over all things, and the other attributes of this sort, which cannot be proved, makes up the article of faith.

8. Someone can begin to believe what he did not believe before but which he held with some hesitation. Thus, it is possible that, before believing in God, someone might think that God exists, and that it would be pleasing to God to have him believe that He exists. In this way a man can believe that God exists because such a belief pleases God, although this is not an article of faith, but preliminary to the article, since it can be proved by a demonstration.

ARTICLE X: IS IT NECESSARY FOR MAN TO HAVE FAITH?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 24, 3, sol. 1; In Boet. De Trinit., 3, 1; Contra Gentiles I, III, ix8, 152; Summa Theol., II-II, 2, 3; Expos. symb.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. As is said in Deuteronomy (32:4): "The works of God are perfect." But nothing is perfect unless it is provided with those things which it must have to attain its proper end. Therefore, sufficient means to attain its final end are given to each thing when God creates its nature. But matters of faith are beyond the knowledge which belongs to men by reason of the constitution of their nature. Therefore, to reach his end man does not need faith, through which these things are perceived or known.

2. It was said that by reason of the constitution of his nature man receives those things which are necessary to reach his natural end, such as the happiness of life of which the philosophers

speak, but does not receive the things needed to reach the supernatural end, which is everlasting happiness.—On the contrary, man, because of his essential constitution, is made to be a sharer of eternal happiness. It was for this that God created a rational nature which could know Him, as we see in the Sentences. Therefore, the principles through which he can reach that end should be innate in man's very nature.

3. We have to have activity as well as knowledge to reach our end. But the habits of virtue given us to attain our supernatural end do not give us an ordination to works other than those toward which we are ordered by natural reason, but, rather, to a more perfect performance of those same works. For acquired and infused chastity seem to have the same act, namely, to control venereal pleasure. Therefore, to reach a supernatural end we do not need the infusion of a cognitive habit ordained to knowledge of something besides what we naturally know, but only to a more perfect knowledge of these same natural objects. Hence, it seems that to have faith in things which are not evident to reason would not be necessary for salvation.

4. A power has no need of a habit for that to which it has a natural determination, as is evident in irrational powers, as the nutritive and the generative, which carry on their activity without the mediation of a habit. Now, the human understanding is naturally directed to knowledge of God. Therefore, it does not need a habit to lead it to this knowledge.

5. That which can reach its final end by itself is more perfect than that which cannot do so. But brute animals can attain their ends by means of natural principles. Therefore, since man is more perfect than they, it seems that natural knowledge should be enough for him to reach his end. Thus, he does not need faith.

6. What is considered to be a vice does not seem necessary for salvation. But credulity is considered to be a vice. Thus, in Ecclesiasticus (19:4) we read: "He that is hasty to give credit is light of heart." Therefore, belief is not necessary for salvation.

7. Since God must be believed above all else, our belief should be greater in one through whom it is clearer that God is speaking. But it is clearer that God has spoken through the natural instinct of reason than through any prophet or apostle, since by this it is most certain that God is the author of all nature. Therefore, we should hold more firmly the things which reason proposes than those which the prophets and apostles preach, and which are the objects of faith. Therefore, since these latter sometimes seem to conflict with what natural reason dictates, as when they say that God is three and one, or that a virgin conceived, and so on, it does not seem reasonable to put faith in such things.

8. That which is rendered useless by the arrival of another thing does not seem to be needed for that thing. For it would not become useless unless there were some opposition between it and the other. Now, a thing does not incline toward its opposite; rather, it withdraws from it. But faith becomes useless when glory arrives. Therefore, faith is not necessary to obtain glory.

9. Nothing in order to reach its end needs that which destroys it. But faith destroys reason, for, as Gregory says: "Faith deserves no merit when human reason offers it proof." Therefore, reason does not need faith to reach its end.

10. A heretic does not have the habit of faith. But, sometimes, a heretic believes in certain truths which are beyond the reach of reason. Thus, he may believe that the Son of God was made flesh, although he does not believe that He suffered. Therefore, the habit of faith is not needed to know things which are above reason.

11. When something is proved by means of many middle terms, the whole proof is ineffective if one of the middle terms is weak. This is evident in syllogistic deductions, where the

existence of one false or doubtful proposition makes the whole proof ineffectual. But the truths of faith reach us through many intermediaries. For God told them to the apostles or prophets, who related them to their followers. These men in turn told others, and in this way they finally reached us through various intermediaries. Now, it is not certain that there was infallible truth in all of these intermediaries. For, since they were men, they could deceive and be deceived. Therefore, we can have no certainty about matters of faith, and so it seems foolish to assent to them.

12. That in a work which lessens the merit for eternal life does not seem necessary to obtain eternal life. But, since difficulty makes for merit, habit, which brings facility, lessens merit. Therefore, the habit of faith is not necessary for salvation.

13. The powers of reason are more noble than the powers of physical nature. But physical powers do not need habits for their acts. Therefore, understanding does not need the habit of faith for its acts.

To the Contrary:

1'. In Hebrews (11:6) we read: "But without faith it is impossible to please God."

2'. That without which man is damned is necessary for salvation. But faith is so needed, as appears in Mark (16: 16): "He that believeth not shall be condemned." Therefore, faith is necessary for salvation.

3'. A higher life needs a higher knowledge. But the life of grace is higher than the life of nature. Therefore, it needs some supernatural knowledge, which is the knowledge of faith.

REPLY:

To obtain eternal life it is necessary to have faith in those things which are beyond the grasp of reason. We can understand this from what follows. For a thing is brought from imperfection to perfection only through the activity of something perfect. Nor does the imperfect thing at once in the very beginning fully receive the action of that which is perfect; at first it receives it imperfectly and, later, more perfectly. And it continues in this way until it reaches perfection. This is evident in all physical things, which acquire a perfection gradually.

We see the same thing in human works, especially in the learning process. For in the beginning a man has incomplete knowledge, and, if he is to reach the perfection of scientific knowledge, needs an instructor to bring him to that perfection. Nor could the teacher do this unless he himself had full knowledge of the science, that is unless he understood the intelligible principles of the things which form the subject matter of the science. At the outset of his teaching, however, he does not explain to his pupil the intelligible principles of the things to be known which he intends to teach, because then, at the very beginning, the pupil would [have to] know the science perfectly. Instead, the teacher proposes some things, the principles of which the pupil does not understand when first taught, but will know later when he has made some progress in the science. For this reason it is said that the learner must believe. And he could not acquire mastery of the science in any other way unless he accepted without proof those things which he is taught at first and the arguments for which he cannot then understand.

The final perfection toward which man is ordained consists in the perfect knowledge of God, which, indeed, man can reach only if God, who knows Himself perfectly, undertakes to teach him. Early in his life, however, man is not capable of receiving perfect knowledge. So, he has to accept certain things on faith and by means of these he is led on till he arrives at perfect knowledge.

Now, some of these things are such that they can never be perfectly known in this life, for they wholly transcend the power of human reason. These we must believe as long as we are in this life. However, we shall see them perfectly in heaven.

There are others which we can know perfectly in this life, as, for instance, the things which we can prove conclusively about God. Still, in the beginning, we have to believe these for five reasons, which Rabbi Moses gives. The first reason is the depth and subtlety of these objects of knowledge which are farthest removed from the senses. Hence, at the very beginning, man is not qualified to know them perfectly. The second reason is the weakness of human understanding when it begins to operate. The third is the number of things needed for a conclusive proof of these. And a man can learn them all only after a long time. The fourth reason is the disinclination for scientific investigation which some men have because they lack the proper temperament. The fifth is the need of engaging in other occupations to provide the necessities of life.

From all this it is clear that, if it were necessary to use a strict demonstration as the only way to reach a knowledge of the things which we must know about God, very few could ever construct such a demonstration and even these could do it only after a long time. From this it is evident that the provision of the way of faith, which gives all easy access to salvation at any time, is beneficial to man.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** In the constitution of man's nature full provision is made for him, in so far as, to attain the end which is within the power of nature, he is given principles which are capable of causing that end. However, for the end which is beyond his natural ability man is given principles which are not a cause of the end, but which give him a capacity for those things which do bring him to his end. For this reason Augustine says: "The capacity to have faith and charity is due to man's nature, but their actual possession is due to the grace which the faithful receive."
- 2.** In the very beginning of creation, human nature was ordained to beatitude, not as to an end proper to man by reason of his nature, but given him solely by divine liberality. Therefore, there is no need for the principles of nature to have sufficient power to achieve that end without the aid of special gifts with which God in His generosity supplements them.
- 3.** One who is some distance from an end can know the end and desire it; however, he cannot engage in activity- which directly concerns the end, but only in that which is connected with the means to the end. Therefore, if we are to reach our supernatural end, we need faith in this life to know the end, for natural knowledge does not go that far. But our natural powers do extend to the means to the end, although not precisely as ordained to that end. Therefore, we do not need infused habits for any other activity than that which natural reason dictates, but just for a more perfect performance of the same activity. However, this is not the case with knowledge for the reason given above.
- 4.** Our understanding does not have a natural determination to matters of faith in the sense that it should know them naturally, but it does in some sense have a natural ordination to a knowledge of them in so far as nature is said to have an ordination to grace by reason of a divine decree. Consequently, this does not remove the need we have for the habit of faith.
- 5.** Man is more perfect than the other animals. However, nature does not determine what is necessary for him to reach his end as it does for other animals, and this for two reasons. First, since man is ordained to a higher end, therefore, even though he needs more helps to reach that end and natural principles are not enough for him, he is nonetheless more perfect. Second, the very fact that he can have many ways to reach his end is a perfection in man. For this reason he cannot be limited to one natural way as other animals are. But, instead of all the means which nature provides for other animals, man is given reason, through which he can

take care of the necessities of this life and make himself fit to receive the divine helps for the future life.

6. Credulity is called a vice because it means an excess of belief, just as to be a drinker means an excess in drinking. However, one who believes God does not believe immoderately, because we cannot put too much faith in Him. So, the conclusion does not follow.

7. The apostles and prophets under divine inspiration have never said anything contrary to the dictates of natural reason. Nevertheless, they have said things which are beyond the comprehension of reason, and so to this extent seem to contradict reason, although they do not really oppose it. In a similar way, to an unlettered person it seems contrary to reason to say that the sun is larger than the earth and the diagonal is incommensurable with the side. However, these appear reasonable to those who are educated.

8. It is because of its imperfection that faith is rendered use when glory arrives. And on this account it has a certain opposition to the perfection of glory. But, as far as the knowledge of faith is concerned, faith is necessary for salvation. For there is nothing unreasonable in the fact that something imperfect, which is directed to the perfection of the end, ceases to exist when the end is reached, as motion ceases to be when rest, which is its end, is reached.

9. Faith does not destroy reason, but goes beyond it and perfects it, as has been said above.

10. A heretic does not have the habit of faith even if it is only one article of faith which he refuses to believe. For infused habits are lost through one contrary act. And the habit of faith has this power, that through it the understanding of the believer is withheld from giving assent to things contrary to faith, just as chastity restrains us from acts opposed to chastity. Now, when a heretic believes something which is beyond the scope of natural knowledge, he does this not by reason of an infused habit, for such a habit would direct him equally to all objects of belief, but by reason of some human judgment, as happens also will pagans who believe certain things surpassing nature about God.

11. All the intermediaries through which faith comes to us are above suspicion. We believe the prophets and apostles because the Lord has been their witness by performing miracles, as Mark (16:20) says: and confirming the word will signs that followed." And we believe the successors of the apostles and prophets only in so far as they tell us those things which the apostles and prophets have left in their writings.

12. There are two kinds of difficulty, one arising from the nature of the work itself, and such difficulty has value for merit; the other arising from the disorder or sluggishness of the will. This latter rather lessens merit, and habit destroys it but not the former.

13. Natural powers have a determination to one object, and so do not need a habit to give them this determination as do the rational powers, which are related equally to things opposed to each other.

ARTICLE XI: IS IT NECESSARY TO BELIEVE EXPLICITLY?

Parallel readings: I Sentences III Sentences 25, 2, 1, sol. 1, 2; Summa Theol., II—II, 2, 5.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

We should not posit any proposition from which an untenable conclusion follows. But, if we claim that explicit belief is necessary for salvation, an untenable conclusion follows. For it is

possible for someone to be brought up in the forest or among wolves, and such a one cannot have explicit knowledge of any matter of faith. Thus, there will be a man who will inevitably be damned. But this is untenable. Hence, explicit belief in something does not seem necessary.

2. We have no obligation to that which is not within our power.

But to believe something explicitly we have to hear it from within or without, for "faith cometh by hearing," as is said in Romans (10: 1). However, hearing is within the power of a person only if there is someone to speak. Thus, to believe something explicitly is not necessary for salvation.

3. Very subtle matters should not be taught to the uneducated. But there is nothing more subtle or more exalted than things which are beyond reason, such as the articles of faith. Therefore, such things should not be taught to the people. Therefore, at least not everybody is required to believe something explicitly.

4. Man is not bound to know that which even the angels do not know. But before the Incarnation the angels did not know the mystery of the Incarnation, as Jerome seems to say. Therefore, the men of those times, at least, were not bound to know or believe something explicitly about the Redeemer.

5. Many Gentiles were saved before the coming of Christ, as Dionysius says. However, they could know nothing explicitly about the Redeemer, since the prophets had not come to them. Therefore, explicit belief in the articles about the Redeemer does not seem necessary for salvation.

6. One of the articles of faith about the Redeemer concerns the descent into hell [that is, limbo]. But, according to Gregory, John doubted about this article when he asked: "Art thou he that art to come?" (Matt. 11:3). Therefore, since he is one of the greater men, for no one is greater than he, as is said in the same passage, it seems that even the greater men are not bound to know explicitly the articles about the Redeemer.

To the Contrary:

1'. Explicit belief in everything seems necessary for salvation, for everything pertains to faith in the same way. So, everything has to be believed explicitly for the same reason that one truth has to be believed explicitly.

2'. Everyone is bound to avoid all errors which are against the faith. This can be done only by having explicit knowledge of all the articles which the errors oppose. Therefore, we have to have explicit belief in all the articles.

3'. As commands direct our action, so articles direct our belief. But everyone is bound to know all the commandments of the Decalogue, for a man is not excused if he commits some sin through ignorance of the commandments. Therefore, everyone is also bound to believe all the articles explicitly.

4'. Just as God is the object of faith, so, also, He is the object of charity. But we should not love anything implicitly in God. Therefore, neither should we believe anything implicitly about Him.

5'. A heretic, however uneducated, is questioned about all the articles of faith. This would not be done if he were not bound to believe all of them explicitly. This brings us to the same conclusion as before.

6'. The habit of faith is specifically the same in all believers. If, then, some of the faithful must believe everything explicitly, all are bound to the same thing.

7'. Formless faith is not enough for salvation. But to believe implicitly is to have formless faith, for superiors on whose faith depends the faith of uneducated people, who believe implicitly, often have formless faith. Therefore, to believe implicitly is not enough for salvation.

REPLY:

Properly speaking, that is called implicit in which many things are contained as in one, and that is called explicit in which each of the things is considered in itself. These appellations are transferred from bodily to spiritual things. When a number of things are contained virtually in one thing, we say they are there implicitly, as, for instance, conclusions in principles. A thing is contained explicitly in another if it actually exists in it. Consequently, one who knows some general principles has implicit knowledge of all the particular conclusions. One, however, who actually considers the conclusions is said to know them explicitly. Hence, we are also said explicitly to believe certain things when we affirm those things about which we are actually thinking. We believe these same things implicitly when we affirm certain other things in which they are contained as in general principles. Thus, one who believes that the faith of the Church is true, implicitly in this believes the individual points which are included in the faith of the Church.

We must note, accordingly, that there are some matters of faith which everyone is bound to believe explicitly in every age. Other matters of faith must believe explicitly in every age but not by every one. Still other matters everyone must believe explicitly, but not in every age. And, finally, there are things that need not be believed explicitly by everyone nor in every age.

That all the faithful in every age must believe something explicitly is evident from the fact that there is a parallel between the reception of faith will reference to our ultimate perfection and a pupil's reception of those things which his master first teaches him, and through which he is guided to prior principles. However, he could not be so guided unless he actually considered something. Hence, the pupil must receive something for actual consideration; likewise, the faithful must explicitly believe something. And these are the two things which the Apostle tells us must be believed explicitly: "For he that cometh to God must believe that He is, and is the rewarder to them that love Him" (Hebrews 11:6). Therefore, everyone in every age is bound explicitly to believe that God exists and exercises providence over human affairs.

However, it is not possible for anyone in this life to know explicitly the whole of God's knowledge, in which our beatitude consists. Yet it is possible for someone in this life to know all those things which are proposed to the human race in its present state as first principles will which to direct itself to its final end. Such a person is said to have faith which is completely explicit. But not all believers have this completeness; hence, there are levels of belief in the Church, so that some are placed over others to teach them in matters of faith. Consequently, not all are required explicitly to believe all matters of faith, but only those are so bound who are appointed teachers in matters of faith, such as superiors and those who have pastoral duties.

And even these are not bound to believe everything explicitly in every age. For there is a gradual progress in faith for the whole human race just as there is for individual men. This is why Gregory says that down the ages there has been a growing development of divine knowledge.

Now, the fullness of time, which is the prime of life of the human race, is in the age of grace. So, in this age, the leaders are bound to believe all matters of faith explicitly. But, in earlier ages, the leaders were not bound to believe everything explicitly. However, more had to be believed explicitly after the age of the law and the prophets than before that time.

Accordingly, before sin came into the world, it was not necessary to believe explicitly the matters concerning the Redeemer, since there was then no need of the Redeemer. Nevertheless, this was implicit in their belief in divine providence, in so far as they believed that God would provide everything necessary for the salvation of those who love Him. Before and after the fall, the leaders in every age had to have explicit faith in the Trinity. Between the fall and the age of grace, however, the ordinary people did not have to have such explicit belief. Perhaps before the fall there was not such a distinction of persons that some had to be taught the faith by others. Likewise, between the fall and the age of grace, the leading men had to have explicit faith in the Redeemer, and the ordinary people only implicit faith. This was contained either in their belief in the faith of the patriarchs and prophets or in their belief in divine providence.

However, in the time of grace, everybody, the leaders and the ordinary people, have to have explicit faith in the Trinity and in the Redeemer. However, only the leaders, and not the ordinary people, are bound to believe explicitly all the matters of faith concerning the Trinity and the Redeemer. The ordinary people must, however, believe explicitly the general articles, such as that God is triune, that the Son of God was made flesh, died, and rose from the dead, and other like matters which the Church commemorates in her feasts.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Granted that everyone is bound to believe something explicitly, no untenable conclusion follows even if someone is brought up in the forest or among wild beasts. For it pertains to divine providence to furnish everyone with what is necessary for salvation, provided that on his part there is no hindrance. Thus, if someone so brought up followed the direction of natural reason in seeking good and avoiding evil, we must most certainly hold that God would either reveal to him through internal inspiration what had to be believed, or would send some preacher of the faith to him as he sent Peter to Cornelius (Acts 10:20).
- 2.** Although it is not within our power to know matters of faith by ourselves alone, still, if we do what we can, that is, follow the guidance of natural reason, God will not withhold from us that which we need.
- 3.** Matters of faith are not presented to the uneducated for minute explanation, but in a general way, for in this way they have to believe them explicitly as has been said.
- 4.** According to Dionysius and Augustine, the angels knew the mystery of the Incarnation of Christ before men did, since it was through the angels that the prophets were told of the Incarnation. But Jerome says that the angels learned this mystery through the Church, in so far as the mystery of the salvation of the Gentiles was fulfilled through the preaching of the Apostles. In this way, their knowledge was more complete with reference to certain circumstances, since they now saw as present what they had foreseen as future.
- 5.** The Gentiles were not established as teachers of divine faith. Hence, no matter how well versed they were in secular wisdom, they should be counted as ordinary people. Therefore, it was enough for them to have implicit faith in the Redeemer, either as part of their belief in the faith of the law and the prophets, or as part of their belief in divine providence itself. Nevertheless, it is likely that the mystery of our redemption was revealed to many Gentiles before Christ's coming, as is clear from the Sibylline prophecies.

6. Although John the Baptist should be counted among the greater persons of his time because God made him a herald of truth, it was not necessary for him to believe explicitly all the matters of revelation which are explicitly believed after Christ's passion and resurrection in the age of grace. For, in his time, the knowledge of the truth had not reached the fullness which it received especially with the coming of the Holy Spirit. Some, however, say that in this passage John did not ask personally for himself, but for his disciples who doubted about Christ. Some also say that this was the question not of one who doubted but of one who had a holy admiration for the humility of Christ, that He would deign to descend into hell.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. All things which pertain to faith do not have the same rational connection with the direction of man to his final end, for some are more obscure than others and some are more necessary to it than others. Therefore, some articles rather than others must be believed explicitly.

2'. One who does not believe all the articles explicitly can still avoid all errors because the habit of faith keeps him from giving assent to things against the articles which he knows only implicitly. Thus, for instance, if something unusual is proposed, he is suspicious of it and delays assent until he gets instruction from him whose duty it is to decide about doubtful matters of faith.

3'. The commandments of the Decalogue deal with things that are dictated by natural reason. Therefore, everyone is required to know them explicitly. A similar argument cannot be used for the articles of faith, which are above reason.

4'. Love is distinguished into implicit and explicit only in so far as it follows faith. For love terminates at some individual thing existing outside the soul, whereas knowledge terminates at that which is within the perception of the soul, which can perceive something in general or in particular. Therefore, faith and charity do not work in the same way.

5'. An uneducated person who is accused of heresy is not examined on all the articles of faith because he must believe them all explicitly, but because he must not obstinately maintain the opposite of any of the articles.

6'. That some of the faithful must believe explicitly what others have to believe only implicitly does not come from a difference in the habit of faith, but from different duties. For one who is made a teacher of the faith should know explicitly those things which he must or ought to teach. And the higher his position is, the more perfect a knowledge of matters of faith he should have.

7'. Ordinary people do not have implicit faith in the faith of some particular men, but in the faith of the Church, which cannot be formless. Furthermore, one is said to have implicit faith in the faith of another, because of an agreement in belief, and not because they have the same mode of informed or formless faith.

ARTICLE XII: IS THERE ONE FAITH FOR MODERNS AND ANCIENTS?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 25, 2, 2, sol. I; Summa Theol., II-II, I, 7; 2, 7; 174, 6.

Difficulties:

It seems that there is not, for

1. Universal knowledge differs from particular knowledge. But the ancients knew the matters of faith as it were in general, believing them implicitly, whereas moderns believe them explicitly and in particular. Therefore, the faith of the ancients and moderns is not the same.

2. Faith concerns a proposition. But the propositions which we believe are not the same as the ones they believed, as, for instance, Christ will be born, and Christ has been born. Therefore, our faith is not the same as that of the ancients.

3. In matters of faith a definite time is a necessary element of belief. Thus, a man would be called an unbeliever if he believed that Christ had not yet come, but would come. But there is temporal variation

in our faith and that of the ancients, for we believe about the past what they believed about the future. Hence, our faith and that of the ancients is not the same.

To the Contrary:

1'. In Ephesians (4:5) we read: "One Lord, one faith, one baptism."

REPLY:

We must firmly hold that there is one faith for ancients and moderns; otherwise, there would not be one Church. To support this position some have said that the proposition about the past which we believe and the one about the future which the ancients believed is the same proposition. But it does not seem right that the proposition should remain the same when its essential parts are changed. For we see that propositions are changed by reason of changes in the subject and verb.

For this reason, others have said that the propositions which we believe and which they believed are different, but that faith does not concern propositions but things. The thing, however, is the same, although the propositions are different. For they say that it belongs intrinsically to faith to believe in the resurrection of Christ, but only accidentally to faith to believe that it is or was. But this is obviously false, for, since belief is called assent, it can only be about a proposition, in which truth or falsity is found. Thus, When I say: "I believe in the resurrection," I must understand some union [of subject and predicate]. And I must do this will reference to some time which the soul always adds in affirmative and negative propositions, as is said in The Soul. Accordingly, the sense of "I believe in the resurrection" is this: "I believe that the resurrection is, was, or will be."

Therefore, we must say that the object of faith can be considered in two ways. First, we have the object in itself as it exists outside the soul. And it is properly in this sense that it has the character of object and is the reason why habits are one or many. Second, we have the object as it exists in the knower as participated by him. Accordingly, we have to say that, if we take as the object of faith the thing believed as it exists outside the soul, it is in this way that each thing is related to us and to the ancients. And faith gets its unity from the oneness of the object. However, if we consider faith as it is in our perception of it, it is multiplied according to different propositions. But faith is not differentiated by this diversity. From this it is evident that faith is one in every way.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. To know in general and in particular differentiates knowledge only will reference to the manner of knowing, not will reference to the thing known, from which the habit has its unity.

2. The answer to the second difficulty is clear from what has been said.

3. Time does not change because of something in the thing, but because of relation to us or the ancients. For there is one time in which Christ suffered. Under different aspects it is called past or future for people in comparison with things which precede or follow.

QUESTION 15: Lower Reason

ARTICLE I: ARE UNDERSTANDING AND REASON DIFFERENT POWERS IN MAN?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 35, 2, 2, sol. I; Summa Theol., I, 8.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are, for

1. In Spirit and Soul we read: "When we want to rise from lower to higher things, first, senses come to our aid; then, imagination; then, reason; then, understanding; then, intelligence; and, in the highest place, there is wisdom, which is God Himself." But imagination and sense are different powers. Therefore, reason and understanding are, too.
2. As Gregory says, man has something in common with every creature, and for this reason is man called all creation. However, that by which man has something in common with plants is a power of the soul, the vegetative, which is distinct from reason, the proper power of man, as man. The same is true for the senses, by which he has something in common with brute animals. Therefore, will equal reason, his understanding, which he has in common with angels, who are above man, is a power different from reason, which is proper to the human race, as Boethius says.
3. Just as the perceptions of the proper senses terminate at the common sense, which makes judgments concerning them, so the discourse of reason terminates at understanding, so that judgment may be made about the things which reason has compared. For man judges of the things which reason compares when by analysis he reaches principles which are the objects of understanding. For this reason the art of judging is called analytical. Therefore, as common sense is a different power from proper sense, so understanding is different from reason.
4. To comprehend and to judge are acts requiring different powers, as is clear in proper and common sense. For common sense judges about the things which proper sense perceives. But, as is said in Spirit and Soul: "Whatever sense perceives, imagination represents, thought forms, genius investigates, reason judges, memory retains, and intelligence comprehends." Therefore, reason and intelligence are different powers.
5. That which is simply composite relates to simple act in the way as that which is altogether simple relates to composite act. But the divine intellect, which is simple in every way, has no composite act, but only the most simple act. Therefore, our reason, which is composite, inasmuch as it compares, does not have a simple act. But the act of understanding is simple, "for it is understanding of things in divisible," as is said in The Soul. Therefore, understanding and reason are not one power.

6. According to the Commentator and the Philosopher, the rational soul knows itself through a likeness. "The mind, however, in which the image resides, knows itself through itself," according to Augustine. Therefore, reason and mind, or understanding, are not the same.

7. Powers are differentiated according to acts, and acts according to objects. But the objects of reason and understanding differ very greatly. For, as is said in *Spirit and Soul*: "The soul perceives bodies by sense, likenesses of bodies by imagination, natures of bodies by reason, created spirit by understanding, and uncreated spirit by intelligence." But bodily nature differs very greatly from created spirit. Therefore, understanding and reason are different powers.

8. Boethius says: "Sense, imagination, reason, and intelligence each look on man in a different way. Sense sees figure embodied in given matter, whereas imagination judges of figure alone without matter. Reason, in its turn, transcends imagination, examining will general consideration the species which exists in singular things. Moreover, the eye of intelligence has a more lofty existence, for intelligence goes beyond the scope of the universe and by sheer force of mind surveys simple form itself." Therefore, just as imagination is a power different from sense, since imagination considers form outside of matter, and sense sees it embodied in matter, so intelligence, which considers form absolutely, is a power different from reason, which studies the general form as it exists in individual things.

9. Boethius says: "As reasoning is related to understanding, as that which is produced, to that which exists, as time to eternity, and as the circle to its center point, so the changeable series of fate is related to the stable simplicity of providence." But it is plain that there is an essential difference between providence and fate, between the circle and its center, between time and eternity, and between generation and existence. Therefore, reason, too, is essentially different from understanding.

10. As Boethius says: "Reason belongs to the human race alone, as intelligence belongs only to the divine." But the divine and the human cannot both share in the one essence of power. Therefore, they are not one power.

11. The order of powers follows the order of acts. But to receive something absolutely, which seems to belong to understanding, is prior to comparison, which belongs to reason. Therefore, understanding is prior to reason. But nothing is prior to itself. Therefore, understanding and reason are not the same power.

12. It is one thing to consider the entity of a thing absolutely, and another to consider it as in this thing. The human soul exercises both of these considerations. Therefore, in the human soul there must be two powers, one to know the absolute entity, which is understanding, and another to know the entity in something else, which seems to be reason. We conclude as before.

13. In *Spirit and Soul* we read: "Reason is the sight of the mind by which it distinguishes good and evil, chooses virtues, and loves God." These things seem to belong to the affections which are a different power from the understanding. Therefore, reason, too, is a different power from the understanding.

14. The rational is distinguished from the concupiscible and irascible. But the irascible and concupiscible belong to the appetites. Therefore, reason does, also. We conclude as before.

15. The Philosopher says: "The will is in the rational part." But it is distinguished from understanding. We conclude as before.

To the Contrary:

1' Augustine seems to say the opposite when he says: "We arrive at the image of God, which is man, in that by which he surpasses other animals, that is, in reason or intelligence. And whatever else there is of the rational or intellectual soul can be said to belong to that thing which is called mind or mental life." From this it seems that he takes reason and intelligence as the same thing.

2' In Augustine (and in the Gloss on Ephesians [4:33]: "And be renewed in the spirit of your mind,") we read: "We should understand that man is made in the image of God in that by which he surpasses irrational animals." But this is reason itself, mind, intelligence, or whatever other name fits it better. Therefore, it seems that reason and understanding are for Augustine different names for the same power.

3' Augustine says: "The image of that nature than which no nature is better should be sought and found in us in that than which our nature, also, has nothing better." But the image of God is in us in the higher part of reason, as is said in The Trinity. Therefore, there is no other power in man better than reason. But, if intelligence or understanding were different from reason, they would be above reason, as is clear from the citations from Boethius and Spirit and Soul mentioned above. Therefore, in man, understanding is not a different power from reason.

4' The more immaterial a power is, the more it can extend to many things. But common sense, which is a material power, institutes comparisons of proper sensibles by distinguishing them from one another, and also has knowledge of them separately. Otherwise, it would not be able to distinguish one from another, as is proved in The Soul. Therefore, it is much more certain that reason, which is a more immaterial power, can not only compare, but also perceive things separately, a function which belongs to understanding. Thus, understanding and reason do not seem to be different powers.

5' As is said in Spirit and Soul: "The mind, capable of receiving everything, and stamped with the likeness of all things, is said to be the soul and to be a nature with a certain power and natural dignity." But that which designates the whole soul should not be distinguished from some power of the soul. Therefore, the mind, which is a power of the soul, should not be distinguished from reason. Similarly, understanding, which seems to be the same thing as mind, should not be distinguished from it.

6' There is a double composition in the activity of the human soul. There is one by which it joins and divides predicate and subject, by forming propositions. The other is that by which it joins by comparing principles with conclusions. In the first composition the same power of the human soul apprehends the simple things, that is, predicate and subject, through their quiddities, and forms a proposition by joining them. For both of these are attributed to the possible intellect, according to The Soul. Therefore, will like reason there will be one power which grasps principles, a function which belongs to understanding, and which orders principles to conclusions, a function which belongs to reason.

7' In Spirit and Soul we read: "The soul is an intellectual or rational spirit." From this it seems that reason is the same as understanding.

8' Augustine says: "As soon as something arises which is not common to us and animals, it belongs to reason." This same thing also belongs to understanding, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, reason and understanding are the same.

9' Difference of objects in their accidental qualities does not indicate diversity of faculties. For a colored man and a colored stone are perceived by the same sensitive faculty, since it is incidental to the sensible thing in so far as it is a sensible thing, to be a man or a stone. But the objects which are ascribed to reason and understanding in Spirit and Soul, that is, "created

spirit" and "corporeal nature," do not differ, but agree, in their essential character as object of knowledge. For, just as a created incorporeal spirit is intelligible because it is immaterial, so, too, bodily natures are objects of understanding only in so far as they are separated from matter. Thus, both of these, in so far as they are known, share in one character of cognoscibility, the character of immateriality. Therefore, reason and understanding are not different powers.

10'. Every power that compares two things with each other must have knowledge of each separately. Hence, the Philosopher proves that in us there must be one power which knows "white and sweet" because we can distinguish between them. But, just as one who distinguishes between different things relates them to each other, so also, he who compares them relates one to the other. Therefore, it also belongs to the power which compares, namely, reason, to know something separately, which is an activity of understanding.

11'. It is more noble to compare than to be compared, just as it is more noble to act than to be acted upon. But a thing is understood and compared through the same thing. Therefore, the soul, also, understands and compares through the same thing. Therefore reason and understanding are the same.

12'. One habit does not exist in different powers. But it is possible for us to compare and perceive something separately by the same habit. Thus, faith, which perceives a thing separately, in so far as it clings to first truth, also compares, to the extent that by a sort of reasoning it sees first truth mirrored in creatures. Therefore, it is the same power which compares and which perceives something separately.

REPLY:

For a clear understanding of this question we must investigate the difference between reason and understanding. We must bear in mind that, according to Augustine, just as among corporeal substances there is an orderly disposition, according to which some are said to be higher than others and have control over them, so, too, among spiritual substances there is a certain orderly disposition.

The difference between higher and lower bodies seems to lie in this, that the lower bodies reach the perfection of their existence through the movement of generation, change, and increase. This is obvious in stones, plants, and animals. Higher bodies, however, have the perfection of their existence according to their substance, power, quantity, and figure immediately in their very beginning without any move merit. This is obvious in the sun, moon, and stars. The perfection of spiritual nature, however, lies in the cognition of truth. Consequently, there are some higher spiritual substances which immediately in the beginning receive knowledge of truth without any movement or reasoning by a sudden or simple reception. This is the case with angels, and for this reason they are said to have godlike understanding. There are, also, lower spiritual substances, which can arrive at perfect knowledge of truth only through a certain movement, in which they go from one thing to another, in order to reach knowledge of things unknown through those which are known. This is proper to human souls. And this is why angels are called intellectual substances, whereas souls are called rational substances.

Understanding seems to indicate simple and absolute knowledge. And one is said to understand (*intelligere*) because in some sense he reads (*legit*) the truth within (*intus*) the very essence of the thing. Reason, on the other hand, denotes a transition from one thing to another by which the human soul reaches or arrives at knowledge of something else. For this reason, Isaac says that reasoning is the progress of the cause to the thing caused.

Now, all movement proceeds from what is at rest, as Augustine says. For rest is the term of motion, as is said in the Physics. Thus, movement is related to rest as to its source and its term, as is reason, also, which is related to understanding as movement to rest and generation to existence, as is clear from the citation from Boethius given above. It is related to understanding as to its source and its term. It is related to it as its source because the human mind could not move from one thing to another unless the movement started from some simple perception of truth, and this perception is understanding of principles. Similarly, the movement of reason would not reach any thing certain unless there were an examination of that which it came upon through discursive movement of the mind. This examination proceeds to first principles, the point to which reason pursues its analysis. As a result, we find that understanding is the source of reasoning in the process of discovery and its term in that of judging.

Consequently, although the knowledge proper to the human soul takes place through the process of reasoning, nevertheless, it participates to some extent in that simple knowledge which exists in higher substances, and because of which they are said to have intellectual power. This is in keeping with the rule which Dionysius gives, that divine wisdom "always joins the limits of higher things to the beginnings of the lower things." This is to say that the lower nature at its highest point reaches something of that which is lowest in the higher nature.

Dionysius also points out this difference between angels and souls when he says: "From divine wisdom the intellectual powers of angelic minds have pure and good acts of understanding, not gathering divine knowledge from divisible things or the senses or extended discussions, but uniformly understanding the intelligible things of God." Later, he adds about souls: Therefore, because of the divine wisdom, souls have rationality, too, "but spread out, circling about the truth of existing things, by the diversity of division falling short of unitive minds. But through the reduction of many things to one by reflection souls are held worthy of acts of understanding equal to those of angels, in so far as this is proper and possible to souls." He says this because that which belongs to a higher nature cannot exist in a lower nature perfectly, but only according to a slight participation. Thus, in sensitive nature there is not reason, but only a participation of reason inasmuch as brute animals have a kind of natural prudence, as appears plainly in the Metaphysics.

However, what is thus shared is not held as a possession, that is, as something perfectly within the power of the one who has it. In this sense it is said in the Metaphysics that knowledge of God is a divine and not a human possession. As a result, no power is assigned for that which is held in this manner. Thus, brute animals are not said to have any reason, although they share to some degree in prudence. But this exists in them according to a natural [instinctive] judgment. Similarly, there is no one special power in man through which he gets knowledge of truth simply, absolutely, and without movement from one thing to another. Such perception of truth is in man through a natural habit, which is called understanding of principles. Accordingly, there is no power in man separate from reason which is called understanding. Rather, reason itself is called understanding because it shares in the intellectual simplicity, by reason of which it begins and through which it terminates its proper activity. For this reason, the proper act of understanding is attributed to reason in Spirit and Soul. And that which is proper to reason is given as the act of reason, where it says that reason is the sight of the soul by which it looks at the true through itself; reasoning, however, is the investigation of reason.

Even if we conceded that it were properly and completely fitting for us to have some power for simple perception and independent knowledge of the truth which is in us, it would not be another power than reason. This is clear from what follows, for, according to Avicenna, different acts indicate a difference of powers only when they cannot be referred to the same

principle. Thus, in physical things, to receive and to retain are not reduced to the same principle, but the former is referred to the wet and the latter to the dry.

Therefore, imagination, which retains bodily forms in a physical organ, is a different power from sense, which receives these forms through a physical organ. However, the act of reason, which is to move from one thing to another, and the act of understanding, which is to grasp truth directly, are related to each other as generation to existence and movement to rest. But to be at rest and to be moved are reduced to the same principle in all things in which both are found. For a thing is moved to a place through the same nature through which it rests in a place. And that which is at rest and that which is moved are like perfect and imperfect. Hence, the power which moves in thought from one thing to another and the power that perceives truth are not different powers, but one power which knows truth absolutely, in so far as it is perfect, and needs movement in thought from one thing to another, in so far as it is imperfect.

Consequently, in us, reason, taken strictly, can in no way be a power different from understanding. But, sometimes, the cogitative power, which is a power of the sensitive soul, is called reason, since it makes comparisons between individual forms, just as reason, properly so called, does between universal forms, as the Commentator says. This has a definite organ, the middle cell of the brain. And this reason is, without doubt, a power different from understanding. But we are not speaking of this at present.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Spirit and Soul is not authentic and is not believed to belong to Augustine. Nevertheless, in support of what it says, one can say that in what he said the author did not intend to distinguish powers of the soul, but to show the different steps by which the soul advances in knowledge, so that through the senses it knows forms in matter, through imagination it knows accidental forms without matter, but will the conditions of matter. Through reason it knows the essential form of material things without the individual matter. From this it rises higher in the possession of some kind of knowledge of created spirits, and, thus, is said to have understanding, since spirits of this sort have prior knowledge of substances which exist entirely without matter. From this it goes even further to some knowledge of God himself, and thus is said to have intelligence, which gives the proper name of the act of understanding, since to know God is proper to God, whose understanding is His intelligence, that is, His act of understanding.

2. As Boethius says: "The higher power embraces the lower, but the lower in no way rises to the higher." Hence, a higher nature can do fully what belongs to the lower, but it cannot perform fully what belongs to one still higher. Therefore, the nature of the rational soul has powers for the things that belong to sensitive and vegetative nature, but not for the things that belong to the intellectual nature which exists above it.

3. Since, according to the Philosopher, common sense perceives all sensibles, it must be drawn to them according to one common character; otherwise it would not have one object of its own. None of the proper senses can attain to this common character of object. Reason, on the other hand, reaches direct understanding as its term when, for example, the movement of reason concludes at science. Consequently, it is not necessary that in us understanding be a different power from reason, as common sense differs from the proper senses.

4. To judge is not a property of reason through which it can be distinguished from understanding. For understanding, too, judges that this is true and that false. But judgment and the comprehension of intelligence are referred to reason to this extent, that in us judgment commonly takes place through analysis into principles, whereas direct comprehension of truth takes place through understanding.

5. That which is altogether simple completely lacks composition. But simple things are preserved in composite things. Thus it is that what belongs to the composite, in so far as it is composite, is not found in what is simple. Accordingly, a simple body does not have taste, which follows upon mixture. But compound bodies have the things which belong to simple bodies, although in an inferior manner. Thus, hot and cold, light and heavy, are found in compound bodies. Therefore, there is no composition in the divine understanding, which is entirely simple. But our reason, although it is composite, can enter upon simple act and composite act, either as it puts subject and predicate together or joins principles in order to arrive at a conclusion, because there is something of the nature of the simple in it, as the model is in its image.

Therefore, in us, it is the same faculty which knows the simple quiddities of things, which forms propositions, and which reasons. The last of these is proper to reason, as reason; the other two can also be long to understanding, as understanding. Hence, the second is found in angels, since they know through many species, but only the first is in God, who understands all things, simple and composite, by knowing His own essence.

6. In some sense the soul knows itself through itself, inasmuch as to know is to possess in itself knowledge of itself, and in some sense it knows itself through a species of an intelligible object, in so far as knowing implies thinking and distinguishing of self. Thus, the Philosopher and Augustine are speaking of the same thing. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.

7. Such difference of objects cannot diversify faculties, because it is based on accidental differences. This has been proved above. Bodily nature is thus given as the object of reason, because it is proper to human knowledge to begin from sense and phantasm. For this reason, the gaze of our understanding, which is properly called reason, inasmuch as reason is proper to the human race, first fastens on the natures of sensible things. From this it rises higher in its knowledge of created spirit, which is more within its competence according to its participation of higher nature than according to that which is proper and perfectly fitted to it.

8. Boethius intends intelligence and reason to be different cognoscitive powers, not of the same subject, but of different subjects. Thus, he intends reason to belong to man, and so he says that it knows general forms existing in individual things, since human knowledge properly concerns forms drawn from the senses. Moreover, he intends intelligence to belong to higher substances, which in their first glance apprehend completely immaterial forms. Accordingly, he does not intend that reason should ever reach that which belongs to intelligence, since we can never in the weakness of this knowledge attain to sight of the quiddities of immaterial substances. However, we will do this in heaven when we will be made godlike through glory.

9. In so far as reason and understanding are in different beings, they are not the same power. But the present question concerns them in so far as both exist in man.

10. This reasoning proceeds correctly for acts which belong to different powers. But one power may have different acts, one of which is before the other. Thus the act of possible intellect is to understand essence and to form propositions.

11. The soul knows both, but through the same power. Nevertheless, it seems proper to the human soul, as rational, to know being in this thing. But to know being simply seems to belong rather to the higher substances, as is clear from the passage cited above.

12. To love God and to choose virtues are attributed to reason, not because they belong to it directly, but in so far as the will is attracted to God as its end, and to virtues as means to that end by the judgment of reason. It is in this way, too, that rational is distinguished from the irascible and the concupiscible, since we are inclined to action by the judgment of reason or

by passion, which is in the irascible or concupiscible parts. The will is also said to be in reason inasmuch as it is in the rational part of the soul, just as memory is said to be in sense since it is in the sensitive part of the soul, and not because it is the same power.

13-14. The solution to the thirteenth and fourteenth difficulties is clear from what has been said.

ARTICLE II: ARE HIGHER AND LOWER REASON DIFFERENT POWERS?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 2, 2; Summa Theol., I, 79, 9.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are, for

As Augustine says, the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of reason, but not in the lower. But the image of God in the soul is made up of the three powers. Therefore, lower reason does not belong to the same power or powers as higher reason. Thus, they seem to be different powers.

2. Since a part is taken with relation to the whole, it is in the same genus as the whole. But the soul is called only a potential (*potentialis*) whole. Therefore, the different parts of soul are different powers (*potentiae*). But higher and lower reason are given by Augustine as different parts of reason. Therefore, they are different powers.

3. Everything eternal is necessary and everything temporal and subject to change is contingent, as appears from the Philosopher. But the Philosopher calls scientific the part of the soul which deals with necessary things, and reasoning, or conjectural, the part which deals with contingent things. Therefore, since, according to Augustine, higher reason embraces eternal things and lower reason administers temporal and perishable things, it seems that the reasoning is the same as lower reason and the scientific is the same as higher reason. But the scientific and reasoning are different powers, as the Philosopher also clearly shows. Therefore, higher and lower reason are different powers.

4. The Philosopher says that we must distinguish different powers of the soul for those things which are generically different, since every power of the soul which is limited to some genus is limited to it because of some likeness. Thus, the very diversity of objects according to genus bears witness to diversity of powers. But that which is eternal and that which is corruptible are entirely different generically, since corruptible and incorruptible do not belong to the same genus, as is said in the Metaphysics. Therefore, higher reason, whose object is eternal things, is a different power from lower reason, which has perishable things for its material object.

5. Powers are distinguished through acts, and acts through objects.

But truth to be contemplated is a different object from good to be done. Therefore, higher reason, which contemplates truth, is a different power from lower reason, which is occupied with the good.

6. That which is not one in itself is much less one when compared with something else. But higher reason is not one power, but several, since the image which consists of the three

powers exists in it. Therefore, it cannot be said that lower and higher reason are the one power.

7. Reason is more simple than sense. However, in sense we do not find that the same power has different functions. Therefore, in the intellective part one power is much less able to have different functions. But higher and lower reason "are double in their functions," as Augustine says. Therefore, they are different powers.

8. Whenever things which are not reduced to the same principle are attributed to the soul, we must assign different powers in the soul according to this difference. Thus, imagination is distinguished from sense according to reception and retention. But the eternal and the corruptible cannot be reduced to the same principle. For, as is proved the Metaphysics, the proximate principles for corruptible and incorruptible things are not the same. Therefore, they should not be attributed to the same power of the soul. Thus, higher and lower reason are different powers.

9. Augustine says that through the three that cooperated in man's sin—man, woman, and serpent—three things in us are indicated, namely, higher and lower reason and sensuality. But sensuality is a different power from lower reason. Therefore, lower reason, too, is different from higher reason.

10. One power cannot at the same time sin and not sin. But, some times, lower reason sins when higher reason does not, as is clear from Augustine. Therefore, lower reason and higher reason are not one power.

11. Different perfections belong to different subjects of perfection, since a proper act requires a proper power. But habits of the soul are perfections of its powers. Therefore, different habits belong to different powers. But, according to Augustine, higher reason is assigned for wisdom and lower reason for scientific knowledge, and these two are different habits. Therefore, higher and lower reason are different powers.

12. Every power is perfected through its act. But diversity of acts leads to or manifests diversity of powers. Therefore, wherever there is diversity of acts, we should conclude to diversity of powers. But higher and lower reason have different acts, since "they are double in their functions," as Augustine says. Therefore, they are different powers.

13. Higher and lower reason differ more than the agent and the possible intellect, since we see that the act of the agent and the possible intellect concern the same intelligible thing. But, as has been said, the acts of higher and lower reason do not concern the same thing, but different things. However, the agent and the possible intellect are different powers. Therefore, higher and lower reason are, too.

14. Everything that is drawn from something differs from it, for nothing is its own cause. But lower reason is drawn from higher reason, as Augustine says. Therefore, it is a different power from higher reason.

15. Nothing is moved by itself, as is proved in the Physics. But higher reason moves lower reason in so far as it directs and governs it. Therefore, higher and lower reason are different powers.

To the Contrary:

I'. Different powers of the soul are different things. But higher and lower reason are not different things. Consequently, Augustine says: "When we discuss the nature of the human mind, we are talking about one thing. And we divide it into the two which we have mentioned only by reason of its functions." Therefore, higher and lower reason are not different powers.

2'. The more immaterial a power is, the more it can extend to many things. But reason is more immaterial than sense. Yet, by the same sensitive power, sight, for example, we discern eternal things, either incorruptible or perpetual, namely the heavenly bodies, and corruptible things, as these lower things around us. Therefore, it is the same power of reason which contemplates eternal things and administers temporal things.

REPLY:

Before we can explain this question we have to know two things: how powers are distinguished, and how higher and lower reason differ. From these two we will be able to clarify the third point, which is the subject of our present inquiry, namely, whether higher and lower reason are one power or different powers.

We must bear in mind that diversity of powers is determined according to acts and objects. However, some say that this is to be understood in the sense that diversity of acts and objects is only a sign of diversity of powers and not its cause. And others say that diversity of objects is the cause of diversity of powers in passive powers, but not in active powers.

But, if we study the matter carefully, we find that in both types of powers acts and objects are not only signs of diversity, but in some way causes of it. For every thing which has existence only because of some end has its manner determined for it from the end to which it is ordained. Thus, a saw has this kind of form and this kind of matter in order to be suitable for its end, which is to cut. But every power of the soul, whether active or passive, is ordained to act as to its end, as is clear in the Metaphysics. Hence, every power has a definite manner and species by reason of which it can be suitable for such an act. Therefore, powers are diversified because the diversity of acts required different principles from which to elicit acts. Moreover, since object is related to act as its term, and acts are specified by their terms, as is plain in the Physics, acts must also be distinguished according to their objects. Therefore, diversity of objects brings about diversity of powers.

Diversity of objects, however, can be regarded in two ways: according to the nature of things and according to the diverse intelligible character of the objects. Diversity according to the nature of things appears in colour and taste; diversity according to intelligible character of object, in the good and the true. Moreover, since powers which are acts of definite organs cannot extend beyond the disposition of their organs (for one and the same physical organ cannot be suitable for knowledge of all natures), it is necessary that powers which are attached to organs be limited to certain natures, that is, to physical natures. For activity which is exercised through a physical organ cannot go beyond physical nature.

However, since there is something in corporeal nature in which all bodies agree, and something in which different bodies are diversified, it will be possible to make one power attached to the body suitable for all bodies according to that which they have in common. Thus, there is imagination for all bodies in so far as they share in the character of quantity, figure, and the things which follow on these. Hence, it extends not only to physical objects, but also to mathematical objects. Similarly, there is common sense in so far as in all the physical bodies, to which alone it extends, there is a force which is active and productive of change [in the sense].

Some powers, however, are adapted to those aspects in which bodies are diversified by reason of a difference in the mode of producing change [in the sense]. Thus, sight relates to colour, hearing to sound, and so on for the other senses. From the fact that the sensitive part of the soul uses an organ in its activity two things follow: first, a power referring to an object common to all beings cannot be attributed to it, for this would immediately transcend physical reality; second, it is possible to find in the sensitive soul powers which differ according to the

different nature of the objects because of the disposition of the organ, which can be suited to this or that nature.

But the part of the soul which does not use a physical organ in its activity does not remain limited, but is in a sense infinite, in so far as it is immaterial. Therefore, its power extends to an object common to all beings. Hence, the object of understanding is said to be "some thing" (quid), which is found in all classes of beings. For this reason, the Philosopher says: "Understanding is that by which one does all things and by which one becomes all things." Consequently, it is impossible to distinguish different powers in the intellective part according to different natures of the objects. We can do so only according to the different character of the object, that is to say, in so far as the act of the soul is directed to one and the same thing according to different relations at different times. Thus, goodness and truth in the intellective part distinguish understanding and will. For understanding is directed to intelligible truth as to a form, since it must be informed by that which is understood, and [the will] is directed to goodness as to an end.

For this reason, the Philosopher says that truth is in the mind and good in things, since form is inside and end is outside. Moreover, form and end do not perfect a thing for the same reason. Thus, goodness and truth do not have the same character of object.

It is in this way, too, that the understanding is divided into agent and a possible intellect. For something is not an object for the same reason when it is in act and when it is in potency, or when it acts or is acted upon. For what is actually intelligible is the object of possible intellect and, as it were, acts upon it so that by the actually intelligible it proceeds from potency to act. But the potentially intelligible is the object of agent intellect, in so far as by reason of the agent intellect it becomes actually intelligible.

Therefore, it is clear how powers can be distinguished in the intellective part. And higher and lower reason are distinguished in this way. There are certain natures higher than the rational soul, and certain natures lower. But, since everything that is understood is understood in the manner of the one understanding, in the rational soul the act of understanding things above the soul is lower than the things under

stood; but for things beneath the soul there is in the soul an act of understanding which is higher than the things themselves, since the things have a more noble existence in the soul than they do in themselves. Thus, the soul has a different relation to both types of things, and from this the different functions are derived. For it is called higher reason in its reference to higher natures, either as contemplating their nature and truth in themselves, or as receiving from them intelligible character and a kind of model for activity. It is called lower reason in so far as it is directed to lower things either to perceive them through contemplation or to manage them through activity. Both types of nature, however, the higher and the lower, are perceived by the human soul in their common character of intelligible, the higher in so far as it is immaterial in itself, and the lower in so far as it is divested of matter through the activity of the soul.

From this it is clear that higher and lower reason are not different powers, but one and the same power which is related differently to different things.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. As we have said in the question on the mind, we see that the image of the Trinity in the soul is in the powers as in its root, but in its fullness it is in the acts of the powers. It is in this latter respect that the image is said to belong to higher and not to lower reason.

2. A part of a power does not always denote a distinct power, but, sometimes, a part of a power is taken according to part of the objects in so far as the virtual division of quantity is

considered. Thus, if some one can carry one hundred pounds, one who can carry only fifty pounds is said to have part of that power, although the power is specifically the same. It is in this sense that higher and lower parts are called parts of reason in so far as they are directed to part of the objects to which reason, as the term is generally used, refers.

3. The scientific and the reasoning or conjectural parts are not the same as higher and lower reason, since we can have necessary considerations, which belong to the scientific, about lower natures will which lower reason is concerned; otherwise, physics and metaphysics would not be sciences; In the same way, higher reason also can in some way turn its attention to human acts, which depend on free will, and are contingent; otherwise, sin, which occurs in such matters, would not be attributed to higher reason. Thus, higher reason is not completely distinct from the reasoning or conjectural part.

But the scientific part and the reasoning part are different powers they are distinguished in relation to the nature of the intelligible object. For, since the act of any power does not extend beyond the scope of its object, every activity that cannot be reduced to the same formality of its object must belong to another power, which has another characteristic object. Now, the object of understanding is "something" (*quid*) as is said in The Soul. For this reason, the activity of understanding extends as far as the scope of the quiddity (*quod quid est*) of this "something" can extend. It is through this action that one at first knows principles themselves immediately, and from knowledge of these principles, by reasoning further, one arrives at knowledge of conclusions. This power, which is naturally ordained to analyze these conclusions into the quiddity (*quod quid est*), the Philosopher calls scientific.

However, there are some things in which it is impossible to perform such an analysis and to arrive at the quiddity, because of the uncertainty of their existence. This is the case will contingent things, in so far as they are contingent. Hence, these are not known through their quiddity, which is the proper object of understanding, but in another way, namely, through a kind of conjecture about those things concerning which we cannot have certitude. For this, then, a different power is needed. And, since this faculty cannot bring the inquiry of reason to its term, as it were, to rest, but stays will the investigation, as it were, in motion, and attains no more than opinion about the objects of its inquiry, this power is, therefore, called the reasoning or the conjectural power from the term of its activity. But higher and lower reason are distinguished according to natures themselves and, therefore, are not different powers as the scientific and the conjectural are.

4. The objects of the scientific and the reasoning parts are generically different by reason of the proper class of objects of knowledge, since they are known according to different intelligible characters. But eternal and temporal things differ in natural genus and not in their character of object of knowledge, according to which we must look for likeness between faculty and object.

5. Truth, which is the object of contemplation, and goodness, which is the object of activity, belong to different faculties, the understanding and the will. But higher and lower reason are not distinguished in this way, for both can be speculative and active, although by reason of different things, as has been shown above. Consequently, the conclusion does not follow.

6. Nothing prevents that which contains many things from being one will something else which contains many things if both contain the same things. Thus, this heap and this collection of stones are one and the same thing. In this way, higher and lower reason are the same faculty, although both in a sense contain several powers, since both contain the same powers. Moreover, higher reason is not said to include several powers in the sense that the power of reason itself is divided into different powers, but in so far as the will is included in

the understanding. This does not mean that the will and the understanding are one faculty, but that the will is set in motion by the perception of the understanding.

7. Even in the sensitive part there is one power which has different functions, as the imagination, whose function it is to retain those things which have been received from the senses and represent them again to understanding. Accordingly, since the more immaterial a power is, the more things it can extend to, there is nothing to prevent one and the same power from having diverse functions in the intellective part, but not in the sensitive part.

8. Although the eternal and temporal are not reduced to the same proximate principle, knowledge of the eternal and of the temporal are reduced to the same principle since both are grasped according to one character of immateriality by one who understands.

9. According to Augustine, as man and woman, between whom there was the carnal marriage bond, belonged to human nature and the serpent did not, so lower reason, as woman, belongs to the nature of higher reason, whereas sensuality, as the serpent, does not.

10. Since sin is an act, properly speaking, it does not belong to either higher or lower reason, but to man according to the former or latter. And, if one power is related to different things, there is nothing inconsistent in having sin according to one relation and not according to the other. Thus, although several habits are in one power, it happens that one sins according to the act of one habit and not according to the act of another, for example, if the same man is grammarian and geometer, and he makes a statement containing truth about limes and also a solecism.

11. When a perfection brings the perfectible thing to completion according to its full capacity, it is impossible for one perfectible thing to have several perfections in the same order. Therefore, matter can not receive perfection from two substantial forms at the same time, because one matter has a capacity for only one substantial nature. However, the case is different with accidental forms, which do not give perfection to their objects according to their full potency. Consequently, it is possible for one perfectible thing to have many accidents. Therefore, there can be many habits of one power, since habits are accidental perfections of powers, for they are superadded to the nature of the complete power.

2. As Avicenna says, diversity of act sometimes indicates diversity of powers and sometimes does not. For there can be diversity in the acts of the soul in five ways. In one, it is according to strength and weakness, as to conjecture and to believe. In the second, it is according to swiftness and slowness, as to run and to be put in motion. In the third, it is according to habit and privation, as to be at rest and to be moved. In the fourth, it is according to relation to opposites of the same genus, as to sense white and to sense black. It is in the fifth when the acts belong to different genera, as we perceive and to move, or to sense sound and we sense colour.

Accordingly, diversity of the first and second type does not manifest diversity of power, for it thus would be necessary to have as many distinct powers of soul as there are grades of strength or weakness and swiftness or slowness in acts. Similarly, diversity of the third and fourth type does not indicate diversity of power, since it belongs to the same power to occupy itself with both opposites. Hence, only diversity of the fifth type manifests diversity of power, so that we say that acts are generically different which do not agree in the character of their object. The diversity of acts of higher and lower reason does not display diversity of power in this way, as is clear from what has been said.

3. Agent and possible intellect differ more than higher and lower reason, since agent and possible intellect refer to objects formally different, although not materially different. For they refer to a different character of object, although both can be found in the same intelligible

thing. For one and the same thing can first be intelligible in potency and then intelligible in act. But higher and lower reason refer to objects materially different, but not formally different. For they refer to different natures according to one character of object, as is clear from what has been said. But formal diversity is greater than material diversity. Therefore, the conclusion does not follow.

14. Lower reason is said to be drawn from higher reason because of the things which lower reason perceives, for these are drawn from those which higher reason perceives. For lower natures are drawn from higher natures. Consequently, nothing prevents higher and lower reason from being the same power. Similarly, we see that it belongs to the same power to study the principles of a sub-alternating science and the principles of a subalternate science, although the latter are drawn from the former.

15. Higher reason is said to move lower reason to this extent, that lower natures must be ruled according to higher natures, just as a subalternate science is ruled by the subalternating science.

ARTICLE III: CAN SIN EXIST IN HIGHER OR LOWER REASON?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 3, 1; Summa Theol., I-II, 15, 4; 74, 7.

Difficulties:

It seems that it cannot, for

2. The Philosopher says: "The understanding is always correct." But reason is the same power as understanding, as was shown earlier. Therefore, reason is always correct. Therefore, there is no sin in it.

2. If anything that is receptive of some perfection is subject to defect, only the defect which is opposite to the perfection can exist in it, since the same thing is receptive of contraries. But, according to Augustine, wisdom is the proper perfection of higher reason, and science is the proper perfection of lower reason. Therefore, stupidity and ignorance can be the only sins in higher or lower reason.

3. According to Augustine, all sin is in the will. But reason is a different power from the will. Therefore, sin is not in reason.

4. Nothing is receptive of its opposite, for opposites cannot exist together. But every Sin of man is contrary to reason, for the evil of man is to be contrary to reason, as Dionysius says. Therefore, sin cannot exist in reason.

5. A sin which is committed in regard to a certain subject matter cannot be attributed to the power which does not extend to that matter. But higher reason has eternal things and not delights of the flesh for its subject matter. Therefore, sins concerning pleasures of the flesh ought not in any way be attributed to higher reason, even though Augustine says that consent to an act is attributed to higher reason.

6. Augustine says that it is higher reason which contemplates higher things and clings to them, namely, through love. But sin does not result from this. Therefore, sin cannot exist in higher reason.

7. The stronger is not overcome by the weaker. But reason is the strongest of the powers which we have within us. Therefore, it cannot be overcome by concupiscence or anger or something else of that sort. Therefore, sin cannot exist in it.

To the Contrary:

1'. Merit and demerit belong to the same thing. But merit resides in the act of reason. Therefore, so does demerit.

2'. According to the Philosopher sin comes not only from passion, but also from choice. But choice consists in an act of reason, since it follows deliberation, as is said in the Ethics. Therefore, there is sin in reason.

3'. Through reason we are directed in speculative and in practical matters. But in speculative matters there is sin of reason, as when one is guilty of paralogism in his reasoning. Therefore, in practical matters, also, there is sin in reason.

REPLY:

According to Augustine, sin is sometimes in higher reason and sometimes in lower reason. To understand this we must first know two things: which act can be attributed to reason; also, which can be attributed to higher, and which to lower, reason.

Accordingly, we must bear in mind that, just as the apprehensive part is twofold, namely, the lower, which is the sensitive, and the higher, which is the intellective or reasoning part, so the appetitive part, also, is twofold, namely, the lower, which is called sense appetite and is divided into concupiscent and irascible, and the higher, which is called will. These two appetitive parts relate to the corresponding apprehensive parts similarly in some respects and differently in others.

They relate similarly in this, that there can be no movement in either appetite unless some apprehension precedes. For that which is desirable moves the higher or lower appetite only when perceived by understanding or imagination or sense. Because of this, not only appetite, but also understanding, imagination, and sense, are called movers.

They relate differently in this, that there is a natural inclination in the lower appetite, by which it is in a way naturally forced to tend toward that which is desirable. But the higher appetite is not determined to one thing, since the higher appetite is free, whereas the lower is not. For this reason, movement of the lower appetite is not attributed to the apprehensive power, because the cause of that movement does not come from perception, but from an inclination of the appetite. Movement of the higher appetite, however, is attributed to its apprehensive faculty, reason, because the inclination of the higher appetite toward this or that is caused by a judgment of reason. Consequently, we divide the sources of movement into rational, irascible, and concupiscent. In the higher part we use the names which belong to perception and in the lower the names which belong to appetite.

Therefore, it is clear that an action is attributed to reason in two ways. According to one way, it is attributed to it because it belongs to it directly, inasmuch as it is elicited by reason itself, for instance, the making of a comparison about objects of activity or of knowledge. In the other way, it is attributed to it because it belongs to it mediately through the will, since the will is set in motion through its judgment. Furthermore, just as a movement of appetite which follows a judgment of reason is attributed to reason, so a movement of appetite which follows deliberation of higher reason is attributed to higher reason. This happens when one bases his deliberation about practical matters on the fact that something is acceptable to God, or prescribed by divine law, or acts in some similar way. However, the movement of appetite will belong to lower reason when it follows a judgment of lower reason, as when one decides

about practical matters on the basis of lower causes, as, for instance, considering the depravity of the act, the dignity of reason, the enmity of men, or something of this sort.

These two types of consideration are interrelated. For, according to the Philosopher, end has the character of principle in objects of activity. But in speculative sciences the judgment of reason reaches its perfection only when conclusions are analyzed into first principles. Hence, even in objects of activity the judgment of reason is brought to perfection only when there is reference to the last end. For only then will reason give the final decision on activity. And this decision is consent to the deed. Consequently, consent to the act is attributed to higher reason, which looks to the last end. But pleasure, whether it is complacency or consent in pleasure, is attributed to lower reason by Augustine.

Therefore, when one sins by giving consent to an evil act, the sin is in higher reason, but when one sins through pleasure alone without some deliberation, the sin is said to be in lower reason because the disposition of these lower things rests directly with it. Thus, sin is said to exist in higher or lower reason, in so far as the movements of appetite are attributed to reason. But, if we consider the proper act of reason, we say that sin is in the higher or lower reason when higher or lower reason is deceived in its proper act of comparison.

Answers to Difficulties:

According to the Philosopher, just as sense is never deceived in its proper sensible objects, but can be deceived concerning common and accidental sensibles, so understanding is never deceived about its proper object, quiddity, except perhaps accidentally, nor about first principles, which are known as soon as the terms are known, but is deceived in comparing and applying common principles to particular conclusions. Thus it comes about that reason loses its correctness and sin exists in it.

2. Stupidity and ignorance are directly opposed to wisdom and science, as such, but in a certain sense all other sins are indirectly opposed to them, in so far as the rule of wisdom and science, which is required in activity, is perverted through sin. For this reason, every evil man is called one who does not know.

3. Sin is said to be in the will not as in a subject but as in a cause, for the thing must be voluntary to be a sin. But that which is caused by the will is also attributed to reason, for the reason mentioned above.

4. Man's sin is said to be against reason in so far as it is against right reason, in which there can be no sin.

6. Higher reason is led directly to eternal essences as to its proper objects. But from them it is in some measure diverted to temporal and perishable things, inasmuch as it judges of these temporal things through the eternal essences. Thus, when its judgment about some matter is turned from its proper course, that is ascribed to higher reason.

6. Although higher reason is ordained to this, that it direct to eternal things, it does not always direct to them. Thus, there can be sin in it.

7. Socrates used a similar reasoning when he wanted to show that one who has certain knowledge does not sin, for, since certain knowledge is more powerful than passion, it is not overcome by it. In answer to this the Philosopher distinguishes certain knowledge into universal and particular, habitual and actual. And he makes a distinction in habitual certain knowledge on this basis, that a habit can be unhindered or repressed, as happens with those who are intoxicated. Accordingly, one who has universal knowledge in act may in a particular case will which a will is concerned have it only in a habit which is repressed through concupiscence or some other passion. As a result, the judgment of reason in the particular

case cannot be informed according to the certain universal knowledge, and so it happens that reason errs in its choice. By reason of such an error of choice every evil man is one who does not know, however much certain knowledge in general he may have. In this way, also, reason is led to sin, inasmuch as it is re pressed through concupiscence.

ARTICLE IV: IS DELIBERATE PLEASURE IN BAD THOUGHTS (*Delectatio Morosa*), WHICH EXISTS IN THE LOWER PART OF REASON THROUGH CONSENT TO THE PLEASURE BUT WITHOUT CONSENT TO THE DEED, A MORTAL SIN?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 3, 1, & 4; Quolibet XII, 22, Summa Theol., I-II, 74, 6, & 8; 88, ad 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. As Augustine says, striking the breast and [saying] the Our Father are the remedies given for venial sins. But consent to pleasure without consent to the deed is numbered among the sins for which striking the breast and [saying] the Our Father are accepted as a remedy. For Augustine says: "Now, when the mind takes pleasure in illicit things in thought alone, not, indeed, seeing them as something to be done, but still holding and gladly desiring these things which should be rejected as soon as they reach the soul, this should be considered to be a sin, but far less a sin than if it decided to carry it out in deed. Therefore, pardon should be sought for such thoughts, too, and we should strike our breasts and say: "Forgive us our trespasses." Therefore, the above-mentioned consent in pleasure is not a mortal sin.
2. Consent to a venial sin is venial, as consent to a mortal sin is mortal. But pleasure is a venial sin. Therefore, consent to it is venial.
3. In the act of fornication we find two things for which it can be judged evil: the vehemence of the pleasure, which engulfs reason, and the harm coming from the act, namely, the uncertain condition of the children and other things of this sort which would result unless marital relations were regulated by law. But it cannot be said that fornication is a mortal sin by reason of the pleasure, for that intensity of pleasure exists in the marital act [in marriage], which is not a sin. Therefore, it is a mortal sin only because of the harm which comes from the act. So, one who consents to the pleasure of fornication, but not w the act, does not approach fornication under the aspect in which it is a mortal sin. Therefore, he does not seem to sin mortally.
4. Homicide is not less a sin than fornication. But one who thinks about homicide and takes pleasure and consents to the pleasure does not sin mortally. Otherwise, all who enjoyed hearing histories of wars, and consented to this pleasure, would sin mortally. But ibis does not seem probable. Therefore, consent to the pleasure of fornication is not a mortal sin.
5. Since venial and mortal sin are almost an infinite distance apart, which is seen from the distance between the punishment, u venial sin cannot become mortal. But the pleasure which consists in thought alone before consent is venial. Therefore, it cannot become mortal when the consent is added.
6. The essence of mortal sin consists in turning away from God. But to turn away from God belongs not to lower reason, but to higher reason, to which, also, it belongs to turn to God. For opposites belong to the same faculty. Therefore, mortal sin cannot exist in lower reason,

and so the consent to pleasure which is ascribed to lower reason by Augustine is not a mortal sin.

7. As Augustine says: "If our desire is moved, it is like a woman being persuaded, but, finally, reason manfully curbs and represses our aroused desire. When this happens, we do not fall into sin. From this, it seems, we perceive that in the spiritual marriage deep within us there is not sin if the woman sins, and the man does not. But when there is consent to pleasure and not to act, the woman sins, and not the man, as Augustine says. Therefore, consent to the pleasure is not a mortal sin.

8. According to the Philosopher, pleasure in good and evil follows the activity by which it is caused. But the exterior act of fornication, which consists in bodily movement, is different from the interior act, namely, the thought. Therefore, pleasure which follows the interior act will be different from that which follows the external act. But the interior act is not of its nature a mortal sin, as the external act is. Therefore, the interior pleasure is not classified as a mortal sin; hence, consent to such pleasure does not seem to be a mortal sin.

9. Only that seems to be a mortal sin which is forbidden by divine law, as is clear from the definition of sin given by Augustine: "Sin is word or deed or desire against the law of God." But there is no law forbidding consent to pleasure. Therefore, it is not a mortal sin.

10. It seems that we should pass the same judgment on interpretative consent and on express consent. But interpretative consent does not seem to be mortal sin because sin is carried over to another faculty only through an act of that faculty. In interpretative consent, however, there is not any act of reason, which is said to consent, but only negligence in repressing illicit movements. Therefore, interpretative consent to pleasure is not a mortal sin, and express consent is, likewise, not a mortal sin.

11. As has been said, an act is a mortal sin because it is against a divine precept. Otherwise, God would not be despised in the transgression of the precept, and thus the mind of the sinner would not be turned away from God. Lower reason, however, does not take the norm of the divine precept into consideration. For this is the task of higher reason, which considers eternal norms. Therefore, there can be no mortal sin in lower reason; hence, consent mentioned above is not a mortal sin.

12. Since there are two elements in sin, turning toward and turning away, the turning away follows the turning toward. For, by the very fact one turns toward one contrary, he turns away from the other. But he who consents to the pleasure and not to the act does not fully turn to changeable good, since completeness is in the act. Therefore, in this there is not complete turning away; hence, no mortal sin.

13. As the Gloss says: "God is more inclined to be merciful than to punish." But, if one took pleasure in meditating on divine commands and consented to such pleasure, he would not merit, as long as he did not propose to fulfil the divine commands in deed. Therefore, neither will one merit punishment if he consents to the pleasure of sin, provided that he does not decide to fulfil it in deed. Accordingly, he does not seem to sin mortally.

14. The lower power of reason is compared to woman. But woman is not mistress of her will, for, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:4): she "does not have power over her body." Therefore, neither is the lower part of reason master of its will; hence, it cannot sin.

To the Contrary:

1'. No one is damned except for mortal sin. But man will be damned for consent to pleasure. Hence, Augustine says: "The whole man will be damned, unless these things which are perceived to be sins only of thought, and which exist without the will to do them, but still will

the will to delight the mind will them, are remitted through the grace of the Mediator." Therefore, consent to pleasure is a mortal sin.

2'. Pleasure in an activity and the activity itself are reduced to the same genus of sin, just as the activity of a virtue and pleasure in it are reduced to the same virtue. For it belongs to the just man to perform just deeds and to take pleasure in them, as is clear in the Ethics. But the act of fornication is classified as a mortal sin. Therefore, the pleasure in the thought of fornication is, too. Therefore, consent to the pleasure will be a mortal sin.

3'. If there could not be mortal sin in lower reason, gentiles, who consider only the lower norms of action, would not sin mortally by fornicating or doing something of the sort. This is obviously false. Therefore, there can be mortal sin in lower reason.

REPLY:

The question whether deliberate pleasure in bad thoughts is a mortal sin and the question about consent to pleasure is the same. For there can be no doubt whether deliberate pleasure in bad thoughts is a sin, if it is called such (*morosa*) from duration (*mora*) of time. For it is certain that mere length of time cannot give an act the character of mortal sin, unless something else intervenes, since length of time is not a circumstance aggravating to infinity. But what is doubtful seems to be this: whether the pleasure which is called such because of the super added consent of reason is a mortal sin. There have been different opinions about this.

For some have said that it is not a mortal sin, but venial. This opinion seems to be opposed to the words of Augustine, who threatens man with damnation because of such consent, as is clear from the passage cited. Furthermore, the almost universal opinion of moderns contradicts this [first] position, which seems, also, to tend to ward danger for souls, since from consent in such pleasure a man can very readily fall into sin.

Hence, it seems that we must accept the second opinion, which makes such consent a mortal sin. The truth of this position can be seen from the following. For we must bear in mind that, just as sensible pleasure follows on the external act of fornication, so interior pleasure follows on the act of thinking. But a double pleasure follows on thought. One of these follows from the thought and the other from the thing thought of. For at times we take pleasure in thought because of the thought itself, from which we get actual knowledge of certain things, although the things displease us. Thus, a just man thinks about sins when he discusses or argues about them, and takes pleasure in the truth of this thought. But the pleasure follows because of the things thought when the thing thought about itself stirs up and attracts the affections. In some acts, these two thoughts obviously differ and are clearly distinct. But their distinction is more obscure in thoughts about sins of the flesh, because, due to the weakened condition of the concupiscible part, when there is thought of such desirable objects, there immediately follows in the concupiscible part a movement which is caused by these objects.

Therefore, the pleasure which follows thought because of the thought is ascribed to an altogether different genus than the pleasure of the exterior act. Consequently, when any such pleasure follows the thought of evil things, it is either no sin at all, but a praiseworthy pleasure, as when one takes delight in the knowledge of the truth; or, if there is some lack of moderation, it is classed under the sin of curiosity.

But the pleasure which follows thought because of the thing thought about belongs to the same class as the pleasure of the external act. For, as is said in the Metaphysics, pleasure consists essentially in the act, but the hope and memory are pleasurable because of the act. From this it is clear that such pleasure is inordinate in its genus by reason of the same disorder which makes external pleasure inordinate.

Accordingly, if the external pleasure is conceded to be mortally sinful, then the interior pleasure, considered in itself and independently, belongs to the genus of mortal sin. Moreover, mortal sin results when ever reason gives itself over to mortal sin by approving of it. For the uprightness of justice is banished from reason when it is made subject to evil by approving of it. And reason makes itself subject to this disordered pleasure when it consents to it. This is the first subjection by which it enslaves itself. Sometimes, there follows on this subjection the choice of the disordered act itself, in order to attain this pleasure more perfectly. And, the more it seeks for further disorders to obtain pleasure, the more it advances in sin. Yet the consent by which it accepted the pleasure will be the first root of that whole progression. Thus, mortal sin begins there.

Consequently, we concede without reserve that consent in the pleasure of fornication or of any other mortal sin is a mortal sin. From this it also follows that whatever a man does because of consent to scull pleasure will a view to fostering or holding it, such as shameful touches, or lustful kisses, or things such as these, the whole thing is a mortal sin.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. As Augustine says, [saying] the Our Father and [ding] other works of this sort have value not only to will out venial sins, but also for the remission of mortal sins, although they are not sufficient for the remission of mortal sins as they are for the remission of venial sins.
2. The pleasure that follows the pleasure in fornication because of the thing thought about is of its nature mortal, but it can be venial accidentally, in so far as it precedes deliberate assent which gives mortal sin its complete character. Without this, if the body were defiled by violence, there would not be mortal sin, for, as Lucy says, the body cannot be defiled will the defilement of sin without the consent of the mind. Therefore, when consent comes, the above-mentioned accident is withdrawn and there is mortal sin, as would happen in a woman who, if she gave consent, would be corrupted through violence.
3. The whole disorder of fornication, from whatever source it arises, flows over into the pleasure which it causes. Hence, one who approves pleasure of this sort sins mortally.
4. If one took pleasure in the thought of murder because of the thing thought about, this would be only by reason of an inclination which he had toward murder; hence, he would sin mortally. However, if one took pleasure in such thought because of knowledge of the things about which he is thinking, or for some other reason of this sort, it would not always be a mortal sin. It would, rather, be classed under some other genus of sin than murder, such as curiosity or some thing else of this sort.
5. The pleasure which was venial will never, as numerically the same, become mortal, but the act of consent added to it will be a mortal sin.
6. Although higher reason alone is of itself directed to God, lower reason to some degree shares in this conversion, in so far as it is ruled by higher reason. Similarly, the concupiscent and irascible are said to share in reason to some degree in so far as they obey reason. Thus, the turning away [from God] in mortal sin can belong to lower reason.
7. In *Against the Manicheans*, Augustine does not explain those three things as he does in *The Trinity*. In the latter, he attributes serpent to sensuality, woman to lower reason, and man to higher reason; whereas, in the former, he attributes serpent to sense, woman to concupiscence or sensuality, and man to reason. Therefore, it is clear that the conclusion does not follow.
8. The internal act, that is to say, thought, has pleasure of a kind different from the pleasure of the external act. And this follows thought for its own sake. But the pleasure which follows thought because of the act thought about is put in the same class [as the act] because no one

takes pleasure in something unless he is attached to it and perceives it as agreeable. Consequently, one who consents to interior pleasure also approves the exterior pleasure and wants to enjoy it, at least by thinking about it.

9. Consent to pleasure is forbidden by the precept: "Thou shall not covet..."(Exod. 20: 17; Deut. 5:2 1). For it is not without cause that different precepts are given in the law for the external act and the internal desire. Nevertheless, even if it were not forbidden in any special commandment, all the consequences of fornication which concern the same object would be forbidden by the very fact that fornication is forbidden.

10. Before reason considers its own pleasure or harm, it does not have interpretative consent, even though it does not resist. But, when it has considered the rising pleasure and the harm that will follow, it seems to consent, as a man seems to consent, unless he openly resists when he perceives that he will be completely drawn to sin by pleasure of this sort, and will fall headlong. Then the sin is attributed to reason because of its act, since to act and not to act when one should are reduced to [one] genus, inasmuch as sin of omission is reduced to sin of act.

11. The force of a commandment of God reaches lower reason inasmuch as it shares the rule of higher reason, as has been said.

12. The conversion by which one turns after deliberation to some thing which is of its nature evil is sufficient for the character of mortal sin, although another complete act can be added to this one.

13. As Dionysius says: "Good is caused by one whole and complete cause, but evil by individual defects." Thus, more things are required for something to be a meritorious good than for it to be a blame worthy evil, although God is more inclined to reward good deeds than to punish evil ones. Consequently, consent to pleasure without consent to the deed is not enough for merit, but, when there is question of evil, it is enough for blame.

14. By right a woman ought not to will anything contrary to the just appointment of her husband, but, as a matter of fact, sometimes one can and does will the opposite. Thus it is will lower reason.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

We concede the arguments to the contrary, although the last concludes falsely. For it proceeds as though a gentile could not sin according to higher reason. And this is false, for there is no one who does not judge that something is the end of human life. And, when he uses that as a basis of his deliberation, he is using higher reason.

ARTICLE V: CAN VENIAL SIN EXIST IN HIGHER REASON?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 3, g; Summa Theol., I-II, 74, 9-10; Q. D. de malo, 7, 5.

Difficulties:

It seems that it cannot, for

1. It belongs to higher reason to cling to the eternal norms of conduct. Therefore, sin can be in it only in so far as it turns away from these eternal norms. But to turn away from them is a mortal sin. Therefore, there can be only mortal sin in higher reason.

2. Through contempt venial sin becomes mortal. But there seems to be contempt when one considers something to be evil and to be punished by God and, nevertheless, consents to commit it. Therefore, it seems that there is a mortal sin whenever one consents to the act even of a venial sin after the consideration of higher reason.

3. There is something in the soul, sensuality, in which there can be only venial sin, and something in which there can be venial and mortal sin, namely, lower reason. Therefore it seems that there is also some thing in the soul in which there can be only mortal sin. But this is not synderesis, because in that there is no sin. Therefore, this description fits higher reason.

4. In angels and in man in the state of innocence there could not be venial sin, because venial sin arises from the weakening of the flesh, and this did not then exist. But higher reason is apart from the weakening of the flesh. Therefore, there can be no venial sin in it.

To the Contrary:

1'. Consent to the act of sin is not more serious than the act of sin itself. But consent to the act of venial sin belongs to higher reason. Therefore so does venial sin.

2'. An unpremeditated movement of infidelity is a venial sin, and this takes place only in higher reason. Therefore, there is venial sin in it.

REPLY:

There can be venial and mortal sin in the higher part of reason. Nevertheless, there is some subject matter concerning which there can be only mortal sin in higher reason. This is plain in what follows. For higher reason has an act concerning some matter directly, that is, concerning eternal norms, and an act concerning some matter indirectly, that is, temporal norms, about which it judges according to eternal norms. With reference to its proper matter, eternal norms, it has a double act, one unpremeditated and one deliberate. But, since mortal sin is committed only after the act of deliberation, there can be venial sin in higher reason when there is an unpremeditated movement, and mortal when there is deliberate movement, as we see in the sin of infidelity. But it has only a deliberate act will reference to the matter of temporal things because it is directed to them only when it compares the eternal norms will them. Consequently, the act of higher reason will always be a mortal sin in this matter, if such matter is by nature a mortal sin. But, if it is by nature a venial sin, it will be venial, as is clear when one gives consent to an idle word.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Higher reason sins in this, that it turns away from eternal norms not only by acting against them, but by acting outside them, which is a venial sin.

2. Not every contempt makes a sin mortal, but contempt of God. And through this alone man is turned away from God. But, when one consents to a venial sin after any deliberation, no matter how much, he does not have contempt of God, unless, perhaps, he would judge that the sin is contrary to a divine commandment. Thus, the conclusion does not follow.

3. That there can be only venial sin in sensuality comes from its imperfection. But reason is a perfect power and, therefore, there be sin in it according to every difference of sin. For its act can be complete in any genus. Hence, if it is by nature a venial sin, it is venial; if it is by nature a mortal sin, it is mortal.

4. Although higher reason is not directly connected with the flesh, the weakening of the flesh reaches it, inasmuch as higher powers receive something from the lower powers.

QUESTION 16: Synderesis

ARTICLE I: IS SYNDERESIS A POWER OR A HABIT?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 2, Summa Theol., I, 7 12.

Difficulties:

It seems to be a power, for

1. Parts resulting from the same division belong to the same genus. But, as Jerome says, synderesis is differentiated from reason, the concupiscent, and the irascible. Therefore, since the irascible, the concupiscent, and reason are powers, synderesis will also be a power.
2. It was said that synderesis does not denote a power alone, but an habituated power.—On the contrary, a subject with an accident is not divided from a subject alone. For a division of animals into man and white man would be improper. Therefore, since a habit is related to a power as an accident to its subject, it does not seem that that which denotes a power alone, as reason, the irascible, and the concupiscent, can be fittingly divided from that which denotes an habituated power.
3. The same power may have different habits. Therefore, if one power is distinguished from another by reason of a habit, the division in which the parts of the soul are distinguished from each other ought to have as many members as there are habits of the powers.
4. One and the same thing cannot be regulator and that which is regulated. But a power is regulated by its habit. Therefore, a power and a habit cannot so blend into one thing that one name will at the same time denote the power and the habit.
5. Nothing is inscribed in a habit, but only in a power. But the general principles of law are said to be inscribed in synderesis. Therefore, it denotes a power without qualification.
6. One thing cannot arise from two things unless one of the two is changed. But the natural habit which the name synderesis is said to represent is not changed, since what is natural must be permanent. Neither are the faculties of the soul changed. Therefore, it seems that one thing cannot result from a habit and a faculty so that both can be given the one name.
7. Synderesis is opposed to sensuality, for, as sensuality always inclines to evil, so synderesis always inclines to good. But sensuality is simply a faculty without a habit. Therefore, synderesis denotes simply a faculty.
8. As is said in the Metaphysics, the nature which the name signifies is the definition. Therefore, that which is not one in such a way that it can be defined, cannot be signified by one name. Rather, it is a combination made up of a subject and an accident. Thus, when I say "white man," it cannot be defined, as is proved in the Metaphysics. The same is true of the combination of a power and a habit. Consequently, a power together with a habit cannot be denoted by one name.
9. Higher reason is the name of a power alone. But synderesis seems to be the same thing as higher reason. For, as Augustine says, in the seat of natural judgment, which we call synderesis, "there are certain rules and lights of the virtues, and things true and things

unchangeable." However, it belongs to higher reason, according to Augustine, to grasp unchangeable natures. Therefore, synderesis is simply a power.

10. According to the Philosopher, everything that is in the soul is either a power, a habit, or a passion. Therefore, either the division of the Philosopher is inadequate or there is nothing in the soul which is at once a power and a habit.

11. Opposites cannot exist in the same thing. But we have an innate tendency (fumes) which always inclines to evil. Therefore, there can not be in us a habit which always inclines to good. Thus, synderesis, which always inclines to good, is not a habit, nor an habituated power, but simply a power.

12. A power and a habit suffice for activity. Therefore, if synderesis is a power will an innate habit, since synderesis inclines to good, man will be capable of performing good actions by reason of purely natural gifts. But this seems to be the heresy of Pelagius.

13. If synderesis is an habituated power, it will not be a passive power but an active one, since it will have some activity. Moreover, just as a passive power is rooted in matter, so an active power is rooted in a form. But in the human soul there is a twofold form: one through which it corresponds to the angels, in so far as it is a spirit, and this is the higher form; and another, the lower form, through which it gives life to the body, in so far as it is a soul. Therefore, synderesis must be based on the higher or the lower form. If on the higher, it is higher reason; if on the lower, it is lower reason. But both higher and lower reason designate simply a power. Therefore, synderesis is simply a power.

14. If synderesis denotes an habituated power, the habit must be innate. For, if it were an acquired or an infused habit, it would be possible to lose synderesis. But synderesis does not denote an innate habit. Therefore, it signifies simply a power. We prove the minor in this way. Every habit which presupposes an act [in time is not an innate habit. But synderesis presupposes an act [in time, for it belongs to synderesis to speak out against evil and stir on to good. And this could not take place unless good and evil are actually known beforehand. Therefore, synderesis requires an act [in time.

15. The function of synderesis seems to be to make judgments. Hence it is called the natural seat of judgment. But free choice takes its name from judging. Therefore, free choice is the same as synderesis. But free choice is simply a power. Therefore, so is synderesis.

16. If synderesis is an habituated power, a kind of composite of the two, it will not be such by logical composition, by which a species is composed of genus and difference, for a power is not related to a habit as genus to difference. For, thus, any habit added to a power would constitute a distinct power. Therefore, it is natural composition. But in natural composition the compound is different from the elements that make it up, as is proved in the Metaphysics. Therefore, synderesis is neither a power nor a habit, but something else. But this cannot be. Therefore, it remains that it is simply a power.

To the Contrary:

1'. If synderesis is a power, it must be a power of reason. But the powers of reason are directed to opposites. Therefore, synderesis will be directed to opposites, which is clearly false, because it always urges to good and never to evil.

2'. If synderesis is a power, it is either the same as reason, or it is different from it. But it is not the same, because it is distinguished from reason in the comment of Jerome, as noted above. And we cannot say that it is different from reason, for a special power requires a special activity. And there is no act ascribed to synderesis which cannot be performed by

reason. For reason itself urges to good and speaks out against evil. Therefore, synderesis is in no way a power.

3'. The tendency to evil (fumes) always inclines to evil, and synderesis always to good. Therefore, these two are directly opposed. But the tendency to evil is a habit, or acts like habit, for concupiscence, which, according to Augustine, is habitual in children and actual in adults, is called the tendency to evil. Therefore, synderesis, also, is a habit.

4'. If synderesis is a power, it is either cognitive or tends to action. But it is clear that it is not simply cognitive from the fact that its act is to incline us to good and warn us against evil. Therefore, if it is a power, it will tend to action. But this is obviously false, for the powers which tend to action are adequately divided into the irascible, the concupiscent, and the rational. And synderesis is distinguished from these, as has been said. Therefore, synderesis is in no way a power.

5'. Just as in the operative part of the soul synderesis never errs, so in the speculative part understanding of principles never errs. But understanding of principles is a habit, as is clear from the Philosopher. Therefore, synderesis is a habit.

REPLY:

There are various opinions on this question. For some say that synderesis designates simply a power, different from, and higher than, reason. Others say that it is, indeed, simply a power which is really identical with reason, but is considered as different from it. For reason is considered as reason, that is, in so far as it reasons and compares, and as such is called the reasoning power; it is also considered as a nature, that is, in so far as one knows something naturally, and thus it is called synderesis still others say that synderesis denotes the power of reason with a natural habit. We can see which of these is more true from what follows.

As Dionysius says, divine wisdom "joins the ends of nobler things with the beginnings of lesser things." For natures which are ordained to one another are related to each other as contiguous bodies, the upper limit of the lower body being in contact with the lower limit of the higher one. Hence, at its highest point a lower nature attains to some thing which is proper to the higher nature and shares in it imperfectly.

Now, the nature of the human soul is lower than the angelic nature, if we consider the natural manner in which each knows. For the natural and proper manner of knowing for an angelic nature is to know truth without investigation or movement of reason. But it is proper to human nature to reach the knowledge of truth by investigating and moving from one thing to another.

Hence, the human soul, according to that which is highest in it, attains to that which is proper to angelic nature, so that it knows some things at once and without investigation, although it is lower than angels in this, that it can know the truth in these things only by receiving something from sense.

However, there is a double knowledge in the angelic nature: one, speculative, by which angels see the truth of things simply and independently; and the other, practical. This second type of knowledge is posited both by the philosophers, who hold that the angels are the movers of the heavens and that all natural forms pre-exist in their fore knowledge, and by the theologians, who hold that the angels serve God in spiritual duties, according to which the orders of angels are distinguished.

Hence it is that human nature, in so far as it comes in contact with the angelic nature, must both in speculative and practical matters know truth without investigation. And this knowledge must be the principle of all the knowledge which follows, whether speculative or practical, since principles must be more stable and certain. Therefore, this knowledge must be in man naturally, since it is a kind of seed plot containing in germ all the knowledge which follows, and since there pre-exist in all natures certain natural seeds of the activities and

effects which follow. Furthermore, this knowledge must be habitual so that it will be ready for use when needed.

Thus, just as there is a natural habit of the human soul through which it knows principles of the speculative sciences, which we call understanding of principles, so, too, there is in the soul a natural habit of first principles of action, which are the universal principles of the natural law. This habit pertains to synderesis. This habit exists in no other power than reason, unless, perhaps, we make understanding a power distinct from reason. But we have shown the opposite above.

It remains, therefore, that the name synderesis designates a natural habit simply, one similar to the habit of principles, or it means some power of reason with such a habit. And whatever it is makes little difference, for it raises a doubt only about the meaning of the name. However, if the power of reason itself, in so far as it knows naturally, is called synderesis, it cannot be so considered apart from every habit, for natural knowledge belongs to reason by reason of a natural habit, as is clear of the understanding of principles.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Things can be parts of the same division in so far as both share in something common, whatever that common thing be, whether genus or accident. Accordingly, in the fourfold division in which synderesis is distinguished from the three powers, the members of the division are not distinguished from each other because all are powers, but because all are principles of action. Therefore, it does not follow that synderesis is a power, but that it is a principle of action.

2. Whenever something special, over and above that which belongs to a subject by its nature, is added to it by an accident, nothing prevents the accident from being distinguished from the subject, or the subject from the accident from being distinguished from the subject taken simply, as if I were to distinguish a colored surface from surface taken simply. For, in so far as surface is taken simply, it is something mathematical, but, if it is considered as colored, it is classified as part of physical reality. So, reason, also, designates knowledge on the human level, but knowledge through a natural habit is on a generically different level, as is clear from what has been said. Consequently, there is nothing to prevent the habit itself from being distinguished from the power in the division in which motive principles are distinguished, nor to prevent the power endowed with that habit from being distinguished from the power taken simply.

3. The other habits which inhere in the power of reason cause more merit in the same way, according to the manner which is proper to reason as reason. Therefore, those habits cannot be distinguished from reason as is the natural habit from which synderesis takes its name.

4. We do not say that synderesis means a power and a habit, as though the power and the habit were one thing, but because the power together with the habit which it underlies is designated by one name.

5. That something is inscribed in another is understood in two ways. In one way, as in a subject, and in this sense something can be inscribed in a soul only with reference to a power. In another way, as in a container, and in this sense there is no reason why something can not be inscribed even in a habit. It is in this sense that we say the single elements pertinent to geometry are inscribed in geometry itself.

6. This difficulty proceeds correctly when one thing results from two because of a mixture. But one thing does not thus result from a habit and a power which is like the union of an accident and its subject.

7. Sensuality always inclines to evil by reason of the corruption of the tendency to evil, and this corruption is in it after the manner of habit. It is thus, too, that synderesis, by reason of a natural habit, always inclines to good.

8. White man cannot be defined with a strict definition, such as the definition of substances, which denotes something that is essentially one, but it can be defined by a definition in a loose sense, in so far as something that is loosely one results from an accident and its subject. This kind of unity is enough to give it one name. Hence, the Philosopher says that a subject and its accident can be indicated by one name.

9. Synderesis does not denote higher or lower reason, but something that refers commonly to both. For in the very habit of the universal principles of law there are contained certain things which pertain to the eternal norms of conduct, such as, that God must be obeyed; and there are some that pertain to lower norms, such as, that we must live according to reason. However, synderesis is said to refer to these unchangeable things in one way, and higher reason in another. For some thing is called unchangeable because of an immutability of its nature, and it is thus that divine things are unchangeable. Higher reason is said to deal with unchangeable things in this way. A thing is also said to be unchangeable because of the necessity of a truth, although the truth may concern things which according to their nature can change. Thus the truth: every whole is greater than its part, is unchangeably true even in changeable things. Synderesis is said to refer to unchangeable things in this way.

10. Although everything in the soul is only habit, or only power, or only passion, not everything which is given a name in the soul is of these alone. For things which are distinct in reality can be joined and given one name by our understanding.

11. The innate habit which inclines to evil belongs to the lower part of the soul, by which it is joined to the body. But the habit which naturally inclines to good belongs to the higher part of the soul. Therefore, these two opposite habits do not belong to the same thing in the same way.

12. A habit together with a power is enough for the act of that habit. But the act of the natural habit called synderesis is to warn against evil and to incline to good. Therefore, men are naturally capable of this act. However, it does not follow from this that a man will purely natural gifts can perform a meritorious act. To impute this to natural capability alone is the Pelagian impiety.

12. In so far as synderesis means a power, it seems to indicate a passive rather than an active power. For an active power is not distinguished from a passive power because it has an activity, for since every power of the soul, active as well as passive, has some activity, every power would be active.

We learn the distinction between the two by comparing the power to its object. For, if the object relates to the power as that which under goes and is changed, the power will be active. If, on the other hand, it relates as agent and mover, the power is passive. Hence it is that all the powers of the vegetative soul are active, because in nutrition, growth, and generation food is changed through the power of the soul. On the other hand, all the sensitive powers are passive, because they are set in motion and come into act through sensible objects. In our understanding, however, there is an active and a passive power, because through intellect the intelligible in potency becomes intelligible in act. This is the activity of the agent intellect, and our understanding is, thus, an active power. The thing actually intelligible also makes the understanding in potency understanding in act, and in this way the possible intellect is a passive power. The agent intellect, however, is not said to be the subject of habits. Rather, the

possible intellect plays this role. Consequently, the power to which the natural habit is joined seems to be a passive rather than an active power.

But, granted that it is an active power, the reasoning is incorrect when it proceeds farther. For there are not two forms in the soul, but only one, which is its essence. For by its essence it is spirit, and by its essence it is the form of the body. It is not this by reason of anything else. As a result, higher and lower reason are not rooted in two forms, but in the one essence of the soul. Nor is it true that lower reason is rooted in the essence of the soul according to the relation by which it is the form of the body. For only the powers which are attached to organs are thus rooted in the essence of the soul, and lower reason does not belong to this class. Granted, too, that the power which synderesis denotes is the same thing as higher or lower reason, nothing prevents us from calling reason, the power simply, and synderesis, the same power will a habit inhering in it.

14. An act of knowing is not prerequisite for the power or habit of synderesis, but only for its act. Hence, this does not prevent the habit of synderesis from being innate.

15. Judgment is twofold: of universal [principles], which belongs to synderesis; and of particular activities, which is the judgment of choice and belongs to free choice. Consequently, it does not follow that they are the same.

16. Natural composition is manifold. One kind is the composition of a compound from elements. The Philosopher says that in this composition the form of the compound must be something entirely different from the elements. There is also the composition of a substantial form and matter, from which a third thing arises, the specific form, which is not altogether different from the matter and the form, but relates to them as a whole to its parts. There is also the composition of subject and accident, in which no third thing results from the two. The composition of a power and a habit is of this sort.

ARTICLE II: CAN SYNDERESIS ERR?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24,3,3; 39., I; Summa Theol., 1,79, 12.

Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

1. After discussing synderesis, Jerome remarks: "We sometimes see this fall down." But, in matters of action, to fall down is nothing else than error. Therefore, synderesis can err.

2. Although error, properly speaking, belongs not to a habit or a power, but to the man, since acts belong to individuals, a habit or a power is said to err in so far as through the act of some habit or power a man is led into error. But a man is sometimes led into error through the act of synderesis. For in the Gospel of St. John (16: 2) it is said: "Yea, the hour cometh, when whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to God." Thus, from the judgment that worship must be offered to God, which judgment certainly pertains to synderesis, some were disposed to kill the Apostles. Therefore, synderesis errs.

3. Jeremias (2: 16) says: "The children, also, of Memphis, and of Taphnes have deflowered thee, even to the crown of thy head." But the crown is the higher part of the soul, as the Gloss on Psalms (7:17) says: "His iniquity shall come down on his crown." Thus, it belongs to synderesis, which is the highest thing in the soul. Therefore, synderesis is deflowered through sin by demons.

4. According to the Philosopher the power of reason is related to opposites. But synderesis is a power of reason. Therefore, it is related to opposites, and so can do good and commit sin.

5. Opposites are naturally produced in connection with the same thing. But virtue and sin are opposed to each other. Since, therefore, the act of virtue is in synderesis, because it urges on to good, the act of sin will also be in it.

6. Synderesis takes the place in matters of action which the understanding of principles does in speculative matters. But all the activity of our reason arises from first principles. Therefore, all the activity of practical reason has its beginning from synderesis. Therefore, just as the activity of practical reason which is virtuous is ascribed to synderesis, so the activity of reason which is sinful is also attributed to it.

7. The punishment corresponds to the crime. But the whole soul of the damned, including synderesis, will be punished. Therefore, synderesis also sins.

To the Contrary:

1'. Good can be more pure than evil, for there is some good in which there is no admixture of evil, but there is nothing so bad that it does not have some admixture of good. But in us there is something which always inclines to evil, namely, the tendency to sin [fomes]. Therefore, there will be something which always inclines to good. But this seems to be only synderesis. Therefore, synderesis never sins.

2'. What is naturally present is always present. But it is natural for synderesis to warn against evil. Therefore, it never consents to evil, and so never sins.

REPLY:

In all its activities nature intends what is good and the conservation of the things which are produced through the activity of nature. Therefore, in all the works of nature, the principles are always permanent and unchangeable and preservative of right order. For, as is said in the Physics: "Principles should be permanent." For it would not be possible to have any stability or certainty in things which flow from principles if the principles themselves were not firmly established.

Consequently, all changeable things are reduced to some first unchangeable thing. Hence, too, it is that all speculative knowledge is derived from some most certain knowledge concerning which there can be no error. This is the knowledge of the first general principles, in reference to which everything else which is known is examined and by reason of which every truth is approved and every falsehood rejected. If any error could take place in these, there would be no certainty in the whole of the knowledge which follows.

As a result, for probity to be possible in human actions, there must be some permanent principle which has unwavering integrity, in reference to which all human works are examined, so that that permanent principle will resist all evil and assent to all good. This is synderesis, whose task it is to warn against evil and incline to good. Therefore, we agree that there can be no error in it.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Synderesis never falls down in a general principle, but error can happen in some application of a general principle to some particular case because of a false deduction, or because of a false assumption. Therefore, it does not say that synderesis simply falls headlong, but that conscience does, which applies the general judgment of synderesis to particular matters.

2. When in a syllogism one arrives at a false conclusion from two propositions one of which is true and the other false, the mistaken conclusion is not attributed to the true, but to the false,

proposition. Therefore, in that choice by which the murderers of the Apostles thought they were offering worship to God, the error did not come from the universal judgment of synderesis that worship should be offered to God, but from the false judgment of higher reason, which considered the killing of the Apostles as pleasing to God. Therefore, we need not concede that they were inclined to sin through an act of synderesis.

3. As the crown of the body is the highest part of the body, so the crown of the soul is the highest part of the soul. Hence, the crown of the soul is understood to mean different things according to the different distinctions of the parts of the soul. If we distinguish the intellectual part from the sensitive part, the whole intellective part of the soul can be called the crown. If we distinguish the intellective part further into higher and lower reason, higher reason is called the crown. If we distinguish reason further into natural judgment and deliberation of reason, natural judgment is called the crown. Therefore, when the soul is said to be deflowered even to its crown, crown is to be taken as denoting higher reason and not synderesis.

4. The power of reason, which of itself is related to opposites, is sometimes limited to one thing through a habit, especially if the habit is completely formed. Moreover, synderesis does not mean the rational power simply, but as perfected by a completely determined habit.

5. The act of synderesis is not strictly an act of virtue, but a kind

of prelude to the act of virtue, just as natural endowments are preludes to freely given and acquired virtues.

6. Just as in speculative matters, although a mistaken reason starts from principles, it does not derive its falsity from first principles, but from wrong use of the principles, so the same thing also happens in practical matters. Therefore, the conclusion does not follow.

7. Augustine shows that this argument does not hold. For he says that "the whole man is damned" for the Sin of lower reason alone, and this because both reasons belong to the "one person," to whom sinning properly belongs. Therefore, the punishment looks directly to the person and not the power, except in so far as the power belongs to the person. For the person of man deserves punishment in all the parts of his person for a sin which he commits by one part of himself. Hence, also, in a civil trial the hand alone is not punished for the murder which a man commits with his hand.

ARTICLE III: ARE THERE SOME IN WHOM SYNDERESIS IS EXTINGUISHED?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 2, 3, ad 5; 39, 3, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that there are, for

1. On Psalms (52:2), "They are corrupted and become abominable," the Gloss has: "Corrupted, that is, deprived of all light of reason." But the light of synderesis is the light of reason. Therefore, in some men synderesis is extinguished.

2. Heretics sometimes have no remorse of conscience for their infidelity. But infidelity is a sin. Accordingly, since the function of synderesis is to protest against sin, it seems that it is extinguished in them.

3. According to the Philosopher, one who has a habit of vice loses the principles of action. But principles of action belong to synderesis. Therefore, in everyone who has the habit of some vice synderesis is extinguished.

. Proverbs (18:3) says: "The wicked man when he is come into the depth of sins, condemned." When this happens, "synderesis does not hold its ground," as Jerome says. Therefore, in some men it is extinguished.

5. Every inclination to evil is taken away from the blessed. Conversely, therefore, every inclination to good is taken away from the damned. But synderesis inclines to good. Therefore, it is extinguished in them.

To the Contrary:

1'. Isaias (66:24) says: "Their worm shall not die." According to Augustine, this refers to the worm of conscience, which is remorse of conscience. But remorse of conscience is caused by synderesis protesting against evil. Therefore, synderesis is not destroyed.

2'. Despair, which is a sin against the Holy Spirit, is in the lowest depths of sin. But, even in those who despair, "synderesis is not extinguished," as is plain from Jerome, who says of synderesis: "Not even in Gain was it suppressed." Nevertheless, it is clear that he despaired, for he said: "My iniquity is greater than that I may deserve pardon" (Genesis 4:13). 'We conclude as before.

REPLY:

That synderesis is extinguished can be understood in two ways. In one, it is considered in so far as it is an habitual light, and in this sense it is impossible for synderesis to be extinguished, just as it is impossible for the soul of a man to be deprived of the light of the agent intellect, through which first principles in speculative and practical matters are made known to us. For this light belongs to the nature of the soul, since by reason of this the soul is intellectual. In Psalms (4:7) it is said of this: "The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us," so that it shows good things to us. For this was the answer to the question: "Many say: Who sheweth us good things?" (Psalms 4:6).

In the other way, in so far as it is an act, it can be extinguished in two ways. In one, the act of synderesis is said to be extinguished inasmuch as it is completely interfered with. This happens in those who do not have the use of free choice or of reason because of an impediment due to an injury to the bodily organs from which our reason needs help. In the other way, the act of synderesis is deflected toward the contrary of synderesis. It is impossible for the universal judgment of synderesis to be destroyed in this way, but in a particular activity it is destroyed whenever one sins in choice. For the force of concupiscence, or of another passion, so absorbs reason that in choice the universal judgment of synderesis is not applied to the particular act.

But this does not destroy synderesis altogether, but only in some respect. Hence, absolutely speaking, we concede that synderesis is never destroyed.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Some sinners are said to be deprived of all light of reason in the act of choice, in which reason errs because it is engrossed by some passion, or oppressed by some habit so that it does not follow the light of synderesis in making its choice.

2. In heretics their conscience does not reprove their infidelity by reason of the error in their higher reason, because of which the judgment of synderesis is not applied to this particular case. For the universal judgment of synderesis remains in them, since they judge it to be evil

not to believe what God has said. But they err in higher reason, because they do not believe that God has said this.

3. One who has the habit of some vice does indeed lose the principles of activity, not as universal principles, but in their application to some particular case, in so far as through some vicious habit his reason is stifled in order to keep it from applying the universal judgment to its particular activity when making its choice. In this way, also, the wicked man who falls into the depths of sin is said to have Contempt.

4. The solution to the fourth difficulty is clear from the answer to the third.

5. Evil is not part of a nature; therefore, there is nothing to prevent the removal of the inclination to evil from the blessed. But good and the inclination thereto result from the nature itself; hence, as long as the nature remains, the inclination to good cannot be taken even from the damned.

QUESTION 16: Conscience

ARTICLE I: IS CONSCIENCE A POWER, A HABIT, OR AN ACT?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 2, 4; Summa Theol., I, 79, 13.

Difficulties (First Series):

It seems to be a power, for

1. After mentioning synderesis, Jerome says: "We see that this conscience is cast down headlong at times." From this it seems that conscience and synderesis are the same thing. But synderesis is in some sense a power. Therefore, conscience is, too.

2. Only a power of the soul is the subject of a vice. But conscience is the subject of the defilement of sin, as is clear from Titus (1: 1): "Both their mind and their conscience are defiled." Therefore, conscience is a power.

3. It was said that the defilement is not in conscience as in a subject. —On the contrary, nothing numerically the same can be defiled and clean, unless it is the subject of defilement. But everything which is changed from defilement to cleanness while remaining numerically the same, is clean at one time and defiled at another. Therefore, every thing which is changed from defilement to cleanness, or the converse, is a subject of defilement and cleanness. But conscience is changed from defilement to cleanness, according to Hebrews (9:14): "How much more shall the blood of Christ... cleanse our conscience from dead works to serve the living God." Therefore, conscience is a power.

4. Conscience is said to be a dictate of reason, a dictate which is nothing else but the judgment of reason. But a judgment of reason pertains to free choice from which it gets its name. Therefore, free choice and conscience seem to be the same thing. But free choice is a power. Therefore, so is conscience.

5. Basil says that conscience is "the natural power of judgment." But the natural power of judgment is synderesis. But synderesis is in some sense a power. Therefore, so is conscience.

6. Sin exists only in the will or in the reason. But sin exists in conscience. Therefore, conscience is the reason or the will. But reason and will are powers. Therefore, conscience is, too.

7. Neither a habit nor an act is said to know. But conscience is said to know, according to Ecclesiastes (7:23): "For thy conscience knoweth that thou also hast often spoken evil of others." Therefore, conscience is not a habit or an act. Therefore, it is a power.

8. Origen says that conscience is "a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which the soul is kept free from evil and made to cling to good." But spirit designates a power or even the essence of the soul. Therefore, conscience designates a power.

9. Conscience is an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act, because it does not always remain in act, for its act is not present in one who is asleep. Yet one who is asleep is said to have conscience. Nor is it a habit. Therefore, it is a power.

Difficulties (Second Series):

1. That it is not a habit is shown in this way: No habit of reason deals with individual things. But conscience is concerned with particular acts. Therefore, conscience is not a habit of reason. It is not a habit of any other power since conscience pertains to reason.

2. In reason there are only speculative and operative habits. But conscience is not a speculative habit, since it has an ordination to activity. Nor is it an operative habit, since it is neither an art nor prudence. And the Philosopher puts only these in the operative part. Therefore, conscience is not a habit.

That it is not an art is clear. That it is not prudence is proved in this way: Prudence is the correct ordering of acts, as is said in the Ethics. But it does not consider individual actions, for, since there are an infinite number of these, there can be no ordering of them. Again, it would follow that prudence, taken in itself, would be essentially increased as it considered many individual actions. But this does not seem to be true. However, conscience considers individual actions. Therefore, conscience is not prudence.

3. It was said that conscience is a habit by which the universal judgment of reason is applied to a particular undertaking. On the contrary, two habits are not needed for something which one can do. But one who has habitual knowledge of a universal can make the application to singulars with the intervention of the sensitive faculty alone. Thus, from the habit by which one knows that all mules are sterile, he will know that this mule is sterile when through his senses he perceives that this is a mule. Therefore, a habit is not needed for the application of a universal judgment to a particular act. Thus, conscience is not a habit. We conclude as before.

4. Every habit is either natural, infused, or acquired. But conscience is not a natural habit because such a habit is the same in all men. But not all men have the same conscience. Again, it is not an infused habit, because such a habit is always correct. But conscience is sometimes erroneous. Again, it is not an acquired habit, because, if it were, conscience would not exist in children or in a man before he had acquired it through many acts. Therefore, it is not a habit. We conclude as before.

5. According to the Philosopher, a habit is acquired from many acts. But one has conscience from one act. Therefore, conscience is not a habit.

6. The Gloss indicates that conscience in the damned is a punishment. But a habit is not a punishment; rather it is a perfection of the one who has it. Therefore, it is not a habit.

To the Contrary (First Series):

1'. Conscience seems to be a habit. For, according to Damascene, it is "the law of our understanding." But the law of our understanding is the habit of the universal principles of law. Therefore, conscience is a habit.

2'. The Gloss on Romans (2:14) says: "Although the Gentiles do not have the written law, they have the natural law, which each one understands and by which he is conscious of what is good and what is evil." From this it seems that the natural law is that by which one is conscious. But everyone is conscious through consciousness (*conscientia*). Therefore, conscience (*conscientia*) is the natural law. We conclude as before.

3'. Science denotes habitual knowledge of conclusions. But conscience is scientific knowledge. Therefore, it is a habit.

4'. A habit is formed by repeated acts. But one acts repeatedly according to conscience. Therefore, from such acts a habit is formed, which can be called conscience.

5'. On the first Epistle to Timothy (1:5), "Now the end of the commandment is charity, from a pure heart, and a good conscience, and an unfeigned faith," the Gloss says: "A good conscience, that is, hope." 10 But hope is a habit. Therefore, conscience is, too.

6'. That which is implanted in us by God seems to be an infused habit. But, according to Damascene, 11 just as the tendency to sin is implanted in us by the devil, so conscience is implanted in us by God. Therefore, conscience is an infused habit.

7'. According to the Philosopher, 12 everything which is in the soul is habit, faculty, or passion. But conscience is not a passion, for by such things we do not merit or demerit, nor are we praised or blamed for them, as the Philosopher also says. Nor is conscience a power, for a power cannot be set aside, but conscience can be set aside. Therefore, conscience is a habit.

To the Contrary (Second Series):

1'. Conscience seems to be an act, for it is said to accuse and excuse. But one is not accused or excused unless he is actually considering something. Therefore, conscience is an act.

2'. Knowledge which consists in comparison is actual knowledge. But conscience denotes knowledge without comparison. For one is said to be conscious (*concire*), that is, to know together (*simul scire*). Therefore, conscience is actual knowledge.

REPLY:

Some say that conscience can have three meanings. For, at times it is taken for the thing itself of which one is conscious, just as faith is taken for the thing believed. Sometimes it is taken for the power by which we are conscious, and sometimes for the habit. And some say that it is also taken for the act. The reason for this distinction seems to be that, since there is an act of conscience, and since an object, a power, a habit, and the act itself are considered with reference to the act, we sometimes find a name which is used equivocally for all four of these. Thus, the name understanding sometimes signifies the thing understood (*intellectam*), as names are said to denote concepts (*intellectus*); sometimes, it signifies the intellectual power itself; sometimes, a habit, and, sometimes, an act.

However, when names such as these, the commonly accepted meaning should be followed, because words should be used in their more common signification, as is said in the Topics. But the name conscience, according to common usage, seems at times to be used for the thing of which one is conscious, as when one says: "I will reveal my conscience to you," that is,

what is in my conscience. But this title cannot properly be given to the power or the habit, but only to the act. For all the things which are attributed to conscience fit only this meaning.

We must bear in mind that it is not customary to have one name for a power, an act, and a habit, unless the act is proper to the power or habit, as to see is proper to the power of sight, and to know is proper to the habit of knowledge. As a result, sight sometimes means the power and sometimes the act. Knowledge is used in a similar way. However, if there is an act which is proper to many or all habits or powers, it is not customary to indicate a power or a habit by such a name of the act. This is clear will the noun use, for it denotes the act of any habit and power, since use belongs to that of which it is the act. Hence, this name use so signifies an act that it does not mean a habit or a power at all.

This seems to be the case will conscience. For the name conscience means the application of knowledge to something. Hence, to be conscious (*conscire*) means to know together (*simul scire*). But any knowledge can be applied to a thing. Hence, conscience cannot denote a special habit or power, but designates the act itself, which is the application of any habit or of any knowledge w some particular act.

Moreover, knowledge is applied to an act in two ways. According to one way, we consider whether the act exists or has existed; according to the other, whether it is correct or not. According to the first mode of application, we are said to have conscience [that is consciousness], of an act inasmuch as we know that the act has been placed or has not been placed, as happens in the common manner of speaking when one says: "As far as my conscience [consciousness] is concerned, this has not taken place; that is, I do not know or I did not know whether this took place." It is according to this manner of speaking that we understand the passage in Genesis (43:22): "cannot tell [*non est in conscientiis nostris*] who put it (the money) in our bags"; and the passage in Ecclesiastes (7:23): "For thy con science knoweth that thou also hast often spoken evil of others." it is according to this that conscience is said to bear witness of some thing, as in Romans (9:1): "my conscience bearing me witness...

According to the second mode of application, by which knowledge is applied to an act, so that one knows whether the act is right or not, there is a double course. There is one according to which we are directed through the habit of scientific knowledge to do or not to do something. There is a second according w which the act, after it has taken place, is examined will reference w the habit of knowledge to see whether it was right or not. This double course in matters of action is distinguished according to the double course which exists in things speculative, that is, the process of discovery and the process of judging. For the process by which through scientific knowledge we look for what should be done, as it were taking counsel will our selves, is similar to discovery, through which we proceed from principles to conclusions. The other process, through which we examine those things which already have been done and consider whether they are right, is like the process of judging, through which we reduce conclusions w principles.

We use the name conscience for both of these modes of application. For, in so far as knowledge is applied to an act, as directive of that act, conscience is said to prod or urge or bind. But, in so far as knowledge is applied to act, by way of examining things which have already taken place, conscience is said w accuse or cause remorse, when that which has been done is found to be out of harmony will the knowledge according to which it is examined; or w defend or excuse, when that which has been done is found to have proceeded according to the form of the knowledge.

But we must bear in mind that in the first application, in which scientific knowledge is applied w an net to know whether it has taken place, it is application to a particular act of sensitive

knowledge, as of memory, through which we recall what was done, or of sense, through which we perceive the particular act in which we are now engaged. But in the second and third applications, by which we deliberate about what should be done, or examine what has already been done, the operative habits of reason are applied to an act. These are the habit of synderesis and the habit of wisdom, which perfect higher reason, and the habit of scientific knowledge, which perfects lower reason of these, either all are applied at the same time, or only one of them is applied. We examine what we have done according to these habits, and, according to them, we take counsel about what should be done. Examination, however, concerns not only what has been done, but also what is to be done. But counsel concerns only what is to be done.

Answers to Difficulties (First Series):

1. When Jerome says: "We see that this conscience is cast down headlong at times," synderesis, which he calls a spark of conscience, is not indicated, but conscience itself, which he had mentioned earlier. Or we can say that the whole force of conscience, as examining or taking counsel, depends on the judgment of synderesis, just as the whole truth of speculative reason depends on first principles. Therefore, he calls conscience synderesis in so far as conscience acts by reason of its power. This answer is especially apt because he wanted to show how synderesis can fail. For it does not err in regard to universal principles, but only in regard to the application to individual acts. Thus, synderesis does not err in itself, but, in a sense, errs in conscience. Therefore, he joins conscience with synderesis to explain this failure of synderesis.
2. Defilement is not said to be in conscience as in a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge. For one is said to have a defiled conscience when he is conscious within himself of some defilement.
3. A defiled conscience is said to be cleansed, in so far as one who was earlier conscious of sin knows later that he has been cleansed from the sin. Thus, he is said to have a pure conscience. Accordingly, it is the same conscience which first was unclean and later clean, not, however, in the sense that conscience is the subject of cleanness and uncleanness, but that through examination made by conscience both are known. It is not that it is numerically the same act by which one knew he was unclean before and knows he is clean afterwards, but that both are known from the same principles, just as consideration which proceeds from the same principles is called the same.
4. The judgments of conscience and of free choice differ to some extent and correspond to some extent. For they correspond in this, that both refer to this particular act. However, the judgment of conscience applies to it in so far as conscience examines it. On this point the judgment of both conscience and free choice differ from the judgment of synderesis. They differ from each other, since the judgment of conscience consists simply in knowledge, whereas the judgment of free choice consists in the application of knowledge to the inclination of the will. This is the judgment of choice.

Thus, it sometimes happens that the judgment of free choice goes astray, but not the judgment of conscience. For example, one debates something which presents itself to be done here and now and judges, still speculating as it were in the realm of principles, that it is evil, for instance, to fornicate with this woman. However, when he comes to apply this to the act, many circumstances relevant to the act present themselves from all sides, for instance, the pleasure of the fornication, by the desire of which reason is constrained, so that its dictates may not issue into choice. Thus, one errs in choice and not in conscience. Rather, he acts against conscience and is said to do this with an evil conscience, in so far as the deed does not agree

will the judgment based on knowledge. Thus, it is clear that it is not necessary for conscience to be the same as free choice.

5. Conscience is called the natural power of judgment in so far as the whole examination or counselling of conscience depends on the natural power of judgment, as we said earlier.

6. Sin is in the reason and the will as in a subject, but it is in conscience in a different way, as has been said.

7. Conscience is said to know something not in a proper sense, but in the sense that knowledge is predicated of that by which we know.

8. Conscience is called spirit, that is, an impulse of our spirit, just as reason is called spirit.

9. Conscience is neither a power nor a habit, but an act. And, although the act of conscience does not always exist, and does not exist in one who is asleep, the act itself remains in its principle, that is, in habits which can be applied to act.

Answers to Difficulties (Second Series):

1-6. We concede the difficulties which prove that conscience is not a habit.

Answers to Difficulties to the Contrary (First Series):

1'. Conscience is called the law of our understanding because it is a judgment of reason derived from the natural law.

2'. One is said to be conscious within himself through the natural law, in the sense in which one is said to deliberate according to principles, but he is conscious within himself through conscience, in the sense in which he is said to deliberate by means of the very act of consideration.

3'. Although scientific knowledge is a habit, its application to some thing is not a habit, but an act. And this is what is indicated by the word conscience.

4'. From these acts there does not arise a habit of a different mode from the habit by which the acts are elicited, but either a habit of the same nature is formed, as the habit of love is formed from acts of infused charity, or an already present habit is strengthened, as in one who has acquired the habit of temperance from repeated acts, the habit itself is strengthened. Accordingly, since the act of conscience proceeds from a habit of wisdom and science, a new habit will not be formed from them, but those habits will be perfected.

5'. When conscience is called hope, the predication is causal in nature, inasmuch as a good conscience makes a man be of good hope, as the Gloss explains.

6'. Even natural habits exist in us because they were put there by God. Consequently, since conscience is an act proceeding from the natural habit of synderesis, God is said to have imprinted it in the way in which He is said to be the source of all knowledge of truth which is in us. For God endows our nature with the knowledge of first principles.

7'. Act is included in habit in that division of the Philosopher because he had proved that habits are formed from acts, and that habits were the principle of similar acts. Accordingly, conscience is not a passion nor a power, but an act, which is reduced to a habit.

Answers to Difficulties to the Contrary (Second Series):

We concede the difficulties which prove that conscience is an act.

ARTICLE II: CAN CONSCIENCE BE MISTAKEN?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 2, 4; 39, 3, I, ad I; 3 3, 2; Quolibet III, 12, 26.

Difficulties:

It seems that it cannot, for

1. The natural power of judgment is never mistaken. But, according to Basil, conscience is "the natural power of judgment." Therefore, it is not mistaken.
2. Conscience adds something to scientific knowledge. Moreover, that which it adds in no way detracts from the nature of scientific knowledge. But scientific knowledge is never mistaken, since it is the habit by which one always speaks the truth, as is clear in the Ethics. Therefore, neither can conscience be mistaken.
3. Synderesis is "a spark of conscience," as Jerome says. Therefore, conscience is related to synderesis as fire is to a spark. But the activity and movement of a fire and of a spark [from it] are the same. Therefore, the activity and movement of conscience and synderesis are also the same. But synderesis is never mistaken. Therefore, neither is conscience.
4. According to Damascene, conscience is the "law of our understanding." But the law of our understanding is more certain than the understanding itself, and, "understanding is always correct," as is said in The Soul. Therefore, with much greater reason, conscience is always correct.
5. Reason, in so far as it is coincident with synderesis, does not make mistakes. But reason joined to synderesis constitutes conscience. Therefore, conscience never makes mistakes.
6. The testimony of witnesses is decisive in court. But conscience is the witness in the divine court, as is clear from Romans (2: 5): "their conscience bearing witness to them." Therefore, since the divine court never can be deceived, it seems that conscience can never err.
7. In all things, the rule which regulates other things must be infallibly correct. But conscience is a rule of human actions. Therefore, conscience must always be correct.
8. Hope depends on conscience, according to the Gloss on the first Epistle to Timothy (1: "From a pure heart, and a good conscience..." But hope is most certain, according to Hebrews (6:18): "we have the most certain comfort, who have fled for refuge to hold fast the hope set before us." Therefore, conscience is infallibly correct.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. In John (16:2) we read: "The hour cometh, when whosoever killed you, will think that he doth a service to God." Therefore, their conscience told those who killed the Apostles that they would please God by this action. But this was a mistake. Therefore, conscience makes mistakes.
- 2'. Conscience includes comparison. But reason can be deceived when it makes comparisons. Therefore, conscience can make mistakes.

REPLY:

As is clear from what has been said, conscience is nothing but the application of knowledge to some special act. Error, however, can occur in this application in two ways; in one, because that which is applied has error within it, and, in the other, because the application is faulty. Thus, in using a syllogism, mistakes can happen in two ways: either from the use of false

premises, or from faulty construction of the syllogism. But this use of something false takes place only in one of the premises and not in the other. For, as has been said, through conscience the knowledge of synderesis and of higher and lower reason are applied to the examination of a particular act.

However, since the act is particular and the judgment of synderesis is universal, the judgment of synderesis can be applied to the act only if some particular judgment is used as the minor premise. Sometimes, higher reason furnishes this particular judgment; sometimes, lower reason does. Thus, the act of conscience is the result of a kind of particular syllogism. For example, if the judgment of synderesis expresses this statement: "I must not do anything which is forbidden by the law of God," and if the knowledge of higher reason presents this minor premise: "Sexual intercourse with this woman is forbidden by the law of God," the application of conscience will be made by concluding: "I must abstain from this intercourse."

Error has no place in the general judgment of synderesis, as is clear from what we have said earlier, but a mistake can occur in the judgment of higher reason, as happens when one judges something to be licit or illicit which is not, as heretics who believe that oaths are forbidden by God. Therefore, mistakes occur in conscience because of the error which existed in the higher part of reason. Similarly, error can occur in conscience because of error which exists in the lower part of reason, as happens when one is mistaken about civil norms of what is just or unjust, good or bad. Error also occurs because conscience does not make a correct application to acts. For, as in constructing speculative syllogisms one can neglect the proper form of argumentation, and thus arrive at a false conclusion, so he can do the same in practical syllogisms, as has been said.

Still, we must remember that in some things conscience can never make a mistake, namely, when the particular act to which conscience is applied has a universal judgment about it in synderesis. For, as in speculative matters, error does not occur when we are dealing with particular conclusions which are derived directly from universal principles and expressed in the same terms—as for instance, no one is deceived in the judgment: "This whole is greater than its part," just as no one is deceived in the judgment: "Every whole is greater than its part" so, too, no conscience can err in the judgments: "I should not love God" or "Some evil should be done." For, in each of these syllogisms, the speculative as well as the practical, the major premise is self-evident in so far as it exists in the universal judgment, and the minor, by means of which the particular predication of identity is made, is also self-evident. This is the case when one says: "Every whole is greater than its part. This whole is a whole. Therefore, it is greater than its part."

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Conscience is called the natural power of judgment in so far as it is a conclusion derived from that power. And in this conclusion there can be error; not, however, because of error in the natural power of judgment, but because of an error of the particular judgment used in the minor premise or because of a faulty reasoning process, as has been said.

2. Conscience adds to scientific knowledge the application of that knowledge to a particular act. There can be error in the application, although there is not error in the scientific knowledge itself. Or we should say that, when I say conscience, I do not imply scientific knowledge (*scientia*) alone, taken strictly in so far as it deals only with things which are true, but taken in the broad sense for any knowledge (*notitia*). In this sense, according to the common use of the word, we say that we know (*scire*) everything which we are acquainted (*novisse*).

3. Just as the spark is that part of fire which is purer and hovers above the whole fire, so synderesis is that which is supreme in the judgment of conscience. And it is according to this

metaphor that synderesis is called a spark of conscience, nor is it necessary for the relation between synderesis and conscience to be the same as that between a spark and fire in all other respects. Yet, even in material fire the fire receives some modification because a foreign element is added to it, a modification which a spark, because of its purity, does not receive. So, too, some error can find its way into conscience because it has to do with particulars, which are, as it were, matter foreign to reason. This error does not occur in synderesis existing in its purity.

4. Conscience is called the law of understanding by reason of that which it has from synderesis. It is never this, but something else which is the source of error, as has been said.

5. Although reason does not err because it is united to synderesis, still, when higher or lower reason is mistaken, it can be applied to synderesis, just as a false minor premise is united with a true major.

6. The testimony of witnesses is decisive in court when it cannot be shown false through other clear evidence. But, in one whose conscience is erroneous, the testimony of his conscience is shown to be false by the very dictate of synderesis. Thus, in the divine court not the testimony of a mistaken conscience, but the dictates of the natural law, will be decisive.

7. Not conscience, but synderesis, is the first rule of human activity. Conscience, however, is a kind of rule which is itself regulated. Hence, it is not strange that it can make mistakes.

8. The hope which is based on a correct conscience has certainty, and this hope is freely given hope. However, the hope which is based on a false conscience is that of which it is said: "The hope of the wicked shall perish" (Proverbs 10:28).

ARTICLE III: DOES CONSCIENCE BIND?

Parallel readings: Quolibet III, 12, 26; Summa Theol., I, 7 13.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. No one is bound to do anything except by some law. But man does not make the law for himself. Therefore, since conscience arises from the act of man, it does not bind.

2. One is not bound to follow the counsels. But conscience operates as a counsel, for conscience seems to precede choice in the way counsel does. Therefore, conscience does not bind.

3. One is bound only by something superior. But the conscience of a man is not superior to the man himself. Therefore, a man is not bound by his conscience.

4. The same thing binds and frees [an obligation]. But conscience cannot free a man [from an obligation]. Therefore, it cannot bind him, either.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Gloss on Ecclesiastes (7:23), "Your conscience knows," says: "No one who is guilty is set free by this judge." But the command of a judge is binding. Therefore, the dictate of conscience binds.

2'. On Romans (14:23), "all that is not of faith...", Origen says: "The Apostle desires that I say, think, or do nothing against conscience" Therefore, Conscience binds.

REPLY:

Conscience is certainly binding. But, to see how it binds, we must bear in mind that binding, taken metaphorically from corporeal things and applied to spiritual, means imposing necessity. For he who is bound must necessarily stay in the place where he is bound, and the power to go off to other places is taken away from him. Hence, it is clear that binding has no place in things which have internal necessity. For we cannot say that fire is bound to rise, although it is necessary for it to rise. Binding, then, has place only in things which are necessary will a necessity imposed-by something else.

Now, there is a twofold necessity which can be imposed by an out side agent. One is the necessity of coercion, through which someone will absolute necessity does that which the agent forces him to do. Otherwise, it is not properly called coercion, but inducement. The other necessity is conditional, on the presupposition, that is, of an end to be attained. In this way, necessity is so imposed on one that, if he does not do a certain thing, he will not receive his reward.

The first necessity, that of coercion, has no place in movements of the will, but only in physical things, because by its nature the will is free from coercion. The second necessity, however, can be imposed on the will, so that one must, for example, choose this means if he is to acquire this good, or avoid this evil. For, in such matters, avoiding evil is considered equivalent to achieving some good, as is clear from the Philosopher.

Moreover, as necessity of coercion is imposed on physical things by means of some action, so, too, it is by means of some action that conditional necessity is imposed on the will. But the action by which the will is moved is the command of the one ruling or governing. Consequently, the Philosopher says that by means of his command the king is the source of movement.

Similarly, too, where the will is concerned, the relation between the command of a ruler and the imposition of the kind of obligation by which the will can be bound is like the relation between physical action and the binding of physical things through the necessity of coercion. However, the action of a physical agent never imposes necessity on another thing except by the contact of its action with the object on which it is acting. So, no one is bound by the command of a king or lord unless the command reaches him who is commanded; and it reaches him through knowledge of it.

Hence, no one is bound by a precept except through his knowledge of the precept. Therefore, one who is not capable of the knowledge of a precept is not bound by the precept. Nor is one who is ignorant of a precept bound to carry out that precept except in so far as he is required to know it. If, however, he is not required to know it, and does not know it, he is in no way bound by the precept. Thus, as in physical things the physical agent acts only by means of contact, so in spiritual things a precept binds only by means of knowledge. There fore, just as it is the same power by which touch acts and by which the power of the agent acts, since touch acts only by the power of the agent and the power of the agent acts only through the mediation of touch, so it is the same power by which the precept binds and by which knowledge binds, since the knowledge binds only through the power of the precept, and the precept only through the knowledge. Consequently, since conscience is nothing else but the application of knowledge to an act, it is obvious that conscience is said to bind by the power of a divine precept.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Man does not make the law for himself, but through the act of his knowledge, by which he knows a law made by someone else, he is bound to fulfil the law.

2. Counsel has two meanings. Sometimes, counsel is nothing other than the action of reason inquiring about things to be done. In this sense, the relation of counsel to election is the same as that of a syllogism or question to a conclusion, as is clear from the Philosopher. Taken in this sense, counsel is not opposed to precept, for we take counsel in this way about matters of precept. Hence, obligation can arise from such counsel. It is in this sense that counsel is found in conscience in so far as it is applied to one function of conscience, when, namely, it makes an investigation into some action.

In the other sense, counsel is called persuasion or inducement to do something when it does not have compelling force. In this sense, counsel is opposed to precept. Friendly exhortations are of this sort, and, sometimes, conscience proceeds from that type of counsel. For the knowledge of this counsel is sometimes applied to a particular act. But, since conscience does not bind except in virtue of that which is in conscience, conscience which follows from counsel cannot bind in any other way than the counsel itself. Consequently, one is bound not to despise it, but he is not obliged to follow it.

3. Although man is not higher than himself, the one whose precept he knows is higher than man. This is how he is bound by his conscience.

4. When a man sins in making the error itself, a false conscience is not enough to excuse him. This is the case when he makes a mistake about things which he is required to know. However, if the error is about things which he is not required to know, he is excused by his conscience, as is clear when one sins from ignorance of a fact, as when one approaches another's will, whom he thinks is his own.

ARTICLE IV: DOES A FALSE CONSCIENCE BIND?

Parallel readings: II Sentences, 3; Quolibet III, 12, 27; VIII, 6, x IX., 15; Ad Rom., c. 14, lectura 2; Ad Gal., c. 5; lectura I; Summa Theol., I-II, 19, 5.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for:

1. Augustine says that sin is a word, deed, or desire contrary to the law of God. Therefore, nothing binds under pain of sin except God's law. But a false conscience is not in accordance with God's law. Therefore, it does not bind under pain of sin.

2. On Romans (13: x), "Let every soul be subject to higher powers," Augustine says that we should not obey a lower power contrary to the commandment of a higher power, just as we should not obey the proconsul if his order is contrary to that of the emperor. But a false conscience is inferior to God. Therefore, when conscience gives orders contrary to the commands of God, the command of a mistaken conscience seems to impose no obligation whatever.

3. According to Ambrose, sin is "a transgression of the divine law and disobedience to the heavenly commands." Therefore, whoever disobeys the divine law sins. But a false conscience makes a man disobey the divine power when, for instance, his conscience tells him to do something which is forbidden by the divine law. Therefore, a false conscience leads one into sin if he follows it, rather than binds him under pain of sin if he does not follow it.

4. According to the law, if a man's conscience tells him that he and his will are related within the forbidden degrees of kindred, and that conscience is probable, then he must follow it

against a precept of the Church, even if an excommunication is attached to the precept. However, if his conscience is not probable, he is not bound to follow it, but should obey the Church. But a false conscience, especially about things which are intrinsically evil, has no probability at all. Therefore, such a conscience does not bind.

5. God is more merciful than a temporal lord. But a temporal lord does not accuse a man of sin in something which he did by mistake. Therefore, in God's sight a man is much less obliged under pain of sin by a mistaken conscience.

6. It was said that a false conscience binds with reference to indifferent things, but not with reference to things which are intrinsically evil.—On the contrary, a mistaken conscience is said not to bind when dealing with things which are intrinsically evil because the dictate of natural reason opposes it. But natural reason in like manner opposes the false conscience which is mistaken about indifferent things. Therefore, that, too, does not bind.

7. An indifferent action may be accepted or rejected. But there is no necessary obligation to do or omit an action which may be accepted or rejected. Therefore, conscience imposes no necessary obligation to indifferent actions.

8. If from a false conscience one acts contrary to the law of God, he is not excused from sin. Accordingly, if one who acted against his conscience, even when it was mistaken, were to sin, it would follow that, whether he acted according to his false conscience or not, he would sin. Therefore, he would be so perplexed that it would be impossible for him to avoid sin. But this seems impossible, because, according to Augustine: "No one sins in that which he cannot avoid." Therefore, it is impossible for such a false conscience to bind.

9. Every sin belongs to some genus of sin. But, if conscience tells one that he should fornicate, to abstain from fornication cannot be classified in any genus of sin. Therefore, he would not sin in thus acting contrary to his conscience. Therefore, such a conscience does not bind.

To the Contrary:

1'. On Romans (14:23), "For all that is not of faith is sin," the Gloss says: "That is, it is a sin in conscience, even if it is good in itself."

But conscience which forbids that which is good in itself is false. Therefore, such a conscience binds.

2'. Observance of the legal prescriptions of the Mosaic law in the new dispensation of grace was not indifferent but intrinsically evil. Hence, Galatians (5:2) says: "If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." Nevertheless, conscience prescribing the observance of circumcision was binding. Hence, in the same Epistle (5:3) we read: "And I testify again to every man circumcising himself, that he is a debtor to do the whole law." Therefore, a false conscience binds in things intrinsically evil.

3'. Sin is principally in the will. But whoever decides to transgress a divine commandment has an evil will. Therefore, he sins. Whoever believes that something is a command and decides to violate it wills to break the law. Therefore, he sins. Moreover, one who has a false conscience, whether in things intrinsically evil or in anything at all, believes that what is opposed to his conscience is contrary to the law of God. Therefore, if he decides to do that, he decides to act contrary to the law of God, and, so, he sins. Consequently, conscience, no matter how false it is, obliges under pain of sin.

4'. According to Damascene: "Conscience is the law of our understanding."⁶ But to act contrary to a law is a sin. Therefore, it is also a sin to act against conscience in any way.

5'. One is bound by a precept. But that which conscience dictates becomes a precept. Therefore, Conscience binds, no matter how false it may be.

REPLY:

There are different opinions on this matter. For some say that conscience can be mistaken both in things which are intrinsically evil and also will regard to indifferent things. Furthermore, a mistaken conscience does not bind in things which are intrinsically evil, but does bind will regard to indifferent things. But those who say this do not seem to understand in what sense conscience imposes an obligation. For conscience is said to bind in so far as one sins if he does not follow his conscience, but not in the sense that he acts correctly if he does follow it. Otherwise, a counsel would be called obligatory, for one who fulfils a counsel acts correctly. Still, we do not say that we are bound to counsels, since one who neglects what is of counsel does not sin. But we say that we are bound to precepts because, if we do not keep them, we commit sin. Therefore, Conscience is not said to bind in the sense that what one does according to such a conscience will be good, but in the sense that in not following it he will sin.

Moreover, it does not seem possible for a man to avoid sin if his conscience, no matter how mistaken, declares that something which is indifferent or intrinsically evil is a command of God, and will such a conscience he decides to do the opposite. For, as far as he can, he has by this very fact decided not to observe the law of God. Consequently, he sins mortally. Accordingly, although such a false conscience can be changed, nevertheless, as long as it remains, it is binding, since one who acts against it necessarily commits a sin.

However, a correct conscience and a false conscience bind in different ways. The correct conscience binds absolutely and for an intrinsic reason; the false binds in a qualified way and for an extrinsic reason.

I say that a correct conscience binds absolutely because it binds without qualification and in every circumstance. For, if one's conscience tells him to avoid adultery, he cannot change that conscience without sin, since he would commit a serious sin in the very error of changing such a conscience. Moreover, as long as it remains, it cannot actually be set aside without sin. Thus, it binds absolutely and in every event. But a false conscience binds only in a qualified way, since it binds conditionally. For one whose conscience tells him he must fornicate is not obliged in such a way that he cannot omit the fornication without sin except on condition that such a conscience remains. But this situation can be changed, and without sin. Hence, such a conscience does not oblige in every event. For something can happen, namely, a change of conscience, and, when this takes place, one is no longer bound. That which is only conditional is said to be qualified.

I also say that a correct conscience binds for an intrinsic reason, and a false conscience binds for an extrinsic reason. This is clear from the following. For one who wishes or desires something because of some thing else desires that because of which he desires the others for an intrinsic reason, and the other for an extrinsic reason, as it were. Thus, one who loves will because of its sweetness loves sweetness for an intrinsic reason, and will for an extrinsic reason. But one who has a false conscience and believes that it is correct (otherwise, he would not be mistaken), clings to his false conscience because of the correctness he believes is there, and, strictly speaking, clings to a correct conscience, but one which is false accidentally, as it were, in so far as this conscience, which he believes to be correct, happens to be false. It is for this reason that, strictly speaking, he is bound by a correct conscience, but accidentally by a false conscience.

We can find this solution from what the Philosopher says when he asks almost the same question, that is, whether one is guilty of excess only if he departs from right reason, or also if he departs from a mistaken reason. His solution is that one who departs from right reason goes

to excess essentially, and one who departs from mistaken reason goes to excess accidentally. And a man departs absolutely from the former and with some qualification from the latter, for what is essential is absolute, and what is accidental is qualified.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Although that which a false conscience dictates is out of harmony with the law of God, the one who is mistaken considers it the law of God. Therefore, taking the thing in itself, if he departs from this, he departs from the law of God, although it would be accidental that he does not depart from the law of God.
- 2.** The argument proceeds correctly when there are distinct commands from higher and lower sources, and both, as essentially distinct, reach the one who is obliged by the command. But this is not the situation here, since the dictate of conscience is nothing other than the delivery of a divine command to him who has the conscience, as is clear from what we have said. In the proposed example the cases would be similar if the command of the emperor could never reach a man except through the proconsul, and the proconsul would not order anything except in so far as he repeated the emperor's commands. Then, it would be the same thing to despise the command of the emperor and the command of the proconsul, whether the latter spoke the truth or lied.
- 3.** A false conscience which is mistaken in things which are intrinsically evil commands something which is contrary to the law of God. Nevertheless, it says that what it commands is the law of God. Accordingly, one who acts against such a conscience becomes a kind of transgressor of the law of God, although one who follows such a conscience and acts according to it acts against the law of God and sins mortally. For there was error in the error itself, since it happened because of ignorance of that which one should have known.
- 4.** When a conscience is not probable, it should be changed. But, as long as such a conscience remains, one sins mortally if he acts against it. Hence, this does not prove that a false conscience does not bind as long as it remains, but that it does not bind absolutely and in every event.
- 5.** We do not conclude from that argument that a false conscience does not bind under pain of sin if it is not followed, but that, if it is followed, it excuses from sin. Consequently, the argument is not to the point. When the error itself is not a sin, the conclusion is true, as when the error is due to ignorance of some fact. But, if it is ignorance of a law, the conclusion is wrong because the ignorance itself is a sin. For before a civil judge, also, one who thus appeals to ignorance of a law which he should know is not excused.
- 6.** Although in natural reason there is a basis for proceeding to the opposite of that which a false conscience dictates, whether the mistake is about indifferent things or things intrinsically evil, natural reason does not actually dictate the opposite. For, if it did dictate the opposite, conscience would not be mistaken.
- 7.** Although an indifferent action, in so far as the act itself is concerned, can be accepted or rejected, still, when one thinks that such an action has been commanded, it loses its indifference because of his judgment.
- 8.** One whose conscience tells him to commit fornication is not completely perplexed, because he can do something by which he can avoid sin, namely, change the false conscience. But he is perplexed to some degree, that is, as long as the false conscience remains. And there is no difficulty in saying that, if some condition is presupposed, it is impossible for a man to avoid sin; just as, if we presuppose the intention of vainglory, one who is required to give alms cannot avoid sin. For, if he gives alms, because of such an intention, he sins; but, if he does not give alms, he violates the law.

9. When a false conscience says that something must be done, it commands this under some aspect of good, either as a work of justice, or temperance, and so forth. Therefore, one who acts against such a conscience falls into the vice opposed to the virtue to which his conscience thinks it belongs when commanding it. Or, if such a conscience orders something under the guise of a command of God, or only of some superior, he commits the sin of disobedience by going against it.

ARTICLE V: DOES CONSCIENCE IN INDIFFERENT MATTERS BIND MORE THAN THE COMMAND OF A SUPERIOR, OR LESS?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 39, 3, 3, ad 3; Ad Rom., c. 14, lectura 2.

Difficulties:

It seems to bind less, for

1. A religious subject vows obedience to his superior. But he is required to keep his vow, as is said in Psalms (75:12): "Vow ye, and pay [them] to the Lord your God." Therefore, one seems to be obliged to obey a superior against his own conscience, and, thus, one is more obliged to obey a superior than conscience.
2. A superior must always be obeyed in things which are not against God's will. But indifferent things are not against God's will. Therefore, one is obliged to obey a superior in these matters. We conclude as before.
3. The higher power should be more obeyed than the lower power, as the Gloss says. But the soul of a prelate is higher than the soul of a subject. Therefore, the subject is bound more by the command of the superior than by his own conscience.
4. A subject should not pass judgment on the command of a superior, but the superior should judge the acts of the subject. But the subject would judge the command of the superior if he refused the command because of his own conscience. Therefore, no matter what conscience dictates in indifferent matters, the command of the superior should prevail.

To the Contrary:

A spiritual bond is stronger than a physical bond, and an intrinsic bond stronger than an extrinsic bond. But conscience is an intrinsic spiritual bond, whereas the office of the superior is physical and extrinsic, as it seems, because all his authority is based on a dispensation which is limited to time. Hence, when we reach eternity, it will cease, as the Gloss indicates. Therefore, it seems that one should obey his conscience rather than a superior.

REPLY:

The answer to this question is clear enough from what has been said. For it has been mentioned above that conscience binds only in virtue of a divine command, either in written law or in the law inherent in our nature. Therefore, to compare the bond of conscience with the bond resulting from the command of a superior is nothing else than to compare the bond of a divine command with the bond of a superior's command. Consequently, since the bond of a divine command binds against a command of a superior, and is more binding than the command of a superior, the bond of conscience is also greater than that of the command of a superior. And conscience will bind even when there exists a command of a superior to the contrary.

Nevertheless, the situation is not the same in the case of a correct conscience and that of a false conscience. For a correct conscience binds absolutely and perfectly against the command of a superior. It binds absolutely, because one cannot be freed from its obligation, for such a conscience cannot be changed without sin. And it binds perfectly, because a correct conscience binds in the sense not only that one who follows it does not commit sin, but also that he is free from sin, no matter what command of a superior there is to the contrary.

But a false conscience binds against the command of a superior even in indifferent matters with some qualification and imperfectly. It binds with some qualification, because it does not bind in every event, but on condition that it endures. For one can and should change such a conscience. It binds imperfectly, because it binds in the sense that the one who follows it does not commit a sin, but not in the sense that one who follows it avoids sin when there is a command of a superior to the contrary, and the command of the superior still binds to that indifferent thing. For in such a case he sins in not acting, because he acts against his conscience, and in acting, because he disobeys the superior. However, he sins more if he does not do what his conscience dictates, as long as that conscience remains, since it binds more than the precept of the superior.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. One who vows obedience must obey in those things to which the vow of obedience extends. He is not freed from that obligation by a mistake of conscience, nor, on the other hand, is he freed from the bond of conscience by that obligation. Thus, there remain in him two opposite obligations. One of these, conscience, is greater, because more intense, and less, because more easily removed; the other is just the opposite. For the obligation to obey the superior cannot be removed, whereas a false conscience can be changed.
2. Although of itself the work is indifferent, it loses its indifference because of the dictate of conscience.
3. Although a superior is higher than a subject, God, in virtue of whose command conscience binds, is greater than the superior.
4. The subject does not have to judge about the command of the superior, but only about its fulfilment, which is his concern. For each is bound to examine his actions according to the knowledge he has from God, whether natural, acquired, or infused. For every man should act according to reason.

QUESTION 18: The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of Innocence

ARTICLE I: DID MAN IN THAT STATE KNOW GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 23, 2, 1; Summa Theol., I, 4, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that he did, for

1. The Master says: "Before sin, man saw God independently of any medium." But to see God independently of any medium is to see God through His essence. Therefore in the state of innocence man saw God through His essence.
2. It was said that the Master means that man saw God without a medium as far as obscurity due to sin is concerned, but not that he saw God without using creatures as a medium.—On the contrary, in that same place the Master says that, since we see God through a medium, we must reach Him by means of visible creatures. Therefore, he seems to mean the use of creatures as a medium. But to see without the use of creatures as a medium is to see through the essence. Therefore.
3. In Philippians (4:7) it is said: "And the peace of God, which surpassed all understanding." But this means the peace which God gives the blessed in heaven. The Gloss explains it in this way: "all understanding, that is, our understanding, not the understanding of those who always see the face of the Father." From this we see that the peace or joy of the blessed surpasses the understanding of all those who do not possess that joy. But Adam in his innocence saw the joys of the blessed. Hence, Gregory says: "Man, losing himself by sin, could not then see those joys of heaven which he was accustomed to contemplate before." Therefore, in that state Adam possessed the joy of heaven.
4. Hugh of St. Victor says: "In that state man knew his Creator with the knowledge which He was then more clearly seen as present in contemplation." But to see God as present in contemplation would seem to be to see Him through His essence. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam saw God through His essence.
5. Man was made to see God. For God made rational creatures to participate in His beatitude. This consists in seeing Him, as is shown in the Sentences. Therefore, if Adam in the state of innocence did not see God through His essence, this was only because some medium prevented him from doing so. However, the medium due to sin did not prevent him, for he was then free from sin. Nor did the use of creatures as a medium prevent him, for God is closer to the rational soul than any creature is. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam saw God through His essence.
6. Just as the affective part of man is perfected only by the highest good, so the cognitive part is perfected only by the highest truth, as is clear from Spirit and Soul. But everyone has within him the desire of his perfection. Therefore, in his original state Adam desired to see God through His essence. But whoever is deprived of that which he desires suffers. Therefore, if Adam did not then see God through His essence, he suffered. However, this is false, because suffering, since it is a punishment, cannot precede sin. Therefore, he saw God through His essence.
7. The soul of man "is so made to God's image that it is formed by the first truth itself without the interposition of any creature," as is said in Spirit and Soul. But the image remained pure and whole in man in the state of innocence. Therefore, he was brought to the highest truth itself without any medium. Consequently, he saw God through His essence.
8. For us actually to understand something, all that is needed is the formation of actually intelligible species through abstraction from matter and the conditions of matter, which is the work of the agent intellect, and reception in our understanding, which is the work of the possible intellect. But the divine essence is of itself intelligible, inasmuch as it is completely separated from matter. It was also at the very center of man's soul, since God is said to be in all things through His essence. Therefore, since in the state of innocence there would be no obstacle in the soul of man, it seems that he saw God through His essence.
9. Since in the state of innocence Adam's soul was properly ordered, higher reason was not less perfectly disposed toward its object than lower reason toward its proper object. But lower

reason, whose task it is to give its attention to temporal things, could see those temporal things immediately. Therefore, higher reason, whose task it is to contemplate eternal things, could see immediately the eternal essence of God.

10. That by which something is made actually sensible, namely, light, is known immediately by the sense of sight. Therefore, that by which something becomes actually intelligible is known immediately by man's understanding. But a thing is made actually intelligible by another only in so far as that other is in act. So, since God alone is pure act, He Himself is that by which all things become intelligible. Therefore, man's understanding in the first state saw God immediately, since then it had no obstacle.

11. Damascene says that in the state of innocence man "had a life which was blessed and rich in all things." But life's beatitude consists in seeing God through His essence. Therefore, he then saw God through His essence.

12. Damascene says: "Man was then refreshed by the enjoyment of the sweetest contemplation, like another angel." But the angels see God through His essence. Therefore, in that state Adam saw God through His essence.

13. Man's nature was more perfect in the state of innocence than after the fall. But after the fall some were allowed to see God through His essence while they still lived in this mortal life, as Augustine says of Paul and Moses. Therefore, will much greater reason Adam in the state of innocence saw God through His essence.

14. The Gloss on Genesis (2:21), "Then the Lord God cast a deep sleep upon Adam," says: "The correct interpretation is that Adam was made to fall into the ecstasy so that his mind, becoming a part of the angelic court and entering the sanctuary of God, might understand the last things." 11 From this it seems that that sleep was a kind of rapture. But those who are enraptured see God through His essence. Therefore, Adam, also, saw Him through His essence.

15. According to Damascene, Adam was placed not only in a corporeal but also in a spiritual paradise. But spiritual paradise is nothing other than beatitude, which consists in the sight of God through His essence. Therefore, he saw God through His essence.

16. Augustine says: "In the state of innocence nothing was missing which a good will could acquire." But a good will could acquire the sight of God through His essence. Therefore, this was not missing in the first parents. Therefore, they saw God through His essence.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says that the sight of God through His essence is "the whole reward" of the saints. But in the state of innocence Adam was not one of the blessed. Therefore, he did not see God through His essence.

2'. Bernard says that in this life God can be loved entirely-, but not seen entirely. But He would be seen entirely if He were seen through His essence, since His essence is simple. Therefore, while he was in this life Adam could not see God through His essence.

3'. When the soul is weighed down by the burden of the flesh, it loses distinct knowledge of things. Hence, Boethius says: "Retaining the sum total, it loses the individuals." 12 But in the state of innocence man's soul was weighed down to some extent by the body, although not as much as after sin. Therefore, he was withheld from sight of the divine essence, which the mind must be most perfectly disposed.

4'. It is proper to Christ alone to be wayfarer and possessor at the same time. But in the state of innocence Adam was a wayfarer, as is clear from the fact that he could sin. Hence, he was not a possessor, and so did not see God through His essence.

REPLY:

Some have said that there is sight of God through His essence not only in heaven but also in this life, although not as perfectly in this life as in heaven. According to this opinion, man in the state of innocence had a sight midway between the sight of the blessed and the sight of man after the fall. For he saw less perfectly than the blessed, but more perfectly than man can see after the fall.

But this position is contrary to the testimony of Scripture, which consistently makes the sight of God man's final beatitude. Hence, from the very fact that a man sees God through His essence he is blessed. Thus, as the common opinion maintains, no one still on the way to beatitude can see God through His essence, not even Adam in the state of innocence. And reason can show the truth of this.

For every nature has something ultimate in which its final perfection consists. Now, the perfection of man, in so far as he is man, consists only in the act of understanding, by which he is constituted man. However, in the activity of understanding different levels can be distinguished in two ways. In one they derive from the diversity of intelligible objects. For, as the intelligible object which a person understands is more noble, so the more noble is his intelligence. For this reason, the Ethics says that the most perfect activity of understanding is the activity of that understanding which is well ordered to the best intelligible thing, just as the most beautiful physical sight is that of the sight "which is well ordered to the most beautiful object of sight." In the other way, levels in the activity of understanding derive from the manner of understanding. For it is possible for one and the same intelligible object to be understood differently by different minds, more perfectly by one, and less perfectly by another.

However, it is not possible for the final limit of human perfection to be taken according to some manner of understanding, for among these modes of understanding one can perceive an infinite number of levels, one of which understands more perfectly than another. Nor is there any one who understands so perfectly that it is impossible to devise another who understands more perfectly, except God, who understands everything with infinite clarity. Hence, the final term of human perfection must lie in the understanding of some most perfect intelligible object, which is the divine essence.

Accordingly, every rational creature finds its beatitude in this, that it sees the essence of God, and not in this, that it sees it with such a degree of clarity, or more or less. Consequently, the sight of the blessed is not distinguished from the sight of those in this life because the former see more perfectly and the latter less perfectly, but because the former see and the latter do not see. Therefore, since Adam was still on the way to beatitude, he did not see God through His essence.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. In a given sight a threefold medium can be discerned. One is the medium under which it is seen; the second that by which, it is seen, and this is the intentional likeness of the thing seen; the third is that from which one obtains knowledge of the thing seen. Thus, for instance, in bodily sight the medium under which a thing is seen is light, by which the thing becomes actually visible and the power of sight is given the perfection of seeing. The medium by which a thing is seen is the sensible species itself of the thing existing in the eye, which, as the form of the one seeing in so far as he is seeing, is the principle of the activity of sight. And the

medium from which one receives knowledge of a thing seen is like a mirror, from which the eye at times receives the species of some visible thing, for example, a stone, and not from the stone itself.

We find these three in intellectual sight, too. Thus, the light of the agent intellect corresponds to physical light as the medium under which our understanding sees. The intelligible species, by which the possible intellect is made actually to understand, corresponds to the visible species. And, finally, the effects from which we come to a knowledge of a cause correspond to the medium from which knowledge of the thing seen is obtained, as from a mirror. For the likeness of the cause is not imprinted on our understanding directly by the cause, but by the effect, in which a likeness of the cause shines forth. Consequently this type of knowledge is called "mirrored" knowledge because of the likeness which it has to sight which takes place through a mirror.

Therefore, to know God, man, as he is after the fall, needs a medium which is like a mirror, in which there arises a likeness of God himself. For we must reach "the invisible things of him... by the things that are made," according to Romans (1:20). Man in the state of innocence, however, did not need this medium, but he did need a medium which is somewhat like the species of the thing seen, because he saw God through a spiritual light which was given to the human mind by God, and which was a kind of expressed likeness of the uncreated light.

But he will not need this medium in heaven, because he will see the essence of God in itself and not through any intelligible or sensible likeness of it, since no created likeness can so perfectly represent God that one who sees through it can know the essence of God. Yet, he will need the light of glory, which will be a kind of medium under which God is seen, according to Psalms (35: 10): "In thy light we shall see light." The reason for this is that this sight is not natural to any creature, but only to God. As a result, no creature can reach it by his own natural power, but to acquire it one must be enlightened by a divinely given light.

The second sight, through a medium which is an intentional likeness, is natural to the angels, but above human nature. Accordingly, for it man needs the light of grace.

The third sight is proper to human nature; hence, it alone remains in man after the fall. Therefore, it is clear that the sight by which man in the state of innocence saw God was midway between the sight which we now have and the sight of the blessed.

Accordingly, it is clear that after the fall man needs a triple medium to see God: creatures themselves, from which he rises to knowledge of God; a likeness of God, which he gets from creatures; and a light from which he receives the perfection of being directed toward God. This light may be the light of nature, such as the light of the agent intellect, or the light of grace, such as that of faith and wisdom. In the state before the fall, however, he needed a double medium: one which is a likeness of God, and one which is a light elevating and directing his mind. The blessed, however, need only one medium, the light of glory which elevates the mind. And God sees Himself without any medium, for He Himself is the light by which He sees Himself.

2. The Master does not reject the possibility of seeing God in the state of innocence through some likeness of a creature as a medium, but only the necessity of the medium of visible creation.

3. In the state of innocence Adam did not perceive the joys of the heavenly court so that he understood what and how great they were, for this belongs only to the blessed. However, he did know that they existed, because he had some participation of them.

4. In contemplation, God is seen through a medium which is the light of wisdom. This elevates the mind to the sight of things divine, not, however, to immediate vision of the divine essence itself. And it is in this way that God is seen through grace by the contemplatives after the fall, although He is seen more perfectly in the state of innocence.

5. Man was made to see God, not in the beginning but in the last stage of his perfection. Therefore, that he did not see God through His essence at the beginning of his existence was not the result of being hindered by some obstacle, but only the result of his own imperfection, because he did not then have that perfection which is needed to see the divine essence.

6. In the state of innocence Adam desired to see God through His essence, but that desire of his was well ordered. For he strove to see God when it would be time for him to do so. Hence, he did not suffer at all at not seeing God before the proper time.

7. Our mind is said to be formed immediately by the first truth itself, not because [is question whether] it knows the first truth at times through the mediation of some habit, species, or creature, but because it is formed by it as a copy is formed to the likeness of its immediate exemplar. For some have held, as Dionysius points out, that among beings the higher are the models for the lower, and thus the soul of man proceeds from God through the mediation of angels, and is formed to the divine model through the mediation of an angelic model. The passage cited denies this, for the human mind is created immediately by God and formed immediately by Himself as its exemplar. For this reason, also, it achieves beatitude immediately in Him as its end.

8. Although, intrinsically, God is completely intelligible, and was present to the mind of man in the state of innocence, He was not there as an intelligible form. For man's understanding did not yet have the perfection needed for this.

9. The object of higher reason according to its natural state is not the divine essence itself, but certain intelligible characters which flow into the mind from God and are received from creatures. By these we are brought to the perfection of sight of eternal things.

10. The agent intellect is the immediate and proximate principle by which things which are potentially intelligible become actually intelligible. But the first principle by which all things become intelligible is uncreated light itself. Thus, the divine essence is compared to intelligible things as the substance of the sun is to visible bodies. However, it is not necessary for one who sees some colour to see the substance of the sun, but only the light of the sun, in so far as it illumines colour. Similarly, it is not necessary for one who knows some intelligible thing to see the divine essence, but only to perceive intelligible light, which originally derives from God, in so far as by it something is made actually intelligible.

11. We should not take what Damascene says to mean that Adam was one of the blessed simply, but that he had the kind of beatitude which fitted his state. Similarly, in the state of affliction some are said to be blessed in some respect by reason of some perfection which exists in them, as in Matthew (5:3): "Blessed are the poor in spirit..."

12. Even the angels in the state of their original nature did not see God through His essence; this belonged to them only through glory.

But in the state of innocence Adam had through grace the kind of sight which the angels had naturally, as has been said. Therefore, he is said to have seen as another angel.

13. By a certain privilege of grace Moses and Paul saw God through His essence. Still, although simply they were in the state of wayfarers, in some respect, that is, in so far as they saw God through His essence, they were not in that state. Therefore in the state of innocence, in which he was still a wayfarer, Adam had no claim to vision of God through His essence. Yet, if by a rapture he was raised above the ordinary knowledge which belonged to him, and

so saw God through His essence, it is not strange, for such a grace can be given just as well in the state of innocence as after the fall.

14. If we maintain that Adam's ecstasy was of the same nature as Paul's rapture, then we will say that that vision surpassed the ordinary manner of sight which then belonged to him. But, since it does not explicitly say that in that sleep he saw God through His essence, we can say that in that ecstasy he was not elevated to a vision of the essence of God, but to a knowledge of certain more profound truths about the divine mysteries than was fitting for him to know at that time according to the common manner of human cognition.

5. Spiritual paradise, in so far as it means perfect delight, which makes one blessed, consists in the sight of God. But, in so far as it means delight about God without qualification, it consists in any kind of contemplation which has God as its object.

16. His will would not have been good and well ordered if he had desired to have at that time what did not then belong to him. For this reason, the conclusion does not follow.

ARTICLE II: DID MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE SEE GOD THROUGH CREATURES?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 23, 2, I; Summa Theol., I, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that he did not, for

1. To know God through creatures is to know a cause through an effect. But this is knowledge which involves comparison and investigation, and, since this is feeble and imperfect, it did not befit man in the state of innocence. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam did not see God through creatures.

2. When the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But Isidore says that the cause why man sees God through creatures is that he turned from the Creator and toward creatures. This was not yet so at that time in the state of innocence. Therefore, at that time man did not see God through creatures.

3. According to Hugh of St. Victor, man in that state knew God, "contemplating Him as present." But He is seen in contemplation without the medium of creatures. Therefore, he did not see God through creatures.

4. Isidore says that the angels, created before the rest of creation, did not know God through creatures. But, according to Damascene,⁴ man in the state of innocence saw God as another angel. Therefore, he did not know God from creatures.

5. Darkness is not the reason for knowing light. But, compared to the Creator, every creature is darkness. Therefore, the Creator cannot be known through creatures.

6. Augustine says: "I say that perhaps He spoke with them four first parents] in this way, although not with the same degree of participation in the divine wisdom as the angels possess, yet, with whatever greater limitations imposed by human nature, within the same general category of vision and conversation." From this it seems that we can conclude that man in the state of innocence knew God with the same mode of knowledge with which the angels know him. But angels do not know God through creatures, as is clear in Augustine and Dionysius. Therefore, man in the state of innocence did not see God through creatures.

7. The soul of man is more like God than is any sensible creature. Therefore, when the soul of man was in its purity, it did not seek knowledge of God through visible creation.

8. Less perfect knowledge is superfluous when more perfect is given. But, as Hugh of St. Victor says, man in the state of innocence knew God "as present in contemplation." Therefore, he did not know God through creatures.

To the Contrary:

Damascene says that Adam was established in a bodily paradise that there he might view his Creator through creatures.

REPLY:

For a clear understanding of this question we must bear in mind that, according to Boethius, nature begins with perfect things. This can be seen in divine works, for in any work of God the things which are first are perfect. Hence, since in the state of innocence God made Adam the source of the whole human race, not only to transmit human nature to posterity but also to pass on original justice to others, man in the state of innocence must be considered as having had a two fold perfection. One of these is natural and the other is given freely by God over and above what is due from natural principles.

According to natural perfection, however, man could flittingly know God only from creation. This is clear from the following. In any genus a passive power extends only to those things to which an active power extends. Therefore, the Commentator says that there is no passive power in nature for which there is not a corresponding active power.

In human nature, however, there is a double power for understanding: one passive, which is the possible intellect, and the other active, which is the agent intellect. Consequently, the possible intellect according to the natural process is in potency only to those forms which become actually intelligible through the agent intellect. But these are only the forms of sensible things which are abstracted from phantasms. For immaterial substances are intelligible of themselves and not because we make them intelligible. Therefore, our possible intellect can not reach any intelligible objects except through those forms which it abstracts from phantasms. Thus it is that by our natural power we can know God and other immaterial substances only through sensible things.

But, in the state of innocence, man, by reason of the perfection of grace, received a knowledge of God by means of an internal inspiration due to the irradiation of divine wisdom. In this way he did not know God from visible creation but from a spiritual likeness imprinted on his mind.

Accordingly, there were thus in man two kinds of knowledge of God, one, by which he knew God as the angels do, through an internal inspiration; the other, by which he knew God as we do, through sensible creatures. However, this second knowledge of his differed from our knowledge as the investigation of one who has the habit of a science and proceeds from things he knows to a consideration of things which he had once known differs from the investigation of one who is learning and strives to proceed from what he knows to things which he does not know. However, we cannot have knowledge of God any other way except by coming to know Him from creatures. But Adam, who already knew God in a different way, that is, through an internal inspiration, also possessed a knowledge of Him from creatures.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That process of reasoning by which we reach the unknown from the known includes imperfection, since through it what is sought is unknown. But the process of reasoning which

man in the state of innocence made use of was not of that sort. However, there is nothing to prevent us from saying that something [belonged to man in that state, not indeed [I perfect in that which was due to his nature, but by comparison with a higher nature. For, when human nature was created, it did not have as much perfection as an angelic nature or the divine nature.

2. What Isidore says gives the reason why man had of necessity to get his knowledge of God, as an unknown, from creatures. Man in the state of innocence did not need this, as has been said.

3. Besides the knowledge of contemplation, he had another knowledge of God by which he knew Him from creatures, as was said above.

4. Through grace, Adam was like an angel in the knowledge of contemplation. But besides this he had another knowledge belonging to his nature, as has been said.

5. Creatures are darkness in so far as they are from nothing, but, in so far as they are from God, they participate in some likeness of Him and thus lead to His likeness.

6. There, Augustine is talking of that knowledge which is had through divine inspiration. This is clear from the fact that he mentions there the speech of God, and is not altogether silent about the other mode of knowledge, when he adds: "Perhaps, also, God spoke to him in that manner of speaking which takes place through creatures," whether by images of bodies in ecstasy of spirit, or by some image presented to the senses of the body themselves.

7. Although the soul is more like God than any other creature is, it cannot reach a knowledge of His nature so that it can distinguish it from other things except through sensible creatures, from which our knowledge takes its origin.

8. Although Adam saw God through the light of contemplation, the knowledge by which he saw God by means of creatures was not superfluous, that is to say, it was not superfluous that he knew the same thing in several ways, and that he had not only gratuitous but also natural knowledge.

ARTICLE III: DID ADAM IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE HAVE FAITH ABOUT GOD?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 29, 3; Summa Theol., I, II-II, q. 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that he did not, for

1. The knowledge of faith is obscure knowledge, as is clear in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1:12): "We see now in a glass.

But in the state of innocence Adam had plain, not obscure, knowledge. Therefore, he did not have faith.

2. Hugh of St. Victor says: "He knew his Creator not with the knowledge with which believers now seek their absent Creator by faith." We conclude as before.

3. Gregory says that faith belongs to him "who cannot know by experience" the things which must be believed. But, as is said in the same place, Adam knew by experience what we believe. Therefore, he did not have faith.

4. Faith concerns not only the Creator but also the Redeemer. But in the state of innocence Adam seems to have known nothing about the Redeemer, because he did not foresee his fall, without which there would have been no redemption. Therefore, Adam did not have faith.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says that in the state of innocence Adam had "the charity of a pure heart and a good conscience and faith unfeigned."

2'. As the Master says, he had all the virtues. Therefore, he also had faith.

REPLY:

In his first state, Adam had faith. This becomes evident if we consider the object of faith. For the object of faith is the first truth itself, in so far as it is not evident. Moreover, I say not evident, either through an intentional likeness, as it appears to the blessed, or through natural reason, as some things about God are known to some philosophers, as that He is intelligible, incorporeal, and so on. Adam, however, knew not only what can be known about God by natural reason, but even more. However, he did not attain to vision of God through His essence. Consequently, it is clear that he had knowledge of God through faith.

But faith is twofold, according to a twofold hearing and a twofold speaking. For "faith cometh by hearing," as is said in Romans (10: 7). Now, there is an external speaking, by which God speaks to us through preachers, and an interior speaking, by which He speaks to us through an internal inspiration. This internal inspiration is called a kind of speaking in view of its likeness to external speaking. For, as in external speaking we present to the hearer not the thing itself which we want to make known but a sign of that thing, that is to say, a word which expresses some meaning; so in internal inspiration it is not His essence which God presents to view, but some sign of His essence, which is some spiritual likeness of His wisdom.

Faith arises in the hearts of the faithful from both kinds of hearing. By interior hearing it arose in those who first received faith and taught it, as in the Apostles and Prophets. Hence, in Psalms (84:9) we read: "I will hear what the Lord God will speak in me." But faith arises in the hearts of the rest of the faithful, who receive knowledge of the faith through other men, by the second kind of hearing. Adam, however, had faith, and as one who first learned it from God. Therefore, he should have had faith through interior speaking.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. He did not have knowledge so plain that it was enough to remove the obscurity of faith. This is removed only through the appearance of the first truth.

2. Hugh denies to the first man the kind of knowledge of faith which belongs to us, who have knowledge of faith, not through a revelation made to us, but through adherence to revelations made to others.

3. That experience which man had was not the kind which those who see God through His essence have, as has been said earlier. Therefore, it is not enough to make faith superfluous.

4. Adam had only implicit and not explicit faith about the Redeemer in so far as he believed that God would make ample provision for all the things which would be necessary for his salvation.

ARTICLE IV: DID ADAM IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF ALL CREATURES?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 23, 2, 2; Summa Theol., I, 3; II-II, 5, 2, ad 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that he did not, for

1. He did not have knowledge of futures, since this is proper only to God, according to Isaias (41:23): "Shew the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods." But among creatures there were many things which were in the future. Therefore, he did not have knowledge of all creatures.
2. As Avicenna says, the senses are necessary to the human soul so that through them it may get perfect knowledge of things. Therefore, if the soul of Adam had knowledge of all things from the beginning, his senses would have been given to him to no purpose. But this can not be; since nothing is to no purpose in the works of God. Therefore, he did not have knowledge of all things.
3. As Boethius says: "Though the mind is born enfolded in the cloud of bodily members, it has not completely forgotten itself, and, while losing the particulars, it retains the sum." Here it is shown that the soul, when first created, had confused knowledge, by which it knew things in general, but did not have distinct knowledge, by which it knew individual things in their proper natures. Therefore, if Adam had the kind of knowledge which it is fitting for the human soul to have when it is created, it seems that he did not have knowledge of creatures distinctly, but only in a confused way.
4. Proper knowledge of a thing is had only through the existence of its proper species in the soul. But, as appears from the Philosopher, when the human soul is created, it is "like a tablet on which nothing is written." Therefore, when Adam was first created, he could not have proper knowledge of created things.
5. It was said that, although he did not have this in virtue of his nature, he had it by divine gift.—On the contrary, when first created, all men are equal with respect to merit, and specifically similar to each other. Therefore, if perfect knowledge of things was conferred on Adam by God when he was first created, it seems that will equal reason this is conferred on all other men when they are created. But we see that this is false.
6. Nothing which is moved toward the perfection of knowledge is at the term of its perfection. But Adam was moved toward the perfection of knowledge. Therefore, he was not at the term of knowledge, as one who had perfect knowledge of creatures. I prove the minor: According to the Philosopher, before the intellect understands, it is not anything of the things which exist. But, after it understands, it is actually something of those things. Thus, at some time it is actually something of things that exist, and sometimes it is not. But everything which has this kind of existence is on the way to perfect act. Therefore, when first created, the human understanding is on the way to perfect knowledge. Hence, when Adam's understanding was first created, it was not at the term of perfect knowledge, but on the way to perfection.
7. For angels to be infused with knowledge of all natural things as soon as they are created is part of the excellence of angelic nature, according to The Causes: "Every intelligence is full of

forms." But human nature does not rise to the excellence of angelic nature. Therefore, it was not fitting for the soul of the first man, when first created, to have knowledge of all things.

8. It is possible for the intellect to understand only when it actually becomes the intelligible thing. But the human understanding cannot actually become many intelligible things at once. Therefore, neither can it know many intelligible things at once; hence, the first could not have knowledge of all things at once.

9. For every subject of perfectibility there is one corresponding perfection, because one power cannot be perfected at one time except by one act of one kind. Thus, in first matter there can be only one substantial form, and in a body only one colour. But the human understanding is a power which is perfected by the habits of the sciences. Therefore, it is impossible for many habits to be in the soul at the same time. Consequently, Adam's soul could not have knowledge of all things, since different things are known through different habits.

10. If Adam knew all creatures, he knew them either in the Word, or in their proper natures, or in his intelligence. But he did not know them in the Word, for that is the knowledge of the blessed, who see the Word. Nor did he see them in their proper natures, since all of them did not yet exist in their proper natures. Nor did he see them in his own intelligence, for it is not contrary to the perfection of the first state for a higher power to receive something from a lower power, as imagination from sense. Hence, it was appropriate for the human soul to have the intellect receive from sense. Consequently, since he did not perceive all creatures through sense, it was impossible for all things to be in his intelligence. Therefore, he did not in any way have knowledge of all creatures.

11. Adam was created in a state in which he could will equal reason progress in understanding as well as in affection. But he who has knowledge of all things cannot make progress in that knowledge. Therefore, he did not have knowledge of all things.

12. Augustine seems to say that Adam was placed in paradise to work, not from necessity but for the pleasure of tilling the soil. This comes from the fact that "human reason in a certain sense converses with physical reality, will the seeds which have been sown, will the shoots which have been planted, as if it asked them what the power of the root and the seed was, what it could do or could not do." But to ask nature about the power of nature is nothing else but to learn the powers of nature from seeing the activities of nature. Therefore, Adam had to receive knowledge of things from things. Thus, he did not have knowledge of all creatures.

13. In the state of innocence Adam was not more perfect than the beatified angels. But they do not know everything. For this reason, Dionysius says that the lower angels are purified from ignorance by the higher angels. Therefore, neither did man in the state of innocence know all things.

14. As Augustine says, the demons can know the secrets of hearts only in so far as these become known from movements of the body. Therefore, since the angelic understanding has clearer sight than the human understanding, it seems that even Adam in the state of innocence could not know the secrets of hearts. Thus, he did not have knowledge of all creatures.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says that in that state "nothing was missing which a good will could acquire." But will a good will he could want to have knowledge of all things. Therefore, he had knowledge of all things.

2'. Adam was an image [of God] more in his soul than in his body. But, when first created, Adam was perfect in body as regards age, stature, and all his members. Therefore, he was perfect also in soul as regards all knowledge.

3' The perfection of nature when it was created is greater than the perfection of fallen nature. But knowledge of the future pertains to the state of fallen nature. Hence, after the fall some saints were raised to the perfection of knowing the future through the gift of prophecy. Therefore, will much greater reason Adam had knowledge of the future, and much more of the present.

[4'. Adam had all the virtues. Therefore, he had all knowledge.]

5' The names of things should fit their properties. But Adam gave names to things, as is clear from Genesis (2: 20). Therefore, he had full knowledge of the nature of things.

REPLY:

Adam had a twofold knowledge: one natural and one due to grace. Natural human knowledge can extend to those things which we can know under the guidance of natural reason. And there is a beginning and a term of this natural knowledge. It has its beginning in a kind confused knowledge of all things, in so far as man naturally has within him a knowledge of the general principles in which, as in seeds, there virtually pre-exist all the objects of knowledge which can be known by natural reason. This knowledge reaches its term when the things which are virtually in the principles are expressed in act, as animal generation is said to reach its term when the animal, with all its members perfect and distinct, is developed from the seed of the animal in which all its members pre-existed virtually.

Adam, however, when first created, had to have natural knowledge not only in its first stage but also in its term, because he was created as the father of the whole human race. For the Sons should receive from their father not only existence through generation, but also instruction through teaching.

One is not a principle in so far as he is in potency, but in so far as he is in act, and, for this reason, act is naturally prior to potency, and the activity of nature always begins from things which are perfect. Because of this, the first man had to be set at the term of perfection as soon as he was created, and this both in body, so that he would be a suitable principle of generation of the whole human race, and in mind, so that he would be an adequate principle of instruction.

And, just as nothing in his body which pertained to bodily perfection was not actually developed, so, too, whatever there was seminally or virtually in the first principles of reason was developed in its entirety, in so far as the perfect knowledge of all those things to which the power of the first principles could extend was concerned. Consequently, we must say that whatever knowledge of things any man could ever acquire by his natural talents Adam had in its entirety by habitual natural knowledge.

There also are many things in creatures which cannot be known by natural knowledge, that is, those to which the power of first principles does not extend, such as future contingents, the secret thoughts of men, and the dispositions of creatures in so far as they are subject to divine providence. For he could not have a comprehensive grasp of divine providence, and so no comprehensive grasp of the order of creatures themselves in so far as they are subject to divine providence. For providence sometimes ordains creatures to many things beyond their natural capacity. But he was helped to know these things to some extent by the other knowledge, which is knowledge due to grace, through which God spoke internally to him, as Augustine says. But the first man was not given this knowledge as though he were placed at the term of its perfection, since one reaches the term of this freely conferred knowledge only in the vision of glory, to which he had not yet arrived. Therefore, he did not know all of these things, but only as much of them as God revealed to him. Accordingly, we have to answer both sets of difficulties.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. There are some futures which can be known naturally in their causes. Adam had knowledge of these. But he did not know all the others which cannot be known naturally, but only those which were revealed to him by God.

2. Adam should have had in its perfection everything which human nature requires. But, just as the power of growth is given to man so that he may reach perfect stature, so the senses are given to the human soul to attain the perfection of knowledge. Accordingly, just as Adam did not have the power of growth, in order through it to grow larger, but in order that he might lack nothing of what is needed for the perfection of his nature, so, too, he did not have senses to acquire knowledge through them, but to have a perfect human nature, and so that through the senses he might experience again what he knew habitually.

3. Adam, in so far as he was made the source of all human nature, had something more than is commonly due to all men. For, in so far as he was the teacher of the whole human race, it was incumbent on him not to have confused, but distinct, knowledge, so that will it he could teach. And for this reason it was also necessary that, when he was first created, his understanding should not be like a tablet on which nothing is written, but should have the fullness of knowledge by reason of God's action. Nor was this necessary for other men, who were not made the source of the human race.

4.-6. The solution to the fourth, fifth, and sixth difficulties is clear from the third response.

7. The angels were created with full knowledge of physical reality because it is due to their nature, but this is not so with man, who obtained this knowledge by reason of God's action. Therefore, human nature still remains lower than the angelic nature. Similarly, man's body is naturally more imperfect than a heavenly body, even though, by the power of God, Adam's body had its full stature when it was created. This belongs to heavenly bodies as due to their nature.

8. Adam's understanding could not actually be many intelligible things, as actually informed by them; however, it could simultaneously be habitually informed by many intelligible things.

9. That argument is valid when the power is perfected completely by one perfection, as a substantial form perfects matter and colour perfects the potency of a surface. But one habit of knowledge does not fully perfect the power of understanding with reference to all intelligible things. Therefore the case is not the same.

10. Adam had knowledge of all natures, not in the Word, but in their proper nature and in his intelligence. This twofold manner of knowing is not distinguished according to the species of things in so far as some thing is known by these species, but in so far as they are what is known. For, even when the understanding knows things in their proper nature, it knows them only through species which are present to it. Accordingly, when through species which are present to it the understanding is directed to things which are outside the soul, then it is said to know things in their proper nature. But, when the understanding stops at the species themselves, studying their nature and arrangement, then is it said to know things in its intelligence, as, for instance, when it understands that it understands and how it understands.

Therefore, to say that all things did not yet exist in their proper nature, and so could not be known in their proper nature, does not follow. For to know a thing in its proper nature is used in two senses. In one, it is used by way of a statement, namely, when the thing itself is known to be in its own proper nature. And this can be done only when the thing exists in its proper nature. Adam did not know all things in their proper nature in this way, for all things did not yet exist in their proper nature, unless we were to say that they were not in their proper nature perfectly, but imperfectly. For all things which were produced later in the works of the six days [of creation] did pre-exist in some way, as is clear from Augustine.

In the other way, one is said to know a thing in its proper nature by way of a definition, that is to say, when one knows what the proper nature of a thing is. In this way, even things which do not exist can be known in their proper nature. Thus, I would be able to know what a lion is even if all lions were dead. In this way, Adam could know in their proper nature even things which did not then exist.

Similarly, there is nothing to prevent all creatures from being in his intelligence through their likenesses, although he did not perceive them all by his senses. For, although it is not contrary to the dignity of the first state for a higher power to receive something from a lower, to be created without the fullness of knowledge and to have to receive knowledge only from sense were contrary to the perfection which belonged to the first man.

11. Adam could make progress in knowledge in two ways. One of these related to things which he did not know, that is, those to which natural reason could not reach. In these he could make progress partly by reason of divine revelation, as in knowledge of divine mysteries, and partly from sense experience, as in knowledge of futures, which, though previously unknown to him, would become known when they came to pass. The other way related to that which he knew, and thus he could later know also through sense experience that which he knew only through intellectual knowledge.

12. Those words of Augustine are not to be taken as though he meant that Adam had to know the power of nature from the works of nature, but that he knew by experience that the nature, which he knew interiorly will his mind, acted according to that which pre-existed in his knowledge. And this he found delightful.

13. The angels are purified from ignorance, not of natural things, but of divine mysteries. This ignorance existed in Adam, too, as has been said. And for this he himself needed an angelic illumination.

14. The secret thoughts of men are among those things to which natural reason cannot extend its knowledge. Hence, our judgment about these is the same as that about the knowledge of future contingents.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. With a good will Adam was able to will only what he willed according to right order, that is, to seek to have what he wanted at its proper time, and not to want what did not befit him.

2'. Adam had natural perfection in his body, but not the supernatural perfection which is the perfection of glory. Consequently, it does not follow that he had in his soul any other than the perfection of natural knowledge.

3'. Foreknowledge of futures is indeed a perfection of human nature, because it does have this perfection even after the fall; it is not a perfection, however, in such a way that it is natural to man. Hence, there was no need for Adam to have such a perfection. For it belongs to Christ alone to be given everything which the other saints had through grace, because He is the source of grace for us, as Adam is the source of nature. It was for this reason that the perfection of natural knowledge was due to Adam.

4'. It was by reason of the state of innocence that Adam had all the virtues, for, if any were lacking in him, he would not have had original justice. But the state of innocence does not require the possession, of all knowledge. Hence, the case is not the same.

5'. We read that Adam gave names to the animals and knew their natures fully, and, consequently, knew the natures of all other natural things. But it does not follow from this that he knew things which surpass natural knowledge.

ARTICLE V: DID ADAM IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE SEE THE ANGELS THROUGH THEIR ESSENCE?

Parallel readings: [Summa Theol., I, 94, 2.](#)

Difficulties:

It seems that he did, for

1. Gregory says: "In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God and to share in purity of heart and loftiness of vision with the spirits of the beatified angels." Therefore, through the loftiness of his vision he seems to have attained even to the Vision of the angels.
2. On the words of Genesis (2:21), "Then the Lord God cast a deep sleep upon Adam," the Gloss reads: "The correct interpretation of this ecstasy is that it was given so that Adam's mind, sharing the company of the heavenly court, might enter into the sanctuary of God and understand the last things." But he could not share the company of the heavenly court unless he knew the angels. Therefore, he had knowledge of the angels.
3. The Master says: "Man had a knowledge of the things which were made for his sake." But, along with other creatures, even the angels are made in some way for man's sake, as the Master says. Therefore, he had knowledge of the angels.
4. It is more difficult to make something which is intelligible in potency become intelligible actually and to understand it than to understand that which is of itself actually intelligible. But Adam's understanding could make species of material things, which of themselves are intelligible in potency, become actually intelligible, and in this way understand material things. Therefore, with much more reason he was able to understand the essences of the angels, which of themselves are actually intelligible, since they are free of matter.
5. That someone does not better understand things which are of themselves more intelligible is due to a defect of his understanding. But the essences of the angels are of themselves more intelligible than the essences of material things, and there was no defect in Adam's understanding. Accordingly, since he knew material things through their essence, with much more reason he could know the angels through their essence.
6. The intellect can understand material things by abstracting the quiddity from the material suppositum. And, if that quiddity is again a suppositum having a quiddity, it can with equal reason abstract the quiddity from it. And, since this cannot go on to infinity, it will at last arrive at the understanding of some simple quiddity, which does not have [another] quiddity. But such a quiddity is the quiddity of a separate substance, that is to say, of an angel. Therefore, Adam's intellect could know the essence of an angel.
7. According to the Philosopher, since understanding is a power not joined to an organ, it is not destroyed by an excessively intelligible object. "For, after it has understood the highest intelligible, it does not understand the lowest intelligibles less, but more," contrary to what takes place in sense. But Adam's understanding in the state of innocence was whole and complete. Therefore, the excellence of an intelligible object was not an impediment to his understanding of it. Consequently, he was able to know the angels through their essence, since the only impediment to this knowledge seems to be the excellence of the intelligible object.
8. As was mentioned above, Adam, as soon as he was created, had all the knowledge to which a man can come naturally. But man can naturally come to a knowledge of the separated

substances through their essence, as is clear from the statements of many philosophers, which the Commentator mentions. Therefore, Adam knew the angels through their essence.

9. It is evident that Adam knew his own soul through its essence. But the essence of the soul is free from matter, just as an angel's essence. Therefore, he could also know the angels through their essence.

10. Adam's knowledge was intermediate between our knowledge and that of the blessed. But the blessed see and know the essence of God, and we know the essence of material things. But between God and material things are spiritual substances, that is, the angels. Therefore, Adam knew the angels through their essence.

To the Contrary:

1'. In its knowledge no power can reach beyond its object. But the objects of the intellectual soul are phantasms, to which the intellectual soul is related, as sense is to sensibles, as is said in *The Soul*. Therefore, our soul can attain to knowledge only of those things which it can derive from phantasms. But the essence of the angels is beyond all phantasms. Therefore, by natural knowledge, the perfection of which we assign to Adam, man cannot reach a knowledge of the angels through their essence.

2'. It was said that, although an angel cannot be perceived through phantasms, some effect of an angel can be grasped under the guise of a phantasm, and from such an effect the angel can be known.—On the contrary, no effect which is not equal to its cause is sufficient of itself to be a means to knowledge of the essence of its cause. Otherwise, those who know God from creatures would see the essence of God, which is false. But a physical effect, which alone can be grasped in a phantasm, is the kind of effect which is not equal to the power of the angels. Therefore, through this kind of effect one cannot know what an angel is, but only whether he exists.

3'. It was said that Adam was able to know the angels through some intelligible effect, according to the dictum of Avicenna that the presence of intelligences in us is nothing other than the presence of their imprints in us.—On the contrary, what is received in a thing is received there according to the mode of being of that in which it is received. But the mode of being of the human soul is lower than that of the angelic nature. Therefore, the imprint made on the human soul by an angel, or by the angelic light, will which it enlightens the mind, is in the human soul in a lower manner than in the angelic nature. Accordingly, since the soul knows a thing through the mode in which the thing known is within it, through this kind of imprint the soul does not reach knowledge of an angel as it is in its essence.

REPLY:

There is a twofold knowledge by which something can be known. One is that by which we know whether a thing exists, and according to this in the state of innocence Adam knew the angels both by natural knowledge and divine revelation far more fully and familiarly than we know them. The other is that by which we know what a thing is, and this is to know it through its essence. And, as I see it, Adam in the state of innocence did not know the angels in this way. The reason for this is that a twofold knowledge is ascribed to Adam: natural knowledge and knowledge due to grace.

That he did not know angels through their essence will natural knowledge can be seen with certainty from this. In no genus does a natural passive power extend farther than that to which the active power of the same genus extends, just as in nature there is a passive power only with reference to those things to which some natural active power can extend, as the Commentator says. In the understanding of the human soul, however, there is a twofold power: passive, the

possible intellect, and the other active, the agent intellect. Consequently, the possible intellect is naturally in potency to have produced in it only those things which the agent intellect is naturally constituted to produce. However, this does not exclude the possibility of other things being produced in it by divine activity, as they are produced in physical nature through miraculous activity. But the action of the agent intellect does not make intelligible those things which are of themselves intelligible, such as the essences of the angels, but things which of themselves are potentially intelligible, such as the essence of material things, which are received through sense and imagination. Hence, in the possible intellect there are naturally produced only those intelligible species which are abstracted from phantasms. However, it is impossible to reach vision of the essence of separated substances through this type of species, since they have no proportion to separated substances and belong, as it were, to a different genus from spiritual essences. Therefore, by natural knowledge man cannot attain to knowledge of the angels through their essence.

Similarly, Adam was not capable of this even through the knowledge due to grace. For knowledge due to grace is higher than knowledge due to nature, but this elevation can be taken with reference either to the intelligible object or to the manner of understanding. With reference to the intelligible object, man's knowledge is indeed raised through grace even without a change of state, as when we are raised to a knowledge of things which are above reason through the grace of faith, and similarly through the grace of prophecy. But, in so far as its manner of knowing is concerned, human knowledge is not elevated without a change of man's state. But the manner in which his understanding knows naturally is by receiving from phantasms, as has been said. Consequently, unless there is a change in man's state, his understanding, even in the knowledge due to grace, which is through divine revelation, must always recur to phantasms. This is what Dionysius says: "It is impossible for the divine radiance to shine on us in any other way, except as shrouded in a variety of sacred veils."¹² But in the state of innocence Adam was in the state of a wayfarer. Hence, in all knowledge due to grace he had to look to phantasms. The essences of angels, however, cannot be seen with that mode of knowledge, as has been said. Thus, Adam did not know the angels through their essence either through natural knowledge or through knowledge due to grace, unless, perhaps, we say that he was elevated to a higher state through grace, as Paul was in his rapture.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. All we can conclude from the authoritative citation from Gregory is that Adam knew the angels in some lofty vision, not, however, so lofty that it reached a knowledge of their essence.
2. If we understand that Adam's sleep was of the same nature as Paul's rapture, there would be nothing to prevent us from saying that he saw the angels through their essence in that rapture. But this was above the common mode of knowing which then belonged to him. However, if we understand that his sleep was not of such a nature that in it Adam in some respect was elevated to the state of the blessed, but was like that in which it is customary for the minds of the prophets to be raised to vision of the divine mysteries, as the words of the Gloss seem to intend, then he is said to have shared the company of the heavenly court through a certain pre-eminence of knowledge, which still did not reach their essence.
3. Adam had knowledge of the angels in so far as they were made for his sake. For he knew that they would be companions of his beatitude and helpers for his salvation in this life, in so far as he knew the distinction of [their] orders and their duties much better than we know them.
4. Difficulty in understanding arises in two ways. In one, the difficulty comes from the thing known; in the other, from the one knowing. On the part of the thing known, it is more difficult to make some thing intelligible and understand it than to understand that which of itself is

intelligible. But, on the part of the one knowing, it can be more difficult to know that which is of itself intelligible. And this is the case with the human understanding, since naturally to understand separated essences is out of proportion with its power, for the reason we have given.

5. Adam's understanding did not suffer from the lack of any perfection which should have been in it at that time. However, it did have some natural deficiencies, among which one was that in knowing it had to look to phantasms. But this is a natural condition of human understanding by reason of its union with the body, and by reason of the fact that by its nature it is the lowest in the order of intellects.

6. By abstraction, understanding can reach a quiddity of a natural thing which does not have another quiddity, and which it can understand because it abstracts it from phantasms and makes it intelligible through the light of the agent intellect. From this it receives the possibility of being perfected by the quiddity as by a proper perfection. But it cannot rise from this quiddity to a knowledge of the essence of a separated substance, because the former quiddity is completely incapable of representing the latter, since quiddity does not exist in separated substances and in material things in entirely the same manner, but, as it were, equivocally, as the Commentator says. And, granted that through this quiddity he could know in some general way that the quiddity of separated substance is of such a nature, he nevertheless would not see the essence of an angel in such a way that he could know the difference between any one separated essence and the others.

7. Although human understanding is not destroyed by an excessively intelligible object, it lacks the proportion needed to be able naturally to reach the highest intelligibles. Hence, we cannot conclude from what the Philosopher says that it understands the highest intelligibles, but only that, if it did understand them, it would not understand others less.

8. The Philosopher leaves this question unsolved when he inquires whether an intellect joined [to a body] can understand separated substances. Nor does he solve the question anywhere else in the works which have come down to us. And his followers have disagreed on this point.

For some have said that our intellect cannot achieve an understanding of separated essences. Some, however, have held that it can. Some of these men have given insufficient reasons, as Avempace, who gave the argument about quiddity, and Themistius, who gave the argument about ease of understanding. Both of these arguments, the Commentator answered. Some, however, as Alexander and the Commentator himself, have taken non-Aristotelian positions, which are against the faith. For Alexander says that, since the possible intellect can be produced by generation and can perish, it can in his theory in no way reach an understanding of the separated substances. But, at the term of its perfection, it does reach the point where the agent intellect, which Alexander makes one of the separated substances, is unit to us as form. In that state we understand through the agent intellect, just as now we understand through the possible intellect. And it is because the agent intellect, as a separated substance, understands separated substances that we understand separated substances in that state. In his opinion it is in this that the final happiness of man will consist.

However, since it does not seem possible for something which is incorruptible and separated, as the agent intellect, to be united as the form for the possible intellect, which, for Alexander, is corruptible and material, it has seemed to others that the possible intellect itself is separated and incorruptible. Hence, Themistius says that the possible intellect, too, is separated, and that it is natural to it to understand not only material things but also separated substances. He adds that its intelligible objects are not temporal, but eternal, things, and that the speculative intellect, by which we understand, is made up of the agent and the possible intellects. But, if

this is so, we can know separated substances from the beginning, since the possible intellect is united to us from the beginning.

Therefore, the Commentator takes a third way, between the opinion of Alexander and that of Themistius. For he says that the possible intellect is separated and eternal, in which he agrees with Themistius and differs from Alexander, and, nevertheless, that the objects of the speculative understanding are temporal things and produced through the activity of the agent intellect. In this he agrees with Alexander and differs from Themistius. He says that these objects have a double existence: one, by which they are based on phantasms, and in this sense they are in us; the other, by which they are in the possible intellect. Consequently, through the mediation of these intelligible objects the possible intellect is united to us.

Now, the agent intellect is related to these intelligible things as form to matter. For, since the possible intellect receives intelligibles of this type which are grounded in phantasms, and also receives the agent intellect, and since the agent intellect is more perfect, the proportion of the agent intellect to intelligibles of this sort, which are in us, must be like the proportion of form to matter. This is like the reciprocal proportion between light and colour which are received in the transparent, as also between all things, one of which is more perfect than the other, which are received in one thing. Therefore, when the production of such intelligibles takes place in us, then the agent intellect is united to us perfectly as a form. And in this way we will be able to know separated substances through the agent intellect, just as we are now able to know through the understanding which is in its habitual state.

It is evident from the statements of these philosophers that they could find no way for us to understand separated substances except by understanding through some separated substance. But it is not in harmony with the truths of the faith to say that the possible or the agent intellect is a separated substance. Neither does it agree with the opinion of the Philosopher, who holds that agent and possible intellects are part of the human soul.

Accordingly, if we retain that position, it does not seem possible for man by his natural knowledge to achieve a knowledge of separated essences.

9. In the state of innocence man knew his act of understanding perfectly because he understood some intelligible object perfectly. And, since the act of understanding is an effect proportionate to, and commensurate with, the power from which it proceeds, it follows that he understood the essence of his soul perfectly. But it does not follow from this that he understood the essence of the angels, since that act of understanding is not commensurate with the power of his understanding.

10. As the angelic nature is intermediate between the divine and physical nature, so the knowledge by which an angelic essence is known is intermediate between the knowledge by which the divine essence is known and by which the essences of material things are known. But there can be many things intermediate between two extremes. And it is not necessary for anyone who exceeds one extreme to reach every intermediate level, but to reach some intermediate level. Accordingly, in the state of innocence man reached one intermediate level, namely, that of receiving knowledge of God not from sensible creatures but from internal revelation. However, he did not arrive at the level of knowing angelic essences. Nevertheless, when the angels were created and not yet beatified, they had arrived at this level.

ARTICLE VI: COULD ADAM IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE BE MISTAKEN OR DECEIVED?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 23, 2, 3; Summa Theol., 94, 4,

Difficulties:

It seems that he could, for

1. As Ambrose says, error is the source of every sin. But Adam could sin. Therefore, he could be mistaken.
2. The will concerns only that which is good or regarded as good. But, when the will deals with what is good, there is no sin. Therefore, there is never sin unless there is an antecedent evaluation in which something is regarded as good, but is not. But in every such evaluation there is deception of some sort. Therefore, before he sinned, Adam in the state of innocence was deceived.
3. The Master says: "The woman was not frightened by the fact that the serpent talked because, since she knew it was created, she considered that it had received even the power of speech from God." But this was false. Therefore, the woman judged falsely before she sinned. Hence, she was deceived.
4. According to the Master, and as Augustine also says: "The devil was allowed to come in that form in order that his malice could be easily detected." But, if in the state of innocence man could not have been deceived, the devil could have been detected in any form in which he came. Therefore, man could be deceived.
5. When the woman heard what the serpent promised, she hoped to be able to obtain it; otherwise, her desire would have been stupid. However, there was no stupidity before the fall. But no one hopes for what he considers impossible. Therefore, since what the devil promised was impossible, it seems that in believing this the woman was deceived before the fall.
6. In the state of innocence man's understanding argued to conclusions and needed deliberation. But it needed deliberation only to avoid error. Therefore, in the state of innocence it could err.
7. The understanding of demons, since it is not united to a body, seems to be much more discerning than the understanding of man in the state of innocence, which was joined to a body. But a demon can be deceived. Consequently, the saints say that, when the demons saw Christ suffering infirmities, they thought He was simply man, but, when they saw him working miracles, they thought He was God. Therefore, man in the state of innocence will much greater reason can be deceived.
8. While man was committing the first sin, in that act itself he was not in the state of guilt. For, since the state of guilt is caused by sin, there would have been another sin before the first sin. But in the act by which man first sinned he was deceived. Therefore, he could be deceived before the state of guilt.
9. Damascene says: "This," that is, fallacious knowledge, "existed in Adam when he was first created." But whoever has fallacious knowledge is deceived. Therefore, Adam was deceived when he was first created.
10. Speculative knowledge is distinguished from the affections. But there can be sin in the affective part without deception in the speculative part. For, many times we have knowledge and act contrary to it. Therefore, in the first man, too, there could have been deception in the speculative part before there was sin in the affective part.
11. As the Gloss on the first Epistle to Timothy (2:14), "Adam was not seduced...", reads: "Adam was not led astray in the way the woman was, that is, so that he thought that what the devil suggested was true, still we can believe that he was led astray in this, that he thought

that the sin committed was venial when it was mortal." Therefore, before the fall Adam could be deceived.

12. No one is freed from deception except through knowledge of the truth. But Adam did not know all things. Therefore, he could not have been free from deception in all things.

13. It was said that through divine providence he was saved from deception.—On the contrary, divine providence brings assistance especially in necessary matters. But in his greatest need, when it would have been most useful for him to be freed from being led astray, divine providence did not protect him from being misled. Therefore, will much less reason would divine providence have freed him from being led astray in other matters.

14. In the state of innocence man would have slept, and likewise would have dreamed, as Boethius says. But every man is deceived in dreams, since to some extent he considers the likenesses of things as if they were the things themselves. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam could be deceived.

15. Adam would have used his bodily senses. But there is frequent deception in sense knowledge, as when one thing seems to be two, and when something which is seen from a distance seems small. Therefore, in the state of innocence Adam would not have been altogether free from deception.

To the Contrary:

1'. As Augustine says: "To accept as true things that are false is not natural for man as he was created, but a punishment for the con demned."⁸ Therefore, in the state of innocence he could not be deceived, which is to accept as true things which are false.

2'. The soul is more noble than the body. But in the state of innocence man could suffer no bodily defect. Therefore, much less could he suffer deception, which is a defect of the soul.

3'. In the state of innocence there could be nothing contrary to man's will, since pain thus would have been able to exist in him. But in man, to be deceived is contrary to his will, according to Augustine, even in those who want to deceive. Therefore, in the state of innocence man could not be deceived.

4'. Every error is due either to guilt or to punishment, neither of which could exist in the state of innocence. Therefore, error could not exist there either.

5'. When that which is higher in the soul directs what is lower, there cannot be any error, because the whole of man's knowledge is corrected by that which is higher in the soul, that is to say, by synderesis and the understanding of principles. But in the state of innocence that which is lower in man was subject to higher reason. Therefore, there could not then be deception.

6'. According to Augustine: "The capacity to believe is in man's nature, but actual belief is a gift of grace to the faithful." Therefore, by the same token, the capacity to be deceived is due to nature, but to be deceived is a defect. But in the state of innocence there were no defects. Therefore, neither could there be deception.

7'. Damascene says that in the state of innocence man "delighted in the sweetest fruit of contemplation, being nourished by this [contemplation]"¹ But, when man is turned toward the things of God, he is not deceived. Therefore, in that state Adam could not be deceived.

8'. Jerome says: "Whatever evil we suffer, our sins have merited." But deception is evil. Therefore, it could not exist before sin.

REPLY:

There are two opinions on this question. For some say that, since Adam did not have full knowledge of everything, but knew some things and was ignorant of others, in the things which he knew he could not be deceived, that is, in those which he knew naturally and those which were divinely revealed to him. But in other things, which he did not know, such as men's secret thoughts, future contingents, and individual things absent from his senses, he could indeed judge falsely, if without serious consideration he formed some false opinion about these things, not, however, in such a way that he gave unqualified assent. Accordingly, they say that error could have no place in him, nor could he accept something false as true, because in these things there is question of unqualified assent to that which is false.

But others attempt to reject this declaration because Augustine calls every false judgment error and also says that every error is evil, great in important matters, and small in small matters.

But we should not insist too much on this, because we should pass over the question of names when we are treating of things. Hence, I say that in the state of innocence there could be not only no error but not even false opinion of any sort. This is evident from the following.

Although in the state of innocence some good could be absent, in no sense could there be any corruption of a good. However, the good of our understanding is the knowledge of truth. Accordingly, those habits by which the understanding is perfected for knowledge of the truth are called virtues, as is said in the Ethics, because they make the act of the understanding good. Falsity, on the other hand, is not only lack of truth but also a corruption of it. For one who has no knowledge of truth at all, who lacks the truth, yet has no contrary opinion, does not have the same relation to truth as one who holds some false opinion and whose judgment is vitiated by falsity. Consequently, just as truth is the good of the understanding, so that which is false is its evil. For this reason, the habit of opinion is not an intellectual virtue, since by it one says what is false, as we see in the Ethics. But no act of virtue can be evil, as if the false opinion itself would be an evil act of [the virtue of] understanding. Consequently, since in the state of innocence there was not any corruption or any evil, there could not be any false opinion in that state.

The Commentator also says that a false opinion has the same place in matters of knowledge as a monstrosity has in physical nature. For a false opinion is one which originates without being intended by first principles, which are the seminal powers, as it were, of knowledge, just as monstrosities originate without being intended by the natural power which is at work. This is because all evil is "unintended," as Dionysius says. Hence, just as in the state of innocence there would be no monstrosities in the conception of the human body, so in understanding there could be no falsity.

This is likewise clear from the fact that disorder always arises when a thing is moved by something which is not its proper mover, as would happen if the will should be moved by what gives pleasure to sense, since it should be moved only by what is noble. The proper mover of the understanding, however, is that which contains infallible truth. Consequently, whenever the understanding is moved by some fallible sign, there is some disorder in it, whether the movement is complete or incomplete. As a result, since in the state of innocence there could be no disorder in man's understanding, it would never have been inclined more to one part than to the other except by an infallible motive.

From this it is clear that not only was there no false opinion in man's understanding, there was no opinion there at all. And whatever he knew, he knew with certainty.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That error from which all sin proceeds is an error of choice, in so far as one chooses what should not be chosen. According to this, the Philosopher says that everyone who is evil lacks knowledge. But this error presupposes disorder in the appetitive part. For it is due to the fact that sensible appetite is drawn toward that which delights it and the higher appetite does not resist it, that reason is hindered from choosing that which it has habitually. Consequently, it is evident that this error does not entirely precede sin, but follows it.
2. That which is perceived as an apparent good cannot lack all goodness whatsoever. Rather, it is good to some extent, and in this respect it is perceived as good from the beginning. This is the case when some forbidden food is perceived as agreeable to see and pleasant to taste, and when the sensible appetite is attracted to such a good as to its proper object. But when the higher appetite follows the lower, it follows that which is good in some respect, as though it were good for it without qualification. Therefore, error of choice follows afterward from disorder of appetite, as has been said.
3. If we understand that the woman believed that the serpent had received the use of speech as part of its nature, this argument seems to be contrary to both opinions. For those who believe that in the state of innocence man could be deceived do not at all believe that he could be deceived when judging about the natures of things, since he had full knowledge of natural things. However, it is contrary to the serpent's nature to have the use of speech naturally, since this belongs only to rational animals. Therefore, we have to say that the woman did not believe that the serpent had the use of speech by its nature, but by reason of some power acting inside it in a hidden way. She did not consider whether it was from God or from the demon.
4. That reason why he appeared in the form of a serpent should not be taken to mean that he could not be detected under whatever form he appeared, but that he could be more easily detected under such a form.
5. The woman hoped that in some way she would be able to get what the serpent promised, and she believed that this was in some way possible. In this she was led astray, as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:14). But a certain elation of mind preceded that leading astray, and because of it she inordinately desired her own excellence, which she realized as soon as the serpent spoke, as men frequently are lifted above themselves when they hear words of flatterers. And this exaltation which preceded concerned her own proper excellence in general and is the first sin. There followed this the seduction by which she believed that what the serpent was saying was true. Thus, there resulted the exaltation will which she definitely desired this excellence which the serpent promised.
6. In the state of innocence man's understanding needed deliberation in order not to fall into error, just as he needed to eat in order that his body might not waste away. However, he was so gifted with correct deliberation that by deliberating he would be able to avoid every error, just as by eating he could avoid every bodily infirmity. Therefore, just as he would commit a sin of omission if he did not eat, so, if he did not deliberate when the occasion was given, error and sin would follow.
7. It was by his natural power that man in the state of innocence was protected from internal bodily suffering, as that of fever and the like, but it was not by any internal power that he was protected from external suffering, as blows or wounds, since he did not have the gift of impassibility. This was due rather to divine providence, which preserved him from all injury. Similarly, it was by the strength of his own reason that he was protected from the deception which comes from within, as when someone independently reasons incorrectly, but it was by the divine aid, which he had at that time for all necessary matters, that he was protected from deception from without. The demons, however, do not have this; hence, they can be deceived.

8. Instantaneous actions have their effect as soon as they begin, just as the eye sees in the same instant that the air is illuminated. Hence, since the movement of will, in which sin primarily consists, is instantaneous, one loses the state of innocence in the same instant in which he sins. Thus, he could be deceived in that instant.

9. Damascene is speaking of the fallacy of the first man by which he was deceived in the sin itself. And, indeed, he committed this sin shortly after he was created, for he did not long persevere in the state of innocence.

10. Since the soul of man in the state of innocence was united to the highest good, there could be no defect in man as long as this union lasted. But this union was brought about principally through the affections. Consequently, no deception could exist in the understanding nor any defect in the body before the affective part was corrupted, although, conversely, there could be defect in the affections without a pre-existing defect in speculative understanding, since the union with God is not completed in the understanding but in the affections.

11. In Adam the elevation of spirit preceded the false opinion by which he believed that what was mortally sinful was only venially so, just as happened with the woman, as has been said.

12. In those things which he did not know he was able to be protected from deception partly from within, since his understanding would not be inclined to one part except for a sufficient motive, and partly, and more especially, by divine providence, which preserved him from deception.

13. In the state in which he sinned had he turned to God, he would have had divine help to keep him from being led astray. But, since he did not do this, he fell into sin and was led astray. Yet, his being led astray followed the sin, as is clear from what has been said.

14. Some say that in the state of innocence Adam did not dream. But this is not necessary, for the Vision of dreams is not in the intellective, but in the sensitive, part. Hence, the deception would not have been in the understanding, which does not have free exercise in sleep, but in the sensitive part.

15. When sense represents what it receives, there is no falsity in sense, as Augustine says, but falsity is in the understanding, which judges that things exist in reality in the way in which sense portrays them. However, this never happened in Adam, since his understanding would either have refrained from judgment, as in dreams, or, when judging about sensible objects when awake, would have had a true judgment.

ARTICLE VII: WOULD THE CHILDREN WHO WERE BORN OF ADAM IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE HAVE HAD FULL KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS AS ADAM DID?

Parallel readings: II Sent., 23, 2, 2; Summa Theol., I, 101, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that they would, for

1. According to Anselm, Adam would have begotten Sons such as he himself was. But Adam had full knowledge of all natural things, as has been said. Therefore, his sons, too, would have had that knowledge immediately at birth.

2. As the affections are perfected by virtue, so the understanding is perfected by knowledge. But the Sons born of Adam, in the state of innocence, would have had the fullness of all the

virtues immediately at birth. For he would have passed original justice on to them, as Anselm says. Therefore, they would likewise have had all knowledge.

3. According to Bede, weakness, concupiscence, ignorance, and malice result from sin. But there would have been no wickedness, weakness, or concupiscence in those children immediately at birth. Therefore, there would not have been any ignorance either; hence, they would have had all knowledge.

4. It would have been more fitting for them to be born perfect in soul than in body. But they would have been born without any bodily defect. Therefore, there would likewise have been no ignorance in their souls.

5. According to Damascene,⁵ man in the state of innocence was "as another angel." But, immediately upon their creation, the angels had knowledge of all natural things. Therefore, for the same reason, men in the state of innocence had it, also.

6. Adam's soul and the souls of his Sons had the same nature. But in its very- beginning Adam's soul was created full of all natural knowledge, as has been said. Therefore, the souls of his sons would have been created with the same fullness of knowledge.

7. Greater perfection of knowledge belongs to man than to the other animals. But, immediately at birth, the other animals have natural [instinctive] judgment of what is helpful and what is harmful. Thus, a newborn lamb flees from the wolf and follows its mother. Therefore, children in the state of innocence with much greater reason would have had perfect knowledge.

To the Contrary:

1'. Hugh of St. Victor says that they would not have been born with perfect knowledge, but would have reached it in the course of time.

2'. Since the soul is the perfection of the body, its development must be proportionate to that of the body. But in the state of innocence Adam's children would not have had full bodily stature as Adam did when he was first created. Therefore, for the same reason they would not have had the fullness of knowledge as Adam had.

3'. Sons receive existence, nature, and instruction from their father. But, if Adam's sons had had full knowledge as soon as they were born, they would not have been able to receive instruction from him. Therefore, the full relationship of paternity would have not been preserved between them and the first parent.

REPLY:

On this question there have been two Opinions. For some have said that children in the state of innocence would have been perfect, just as Adam, with reference to everything belonging to the soul, that is, as regards both virtues and knowledge. They would not, however, have been perfect as regards the body. This was due to the exigencies of their mother's womb, for they had to be born.

Others, however, following Hugh, say that, just as they would not immediately have received perfect stature of body, but in time would have reached it, so, too, they would in time have reached perfect knowledge.

However, in order to know which of these opinions contains more truth, we must remember that the same reasons do not hold for Adam and for his Sons immediately upon birth. For, since Adam was ordained to be the source of the whole human race, as soon as he was created he had to have not only what belonged to the beginning of natural perfection but also that which belonged to its term. But his sons, who were not constituted the source of the human

race, but as having existence from its source, did not have to be set at the term of natural perfection. It was enough for them to have at birth only as much as the initial state of natural perfection demands.

However, according to two opinions, the initial stage of the natural perfection of knowledge is placed at different levels. For some, as the Platonists, have held that the soul comes to the body filled with all the sciences, but it is clouded over by the body and thus its capacity for free use of the knowledge which it has is inhibited except with reference to some universals. But afterwards, through the exercise of study and of the senses, these obstacles are removed, so that it can use its knowledge freely. Thus, they say that learning is the same as remembering. But, if this opinion were true, we would have to say that in the state of innocence, as soon as children were born, they would have had knowledge of all things because the body in that state of innocence was altogether subject to the soul, and, so, the weight of the body would not have been able so to oppress the soul that it would lose its perfection in any way.

But this opinion seems to proceed from the position that the nature of the angels and of the soul is the same, so that the soul would have full knowledge as soon as it is created, just as an intelligence is said to be created full of forms. For this reason, the Platonists said that souls existed before being united to bodies and, after leaving bodies, return as intelligences to stars of rank equal to theirs. But this opinion is out of harmony with Catholic truth.

Therefore, others according to the opinion of Aristotle say that human understanding is last in the order of intelligible things, just as first matter is last in the order of sensible things. And as matter, considered in its essence, has no form, so the human understanding, in the beginning, is "like a tablet, on which nothing is written," but, later, acquires knowledge through the senses by virtue of the agent intellect. Thus, the beginning of natural human knowledge is, indeed, to be in potency to all things knowable, but to know from the beginning only those things which are known immediately through the light of the agent intellect, that is to say, universal first principles.

Hence, it was not necessary for Adam's sons to have knowledge of all things immediately at birth, but they would have reached it as they advanced in age. Nevertheless, it is necessary to ascribe to them some perfect knowledge, namely, the knowledge of things which must be chosen or avoided, a knowledge which pertains to prudence. For, as is proved in the Ethics, without prudence the other virtues cannot exist. And Adam's children must have had these virtues because of original justice.

To me this opinion seems to contain more truth, if we look to what was required by the integrity of nature. But, if by divine grace any thing else had been given them beyond that which integrity of nature required, this could not be asserted, since there is no express authority for it.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Adam would have begotten sons like himself in those things which were due to him by his specific nature. But it was not necessary for his sons to be born like him in those things which were due to him as the source of the whole human race.
- 2.** For the perfect union with God, which the state of innocence demands, all the virtues are needed, but not all the sciences.
- 3.** Although the children would not have all knowledge as soon as they were born, they would not have had the ignorance which follows from sin, which is a lack of knowledge of things which ought to be known. For they would have been ignorant of those things which their state did not require them to know.

4. In the bodies of these children there would have been no defect by which they would be deprived of a good which then was their due. Nevertheless, their bodies did lack a good which would accrue to them later, such as fullness of stature and the gifts of glory. The same must be said of the soul.

5. Angels are on a higher level of nature than souls, although souls can be equal to them in the gifts of grace. Consequently, it is not necessary to concede to the soul as something natural that which is naturally due to angels. However, in the state of innocence, man is said to be as another angel because of the fullness of grace.

6. Although the soul of Adam and the souls of his Sons had the same nature, they did not have the same office. For Adam's soul was made a source from which all teaching would come to posterity. Therefore, it had to be perfect immediately, which was not necessary for the souls of his children.

7. At the beginning, brute animals receive natural [instinctive] judgment in order to know what is harmful and what is helpful, because they cannot reach this through their own investigation. Man, however, can reach this and many other things through the investigation of reason. Hence, it is not necessary for all knowledge to exist in him naturally. Nevertheless, the knowledge of practical matters, which pertains to prudence, is more natural to man than the knowledge of speculative matters. For this reason we find that some are naturally prudent but do not naturally possess learning, as is said in the Ethics. For this reason men do not forget prudence as easily as they forget science. Therefore, at that time the children would have been more perfect in the matters which pertain to prudence than in those which pertain to speculative science, as has been said.

ARTICLE VIII: IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE WOULD CHILDREN HAVE HAD THE FULL USE OF REASON IMMEDIATELY AT BIRTH?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 20, 2, 2; Summa Theol., I, 101, sol, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that they would, for

1. If they were restricted in its use, this would have resulted only from some bodily defect. But in that state there was nothing in which the body resisted the soul. Therefore, the use of reason could not be restricted.

2. A virtue or power which does not use an organ is not restricted in its activity because of a defect of an organ. But the understanding is a power which does not use an organ, as is said in The Soul. Therefore, the act of the understanding could not then be impeded because of the defect of a bodily organ.

3. If it be said that the act of understanding was restricted because of a defect of body in so far as the understanding received something from the senses, the answer is that the understanding is higher than any sense power. But it seems to be out of order for the higher to receive from the lower. Therefore, since there was nothing out of order in man's nature in that state, it seems that it would not have been necessary for the understanding to receive from the senses.

4. The understanding needs the senses to acquire knowledge through them. But, once it has acquired knowledge, it does not need them, just as a man does not need a horse once he has

finished his journey, as Avicenna says. But, according to one opinion, a children in the state of innocence had the fullness of all knowledge. Therefore, they could not be kept from using the knowledge they had because of imperfection in the sense organs.

5. Defect of bodily organs hinders sense more than understanding. But children do not suffer so great a bodily defect that they cannot see and hear. Therefore, neither is their understanding hindered because of bodily defect, but seemingly because of the punishment for the first sin. But this would not have existed before the fall. Therefore, children at that time would have had the full use of understanding as soon as they were born.

6. Man's relation to the knowledge which he has naturally is the same as that which brute animals have to natural [instinctive] judgment. But brute animals can make use of this natural judgment immediately at birth. Therefore, in the state of innocence children were able to make use of natural knowledge, at least of first principles immediately at birth.

7. Wisdom (9:15) says: "For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul..." But in the state of innocence the body was not corruptible. Therefore, the soul was not weighed down by it, and so kept from having free use of reason.

To the Contrary:

1'. Every activity which is common to soul and body is hindered because of a defect of the body. But understanding is an activity common to soul and body, as is clear from The Soul. Therefore, the use of reason could be hindered by a bodily defect or imperfection which the children suffered.

2'. According to the Philosopher: "The soul in no way understands without a phantasm." But the use of the imagination can be hindered by a defect of a bodily organ. Therefore, so can the use of understanding. We conclude as before.

REPLY:

There are two opinions on this question. For some say that children in the state of innocence would have had the full use of all their bodily members and that the clumsiness which we now see in children, that they are notable w use their feet to walk, their hands to carve, and so on, comes entirely from the first sin.

Others, thinking that this type of clumsiness has its cause in natural principles, as moistness, which must abound in children, say that in the state of innocence the members of children would not have been altogether suitable for their acts, although they would not be so completely deficient as they now are, since now what is due to corruption has been added to that which is due to nature. And this opinion seems more probable.

Hence, since it is necessary that moistness, especially in the brain, abound in children, and it is the brain in which imagination, natural judgment, memory, and common sense have their organs, the acts of these powers must be particularly hindered, and, consequently, understanding, which receives something immediately from these powers, and turns to them when ever it is in act, must be hindered, too. Nevertheless, the use of understanding was not fettered in children to the extent that it is now. However, if the other opinion were true, the use of understanding in children at that time would not have been fettered in any way.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The soul can be restricted by the body in two ways. One is by way of opposition, as happens when the body resists the soul and obscures it. This, however, would not have happened in the state of innocence. The other is by way of incapacity and defect, namely, in so far as the body is unable to execute all that the soul would be capable of considered in

itself. And there was nothing to keep the soul from being restricted by the body in this way in the state of innocence. For it is thus evident that by reason of the body the soul is hindered from passing through things thrust in its path and from changing its location will as much case as it does when separated from the body. In this way, also, it is kept from being able to have perfect use of its powers still, there would have been no pain in this, Since the soul, by reason of its orderly disposition, would have given only those commands which the body could carry out.

2. Although the understanding does not use an organ, nevertheless, it receives something from faculties which use an organ. Therefore, its act can be restricted because of an impediment or defect of the bodily organs.

3. The intelligible species has that which is formal in it, through which it is actually intelligible, from the agent intellect, which is a higher power than the possible intellect, although that which is material in it is abstracted from phantasms. Therefore, more properly, the possible intellect receives from what is higher than from what is lower, since that which is from the lower can be received by the possible intellect only in so far as it receives the form of intelligibility- from the agent intellect.

Or we should say that the lower powers are higher in some respect, especially in the ability to act and w cause. This is due to their greater proximity w external things, which are the cause and measure of our knowledge. It is for this reason that the sense serves imagination, not of itself, but in so far as it is informed by the species of a sensible thing, and so for the rest.

4. According to the Philosopher,⁸ the intellective soul is related to phantasms as to its objects. Consequently, our understanding needs conversion to phantasms not only in acquiring knowledge but also in using knowledge once it is acquired. This is evident from the fact that, as long as the soul is in the body, a man cannot use even previously acquired knowledge if the organ of the power of imagination is injured, as happens in the insane. What Avicenna says should be taken of the soul separated from the body, which has a different mode of understanding.

5. The organ of the power of imagination, of memory, and of the cogitative sense is in the brain itself, which is the place of greatest moistness in the human body. Therefore, because of the large measure of moistness which is in children, the acts of these powers are hindered more than the acts of the external senses. But understanding receives immediately from the interior and not the exterior senses.

6. Some other animals naturally have a dry disposition; hence, at their birth there is not so great a profusion of moistness which greatly impedes the acts of the interior senses. But man naturally has a moderate disposition, and therefore he must have a high degree of warmth and moistness. So, at the beginning of his existence there has to be proportionately more moistness in him. For all animal and plant generations begin from moistness.

7. The body which corrupts weighs down the soul not only because it is powerless but also because it resists and obscures the soul. How ever, the human body in the state of innocence hindered the acts of the soul only because of the imperfection of a power or disposition.

QUESTION 19: the Knowledge of the Soul after Death.

ARTICLE I: CAN THE SOUL UNDERSTAND AFTER DEATH?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 31, 2, 4; IV Sentences 50, I, I; Quolibet III, 9, 21; XII, 9, 12; Contra Gentiles II, 81; III, 2 Cor., c. 13, lectura 3; Summa Theol., I, 89, 1-3 Q. D. de anima, aa. 15, 17, 18.

Difficulties:

It seems that it cannot, for

- 1.** No activity common to soul and body can remain in the soul after death. But understanding is an activity common to soul and body. For the Philosopher says: "To say that the soul understands is like saying that it weaves or builds." Therefore, after death the soul cannot understand.
- 2.** It was said that the Philosopher is speaking of the act of understanding which befits the soul in its lower aspect, but not about the act which befits it in its higher aspect.—On the contrary, the higher aspect of the soul is that according to which it turns to the things of God. However, even when man understands something by reason of divine revelation, his understanding depends on the body, because he must understand through conversion to phantasms, which are in a bodily organ. For, as Dionysius says: "It is impossible for the divine radiance to shine on us unless it is shrouded with a variety of sacred veils." For him, veils are the bodily forms under which spiritual things are revealed. Therefore, the act of understanding which belongs to the soul according to its higher aspect depends on the body. Consequently, understanding in no way remains in the soul after death.
- 3.** In Ecclesiastes (9:5) it is said: "For the living know that they shall die, but the dead know nothing more." The Gloss reads: "For they make no more progress." Therefore, it seems that after death the soul either knows nothing, if we take "more" in a temporal sense, or at least that it can understand nothing it did not understand before. For it thus would make more progress, which is contrary to the Gloss.
- 4.** According to the Philosopher, the understanding is related to phantasms as the senses are to sensible things. But sense can have sensation only when sensible things are presented to it. Therefore, neither can the human soul understand anything unless phantasms are presented to it. But they are not presented to it after death, because they are presented only in a bodily organ. Therefore, after death the soul cannot understand.
- 5.** It was said that the Philosopher is speaking of the soul according to the state in which it is in the body. On the contrary, the object of a power is determined by the nature of the power itself. But the nature of the intellectual soul is the same before and after death. Therefore, if the intellectual soul has an ordination to phantasms as objects before death, it seems that it will likewise have it after death. We conclude as before.
- 6.** The soul cannot understand if the intellectual power is taken away from it. But, after death, the intellectual powers, agent and possible intellect, do not remain in the soul, for these powers belong to it by reason of its union with the body. For, if it were not united to the body, it would not have these powers, just as an angel does not have them. Therefore, after death the soul cannot understand.

7. The Philosopher says: "Understanding is destroyed when some thing within us is destroyed." But that thing within us, about which the Philosopher is speaking, is destroyed in death. Therefore, there will be no understanding after death.

8. If the soul understands after death, it must understand through some power, because everything which acts, acts through some active power, and everything which is acted upon is acted upon through some passive power. Therefore, it will understand either through the same power which it had in this life or through another. If through another, it seems that new powers are produced in it when it is separated from the body. But this does not seem probable. However, if it understands through the same power, this does not seem correct either, since the powers which it has are in it by reason of its union with the body. And this union ceases with death. Therefore, the soul cannot understand after death.

9. If the intellective power remains in the soul, it remains only in so far as it is grounded in the substance of the soul, or in so far as it has reference to act. But it does not remain in so far as it is grounded in the substance of the soul, since, if it remained only in this way, after death it would be able to understand nothing but itself. Nor does it remain in so far as it has reference to act, for, in so far as it has reference to act, it is brought to completion through the habits which it has acquired in the body, and these habits depend on the body. Therefore, it seems that the intellective power does not remain after death; hence, the soul will not understand after death.

10. Everything which is understood is understood through the essence of the thing understood, through the essence of the thing understood, or through a likeness of the thing understood which exists in the one understanding. But it cannot be said that the soul understands things only through the essence of the thing understood, for thus it would understand only itself, its habits, and other things the essences of which are present in the soul. Likewise, it cannot be said to understand only through the essence of itself as understanding for, if it understood things beside itself in this way, its essence would have to be the exemplar of other things, just as the divine essence is the exemplar of all things, for which reason God understands all other things by understanding His essence. But this cannot be said of the soul. Again, it cannot be said to understand through likenesses of the things understood which exist in the soul, since it would seem that above all it understands through the species which it has acquired in the body. And it cannot be said to understand only through them, because the souls of children, which have received nothing from the senses, would thus understand nothing after death. Therefore, it seems that the soul cannot understand in any way after death.

11. If it be said that it knows through species which it is created, the answer is that whatever is created along with the soul belongs to it just as much when it is existing in the body as when it is separated from the body. Therefore, if species through which it can know are created along with the human soul, to know through these species befits the soul not only after it is separated from the body but also while it is in the body. Thus, it seems that the species which it receives from things would be superfluous.

12. If it be said that the body makes it impossible for the soul to use these while it is joined to the body, the answer is that if the body keeps the soul from using these species, this will be either because of the body's nature, or because of corruption. But it is not because of the body's nature, since that is not directly opposed to understanding. And nothing is naturally impeded except by its opposite. Likewise, it is not because of corruption, since, if it were, in the state of innocence, when there was none of this corruption, man would have been able to use these species, and so would not have needed his senses in order that through them the soul might receive species from things. But this seems to be false. Therefore, it does not seem that the separated soul understands through innate species.

13. If it be said that the soul understands through infused species, the answer is that such species were infused either by God or by an angel. But not by an angel, because, if they were, these species would have to be created in the soul by the angel. Similarly, they are not infused by God, because it is not probable that God would infuse His gifts into souls existing in hell. Hence, it would follow that the souls in hell would not understand. Therefore, it does not seem that the separated soul understands through infused species.

14. Augustine gives the mode in which the soul knows when he says: "Since the soul cannot bring bodies themselves into itself, as though it brought them within the limits of incorporeal nature, it fashions likenesses of bodies and seizes upon these likenesses which are made in the soul by itself. For, in forming them, it gives them something of its own substance. However, it saves something will which freely to judge of the species of such images. This is mind, that is, the rational intelligence, which is kept to judge. For we perceive that we have in common will beasts those parts of the soul which are informed by bodily likenesses." In these words he says that the judgment of the rational soul deals with the images with which the sensitive powers are informed. But these images do not remain after death, since they are received in a bodily organ. Therefore, neither does the judgment of the rational soul, which is its understanding, remain in the soul after death.

To the Contrary:

1'. According to Damascene, no substance is deprived of its proper activity. But the proper activity of the rational soul is to understand. Therefore, the soul understands after death.

2'. Just as something is made passive by its union with a material body, so it is made active by its separation from the same body. For something hot acts and is acted upon because of the union of heat with matter. But, if there were heat without matter, it would act and not be acted upon. Therefore, the soul is made completely active by its separation from the body. But it is due to the passivity of the powers of the soul that they cannot know of themselves without exterior objects, as the Philosopher says of the senses. Therefore, after the separation from the body, the soul will be able to understand of itself without reception from any objects.

3'. Augustine says: "Just as the mind itself obtains knowledge of bodily things through the senses of the body, so it obtains knowledge of incorporeal things through itself." But it will always be present to itself. Therefore, it will be able to have understanding at least of incorporeal things.

4'. As is clear from the passage quoted above from Augustine, the soul knows bodily things in so far as it fashions likenesses of these things and draws them within itself. But it can do this more freely after its separation from the body, especially since Augustine there says that it does this by itself. Therefore, the soul can understand better when separated from the body.

5'. In *Spirit and Soul* it is said that the soul takes its powers along with it when it is separated from the body. But it is called cognoscitive because of its powers. Therefore, it will be able to know after death.

REPLY:

As the Philosopher says, if none of the activities of the soul is proper to it, that is to say, in such a way that it would not be able to have it without the body, it is impossible for the soul to be separated from the body. For the activity of anything is its end, in a sense, since it is what is best in it. Hence, just as we firmly maintain according to the Catholic faith that the soul continues to exist after being separated from the body, so must we maintain that it can understand when it exists without the body. But it is hard to see the way in which it understands, because we have to say that it has a different mode of understanding than it has now,

since it is quite clear that it can understand now only if it turns to phantasms, and these will not remain in any way after death.

Accordingly, some say that, just as the soul now receives species from sensible things through the mediation of the senses, so, then, it will be able to receive them without the intervention of any sense. But this seems to be impossible, because a thing cannot pass from one extreme to the other except through the intermediate things. But in the sensible thing the species has an extremely material existence, but, in the understanding, a very highly spiritual existence. Hence, it has to pass to this spirituality through certain intermediate levels, inasmuch as it has a more spiritual existence in sense than in the sensible thing, and a still more spiritual existence in imagination than in sense, and so on as it goes higher.

Hence, others, therefore, say that the soul understands after death through the species which were received from the senses while it was in the body, and which are retained within the soul itself. But this opinion is attacked by some who follow Avicenna's opinion. For, since the intellective soul does not use a bodily organ in order to understand, there cannot be anything in the intellective part of the soul except in so far as it is intelligible. In powers which use a physical organ, however, something can be retained, not in so far as it is knowable, but as in some kind of physical subject. It is because of this that there are certain sensitive powers which do not always actually apprehend the species or intentions which are retained in them. This is clearly the case with imagination and memory. Thus, it seems that only what is actually perceived is retained in the intellective part of the soul. Accordingly, after death the soul can in no way understand through the species which it previously received from things.

But this does not seem to be true, because everything which is received in a thing is received in it according to the mode of the recipient. However, since an immaterial substance has a more stable existence than a physical substance, the species will be received with greater firmness and immobility in the intellective part than in any material thing. And, although they are received in it in so far as they have the character of an intelligible, it is not necessary for the soul actually to understand them at all times, because they are not always in the soul in perfect act. Nor are they there in pure potency, but in incomplete act, which is intermediate between potency and act, which is to say that something exists habitually in the understanding. For this reason, also, the Philosopher wants to make the intellective soul "the place of the species," inasmuch as it retains and preserves them in itself. However, such species, previously received and preserved, do not suffice for the knowledge which we must ascribe to the separated soul because of the souls of children and because of the fact that there are many things now not known to us, such as the punishments of hell and so forth, which will be known by the separated souls.

Therefore, others say that, although the separated soul does not receive anything from things, still, in their presence it has the power to confirm itself to the things it is to know. We see that the imagination of itself makes up forms in this way which it has never received through the senses. But this cannot stand either, for it is impossible to have something which reduces itself from potency into act. And our soul is in potency to the likenesses of the things by which it knows. Consequently, they have to be made actual, not through the soul, but through something which has these likenesses actually, either through the things themselves or through God, in whom all forms are in actuality. Thus, neither imagination nor understanding constructs a new form except from those already in existence, as it fashions the form of a golden mountain from the pre-existing likenesses of gold and mountain.

Therefore, others say that the forms by which the separated soul knows are imprinted on it by God from its very creation, and according to some we now understand through these forms in such a way that no new species are acquired for the soul through the senses, but the soul is

only aroused to look at the species which it has within itself. And the Platonists, who wanted learning to be nothing but remembering, have spoken in this way. But experience contradicts this opinion, for we see that one who lacks one sense lacks one type of knowledge, so that one who does not have sight cannot have knowledge of colors. But this would not be so if the soul did not need to receive from the senses the species by which it knows.

However, according to others, while the soul is joined to the body and is hindered by the body, it understands nothing through these concreated species. But it does understand through them once it is separated from the body. But, again, it seems difficult to admit that species which are naturally implanted in the soul should be hindered completely by the body, even though the union of body and soul is natural to the soul and not adventitious. For we do not find that one of two elements which are natural to a given thing hinders the other in every respect. Otherwise, the second element would be to no purpose. This position also disagrees with that of the Philosopher, who compares the understanding of the human soul to "a tablet on which nothing is written."

Therefore, we must give a different answer, namely, that each thing is influenced by that which is above it according to the mode of its own being. But the rational soul receives its being in a mode midway between separated forms and material forms. For immaterial forms, that is to say, angels, receive from God a being which does not depend on matter and is not in any matter. But material forms receive from God a being which is in matter and depends on matter, since they can not be conserved without matter. The soul, however, receives from God a being which is in matter, for it exists in matter in so far as it is the form of the body, and through this it is united to the body in its being, but it is not dependent on matter, since the being of the soul can be maintained without the body. Therefore, the rational soul receives God's influence in a manner midway between that of angels and that of material things.

For it receives intellectual light in such way that its intellective knowledge has an ordination to the body, in so far as it receives some thing from the powers of the body and has to refer to them in the act of consideration. In this it is lower than the angels. Nevertheless, this light is not so confined to the body that its activity is performed by means of a bodily organ. In this it is above every material form, which performs only the activity in which matter has a share. But, when the soul will be separated from the body, just as it will have its being neither dependent on the body nor existing in the body, so, too, it will receive an influx of intellectual knowledge in such a way that it will neither be confined to the body, as though it had to be exercised through the body, nor will it have any ordination to the body at all.

Therefore, when at its creation the soul is infused in the body, the only intellectual knowledge that is given it is ordained to the powers of the body. Thus, through the agent intellect it can make potentially intelligible phantasms actually intelligible, and through the possible intellect it can receive the intelligible species thus abstracted. Hence it is, too, that, as long as it has being united to the body in the state of this life, it does not know even those things whose species are preserved in it except by insight into phantasms. And for this reason, also, God does not make any revelations to it except under the species of phantasms, nor is it able to understand separated substances, inasmuch as these cannot be sufficiently known through the species of sensible things.

But, when it will have its being free of the body, then it will receive the influx of intellectual knowledge in the way in which angels receive it, without any ordination to the body. Thus, it will receive species of things from God himself, in order not to have to turn to any phantasms actually to know through these species or through those which it acquired previously. Nevertheless, it will be able to see separated substances, as the angels and demons, will natural knowledge, although it will not be able to see God in this way, for, without grace this is not given to any creature.

From all this we can conclude that the soul understands in three ways after death. In one, it understands through species which it received from things while it was in the body. In the second, through species which God infuses in it at the time of its separation from the body. In the third, by seeing separated substances and looking at the species of things which are in them. But this last mode does not lie within their free choice but within that of the separated substance, which opens its intelligence when it speaks and closes it when it is silent. We have said before what sort of speech this is.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The activity of understanding which is common to soul and body is that activity which now belongs to the intellective soul in its relation to the powers of the body, whether we take this will reference to the higher part of the soul or to the lower part. But, after death, the soul, separated from the body, will have an activity which will not take place through a bodily organ and will have no ordination to the body.
2. The solution to the second difficulty is clear from the first response.
3. This authoritative citation is speaking of progress in merit, as it is clear from another gloss on the same passage which says: "Some assert that merit increases and decreases after death, so that it be understood that there is no further advance in knowledge,"²³ which is to say, that they have more merit or reward, or that they deserve clearer knowledge, but it does not mean that they will not then know anything which was previously unknown. For it is clear that they will then know the punishments of hell, which they do not know now.
4. The Philosopher is here speaking only of the understanding united to the body. Otherwise, the consideration of understanding would not belong to natural science.
5. Although the nature of the soul is specifically the same before and after death, its mode of being is not the same. Consequently, its mode of activity is not the same.
6. The power of understanding and the agent and possible intellects will remain in the separated soul. For the existence of these powers is not caused in the soul by the body, although, while they exist in the soul united to the body, they do have an ordination to the body which they will not have in the separated soul.
7. The Philosopher is speaking of the act of understanding which is now proper for us will our dependence on phantasms. For this is hindered when the bodily organ is inhibited and it is completely destroyed when the organ is destroyed.
8. The same intellective powers which are now in the soul will be in the separated soul because they are natural. And things which are natural have to remain, although they now have an ordination to the body which they will not have then, as has been said.
9. The intellective powers remain in the separated soul both in their radication in the essence of the soul and in their relation w act. Nor is it necessary that the habits which were acquired in the body be destroyed, except, perhaps, according to the opinion mentioned above, which says that no species remains in the understanding, unless actual intellection continues. But, even granting that those habits would not remain, the intellective power will an ordination to acts of a different type would remain.
10. After death, the soul understands through certain species. It can, indeed, understand through the species which it has acquired in the body, although these are not entirely adequate, as the difficulty points out.

11-12. We concede these two difficulties.

13. The infusion of the gifts of grace does not reach those who are in hell, but these souls are not deprived of the things which belong to the state of nature. "For nothing is completely deprived of a share in the good," as Dionysius says. But the infusion of species mentioned above, which is given when the soul is separated from the body, belongs to the natural state of separated substances. Therefore, the souls of the damned are not deprived of this infusion.

14. Augustine is here trying to show how the soul clothes itself with likenesses of physical things, so that it sometimes thinks it is itself a body, as appears in the opinion of the ancient philosophers. He says that this happens because the soul with its attention focused on bodies is attracted to them through the external senses. For this reason, it strives to bring these bodies into itself in so far as possible. However, since the soul is incorporeal, it cannot bring the bodies themselves into itself, but it does bring likenesses of bodies into the domain of incorporeal nature, as it were, in so far as the forms existing in imagination are without matter; however, they do not yet reach the limits of incorporeal nature, because they are still not free of the conditions of matter.

The soul is said to seize upon these likenesses in so far as it immediately abstracts them from sensible things. And it is said to fashion them to the extent that it simplifies them, or in so far as it joins and divides them. It constructs them in itself in so far as it receives them in a power of the soul, the imagination. It constructs them by itself because the soul itself is that which fashions imaginations of this sort in itself, so that the word *by* denotes the efficient principle. Therefore, he adds that the soul gives these species something of its substance when it forms them, since a part of the soul, rooted in its substance, is given this role of forming images.

But, since everything which passes judgment on a thing has to be free from that thing, understanding has been made pure and unmixed in order to judge of all things, according to the Philosopher.²⁸ Therefore, for the soul to judge of these images, which are not things themselves, but likenesses of things, there has to be something higher in the soul which is not occupied by these images. This is the mind, which can judge of such images. However, it is not necessary that the mind judge only of these images, but at times it also judges of things which are neither bodies nor the likeness of bodies.

ARTICLE II: DOES THE SEPARATED SO KNOW SINGULARS?

Parallel readings: IV Sentences 50, I, 3; Summa Theol., I, 89, 4; Q. D. de anima, 20.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. If it knows singulars, it knows them either through species created with the soul, or through species it has acquired. But it does not know them through species which it has acquired, because the species received in the intellective part of the soul are not singular but universal. And it is only this part of the soul which is separated from the body, "as the perpetual from the corruptible," according to the Philosopher.¹ Similarly, it does not know them through species created with the soul, for, since singulars are countless, there would have to be an infinite number of species created with the soul. But this is impossible. Therefore, the separated soul does not know singulars.

2. It was said that it knows singulars through a universal species.— On the contrary, an indistinct species cannot be the source of distinct knowledge. But the universal species is

indistinct, and knowledge of singulars is distinct. Therefore, separated souls cannot know singulars through universal species.

3. It was said that the separated soul confirms itself to the singular when the singular is present to it and thus knows the singular.—On the contrary, when the singular thing is present to the soul, either some thing passes over from the singular into the soul, or nothing passes over. If something passes over, the separated soul receives something from singulars, which seems unfitting, but, if nothing passes over, the species existing in the soul remain general, and, so, nothing singular can be known through them.

4. Nothing which is in potency reduces itself from potency to act. But the cognoscitive soul is in potency to things which can be known. Therefore, it cannot reduce itself to act, and so confirm itself to them. Consequently, it seems that the separated soul does not know singulars when they are present to it.

To the Contrary:

1' In Luke (16:23) we read that Dives in hell knew Abraham and Lazarus, and retained the knowledge of his brothers still living. Therefore, the separated soul knows singulars.

2' There is not pain without knowledge. But the soul will undergo pain from the fire and the other punishments of hell. Therefore, it will know singulars.

REPLY:

The separated soul, as has been said, knows in two ways. In one it knows through species infused when it is separated from the body; in the other, through species which it received while in the body.

According to the first mode, we have to ascribe to the separated soul a knowledge which is like angelic knowledge. Consequently, just as angels know singulars through the species given them at their creation, so, too, the soul will know them through the species given it at its separation from the body. For, since the ideas which exist in the divine mind are productive of things according to form and matter, they must be exemplars and likenesses of things according to both form and matter. Hence, through them God knows things not only in their generic and specific nature, which is derived from formal principles, but also in its singularity, whose principle is matter. But the forms which are created will angelic minds and which souls acquire when they are separated from the body are likenesses of those ideal forms which exist in the divine mind. Therefore, just as things derive from these ideas and so exist in form and matter, so also the species in created minds derive from them. And these species can know things according to form and to matter, that is, according to their universal nature and their singular nature. It is through this kind of species that the separated soul knows singulars.

But the species which it has received from the senses are like things only in so far as these latter can act, and they act according to their form. Therefore, singulars can be known through them only in so far as they are received in another power which uses a bodily organ, in which they exist materially in some way, and so are received as individual. In the understanding, however, which is entirely free from matter, they can be a principle only of universal knowledge, unless, perhaps, through some reflection on phantasms, from which the intelligible species are abstracted. After death, when phantasms have been destroyed, there cannot be this reflection. However, the soul can apply universal forms of this type to singulars which it knows through another type of knowledge.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The separated soul does not know singulars through the species which it acquired while in the body, nor through species created will the soul, but through species given it when it is

separated from the body. Nevertheless, it is not necessary to have an infinite number of species infused into the soul to know singulars, because the singulars which it is to know are not actually infinite in number, and because a separated substance can know all the individuals of a species through one likeness of the species, in so far as that likeness of the species is made the proper likeness of each of the singulars according to its proper relation to this or that individual, as we said of the angels. This is also clear of the divine essence which is the proper likeness not only of the individuals of one species but of all beings according to the different relations which it has to different things.

2. Although the species by which the separated soul knows singulars are intrinsically immaterial and therefore universal, they are likenesses of things both in their general nature and in their singular nature. Therefore, nothing prevents the soul from knowing singulars through them.

We concede the other difficulties.

QUESTION 20: The Knowledge of Christ

ARTICLE I: SHOULD WE SAY THAT THERE IS CREATED KNOWLEDGE IN CHRIST?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 14, 1, sol. 1; Camp. Theol., 216; Summa Theol., III, 9, I.

Difficulties:

It seems that there we should not, for

1. Knowledge is a perfection of the one who knows. But every perfection is more noble than the subject of perfectibility. Therefore, if Christ knows by reason of some created knowledge, something created will be more noble than the soul of Christ. But this seems unfitting.
2. Activity is not attributed to the nature, but to the substantial subject. For activities belong to substantial subjects and individuals. But, for the person of Christ to understand, uncreated knowledge is sufficient. Therefore, it is superfluous to ascribe created knowledge to Christ.
3. The more noble a thing is, the more it is like God. But the soul of Christ is more noble than physical heat. Therefore, since physical heat acts without a medium, and in this is like God, who acts without a medium, it seems that, with much greater reason, the soul of Christ should understand without the mediation of any created knowledge.
4. It was said that the activity of heat proceeds from within, but the activity of knowledge, from without, since it is according to the move merit from things to the soul. Hence, they are not alike. —On the contrary, in the activity of knowing there is not only reception, but also judgment about the things received. And, although reception is from without, judgment proceeds from within. Therefore, the activity of knowledge is not entirely from without.
5. Christ, the Son of God, did not assume any imperfection unless it aided our redemption. But imperfection of knowledge does not aid our redemption. Therefore, He did not assume imperfection of knowledge. But all created knowledge is imperfect in some degree by the very fact that it is created. Therefore, He did not assume created knowledge.
6. Anyone who is always engaged in the act of thinking according to the most perfect knowledge does not need any less perfect knowledge, because he would never use it, and so

would have it to no purpose. But Christ is always engaged in the act of thinking according to the most perfect knowledge, namely, uncreated knowledge. Therefore, we should not ascribe another, that is, created knowledge to Him.

7. Nature does not do will two things that which it can do will one; much less does God, who acts in a more orderly way than nature. But Christ could become will if He had only uncreated knowledge. Therefore, He did not become will by means of created knowledge.

8. According to the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1 3: i o): "When that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be put away." But created knowledge, in comparison with uncreated knowledge, is more imperfect than vision in the mirror [creatures], in comparison with vision of [essence]. Therefore, if the vision of faith is removed because of its imperfection when vision of [essence] arrives, will much greater reason created knowledge will be excluded from Christ in whom there was uncreated knowledge.

9. The Word united to His soul is much more intimate to it than our understanding is to our soul, since the Word is united to it not only through its essence, presence, and power, as in other souls, and through grace, as in the just, but also in unity of person. But our soul understands through its intellectual power. Therefore, Christ's soul could be will with the wisdom of the Word, and so it did not need created knowledge.

10. If Christ had created knowledge, it was not given to Him except for His perfection. But the soul of Christ, united to the Word and having created knowledge, is not more noble than if it were united to the Word alone without created knowledge. For something created added to God does not increase His goodness, just as a point added to a line does not make it longer. Therefore, we should not ascribe created knowledge to Christ.

To the Contrary:

1' In Luke (2:52) we read: "And Jesus advanced in wisdom. But it is clear that he could not advance in uncreated wisdom, since that neither grows nor declines. Therefore, we should say that there is created knowledge in Christ.

2' According to Damascene: "The Word of God assumed every thing which God implanted in our nature." But He implanted created knowledge in our nature. Therefore, He assumed created knowledge.

3' Just as divine knowledge is above created intellectual knowledge, so created intellectual knowledge is above sensitive knowledge. But one who has created intellectual knowledge does not lose sensitive knowledge, as is evident in men. Therefore, created intellectual knowledge can remain after the advent of uncreated intellectual knowledge.

REPLY:

Just as we say that there are two natures in Christ, so, also, we say that there are two kinds of knowledge: created and uncreated. But some heretics have said that there is only uncreated knowledge in Christ.

To see the source of this error we must bear in mind that some have understood that the union of the divine and human natures takes place in the way in which the soul is united to the body. Thus, as the soul is the form of the body, so in Christ the divinity would be the form of the humanity. Therefore, some have thought that if the Word were united to Christ's body as the soul is to our body, it could give life to Him just as our soul gives life to our body. Hence, they said that there were only two substances in Christ, body and divinity, and the latter in place of the soul gave life to the body. This was the error of Eunomius and his followers.

However, some, perceiving that it would be unworthy for the divinity to be united to the body as that which gives it life, said that Christ had a soul which gives life and sensation, that is to say, a vegetative and a sensitive soul, but did not have an intellectual soul. They said that in Christ the Word Himself took the place of the intellectual soul. This was the error of Apollinaris and his followers.⁶ And, granted this error, it is plain that there is only uncreated knowledge in Christ.

But this manner of understanding the union in Christ leads one to believe that the divine and human natures are combined into a single nature, just as the union of body and soul results in not only one substantial subject but also one nature. Furthermore, it follows from this that the true reality of each nature is destroyed. For, since it is essential to the divine nature to have its being separate from all things, if we make it the act of any body, it loses its proper nature. In the same way, if the soul or the understanding or anything integral to human nature is taken away from it, there will no longer remain the true reality- of the specific nature, since, as is said in the Metaphysics, the specific natures are similar to numbers, in which the species of the number is changed when unity is added or subtracted. Therefore, according to the foregoing error, Christ was neither true God nor true man.

Therefore, for Christ to be true God and true man, He must have within him all that pertains to the divine nature, and, also, as a distinct nature in the same person, all that constitutes the specific nature of man. And for him to be not only a true man, but a perfect man, he must have everything which we need to be perfect, such as habits of the sciences and of the virtues. However, just as divinity cannot be an act of a body, in such a way that by it the body formally has life, or becomes a rational creature, so also it cannot be the act of the rational soul, so that by it the soul formally has knowledge or virtue in the way in which we have them through a habit of virtue or knowledge. Therefore, we must hold that there is created knowledge and virtue in Christ.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Created knowledge is, indeed, more noble than Christ's soul in some respect, in so far as it is an act of His soul. In this sense, His colour is more noble than His body, and any accident is more noble than its subject, in so as it is related to it as act to potency. Simply, however, the subject is more noble than an accident, and, thus, Christ's soul is more noble than its knowledge.
2. Although activity is ascribed to the substantial subject as agent, it is ascribed to the nature as the source of activity. And activity does not receive its specification from the agent but from the source of the activity. Hence, there can be specifically different activities in one agent because of the diversity of the principles of operation, as sight and hearing in man. Therefore, although in Christ there is only one substantial subject, in Him there are two natures and, so, two activities. Furthermore, Christ must have the perfection of both activities. Thus, He has not only uncreated knowledge, which is sufficient for the activity of the uncreated nature, but also created knowledge, which is needed for the perfect activity of the created nature.
3. Properly speaking, heat does not act; rather, it is the medium through which fire acts. For this reason, it is related to the activity of heating in the way in which created knowledge is related to the act of considering.
4. Although there is something from within in the deliberation of science, such activity is completed only when there is something from without. Here we see the dissimilarity.
5. Although created existence is imperfect in comparison with the eminence of the divine perfection, each thing is perfect in its own order and demands some perfection of its own

order. Thus, even in Christ the created nature had some created perfection, namely, created knowledge.

6. Christ is always engaged in the act of thinking according to His uncreated knowledge. But, since the two activities belong to Him by reason of two natures, this actual consciousness does not therefore exclude the added consciousness of created knowledge.

7. If Christ had only uncreated knowledge, He would indeed be will as God, but He would not, so to speak, be will as man. Hence, He had to have created knowledge to be will in His humanity.

8. What the Apostle says should be taken of the perfection which is opposed to imperfection, for thus the imperfect is removed when the perfect arrives. But the perfection of divine knowledge is not opposed to the imperfection of created knowledge, since their objects are different. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.

9. Although the Word is more deeply within the soul than any of its powers, inasmuch as it supports and conserves the soul in existence, the understanding or any other power is more at one with the soul because it is united not only in person but also in nature, inasmuch as a power is a perfection of the soul itself, whereas the Word is not. Consequently, formally speaking, the soul of Christ cannot understand through the Word as though through its intellect.

Although the Word plus created knowledge is not better than the Word alone, the soul united to the Word and having the perfection of created knowledge is better than if it were united to the Word without having created knowledge. For created knowledge has a relation to the soul in a manner in which the Word does not. Therefore, the conclusion does not follow.

ARTICLE II: DID THE SOUL OF CHRIST SEE THE WORD THROUGH A HABIT?

Parallel readings: *Summa Theol.*, III, 9, 2, ad., 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that it did not, for

1. To see through a habit is to see through a medium. But the soul of Christ sees the Word without a medium. Therefore, it does not see it through a habit.

2. The soul of Christ is beatified because it sees the Word. But beatitude, or happiness, consists not in habit but in act, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, the soul of Christ does not see the Word through a habit.

3. The more simple a thing is, the closer it is to God. And the closer it is to God, the more noble it is. Therefore, since the soul of Christ has nobility especially because it sees God perfectly, it seems that it gets no composition in that vision, as it would if it understood the Word through a habit conjoined to the soul.

4. The soul of Christ is more noble than the angels, especially with reference to what belongs to vision of the Word. But the angels do not see the Word through habits, since, as Maximus says: "It is not fitting to think that the great Dionysius said that attributes [*habitudines*] exist in divine intellects in the manner of accidents, as they do in us, and that they exist differently in different subjects, as if they were made into qualities. For every accident is excluded from those divine intellects." Therefore, neither did the soul of Christ see the Word through a habit.

5. The soul of Christ can be considered only as united to the Word, or according to its own nature. But, in so far as it is united to the Word, it does not befit it to see the Word through the medium of a habit, since it is not united to the Word through the medium of a habit. Likewise, this does not befit it by reason of its proper nature, for, just as every whole is greater than the part, so every whole is better and more perfect than any of its parts. But a part of the soul, the agent intellect, carries on its activity without the mediation of a habit, and this seems to pertain to the nobility of the agent intellect. So, with much greater reason, the whole soul engages in activity without the mediation of a habit. Therefore, the soul of Christ does not in any way see the Word through a habit.

6. As the Gloss says: "After God there is nothing better than the nature of the human mind such as Christ assumed." But some creatures even without sense perform their activities without the mediation of a habit. And this seems to pertain to their nobility, since in this they are like God. Therefore, the soul of Christ with much greater reason performs its activity without any habit. Thus, we conclude as before.

To the Contrary:

1'. No passive power can perform its activity unless it is perfected by the form of its corresponding active agent, since a thing operates only in so far as it is in act. But the possible intellect, by which the soul of Christ understood, was a passive power. Therefore, it could not understand unless it was perfected through the form of its corresponding active principle, that is to say, unless it was perfected by something intelligible. But a habit in the understanding seems to be nothing other than the species of intelligible things in the understanding. Therefore, the soul of Christ saw God and understood through the mediation of a habit.

2'. It did not befit the Son of God to assume anything but a perfect intellective power. But the active power is made perfect through the habit of knowledge. Therefore, He assumed habitual knowledge.

REPLY:

For a clear understanding of this question we must know what habit is, and why we need habits.

At first sight, habit seems to mean something added to a power, by which power receives the perfection needed for its activity. A power, however, needs some addition for two reasons: because of the state of its nature, and because of the nature of the power of itself. Nor is this without reason, since the activity, which proceeds from a power, depends on the nature which is the source of the power.

A power needs something for its activity because of its nature, for example, when the activity is such that it is beyond the capacity and condition of the nature. In this way, to love God with the love of fellowship, as a sharer in His inheritance, is beyond the condition of human nature. Hence, our affective power needs the habit of charity for this activity. A power needs something by reason of the power itself, however, when it is ordained to objects of such a nature that it can in no way of itself perfectly possess their act. Thus, the power of sight is ordained to knowledge of all colors, but it was not possible for all colors actually to exist in the organ of sight. Therefore, things were ordained differently, namely, that the power of sight could be given the likeness of any colour and so proceed to the act of sight.

Still, we must bear in mind that that which is added to a power is sometimes received in it as a habit, and sometimes after the manner of transient impression.

This latter is the case when that which is received does not remain within the recipient, and does not become a quality of the recipient, but is impressed on it by a kind of contact from

some agent, and quickly passes on. Thus, the Philosopher says that, when one suddenly blushes because of shame, the redness is "a transient impression" and not an affective "quality."

But that which is received is retained as a habit when it becomes in sense connatural to the receiver. For this reason, the Philosopher says that a habit is a quality which is hard to change. Hence it is, also, that activities which proceed from a habit are pleasurable, readily undertaken, and easily performed, since they have, in a sense, become connatural.

Accordingly, what is supplementary in the sense powers is not given as a habit, but as a transient impression. But in the intellective powers of the soul the supplement is given as a habit. For the sensitive part is led by natural instinct rather than taking the lead itself, whereas the intellective part has the direction of its acts. Therefore, it should have a readiness to act, so that it can engage in activity when it pleases.

From what has been said, it is evident that a power is more perfect when it receives something as a habit than if it receives it only as a transient impression. Therefore, we must say that anything supplementary to the soul of Christ is there as a habit.

For both of the reasons we have given we must say that there is some addition to the soul of Christ. By reason of the nature, for vision of the divine essence is above the state of any created nature. Consequently, no creature can reach this unless it is elevated to that blessed vision by some light. In some, for example those enraptured, this light is received as a temporary impression and transiently. But in Christ it was there as a habit, making the soul of Christ beatified from the beginning of its existence.

By reason of the power, however, the intellect of the human soul is in potency to all things. However, it is impossible for any created being to be perfectly the act and likeness of all beings, for, thus, it would possess the nature of being in an infinite manner. Hence, only God can understand all things by Himself and without any addition. But every created intellect understands through some species given it, either acquired by it, as happens with us, or given in creation or infused, as in the angels. And what belongs to angels by reason of the state of their nature, that is to say, to have the species of all things infused in them from their creation, was conferred on the soul of Christ in a much more excellent way by reason of the fullness of grace. But through the mediation of these species it did not know the Word, but only created things.

Therefore, it must be said that in the knowledge will which the soul of Christ saw the Word it needed the habit which is light, not as that through which something would become actually intelligible, as happens in us with the light of the agent intellect, but as that through which the created understanding would be elevated to that which is above it. But, for knowledge of other creatures, it had the habit which is the aggregate of the species ordained to knowledge.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** The soul of Christ sees the Word without that medium which consists in a likeness of the thing seen, as the species in the eye is a likeness of the visible thing, or a mirror is a likeness of the thing reflected. But it does not see the Word without that medium which is a disposition of the one seeing. Thus, the argument is not valid.
- 2.** When one says that happiness is not habitual, this should be understood of the habit from which an act does not proceed. For one who has something habitually and not actually is like one who is asleep. But, according to the opinion of the Philosopher, the act in which happiness consists must proceed from some habit. Otherwise, the activity would not be pleasurable and perfect.

3. According to Dionysius, the situation is not the same in participations and participants, for, the more simple participations are, the more noble they are, as to exist than to live, and to live than to under stand, if by our understanding we separate existence and life in order to compare them. But, among participants, the more composed a thing is (not, of course, will material composition, but by reason of reception of more participations), the more noble it is, because it is like God in so many more things. This kind of assimilation can come only from something received from God. Hence, also, the soul which besides its nature has habits perfecting it is more noble.

4. The words of Maximus should be taken of separable accidents and those belonging to [physical] nature, for, if they had accidents of this sort, they would be subject to change, and not immaterial and subsistent essences. Consequently, he adds: "For if it were this, their essence would certainly not remain within itself." And he concludes: "Therefore, their attributes [*habitudines*] and powers are essential to them because of their immateriality." And he calls essential that which never leaves the essence.

5. The union in Christ does not terminate in activity but in existence. Therefore, in so far as the soul is united to the Word, speaking of what is immediate; it is not entitled to sight of the Word or any other activity, but to this only, namely, existence in the person of the Word. However, its activities belong to it by reason of its powers and its nature. And, although the whole soul is more perfect than the agent intellect, no other power of the soul is more noble than the agent intellect. Hence, the fact that the agent intellect does not need a habit does not mean that the possible intellect must not need one. For the agent intellect needs no habit for its activity, because it does not receive anything from intelligible things, but gives its own form to them by making them actually intelligible. The possible intellect, however, has just the opposite relation to intelligible things.

6. Natural powers are limited to one thing, so they reach their objects of themselves and do not need anything supplementary in order to act. But rational powers are ordained to many things, and this is an indication of their nobility. Therefore, the case is not the same.

ARTICLE III: DOES CHRIST HAVE OTHER KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS THAN THAT BY WHICH HE KNOWS THEM IN THE WORD?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 20, 2; III Sentences 14, 1, sol. 5; Comp. Theol., 216; Summa Theol., 111, 9, 3; 12, I.

Difficulties:

It seems that he does not, for

1. As is said in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (1: 10): "But when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be put away." But the knowledge by which we now know things in them selves is in part, as we read in that same passage. Therefore, when the perfect knowledge of glory comes, our present knowledge will be put away, as the Apostle expressly seems to mean. But, in Christ, from the first moment of His conception there was the knowledge of glory, that is to say, that knowledge by which He knew things in the Word. Therefore, He had no other knowledge of things.

2. It was said that, when glory comes, knowledge will be put away, not in its essence but in the mode in which the understanding now sees by inquiry and dependence on phantasms. On the contrary, this mode is of the essence of knowledge. And, if something essential is taken

away, the substance of the thing cannot remain. Therefore, if that mode leaves, the knowledge cannot remain in its substance.

3. According to the Philosopher, all habits which are acquired from acts are the source of acts like those from which they are acquired. But the knowledge which we now have was acquired from the kind of consideration in which we turn to phantasms and proceed by making comparisons. Therefore, knowledge like this can produce only acts of this nature. So, the knowledge would remain useless if such a mode of knowledge were discontinued.

4. It is impossible to have two forms of the same species in one and the same subject. But, when the soul of Christ sees things in the Word, it has likenesses of the things it sees, since a thing is seen only through its likeness. Therefore, it is impossible for it to have other likenesses of the same things. So, there cannot be another knowledge in Christ except that by which He knows things in the Word.

5. Knowledge is ascribed to the soul of Christ because of its perfection. But, since the soul of Christ sees things in the Word and sees the Word itself, it is not more or less perfect whether it has other knowledge or not. Therefore, we should not ascribe any other knowledge to Him. I prove the minor premise from Augustine, who says: "Unhappy the man who knows all those things [creatures] and does not know You. Blessed the man who knows You, even if he does not know those things. However, one who knows both You and them is not more blessed because of them, but only blessed because of You."

To the Contrary:

1'. Christ was more perfect than the angels, as the Apostle proves (Heb. 1:4 ff). But, besides knowledge of things which they have in the Word, angels have knowledge of things in their own nature, as is clear from Augustine. Therefore, with much greater reason the soul of Christ knew things in their own nature besides knowing them in the Word.

2'. It is not fitting that any of the natural perfections should be lacking in Christ. But it is a natural perfection of the human soul to know things in their own nature. Therefore, Christ had this kind of knowledge of things.

REPLY:

As we said before, the perfection which belongs to Christ super naturally does not exclude His natural perfection, just as uncreated life does not exclude a soul which gives life. But the knowledge by which the soul of Christ knows the Word and things in the Word is supernatural, as has been said. Hence, this does not prevent the soul of Christ from having every natural perfection. However, to be reduced to act is the natural perfection of anything which is existing in potency. But the possible intellect is naturally in potency to intelligible things. Consequently, before it is reduced to act, it is imperfect, and it is made perfect when it is reduced to act and so has knowledge of things. Therefore, some philosophers, looking at man's natural perfection, have said that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the delineation of the order of the whole universe in the soul of man. Therefore, Christ had this perfection of knowing things in their own nature through the infused knowledge given Him by God, much more than man in the state of innocence or angels by reason of their natural knowledge.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. There are two opinions about knowledge. One says that science acquired here remains as far as the essence of the habit is concerned, but the mode in which we use science in this life is taken away. The subsumption in the [second] difficulty proceeds according to this opinion. Nevertheless, we must add that, since Christ was a wayfarer and a possessor of the term, He

had both modes of thinking, one in which He was like the angels, in that He knew things without discursive thought, and the other through which He knew by turning to phantasms. And it is proper to Christ to have both modes of knowledge, for it belongs to Him simultaneously to be a wayfarer and possessor of the term.

The other opinion, however, holds that knowledge acquired here will be taken away in so far as the essence of the habit is concerned. According to this (although I do not believe it is true), one could answer that the soul of Christ did not have knowledge acquired from the senses but infused knowledge such as the angels have through species created will them. It is clear that such knowledge remains in angels along with the vision of glory.

2. This mode of knowing is not essential because of itself, but by reason of its subject, for which this is the normal mode of understanding according to the state of this life. But all that is essential to knowledge in itself is that through it things which can be known are known. Therefore, when the condition of the subject is changed, the mode of knowing is changed, although the habit of knowledge is not.

3. An act can be like another act in two ways. In one way, they are alike in the species of the act which it derives from the matter it concerns. According to this, an acquired habit always produces an act similar to the act by which it was generated. Thus, one becomes brave by doing brave deeds, and, when he has become brave, does brave deeds. In the other way, they are alike according to the mode which follows the disposition of the subject. And, according to this, it is not necessary for the acts in question to be alike. For it is clear that the acts by which we acquire political bravery are performed with sadness and without pleasure. But acts which follow a habit are rather easy and are accompanied by pleasure, or at least are without sadness. Hence, in knowledge we see that man acquires knowledge of things by considering some things, and can consider these same things once he knows them. Nevertheless, he does this in a different way than he did before, for he no longer investigates but looks at what he has investigated. Thus, there is nothing to prevent acts which are produced by habits in the state of glory from having a different mode.

4. As far as it is said to know in the Word, the soul of Christ and any other soul has no other likenesses than the Word itself for the things which it knows in the Word. However, from the fact that it sees in the Word, it can form for itself likenesses of the things it sees, as one who sees something in a mirror sees the thing through the form of the mirror. We have discussed this more fully in our treatment of the angels.

ç. Man's beatitude consists in the knowledge of God and not in the knowledge of creatures. Hence, one is more blessed not because of knowledge of creatures but only because of the knowledge of God. Nevertheless, it is still true that knowledge of creatures belongs to the natural perfection of the soul, as has been said.

ARTICLE IV: DOES THE SOUL OF CHRIST KNOW IN THE WORD ALL THAT THE WORD KNOWS?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 8, 4; III Sentences 14, 2, sol. 2; Comp. Theol., 216; Summa Theol., III, 10, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. God knows an infinite multitude of things, as Augustine says. But, since the soul of Christ is finite, it cannot know an infinite multitude of things. Therefore, in the Word the soul of Christ cannot know all that God knows.

2. It was said that by its union with the Word the soul of Christ is strengthened, and thus can know an infinite multitude of things.—On the contrary, the activity of the soul of Christ proceeds from it through the mediation not of the Word but of its own power. But its power is not infinite, since its essence is finite. Therefore, neither can its operation extend to the knowledge of an infinite multitude of things, although the Word to whom it is united is infinite.

3. In the union of the human and the divine nature, as Damascene says, "the uncreated remains uncreated, and the created remains created." But the capacity and activity of any created thing is finite. Therefore, from its union with the Word, the soul of Christ did not receive the ability to know an infinite multitude of things.

4. Since the Word is infinite, it is fitting that He not only know an infinite multitude of things but also comprehend the infinite, that is to say, God. Therefore, if from its union with the Word the soul of Christ received knowledge of an infinite multitude of things, will equal reason, from the same union, it should have received comprehension of God. But this is false.

5. The activity by which the soul of Christ knew an infinite multitude of things was either the Creator or a creature. If it was the creator, it proceeded from the soul of Christ, which is a creature. Therefore, the Creator proceeded from a creature, which is impossible. If it is a creature—and every creature is finite—then that activity is finite. So, an infinite multitude of things are not known through it.

6. It was said that, although the activity is finite, it has an ordination to an infinite multitude of things.—On the contrary, that relation by which it is ordained to what is infinite is either the Creator or a creature. And we can proceed in the same way as before.

7. Since everything known is known through some species, if the soul of Christ knows an infinite multitude of things, it will know them through a finite or an infinite species. But it does not know them through an infinite species, since no created species is infinite. But, if it knows them through a finite species—and such a species does not represent an infinite multitude of things—then it is impossible for the soul of Christ to know an infinite multitude of things.

8. It was said that, although the species by which the soul of Christ knows is created, still, from its union with the Word of God, it becomes a representation for knowing an infinite multitude of things. —On the contrary, union with the Word does not elevate a creature beyond the limits of creaturehood. For what is created can in no way become uncreated. But it is beyond the limits of creaturehood to be a representation of an infinite multitude of things. Therefore, no created species is elevated to this by union [with the Word].

9. Isidore says that the assumed man was made equal to the Word neither in knowledge nor in anything else. Consequently, not in number of things known. Therefore.

10. We can say that two quantities of equal length but unequal width are in some way equal. But, just as a quantity is called large by reason of several dimensions, so knowledge is called great for different reasons, both because of the number of things known and because of the clarity of the cognition. Accordingly, if the knowledge of the soul of Christ is made equal to the knowledge of God in the number of things known, although not in clearness and distinctness of the cognition, it can be said that the knowledge of the soul of Christ is in some

way equal to the divine knowledge. But it seems absurd to make a creature equal to the Creator in anything.

11. Along with our nature, Christ took on those defects which did not hinder the purpose for which He assumed it, namely, our redemption. But a lack of knowledge of many things would never have hindered our redemption, as, for example, if Christ would not have known the number of pebbles in the bed of some river. Therefore, we should not say that Christ knew everything.

12. It was said that, although knowledge of such things would not help toward the end of our redemption, ignorance of these things would derogate from Christ's perfection. On the contrary, ignorance is opposed to the perfection of the soul in the way hunger and thirst are opposed to the perfection of the body. But Christ took on hunger and thirst because they were not obstacles to our redemption. Therefore, for equal reason He should have assumed ignorance of many things.

13. Ambrose says: "Every nature is bounded by its given limits." But nothing of this sort extends to an infinite multitude of things. Therefore, the soul of Christ does not know an infinite multitude of things.

14. Just as knowledge is said to be infinite in extension in as far as one knows an infinite multitude of things, so it is said to be infinite

in intensity in as far as one knows will infinite clearness. But Christ's knowledge was not infinite in intensity, since, if it were, it would be equal to God's knowledge in clearness. Therefore, it was not infinite in extension, either. Hence He did not know an infinite number of things, or all that God knows.

To the Contrary:

1'. Commenting on the Apocalypse (5: 12), "The Lamb... is worthy to receive...wisdom," the Gloss says: "... knowledge of all things which God knows." Therefore, the soul of Christ knows everything that God knows.

2'. By one infinite, it is possible to know an infinite multitude of things, since God knows an infinite multitude of things by His essence, which is infinite. But the soul of Christ saw the Word, which is infinite, and through the Word it sees other things. Therefore, it can know an infinite multitude of things.

3'. In Colossians (1: 19) we read: "Because in him [Christ] it hath well pleased the Father, that all fullness [of divinity] should dwell." But this would not be so unless He knew all that God knows. Therefore, the soul of Christ knows everything that God knows.

4'. Whatever can be communicated to any creature was communicated to the soul of Christ. But the knowledge of all things can be communicated to a creature, for, according to the Philosopher, the possible intellect is in potency to all intelligible things. Therefore, God conferred on the soul of Christ the Vision of all things in the Word.

REPLY:

For a clear understanding of this question we must grasp what it means to see something in the Word. Therefore, we must remember that a thing can be seen in something only in the way in which it exists in that thing. However, there are two ways in which a number of things can come to exist in one thing. In one way, they exist there in separation and multiplicity, as for instance, will many forms, each is reflected separately in a mirror, and as many men are in one house. In the other way, they are there according to one simple form, as many effects exist virtually in a cause, as conclusions in a principle, and as bodily members in seed.

Accordingly, whoever sees anything must, as a consequence, also see those things which exist in it in multiplicity and division. For each one of them presents itself to him in the same way as that single thing in which they are contained presents itself. To this extent, one who sees a mirror sees the forms reflected by the mirror. But one who sees some one thing does not have to see all the things which exist in it as united in one form, except when he comprehends the total power of that one thing. Thus, one who sees some principle does not have to see all the conclusions which exist virtually in it, unless he comprehends the principle.

But created things are not in God in multiplicity, but in unity, as Dionysius says. Hence, when we say that a thing is in God, this is more like the manner in which effects are in a cause and conclusions in a principle, than like the manner in which forms are in a mirror. Therefore, one who sees the Word does not have to see everything which the Word sees in Himself, as some have said, using the example of forms which are seen in a mirror when one sees the mirror. For the Word has comprehensive knowledge of Himself, so that, seeing Him self, He knows all the things which are in Him virtually and in unity.

But created intellects, which do not have a comprehensive grasp of the Word, do not necessarily see all that is in the Word when they see the Word. But, even in this, the soul of Christ enjoyed a greater privilege than any [other] created intellect. For in the Word it sees all things, present, past, and future.

The reason for this is that there is a double relation of God to creatures, since He is the principle and end of all things. We have one of these in so far as all things proceed from God into being, and the other in so far as they are ordained to God as to their end. Some, as the irrational creatures, are thus ordained only by assimilation; others, however, are thus ordained both by assimilation and also by attaining the divine essence itself. For it is innate in every creature proceeding from God to strive for the good by its activity. But a creature is assimilated to God in attaining any good whatsoever. But, beyond this, rational creatures by their activity can attain to knowledge and love of God. Consequently, they, beyond other creatures, have a capacity for beatitude.

The Creator, however, surpasses creatures in both of these relations. In the first, because over and above everything which God has made He can still make other different things, new species, new genera, and other worlds. And that which has been made can never exhaust the power of the Maker. And He surpasses creatures in the second relation because, no matter how much a creature shares the good, it can never reach the point where it is equal to God's goodness. Also, no matter how much a rational creature knows and loves God, it can never know and love Him as perfectly as He can be known and loved.

And, just as creatures would be imperfect if they proceeded from God and were not ordained to return to God, so, too, their procession from God would be imperfect unless the return to God were equal to the procession. Therefore, every creature participates in goodness to the extent to which it participates in being. Thus, it is necessary for the most excellent created intellects to know God, so that their knowledge be equal to the procession of creatures from God. But things proceed from God naturally and according to the order of grace. Hence, the created intellects, that is, the angels, who in the natural order are set at the peak of creation, receive knowledge of all natural things in God and from God. But Christ stands above every creature also according to the gifts of grace, since "of his fullness we all have received, and grace for grace" (John 1:16). Therefore, He received in God knowledge of all things which proceed from God at any time, not only according to the order of nature, but also according to the order of grace.

Therefore, the soul of Christ knows all creatures not only according to their natural properties, as the angels also do, but even in so far as they are subject to divine providence and are

ordered to the end of human salvation and the gifts of grace. Therefore, He knows all individual things and every single act of all things, even the secret thoughts of men's hearts. This can be said of no other creature. Nevertheless, because this does not reach the point where it includes comprehensive grasp of God's infinity, God still has the power to do many other things than those which the soul of Christ knows.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The common answer to this objection is that God knows some things will the knowledge of vision, namely, present, past, and future things. And granted that the world has a beginning and an end, these are not infinite. We say that God sees only these because vision concerns things which exist in themselves outside the understanding of the one who sees them. However, He knows some things will the knowledge of simple intelligence, namely, those which He can make, but which will never exist. These things are infinite. And we say that God understands these things by means of the representation which His understanding can use to form quiddities of things which do not exist outside of Him. Accordingly, the soul of Christ sees all things, present, past, and future, in the Word; nevertheless, it does not see everything which God can make, and thus it does not follow that it knows an infinite multitude of things.

But that answer does not meet the force of the difficulty. For, if we grant that generation might continue to infinity in the future, as God could so make it, it is evident that there would be an infinite multitude of men, and God would know them all by knowledge of vision. Hence, if the soul of Christ knew everything that God knows will the knowledge of vision, it would follow that it would know an infinite multitude of things, although it would not know everything which God can do. For, besides an infinite multitude of individuals of these finite species, God can make an infinite multitude of different species and an infinite multitude of individuals in each species, as is clear especially in the ratios of numbers.

For, if we take the individuals in one species of ratio, they will be multiplied to infinity. Thus, in the species of doubling there is the ratio of two to one, four to two, six to three, and so on to infinity. And again, besides the ratio of doubling, there is another species, that of triple, and also of quadruple, and quintuple, and so on to infinity. Yet each of these contains potentially an infinite multitude of individuals. Consequently, if generation were to continue to infinity according to these species which are now finite, God could still make more, because He could make new species, and this to infinity. It is clear from this that it does not mean the same thing to say that the soul of Christ knows an infinite multitude of things and that it knows all that God can make.

Furthermore, in knowing all creatures will the knowledge of vision, God has a comprehensive grasp of them, so He knows whatever is in the potency of creatures. But there is an infinity in the potency of creatures, as is evident in the division of the continuum and in the addition of numbers. Hence, since the soul of Christ has comprehensive knowledge of creatures, it knows the infinite number of things which are in creatures potentially.

Besides, if the souls of the damned exist forever, and their thoughts, all of which God knows, will be changing, God now knows an infinite multitude of future things will the knowledge of vision. Hence, if the soul of Christ knows everything that God knows will the knowledge of the vision, we must say that it knows an infinite multitude of things.

Hence, we have to give a different answer, and say that in reality we find something which is simply and in every way infinite, namely, God. And there is something finite in every way, namely, material things. Moreover, there is something which is finite in some sense and infinite in some sense, for any immaterial substance is finite in so far as it has existence limited to its own nature, since no created substance, although immaterial, is its own

existence, but participates in existence. Nevertheless, it is infinite by reason of the removal of that limitation by which a form is limited by the very fact of its reception into matter. For everything received exists in the recipient according to the mode of the recipient.

Therefore, in so far as a thing is infinite, it is related to the infinite by its activity. For that which is infinite both because of its existence and its immateriality, namely God, is related to infinity through its operation by reason both of its matter, or quantity, and of its specific or generic nature. Consequently, God can know an infinite multitude of individuals and an infinite multitude of species because He knows all that He can do, and He can make new species to infinity. Besides this, since a thing acts in so far as it is in act, just as God's being is infinite, so also His activity is infinitely efficacious.

But a material thing is not related to an infinite multitude of things either as infinite according to quantity or matter, or as infinite according to species. This is evident in sight, which is a material power and, accordingly, cannot know any species whatever, but a determined species, colour. Nor can it know an infinite number of things except successively. For, since it is material, its activity is material, and attains to things which are numerically infinite according to continuous or discrete quantity, and this is material infinity. It does this in the way in which they are infinite, that is to say, materially, numbering part after part. Therefore, it can never arrive at knowledge of an infinite number of individuals. And since our understanding in the present state receives from sense, neither can it know an infinite number of things in this way.

But immaterial substances, which are in some sense infinite and in some sense finite, have limited existence, and because of this their activity has finite efficacy and is ordained to finite natures. But, because they are immaterial, their activity extends to things materially infinite. Hence, as the Commentator says, our understanding appears to be infinite in some respect, in so far as it knows the universal, in which an infinite number of singulars are known. But it is deficient in this, that the universal species which understanding perceives, that of man, for example, is not a perfect representation for knowledge of any individual in its individuality. However, if that were the case, then our understanding, granted that there were an infinite number of men, would still know these materially infinite things through one finite nature, human nature. For, although in an infinite multitude of men human nature would be in finite quantitatively or materially, it would not be infinite specifically. This is clear from the fact that there can be other species outside of the infinite multitude of men. And the proper object of understanding is the specific nature, not matter. The case would be similar will one who, by means of the nature of animal, would know all species of animals in their specific qualities. For if there were an actually infinite number of species of animals, he would indeed know an infinite species but only a finite nature, since, besides the nature of animal, there is still the nature of stone.

Therefore, since the soul of Christ knows the Word, which is a sufficient representation for knowledge of all individuals in their individuality, and all species in their specific qualities, nothing prevents the soul of Christ from knowing an infinite multitude of things, even though its being is finite. Nevertheless, it cannot have a comprehensive grasp of infinite nature.

2. The soul of Christ is not elevated above the limits of creature hood by its union with the Word. Therefore, it does not become infinite, does not have infinite power, and its activity is not intrinsically infinite, although it does know an infinite multitude of things. For it knows an infinite multitude of things with a finite power. As a result, it remains infinite only materially.

3. The solution to the third difficulty is clear from the second response.

4. Comprehensive grasp of the infinite can come only through an activity which has infinite efficacy. For God Himself is known comprehensively by an intellect when it has as much

efficacy to understand as God has to be understood. Consequently, He can be known comprehensively only by an uncreated intellect. But knowledge of an infinite multitude of things does not demand infinite efficacy in intellectual activity, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, the conclusion does not follow.

5-6. The solution to the fifth and sixth difficulties is clear from what has been said.

7. The soul of Christ knows an infinite multitude of things through an uncreated species in the way we have described, that is, thro the divine essence itself. And, since this is infinite, nothing prevents it from containing the intelligibility of an infinite multitude of things.

8. The solution to the eighth difficulty is clear from what has been said. The man assumed [by the Word] was not made equal to the Word in the number of things known, although he knew an infinite multitude of things. For it still does not follow that he knows every thing which God can make as is clear from what has been said. And, granting that he knew all that the Word knows, even though the number were equal in both, he is not made equal in the number of things known will reference to the manner of knowing.

10. Essentially, any dimension belongs to measurable quantity. Therefore, one body can be said to be equal to another according to any dimension in which it is equal to the other. But quantity of knowledge, which is considered according to the number of things known, belongs to it accidentally and materially, especially when in the many objects of knowledge there is a single intelligible aspect by which they are known. It would be different if they were known according to different intelligible aspects. But the quantity which comes from efficacy of knowledge belongs essentially to knowledge, since such quantity is considered according to the procession of intellectual activity from the intellectual power. Therefore, the situation is not the same.

11. The Son of God did not assume all the defects which could have existed in Him without interfering with the redemption of men. But it is true that He assumed those whose assumption aided in the redemption of the human race. Nevertheless, any lack of knowledge whatever would have been a defect which hindered the redemption of the human race. For the Redeemer, through whom grace and truth were to be diffused throughout the whole human race, needed the fullness of grace and truth. And any defect of knowledge could have been prejudicial to this.

12. Through His bodily weakness Christ came to heal the weakness of soul which consists in a lack of grace and knowledge. Therefore, although He did assume bodily defects, He should not in any way have assumed any defect of knowledge or grace.

13. The solution to this thirteenth difficulty is clear from what has been said.

14. Extensive quantity, as is clear from what has been said, is accidental to knowledge. But intensive quantity is essential to it, as is also clear from our explanation. Therefore, the situation is not the same.

ARTICLE V: DOES THE SOUL OF CHRIST KNOW ALL THAT GOD COULD MAKE?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 8, 4; III Sentences 14, 2, sol. 2; Comp. Theol., 216; Summa Theol., III, 10, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does, for

1. Whoever knows the greater can know the less. But God is greater than anything which He can make, for whatever He can make is created. Therefore, since the soul of Christ knows God, it can will much greater reason know whatever God can make.
2. It was said that, although God is greater, the soul of Christ has an ordination to the knowledge of God but not to the knowledge of everything which God can make.—On the contrary, although God in Himself is more knowable than any creature, yet, for us, creatures are more knowable than God. But whatever God can make is a creature. Therefore, it is more natural for the soul to know anything God can make than to know God Himself.
3. Just as the soul of Christ sees the divine essence, so, also, it sees the divine power. However, it is said to see the whole divine essence, but does not see it totally. Therefore it sees the whole divine power, although it does not see it totally. But the whole power cannot be seen unless whatever it can extend w is seen. Therefore, the soul of Christ know everything which God can make.
4. Whatever God can make He can disclose. But whatever can be disclosed to any creature was disclosed to Christ. Therefore, whatever God can make was disclosed to Christ.
5. That which does not entail defect in the one communicating nor in the one to whom it is communicated can be communicated. But to give the soul of Christ the knowledge of everything which God can make does not entail any defect in God, since this would seem to pertain to His supreme liberality, nor in the soul of Christ, since it belongs to its supreme perfection. Therefore, this could be communicated to the soul of Christ; so, it was communicated to it.
6. If the soul of Christ does not know all that God can do, granted that God did something, the soul of Christ would not know it, unless it learned it anew. But it is unfitting to say that the soul of Christ is ignorant of any existing thing, or that it learns anything new. There fore, the soul of Christ knows all that God can make.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. If the soul of Christ knows whatever God can make, everything that God can make is enclosed in the soul of Christ. But the soul of Christ is finite. Therefore, since God can make an infinite multitude of things, it follows that the infinite would be enclosed in the finite. But this is impossible. Therefore the first, that the soul of Christ is able to know whatever God can make, is impossible too.
- 2'. The divine power is infinite, just as the divine essence is. But the soul of Christ cannot have a comprehensive grasp of the divine essence because of its infinity. Therefore, neither can it have a comprehensive grasp of the divine power. Thus, it cannot know whatever God can make.
- 3'. The more perfectly a thing is known by someone, the more things are known in it. But God knows Himself more perfectly than the soul of Christ does. Therefore, He knows more things in Himself than the soul of Christ knows in the Word. But God knows nothing in Himself but what is, or was, or will be, or can be, could have been, or could be [the future]. Therefore, the soul of Christ does not know all these things.

REPLY:

There have been different opinions on this matter. For some have said that not only the soul of Christ, but every soul, sees in the Word whatever can be seen there. This includes not only what is, will be, or has been, but whatever God can make. But these people were mistaken in this because they thought the mode of seeing things in the Word was like the mode of seeing

things in a material mirror, in which images of things are reflected as many and diverse. But the natures of things exist in God in unity and simplicity, as Dionysius says. How ever, if they existed there as many and diverse, then everything that could be known in God would be known once He was seen. Thus, all who saw God through His essence would see everything that God can make, since all these things could be known in God.

But, since we are told expressly that some who see God through His essence are ignorant of some things, as is evident of the angels, who are illumined by one another, as Dionysius says, some ascribe this perfection of knowledge only to the soul of Christ, and not to all who see God, so that, besides God only the soul of Christ knows all that God can make.

But, since it does not seem fitting to ascribe an infinite activity to a finite creature, and since to see all that God can make requires an infinite activity, others have said that the soul of Christ does not see all the things which God can make in actual knowledge, but still does see them in habitual knowledge. For it knows the Word so perfectly that by turning to the Word it receives in the Word knowledge of whatever it wants to know, although it does not always actually consider everything that it can know in the Word. But this does not seem to be true. For the soul of Christ, and any of the blessed, in so far as they have the beatific vision, by which they see the Word and things in the Word, do not have succession in their acts of understanding. For, according to Augustine: "Thoughts will not come and go in heaven." Hence, we must say that in the Word the soul of Christ sees in actual knowledge all that it sees there in habitual knowledge. This agrees with what the Philosopher says, when he says that happiness is had according to act, and not only according to habit. Furthermore, as it is not fitting to say that there is a created activity which extends to all that God can make, so it is also not fitting to say that there is a created habit with an ordination to these same things.

Therefore, we must say with others that the soul of Christ does not know all that God can make. The reason for this is that two elements must be considered in knowledge: that which is known and the manner in which it is known. It sometimes happens that some agree in one of these who differ in the other, as when one and the same thing is known by different subjects, less by one and more by the other. That which in itself is presented to be known pertains to that which is known; that, however, which is known in something else pertains to the manner of knowing of that in which it is known. Thus, if one knows some principle and in it acquires knowledge of some conclusions, the knowledge of those conclusions depends on the manner of knowing the principle.

For, the more perfectly one knows a principle, the more conclusions he sees in it, but, however weak his knowledge of the principle is, the substance of that principle always remains known to him. Therefore, his knowledge of it does not involve any determinate way of knowing, as the knowledge of conclusions which are known in the principle involves a determinate way of knowing. Hence it is that all who are presented with one principle know the substance of the principle but do not know the same conclusions or an equal number of conclusions. They differ in this, as they do in the manner of knowing the principle.

All who see God through His essence are said to see the whole essence of God. For there is nothing of the essence which any of them does not see, since the divine essence has no parts. Nevertheless, all do not see it totally, but only God sees Himself totally, in this sense, that the mode of the knower is equal to the mode of the thing known. For the efficacy of the divine intellect in knowing is as great as the know ability of the divine essence.

But this cannot be said of any created intellect; hence, no created intellect reaches the point where it sees the divine essence as perfectly as it can be seen. For this reason, no created intellect can have comprehensive knowledge of it, but one created intellect sees the divine essence more perfectly than another. Therefore, it is evident that knowledge of something in the Word depends on the mode of knowing the Word. Thus, as it is impossible for a created

intellect to arrive at the perfect mode of knowing the Word as it can be known, so, too, it is impossible for a created intellect to know everything which can be known in the Word, that is to say, everything which God can make.

Consequently, it is impossible for the soul of Christ to know every thing which God can make, just as it is impossible for it to have comprehensive knowledge of the divine power. For each thing is known comprehensively when its definition is known. For the definition is the power comprehending the thing. But the definition of any power is taken from the things to which the power of God extends. Hence, if the soul of Christ knew everything to which the power of God extended, it would completely comprehend the power of God. But this is altogether impossible.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Whatever God can do is less than God Himself. And it could be known more easily by the soul of Christ if whatever God can make were in itself presented to the soul of Christ, as God Himself is thus presented to it. But, in the present state of things, what God can do, or what He did, are not presented to the soul of Christ in themselves, but in the Word. Therefore, the conclusion does not follow.

2. That through which another thing is known is always more evident. Therefore although according to a certain mode of knowing creatures are more evident to us than God, still, in the mode of knowledge in which things are seen in the Word, the Word itself is more evident than the things seen in the Word. Hence, the conclusion does not follow.

3. Power can be considered in two ways, either according to its substance, and thus the soul of Christ sees the whole divine power, as it sees the whole essence, or according to the things to which the power extends, and it is from these that the quantity of power is calculated. In this way, the soul of Christ does not see the whole power, because this would be completely to grasp the power, as has been said.

4. It is impossible that God has made everything which He can make, for thus God would have made so many things that He could not make any more, and thus His power would be limited to the creatures actually in existence. Similarly, it is impossible to hold that what ever God can disclose has been disclosed to any creature.

5. To hold that the soul of Christ knows everything which God can make implies a defect in God Himself. For God would be grasped completely by the soul of Christ, and this would derogate from His infinity.

6. We have to answer this difficulty in the way in which we answered the difficulties about predestination. For, although it is possible for one who is predestined to be damned, still, as soon as we say he is damned, we say that he was not predestined, since these two, to be predestined and to be damned, cannot stand together. Similarly, I say that when the soul of Christ knows everything which God foresees that He will do, as soon as it is true that God does something else, it is true that God foresaw that He would do it, and the soul of Christ knew it. Thus, it is not necessary to say that there is ignorance of anything in the soul of Christ, or that He learned anything anew.

ARTICLE VI: DOES THE SOUL OF CHRIST KNOW EVERYTHING WITH THAT KNOWLEDGE BY WHICH IT KNOWS THINGS IN THEIR PROPER NATURE?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 13, sol. 1; Comp. Theol., 216; S. T., III, 11, 1; 12, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does, for

1. The capacity of the soul is not limited to a certain number of objects of knowledge. Accordingly, if the capacity of Christ's soul is adequately filled with the knowledge of things in their proper genus, we must say that it knows all things according to this knowledge.
2. Everything which is in potency is imperfect before it is reduced to act. But the possible intellect, which was not missing from the soul of Christ, is "that by which one becomes all things," as is said in *The Soul*. Therefore, since Christ's understanding was not imperfect, it seems that it had knowledge of all intelligible things.
3. Not to be able to advance in scientific knowledge pertains to the perfection of knowledge only when all things are known scientifically. But, according to the common opinion, the soul of Christ could not advance in the habit of science. Therefore, it knows all things according to the knowledge with which it knows things in their proper genus.

To the Contrary:

The soul of Christ knew created things by a created habit of science. But a created habit of science cannot be the likeness of all things. Therefore, the soul of Christ could not know all things according to that mode of science.

REPLY:

We ascribe that scientific knowledge of things in their proper genus to the soul of Christ so that no natural perfection may be lacking to it, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore, through this knowledge He knew as much as the natural knowledge of the soul can reach, not only in this life, but after death. This is so because in His soul Christ was at once a wayfarer and one who possessed the term.

But there are some things which natural knowledge can in no way reach. Such are the divine essence, future contingents, the secret thoughts of men's hearts, and other things of this sort. And the soul of Christ did not have knowledge of these things through that mode of knowledge, but knew them in the Word. It did not know them by the knowledge of prophecy, since prophecy is an imperfect participation of that sight by which things are seen in the Word. And, since this knowledge was perfect in Christ, the imperfection of prophecy had no place there.

It is also clear that Christ had this knowledge more fully than Adam, since through this knowledge Adam did not know created separated substances, and the soul of Christ did. For the natural knowledge of the separated soul extends to this, although the knowledge of the soul joined to a corruptible body does not.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The capacity of the human soul extends to a determined class of knowable things, but not to a definite number in that class.
2. The possible intellect is in potency to receive all intelligible things which can become such through the agent intellect of this. The Philosopher says that the agent intellect is that "by which one makes all things [."But these are the things which are abstracted from phantasms and which we can come to know through naturally known principles. Therefore, the possible intellect is in natural potency only to these things. But Christ knew all these through this knowledge. Hence, there was no imperfection in His understanding.
3. For that matter, even in this knowledge Christ could not advance insofar as the habit is concerned, since such knowledge by the nature of its genus cannot extend to more things than

Christ knew through it. But in the Gospel it is said that He "advanced in wisdom" will reference to experience of those things which He knew in the habit.

QUESTION 21: Good

ARTICLE I: DOES GOOD ADD ANYTHING TO BEING?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 1, i c; I Sentences 8, 1, 3; 19, 5, 1 ad 2 & 3; De potentia 9, 7 ad 6; Sum.Theol., I, 5, 18.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does, for

1. Everything is a being essentially. But a creature is good not essentially but by participation. Good, therefore, really adds something to being.
2. Since good includes being in its very notion, and yet good is rationally distinct from being, the formal character of good must add something to that of being. But it cannot be said to add a negation to being, as does the one, which adds undividedness, because the whole character of good consists in something positive. Hence it adds some thing to being positively, and thus it seems to add to being in reality.
3. The answer was given that it adds a relation to an end.—On the contrary, in this case good would be nothing but related being. But related being pertains to a definite category of being, which is called "relation" or "to something." Good would therefore be in a definite category. But this is contrary to what the Philosopher says, placing good in all the categories.
4. As can be gathered from the words of Dionysius, good tends to pour out itself and existence. A thing is good, therefore, by the fact that it is diffusive. But to pour out or diffuse implies an action, and an action proceeds from the essence through the mediation of a power. A thing is therefore said to be good by reason of a power added to the essence, and so good really adds something to being.
5. The farther we get from the first being, which is one and simple, the more we find difference in things. But in God being and good are really one, being distinguished only conceptually. In creatures, therefore, they are distinguished more than conceptually; and so, since there is no distinction beyond the conceptual except the real, they are distinguished really.
6. Accidentals really add something to the essence. But goodness is accidental to the creature; otherwise it could not be lost. Good there fore really adds something to being.
7. Whatever is predicated as informing something else really adds something to it, since nothing is informed by itself. Good, however, is predicated as informing, as is said in The Causes. It therefore adds something to being.
8. Nothing is determined by itself. But good determines being. It therefore adds something to being.
9. The answer was given that good determines being in concept. On the contrary, corresponding to that concept there is either some thing in reality or nothing. If nothing, it follows that the concept is void and useless; but if there is something corresponding in reality, the point is established: good really adds something to being.

10. A relation is specified according to the term in respect to which it is predicated. But good implies a relation to a definite sort of being, an end. Good therefore implies a specified relation. Every specified being, however, really adds something to being in general. Hence good really adds something to being.

Good and being are interchangeable, like man and "capable of laughter." But though "capable of laughter" is interchangeable with man, it nevertheless really adds something to man, namely, a property. But a property is classed as an accident. Similarly, therefore, good really adds something to being.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "Inasmuch as God is good, we are; but inasmuch as we are, we are good." It therefore seems that good does not add anything to being.

2'. Whenever things are so related that one adds something to the other either really or conceptually, one can be understood without the other. But being cannot be understood without good. Hence good does not add anything to being either really or conceptually. Proof of the minor: God can make more than man can understand. But God cannot make a being that is not good, because by the very fact of its being from good it is good, as Boethius makes clear. Therefore neither can the intellect understand it.

REPLY:

Something can be added to something else in three ways. (1) It adds some reality which is outside the essence of the thing to which it is said to be added. For instance, white adds something to body, since the essence of whiteness is something beyond that of body. (2) One thing is added to the other as limiting and determining it. Man, for instance, adds something to animal—not indeed in such a way that there is in man some reality which is completely outside the essence of animal; otherwise it would be necessary to say that it is not the whole of man which is animal but only a part. Animal is limited by man because what is contained in the notion of man determinately and actually, is only implicitly and, as it were, potentially contained in the notion of animal. It belongs to the notion of man that he have a rational soul; to the notion of animal, that it have a soul, without its being determined to rational or non rational. And yet that determination by reason of which man is said to add something to animal is founded in reality. Something is said to add to something else in concept only. This occurs when something which is nothing in reality but only in thought, belongs to the notion of one thing and not to the notion of the other, whether that to which it is said to be added is limited by it or not. Thus blind adds something to man, i.e., blindness, which is not a being in nature but merely a being in the thought of one who knows privations. By it man is limited, for not every man is blind. But when we say "a blind mole," no limitation is placed by what is added.

It is not possible, however, for something to add anything to being in general in the first way, though in that way there can be an addition to some particular sort of being; for there is no real being which is outside the essence of being in general, though some reality may be outside the essence of this being. But in the second way certain things are found to add to being, since being is narrowed down in the ten categories, each of which adds something to being not, of course, an accident or difference which is outside the essence of being, but a definite manner of being which is founded upon the very existence of the thing. It is not in this way, however, that good adds something to being, since good itself, like being, is divided into the ten categories, as is made clear in the Ethics.

Good must, accordingly, either add nothing to being or add something merely in concept. For if it added something real, being would have to be narrowed down by the character of good to a special genus. But since being is what is first conceived by the intellect, as Avicenna says, every other noun must either be a synonym of being or add something at least conceptually.

The former cannot be said of good, since it is not nonsense to say a being good. Thus good, by the fact of its not limiting being, must add to it something merely conceptual.

What is merely conceptual, however, can be of only two kinds: negation and a certain kind of relation. Every absolute positing signifies something existing in reality. Thus to being, the first intellectual conception, one adds what is merely conceptual—a negation; for it means undivided being. But true and good, being predicated positively, cannot add anything except a relation which is merely conceptual. A relation is merely conceptual, according to the Philosopher, when by it something is said to be related which is not dependent upon that to which it is referred, but vice versa; for a relation is a sort of dependence. An example is had in intellectual knowledge and its object, as also in sense and the sensible object. Knowledge depends upon its object, but not the other way about. The relation by which knowledge is referred to its object is accordingly real, but the relation by which the object is referred to the knowledge is only conceptual. According to the Philosopher the object of knowledge is said to be related, not because it is itself referred, but because something else is referred to it. The same holds true of all other things which stand to one another as measure and thing measured or as perfective and perfectible.

The true and the good must therefore add to the concept of being, a relationship of that which perfects. But in any being there are two aspects to be considered, the formal character of its species and the act of being by which it subsists in that species. And so a being can be perfective in two ways. (1) It can be so just according to its specific character. In this way the intellect is perfected by a being, for it perceives the formal character of the being. But the being is still not in it according to its natural existence. It is this mode of perfecting which the true adds to being. For the true is in the mind, as the Philosopher says; and every being is called true inasmuch as it is confirmed or confirmable to intellect. For this reason all who correctly define true put intellect in its definition. (2) A being is perfective of another not only according to its specific character but also according to the existence which it has in reality. In this fashion the good is perfective; for the good is in things, as the Philosopher says. Inasmuch as one being by reason of its act of existing is such as to perfect and complete another, it stands to that other as an end. And hence it is that all who rightly define good put in its notion something about its status as an end. The Philosopher accordingly says that they excellently defined good who said that it is "that which all things desire."

First of all and principally, therefore, a being capable of perfecting another after the manner of an end is called good; but secondarily something is called good which leads to an end (as the useful is said to be good), or which naturally follows upon an end (as not only that which has health is called healthy, but also anything which causes, preserves, or signifies health).

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Since being is predicated absolutely and good adds to it the status of a final cause, the essence of a thing considered absolutely suffices for the thing to be called a being on its account, but not thereby to be called good. Just as in the case of the other kinds of causes the status of a secondary cause depends upon that of the primary cause, but that of the primary cause depends upon no other; so also in the case of final causes secondary ends share in the status of final cause from their relation to the last end, but the last end has this status of itself.

And so it is that the essence of God, who is the last end of creatures, suffices for God to be called good by reason of it; but when the essence of a creature is given, the thing is not yet called good except from the relation to God by reason of which it has the character of a final cause. In this sense it is said that a creature is not good essentially but by participation. For from one point of view this is so inasmuch as the essence itself, in our understanding of it, is considered as some thing other than that relation to God by which it is constituted a final

cause and is directed to God as its end. But from another point of view a creature can be called essentially good inasmuch as the essence of a creature does not exist without a relation to God's goodness. This is Boethius meaning.

2. It is not only negation that expresses what is merely conceptual but also a certain type of relation, as has been said.

3. Every real relation is in a definite category, but non-real relations can run through all being.

4. Though, according to the proper use of the word, to pour out seems to imply the operation of an efficient cause, yet taken broadly it can imply the status of any cause, as do to influence, to make, etc. When good is said to be of its very notion diffusive, however, diffusion is not to be understood as implying the operation of an efficient cause but rather the status of a final cause. Nor is such diffusion brought about through the mediation of any added power. Good expresses the diffusion of a final cause and not that of an agent, both because the latter, as efficient, is not the measure and perfection of the thing caused but rather its beginning, and also because the effect participates in the efficient cause only in an assimilation of its form, whereas a thing is dependent upon its end in its whole existence. It is in this that the character of good was held to consist.

5. Things can be really one in God in two ways. (1) Their unity may be merely from that in which they are, and not from their own formal characters. In this way knowledge and power are one; for knowledge is not really the same as power by reason of its being knowledge, but by reason of its being divine. Now things which are really one in God in this way are found to differ really in creatures. (2) The things which are said to be really one in God may be so by their very formal characters. In this way good and being are really one in God, because it is of the very notion of good that it does not differ in reality from being. Hence, wherever good and being are found, they are really identical.

6. Just as there is essential being and accidental being, so also there is essential good and accidental good; and a thing loses its goodness in just the same way as it loses its substantial or accidental act of being.

7. From the relationship mentioned above it comes about that good is said to inform or determine being conceptually.

8. The answer is clear from what has just been said.

9. To that concept something does correspond in reality (a real dependence of that which is a means to an end upon the end itself), as there also does in other conceptual relations.

10. Although good expresses a special status, that of an end, nevertheless that status belongs to any being whatsoever and does not put anything real into being. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

11. "Capable of laughter," though interchanged with man, still adds to man a distinct reality which is over and above man's essence. But nothing can be added to being in this way, as has been said.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. We grant this, because good as such does not really add anything to being.

2'. This argues that nothing is added even conceptually. To this it must be said that a thing can be understood without another in two ways. (1) This occurs by way of enunciating, when one thing is understood to be without the other. Whatever the intellect can understand without another in this sense, God can make without the other. But being cannot be so understood without good, i.e., so that the intellect understands that something is a being and is

not good. (2) Some thing can be understood without another by way of defining, so that the intellect understands one without at the same time understanding the other. Thus animal is understood without man or any of the other species. In this sense being can be understood without good. Yet it does not follow that God can make a being without good, because the very notion of making is to bring into existence.

ARTICLE II: ARE BEING AND GOOD INTERCHANGEABLE AS TO THEIR REAL SUBJECTS?

Parallel readings: I Sentences 8, 1, 3; in De hebdom., 2; [Contra Gentiles](#) III, 20; Sum. Theol., I, 5, 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are not, for

1. Opposites are capable of occurring in regard to the same thing.

But good and evil are opposites. Now evil is not capable of being in all things; for, as Avicenna says, beyond the sphere of the moon there is no evil. It seems, then, that neither is good found in all beings. And so good is not interchangeable with being.

2. Predicates such that one extends to more things than another are not interchangeable with one another. But, as Maximus the commentator says, good extends to more things than being; for it extends to non-beings, which are called into being by good. Therefore good and being are not interchangeable.

3. Good is a perfection of which the apprehension is enjoyable, as Algazel says. But not every being has perfection, for prime matter has none. Not every being, therefore, is good.

4. In mathematics being is found but not good, as appears from what the Philosopher says. Being and good are therefore not interchangeable.

g. In [The Causes](#) it is said that the first of created things is the act of being. But according to the Philosopher "the prior is that from which there is a sequence which cannot be reversed." The sequence from being to good therefore cannot be reversed; and so good and being are not interchangeable.

6. What is divided is not interchangeable with any one of the things into which it is divided, as animal is not interchangeable with rational. But being is divided into good and evil, since many beings are called evil. Therefore good and being are not interchangeable.

7. Even a privation, according to the Philosopher, is called a being in a certain sense. But it cannot in any sense be called good; otherwise evil, consisting essentially in a privation, would be good. Good and being are therefore not interchangeable.

8. According to Boethius all things are said to be good by reason of the fact that they are from the good, namely God. But God's goodness is His very wisdom and justice. By the same reasoning, then, all things which are from God would be wise and just. But this is false. So too, then, is the first, viz., that all things are good.

To the Contrary:

1'. Nothing tends except to what is like itself. But, as Boethius says, "every being tends to good." Then every being is good, and nothing can be good unless it in some way is. Consequently good and being are interchangeable.

2'. Only what is good can be from the good. But every being proceeds from the divine goodness. Therefore every being is good; and so the conclusion must be the same as above.

REPLY:

Since the essence of good consists in this, that something perfects another as an end, whatever is found to have the character of an end also has that of good. Now two things are essential to an end: it must be sought or desired by things which have not yet attained the end, and it must be loved by the things which share the end, and be, as it were, enjoyable to them. For it is essentially the same to tend to an end and in some sense to repose in that end. Thus by the same natural tendency a stone moves towards the center [of the world] and comes to rest there.

These two properties are found to belong to the act of being. For whatever does not yet participate in the act of being tends toward it by a certain natural appetite. In this way matter tends to form, according to the Philosopher. But everything which already has being naturally loves its being and will all its strength preserves it. Boethius accordingly says: "Divine providence has given to the things created by it this greatest of reasons for remaining, namely, that they naturally desire to remain to the best of their ability. Therefore you can not in the least doubt that all beings naturally seek permanence in perduring and avoid destruction."

Existence itself, therefore, has the essential note of goodness. Just as it is impossible, then, for anything to be a being which does not have existence, so too it is necessary that every being be good by the very fact of its having existence, even though in many beings many other aspects of goodness are added over and above the act of existing by which they subsist.

Since, moreover, good includes the note of being, as is clear from what has been said, it is impossible for anything to be good which is not a being. Thus we are left with the conclusion that good and being are interchangeable.

Answers to Difficulties:

Good and evil are opposed as privation and possession or habit. But privation does not have to be in every being in which habit is found; and so evil does not have to be in everything in which there is good. Furthermore, in the case of contraries as long as one is really in a certain thing, the other is not capable of being in the same thing as the Philosopher says. Good, however, is really in every being whatever, since it is called good from its own real act of existing.

2. Good extends to non-beings not attributively but causally, inasmuch as non-beings tend to good. And so we can call non-beings things which in potency and not in act. But the act of being does not have causality except perhaps after the manner of an exemplary cause. This sort of causality, however, extends only to the things which actually participate in being.

3. Just as prime matter is a being in potency and not in act, so it is perfect in potency and not in act and good potentially and not actually.

4. The things which a mathematician studies are good according to the existence which they have in reality. The very existence of a line or of a number, for instance, is good. But the mathematician does not study them according to their existence but only according to their specific formal character. For he studies them abstractly, though they are not abstract in their existence but only in their notion. It was said above that good is not consequent upon the specific character except according to the existence which it has in some real thing. And so the note of goodness does not belong to a line or number as they fall within the purview of the mathematician, even though a line and a number are good.

5. Being is not called prior to good in the sense of prior employed in the objection, but in another sense, as the absolute is prior to the relative.

6. A thing can be called good both from its act of existing and from some added property or state. Thus a man is said to be good both as existing and as being just and chaste or destined for beatitude. By reason of the first goodness being is interchanged with good, and conversely. But by reason of the second, good is a division of being.

7. Privation is not called a reality but only a conceptual being. In this sense it is a good for reason, for to know a privation or anything of the sort is good. Even knowledge of evil, as Boethius points out, cannot be lacking in good.

8. According to Boethius a thing is called good from its very existence, but is called just by reason of some action of its own. Existence, however, is communicated to everything that comes forth from God. But not all things share in that activity to which justice is referred. For although in God to act and to be are the same thing, and thus His justice is His goodness, nevertheless in creatures to act and to be are distinct. Hence existence can be communicated to something to which activity is not; and even in those beings to which both are communicated, to act is not the same as to be. Hence also men who are good and just are indeed good because they exist, but not just because they exist, but rather because they have a certain habit directed to action. And the same can be said of wisdom and other things of the sort.

Or a different answer can be taken from the same Boethius: The just and the will and other things of this kind are special goods since they are special perfections; but good designates something perfect in an unqualified sense. From the perfect God, therefore, things come forth perfect, but not with the same degree of perfection with which God is perfect, because what is made does not exist in the manner of the agent but in that of the product. Nor do all things which receive perfection from God receive it in the same measure. And so, just as

It is common to God and all creatures to be perfect in an absolute sense, but not to be perfect in this or that particular way, so also does it belong to God and to all creatures to be good; but the particular goodness which is wisdom or that which is justice does not have to be common to all. Some goods belong to God alone, as eternity and omnipotence; but some others, to certain creatures as well as to God, as wisdom and justice and the like.

ARTICLE III: IS GOOD IN ITS ESSENTIAL CHARACTER PRIOR TO THE TRUE?

Parallel readings: in Hebr., c. 11, lectura 1; Sum. Theol., I, 16, 4.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. What is in things is prior to what is only in apprehension, because our apprehension is caused and measured by things. But according to the Philosopher good is in things, the true in the mind. Good is therefore in its essential character prior to the true.

2. What is perfect in itself is prior in character to that which perfects another. Now a thing is called good inasmuch as it is perfect in itself, but true inasmuch as it can perfect another. Hence good is prior to the true.

3. Good is predicated with reference to the final cause, the true with reference to the formal cause. But the final cause is prior to the formal because the end is the cause of causes. Good is therefore prior in essential character to the true.

4. A particular good is posterior to the universal good. But the true is a particular good, for it is the good of the intellect, as the Philosopher says. Therefore good is naturally prior in character to the true.

5. Good has the character of an end. But the end is first in intention. Therefore the intention of good is prior to that of the true.

To the Contrary:

1'. Good perfects the will; the true, the intellect. The intellect, however, naturally precedes the will. Then the true likewise precedes good.

2'. The more immaterial any-thing is, the more it is prior. But the true is more immaterial than good, for good is found even in material beings, whereas the true is found only in an immaterial mind. The true is therefore by nature prior to good.

REPLY:

Both the true and good have the essential character of that which perfects or of perfections, as has been said. The order among perfections, however, can be considered in two ways: (x) from the view point of the perfections themselves, and (2) from that of the beings perfected.

If the true and good are considered in themselves, then the true is prior in meaning to good since the true perfects something specifically, whereas good perfects not only specifically but also according to the existence which the thing has in reality. Thus the character of good includes more notes than that of the true and is constituted by a sort of addition to the character of the true. Thus good presupposes the true, but the true in turn presupposes the one, since the notion of the true is fulfilled by an apprehension on the part of the intellect, and a thing is intelligible in so far as it is one; for whoever does not understand a unit understands nothing, as the Philosopher says. The order of these transcendent names, accordingly, if they are considered in themselves, is as follows: after being comes the one; after the one comes the true; and then after the true comes good.

If, however, the order between the true and good is viewed from the standpoint of the beings perfected, then the converse holds: good is naturally prior to the true, and that for two reasons.

(1) The perfection of good has greater extension than that of the true. By the true only those things can be perfected which can receive a being into themselves or have it within themselves according to its formal character but not according to the existence which that being has in itself. of this sort are only those things which can receive something immaterially and have the power of cognition. For the species of a stone is in the soul but not according to the act of existing which it has in the stone. But even things which receive something according to the material act of being are capable of being perfected by good, since the essence of good consists in being perfective both specifically and existentially, as has been said. All things, accordingly, seek good, but not all know the true. In both the tendency to good and the knowledge of truth, however, there is verified the relation of the perfectible to a perfection, which is good or the true.

(2) The things capable of being perfected by both the true and good, moreover, are perfected by good before they are by the true. For by the mere fact that they share in the act of being they are perfected by good, as has been said; but by the fact that they know something they are perfected by the true. Knowledge, however, is subsequent to existence. Hence in this consideration from the view point of the beings which are perfectible good precedes the true.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The argument is taken from the order of the true and good from the viewpoint of the perfectible beings, not from that of the true and good in themselves. For only the mind is perfectible by the true, but every real being is perfectible by good.

2. Like the true, good has not only the character of the perfect but also that of the perfective, as was said above. Hence the argument does not hold.

. The end comes before any of the other causes in the line of causation. And so the argument is based upon the relation of the perfectible to its perfection. In this relationship good is prior. But if the form and the end are considered absolutely, then, since the form itself is the end, the form considered in itself is prior to its aspect as the end of something else. But the essential character of the true arises from the species itself in so far as it is understood as it is.

4. The true is said to be a good inasmuch as it has existence in some special being capable of being perfected. Thus this objection too is concerned with the relation of the perfectible to its perfection.

5. The end is said to be prior in intention to the means, but not to the other causes except in so far as they are means to the end. Thus the solution is the same as that given to the third difficulty. It should nevertheless be noted that when the end is called prior in intention, intention is taken as the act of the mind which is to intend. But when we compare the intention of good with that of the true, intention is taken as the essential character which is signified by a definition. Hence the term is used equivocally in the two contexts.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. A thing is capable of being perfected by good not only through the mediation of the will but also in so far as it has the act of existing. Hence, although the intellect comes before the will, it does not follow that anything is perfected by the true before being perfected by good.

2'. That argument is based upon the true and good considered in themselves. It is therefore to be granted.

ARTICLE IV: IS EVERYTHING GOOD BY THE FIRST GOODNESS?

Parallel readings: I Sentences 19, 5, 2 ad 3; [Contra Gentiles](#) I, 40; [Sum. Theol.](#), I, 6, 4.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

2. According to Boethius, if by an impossible supposition we were to understand that God existed without His goodness, it would follow that all other things would be beings but not good; but if we understand goodness to be in God, then it follows that all things are good as well as beings. Everything, therefore, is called good by reason of the first goodness.

2. The answer was given that the reason why it happens that when we do not understand goodness in God there is no goodness in His creatures, is that the goodness of the creature is caused by the goodness of God, and not that the thing is formally denominated good by the goodness of God.—On the contrary, whenever anything is denominated in a given way merely from its relation to something else, it is not so denominated from something inhering in it formally but from something outside it to which it is referred. Thus urine is called healthy because it is a sign of the health of an animal. It is not so denominated from any health inherent in it but from the animal's health which it signifies. But a creature is called good in

reference to the first goodness because everything is called good from the fact of its flowing from the first good, as Boethius says. Hence the creature is not denominated good from any formal goodness found in it but from the divine goodness.

3. Augustine says: "This is good and that is good. Remove this and that and, if possible, see the good itself. Thus you will see God, not as good by some other good, but as the good of every good." But by reason of that good which is the good of every good all things are called good. Therefore, by reason of the divine goodness of which Augustine speaks, everything is said to be good.

4. Since every creature is good, it is good either by some inherent goodness or only by the first goodness. If it is good by some goodness inherent to it, then, since that goodness is also a creature, it too will be good either by being goodness itself or by some other goodness. But if it is good by being goodness itself, then it will be the first good ness; for it is of the essence of the first good that it be good of itself, as appears from the passage of St. Augustine just cited. And thus the point is established—a creature is good by the first goodness. If, however, that goodness is good by some other goodness, the same problem remains in regard to the latter. We must, therefore, proceed to infinity which is impossible— or arrive at some goodness giving its name to created goodness, which is good of itself; and this will be the first goodness. Hence, from every point of view creatures must be good by the first goodness.

5. Everything true is true by the first truth according to Anselm. But the first goodness stands to good things in the same way as the first truth to true things. Everything is therefore good by the first goodness.

6. What is incapable of the lesser is incapable of the greater. But to be is something less than to be good. A creature, however, has no power over the act of being, since all being is from God. Neither, then, has it power over being good. The goodness by which any thing is called good is therefore not created goodness.

7. To be, according to Hilary, is "proper to God." But whatever is proper belongs to only one. There is therefore no other act of being besides God Himself. But all things are good in so far as they have the act of being. All things, therefore, are good by the very divine act of being which constitutes God's goodness.

8. The first goodness has nothing added to goodness; otherwise it would be composite. But it is true that everything is good by good ness. It is consequently also true that everything is good by the first goodness.

9. The answer was given that to goodness taken absolutely some thing may be added conceptually though not really. On the contrary, a notion to which there corresponds nothing in reality is empty and useless. But the notion by which we understand the first good ness is not useless. If, therefore, anything is added in our notion, it will also be added in reality. But this is impossible. Neither, then, will any thing be added conceptually. Everything, as a consequence, will be called good by the first goodness just as by goodness taken absolutely.

To the Contrary:

1'. Everything is good in so far as it is a being, because, according to Augustine, "inasmuch as we are, we are good." But not everything is called a being formally by reason of the first essence but by reason of a created essence. Consequently neither is everything formally good by the first goodness but by a created goodness.

2'. The changeable is not informed by the unchangeable, since they are opposites. But every creature is changeable, whereas the first good ness is unchangeable. A creature is therefore not called good formally by the first goodness.

3'. Every form is proportioned to the thing which it perfects. But the first goodness, being infinite, is not proportioned to a creature, which is finite. A creature is therefore not said to be good formally by reason of the first goodness.

4'. All created things "are good by participation in the good," as Augustine says. But participation in the good is not the first goodness itself, for this is total and perfect goodness. Not everything, therefore, is good formally by the first goodness.

5'. A creature is said to have a vestige of the Trinity inasmuch as it is one, true, and good. Thus good belongs to the vestige. But the vestige and its parts are something created. Therefore a creature is good by a created goodness.

6'. The first goodness is perfectly simple. It is therefore neither composite in itself nor compoundable with anything else. Thus it can not be the form of anything, since a form enters into composition with that which it informs. But the goodness by which certain things are said to be good is a form, since every act of being comes from a form. Creatures are therefore not good formally by the first goodness.

REPLY:

There have been various positions concerning this question. Some, induced by trivial reasons, were so foolish as to state that God is a substantial part of all things. Some of these, e.g., David of Dinant, taught that He is the same as prime matter. Some others said that He is the form of all things. Now the falsity of this erroneous opinion is immediately made apparent. For when they speak of God, all men understand that He is the effective principle of all things, since all being must flow from a single first being. The efficient cause, however, according to the teaching of the Philosopher, does not coincide with the material cause, since they have contrary characters. For a thing is an agent inasmuch as it is in act; but the characteristic of matter is to be in potency. The efficient cause and the form of the effect are the same in species inasmuch as every agent effects something similar to itself; but they are not numerically the same, because the maker and the thing made cannot be identical. It is apparent from this that the divine essence is neither the matter of any creature nor is it its form in such a way that by it the creature can be said to be good formally as by an intrinsic form. But every form is a certain likeness of God.

The Platonists therefore said that all things are formally good by the first goodness, not as by a conjoint form, but as by a separated form. For an understanding of this point it should be noted that Plato held that all things that can be separated in thought are separated in reality. Thus, just as man can be understood apart from Socrates and Plato, he taught that man exists apart from Socrates and Plato. Thus he called "man-in-himself" or "the idea of man," and said that by participation in this man Socrates and Plato are called men. More over, just as he found man common to Socrates and Plato and all others like them, in the same way he found good to be common to all good things and to be capable of being understood independently of any understanding of this or that good. Hence he asserted that good is separate from all particular goods, and he called it "good-in-itself" or "the idea of good." By participation in it, he said, all things are called good. This is set forth by the Philosopher.

There is this difference between the idea of good and that of man as Plato explained them: the idea of man does not extend to every thing, whereas that of good does, even to the other ideas. For even the very idea of good is a particular good. And so it was necessary to say that the very good-in-itself is the universal principle of all things; and this principle is God. It therefore followed, according to this position, that all things are denominated good by the first goodness, which is God, just as, according to Plato, Socrates and Plato are called men by participation in separated man, not by any humanity inherent in them.

This Platonic position was in a sense followed by the Porretans. They said that we predicate good of a creature either simply, as when we say, "Mari is good," or with some qualification, as when we say, "Socrates is a good man." A creature is called good simply, they said, not by any inherent goodness but by the first goodness—as if good taken absolutely and in general were the divine goodness; but when a creature is called a good something-or-other, it is so denominated from a created goodness, because particular created goodnesses are like particular ideas for Plato. But this opinion is refuted by the Philosopher in a number of ways. He argues that the quiddities and forms of things are in particular things themselves and not separated from them, and he shows this in various ways. He also argues more specifically that, granting that there are ideas, that position does not apply to good, since good is not predicated univocally of goods; and where the predication was not univocal, Plato did not assign a single idea. This is how the Philosopher proceeds against him in the Ethics. In particular for the point at issue the falsity of the above-mentioned position appears from the fact that every agent is found to effect something like itself. If, therefore, the first goodness is the effective cause of all goods, it must imprint its likeness upon the things produced; and so each thing will be called good by reason of an inherent form because of the likeness of the highest good implanted in it, and also because of the first goodness taken as the exemplar and effective cause of all created goodness. In this respect the opinion of Plato can be held. We say, therefore, following the common opinion, that all things are good by a created goodness formally as by an inherent form, but by the uncreated goodness as by an exemplary form.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. As has been touched upon above, the reason why creatures would not be good unless goodness were understood in God is this: the goodness of the creature is modeled upon the divine goodness. Hence it does not follow that the creature is called good by the uncreated goodness except as by an exemplary form.
2. A thing is denominated with reference to something else in two ways. (1) This occurs when the very reference itself is the meaning of the denomination. Thus urine is called healthy with respect to the health of an animal. For the meaning of healthy as predicated of urine is "serving as a sign of the health of an animal." In such cases what is thus relatively denominated does not get its name from a form inherent in it but from something extrinsic to which it is referred. (2) A thing is denominated by reference to something else when the reference is not the meaning of the denomination but its cause. For instance, air is said to be bright from the sun, not because the very fact that the air is referred to the sun is the brightness of the air, but because the placing of the air directly before the sun is the cause of its being bright. It is in this way that the creature is called good with reference to God. Consequently the argument is not valid.
3. In many points Augustine follows the opinion of Plato, but just as far as the truth of the faith allows. His words are, consequently, to be interpreted in this way: the divine goodness is called the good of every good in the sense that it is the first efficient and exemplary cause of every good, without excluding a created goodness by which creatures are denominated good as from an inherent form.
4. The case of general forms is different from that of special forms. Where there is question of special forms, as is clear from Dionysius, the concrete cannot be predicated of the abstract so that we should say: whiteness is white, or heat is hot. But when there is question of general forms, such predication is permitted. We say that an essence is a being, goodness is good, oneness is one, and so forth.

The reason for this is that what is first apprehended by the intellect is being. Hence the intellect must attribute this (being) to whatever is apprehended by it. And so when it apprehends the essence of any being, it says that that essence is a being. The same is true of any general or special form; e.g., goodness is a being, whiteness is a being, and so on. And because certain things are inseparably connected with the notion of being, as the one, good, etc., these also must, for the same reason as being, be predicated of anything apprehended. Thus we say that an essence is one and good, and likewise that oneness is one and good; and the same is true of goodness and whiteness and any other general or special form.

The white, however, being special, does not inseparably accompany the notion of being. The form of whiteness can therefore be apprehended without having white attributed to it. Hence we are not forced to say that whiteness is white. White is predicated in a single sense; but being and the one and good and other such attributes which must necessarily be said of everything apprehended, are predicated in many senses. One thing is called a being because it subsists in itself; another, because it is a principle of subsisting, as a form; another, because it is a disposition of a subsisting being, as a quality; another, because it is the privation of a disposition of a subsisting being, as blindness. When, therefore, we say, "An essence is a being," if we go on thus: "Therefore it is a being by something, either by itself or by another," the inference is wrong, because being was not predicated in the sense in which something subsisting will its own existence is a being, but in the sense of that by which something is. Hence what we should ask is not how an essence is by something else, but how something else is by that essence.

In the same way, when goodness is said to be good, it is not called good in the sense that it is subsisting in goodness, but in the sense in which we say good that by which something is good. There is, accordingly, no point in inquiring whether goodness is good by its own goodness or by some other, but rather whether by that goodness any thing is good which is distinct from that goodness (as occurs in creatures) or which is identical with that goodness (as is true of God).

5. A similar distinction must be made in regard to truth, namely, that all things are true by the first truth as their first exemplar, even though they are still true by a created truth as their inherent form. There is, nevertheless, a difference between truth and goodness. The essence of truth consists in a certain equation or commensuration. But a thing is designated as measured or commensurate from something extrinsic, as cloth from a forearm or cubit. This is what Anselm meant in saying that all things are true by the first truth; i.e., they are true inasmuch as each is made commensurate to the divine intellect by fulfilling the destiny set for it by divine providence or the foreknowledge had of it. The essence of goodness, however, does not consist in commensuration. Hence there is no parallel here.

6. A creature does not have power over the act of being in the sense that it has being of itself; and yet in some respects it does have power over it, since the creature may be a formal principle of existing. In this way any form has power over the act of being. It is in this way too that created goodness has power over the act of being good as its formal principle.

7. When to be is said to be proper to God, we are not to understand that there is no other act of being than the uncreated one, but only that that act of being is properly said to be inasmuch as, by reason of its immutability, it admits of no has been or will be. But the act of being of a creature is so called by a certain likeness to that first to be, although it has in it an admixture of will be or has been by reason of the mutability of the creature.

Or it can be said that to be is proper to God because only God is His act of being, although others have an act of being, which is, in deed, distinct from the divine act of being.

8. The first goodness does not add anything in reality to goodness taken absolutely, but it does add something conceptually.

9. Pure goodness in itself is made individual and set apart from all other things by the fact that it receives no addition, as the comment in The Causes explains. It does not, however, belong to the notion of goodness taken absolutely to receive an addition or not to receive it. For if it were in its notion to receive an addition, then every goodness would receive an addition, and there would be no pure goodness. Similarly, if it were in its notion not to receive an addition, then no goodness would receive it, and every goodness would be pure goodness. The case is parallel to that of animal, in whose notion is found neither rational nor irrational. The very fact of its being unable to receive an addition, therefore, restricts absolute goodness and distinguishes the first goodness, which is pure goodness, from other goodneses. But the fact of not receiving an addition, being a negation, is a conceptual being, yet founded upon the simplicity of the first goodness. It does not follow, therefore, that this notion is empty and useless.

ARTICLE V: IS A CREATED GOOD, GOOD BY ITS ESSENCE?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 21, I ad 1; In De hebdom., 3; Contra Gentiles, I, 38 & 70; III, 20; Sum. Theol., I, 6, Comp. Theol., I, 109.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. That without which a thing cannot be seems to be essential to it. But a creature cannot be without goodness, because nothing can be created by God which is not good. A creature is therefore good by its essence.

2. To be and to be good are had by the creature from the same source, because from the mere fact of having being it is good, as has previously been shown.¹ But a creature has being by its essence. By its essence, therefore, it is also good.

3. Whatever belongs to something under the qualification "as such" is essential to it. But good belongs to a creature as existing, because, as Augustine says, "inasmuch as we are, we are good." Hence a creature is good by its own essence.

4. Since goodness is a created form inhering in the creature, as has been shown, it will be either the substantial form or an accidental form. If accidental, the creature will be able sometimes to be without it. But this cannot be said of a creature. It remains, then, that it is the substantial form. But every such form is either the essence of the thing or a part of the essence. A creature is therefore good by its essence.

5. According to Boethius, creatures are good inasmuch as they have emanated from the first good. But they have emanated from the first good essentially. Therefore creatures are essentially good.

6. That which gives its name is always simpler than that which receives the name, or equally simple. But no form added to the essence is simpler than the essence or equally simple. Therefore no other form added to the essence gives its name to the essence; for we cannot say that the essence is white. But the very essence of a thing is named from goodness, for every essence is good. Goodness is therefore not a form added to the essence, and accordingly any creature is essentially good.

7. Just as the one is interchangeable with being, so too is good. But oneness, from which the one which is interchanged with being is designated, does not express a form added to the essence of a thing, as the Commentator says; but everything is one by its essence. So too, then, is everything good by its essence.

8. If a creature is good by a goodness added to its essence, since everything which is, is good, that goodness too, being something real, will be good. But it will not be good by some other goodness—for that would involve an infinite regress—but by its own essence. By the same reasoning, then, it can be asserted that the creature itself is good by its own essence.

To the Contrary:

1'. Nothing which is said of a thing by participation belongs to that thing by its essence. But a creature is called good by participation, as is clear from Augustine. A creature is therefore not good essentially.

2'. Everything that is good by its own essence is a substantial good. But creatures are not substantial goods, as is clear from Boethius. Creatures, therefore, are not good by their essence.

3'. Whatever has something predicated of it essentially, cannot have its opposite predicated of it. But evil, the opposite of good, is predicated of some creatures. A creature is therefore not good essentially.

REPLY:

With three authorities we must say that creatures are not good by their essence but by participation. These are Augustine, Boethius, and the author of The Causes, who says that only God is pure goodness. They were, however, brought to the same position by different considerations.

For the clarification of this point it should be noted that, as appears from what has been said, goodness is divided into substantial and accidental, just as is the act of being. There is, however, this difference: a thing is called a being in an absolute sense because of its substantial act of existing; but because of its accidental act of existing it is not said to be absolutely. Since generation is a motion toward existence, when someone receives substantial existence, he is said to be generated without qualification; but when he receives accidental existence, he is said to be generated in a certain sense. The same also holds for corruption, which is the loss of existence. But just the opposite is true of good. From the point of view of its substantial goodness a thing is said to be good in a certain sense, but from that of its accidental goodness it is said to be good without qualification. Thus we do not call an unjust man good simply, but only in a certain sense—inasmuch as he is a man. But a just man we call good without further restriction.

The reason for this difference is this. A thing is called a being inasmuch as it is considered absolutely, but good, as has already been made clear, in relation to other things. Now it is by its essential principles that a thing is fully constituted in itself so that it subsists; but it is not so perfectly constituted as to stand as it should in relation to everything outside itself except by means of accidents added to the essence because the operations by which one thing is in some sense joined to another proceed from the essence through powers distinct from it. Consequently nothing achieves goodness absolutely until it is complete in both its essential and its accidental principles.

Any perfection which a creature has from its essential and accidental principles combined, God has in its entirety by His one simple act of being. His essence is His wisdom, His justice, His power, and so forth—all of which in us are distinct from our essence. In God, accordingly,

absolute goodness is itself also the same as His essence; but in us it is taken with reference to things that are added to our essence. Consequently, complete or absolute goodness increases and diminishes and disappears entirely in us, but not in God. Our substantial goodness, however, always remains. It is in this sense, it seems, that Augustine says that God is good essentially, but we, by participation.

Still another difference is found between God's goodness and ours. Goodness is not taken as essential when a nature is considered absolutely but when it is taken in its act of existence. Humanity, for instance, does not have the note of good or goodness except by its having existence. The divine nature or essence, however, is itself its act of being, whereas the nature or essence of any created thing is not its act of being but participates in being from another. In God, accordingly, the act of being is pure, because God is His own subsistent act of being; but in the creature the act of being is received or participated. Even granted, therefore, that absolute goodness were attributed to a creature because of its substantial existence, nevertheless the fact would still remain that it has goodness by participation, just as it has a participated existence. But God is goodness essentially inasmuch as His essence is His existence. This seems to be the meaning of the philosopher in The Causes when he says that only the divine goodness is pure goodness.

A still further difference is discovered between the divine goodness and that of creatures. Goodness has the character of a final cause. But God has this, since He is the ultimate end of all beings just as He is their first principle. From this it follows that any other end has the status or character of an end only in relation to the first cause, because a secondary cause does not influence the effect unless the influence of the first cause is presupposed, as is made clear in The Causes. Hence too, good, having the character of an end, cannot be said of a creature unless we presuppose the relation of Creator to creature.

Granted, therefore, that a creature were its own act of being, as God is, the act of being of the creature would still not have the character of good except on the supposition of its relation to its Creator; and it would, by that fact, still be called good by participation and not absolutely in its essential constitution. But the divine act of being, which has the character of good even if nothing else is presupposed, has this character of itself. This is what Boethius seems to have meant.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. A creature cannot fail to be good with essential goodness, which is goodness in a qualified sense; yet it can fail to be good with accidental goodness, which is absolute and unqualified goodness. That goodness, moreover, which is referred to from the viewpoint of the substantial act of being is not the very essence of the thing but is a participated act of being. This is true even if the relation to the first act of being subsisting by itself is presupposed.

2. A thing has from the same source being and goodness in a qualified sense, i.e., in its substantial existence; but it does not formally have from the same source being without qualification and goodness without qualification, as is clear from what has been said. For this reason the conclusion does not follow.

3-4. The same answer applies.

5. A creature is from God not only in its essence but also in its act of existing, which constitutes the chief characteristic of substantial goodness; and also in its additional perfections, which constitute its absolute goodness. These are not the essence of the thing. And furthermore, even the relation by which the essence of the thing is referred to God as its source is distinct from the essence.

6. An essence is denominated good in the same way as it is denominated a being. It is good by participation, then, just as it has existence by participation. Existence and good taken in general are simpler than essence because more general, since these are said not only of essence but also of what subsists by reason of the essence and even, too, of accidents.

7. The predication of the one which is interchanged will being is based upon the note of negation which it adds to being. But good does not add to being a negation but essentially consists in something Positive. There is consequently no parallel.

8. The existence of a thing is called a being, not because it has some existence other than itself, but because by that existence the thing is said to be. In just the same way goodness is called good because by it a thing is said to be good. From the fact that the existence of a thing is not called a being because of an existence distinct from itself it does not follow that the substance of the thing is not said to be by an existence which is distinct from it. In just the same way that conclusion does not follow in regard to goodness. It does, however, apply to oneness (in regard to which the Commentator adduces the argument because it makes no difference to the one whether it be referred to essence or to existence. Hence the essence of a thing is one of itself, not because of its act of existing; and so it is not one by any participation, though it is a being and good in this way.

ARTICLE VI: DOES THE GOOD OF A CREATURE CONSIST IN MEASURE, SPECIES, AND ORDER AS AUGUSTINE SAYS?

Parallel readings: Sum. Theol., I, 5, 5; I-II, 85, 4.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

Good, according to the Philosopher, has the character of an end. But the whole character of an end consists in order. The whole character of good, therefore, consists in order; and the other two are superfluous.

2. Being, good, and one differ in meaning. But the notion of being consists in species; that of one, in measure. That of good, therefore, does not consist in species and measure.

3. Species designates a formal cause. But in this respect, according to some, good differs from the true, because the true expresses the notion of a formal cause whereas good expresses that of a final cause. Species therefore does not pertain to the notion of good.

4. Evil and good, being opposites, are applied to the same thing. But as Augustine says, "evil is discovered to consist entirely in the privation of species." The whole notion of good, therefore, consists in the positive presence of species; and so measure and order seem superfluous.

5. Measure pertains to the properties of a thing; but a certain goodness belongs to its essence. Measure is therefore not an essential note of good.

6. What God can do through one thing He does not do through several. But God could have made a creature good through one of those three notes, because each one has some aspect of goodness. All three are not, therefore, to be considered necessary for the formal character of good.

7. If those three notes are essential to goodness, then in every good the three must be found. But each of the three is itself good. In each of them, then, there are all three; and so they should not be distinguished from one another.

8. If those three notes are good, they must have measure, species, and order. There will therefore be a measure of the measure, a species of the species, and SO on to infinity.

9. Measure, species, and order are decreased by sin, according to Augustine. But the substantial goodness of a thing is not decreased by sin. The formal character of good therefore does not consist universally in those three notes.

10. Whatever is essential to good does not have evil predicated of it. But measure, species, and order can have evil predicated of them, according to Augustine; for he speaks of "a bad measure," "a bad species," etc. The character of good therefore does not consist in those three notes.

11. Ambrose says: "The nature of light does not consist in number, weight, and dimension like any other creature." But according to Augustine species, measure, and order are constituted by these three. Since, therefore, light is good, the character of good does not include species, measure, and order.

12. According to Bernard the measure of charity is not to have any measure; and yet charity is good. It does not, then, require the three notes mentioned

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "Where these three are great, the good is great; where they are small, it is small; where they are not at all, it is not at all. The essence of the good therefore consists in measure, species, and order.

2'. Augustine says again: "Things are called good inasmuch as they are measured, specified, and ordered."

3'. A creature is called good from its relation to God, as Boethius maintains. But God bears to the creature the relation of a threefold cause: efficient, final, and exemplary formal. The creature is therefore said to be good according to its relation to God under the aspect of a threefold c Accordingly, because it is referred to God as its efficient cause, it has the measure set for it by God. Referred to God as its exemplary cause, it has species. Referred to Him as its end, it has order. The good of the creature therefore consists in measure, species, and order.

4'. All creatures are oriented to God through the mediation of a rational creature, which alone is capable of beatitude. And this occurs inasmuch as God is known by the rational creature. Since, then, a creature is good from its orientation to God, three things are required for it to be good: that it be existing, that it be knowable, and that it be oriented. But it is existing by its measure, knowable by its species, and oriented by its order. In these three, therefore, the good of a creature consists.

5'. It is said in Wisdom (1 1:21): "But thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight." But according to Augustine measure sets the limit of each thing; number gives its species; and weight gives order. In these three, then, limit or measure, species, and order, consists the goodness of a creature, since a creature is good in virtue of the disposition given it by God.

REPLY:

The essence of good consists in the above-mentioned three notes, as Augustine says. For the elucidation of this point it should be noted that a name can imply a relation in two ways. (1) The name is used to signify the relation itself, as father or son or even fatherhood. (2) Some

names are said to imply a relation because they signify a thing of a given kind which is accompanied by a relation, although the name is not used to signify the relation itself. Thus the word knowledge is used to signify a certain quality which entails a relation, but not to signify the relation itself.

In this way the essence of good implies a relation, not because the name good itself signifies only a relation, but because it signifies some thing which has a relation along with the relation itself. The relation implied in the word good is the status of that which perfects. This follows from the fact that a thing is capable of perfecting not only according to its own specific character but also according to the act of being which it has in reality. In this way an end perfects the means to that end. But since creatures are not their own act of existing, they must have a received existence. Thus their existence is limited and determined according to the measure of the thing in which it is received.

Among the three notes which Augustine lays down, the last, order, is the relation which the name good implies; but the other two, species and measure, are causes of that relation. For species belongs to the very specific character which, having existence in a subject, is received in a determined measure, since everything which is in a subject is in it according to the measure of the subject. Thus every good, being perfective in accordance with both its specific character and its act of being, has measure, species, and order: species in its specific character, measure in its act of being, and order in its status as perfective.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That argument would hold if the name good were used to signify the relation itself; but this is false, as is apparent from what has been said. The reasoning is therefore not consequent.
2. Good does not differ from being and the one because the notions are opposed but because the notion of good includes those of being and the one and adds something to them.
3. According to the Philosopher, just as in regard to numbers the addition or subtraction of one changes the species of the number, so also in definitions the addition or subtraction of anything constitutes a different species. Thus from the species alone is constituted the essence of the true inasmuch as the true is perfective according to the specific character alone, as is clear from what has been said; but from the species plus the measure is constituted the essence of good, which is perfective not only in regard to species but also in regard to the act of being.
4. When Augustine says that evil is discovered to consist entirely in the privation of species, he does not exclude the other two because, as he himself says in the very same book, "where there is any species there is necessarily some measure." Order also follows upon species and measure. But he names species because the other two are consequent upon species.
5. Wherever something has been received, there measure must be found, since what is received is limited in proportion to the recipient. Since a creature's act of being, both accidental and essential, is received, measure is found not only in accidentals but also in substantials.
6. Since the essence of the good consists in species, measure, and order, even God could not bring it about that anything should be good without having species, measure, and order, just as it would be impossible for I-Ilm to make a man who was not a rational animal.
7. Measure, species, and order are each good, not in the sense in which something subsisting in goodness is called good, but in the sense in which the principle of goodness is said to be good. Hence it is not necessary that each of them have measure, species, and order, just as it is not necessary that a form have a form, although it is a being and every being is in virtue of a

form. This is the explanation of some who say that, when we speak of all things having measure, species, and order, this applies to things created, not to those which are Co-created

8. The answer is clear from what has just been said.

9. Some say that the measure, species, and order which constitute the good of a real being and those which are in the domain of moral good and are decreased by sin are really the same but differ in concept. One and the same will, for instance, can be considered from the point of view of being a certain reality and thus having in it a measure, species, and order which constitute it a good in the real order, and also from the point of view of being specifically a will with an ordination to grace, and thus having attributed to it a measure, species, and orderable to be decreased through sin, which constitute it a moral good.

Or a better answer would be that, in view of the fact that good is consequent upon existence and is constituted by species, measure, and order, just as substantial and accidental existence are distinct, so substantial and accidental form are obviously distinct; and each has its own measure and order.

10. Measure, species, and order, according to Augustine, are not called bad because they are bad in themselves but either because "they are less than they ought to be" or because "they are not adapted to the things to which they should be adapted." It is accordingly from some privation in point of measure, species, or order that they are called bad, not of themselves.

11. Ambrose's statement is not to be understood in the sense that light is entirely without measure, since it has a limited species and power, but in the sense that it is not determined as regards any particular corporeal beings because it extends to all things corporeal inasmuch as all of them are capable of being illuminated or of receiving the other effects of light, as Dionysius makes clear.

12. Charity has measure arising from the existence which it has in a subject. In this sense it is a creature. But as referred to an infinite object, God, it has no measure beyond which our charity should not

QUESTION 22: The Tendency to Good and the Will

ARTICLE I: DO ALL THINGS TEND TO GOOD?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 21, 2; [Contra Gentiles](#) III, 16; Sum. Theol., I., 1; 80, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that they do not, for

1. Being is related to the true and to good in the same way since it is interchanged with either one. Furthermore, tendency is related to good as cognition is to the true. But not every being knows the true. Neither, then, does every being tend to good.

2. When the prior is removed the posterior also is removed. But in an animal cognition precedes appetitive tendency. Cognition, however, in no sense extends to inanimate things so that we could say that they know naturally. Neither, then, does appetitive tendency extend to them so that we could say that they naturally tend to good.

3. According to Boethius a thing is said to tend to something else inasmuch as it is like it. if, then, something tends to good, it must be like good. But since things are alike which have the same quality or form, the form of good must be in whatever tends to good. Now it cannot be there according to the thing's real existence, because it would then no longer tend; for what someone has he does not seek. The form of good must therefore pre-exist intentionally in the being which tends to good. But anything which has something else in it in this manner is cognitive. Only in cognitive beings, therefore, can there be a tendency to good; and so the conclusion is the same as before.

4. If all things tend to good, this must be understood of a good which all can have, because nothing tends either naturally or rationally to what is impossible for it to have. But the only good extending to all beings is existence. It is therefore the same to say that all things tend to good as that they tend to existence. Now not all things tend to existence; in fact it seems that none do, because all have existence and nothing tends except to what it does not have, as is made clear by Augustine and the Philosopher. Not all things, therefore, tend to good.

6. The one, the true, and the good are all equally interchanged will being. But not all beings tend to the one and the true. Neither, then, do they tend to the good.

6. Some people who know the right thing to do act contrary to this knowledge, according to the Philosopher. Now they would not so act if they did not desire or will to do so. But what is against reason is evil. Some people therefore tend to evil, and so not all tend to good.

7. The good which all things are said to tend to, as the Commentator says, is to be. But some people do not seek to be but rather not to be—the damned in hell, for instance, who desire even the death of the soul so that they should not exist at all. Not everything, therefore, seeks good.

8. The appetitive powers stand to their objects in just the same relation as the apprehensive to theirs. But an apprehensive power has to be devoid of the species of its object in order to be able to know, as the pupil of the eye must be without colour. Hence whatever tends to good must also be devoid of the species of good. But everything has the species of good. Therefore nothing tends to good.

9. To work for an end belongs to the Creator, to nature, and to an agent who acts with a purpose. But the Creator and a created agent with a purpose, such as man, in working for an end and desiring and loving good, have knowledge of the end or good. Then since nature is in a sense intermediate between the two, presupposing the work of creation and being presupposed in the work of art, if it takes pleasure in seeking the end for which it works, it too must know that end. But it does not have knowledge. Then the things of nature also do not tend to good.

10. Whatever is tended to is sought. But according to Plato⁶ nothing of which knowledge is not had can be sought. Thus if anyone were to seek a runaway slave without having any knowledge of his appearance, upon finding him he would not know that he had done so. Hence things which do not have knowledge of good do not tend to it.

11. To strive for an end belongs to what is directed to an end. But the last end, God, is not directed to an end. He does not, then, strive for an end or good; and so not everything tends to good.

12. A nature is determined to one thing. Then if things naturally tend to good, they should not naturally tend to anything else. But all things seek peace, as Augustine and Dionysius explain, and also the beautiful, as Dionysius also says. Consequently not all things naturally tend to good.

13. Just as a person strives for an end when he does not have it, he also takes pleasure in it when he has it. But we do not say that in animate things take pleasure in good. Neither, then, should we say that they tend to good.

To the Contrary

1'. Dionysius says: "Existents desire the beautiful and the good; and whatever they do, they do because it seems good. The intention of all existents has as its principle and term the good."

2'. The Philosopher says that some have defined good well by saying that it is "what all things tend to."

3'. Whatever acts, acts for an end, as is made clear by the Philosopher. But whatever acts for something tends to it. Therefore every thing tends to an end and to good, which has the character of an end.

4'. Everything seeks its own perfection. But by the fact that a thing is perfect it is good. Everything therefore seeks good.

REPLY.

All things, not only those which have knowledge but also those which are without it, tend to good. To understand this it will help to bear in mind that some of the ancient philosophers taught that well suited effects in nature come about from the necessity of their prior Causes, though the natural causes themselves have not been disposed in that particular way will a view to the suitability of the effects.

With this opinion the Philosopher finds fault, because according to it, unless such suitabilities and aptnesses were in some sense intended, they would come about by chance and so would not happen most of the time but only rarely, like other things which we say happen by chance. Hence we must say that all natural things are ordained and disposed to their well adapted effects.

There are two ways in which a thing may be ordained or directed to something else as its end: (1) by itself, as a man directs himself to the place where he is going; and (2) by something else, as an arrow is aimed at a definite spot by the archer. Nothing can direct itself to an end unless it knows the end, for the one directing must have knowledge of that to which he directs. But even things which do not know the end can be directed to a definite end, as is evident from the arrow.

This can come about in two ways. (1) Sometimes what is directed to an end is merely driven or moved by the one directing it without acquiring from the director any form by which such a direction or inclination belongs to it. Such an inclination, like that by which the arrow is aimed by the archer at a definite target, is violent. (2) Some times what is directed or inclined to an end acquires from the director or mover some form by which such an inclination belongs to it. In that case the inclination will be natural, having a natural principle. Thus He who gave heaviness to the stone inclined it to be borne down ward naturally. In this way the one who begets them is the mover in regard to heavy and light things, according to the Philosopher.

It is after this fashion that all natural things are inclined to what is suitable for them, having within themselves some principle of their inclination in virtue of which that inclination is natural, so that in a way they go themselves and are not merely led to their due ends. Things moved by violence are only led, because they contribute nothing to the mover. But natural

things go to their ends inasmuch as they cooperate with the one inclining and directing them through a principle implanted in them.

What is directed or inclined to something by another is inclined to that which is intended by the one inclining or directing it. The arrow, for example, is directed to the same target at which the archer aims. Consequently, since all natural things have been inclined by a certain natural inclination toward their ends by the prime mover, God, that to which everything is naturally inclined must be what is willed or intended by God. But since God can have no end for His will other than Himself and He is the very essence of goodness, all other things must be naturally inclined to good. To desire or have appetency (*appetere*) is nothing else but to strive for something (*ad aliquid Petere*), stretching, as it were, toward something which is destined for oneself.

Accordingly since all things are destined and directed by God to good, and this is done in such a way that in each one is a principle by which it tends of itself to good as if seeking good itself, it is necessary to say that all things naturally tend good. If all things were inclined to good without having within themselves any principle of inclination, they could be said to be led to good, but not to be tending toward it. But in virtue of an innate principle all things are said to tend to good as if reaching for it of their own accord. For this reason it is said in Wisdom (8:1) that divine wisdom "ordered all things sweetly" because each one by its own motion tends to that for which it has been divinely destined.

Answers to Difficulty

1. The true and good are somewhat similarly related to being, and also somewhat dissimilarly. From the viewpoint of predicative interchangeability they are similarly related, for every being is good just as it is true. But as Perfecting causes they are dissimilarly related; for the true, unlike good, does not stand as a perfecting cause to all beings, because the perfection of the true is considered from the point of view of the specific character only. Only immaterial beings, then, can be perfected by the true, because only they can receive the specific character without its material act of existing. But good, being perfective both in regard to the specific character and in regard to the act of existing, can perfect material beings as well as immaterial. All things can accordingly tend to good, but not all can know the true.

2. Some say that there is natural cognition in all things just as there is a natural appetitive tendency. But this cannot be true because, in view of the fact that cognition is by assimilation likeness in real existence does not bring about cognition but rather hinders it. It is for this reason that the sense organs must be devoid of sensible species in order to be able to receive them by way of the spiritual existence which causes knowledge. Hence those things which in no way receive anything except according to material existence can in no way know. Yet they can tend inasmuch as they are directed to something having real existence. Appetitive tendency does not necessarily look to a spiritual existence as does cognition. Hence there can be a natural appetite but not a natural Cognition. This still does not prevent appetite from following cognition in animals, because even in the things of nature it follows apprehension or cognition—not that of the things which have the appetite but that of Him who directs them to their end.

3. Whatever tends to anything tends to it in so far as that thing has some likeness to itself. And a likeness in spiritual existence does not suffice; otherwise an animal would have to tend to whatever it knows. The likeness must be one in real existence. Now this likeness may be taken in two ways: (1) in so far as the form of one thing is in another will perfect actuality; and in this case there does not follow from likeness to the end a tendency to the end, but repose in it; and (2) in so far as the form of one is in another incompletely, i.e., potentially;

and so, by reason of the potential possession of the form of the end and of good, the thing tends to good or its end and desires it. It is in this sense, as having form within it potentially, that matter is said to desire form. The more, then, that potentiality is achieved and brought closer to actuality, the more vigorous is the inclination which it causes. This is why any natural motion is intensified near the end when the thing tending to the end is more like that end.

4. When we say that all things tend to good, good is not to be restricted to this or that but to be taken in its generality, because each being naturally tends to a good suitable to itself. If, notwithstanding, the term good is limited to some single good, that will be the act of being. Nor is this prevented by the fact that all things have the act of being, because whatever has being desires its continuance and what actually has being in one way has it only potentially in another. Thus air is actually air and potentially fire. And so what actually has being desires to be actually.

5. The one and the true do not have the character of an end as does good; and so they do not have the character of the appetible either.

6. Even those who act contrary to reason are seeking good directly. A man who fornicates, for instance, is interested in something good and pleasurable to sense. That the act is bad from the viewpoint of reason is beyond his intention. Good is accordingly desired directly; evil, indirectly.

7. A thing is appetible in the same way as it is good. It was said above that in its substantial act of being a thing is not called good simply and absolutely unless other due perfections are added. The substantial act of being is accordingly not appetible in an absolute sense if its due perfections are not joined to it. Hence the Philosopher says: "To be is delightful to all things." But we are not to understand an evil and corrupt life or a sorrowful one, for this is evil simply and is simply to be shunned, though it is appetible in a certain respect. In the matter of seeking and shunning, it is all of a piece for a thing to be good and to be destructive of evil, or again to be evil and to be destructive of good. Hence we call the very lack of evil a good, as the Philosopher points out. Non-existence therefore assumes the aspect of a good inasmuch as it takes away being in a state of sorrow or wickedness, which is simply evil, although it is good in some respect. In this sense non-existence can be desired under the aspect of good.

8. Concerning apprehensive powers it is not always true that the power is altogether devoid of the species of its object. It is false in regard to those powers which have a universal object, as in the case of the intellect, whose object is the what although it has whatness in itself. Yet it must be devoid of the forms which it receives. It is false also in regard to touch, because, although it has special objects, they nevertheless necessarily belong to an animal. Thus its organ cannot be wholly without warmth and cold; and yet it is somehow independent of heat and cold, being of an intermediate make-up. But what is intermediate is neither of the extremes. Now appetitive tendency has a common object, good. Hence it is not altogether devoid of good, but just of that good to which it tends. It nevertheless has that good potentially and in this respect is like it, just as an apprehensive power is in potency to the species of its object.

9. As is clear from what has been said, knowledge of the end is required in everyone directing anything to an end. Nature, however, does not direct to an end but is directed. But God and also any purposeful agent direct to an end, and so they must have knowledge of the end, but not a thing of nature.

10. That argument is correct in regard to a being that tends to an end by directing itself towards it, because it has to know when it has reached the end. But there is no such necessity in a thing which is merely being directed to its end.

11. By the same nature by which a thing tends to an end which it does not yet have, it delights in an end which it already has. Thus by the same nature the element earth moves downward and rests there. Now it is not Consonant will the last end to tend to an end, but it is consonant will it to take pleasure in itself as an end. Though this cannot properly be called an appetite, still it is something belonging to the genus of appetite, and from it all appetite is derived. For from the fact that God takes pleasure in himself, He directs other things to Himself.

12. If appetite terminates in good and peace and the beautiful, this does not mean that it terminates in different goals. By the very fact of tending w good a thing at the same time tends to the beautiful and to peace. It tends w the beautiful inasmuch as it is proportioned and specified in itself. These notes are included in the essential character of good, but good adds a relationship of what is perfective in regard w other things. Whoever tends to good, then, by that very fact tends to the beautiful. Peace, moreover, implies the removal of disturbances or obstacles to the obtaining of good. By the very fact that something is desired, the removal of obstacles to it is also desired. Consequently, at the same time and by the same appetitive tendency good, the beautiful, and peace are sought.

13. Pleasure includes in its notion knowledge of the good which gives pleasure. For this reason only things winch know the end can take pleasure in an end. But appetitive tendency does not entail knowledge in the being which tends, as is evident from what has been said. Nevertheless, using pleasure broadly and improperly, Dionysius says that what is beautiful and good is found by all to be pleasurable and lovable.

ARTICLE II: DO ALL THINGS TEND TO GOD HIMSELF?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 1, 2, 1; CE., III, 17 & 18; Sum. Theol., I, 6, i c & ad 2 44, Comp. Theol., I, 100 & 101.

Difficulties:

It seems that they do not, for

2. Things are oriented to God as knowable and appetible. But not all things oriented to God as knowable know Him, for not all cognitive beings know God. Therefore, neither do all things oriented in Him as appetible tend to Him.

2. The good which is desired by all things is, in the opinion of the Philosopher, existence, as the Commentator maintains. But God is not the existence of all. Then God is not the good which is desired by all.

3. No one seeks what he flees from. But some people flee from God, as is had in the Psalms (73:23): "The pride of them that hate thee ascended continually." And Job (21:14) says: "[They] have said to God: Depart from us." Hence not all things seek God.

4. No one seeks what he has. But some, the blessed who enjoy the possession of Him, have God. Then not all things seek Him.

5. There is a natural appetite only for what can be had. But only a rational creature can have God, since it alone is made to the image of God and "is the image of God by the very fact of having a capacity for Him," as Augustine says. Not all things, then, naturally seek God.

To the Contrary:

1'. There is the statement of Augustine: "Whatever can love loves God." But all things can love because all seek good. Then all seek God.

2' Everything naturally tends to the end for which it exists. But all things are ordained to God as their end; for as is written in Proverbs (16:4): "The Lord hath made all things for himself." all things, therefore, naturally tend to God.

REPLY:

All things naturally tend in God implicitly, but not explicitly. That this may appear clearly it should be observed that a secondary cause can influence its effect only in so far as it receives the power of the first cause. The influence of an efficient cause is to act; that of a final cause is to be sought or desired. A secondary agent acts only by the efficacy of the first agent existing in it; similarly a secondary end is sought only by reason of the worth of the principal end existing in it inasmuch as it is subordinated to the principal end or has its likeness.

Accordingly, because God is the last end, He is sought in every end, just as, because He is the first efficient cause, He acts in every agent. But this is what tending to God implicitly, means. For the efficacy of the first cause is in the second as the principles of reasoning are in the conclusions. But to reduce conclusions with their principles or secondary causes to their first causes belongs only to the

Power of reasoning. Hence only a rational nature can trace secondary ends back to God by a sort of analytic procedure so as to seek God explicitly. In demonstrative sciences a conclusion is correctly drawn only by a reduction to first principles. In the same way the appetite of a rational creature is correctly directed only by an explicit appetitive tendency to God, either actual or habitual.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. All cognitive beings also know God implicitly in any object of knowledge. Just as nothing has the note of appetibility except by a likeness to the first goodness, so nothing is knowable except by a likeness to the first truth.

2. Created existence is itself a likeness to the divine goodness. So in desiring to be, things implicitly desire a likeness to God and God Himself.

. God can be viewed in two ways, in Himself and in His effects. Viewed in Himself He cannot but be loved since He is the very essence of goodness. Hence He is loved in His essence by all who see Him; and to the extent that each one knows Him each loves Him. But viewed in some of His effects, e.g., punishment or commands that seem onerous, seeing that they are contrary to our will, God is shunned and, in a sense, hated. And yet those who hate Him in some of His effects necessarily love Him in others. Thus even the devils, as Dionysius teaches, naturally desire to be and to live, and in this respect seek and love God Himself.

4. The blessed who already enjoy the possession of God desire the continuance of their enjoyment. Furthermore, the enjoyment itself is a sort of appetite perfected by its object, although the name appetite implies imperfection.

5. Only a rational creature has the capacity for God because only it can know and love Him explicitly. But other creatures too participate in a likeness to God and so tend to Him.

ARTICLE III: IS APPETITE A SPECIAL POWER OF THE SOUL?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 27, I, 2; Sum. Theol., I, 80, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. The powers of the soul are ordained only to vital operations. Now those operations are called vital by which animate things are distinguished from inanimate. But it is not as regards tending that animate things are distinguished from inanimate, because even the inanimate tend to good. Appetite is therefore not a special power of the soul.
2. Appetite is nothing, it seems, but a sort of direction to an end. But natural appetite suffices for a thing to be directed to an end. So there is no necessity of adding an animal appetite which would be a special power of the soul.
3. Operations and powers are differentiated as to their terms. But there is the same term, good, for both natural and animal appetite. It is therefore the same power or operation. But natural appetite is not a power of the soul. Then neither is animal appetite.
4. Appetite is for what is not had, according to Augustine.¹ But in the case of animals the good is already had by knowledge. Therefore there does not follow upon knowledge among animals any appetite which would call for a special power.
5. A special power is destined for a special act, not for an act common to all the powers of the soul. But to tend to good is common to all the powers of the soul. This is apparent from the fact that every power tends to its object and takes pleasure in it. Therefore appetite is not a special power of the soul.
6. If the appetitive power tends to good, it tends either to good in general or to what is good for itself. Now if it should tend to good in general, since every other power tends to some particular good, the appetitive power will not be a special power but a universal one. But if it tends to what is good for itself, since every other power also tends to what is good for itself, every other power can for the same reason be called an appetite. There will therefore not be any power of the soul which can be called appetite in a special way.

To the Contrary:

The Philosopher posits the appetitive part as a special power of the soul.

REPLY.

Appetite is a special power of the soul. In this regard it should be noted that, since the powers of the soul are destined for operations proper to animate beings, an operation has a special power of the soul appointed for it for the reason that it is an operation proper to an animate being. There is found, indeed, a certain operation which from one point of view is common to both animate and inanimate beings but from another is proper to animate beings; for instance, to be moved or generated.

Spiritual things considered in themselves have such a nature as to move but not to be moved. Bodies, however, are moved; and though one can move another, still no one of them can move itself. For things which move themselves are divided into two parts, one of which is the mover, the other, moved, as is shown in the Physics.

But this cannot be realized in purely corporeal beings, because their forms cannot be movers, though they can be the principle of motion in the sense of that by which something is moved. In the movement of the element earth, for instance, heaviness is the principle by which it is moved but yet is not the mover. This is so both because of the simplicity of inanimate bodies, which do not have enough diversity in their parts for one to originate motion and another to be moved, and also because of the baseness and materiality of their forms, which, being far removed from the separated forms to which it belongs to move, do not retain the ability to move but only the function of being principles of motion.

Animate things, however, are composed of a spiritual and a corporeal nature. There can accordingly be in them a moving part and another moved—both locally and in other ways. And so, inasmuch as to be moved is made an action proper to animate beings in the sense that they move themselves to definite species of movement, there is found in animals a hierarchy of special powers. Thus for locomotion in animals there is a motive power; and in plants and animals alike, a power of growth for the movement of growing, a nutritive power for the movement of alteration, and a generative power for the move merit of generation. To tend, which is in a way common to all things, likewise becomes in a way special for animate beings, or rather animals, inasmuch as there are found in them appetite and what moves the appetite. This latter, according to the Philosopher, is the apprehended good itself. Hence, just as animals more than other things are moved of themselves, so too they tend of themselves. For this reason the appetitive power is a special faculty in the soul in the same way as the motive power.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The solution is clear from what has already been said.
2. It is precisely because animals are capable of participating in divine goodness in a more eminent way than other, inferior things, that they have need of many operations and helps to their perfection. A man who can gain perfect health by much exercise is nearer to health than one who can attain only a little health and needs for this only a little exercise—to use the example given by the Philosopher. Now a natural appetite is determined to a single object and cannot be so diversely oriented that it extends to as many different things as animals have need of. For this reason it was necessary for animals to be supplied in addition will an animal appetite consequent upon apprehension so that among many objects of apprehension the animal would be attracted to different ones.
3. Although good is sought by both natural and animal appetite, nevertheless by its natural appetite a thing does not of itself seek good as it does by its animal appetite. Consequently for the seeking of good by animal appetite there is required a power which is not required for the exercise of natural appetite. Furthermore the good to which a natural appetite tends is definite and always the same; but this is not true of the good sought by an animal appetite. And the same can be applied to the motive power.
4. The being which desires a good does not seek to have the good according to its intentional existence, as it is had by one who knows it, but according to its essential or real existence. Consequently the fact that an animal possesses the good by knowing it does not keep it from being able to desire it.
5. Every power tends to its object by a natural appetite. But animal appetite belongs to a special power. And because natural appetite is determined to a single object whereas animal appetite follows apprehension, individual powers tend to a determined good but the appetitive faculty tends to any good apprehended. Yet it does not follow that it is a universal power, since it tends to good in a special way.
6. The solution to this difficulty is evident from what has just been said.

ARTICLE IV: IN RATIONAL BEINGS IS WILL A POWER DISTINCT FROM SENSE APPETITE?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 25, I; III Sentences 26, I, 2 sol. & ad 2; [Contra Gentiles II](#), 47; In III de an., nn. 802-06; 15, fl. 831; Sum. Theol., I, 80, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. An accidental difference in objects does not distinguish powers. But the objects of the will and of the sense appetite are differentiated only by accidental differences in good, which is essentially the object of appetite. They do not, indeed, seem to differ except inasmuch as the will has as its object the good apprehended by the intellect, and sense appetite, that apprehended by sense. But these differences are accidental to good as such. Therefore the will is not a power distinct from sense appetite.
2. Sensitive and intellectual apprehensive powers differ as particular and universal, for sense apprehends particulars and intellect universals. But the appetite of the sensitive and intellective parts cannot be distinguished in this way, because any appetite is for the good as it exists in reality. This, however, is not universal but singular. The rational appetite will—must therefore not be said to be a power other than sense appetite as intellect is other than sense.
3. The motive power follows the appetitive just as the appetitive follows apprehension. But the motive power is not one thing in rational beings and another in irrational. Then neither is the appetitive. And so the conclusion is the same as before.
4. The Philosopher distinguishes five kinds of powers and operations of the soul. One includes generation, nutrition, and growth; the second is sense; the third, appetite; the fourth, locomotion; and the fifth, intellect. Intellect is here distinguished from sense, but not intellective appetite from sense appetite. It therefore seems that a higher appetitive power is not distinguished from a lower as a higher apprehensive power is distinguished from a lower.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. The Philosopher distinguishes the will from sense appetite.
- 2'. All things that stand in a series must be distinct. But intellective appetite is higher than that of sense according to the Philosopher and even moves it "as sphere moves sphere," as he says in the same place. The will is therefore a power other than sense appetite.

REPLY:

The will is a power distinct from sense appetite. It Should be noted in this connection that rational appetite is distinguished from that of sense in just the same way as sensitive appetite is distinguished from that of nature because of a more perfect way of tending. The closer a nature is to God, the more pronounced is the likeness of the divine excellence which is found in it. Now it belongs to the divine excellence to move and incline and direct all things while not being moved, inclined, or directed by any other. Hence the nearer a nature is to God, the less it is inclined by another and the more it is capable of inclining itself.

An insensible nature, therefore being by reason of its material the farthest removed from God, is inclined to an end, to be sure, but has within it nothing which inclines, but only a principle of inclination, as was explained above.

A sensitive nature, however being closer to God, has within itself something which inclines, i.e., the apprehended object of appetite. Yet this inclination is not within the control of the animal which is inclined but is determined by something else. An animal is notable at the sight of something attractive not to crave it, because animals do not themselves have the mastery over their own inclination. Hence "they do not act but are rather acted Upon," as Damascene says. This is because the sensuous appetitive power has a bodily organ and so is nearly in the condition of matter and of corporeal things so as rather to be moved than to move.

But a rational nature, being closest to God, not merely, like man, has an inclination to something, and, like a sentient nature, a mover of this inclination determined as if it were extrinsically but further so has its inclination within its own power that it does not necessarily incline to anything appetible which is apprehended, but can incline or not incline. And so its inclination is not determined for it by anything else but by itself. This belongs to it inasmuch as it does not use a bodily organ; and so, getting farther away from the nature of what is moved it approaches that of what moves and acts. It can come about that something determines for itself its inclination to an end only if it knows the end and the bearing of the end upon the means to it. But this belongs to reason alone. Thus such an appetite, which is not determined of necessity by something else, follows the apprehension of reason. Hence, rational appetite, called will, is a power distinct from sense appetite.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The will is not distinguished from sense appetite directly on the basis of the apprehension which it follows but on that of determining one's inclination for oneself or having it determined by another. These two sorts of inclination require different kinds of powers. And such a diversity further demands a difference in the apprehensions, as appears from what has been said. Hence the distinction of the appetitive powers is more or less resultantly based upon the distinction of the apprehensive, not principally.
2. Although appetite always looks to something existing in reality as a particular and not as a universal, nevertheless it is sometimes moved to tend by the apprehension of some universal condition. We tend to this particular good, for instance, from the consideration of the fact that we look upon good as simply to be sought. At other times we tend as a result of the apprehension of a particular thing in its particularity. Thus appetite is distinguished into universal and particular in a secondary sense, just as it is distinguished in a secondary sense according to the difference in the apprehension which it follows.
3. Motion and operations are found in singulars. But there can be descent from a universal proposition to a particular conclusion only through the mediation of a particular assumption. Now in matters of operating the choice of a deed is a sort of conclusion, as is said in the Ethics. A universal conception of the intellect, accordingly, can be applied to the choice of a deed only by means of a particular apprehension. Consequently the motion which follows upon a universal apprehension of the intellect by means of a particular sense apprehension does not require one motive power corresponding to intellect and another corresponding to sense, as is true of the appetite which follows apprehension immediately. Moreover, the motive power in question in the difficulty, that which is commanded, is a power attached to the muscles and nerves. Hence it cannot pertain to the intellectual part, which uses no organ.
4. Because sense and the intellect differ according to the formal aspects of the apprehensible in so far as it is apprehensible, they therefore belong to different genera of powers. Sense is concerned with apprehending the particular; the intellect, with apprehending the universal. But higher and lower appetite are not differentiated by differences in the appetible as such, since either appetite sometimes tends to the same good. They differ rather in their different ways of tending, as is evident from what has been said. Hence they are indeed distinct powers but not distinct kinds of powers.

ARTICLE V: DOES THE WILL WILL ANYTHING NECESSARILY?

Parallel readings: II Sent, 25, a. 2; Sum. Theol., 1, 8 1; 1-11, 10, 2; De malo, 6.

Difficulties

It seems that it does, for

1. According to Augustine all seek happiness "will a single will." But what is sought by all in common is sought of necessity; for if it were not of necessity, it might chance not to be sought by someone. The will therefore wills something necessarily.
2. Every cause of motion having perfect efficacy moves its object of necessity. But according to the Philosopher good as apprehended is the cause of the motion of the will. Therefore, since something is a perfect good, viz., God and beatitude, as is said in the Ethics, there will be something which will move the will of necessity. And so something is desired by the will necessarily.
3. Immateriality is the reason why a given power cannot be forced; for powers connected with organs are forced, as appears especially in regard to the motive power. But the intellect is a more immaterial power than the will. This is clear from the fact that it has a more immaterial object, the universal, whereas the object of the will is the good existing in particular things. Since, then, the intellect is forced to hold something of necessity, as is said in the Metaphysics, it seems that the will also tends to something of necessity.
4. Necessity is removed from the will only by reason of freedom, to which necessity seems to be opposed. But not every sort of necessity prevents freedom. Hence Augustine says: "If necessity is defined to be that according to which we say: 'it is necessary for something to be or to become thus and so, I do not know why we should fear that it will take away the freedom of the will.'" The will therefore of necessity wills something.
5. Necessary means unable not to be. But God is unable not to will good just as He is unable not to be good. He therefore necessarily wills good; and so some will wills something necessarily.
6. According to Gregory "a sin which is not wiped out by repentance, by its own weight soon draws a person to another." But a sin is not committed unless it is done voluntarily, as Augustine teaches. Since drawing is a violent motion, as is made clear in the Physics, one can accordingly be violently forced to will something of necessity.
7. Following Augustine, the Master says: "In the second state (the state of guilt) man cannot avoid sinning even mortally before reparation and at least venially after reparation." But both mortal and venial sin are voluntary. There is therefore a state of man in which he is unable not to will something which constitutes a sin. And so the will of necessity wills something.
8. The more a thing is disposed by nature to cause motion, the more it is disposed to impose necessity. But good can cause motion more than what is true, since good is in things but what is true is only in thought, as is said in the Metaphysics. Therefore, since what is true forces the intellect, will all the more reason does good force the will.
9. Good makes a stronger impression than truth. This is evident from the fact that love, which is the imprint left by the impact of good, is more conducive to unity than knowledge, which is the imprint left by the impact of truth. For according to Augustine, love is a sort of life uniting the lover to the beloved. Good can therefore impose necessity upon the will more than truth can upon the intellect. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.
10. The more power a faculty has over its objects, the less it can be forced by them. But reason has more power over its objects than will; for according to Augustine reason forms within itself the species of things, and the will does not, but is moved by appetible things. The

will can therefore be forced by its objects more than reason can by- its own. And so the same conclusion is reached as before.

11. What is in something essentially is in it of necessity. But to will something is in the will essentially. Therefore the will wills something of necessity. Proof of the minor: The highest good is willed essentially. Therefore whenever the will is directed to it, it wills essentially. But then it is always directed to it because it is so naturally. Therefore the will always essentially wills the highest good.

2. In scientific knowledge necessity is found. Now just as all men naturally want to know, as the Philosopher says, so too do they naturally will good. In willing good necessity is therefore found.

13. The Gloss says that the will "naturally wills good." But things which are in something by nature are necessary. Therefore the will necessarily wills good.

14. Whatever is increased or diminished can also be taken away entirely. But the freedom of the will is increased or diminished, for before the fall man had freer choice than after the fall, according to Augustine. The freedom of the will can therefore be taken away entirely. And so the will can be forced will necessity.

To the Contrary:

1'. According to Augustine, if anything is voluntary, it is not necessary. But whatever we will is voluntary. The will therefore does not will anything necessarily.

2'. Bernard says that free choice is the most powerful thing under God. But such a thing cannot be forced by anyone. The will therefore cannot be forced to will something of necessity.

3'. Freedom is opposed to necessity. But the will is free. Therefore it does not will anything of necessity.

4'. Bernard says that our choice, which is free because of our innate will, is moved by no necessity. But the dignity- of the will cannot be taken away. The will therefore cannot will anything of necessity.

5'. Rational faculties are open to Opposites according to the Philosopher. But the will is a rational faculty, for it is in reason, as is said in The Soul. It is therefore open to opposites, and so it is not determined to anything necessarily.

6'. Whatever is determined to something of necessity is naturally determined to it. But the will is distinguished from natural appetite. It therefore does not will any of necessity.

7'. From the fact that something is voluntary it is said to be in us in such a way that we are masters of it. But we can will or not will any_ thing within us of which we are masters. Therefore, whatever the will wills it call will or not will. Thus it does not will anything necessarily.

REPLY:

As can be gathered from the words of Augustine, necessity is of two kinds: the necessity of force; and this can by no means apply to the will; and the necessity of natural inclination, as we say that God necessarily lives; and will such necessity the will necessarily wills something.

For an understanding of this it should be noted that among things arranged in an order the first must be included in the second, and in the second must be found not only what belongs to it by its own nature but also what belongs to it according to the nature of the first. Thus it is the

lot of man not only to make use of reason, as belongs to him in accordance with his specific difference, rational; but also to make use of senses and food, as belongs to him in accordance with his genus, animal or living being. In like manner we see among the senses that the sense of touch is a sort of foundation for the other senses and that in the organ of each sense there is found not only the distinctive characteristic of the sense whose proper organ it is, but also the characteristics of touch. Thus the eye not only senses white and black as the organ of sight, but also as the organ of touch senses heat and cold and is destroyed by an excess in them.

Now nature and the will stand in such an order that the will itself is a nature, because whatever is found in reality is called a nature. There must accordingly be found in the will not only what is proper to the will but also what is proper to nature. It belongs to any created intellect, however, to be ordained by God for good, naturally tending to it. Hence even in the will there is a certain natural appetite for the good corresponding to it. And it has, moreover, the tendency to some thing according to its own determination and not from necessity. This belongs to it inasmuch as it is the will.

Just as there is an ordination of nature to the will, there is, more over, a parallel ordination of the things which the will naturally wills to those in regard to which it is determined of itself and not by nature. Thus, just as nature is the foundation of will, similarly the object of natural appetite is the principle and foundation of the other objects of appetite. Now among the objects of appetite the end is the foundation and principle of the means to the end, because the latter, being for the sake of the end, are not desired except by reason of the end. Accordingly what the will necessarily wills, determined to it by a natural inclination, is the last end, happiness, and whatever is included in it: to be, knowledge of truth, and the like. But it is determined to other things, not by a natural inclination, but by so disposing itself without any necessity.

Although the will wills the last end by a certain necessary inclination, it is nevertheless in no way to be granted that it is forced to will it. For force is nothing else but the infliction of some violence. According to the Philosopher that is violent "whose principle is outside it will the being which suffers the violence contributing nothing." The throwing of a stone upward would be an example, because the stone of itself is not at all inclined to that motion. But seeing that the will is an inclination by the fact of its being an appetite, it cannot happen that the will should will anything without having an inclination to it. Thus it is impossible for the will to will anything by force or violently even though it does will something by a natural inclination. It is therefore evident that the will does not will anything necessarily will the necessity of force, yet it does will something necessarily will the necessity of natural inclination.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That common appetite for happiness does not come from any forcing but from a natural inclination.
2. However effectively a good moves the will, it still cannot force it; because as soon as we posit that the will wills something, we posit that it has an inclination to it. But that is the contrary of force. It does happen, however, that because of the excellence of a good the will is determined to it by an inclination of natural necessity.
3. The intellect naturally understands something just as the will naturally wills. But force is not contrary to the intellect in its very notion as it is with the will. For although the intellect has an inclination to something, it nevertheless does not designate a man's inclination itself, whereas the will does designate the very inclination of the man. Hence whatever happens according to the will happens according to the man's inclination and so cannot be Violent.

But the operation of the intellect can be against a man's inclination, his will. This occurs, for instance, when a certain Opinion pleases him but because of the force of the arguments he is brought by his intellect to assent to the Contrary.

4. Augustine is speaking of natural necessity, which we do not exclude from the will in regard to certain things. This necessity is also found in the divine will just as it is found in the divine existence; for God is necessary essentially, as is said in the Metaphysics.

5. From what has just been said the answer is clear.

6. A sin committed does not draw a man by forcing his will but by inclining it, inasmuch as it deprives the man of the grace by which he is strengthened against sin, and also inasmuch as there is left in the soul from the act of sinning a disposition or habit inclining it to subsequent sin.

7. On this point there are two opinions. Some say that however much a man may be in the state of mortal sin, he can avoid mortal sin by the freedom of his will. They explain the statement that man cannot avoid sinning to mean that he cannot avoid having sin, just as to see means to have sight as well as to make use of sight. But in their opinion he is able not to sin, meaning not to make use of sin. And it is accordingly evident that no necessity of consenting to sin is introduced into the will. Others say that, just as a man in the state of this present life cannot avoid venial sin, not in the sense that he is unable to avoid this or that particular venial sin, but in the sense that he cannot avoid all venial sins so as not to commit a single one, the same is also true of mortal sins in a man who does not have grace. And in accordance with this opinion it is clear that the will is not necessitated to will this or that mortal sin, although when without grace it is found to fall short of an unwavering inclination to good.

8. A form received into something does not move the recipient, but the very having of such a form means that it has been moved. It is, however, moved by an external agent. Thus a body which is heated by fire is not moved by the heat received but by the fire. So too the intellect is not moved by the species already received or by the true knowledge which is consequent upon the species, but by some external thing which influences the intellect—the agent intellect or a phantasm or something else of the sort. Moreover, just as truth is proportioned to the understanding, so too is good proportioned to the affection. Hence because truth is in our apprehension, it is not for that reason any less capable of moving our understanding than good our affection. And furthermore, the fact that the will is not forced by a good does not come from the insufficiency of the good for moving but from the very nature of willing, as is apparent from what has been said.

9. From the above answer the answer here too is evident.

10. A thing which is external to the soul does not imprint its species upon the possible intellect except through the operation of the agent intellect. On this account the soul is said to form within itself the forms of things. In like manner it is not without the operation of the will that the will tends to its object. The argument is accordingly not conclusive. And besides, the same answer can be given as was given to the two preceding difficulties.

11. The first good is essentially willed, and the will essentially and naturally wills it. Nevertheless it does not always actually will it, for it is not necessary that the things which are naturally associated with the soul are always actually in the soul, just as principles which are naturally known are not always actually being considered.

12. The necessity by which we know something necessarily in scientific knowledge and that by which of necessity we desire knowledge do not belong to the same kind of necessity. The

former can be the necessity of force, but the latter can be only a necessity of natural inclination. It is in this way that the will necessarily wills good inasmuch as it naturally wills it.

3. From the above answer this answer also is clear

4. The freedom which is increased and diminished is freedom from sin and from misery, not freedom from force. Hence it does not follow that the will can be brought to such a pass that it is forced.

Answers to Difficulties to the Contrary.

2'. That authoritative statement to be understood of the necessity of force, which is repugnant to the will, not of the necessity of natural inclination, which, according to Augustine, is not repugnant to the will.

2'. It is not due to the weakness of the will if it is directed to some thing of necessity by a natural inclination but rather to its strength, just as a heavy body is the stronger, the greater the necessity will which it is borne downward. But it would be due to its weakness if it were forced by another.

3'. Freedom is opposed to the necessity of force, according to Augustine, as but not to the necessity of natural inclination.

4'. Natural necessity is not repugnant to the dignity of the will, but Only the necessity of force.

5'. Inasmuch as the will is rational it is open to opposites. This is to consider it according to what is distinctive of it. But from the view point of its being a nature nothing prevents it from being naturally determined to one object.

6'. The will is distinguished from natural appetite in a precise sense i.e., an appetite which is only natural, just as man is distinguished from what is only animal. It is not distinguished from natural appetite in an absolute sense but includes just as man includes animal.

7'. This argument also is based Upon the will taken as will. For it is characteristic of the will as will to be master of its Own acts.

ARTICLE VI: DOES THE WILL NECESSARILY WILL WHATEVER IT WILLS?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 25, a. 2; [Contra Gentiles II, 7](#); Sum. Theol., I, 82, 2; I-II, 10, 2; De malo, 3, 3; 6; in i Perihermen., 14, nn. 23-24.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does, for

1. The nobler a thing is, the more unchangeable it is. But to live is nobler than to be; to understand, nobler than to live; and to will, nobler than to understand. Therefore to will is more unchangeable than to be. But the being of a soul that wills is unchangeable because it is incorruptible. Therefore its willing is also unchangeable; and so whatever it wills, it wills unchangeably and necessarily.

2. The more confirmed a thing is to God, the more unchangeable it is. But the soul is more confirmed to God by secondary confirmity, which is that of likeness, than by primary conformity, which is that of an image. But in its primary conformity the soul has

unchangeable ness because it cannot lose its image, according to the words of the Psalm (38:7): "Man passed as an image." Then according to secondary conformity, which is that of a likeness consisting in the due ordering of the will, it will also have unchangeableness so that the will will unchangeably will good and cannot will evil.

3. Potency stands to potential being as act to actual being. But God, being actually good, cannot actually do anything evil. Therefore His power, which is good, also cannot produce anything which is evil potentially; and thus the will, which the divine power has produced, cannot tend to evil.

4. According to the Philosopher in matters of operation and appetency ends are related to means just as in demonstrative sciences principles are to conclusions. But from principles that are naturally known necessity is imposed upon the intellect so that it knows conclusions necessarily. Then from the fact that the will necessarily wills the last end in the way already explained, it will of necessity will all other things which are directed to the ultimate end.

5. Whatever is naturally determined to something necessarily attains it unless something interferes. But the will "naturally wills good," as is said in the Gloss. It therefore unchangeably wills good, since there is nothing to stop it, seeing that it is "the most powerful" thing under God, as Bernard teaches.

6. Evil is opposed to good as darkness to light. But sight, which is naturally determined to know light and what is lighted, sees them naturally so as to be unable to see what is dark. Then the will, whose object is the good, so unchangeably wills good that it can in no way will evil. And so the will has some necessity not only in regard to the last end but also in regard to other things.

To the Contrary:

1' Augustine says: "It is by the will that one sins or lives correctly."

2' According to Augustine "sin is voluntary to such an extent that if it is not voluntary it is not a sin." If, then, sin is not at all from the will, there will not be any sin at all. But it is evident from experience that that is false.

REPLY:

Something is said to be necessary from the fact that it is unchangeably determined to one thing. Since, therefore, the will stands undetermined in regard to many things, it is not under necessity in regard to everything but only in regard to those things to which it is determined by a natural inclination, as has been said. And because every thing mobile is reduced to what is immobile as its principle, and everything undetermined, to what is determined, that to which the will is determined must be the principle of tending to the things to which it is not determined; and this is the last end, as has been said. Now there is found to be indetermination of the will in regard to three things: its object, its act, and its ordination to its end.

In regard to its object the will is undetermined as to the means to the end, not as to the last end itself, as has been said. This is so because there are many ways of reaching the last end, and for different people different ways prove suitable. The appetite of the will could not, then, be determined to the means to the end as is the appetite in natural things, which have definite and fixed ways of reaching a definite and fixed end. And so it is evident that natural things not only desire the end necessarily, but also desire the means in the same way, so that there are among the means none to which natural things can either tend or not. The will, however, necessarily desires the last end in such a way that it is unable not to desire it, but it does not necessarily desire any of the means. In their regard, then, it is within the power of the will to desire this or that.

In the second place the will is undetermined in regard to its act, because even concerning a determined object it can perform its act or not perform it when it wishes. It can pass or not pass into the act of willing will regard to anything at all. This is not true of natural things, for something heavy always actually goes down unless some thing else prevents it. This is the case because inanimate things do not move themselves but are moved by other things. There is in them, then, no ability to be moved or not to be moved. But animate things are their own source of movement. Hence it is that the will can will or not.

A third indetermination of the will is found in regard to its ordination to its end inasmuch as the will can desire what is in truth directed to its appointed end or what is so only in appearance. This indetermination comes from two sources: from the indetermination in regard to its object in the case of the means, and again from the indetermination of our apprehension, which can be correct or not. From a given true principle a false conclusion does not follow unless it is because of some falsity in the reasoning through a false subsumption or the false relating of the principle to the conclusion. In the same way from a correct appetite for the last end the inordinate desire for something could not follow unless reason were to take as referable to the end something which is not so referable. Thus a person who naturally desires happiness will a correct appetite would never be led to desire fornication except in so far as he apprehends it as a good for man, seeing that it is something pleasurable, and as referable to happiness as a sort of copy of it. From this there follows the indetermination of the will by which it can desire good or evil.

Since the will is said to be free inasmuch as it is not necessitated, the freedom of the will can be viewed in three respects: (1) as regards its act, inasmuch as it can will or not will; (2) as regards its object, inasmuch as it can will this or that, even if one is the opposite of the other; and (2) as regards its ordination to the end, inasmuch as it can will good or evil.

In regard to the first of these three there is freedom in the will in any state of nature will reference to any object, for the act of any will is in its power as regards any object. The second of these is had will reference to some objects, the means and not the end itself. This too holds for any state of nature. The third is not will reference to all objects but only certain ones, the means to the end, and not will reference to any state of nature but only that in which nature can fail. Where there is no failure in apprehending and comparing, there can be no willing of evil even when there is question of means, as is clear among the blessed. For this reason it is said that to will evil is not freedom or any part of it, though it is a sign of freedom.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** The act of being of the soul is not determined for it by itself but by another, but it does determine its own act of willing. Thus, al though its being is unchangeable, still its willing is undetermined and so can be directed to different things. It is not true, however that to understand or to will is nobler than to be if they are discriminated from being. Rather being is then nobler than they, according to Dionysius.
- 2.** The conformity of an image is viewed from the standpoint of natural powers, which are determined for the thing by nature. And so that conformity always remains. But secondary conformity, that of likeness, is had by grace and the habits and acts of the virtues, to which the soul is directed by an act of the will which stands within its power. That conformity, then, does not always remain.
- 3.** In God there is no passive or material potency to be distinguished from act, as is supposed in the objection; but there is active potency, which is the act itself, because a being is capable of acting inasmuch as it is in act. And yet the ability of the will to be directed to evil does not come from the fact of its being from God but from that of its being made out of nothing.

4. In demonstrative sciences conclusions are so related to principles that when the Conclusion is removed the principle is removed. And so from this fixity of the conclusions with regard to the principles the intellect is forced by the principles themselves to assent to the Conclusions. But the means do not have will regard to the end such a fixity that upon the removal of any one of them the end is removed, Since it is possible to attain the last end in various ways either really or apparently Consequently from the necessity which is in the voluntary appetite in regard to the end, there is not imposed upon it any necessity in regard to the means.

5. The will naturally wills good but not this or that particular good. It is like sight, which naturally sees colour but not this or that particular Color. For this reason whatever the will wills it wills under the aspect of good; yet it does not always have to will this or that good.

6. Nothing is so evil that it cannot have some aspect of good; and it is by reason of that goodness that it can move the appetite.

ARTICLE VII: DOES A PERSON MERIT BY WILLING WHAT HE WILLS NECESSARILY?

Parallel readings: [Contra Gentiles III, 8](#); [Sum. Theol., II-II, 88, 6](#); [189, 2](#).

Difficulties:

It seems that he does not, for

2. What anyone necessarily wills he wills naturally. But we do not merit by what is natural. Therefore we do not merit by such an act of the will.

2. Merit and demerit app to the same thing. But according to Augustine no one gets any demerit in anything that he cannot avoid.

3. No one merits except by an act of virtue. But every act of virtue is from a choice, not from a natural inclination. Then no one merits in anything that he does from necessity.

To the Contrary:

1'. Every creature naturally and necessarily seeks God. But in loving God we merit. It is therefore possible to merit in what one necessarily does.

2'. Happiness consists in eternal life. But saints merit by desiring eternal life. Therefore a person merits by willing what he wills necessarily.

REPLY:

In willing what he naturally wills a person merits in a certain sense and in a certain sense does not. For the explanation of this it should be observed that there is a difference in the way in which providence is exercised in regard to man and in regard to the other animals both as to his body and as to his soul. For other animals are provided with special coverings for their bodies, such as a tough hide, feathers, and the like, and also special weapons, such as horns, claws, and so forth. This is because they have just a few ways of acting to which they can adapt definite instruments. But man is provided with those things in a general way inasmuch as there has been given to him by nature hands by which he is able to prepare for himself a variety of coverings and protections. This is because man's reason is so manifold and extends to so many different things that definite tools sufficient for him could not be provided for him ahead of time.

The case is similar in regard to apprehension. Other animals have innate in them in the line of natural discretion certain specific conceptions necessary for them, as a sheep has a natural realization that wolf is its enemy, and so on. But in place of these there are implanted in man certain naturally understood universal principles by means of which he can go on to [figure out] everything that is necessary- for him.

In regard to their appetitive tendency also the same holds true. In other things there is implanted a natural appetite for something definite, as in a heavy body, to be down, and in every animal, whatever suits it according to its nature. But man has implanted in him an appetite for his last end in general so that he naturally desires to be complete in goodness. But in just what that completeness consists, whether in virtues or knowledge or pleasure or anything else of the sort, has not been determined for him by nature.

When, therefore, by his own reason with the help of divine grace he grasps as his happiness any particular good in which his happiness really does consist, then he merits, not because he desires happiness (which he naturally desires), but because he desires this particular good (which he does not naturally desire) for example, the Vision of God, in which his happiness does in truth consist. But if anyone were by erroneous reasoning to be brought to desire as his happiness some particular good—for example, bodily pleasures, in which his happiness does not in fact consist – he incurs demerit by so desiring. This is not because he desires happiness, but because he unwarranted desires as his happiness this particular thing in which his happiness is not found.

It is therefore clear that willing what anyone naturally wills is in itself neither meritorious nor blameworthy. But when it is specified to this or that, it can be either the one or the other. In this way the saints merit by desiring God and eternal life.

Answer to Difficulties:

From what has just been said the answers are clear.

ARTICLE VIII: CAN GOD FORCE THE WILL?

Parallel readings: C.OE, III, 88, 89, 91; Sum. Theol., I, 105,4; II 2 I-II, 9,6; De malo, 3, 3; Comp. theol, I, 129.

Difficulties:

It seems that He can, for

1. Whoever turns something whithersoever he wishes can force it. But, as is said in Proverbs (21:1), "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord: whithersoever he will he shall turn it." God can therefore force the will.
2. Quoting Augustine on Romans (I: 24): "Wherefore, God gave them up to the desires of their heart....," the Gloss says: "It is evident that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills to whatever He wishes, whether to good, according to His mercy, or to evil, according to their deserts." God can accordingly force the will.
3. If a finite being acts finitely, an infinite being will act infinitely. But a finite creature attracts the will in a finite way, because, as Cicero says, the honorable is what attracts us by its own vigor and entices us by its own excellence. Therefore God, who has infinite efficacy in acting, can altogether force the will.

4. He is properly said to be forced to something who is unable not to do it whether he wants to or not. But the will is unable not to will what God by His will of good pleasure wants it to will; otherwise the will of God would be inefficacious in regard to our will. God can therefore force the will.

5. In any creature there is perfect obedience to the Creator. But the will is a creature. Hence there is in it a perfect obedience to the Creator. God can therefore force it to what He wills.

To the Contrary:

1'. To be free from force is natural to the will. But what is natural to anything cannot be removed from it. The will therefore cannot be forced by God.

2'. God cannot make opposites to be true at the same time. But what is voluntary and what is violent are opposites, because the violent is a species of the Involuntar as is made clear in the Ethics. God therefore cannot make the will do anything by force; and so He cannot force the will.

REPLY:

God can change the will with necessity but nevertheless cannot force it. For however much the will is moved toward something, it is not said to be forced to it. The reason for this is that to will some thing is to be inclined to it. But force or violence is contrary to the inclination of the thing forced. When God moves the will, then, He causes an inclination to succeed a previous inclination so that the first disappears and the second remains. Accordingly, that to which He induces the will is not contrary to an inclination still extant but merely to one that was previously there. This is not, then, violence or force.

The case is parallel to that of a stone, in which by reason of its heaviness there is an inclination downward. While this Inclination remains, if the stone is thrown upward violence is done it. But if God were to subtract from the stone the inclination of its heaviness and give it an inclination of lightness, then it would not be violent for the stone to be borne upward. Thus a change of motion can be had without Violence.

It is in this way that God's changing of the will without forcing it is to be understood. God can change the will because He works within it just as He works in nature. Now, just as every natural action is from God, so too every action of the will, in so far as it is an action, not only is from the will as its immediate agent but also is from God as its first agent, who in it more forcefully. Then, just as the will can change its act to something else, as is apparent from the explanation above, so too and much more can God.

God changes the will in two ways. (1) He does it merely by moving it. This occurs for instance when He moves the will to want something without introducing any form into the will. Thus He some times without the addition of any habit causes a man to want what he did not want before. (2) He does it by introducing some form into the will itself. By the very nature which God gave the will He inclines it to will something as is clear from what has been said. Now in like fashion by something additional, such as grace or a virtue, the soul is inclined to will something to which it was not previously determined by a natural inclination.

This additional inclination is sometimes perfect, sometimes imperfect. When it is perfect it causes a necessary inclination to the thing to which it determines the will, in the same way as the will is inclined by nature necessarily to desire the end. This happens among the blessed, whom perfect charity sufficiently inclines to good not only as regards the last end but also as regards the means to this end. Sometimes, however, the additional form is not in all respects

perfect, as among the wayfarers on earth. Then the will is indeed inclined by reason of the additional form, but not necessarily.

Answers to Difficulties:

From what has just been said the answers are clear. For the first set of arguments go to prove that God can change the will; the second, that He cannot force it. Both of these are true, as is evident from the explanation above.

It should, however, be noted that, when it is said in the Glass as cited that God works in the hearts of men to incline their wills to evil, this is not to be understood (as the Glass itself says in the same place) as if God bestowed wilderness, but in the sense that, just as He confers grace by which men's wills are inclined to good, He also withdraws it from some; and when it is thus withdrawn, their wills are bent to evil.

ARTICLE IX: CAN ANY CREATURE CHANGE THE WILL OR INFLUENCE IT?

Parallel readings: J1 Sentences 8, a. g; Contra Gentiles III, 88 & 92; Sum. Theol., I, 106, 2; I-II, So, 1; De malo,, & in Joan., c. 13, lectura 1, 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

The will is a creature. But the will changes its own act as it wishes. It therefore seems that some creature can change the will and force it.

2. It is harder to change a whole thing than a part of it. But according to some philosophers the heavenly bodies change a whole crowd to will something. With all the more reason, then, does it seem that they can force the will of a single man.

3. Whoever is bound by something is forced by it. But according to the Philosopher² incontinent people are bound by their passions. Passions therefore change and force the will of an incontinent person.

4. According to Augustine³ both among spirits and among bodies the higher move the lower will a certain natural order. But not only the intellect but also the will of the blessed angels is higher and more perfect than ours. Therefore, just as they can influence our intellect by theirs by enlightening it, according to the teaching of Dionysius, so also it seems that by their will they can influence our will by changing it in some Way.

5. According to Dionysius⁵ the higher angels enlighten, cleanse, and perfect the lower. But just as enlighten me applies to the intellect, so cleansing seems to apply to the affections. Angels can accordingly influence the will as they can the intellect.

6. A thing is naturally more disposed to be changed by a higher nature than by a lower. But just as sense appetite is inferior to our will, the will of angels is superior. Therefore, since sense appetite sometimes changes our will, will all the more reason will the angelic will be able to change ours.

7. In Luke (4:23) the master says to his servant, "Compel them to come in." Now it is by their will that they enter that banquet hall. Our will can therefore be forced by an angel, the servant of God.

To the Contrary:

1'. Bernard says that free choice is the most powerful thing this side of God. But nothing is changed except by something stronger. Then nothing can change the will.

2'. Merit and demerit are in some sense situated in the will. If, then, any creature could change the will, a person could be justified or even made a sinner by some creature. But that is false, because no one becomes a sinner except by himself. nor does anyone become just except by the operation of God and his own cooperation.

REPLY.

The will can be understood to be changed by something in two ways. (1) This is referred to its object. In this sense the will is changed by the appetible thing. But nothing which changes the will in this way is in question here; for that was treated above, where it was shown that a certain good does move the will with necessity (in the way in which the object moves it), though the will is not forced. (2) The will can be taken to be moved by something in the manner of an efficient cause. In this sense we say that not only can no creature by acting upon the will force it (for even God could not do this), but also it cannot even act upon the will directly so as to change it will necessity or in any way to incline it (which God can do). But indirectly a creature can in some way incline the will though not change it will necessity. The reason for this is that, since the act of the will mediates as it were between the power and its object, a change in the act can be considered either from the point of view of the will or from that of the object.

From the point of view of the will only what works inside the will can change the act of the will. This is the will itself and that which is the cause of the being of the will, which according to the faith is God alone. Consequently only God can transfer the act of the will which He has made, from one thing to another as He wishes. But according to those who hold that the soul was created by intelligences (which is in fact contrary to the faith), the angel or intelligence itself has an effect intrinsic to the will, since it causes the act of being which is intrinsic to the will. Avicenna accordingly maintains that our wills are changed by the will of the heavenly souls just as our bodies are changed by the heavenly bodies. This is, however, thoroughly heretical.

But if the act of will is considered from the point of view of the object, the object of the will is found to be twofold. There is one to which the natural inclination of the will is determined will necessity. This object is implanted in the will and proposed to it by the Creator, who gave it its natural inclination to this. Consequently no one can change the will necessarily by means of such an object except God alone. But there is another object of the will capable of inclining the will inasmuch as there is in it some likeness or ordination will regard to the last end which is naturally desired. And yet the will is not changed necessarily by this object, as was said above, because there is not found in it alone an ordination to the naturally desired last end. Now by means of this object a creature can incline the will to some extent but not change it in a necessary way. This is the case when someone persuades another to do something by proposing to him its usefulness or nobility. It nonetheless remains within the power of the will to accept it or not, seeing that it is not determined to it by nature.

It is accordingly apparent that no creature can directly change the will as if by acting within the will itself; but by proposing something to the will extrinsically it can in some way induce it, though not change it necessarily.

1. The will can change itself in regard to certain things even directly, since it is master of its acts. And when we say that it cannot be changed directly by a creature, we mean by another creature. Still it cannot force itself, because to say that anything is forced by itself implies a contradiction, since that is violent in which the patient contributes nothing; but the one who exerts force does contribute something. And so the will cannot force itself, because in

applying the force it would thus be contributing something inasmuch as it would force itself, and contributing nothing inasmuch as it would be forced. And this is impossible. It is in this way that the Philosopher proves that no one suffers anything unjust from himself, because anyone who suffers something unjust suffers against his will; but if he does some thing unjust, that is according to his will.

2. Heavenly bodies cannot will necessity change the will either of one man or of a crowd, but they can change their bodies. And by means of the body the will is in some way inclined, though not necessarily. Since it can resist. Choleric persons, for example are inclined by their nature to wrath; yet a choleric person can resist that inclination by his will. But only the will resists bodily inclinations. and they are few in comparison with the foolish, because according to Ecclesiastes (1:15) "the number of fools is infinite." Consequently it is said that heavenly bodies change a crowd inasmuch as the crowd follows bodily inclinations; but they do not change this or that individual who will prudently resists the inclination mentioned.

3. An incontinent person is not said to be bound by his passions as if the bodily passions forced or necessitated his will; otherwise an incontinent person should not be punished, because punishment is not deserved for what is involuntary. Now the incontinent man is not said to act involuntarily, according to the Philosopher but he is said to be bound by his passions inasmuch as he voluntarily yields to their urge.

4. Angels influence the intellect by acting upon it interiorly but only from the viewpoint of the object, because they propose the intelligible object by which our intellect is actuated and won over to assent. But the object of the will proposed by an angel does not change the will of necessity, as has been said. Thus there is no parallel.

5. That cleansing which the angels undergo applies to the intellect, for it is a cleansing from ignorance, as Dionysius says. But even if it did apply to the affections, it would be used in the sense of persuading.

6. What is inferior to the will, as the body or sense appetite, does not change the will by acting upon it directly but only from the point of view of its object. For the object of the will is the apprehended good. But the good apprehended by universal reason moves the will only through the mediation of a particular apprehension, as is said in The Soul, since acts are performed in individual cases. Now by the passion of the sense appetite, the cause of which can sometimes be the bodily make-up or anything undergone by the body from the fact that sense appetite uses an organ, the particular apprehension itself is impeded and sometimes entirely inhibited so that what higher reason dictates in a universal way is not actually applied to this particular case. And so in its appetitive tendency the will is moved to that good which the particular apprehension reports to it, passing up the good which universal reason reports. In this way such passions incline the will; yet they do not change it will necessity, because it remains within the power of the will to restrain such passions so that the use of reason is not prevented, in accordance with the words of Genesis (4:7): "But the lust thereof shall be under thee," namely, that of sin.

7. The compelling there mentioned is not that of force but that of efficacious persuasion either by harsh or by gentle means.

ARTICLE X: ARE WILL AND INTELLECT THE SAME POWER?

Parallel readings: Sum. Theol., I, 80, I; 82, 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are, for

1. Powers are distinguished on the basis of their objects. Now the object of the intellect is the true, that of the will, the good. Since the good and the true are identical as to their real subject and differ in formal character, it therefore seems that the intellect and the will are really identical and differ only in formal character.
2. According to the Philosopher the will is in reason. It is therefore either the same as reason or a part of reason. But reason is the same power as the intellect. Then so is the will.
3. The faculties of the soul are commonly divided into the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible. But the will is distinguished from the irascible and the concupiscible. It is therefore contained will in the rational.
4. Wherever there is found an object which is the same in reality and in formal character, there is a single power. But the object of the will and of the practical intellect is the same in reality and in formal character, for the object of both is the good. Therefore the practical intellect is not a power different from the will. But the speculative intellect is not a power different from the practical because, according to the Philosopher, by extension the speculative intellect becomes practical. Therefore the will and the intellect (taken simply) are a single power.
5. To know the difference of two things from one another it is necessary for the same person to know both of the things differentiated. Similarly it must be the same person who knows and wills. But for the knowing of the difference between any two things, as "between white and sweet," it must be the same power which knows both. From this the Philosopher proves the existence of the central sense. By the same reasoning, then, it must be a single power which knows and wills; and so the intellect and the will are a single power, so it seems.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. The appetitive genus of powers of the soul is different from the intellective according to the Philosopher.⁴ But the will is listed under the appetitive. The will is therefore a power different from the intellect.
- 2'. The intellect can be forced, according to the Philosopher. But the will cannot be forced, as has been said. The intellect and the will are therefore not one and the same power.

REPLY:

The will and the intellect are distinct powers, even belonging to different genera of powers. That this may be clearly understood it should be noted that, since the distinction of powers is taken from the acts and objects, not just any difference at all among the objects reveals the distinctness of the powers but a difference in the objects. Precisely inasmuch as they are objects; and this will not be an accidental difference mean one which merely happens to be connected with the object taken specifically as object. It merely happens to the object of sense, for instance, inasmuch as it is sensible, to be animate or inanimate, though these differences are essential for the things which are sensed. It is accordingly not from these differences that the sense powers are diversified, but according as their objects are audible, visible, or tangible (for these are differences in the sensible inasmuch as it is sensible); that is to say, according to whether the objects are sensible through a medium or without a medium.

Now when essential differences of objects as objects are taken as dividing some specific object of the soul of themselves, by this fact powers are diversified but not genera of powers.

Thus the sensible designates, not the object of the soul without qualification, but an object which of itself is divided by the aforesaid differences. Hence sight, hearing, and touch are distinct specific powers belonging to the same genus of powers of the soul, i.e., to sense. But when the differences considered divide the object taken in general, then from such a difference distinct genera of powers become known.

Something is said to be an object of the soul according as it has some relation to the soul. Hence, where we find different aspects of relatedness to the soul, there we find an essential difference in the object of the soul, and this indicates a distinct genus of the soul's powers. Now a thing is found to have a twofold relationship to the soul: one by which the thing itself is in the soul in the soul's manner and not in its own, the other by which the soul is referred to the thing in its own existence. Thus something is an object of the soul in two ways. (1) It is so inasmuch as it is capable of being in the soul, not according to its own act of being, but according to the manner of the soul —spiritually. This is the essential constituent of the knowable in so far as it is knowable. (2) Something is the object of the soul according as the soul is inclined and oriented to it after the manner of the thing itself as it is in itself. This is the essential constituent of the appetible in so far as it is appetible.

The cognitive and appetitive principles in the soul accordingly constitute distinct genera of powers. Hence, since the intellect is included in the cognitive, and the will in the appetitive, the will and the intellect must be powers that are distinct even generically.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The distinction of powers is not manifested by the objects taken according to their reality but according to their formal aspect, because the formal aspects of the objects specify the operations of the powers. And so where there is a different formal aspect of the object, there we find a different power, even though it is the same thing which has the two formal aspects, as is the case with good and the true. This is also verified in material things. Air is modified by fire inasmuch as fire is hot, in view of the fact that air is potentially hot. But inasmuch as fire is luminous, air is modified by it in view of the fact that air is transparent. Nor is it the same potency in air by which it is called transparent and by which it is called potentially hot, even though it is the same fire which acts upon both potencies.

2. A power can be considered in two ways: either in reference to the object or in reference to the essence of the soul in which it is rooted. If the will is considered in reference to its object, it then belongs to a different genus from intellect. In this way will is distinguished from reason and intellect, as has been said. But if the will is considered according to that in which it is rooted, then since the will, like the intellect, does not have a bodily organ, the will and the intellect are reduced to the same part of the soul. In this way the intellect or reason is sometimes taken as including both within it, and then the will is said to be in reason. On this basis the rational part, including both the intellect and the will, is distinguished from the irascible and the concupiscible.

3. From the above answer this also is clear.

4. The object of the practical intellect is not the good, but the true which is related to operation.

5. To will and to know are not acts of the same formal character, and so they cannot belong to the same power as can knowledge of what is sweet and what is white. Hence there is no parallel.

ARTICLE XI: IS THE WILL A HIGHER POWER THAN THE INTELLECT, OR IS THE OPPOSITE TRUE?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 25, a. 2 ad /// Sentences 27, I, 4; [Contra Gentiles](#) 1H, 26; Sum. Theol., I, 82,3; 4 ad x; II-II, 23,6 ad 1; De cant., 3 ad 12 & 13.

Difficulties:

It seems that the intellect is the nobler and higher, for

1. The nobility of the soul consists in its being made to the image of God. But the soul is made to the image of God in virtue of reason or intelligence. Hence Augustine says: "Let us understand that man is made to the image of God in that particular in which he excels irrational animals; but that is reason, mind, or intelligence, or whatever it may more appropriately be called." Therefore the most excellent power of the soul is the intellect.

2. The answer was given that the image is in the will as well as in the intellect, since according to Augustine the image is seen in memory, intelligence, and will.—On the contrary, when the nobility of the soul is considered from the standpoint of the image, that in which the notion of image is most properly verified must be the most excellent part of the soul. Now even if the image is in both the will and the intellect, it is more properly in the intellect than in the will. Hence the Master of the Sentences says that the image is in the knowledge of truth and merely a likeness in the love of good. Therefore the intellect must still be nobler than the will.

. Since we judge of the powers from their acts, that power must be the nobler whose act is the nobler. But to understand is nobler than to will. Therefore the intellect is nobler than the will. Proof of the minor: Since acts are specified by their terms, that act must be nobler whose term is nobler. But the act of the intellect involves a motion to the soul; that of the will, from the soul to things. Since the soul is nobler than external things, to understand is therefore nobler than to will.

4. Among all things arranged in an order the more distant anything is from the lowest member, the higher it is. But the lowest among the powers of the soul is sense, and the will stands closer to sense than does the intellect. For the will shares with the sense powers the condition of its object, because the will is concerned with particulars just as is sense. We will for a particular health and not health as some thing universal. But the intellect is concerned with universals. The intellect is therefore a higher power than the will.

5. That which rules is nobler than the thing ruled. But the intellect rules the will. Therefore it is nobler than the will.

6. That from which something comes has authority over it and is greater than it if it is distinct in essence. But intelligence is from memory as the Son from the Father, and will is from memory and intelligence as the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. Intelligence therefore has authority in regard to the will and is greater and stronger than it.

7. The simpler and more immaterial an act is, the nobler it is. But the act of the intellect is simpler and more immaterial than that of the will, because the intellect abstracts from matter, but not the will. The act of the intellect is therefore nobler than that of the will.

8. The intellect bears to the soul the same relation as brightness to material things, and the will or affective power, that of warmth, as appears from the sayings of the saints. But brightness is

nobler than warmth, Since it is the quality of a nobler body. The intellect is therefore also nobler than the will.

9. According to the Philosopher that which is proper to man as man is nobler than that which is shared by man and the other animals. But to understand is proper to man, whereas to will belongs to the other animals also. The Philosopher accordingly says, "Children and brutes share in what is voluntary." The intellect is therefore nobler than the will.

10. The nearer a thing is to its end, the nobler it is, Since the goodness of means is from the end. But the intellect seems to be nearer to the end than the will, for a man first attains the end by his intellect by knowing it before he does so by his will by desiring it. The intellect is therefore nobler than the will.

11. Gregory says, "The contemplative life is...of greater merit than the active." But the contemplative life pertains to the intellect; the active, to the will. Then the intellect is also nobler than the will.

2. The Philosopher says that the intellect is the most excellent of the things which are in us. It is therefore nobler than the will.

To the Contrary

1'. The habit of a more perfect power is more perfect. But the habit by which the will is perfected, charity, is nobler than faith and knowledge, by which the intellect is perfected, as is evident from what the Apostle says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13:2). The will is therefore nobler than the intellect.

2'. What is free is nobler than what is not. But the intellect is not free since it can be forced, but the will is free since it cannot be forced. The will is therefore nobler than the intellect.

3'. The order of the powers follows the order of their objects. But good, which is the object of the will, is nobler than the true, which is the object of the intellect. The will is therefore also nobler than the intellect.

4'. According to Dionysius⁹ the more common any one of the divine participations is, the nobler it is. But the will is more common than the intellect because some things participate in will which do not participate in intellect, as was said above. The will is therefore nobler than the intellect.

5'. The nearer to God anything is, the nobler it is. But the will comes closer to God than the intellect, because, as Hugh of St. Victor says, love enters in where knowledge remains outside, for we love God more than we are able to know of Him. Therefore the will is nobler than the intellect.

REPLY:

A thing can be said to be more eminent than another either simply or in a certain respect. For something to be shown to be simply better than another the comparison must be made on the basis of what is essential to them and not on that of accidentals. In the latter case one thing would be shown to stand out over another merely in a certain respect. Thus if a man were to be compared to a lion on the basis of essential differences, he would be found to be simply nobler inasmuch as the man is a rational animal, the lion irrational. But if a lion is compared to a man on the basis of physical strength, he surpasses the man. But this is to be nobler only in a certain respect. To see, then, which of these two powers, the will or the intellect, is better without qualification, we must consider the matter from their essential differences.

The perfection and dignity of the intellect consists in this, that the species of the thing which is understood is in the intellect itself, since in this way it actually understands, and from this

its whole dignity is seen. The nobility of the will and of its act, however, consists in this, that the soul is directed to some noble thing in the very existence which that thing has in itself. Now it is more perfect, simply and absolutely speaking, to have within oneself the nobility of another thing than to be related to a noble thing outside oneself. Hence, if the will and the intellect are considered absolutely, and not will reference to this or that particular thing, they have this order, that the intellect is simply more excellent than the will.

But it may happen that to be related in some way to some noble thing is more excellent than to have its nobility within oneself. This is the case, for instance, when the nobility of that thing is possessed in a way much inferior to that in which the thing has it within itself. But if the nobility of one thing is in another just as nobly or more nobly than it is in the thing to which it belongs, then without doubt that which has the nobility of that thing within itself is nobler than that which is related in any way whatsoever to that noble thing. Now the intellect takes on the forms of things superior to the soul in a way inferior to that which they have in the things themselves; for the intellect receives things after its own fashion, as is said in The Causes. And for the same reason the forms of things inferior to the soul, such as corporeal things, are more noble in the soul than in the things themselves

The intellect can accordingly be compared to the will in three ways: Absolutely and in general, without any reference to this or that particular thing. In this way the intellect is more excellent than the will, just as it is more perfect to possess what there is of dignity in a thing than merely to be related to its nobility. With regard to material and sensible things. In this way again the intellect is simply nobler than the will. For example, to know a stone intellectually is nobler than to will it, because the form of the stone is in the intellect, inasmuch as it is known by the intellect, in a nobler way than it is in itself as desired by the will. With reference to divine things, which are superior to the soul. In this way to will is more excellent than to understand, as to will God or to love Him is more excellent than to know Him. This is because the divine goodness itself is more perfectly in God Himself as He is desired by the will than the participated goodness is in us as known by the intellect.

Answers to Difficulties:

Augustine takes reason and intelligence for the whole intellective part, which includes both the apprehension of the intellect and the appetite of the will; and so the will is not excluded from the image.

2. The Master appropriates to reason the fact of being an image because it is prior; and to love, likeness, because will reference to God knowledge is completed by love, just as a picture is achieved and beautified by Colors and similar means, by which it is made like the original.

3. That argument is based upon things Surpassed in nobility by the soul. But by the same reasoning can be shown the pre-eminence of the will in reference to things nobler than the soul.

4. The will has its object in common with the senses only in so far as it is directed to sensible things, which are inferior to the soul. But far as it is directed to intelligible and divine things, it is more distant from the senses than is the intellect, since the intellect can grasp less of divine things than the affective power desires and loves.

5. The intellect rules the will, not by inclining it to that to which it tends, but by showing it that to which it should tend. When, therefore, the intellect is less capable of exhibiting something noble than the inclination of the will is of being directed to it, the will surpasses the intellect.

6. The will does not proceed from intelligence directly but from the essence of the soul, intelligence being presupposed. From this, then, the order of dignity is not revealed, but only the order of origin, by which the intellect is naturally prior to the will.

7. The intellect abstracts from matter only when it knows sensible and material things; but when it knows things which are above it, it does not abstract; rather it receives things in a way that is less simple than the things are in themselves. Hence, the act of the will, which is directed to the things as they are in themselves, remains simpler and nobler.

8. Those expressions by which the intellect is compared to brightness and the will to warmth are metaphorical; and from such expressions no argument is to be drawn, as the Master says. Dionysius also says that symbolical theology is not argumentative.

9. Willing belongs to man alone as well as understanding, though tending appetitively belongs to other things besides man.

10. Although the soul is referred to God by the intellect before it is by the affections, nevertheless the affections attain Him more perfectly than does the intellect, as has been said.

11. The will is not excluded from contemplation. Gregory says that the contemplative life is to love God and one's neighbour. Hence the pre-eminence of the contemplative life over the active is not prejudicial to the will.

12. The Philosopher is speaking of the intellect according as it is taken for the whole intellective part, which includes the will also.— Or it can be said that he is viewing the intellect and the other powers of the soul absolutely, not as referred to this or that particular object.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. Charity is a habit perfecting the will with reference to God. In this reference the will is nobler than the intellect.

2'. The freedom of the will does not show that it is nobler simply, but that it is nobler in moving, as will appear more clearly from what follows.

3'. Since the true is a certain good (for it is the good of the intellect, as is made clear by the Philosopher) good should not be called nobler than the true, just as animal is not nobler than man, since man includes the nobility of animal and adds to it. We are now speaking of the true and the good in so far as they are the objects of the will and of the intellect.

4'. Willing is not found more extensively than understanding although tending appetitively is. It should, however, be observed that in this argument the passage from Dionysius is not used in his meaning for two reasons. Dionysius is speaking on the supposition that one is included in the notion of the other, as being in living and living in understanding. He accordingly says that one is simpler than the other. Although a participation which is simpler is nobler, nevertheless, if it is taken together with the mode in which it is found in things lacking additional perfections, it will be less noble. Thus if to be, which is nobler than to live, is taken together with the mode in which inanimate things are, that mode of being will be less noble than the being of living things, which is to live. It is accordingly not necessary that what is found more extensively should always be more noble; otherwise we should have to say that sense is nobler than intellect and the nutritive power nobler than the sensitive.

5'. That argument is concerned with the will in reference to God. In this sense it is granted to be more noble.

ARTICLE XII: DOES THE WILL MOVE THE INTELLECT AND THE OTHER POWERS OF THE SOUL?

Parallel readings: C.Q., III, 6; Sum. Theol., 1, 82-4; I II, 9, 1 & 3; De malo, 6.

Difficulties.

It seems that it does not, for

1. The mover is naturally prior to the thing moved. But the will is Posterior to the intellect, for nothing is loved or desired unless it is known, according to Augustine. The will therefore does not move the intellect.
2. If the will moves the intellect to its act, then it follows that the intellect understands because the will wants it to understand. But the will does not want anything unless it is understood. The intellect therefore first understands its understanding before the will wills it. But before the intellect could understand this, the will would have to be held to will it, because the intellect is held to be moved by the will. We should then have to go on to infinity. But this is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect.
3. Every passive power is moved by its object. But the will is a passive power, for appetite is a mover which is moved, as is said in *The Soul*. Hence it is moved by its object. But its object is the understood or apprehended good, as is said in the same book. Therefore the intellect or some other apprehensive power moves the will, and not the other way about.
4. One power is said to move another only because of the ability to command which it has over the other. But to command belongs to reason, as is said in *the Ethics*. It therefore belongs to reason to command the other powers and not to the will.
5. According to Augustine the mover and agent is nobler than the thing moved or made. But the intellect is nobler than the will, at least in regard to sensible things, as has been explained. At least in regard to these, then, it is not moved by the will.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. Anselm says that the will moves all the other powers of the soul.
- 2'. According to Augustine every motion proceeds from what is immovable. But among the powers of the soul the will is the only one which is immovable in the sense of not being able to be forced by anything. All the other powers of the soul are therefore moved by the will.
- 3'. According to the Philosopher every motion occurs for the sake of an end. But good and the end are the object of the will. The will, then, moves the other powers.
- 4'. According to Augustine, among spirits love does the same thing as weight among bodies. But weight moves bodies. Then the love of the will moves the spiritual powers of the soul.

REPLY:

In a way the intellect moves the will, and in a way the will moves the intellect and the other powers. For the clarification of this it should be noted that both an end and an efficient cause are said to move, but in different ways. Two things are to be taken into account in any action, the agent and the reason for acting. In heating, the agent is fire and the reason for acting is heat. Similarly in moving, the end is said to move as the reason for moving, but the efficient cause, as the one producing the movement that is, the one which brings the subject of the motion from potency to act.

The reason for acting is the form of the agent by which it acts. It must accordingly be in the agent for it to act. It is not there, however, according to its perfect act of being; for when that is had the motion comes to rest. But it is in the agent by way of an intention, for the end is prior in intention but posterior in being. Thus the end pre-exists in the mover in a proper sense intellectually (for it belongs to intellect to receive something by way of an intention) and not according to its real existence. Hence the intellect moves the will in the way in which an end is said to move—by conceiving beforehand the reason for acting and proposing it to the will.

To move in the manner of an efficient cause, however, belongs to the will and not to the intellect; for the will is referred to things as they are in themselves, whereas the intellect is referred to them as existing spiritually in the soul. Now to act and to move pertain to things according to their own act of being by which they subsist in themselves not according as they exist in the soul in the manner of an intention. It is not heat in the soul which heats, but that which is in fire. Thus the will is referred to things as subject to motion, but not the intellect. Furthermore the act of the will is an inclination to some thing, but not that of the intellect. But an inclination is the disposition of something that moves other things as an efficient cause moves. It is accordingly evident that the will has the function of moving in the manner of an agent cause; not, however, the intellect.

The higher powers of the soul, because immaterial are capable of reflecting upon themselves. Both the will and the intellect, therefore, reflect upon themselves upon each other, upon the essence of the soul, and upon all its powers. The intellect understands itself and the will and the essence of the soul and all the soul's powers. Similarly the will wills that it will, that the intellect understand, that the soul be, and so of the other powers. Now when one power is brought to bear upon another it is referred to that other according to what is proper to itself. When the intellect understands that the will is willing, it receives within itself the intelligible character of willing. When the will is brought to bear upon the other powers of the soul, it is directed to them as things to which motion and operation belong, and it inclines each to its own operation. Thus the will moves in the manner of an efficient cause not only external things but also the very Powers of the soul.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Since there is in reflection a certain similarity to circular motion, in which what is last is the same as what was originally the beginning, we must so express ourselves in regard to reflection that what was originally prior then becomes posterior. And so, although the intellect is prior to the will when taken absolutely, it nonetheless becomes posterior to the will by reflection. Thus the will can move the intellect.
- 2.** There is no necessity of going on to infinity, for we stop at the natural appetite by which the intellect is inclined to its act.
- 3.** The argument shows that the intellect moves in the manner of an end, for this is the bearing of the apprehended good upon the will. Command belongs to both will and reason but in different respects. It belongs to the will in so far as a command implies an inclination; it belongs to reason in so far as this inclination is distributed and ordained to be carried out by this or that individual.
- 5.** Any power surpasses another in what is proper to itself. Thus touch is referred to heat, which it senses in itself, in a more perfect way than sight, which sees it only by accident. Similarly the intellect is referred to truth more completely than the will; and conversely, the will is referred to the good in things more perfectly than the intellect. Hence, although the intellect is nobler than the will absolutely, at least in regard to some things, nevertheless under the aspect of moving, which belongs to the will by reason of the distinctive characteristic of its object, the will is found to be nobler.

ARTICLE XIII: IS INTENTION AN ACT OF THE WILL?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 38, 1, 3; Sum. Theol., I-II, 12, I.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. In regard to the words of Luke (II:34): "The light of thy body is thy eye," the Gloss explains: "That is, 'thy intention.' "1 But the eye in the soul is reason or the intellect. Intention therefore pertains to reason or the intellect, not to the will.
2. The answer was given that it pertains to the will as subordinated to reason and in this respect is compared to an eye.—On the contrary, the act of a higher and prior power does not depend upon that of a posterior power. The will, however, is prior to the intellect in acting, because it moves the intellect, as has been said. Then the act of the will does not depend upon reason. If intention were an act of the will, it would therefore in no way pertain to reason.
3. The answer was given that the act of the will does depend upon reason in this respect, that knowledge of the thing willed is a prerequisite for willing; and so, although intention is an act of the will, it nevertheless does in some sense belong to reason. On the contrary, there is no act of the will for which knowledge is not a prerequisite. Consequently, according to the proposed solution no act should be attributed to the will simply, not even willing and loving, but to will and reason together. This, however, is false. Then so is the preceding contention that intention is an act of the will.
4. The very name intention implies a relation to an end. But it belongs to reason to refer anything to an end. Intention therefore belongs to reason and not to will.
5. It was maintained in answer that there is in intention not only a relation to an end but also an act of the will which is referred to the end, and that both are meant by the name intention. On the contrary, that act is made the substratum of the relation to an end as a material principle is made that of the formal. But a thing takes its name from its formal rather than its material principle. Intention accordingly takes its name rather from what belongs to reason than from what belongs to will, and so it should be held to be an act of reason rather than of will.
6. Reason directs the will just as the prime mover directs the whole of nature. But the intention in the things of nature is more properly attributed to the prime mover than to the things of nature themselves, since these are said to intend something only in so far as they are directed by the prime mover. Then among the powers of the soul too, intention should be attributed to reason rather than to the will.
7. Properly speaking there is an intention only in a knower. But the will is not a knower. Intention therefore does not belong to the will.
8. There cannot be a single act of things that are in no sense one. But the will and reason are in no sense one, since they even belong to different genera of powers of the soul: the will is in the appetitive genus and reason is in the intellective. Consequently reason and the will cannot have a single act; and so, if intention is in any sense an act of reason, it will not be an act of the will.
9. According to the Philosopher "willing has as its object only the end." But in a single order there is only a single end. The will in its act, then, is referred to only one thing. But where

there is only one thing, there is no order. Since intention implies order, it therefore seems that it in no sense belongs w the will.

10. Intention seems to be nothing but the direction of the will to the last end. But it belongs to reason to direct the will. Intention therefore belongs to reason.

11. In the perversity of sin error belongs to reason, contempt to the irascible power, and the inordinacy of will to the concupiscible. In the reformation of the soul, on the other hand, faith belongs to reason, hope to the irascible power, and charity to the concupiscible. But according to Augustine it is faith which "directs the intention." Intention therefore belongs to reason.

12. According to the Philosopher the will is referred to both possibles and impossibles, but intention only w possibles. Intention does not, then, belong to the will.

13. What is not in the soul is not in the will. Now intention is not in the soul, because it is not a power (for then it would be natural, and there would be no merit in it), nor is it a habit (for then it would be in one asleep), nor is it a passion (for then it would pertain to the sensitive part, as is apparent from what the Philosopher says Since there are in the soul only these three, as is said in the Ethics, intention is not in the will.

14. To order is the function of reason, since this belongs to the will man, as is said in the Metaphysics. But intention is an ordination to an end. It therefore is the function of reason.

15. Intention is referred to what is distant from an end, since distance is implied in the [latin] preposition in [here used as a prefix]. But reason is more distant from the end than is the will, because reason merely points out the end, whereas the will clings to the end as its proper object. Intending, then, belongs to reason rather than to the will.

16. Every act of the will belongs to it either absolutely, or by a reference to higher powers, or by a reference to lower powers. Now intending is not an act of the will absolutely, because in that case it would be the same as willing or loving. Nor is intending its act by a reference to a higher power, reason, for in that reference its act is to choose. Nor is it so by a reference to lower powers, since its act in that reference is to command Intending is therefore in no will an act of the will.

To the Contrary:

1'. Intention is referred Only to the end. But the end and good are the object of the will. Intention therefore pertains to the will.

2'. Intending is a sort of pursuing. But pursuit and flight pertain to the will, not to reason. To reason it belongs only to say that some thing should be pursued or fled. Intention accordingly belongs to the will.

3'. All merit is situated in the will. But intention is meritorious, and chiefly on the basis of it merit and demerit are reckoned. Hence intention is a function of the will.

4'. Ambrose says: "Affection gives the name to your work." But an act is judged to be good or bad from the intention. The intention is therefore Contained in affection, and so it seems to belong to the will and not to reason.

REPLY:

Intention is an act of the will. This shows up very clearly from its object. A power and its act must agree in their object, since a power is referred to the object only through the act.. Thus for the power of sight and for Vision there must be the same object, colour. Now since the object of the act of intention is the good which is an end, and this is also the object of the will,

intention must be an act of the will. It is, however, an act of the will, not absolutely but in subordination to reason.

That this may be seen clearly it should be noted that, whenever there are two agents standing in an order, the second agent can move or act in two ways: (1) according to what belongs to its own nature, and (2) according to what belongs to the nature of the higher agent. The influence of the higher agent remains in the lower, and for this reason the lower acts not only by its own action but also by the action of the higher. The sphere of the sun, for example, moves by its own motion, which is completed in the course of a year, and by the motion of the first mobile, which is the motion of one day. In like fashion water moves by its own motion, tending to the center, and it has a motion from the influence of the moon moving it, as is revealed in the tides. Compounds also have certain reactions proper to them selves which are based upon the natures of the four elements, such as to tend downward, to heat, and to cool; and they have other operations from the influence of the heavenly bodies, as a magnet attracts iron.

Though no action of the lower agent takes place unless that of the higher agent is presupposed, nevertheless the action which belongs to it in accordance with its own nature is attributed to it absolutely, as it is attributed to water to move downward; but that which belongs to it from the influence of the higher agent is not attributed to it absolutely but only with reference to something else. Thus the ebb and flow of the tides are said to be the proper motion of the sea, not in so far as it is water, but in so far as it is moved by the moon.

Now reason and the will are operative powers related to each other. Viewed absolutely, reason is prior, although by reflection the will is made prior and superior inasmuch as it moves reason.

The will can accordingly have two types of acts. (1) It has one which belongs to it according to its own nature inasmuch as it tends to its own object absolutely. This act is attributed to the will without qualification, e.g., to will and to love, although even for this act the action of reason is presupposed. (2) It has another type of act which belongs to it inasmuch as the influence of reason is left in the will. Since the proper function of reason is to order and compare, whenever there appears in the act of the will any comparison or ordering, such an act does not belong to the will absolutely but in subordination to reason. It is in this way that intending is an act of the will, since to intend seems to be nothing but to tend from what one wills to some thing else as to an end. Thus intending differs from willing in this, that willing tends to an end absolutely whereas intending expresses a reference to an end inasmuch as the end is that to which the means are referred. Since the will is moved to its object as proposed to it by reason, it is moved in various ways according as the object is variously proposed. When reason proposes something to it as a good absolutely, the will is moved to it absolutely. This is willing. When reason proposes something to it under the aspect of a good to which other things are referred as to an end, then the will tends to it with a certain order, which is found in the act of the will, not in accordance with its own nature, but in accordance with the demands of reason. In this way intending is an act of the will in subordination to reason.

Answers to Difficulties:

Intention is likened to an eye as regards the characteristic of reason which is found in it.

2. Reason moves the will in a certain sense, and the will in a certain sense moves reason, as is evident from what has been said. Thus each one is higher than the other in a different respect, and to each can be attributed an act in subordination to the other.

3. Although any act of the will presupposes knowledge on the part of reason, nevertheless there does not always appear in the act of the will what is proper to reason, as is clear from what has been said. Hence the argument proves nothing.

4. An active relation to the end belongs to reason, for it is its function to refer or relate to an end. But a passive relation can belong w whatever is directed or referred to an end by reason, and so it can also belong w the will. It is in this sense that the relation to an end pertains to intention.
5. From what has just been said the answer is clear.
6. In the prime mover there is found not only knowledge but also will, and so intention can properly be attributed to it. But only knowledge belongs to reason. The case is accordingly not the same.
7. Intending also has to do w non-cognitive beings, since even the things of nature intend an end, even though intention supposes some knowledge. But if we speak of an intention of the soul, this has to do only w cognitive beings, as does willing. Yet it is not necessary that intending and willing be acts of the same power as knowing, but merely of the same Supposite. Properly speaking, it is not a power which knows or intends, but the supposite through a power.
8. Reason and the will are one by order, just as the universe is said to be one. In this case nothing prevents a single act from belonging w both, to one immediately, to the other mediate.
9. Although the will is chiefly concerned w the end in view of the fact that the means are desired only for the sake of the end, nevertheless the will is also concerned w the means to the end. The state merit of the Philosopher that "the will is concerned w the end; choice, w the means," does not mean that the will is always directed to the end, but merely sometimes and chiefly. From the fact that choice is never directed to the end it is shown that choosing and Willing are not the same thing.
10. Active direction to an end belongs to reason, but passive direction to an end can belong w will. In the latter way it belongs to intention.
11. Faith directs our intention as reason directs our will. Intention accordingly is a function of the will as faith is of reason.
12. The will is not always concerned w impossibles but merely sometimes. In conformity w the Philosopher's meaning this suffices to show the difference between willing and choice, which is always concerned w possibles; that is, it shows that to choose is not altogether the same as to will. Similarly, neither is to intend altogether the same as to will. But this does not keep it from being an act of the will.
13. Intention is an act of the soul. But in that threefold division proposed by the Philosopher the actions of the soul are not included, because actions do not belong to the soul as being in the soul but rather as being from the soul.—Or it may be said that actions are included under habits as that which proceeds from a principle is contained within its principle.
14. To order is the function of reason, but to be ordered can be the function of the will. In this way intention implies ordering.
15. That argument would prove something if nothing else were required for intention besides mere distance. But along w distance there is required an inclination; and that inclination is in the province of the will, not of reason. Hence the conclusion does not follow.
16. Intention is an act of the will in subordination to reason as it directs to an end the means to it. Choice is an act of the will in subordination to reason as it compares among themselves the means to an end. On this account intention and choice also differ.

ARTICLE XIV: DOES THE WILL IN THE SAME MOTION WILL THE END AND INTEND THE MEANS?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 38, I, 4; Sum. Theol., I-II, 8, 3; 12, 4.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. It is impossible for the same act to be at the same time good and bad. But it sometimes happens that there is a bad act of will with a good intention, as when someone wishes to steal in order to give an aim. Intending and willing are therefore not the same act.
2. According to the Philosopher a motion which terminates in the mean and one which terminates in the extreme are specifically different. But the means to an end and the end are related about as the mean and the extreme. The intention of the end and the willing of the means are therefore specifically different, and so they are not a single act.
3. According to the Philosopher, in practical matters ends are comparable to principles in demonstrative sciences. But the act of the speculative intellect by which it understands principles is not the same as that by which it sees conclusions. This is shown by the fact that they are elicited from different habits; for understanding is the habit of principles, and science, that of conclusions. Then in matters of operation it is not the same act of the will by which we intend the end and will the means.
4. Acts are distinguished by their objects. But the end and the means are distinct. The intention of the end and the willing of the means are therefore not the same act.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. There cannot be two acts of the same power at the same time. But while the will is willing the means, it is at the same time intending the end. The intention of the end and the willing of the means are therefore not distinct acts.
- 2'. The end is the reason for the appetibility of the means just as light is the reason for the visibility of colour. But in the same act sight sees colour and light. In the same act, therefore, the will wills the means and intends the end.

REPLY:

Concerning this question there are two Opinions, as the Master of the Sentences says. Some have said that the willing of the means to an end and the intention of the end are distinct acts. Others, on the contrary, have said that they are one and the same act but that their distinction comes merely from the difference in things. Each of these Opinions is in some respect true.

In clarification of this it should be noted that, since the unity of an act is to be judged from the unity of its object, if there are any two things which are one in any sense, an act which is directed to them under the aspect of their unity will be one. But an act which is directed to them under the aspect of their duality will be two different acts. Take for example the parts of a line, which are in some sense two and in some sense one—as they are united in the whole. If an act of vision is directed to the two parts of the line as two, that is, to each one under the aspect of what is proper to it, there will be two acts of seeing, and the two parts will not be able to be seen at the same time. But if our vision is directed to the whole line embracing both parts, it will be a single act of seeing, and the whole line will be seen at once.

Now all things that are arranged in an order are, indeed, many in so far as they are things viewed in themselves, but they are one in regard to the order in which they are arranged. An act of the soul which is directed to them from the point of view of their order is accordingly one. But an act which is directed to them as considered in themselves is manifold. This distinction shows up in a viewing of the statue of Mercury. If one looks upon it as a thing in itself, one's attention will in one act be directed to it, and in another to Mercury, whose image the statue is. But if one looks upon the statue as the image of Mercury, in the same act one's attention will be directed to the statue and to Mercury.

Similarly when the motion of the will is directed to the end and to the means, if it is directed to them inasmuch as each is a certain thing existing by itself, there will be a distinct motion of the will for each. In this way the opinion which says that the intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct acts is true. But if the will is directed to one as having an ordination to the other, there is a single act of the will in regard to both. In this way the other opinion, which holds that the intention of the end and the willing of the means are one and the same act, is true.

Now if the essential character of intention is rightly examined, the latter opinion is found to be truer than the former. For the motion of the will toward an end taken absolutely is not called an intention, but it is called willing without further qualification. But an inclination of the will to an end as being that in which the means terminate is called an intention. A person who wants health is said simply to will it. He is said to intend it only when he wills something else on account of health. And so it must be granted that intention is not an act numerically distinct from willing.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. A single act cannot be both good and bad; yet there can be a good circumstance of a bad act. The act is vicious if a person eats more than he should, though he may eat when he should. Thus the act of will by which someone wishes to steal in order to give food to a poor man is an act simply evil, yet having a good circumstance; for the reason for which something is done is listed as one of the circumstances.

2. The Philosopher's statement is to be understood as meaning:

when the motion stops in the mean. When it passes through the mean to the term, then the motion is numerically one. And so when the will is moved to a means subordinated to the end, there is a single motion.

3. When the conclusion and the principle are considered each by itself, there are distinct Considerations; but when the principle is considered in its relation to the conclusion, as happens in syllogizing, there is one and the same consideration of both.

4. The end and the means are one object in so far as one is considered in relation to the other.

ARTICLE XV: IS CHOICE AN ACT OF THE WILL?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, I, 2; Sum. Theol., I, 83, 3; In III Eth., 6, XII 452, 456; 9, flfl. 484, 486; in Vi Eth., 2, nn. 1129, 1133 Sum. Theol., I-II, 13, I.

Difficulties.

It seems that it is not, but rather of reason, for

1. Ignorance is not found in the will but in reason. But the perversity of a choice is a sort of ignorance. Hence also "every evil person is said to be ignorant" will the ignorance of choice, as is explained in the Ethics. Choice, then, pertains to reason.

2. Not only do inquiry and argumentation belong to reason but also conclusion. But a choice is, as it were, the conclusion of a deliberation, as is made clear in the Ethic. Since deliberation belongs to reason, choice will therefore also belong to reason.

3. According to the Philosopher the chief characteristic of moral virtue con in choice. But, as he himself says, in the moral virtues the part of prudence is the most important factor, adding the last formal determinant to the essential nature of virtue Choice therefore pertains to prudence. But prudence is in reason, and so choice also is.

4. Choice implies a certain discrimination. But to discriminate is a function of reason. Therefore to choose also is.

To the Contrary:

1'. To choose is, when two things are proposed, to want one in preference to the other, as Damascene explains. But to want is an act of the will, not of reason. Then so is to choose.

2'. The Philosopher says that choice is the desire of what has been previously deliberated. But desire is a function of the will, not of reason. Then so is choice.

REPLY:

Choice contains something of the will and something of reason. But the Philosopher seems to leave in doubt whether it is properly an act of the will or of reason, when he says that choice is an act either of the intellective appetite (that is, of appetite as subordinated to the intellect) or of the appetitive intellect (that is, of the intellect in sub ordination to appetite). The first, that it is an act of the will in subordination to reason, is the truer.

That it is directly an act of the will is clear from two considerations: (1) From the formality of its object. The proper object of choice is the means to an end, and this belongs to the formality of good, which is the object of the will. For both the end, such as the honorable or the pleasurable, and the means, namely, the useful, are called good. (2) From the formality of the act itself. Choice is the final acceptance of something to be carried out. This is not the business of reason but of will; for, however much reason puts one ahead of the other, there is not yet the acceptance of one in preference to the other as something to be done until the will inclines to the one rather than to the other. The will does not of necessity follow reason. Choice is nevertheless not an act of the will taken absolutely but in its relation to reason, because there appears in choice what is proper to reason: the comparing of one will the other or the putting of one before the other. This is, of course, found in the act of the will from the influence of reason: reason proposes something to the will, not as useful simply, but as the more useful to an end.

It is accordingly clear that the act of the will is to will, to choose, and to intend. It is to will in so far as reason proposes to the will some thing good absolutely, whether it is something to be chosen for itself, as an end, or because of something else, as a means. In either case we are said to will it. In so far as reason proposes to the will a good as the more useful to an end, the act is to choose. It is w intend in so far as reason proposes to the will a good as an end to be attained through a means.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Ignorance is attributed to choice on the basis of the part played in it by reason.

2. The Conclusion of a practical inquiry is of two kinds. One is in reason, and this is decision, the judgment about what has been deliberated upon. The other is in the will, and this is choice. It is called a conclusion by a sort of simile, because in speculative matters the discourse finally comes to rest in the conclusion, and in matters of operation it comes to rest in the doing.

3. Choice is said to be the principal element in moral virtue both from the point of view of the role of reason in it, and from that of the role of the will. Both are necessary for the essential character of moral virtue. Choice is called the principal element will reference to external acts. It is accordingly not necessary that choice be entirely an act of prudence, but it shares in the characteristics of prudence as it does in those of reason.

4. Discrimination is found in choice in accordance with what belongs to reason, whose distinctive characteristic the will follows in choosing, as has been said.

QUESTION 23: God's Will

ARTICLE I: DOES IT BELONG TO GOD TO HAVE A WILL?

Parallel readings: I Sentences 45, a. 1; [Contra Gentiles](#) 1, 72 & 73; IV, 19; Sum. Theol., I, 19, 1 Comp. Theol., I, 3 2-34.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. It belongs to everyone who has a will to act according to the choice of his will. But God does not act according to the choice of His will; for, as Dionysius says, just as our visible sun enlightens all things, not by reasoning or choosing, but by its very being, so too does the divine goodness. It therefore does not belong to God to have a will.

2. Necessary effects cannot come from a contingent cause. But the will is a contingent cause, since it is open to alternatives. It cannot, then, be the cause of necessary things. But God is the cause of all things, necessary as well as contingent. He therefore does not act through a will, and so the conclusion is the same as before.

3. Nothing which implies a reference to a cause belongs to that which has no cause. But since God is the first cause of all things, He has no cause. Now a will implies a relationship to a final cause, because the will is referred to an end, as the Philosopher says. It therefore seems that will does not pertain to God.

4. According to the Philosopher, what is voluntary deserves praise or blame; what is involuntary deserves pardon and mercy. Voluntariness therefore does not belong to anything to which praiseworthiness does not belong. But praiseworthiness does not belong to God because, as is said in [the Ethics](#), "praise is not for the best," but for those things which are directed to the best. Honor is for the best. It therefore does not belong to God to have a will.

5. Opposites have reference to the same thing. But two species of the involuntary are opposed to the voluntary, as is said in [the Ethics](#): the involuntary "from violence" and the involuntary "from ignorance." Now nothing involuntary from violence is attributable to God because

force cannot be applied to Him; nor is anything involuntary from ignorance, because He knows everything. Then neither is anything voluntary attributable to God.

6. As is said in The Rules of Faith, there are two kinds of will: affective, regarding internal acts, and effective, regarding external acts. Affective will works for merit, as is said there; effective will achieves merit. But it does not belong to God to merit. Then neither does it belong to Him in any way to have a will.

7. God is an unmoved mover because, in the words of Boethius, "while remaining immobile He communicates motion to all things." But a will is a moved mover, as is said in The Soul. Hence the Philosopher likewise argues from the principle that God is an unmoved mover to show that He moves only by being desired and known. It therefore does not belong to God to have a will.

8. Will is a sort of appetite, for it is included in the appetitive part of the soul. But appetite is an imperfection, since it is directed to what is not had, as Augustine points out. Since no imperfection is found in God, it therefore seems that it does not belong to Him to have a will.

9. Nothing that has reference to opposites seems to belong to God, since things having such reference are subject to generation and corruption. But God is far removed from these. Now the will has reference to opposites, since it is numbered among the rational powers, and these are open to opposite determinations according to the Philosopher." Will is therefore not attributable to God.

10. Augustine says that God is not disposed in one way to things when they are and in another when they are not. But when they are not, God does not want things to be; for, if He willed them to be, they would be. Therefore even when they are, God does not will them to be.

11. It is compatible will God to perfect but not to be perfected. It belongs to the will, however, to be perfected by good, as to the intellect to be perfected by truth. Will is therefore not compatible will God.

To the Contrary:

1^o. In one of the Psalms (113:3) it is said that the Lord "hath done all things whatsoever he would." From this it appears that He has a will and that created things exist by His will.

2^o. Happiness is found most perfectly in God. But happiness demands will, because according to Augustine a happy person is one "who has whatever he wishes and wishes no evil." Will therefore belongs to God.

3^o. Wherever more perfect conditions for willing are found, will exists in a more perfect way. But in God the conditions for willing are found most perfectly. In Him there is no separation of the will from its subject, because His essence is His will. There is no separation of the will from its act, because His action also is His essence. There is no separation of the will from the end, its object, because His will is His goodness. Therefore will is found most perfectly in God.

4^o. Will is the root of freedom. But freedom belongs especially to God. In the words of the Philosopher, "a free person is one who is for his own sake," and this is most true of God. Will is therefore found in God.

REPLY:

Will is most properly found in God. In support of this it should be noted that knowledge and will in a spiritual substance are founded upon its different relations to things. There is one relation of a spiritual substance to things according as the things are in some sense within the spiritual substance itself, not indeed in their own existence, as the ancients held, saying that

by earth we know earth and by water, water, etc., but in their distinctive intelligible design. "For a stone is not in the soul, but its species is" (that is, its intelligible design), as the Philosopher taught. Because the intelligible design of a being cannot be found by itself without a subject except in an immaterial substance, knowledge is not attributed to all things but only to immaterial beings. And the degree of knowledge parallels the degree of immateriality so that the things which are most immaterial are most capable of knowledge. Because their essence is immaterial, it serves them as a medium for knowing. Through His essence God knows Himself and all other things. Will, however, and any appetite is based upon the relation by which a spiritual substance is oriented to things as existing in themselves.

Inasmuch as it is characteristic of any being, whether material or immaterial, to have some reference to something else, it accordingly follows that it pertains to everything whatever to have an appetite, natural or animal or rational (that is, intellectual); but in different beings it is found in different ways. Since a thing has its reference to another being through something which it has within itself, its different ways of being referred to another correspond to the different ways in which it has something within itself.

Whatever is in material things is in them as bound up and compounded will matter. The reference of material beings to other things is accordingly not free but dependent upon the necessity of a natural disposition. Material beings are therefore not the cause of their own reference as if they directed themselves to the end to which they are in fact directed. They receive that direction from elsewhere, namely, the source from which they get their natural disposition. They are consequently able to have only a natural appetite.

In immaterial and knowing substances, on the other hand, there is found something in the pure state and not compounded or tied up will matter. This is proportioned to the degree of their immateriality. By this very fact, too, they are referred to things by a free reference of which they are the cause, directing themselves to that to which they are referred. It is accordingly their lot to do or seek something voluntarily and of their own accord. If the house in the mind of the builder were a material form having a determinate act of being, it would incline him only in accordance with its own determinate mode of existence. Hence the builder would not remain free to make the house or not, or to make it in this way or in some other. But because the form of the house in the mind of the builder is the plan of the house taken absolutely, of itself not disposed any more to existence than to non-existence or to existence in one particular way rather than in another as far as the accidental features of the house go, the builder's inclination in regard to making the house or not remains free.

In the case of a sentient spiritual substance, however, the forms, though received without matter, are nevertheless as a consequence of their being received in a bodily organ, not received altogether immaterially and without the conditions of matter. Their inclination is for this reason not altogether free, though they have a certain imitation or semblance of freedom. They incline appetitively to something by themselves inasmuch as they desire something as a result of their apprehension; but it does not lie within their competence to incline or not to incline to that which they desire. But in an intellectual nature, in which something is received altogether immaterially, the essence of a free inclination is found perfectly verified. And this free inclination is what constitutes the essential character of will.

Will is accordingly not attributed to material things, though natural appetite is. To a sensitive soul there is attributed not will but animal appetite. Only to an intellectual substance is will attributed; and the more immaterial this substance is, the more the essence of will belongs to it. Consequently, since God is at the extreme of immateriality, the essential character of will supremely and most properly belongs to Him.

Answers to Difficulties:

2. By the words cited Dionysius does not mean to exclude will and choice from God but to show His universal influence upon things. God does not communicate His goodness to things in such a way that He chooses certain ones to receive a share in His goodness and excludes others completely from a share in it; but He "giveth to all abundantly," as is said in the Epistle of St. James (1:5). He is, however, said to choose in this respect, that in the order of His wisdom he gives more to some than to others.

2. The will of God is not a contingent cause, inasmuch as what He wills He wills immutably. By reason of its very immutability necessary things can be caused. This is of particular importance since of itself no created thing is necessary but is possible in itself and necessary through something else.

3. The will is directed to something in two ways: (1) principally, and (2) secondarily. Principally the will is directed to the end, which is the reason for willing everything else. Secondarily it is directed to the means, which we want for the sake of the end. Now the will does not stand in a relationship of an effect to a cause in regard to its secondary object, but only in regard to its principal object, the end. It should be noticed, however, that the will and its object are sometimes really distinct, and in that case the object is related to the will as its real final cause. But if the will and its object are only conceptually distinct, the object will then not be the final cause of the will except according to our way of expressing it.

The divine will is accordingly referred to God's goodness as to an end, whereas the two are really identical. They are distinguished only in our manner of speaking. There accordingly remains only the conclusion that nothing is really the cause of the divine will, but it is a cause only in our manner of designating it. Nor is it out of place for something to be designated after the manner of a cause in regard to God. It is in this way for instance, that deity is spoken of as if it were related to God as His formal cause.

The created things which God wills, however, are not related to the divine will as ends but as directed to an end. God wills creatures to exist in order that His goodness may be manifested in them, and that His goodness, which in its essence cannot be multiplied, may be poured out upon many at least by a participation through likeness.

4. If praise is taken strictly, as the Philosopher takes it, it is not due to the will in every one of its acts but only in that in which the will regards the means to an end. It is clear that an act of the will is found not only in virtuous deeds, which are praiseworthy, but also in the act of happiness, which is concerned with honorable things; for happiness obviously involves pleasure. And yet praise is attributed to God too, since we are invited in many places in Holy Scripture to praise God. But in this case praise is taken more broadly than the Philosopher takes it.—Or it can be said that praise, even in its proper sense, is attributable to God in so far as by His will He directs creatures to Himself as their end.

5. [This answer is lacking.]

6. There is in God both affective and effective will, for I-le wills to will and He wills to do what He does. But it is not necessary that, wherever there is either one of these types of will, merit be found, but only in an imperfect nature which is tending to perfection.

7. When the object of the will is distinct from the will itself, the object really moves the will. But when it is identical with the will, then it moves it only in our way of speaking. And in regard to this way of speaking, in the opinion of the Commentator⁷ there is verified the saying of Plato⁸ that the first mover moves itself inasmuch as it understands and wills itself. Nor does it follow from the fact that God wills creatures to be that He is moved by creatures, because He does not will the creatures except by reason of His own goodness, as has been said.

8. It is by one and the same nature that a thing both moves toward a term which it does not yet possess and reposes in a term which it has already come to possess. It is accordingly the function of one and the same power to tend to a good when it is not yet had, and to love it and take pleasure in it after it is had. Both belong to the appetitive power, though it gets its name rather from that act by which it tends to what it does not have. That is why appetite is said to belong to what is imperfect. But will is equally applicable to both. Hence will in its proper meaning is attributable to God, but not appetite.

9. It is not compatible will God to have reference to opposites as regards the things that are in His essence; but He can have opposite dispositions as regards His effects in creatures, which He can produce or not.

10. Even when God is not producing things, He wants things to be; but He does not want them to be at that time. The argument accordingly proceeds from a false supposition.

11. God cannot really be perfected by anything; yet in our manner of expressing it He is sometimes referred to as being perfected by something; for example, when I say that God understands something. The intelligible object is the perfection of the intellect just as the willed object is the perfection of the will. In God, however, the first intelligible object and the intellect are identical, and also the first object willed and the will.

ARTICLE II: CAN THE DIVINE WILL BE DISTINGUISHED INTO ANTECEDENT AND CONSEQUENT?

Parallel readings: I Sentences 46, a. 47, aa. 2 & 3; In Timoth., c. 2, lectura 1; Sum Theol., I, 19, 6 ad 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it cannot, for

1. Order presupposes distinction. But in the divine will there is no distinction, since in one simple act it wills everything which it wills. Therefore antecedent and consequent, when imply order, are not found in the divine will.

2. The answer was given that, although there is no distinction in the divine will on the part of the one willing, there is on the part of the things willed. On the contrary, order can be held to be in the will on the part of the things willed in only two ways: either in regard to different things willed or in regard to one and the same thing willed. If this order is taken in regard to different things willed, it follows that the will will be said to be antecedent concerning the first creatures and consequent concerning those which follow. But this is false. If, however, this order is taken in regard to one and the same thing willed, this can only be according to different circumstances considered in that thing. But this cannot put any distinction or order in the will, since the will is referred to the thing as existing in its own nature whereas the thing in its own nature is enmeshed in all its conditions. In no sense, therefore, should antecedent and consequent be affirmed of the divine will.

3. Knowledge and power are referred to creatures in just the same way as will. But we do not distinguish God's knowledge and power into antecedent and consequent on the basis of the order of creatures. Then neither should His will be so distinguished.

4. Whatever is not subject to change or hindrance by another is not judged according to that other but only in itself. Now the divine will cannot be changed or hindered by anything. It should not, therefore, be judged according to anything else but only in itself. But according to

Damascene "antecedent will" is spoken of in God "as arising from Him; consequent will, as arising because of us." Consequent will should therefore not be distinguished in God from antecedent will.

5. In the affective power there does not seem to be any order except that derived from the cognitive, because order pertains to reason. But we do not attribute to God ordered cognition, which is reasoning, but rather simple cognition, which is understanding. Then neither should we affirm the order of antecedent and consequent of His will.

6. Boethius says that God "beholds all things in a single look of His mind." In like fashion, then, will one simple act of His will He reaches out to everything which He wills; and so antecedent and consequent should not be affirmed of His will.

7. God knows things in Himself and in their own nature; and al though they are in their own nature only after being in the Word, even so the distinction of antecedent and consequent is not affirmed of God's knowledge. Then neither should it be affirmed of His will.

8. The divine will, like the divine existence, is measured by eternity.

But the duration of the divine existence, because measured by eternity, is all simultaneous, having no before and after. Then neither should antecedent and consequent be placed in the divine will.

To the Contrary:

1'. Damascene says that it should be noted that "God wills all to be saved by His antecedent will," and not by His consequent will, as he adds just afterwards. The distinction of antecedent and consequent therefore applies to the divine will.

2'. There is in God an eternal habitual will inasmuch as He is God, and an actual will inasmuch as He is the Creator, willing things actually to be. But this latter will is compared to the former as consequent to antecedent. Antecedent and consequent are therefore found in the divine will.

REPLY:

The divine will is fittingly distinguished into antecedent and consequent. An understanding of this distinction is to be got from the words of Damascene, who introduced it. He says: "Antecedent will is God's acceptance of something on His own account," whereas "consequent will is a concession on our account."

For the clarification of this point it should be noted that in any action there is something to be considered on the part of the agent and something on the part of the recipient. The agent is prior to the product and more important. Thus what pertains to the maker is naturally prior to what pertains to the thing made. It is evident in the operation of nature, for instance, that the production of a perfect animal depends upon the formative power, which is found in the semen; but it occasionally happens because of the matter receiving it, which is sometimes indisposed, that a perfect animal is not produced. This happens, for example, in the births of monsters. We accordingly say that it is by the primary intention of nature that a perfect animal is produced, but that the production of an imperfect animal is by the secondary intention of nature, which gives to the matter what it is capable of receiving, since it is unable because of the indisposition of the matter to give it the form of the perfect state.

In God's operation in regard to creatures similar factors must be taken into account. Though in His operation He requires no matter, and created things originally without any pre-existing matter, nevertheless He now works in the things which He first created, governing them in accordance with the nature which He previously gave them.

And although He could remove from His creatures every obstacle by which they are made incapable of perfection, yet in the order of His wisdom He disposes of things conformably to their state, giving to each one in accordance with its own capacity.

That to which God has destined the creature as far as He is concerned is said to be willed by Him in a primary intention or antecedent will. But when the creature is held back from this end because of its own failure, God nonetheless fulfils in it that amount of goodness of which it is capable. This pertains to His secondary intention and is called His consequent will. Because, then, God has made all men for happiness, He is said to will the salvation of all by His antecedent will. But because some work against their own salvation, and the order of His wisdom does not admit of their attaining salvation in view of their failure, He fulfils in them in another way the demands of His goodness, damning them out of justice. As a result, falling short of the first order of His will, they thus slip into the second. And although they do not do God's will, His will is still fulfilled in them. But the failure constituting sin, by which a person is made deserving of punishment here and now or in the future, is not itself willed by God will either an antecedent or a consequent will; it is merely permitted by Him.

It should not, however, be concluded from what has just been said that God's intention can be frustrated, because from all eternity God has foreseen that the one who is not saved would not be saved. Nor did He ordain that particular one for salvation in the order of pre destination which is the order of His absolute will. But as far as He was concerned He gave that creature a nature intended for happiness.

Answers to Difficulties.

- 1.** In the divine will neither the order nor the distinction is in the act of the will but only in the things willed.
- 2.** The order of the divine will is not based upon the different objects of the will but upon the different factors found in one and the same object. For example, by His antecedent will God wants a certain man to be saved by reason of his human nature, which He made for salvation; but by His consequent will He wishes him to be damned because of the sins which are found in him. Now although the thing to which the act of the will is directed exists with all its conditions, it is not necessary that every one of those Conditions which are found in the object should be the reason which moves the will. Wine, for instance, does not move the appetite of the drinker by reason of its power of inebriating but by reason of its sweetness, although both factors are found together in it.
- 3.** The divine will is the immediate principle of creatures, ordering the divine attributes (as we must conceive the matter) in so far as they are applied to operation; for no power passes into operation unless it is regulated by knowledge and determined by the will to do something. The order of things is accordingly referred to God's will rather than to His power or knowledge.—Or the answer may be given that the essence of willing consists in a reference of the one willing to things themselves, as has been said. But things are said to be known or possible for a given agent in so far as they are within its knowledge or its power. Things do not have any order as they are in God but as they are in themselves. Thus the order of things is not attributed to His knowledge or to His power but only to His will.
- 4.** Although the divine will is not hindered or changed by anything else, yet in the order of wisdom it is directed to a thing in accordance with its state. In this way something is attributed to the divine will because of us.
- 5.** That difficulty argues from the order of the will on the part of its act. But the order of antecedent and consequent is not found in it from that point of view.
- 6.** The same is to be said here.

7. Although a thing has existence in its own nature after it has it in God, it is not, however, known by God in its own nature after it is known in Him, because by the very fact of knowing His own essence God beholds things both as they are in Himself and as they are in their own nature.

8. Antecedent and consequent are not affirmed of God's will for the purpose of implying any succession (for that is repugnant to eternity), but to denote a diversity in its reference to the things willed.

ARTICLE III: IS GOD'S WILL SUITABLY DIVIDED INTO HIS EMBRACING WILL AND HIS INDICATIVE WILL?

Parallel reasngs: I Sentences 45, a. 4; Sum. Theol., 1, 19, II & 12.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

2. What is done in creatures is a sign or indication not only of the divine will but also of the divine knowledge and power. But knowledge and power are not distinguished into power and knowledge which are God's essence and those which are indications of it. Then neither should God's will be thus distinguished into His embracing will (*voluntas beneplaciti*) which is the divine essence, and His indicative will (*voluntas signi*).

2. By the fact that God wishes something by His embracing will it is shown that the act of the divine will is brought to bear upon it will the result that it is pleasing to God. Then that upon which His indicative will is brought to bear is either pleasing to God or not. If it is pleasing to God, then He wills it will His embracing will; and in that case His indicative will should not be distinguished from His embracing will. If, however, it is not something pleasing to God, it is nevertheless designated as pleasing to Him by His indicative will; and consequently the indication of the divine will is false. And so in the true doctrine such indications of the divine will should not be affirmed.

3. Every will is in the one willing. But whatever is in God is the divine essence. Consequently, if indicative will is attributed to God, it will be the same as the divine essence. In this way it will not be distinguished from His embracing will; for that will is said to be embracing which is the very divine essence, as the Master says.

4. Whatever God wills is good. But the indication of His will ought to correspond to the divine will. There should therefore not be an indication of His will concerning evil. Since permission concerns evil, and likewise prohibition, it therefore seems that indications of the divine will should not be affirmed.

5. Not only are good and better found but also bad and worse. But on the basis of good and better two sorts of indicative will are distinguished: precept, which concerns good, and counsel, which concerns a better good. Then two signs or indications of will should be affirmed in regard to bad and worse.

6. God's will is more inclined to good than to evil. But the indication of will which regards evil, permission, can never be frustrated. Then precept and counsel, too, which are referred to good, should not be subject to frustration. Yet this is evidently false.

7. Things that stand in a sequence of dependence should not be opposed. But God's embracing will and His operation stand in a sequence of dependence; for God does not do

anything which He does not will with His embracing will, and He wills nothing in creatures will His embracing will which He does not do, according to the words of the Psalm (1 13:3): "[The Lord] hath done all things what so ever he would." God's operation should therefore not be listed under His indicative will, which is opposed to His embracing will.

REPLY:

In matters dealing will God there are two different ways of speaking: (1) In proper language. This is found when we attribute to God what pertains to Him in His own nature, although it always pertains to Him in a way that goes beyond what we conceive in our minds or express in speech. For this reason none of our language about God can be proper in the full sense. (2) In figurative, transferred, or symbolic language. Because God, as He is in Himself, exceeds the grasp of our mind, we must speak of Him by means of the things that are found in our world. Thus we apply the names of sensible things to God, calling Him light or a lion or something of the sort. The truth of such expressions is founded on the fact that no creature "is deprived altogether of participation in good," as Dionysius says. In every creature there are to be found certain properties representing the divine goodness in some respect. Thus the name is transferred to God inasmuch as the thing signified by the name is a sign of the divine goodness. Any sign, then, that is used instead of what is signified in speaking of God is a figurative expression.

Both of these two ways of speaking are used in regard to the divine will. There is found in God in a proper sense the formal character of will, as was said above; and so will is properly predicated of God. This is His embracing will (*voluntas beneplaciti*), which is distinguished into antecedent and consequent, as has been said. Because, however, will in us has some passion of the soul consequent upon it, the name of the will is predicated of God metaphorically like the names of the other passions. The name of anger is applied to God because there is found in Him an effect which is commonly that of an angry person among us, namely, punishment. As a consequence the punishment itself which God inflicts is called God's anger. In like manner whatever is commonly a sign or indication of will among us is called the will of God. For this reason we speak of His indicative will (*voluntas signi*) because the sign itself which is usually the sign or indication of the will is called will.

Now since the will can be considered both as prescribing a course of action and as setting the work in motion, in either sense certain signs are attributed to the will. From the viewpoint of its proposing a course of action regarding flight from evil, its sign is a prohibition. Regarding the pursuit of good there are two signs of the will. If the good is necessary and the will cannot attain its end without it, the sign of the will is a command. If the good is useful and by it the end can be acquired in an easier and more suitable fashion, the sign of the will is a counsel. From the viewpoint of setting the work in motion two signs are attributed to the will. One is express, and this is an operation; for the fact that a person does something indicates that he expressly wills it. The other is an interpretative sign, permission; for anyone who does not forbid what he can prevent, when interpreted seems to consent to it. This is what the name permission implies.

Answers to Difficulties

1. Although God is capable of doing all things and knows all things, yet He does not will all things. Consequently besides the signs found in creatures, by which it is shown that He is knowing, powerful, and willing, certain signs are ascribed to I-his will to show what God wills and not only the fact that He is willing. Or it may be said that knowledge and power are not accompanied by a passion, as the will is in our case. Thus the will comes closer to the things which are said metaphorically of God than do either power or knowledge. And so the

signs of will we call will, metaphorically speaking, more than we call the signs of knowledge and power knowledge and power.

2. Although God does not will everything that He commands or permits, yet He does will something concerning it. He wills that we be obliged to what He commands and that there be in our power what He permits. It is this divine will which the command or permission signifies.

Or the answer can be given that His indicative will is not so called because it means that God wills the matter itself, but because what is ordinarily the indication of a will in our case is called will. It is not necessary that what is usually the sign of a certain thing be false when its usual term of reference does not correspond to it, but only when it is used in that signification. Although among us to command something is the sign of our willing it, yet is not necessary, whenever either God or man commands something, for him to signify that he wishes it to be. It consequently does not follow that it is a false sign.

That is why there is not always a falsehood in our actions whenever an action which usually signifies something is performed and that signification is not there. But in our words, if what they signify does not underlie them, there is necessarily falsity, because words have been instituted for the very purpose of being signs. Hence, if what is signified does not correspond to them, there is falsity there. Actions, on the other hand, have not been instituted to serve as signs but to get something done. That they signify anything is quite accidental to them. There is consequently not always falsity in them if what is usually signified does not correspond. There can be falsity only when they are made use of by the agent in order to signify something.

3. Indicative will is not in God but is from God; for it is an effect of God such as we usually term, when the effect of a man, that man's will.

4. Although the will of God does not concern evil with a view to its being done, it nevertheless does concern evil with a view to preventing it by forbidding it, or with a view to putting it within our power by permitting it.

5. Since everything to which the will tends has a relation to the end which is the reason for willing, but all evils lack a relation to that end, all evils are on the same footing not only in regard to the end but also in regard to the divine will. But to goods, which are referred to the end, the will stands in different relations according to the different relation which they have to the end. For this reason there are different indications for the good and the better, but not for the bad and the worse.

6. God's indicative will is not opposed to His embracing will on the basis of fulfilment and non-fulfilment. Although His embracing will is always fulfilled, something which is fulfilled can also belong to His indicative will. Hence, even the matters which God commands or counsels He sometimes wills with an embracing will. But His indicative will is distinguished from His embracing will because the one is God Himself, the other is an effect of His, as has already been explained.

It should be noted that God's indicative will is related to His embracing will in three ways: (1) there is an indicative will which never coincides with an embracing will, as the permission by which God permits evil to be done, since He never wills evil to be done; (2) there is another which always coincides, as an operation; (3) there is an other which sometimes coincides, sometimes not, as a precept, a prohibition, or a counsel.

7. This answer is clear from the above.

ARTICLE IV: DOES GOD OF NECESSITY WILL WHATEVER HE WILLS?

Parallel readings: [Contra Gentiles](#) I, 80-83; 11, 28; III, De potentia I, 5; b, 2 ad 6; Sum. Theol., I, 19, 3 & 10; Comp. Theol., I, 96.

Difficulties:

It seems that He does, for

- 1.** Everything that is eternal is necessary. But from eternity God wills whatever He wills. Therefore of necessity He wills whatever He wills.
- 2.** The answer was given that God's willing is necessary and eternal on the part of the One willing both from the viewpoint of the act of will, which is the divine essence, and from that of the reason for willing, which is the divine goodness; but not under the aspect of the relation of the will to the thing willed. On the contrary, the very fact of God's willing anything implies a relationship of the will to the thing willed. But the fact of God's willing something is eternal. Then the relationship of the will to the thing willed is itself eternal and necessary.
- 3.** The answer was given that the relationship to the thing willed is eternal and necessary inasmuch as the thing willed exists in its exemplary idea, not inasmuch as it exists in itself or in its own nature.— On the contrary, a thing is willed by the fact of having the will of God referred to it. Consequently if the will of God were not referred from all eternity to the thing willed as it exists in itself but merely as it exists in its exemplary idea, then a temporal fact, such as the salvation of Peter, would not be willed by God from all eternity as it exists in its own nature; but it would merely be the object of God's will from all eternity as it exists in God's eternal ideas. But this is obviously false.
- 4.** Whatever God has willed or wills, after He wills or has willed it, He is unable not to will or not to have willed it. But whatever God wills He never has not willed, because He always and from all eternity has willed whatever He wills. God is therefore unable not to will whatever He wills. 'Whatever God wills God therefore wills from necessity.
- 5.** The answer was given that the above argument is based upon God's willing taken from the viewpoint of the One willing or of the act or of the reason for willing, not from that of its relationship to the thing willed.—On the contrary, to create is an act which always implies a relation to its effect, for it connotes a temporal effect. But the above reasoning would be verified concerning creation if it were supposed that God had always been creating, because what God has created God is unable not to have created. It therefore follows that necessity also from the viewpoint of the relation to the thing willed.
- 6.** To be and to will are one and the same for God. But God must necessarily be everything that He is, because "in everlasting beings there is no difference between being and being able to be" in the words of the Philosopher. God must therefore also necessarily will everything that He wills.
- 7.** The answer was given that, although to will and to be are in this case really identical, they nevertheless differ in the manner in which they are expressed, because to will is expressed after the manner of an act that passes over into something else.—On the contrary, even God's act of being, though really identical with His essence, nevertheless differs in the manner of its expression, because to be is expressed after the manner of an act. There is therefore no difference in this respect between being and willing.

8. Eternity does not admit of succession. But divine willing is measured by eternity. Hence there cannot be any succession in it. But there would be succession in it if God did not will what He has willed from eternity, or if He willed what He has not willed. It is consequently impossible for Him to will what He has not willed or not to will what He has willed. Hence whatever Fie wills He wills from necessity, and whatever He does not will Fie necessarily does not will.

9. It is impossible for anyone who has willed anything not to have willed it, because what has been done is unable not to have been done.

But in God to will and to have willed are identical because the act of His will is not new but is eternal. God is therefore unable not to will what He wills; and so He necessarily wills what Fie wills.

10. The answer was given that He necessarily wills from the point of view of His reason for willing, but not from that of the thing willed.—On the contrary, God's reason for willing is Himself, because Fie wills for Himself whatever He wills. Then, if Fie necessarily wills Himself, Fie will also necessarily will all other things.

11. The reason for willing is the end. But according to the Philosopher in matters of appetite and operation the end occupies the same place as the principle in matters of demonstration. Now in matters of demonstration if the principles are necessary, a necessary conclusion follows. Hence also in matters of appetite, if a person wills the end, he necessarily wills the means to the end; and so, if the divine act of willing is necessary from the standpoint of the reason for willing, he will also be necessary will reference to the things willed.

12. Whoever can will and not will something can begin to will it. But God cannot begin to will something. Hence He cannot will and not will something; and so Fie necessarily wills whatever He wills.

13. God's power and knowledge, like His will, imply a relation to creatures. But it is necessary for God to be able to do anything that He is able to do, and it is necessary for Hum to know whatever He knows. It is therefore necessary for Hum to will whatever He wills.

14. Whatever is always the same is necessary. But the relation of the divine will to the things willed is always the same. It is therefore necessary; and so the divine act of willing is also necessary from the standpoint of its relationship to the substance of the thing willed.

15. If God wills that there shah be an Antichrist, he follows will necessity that there will be an Antichrist even though it is not necessary that there should be an Antichrist. Now this would not be the case if there were not a necessary relation or reference of the di vine will to the thing willed. The divine act of willing inasmuch as it implies a relation of the will to the thing willed is therefore itself necessary.

16. The relation of the divine will to the reason for willing is the cause of the relation of the divine will to the thing willed, for the will is directed to some object because of the reason for willing. Between the two relations moreover there does not fail any contingent intermediary. When a necessary cause is placed, a necessary effect follows unless there happens to be a Contingent cause between them. Consequently, since the divine act of will is necessary in its relation to the reason for willing, it will also be necessary in its relation to the thing willed; and so God wills necessarily whatever He wills.

To the Contrary:

1'. God's will is more fully free than our will. But our will does not necessarily will whatever it wills. Then neither does God's.

2'. Necessity is opposed to gratuitous willing. But God wills the salvation of me will a gratuitous will. He therefore does not will from necessity.

3'. Since nothing extrinsic to God can impose necessity upon Him, if He willed anything from necessity, He would will it only from the necessity of His own nature. The same consequence would therefore follow from positing that God acts by His will and from positing that He acts by the necessity of nature. Now since it follows for those who hold that God acts by the necessity of nature that all things have been made by Him from all eternity, the same conclusion would follow for us, who hold that He makes all things by His will.

REPLY:

It is undoubtedly true that the divine act of willing has necessity from the point of view of the One willing and of the act; for God's action is His essence, which is clearly eternal. That is accordingly not the question, but rather whether God's willing has any necessity with respect to the thing willed. It is in this respect which is understood when we say that God wills this or that. And this is what we ask about when we ask whether God wills anything from necessity.

It should therefore be noted that the object of any will is twofold: one which is principal and another which is, in a sense, secondary. The principal object is that to which the will is directed of its own nature, since the will is a nature and has a natural ordination to some thing. This is what the will naturally wills, as the human will naturally desires happiness. In regard to this object the will is under necessity, since it tends to it in the manner of a nature. A man, for instance, cannot will to be miserable or not to be happy. Secondary objects of the will are the things which are directed to this principal object as to an end. Now upon these two different sorts of objects the will has a different bearing, just as the intellect has upon the principles which are naturally known and the conclusions which it draws out of these.

The divine will has as its principal object that which it naturally wills and which is a sort of end of its willing, God's own goodness, on account of which He wills whatever else He wills distinct from Himself. For He makes things on account of His own goodness, as Augustine says; that is to say, He does it in order that His goodness, which cannot be multiplied in its essence, may at least by a certain participation through likeness be poured out upon many recipients. Hence the things which He wills concerning creatures are, as it were, the secondary objects of His will. He wills them on account of His goodness. Thus the divine goodness serves His will as the reason for willing all things, just as His essence is the reason for His knowing all things.

In regard to that principal object, God's goodness, the divine will is under a necessity, not of force but of natural ordination, which is not incompatible with freedom, according to Augustine. God can not will Himself not to be good, for, consequently not to be intelligent or powerful or anything else which the nature of His goodness includes.

It is not, however, under any necessity in regard to any other object. Since the reason for willing the means is the end, the means stands to the will in the same relation as it stands to the end. Hence if the means is proportioned to the end so that it embraces the end perfectly and without it the end cannot be obtained, the means, like the end, is desired of necessity, and especially by a will which cannot depart from the rule of wisdom. It seems to be all of a piece, for in stance, to desire the continuance of life and the taking of food by which life is sustained and without which it cannot be preserved.

But just as no effect of God is equal to the power of the cause, so nothing which is directed to God as its end is equal to the end. No creature is made perfectly like God. That is the exclusive property of the uncreated Word. From this it comes about that, no matter how much more nobly any pure creature is related to God, being assimilated to Him in some way, it is

still possible for some other creature to be related to God and to represent the divine goodness in a manner equally noble.

It is accordingly clear that from the love which God has for His own goodness there is no necessity in the divine will for willing this or that concerning a creature. Nor is there any necessity in it as regards the whole of creation, since the divine goodness is perfect in itself, and would be so even though no creature existed, because God has no need of our goods, as is said in the Psalm (15:2). For the divine goodness is not an end of the kind which is produced by the means to the end, but rather one by which the things which are directed to it are produced and perfected. For this reason Avicenna says that only God's action is purely liberal, because nothing accrues to Him from what He wills or does regarding any creature.

It is therefore clear from what has been said that whatever God wills to be in His own regard He wills from necessity, but whatever He wills to be concerning creatures He does not will from necessity.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Something is said to be necessary in two ways: (1) absolutely, and (2) conditionally. Something is said to be necessary absolutely because of a necessary relation which the terms used in a proposition have to each other; e.g., "Man is an animal" or "Every whole is greater than its part" and the like. But something is necessary conditionally which is not necessary of itself but only if something else is given; e.g., "Socrates has run." In himself Socrates is no more disposed to this than to its opposite; but on the condition that he has run it is impossible for him not to have run.

I say, therefore, that God's willing something in creatures, as that Peter be saved, is not necessary absolutely, since the divine will does not have a necessary relation to this, as is evident from what has been said. But on the condition that God wills or has willed it, then it is impossible for Him not to have willed or not to will it, since His will is unchangeable. Among the theologians such necessity is accordingly called the necessity of unchangeability. Now the fact that God's act of willing is not absolutely necessary comes from the thing willed, which falls short of a perfect proportion to the end, as has been said. In this respect the answer given above is verified. And eternity is to be distinguished in the same way as necessity.

2. The relationship implied is necessary and eternal conditionally, not absolutely; and this is from the standpoint of its termination in the object, not only as it has its exemplar in the reason for willing, but also as in its own nature it exists in time.

3. This we concede.

4. After God wills or has willed something, that He wills or has willed it is necessary conditionally, not absolutely; as it is that Socrates has run, after he has run. This is the case with creation or any act of the divine will which terminates in something external.

5. We concede this.

6. Although the divine existence is necessary in itself, yet creatures do not proceed from God through necessity but through a free act of will. Whatever implies a reference of God to the origin of creatures, as to will, to create, etc., is not necessary absolutely, like the predicates which refer to God in Himself, such as to be good, living, will, etc.

7. To be does not express the kind of act which is an operation passing over into something external to be produced in time, but rather the act that is primary. To will, however, expresses a secondary act, which is an operation. Thus it is from the different manner of expression that

something is attributed to the divine act of being which is not attributed to the divine act of willing.

8. We do not imply succession if we say that God can will or not will something unless this is understood in the sense that, on the condition that He wills something, it is asserted that lie afterward does not will it. But this is excluded by our affirmation that God's willing something is necessary conditionally.

9. God's having willed what lie has willed is necessary condition ally, not absolutely. The same is true of God's willing what He wills.

10. Although God necessarily wills that lie be, it nevertheless does not follow that lie wills other things necessarily. Nothing is said to be necessary by reason of the end except when it is such that without it the end cannot be had, as is evident in the *Metaphysics*.⁸ But that is not the case in the point at issue.

11. If the principle is necessary in syllogisms, it does not follow that the conclusion is necessary unless the relationship of the principle to the Conclusion is also necessary. In the same way, no matter how necessary the end is, unless the means has a necessary relationship to the end so that without it the end cannot exist, there will be no necessity arising from the end in the means; just as, even though the principles may be true, if the conclusion is false because of the lack of a necessary relationship, no necessity on the part of the conclusion follows from the necessity of the principles.

12. If anyone who can will and not will can will after he has been unwilling and can be unwilling after he has willed, he can begin to will. If he wills, he can cease to will and again begin to will. If he does not will, he can immediately begin to will. God cannot will and not will in this way because of the unchangeableness of the divine will. But He can will and no will inasmuch as His will is not bound on it part to will or not to will. It remains, then, that God's willing something is necessary conditionally not absolutely

13. Although knowledge and power imply a relation to creatures, they nevertheless pertain to the very perfection of the divine essence, 1 there can be nothing except what is necessary of itself. A thing is said to have knowledge because the thing known is in the knower. Something is said to have power to do something inasmuch as it is in complete act will respect to that which is to be done. What ever is in God, however, must necessarily be in Him; and whatever God actually is, He must necessarily be actually. But when it is said that God wills something, that something is not designated as being in God, but there is merely implied the relationship of God Himself to the production of that thing in its own nature. From this point of view the condition of absolute necessity is accordingly lacking, as was said above.

14. That relationship is always the same because of the immutability of the divine will. The argument is accordingly conclusive only in regard to the necessary which is conditional.

15. The will has a twofold relation to its object: (1) inasmuch as the latter is the object, and (2) inasmuch as it is to be brought into act by the will. The second relation presupposes the first. We first understand that the will wills something. Then, from the fact that it wills it, we understand that it is bringing it forth into reality, if the will is efficacious. The first relation of the divine will to its object is not necessary in an absolute sense because of the lack of proportion of the object to the end, which is the reason for willing, as has been said. Hence it is not necessary absolutely that God will it. But the second relation is necessary because of the efficacy of the divine will; and for this reason it follows of necessity that if God wills anything will His embracing will, it comes about.

16. Although between the two relations mentioned in the difficulty there intervenes no contingent cause, yet because of the lack of proportion the necessity of the first relation does not introduce necessity into the second, as is clear from what has been said.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'-2'. These we concede.

3'. The difficulty about the freedom of the will has already been solved inasmuch as the necessity of the order of nature is not incompatible with freedom, but only the necessity of force.

ARTICLE V: DOES THE DIVINE WILL IMPOSE NECESSITY UPON THE THINGS WILLED?

Parallel readings [Contra Gentiles I, 8 II, 29 & 30; Quodlibet XI, \(s\), 3; XII, \(3\), 3 ad. 2; Sum. Theol., 1, 19, 8; De male, 16, 7 ad i In I Perihermen., 14; In VI Met., 3.](#)

Difficulties:

It seems that it does, for

1. When a sufficient cause is placed, it is necessary that the effect be placed. Avicenna proves this as follows. If, when the cause is placed, the effect is not necessarily placed, then even after the placing of the cause the effect remains open to the alternatives of either existence or non-existence. But whatever has the potentiality of alter natives is not determined to either one of them unless there is some thing to determine it. Consequently, after the placing of the cause it is still necessary to posit something which will make the effect exist. The cause was accordingly not sufficient. But if the cause is sufficient, when it is placed, the placing of the effect must be necessary. Now the divine will is a sufficient cause, and not a contingent but a necessary cause. The things willed by God are therefore necessary.

2. The answer was given that from a necessary cause there some times follows a contingent effect because of the contingency of an intervening cause; e.g., from a major premise expressing what is necessary a contingent conclusion follows because of a subsumption expressing what is contingent. the contrary, whenever a contingent effect follow from a necessary cause because of the contingency of an intermediate cause, this comes from the deficiency of the second cause. The blossoming of a tree, for example, is contingent and not necessary because of the possible failure of the germinative power, which is the intermediate cause, although the motion of the sun, the first cause, is a necessary cause. But the divine will can remove all deficiency from the second cause, and likewise every hindrance. The Contingency of a second cause, therefore, does not keep the effect from being necessary because of the necessity of the divine will.

3. When the effect is contingent because of the contingency of the second cause, given a necessary first cause, the non-existence of the effect is compatible with the existence of the first cause. Thus the non-blossoming of a tree in spring is compatible with the motion of the sun. But the non-existence of what is willed by God is not compatible with the divine will. For these two things, God's willing some thing to be and its not being, are irreconcilable. Consequently the contingency of second causes does not prevent the things willed by God from being necessary because of the necessity of the divine will.

4. The answer was given that, although the non-existence of a divine effect is not compatible with the divine will, even so, because the second cause can fail, the effect itself is contingent. On the contrary, the effect does not fail to occur except by the failure of the second cause. But it is impossible that the second cause should fail, given the divine will; for in that case there would simultaneously be verified the existence of the divine will and the non-existence of what is willed by God. But this is manifestly false. Hence the contingency of second causes does not prevent the effect of the divine will from being necessary.

To the Contrary:

All goods come about because God wills them. Now if the divine will imposes necessity upon things, all the goods that there are in the world will therefore exist from necessity; and so free choice and other contingent causes will be eliminated.

REPLY:

The divine will does not impose necessity upon all things. The reason for this is ascribed by some to the fact that, since this will is the first cause of all things, it produces certain effects through the mediation of secondary causes which are contingent and can fail. Thus the effect follows the contingency of the proximate cause, not the necessity of the first cause. But this seems to be in agreement with those who held that all things proceed from God with natural necessity, just as they held that from the simple One there proceeds immediately a single being having some multiplicity, and through its mediation the whole multitude of things proceeds. In like fashion they say that from a single wholly immobile principle there proceeds something which is immobile in its substance but mobile and undetermined as to position, and through the mediation of this being generation and corruption occur in the things here below. In this line of argument it could not be held that multiplicity and corruptible and contingent things are caused immediately by God. But that position is contrary to the doctrine of the faith, which holds that a multitude even of corruptible things was immediately created by God; for example, the first individuals of trees and brute animals.

It is accordingly necessary to assign a different principal reason for the contingency in things, to which the previously assigned cause will be subordinated. For the patient must be assimilated to the agent; and, if the agent is most powerful, the likeness of the effect to the agent cause will be perfect; but if the agent is weak, the likeness will be imperfect. Thus because of the strength of the formative power in the semen a son is made like his father not only in the nature of the species but also in many accidents. On the other hand, because of the weakness of the power mentioned the aforesaid assimilation is done away with, as is said in *Animals*.⁴ Now the divine will is a most powerful agent. Hence its effect must be made like it in all respects, so that there not only comes about what God wants to come about (a sort of likening in species), but it comes about in the manner in which God wants it to come about necessarily or contingently, quickly or slowly (and this is a sort of likening in its accidents).

The divine will determines this manner for things beforehand in the order of God's wisdom. According as it arranges for certain things to come into being in this way or in that, it adapts their causes to the manner fixed upon. It could, however, introduce this manner into things even without the mediation of those causes. We accordingly say that some of the divine effects are contingent not merely because of the contingency of secondary causes but rather because of the appointment of the divine will, which saw to such an order for things.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That argument is applicable in the case of causes acting from the necessity of nature and in regard to their immediate effects; but it is beside the point in the case of voluntary causes, because a thing follows from the will in the way in which the will disposes and not in the way in which the will has existence, as occurs among natural causes in the latter we look to an

assimilation as regards the condition of the cause and the thing caused, which is the same in both, whereas in Voluntary causes we look to an assimilation as regards the fulfilment of the will of the agent in the effect, as has been said. And even in regard to natural causes the argument does not apply in the case of their mediate effects.

2. Even though God can remove every hindrance from a secondary cause when He so wills, yet He does not always will to remove it. Thus there remains contingency in the secondary cause and, consequently, in the effect.

3. Although the non-existence of an effect of the divine will is incompatible with the divine will, the possibility that the effect should be lacking is given simultaneously with the divine will. God's willing someone to be saved and the possibility that that person be damned are not incompatible; but God's willing him to be saved and his actually being damned are incompatible.

4. The same is to be said about the deficiency of the intervening cause.

ARTICLE VI: DOES JUSTICE AS FOUND AMONG CREATED THINGS DEPEND SIMPLY UPON THE DIVINE WILL?

Parallel readings: No direct parallels; but cf. [Contra Gentiles II](#), 24; [Sum. Theol.](#), 1, 21, 2; I-II, 68, ad 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does, for

1. Anselm says: "That only is just which You will." Justice therefore depends only upon God's will.

2. Something is just by reason of its agreement with a law. But a law seems to be nothing but the expression of the will of a sovereign, because "what has pleased the prince has the force of law," as the Legislator says. Since the sovereign of all things is the divine will, it therefore seems that the whole character of justice depends upon it alone.

3. Political justice, which is found in human affairs, has its model in natural justice, which consists in the fulfilment of its own nature by anything whatever. But each thing participates in the order of its nature because of the divine will; for Hilary says: "The will of God has conferred upon all creatures their essence." All justice therefore depends merely upon the will of God.

4. Since justice is a certain correctness, it depends upon the imitation of some rule. But the rule of the effect is its due cause. Since the first cause of all things is the divine will, it therefore seems to be the first rule from which everything just is judged.

5. God's will cannot be anything but just. If the character of justice depended upon anything else besides the divine will, that would restrict and, in a sense, bind the divine will. But that is impossible.

6. Every will which is just by a principle other than itself is such that its principle should be sought. But "the cause of God's will is not to be sought," as Augustine says. The principle of justice therefore depends upon no other than the divine will.

To, the Contrary:

1'. The works of justice are distinguished from the works of mercy. But the works of divine mercy depend upon God's will. Hence some thing else besides the mere will of God is demanded for the character of justice.

2'. According to Anselm justice is "correctness of will." But correctness of will is distinct from the will. In us it is really distinct, since our will can be correct or not. In God it is distinct at least conceptually or according to our manner of understanding it. Therefore the character of justice does not depend upon the divine will alone.

REPLY:

Since justice is a certain "correctness," as Anselm says, or "equation," as the Philosopher teaches, the essential character of justice must depend first of all upon that in which there is first found the character of a rule according to which the equality and correctness of justice is established in things. Now the will does not have the character of the first rule; it is rather a rule which has a rule, for it is directed by reason and the intellect. This is true not only in us but also in God, although in us the will is really distinct from the intellect. For this reason the will and its correctness are not the same thing. In God, however the will is really identical with the intellect, and for this reason the correctness of His will is really the same as His will itself. Consequently the first thing upon which the essential character of all justice depends is the wisdom of the divine intellect, which constitutes them in their due proportion both to one another and to their cause. In this proportion the essential character of created justice consists. But to say that justice depends simply upon the will is to say that the divine will does not proceed according to the order of wisdom, and that is blasphemous

Answer to Difficulties:

1. Nothing can be just unless it is willed by God. Yet what is willed by God has the first cause of its justice from the order of divine Wisdom

2. Although the will of the prince, by the fact of its being a will, has the coercive force of law, yet it does not have the character of justice except from being led by reason.

3. God works in natural things in two ways: (1) by establishing the natures themselves, and (2) by providing each thing with what ever belongs to its nature. The essence of justice demands something due. Now, since it is no way due that creatures be brought into being, but purely voluntary, the first operation does not have the note of justice, but it depends simply upon the divine will. It might, however, conceivably be said to have the note of justice because of the ordination of the thing made to the will. For it is of obligation from the very fact that God wills it that everything which God wills be done. But in the fulfilment of this ordination it is wisdom which does the directing as the first rule. In the second sort of operation, however, there is found the character of something due, not on the part of the agent, since God is indebted to no one, but rather on the part of the recipient. It is due to every natural being that it have the things which its nature calls for both in essentials and in accidentals. But what is due depends upon the divine wisdom inasmuch as the natural being should be such as to imitate the idea of it which is in the divine mind. In this way the divine wisdom is found to be the first rule of justice. In all the divine operations, however, by which God bestows upon the creature anything beyond the debt of nature, as in the gifts of grace, the same sort of justice is found as is assigned in the first sort of operation, by which God establishes natures.

4. According to our manner of understanding, the divine will presupposes wisdom, which first has the character of a rule.

5. Since intellect and will do not really differ in God, by the fact of being directed and determined to something definite the will is not restricted by anything other than itself; but it is moved according to its own nature, since it is natural for that will always to act according to the order of wisdom.

6. On the part of the One willing there cannot be any cause of the divine will other than the will itself as its reason for willing. For in God will, wisdom, and goodness are really identical. But on the part of the thing willed the divine will has a principle, which is that of the thing willed, not that of the One willing, according to which the thing willed is ordained to something else either by desert or by fitness. This ordination belongs to the divine wisdom. Hence this is the first root of justice.

ARTICLE VII: ARE WE OBLIGED TO CONFORM OUR WILL TO THE DIVINE WILL?

Parallel readings. / Sentences 48, aa. & Sum. Theol., I-II, 19, 9.

Difficulties:

It seems that we are not, for

1. No one is held to the impossible. But it is impossible for us to confirm our will to the divine will, since the divine will is unknown to us. Therefore we are not held to the conformity mentioned

2. Whoever does not do that to which he is obliged sins. If, then, we are obliged to confirm our will to the divine will, we sin in not confirming it. But whoever sins mortally does not confirm his will to the divine in the matter in which he sins. By that very fact, therefore, he sins. He sins, however, by some other specific sin, such as stealing or fornicating. Hence whoever sins commits two sins. But this seems to be absurd.

3. The answer was given that the commandment about the conformity of our will to the divine, being affirmative, does not bind to constant compliance though it constantly binds. Thus it is not necessary that whenever conformity is lacking there is sin.—On the contrary, although a person not observing an affirmative commandment does not sin at every moment in which he is not observing it, yet he does sin whenever he acts contrary to it. Thus a person sins whenever he dishonors his parents, although he does not always sin when he is not actually honoring them. But he who sins mortally acts contrary to the conformity in question. It is therefore by this fact that he sins.

4. Whoever does not observe that to which he is obliged is a transgressor. But one who sins venially does not confirm his will to the divine will. If he is obliged to confirm to it, he will be a transgressor and so will sin mortally.

5. The answer was given that he is not obliged at that moment in which he is sinning venially, because affirmative commandments do not oblige us to comply always. the contrary, whoever does not comply with an affirmative commandment at the place and time at which it binds, is adjudged a transgressor. But it seems that no other time for confirming our will to the divine will can be determined upon than that at which the will passes into act. Hence, whenever the will passes into act, unless it is confirmed to the divine will, there seems to be a sin; and so when a person sins venially, the sin seems to be mortal.

6. No one is held to the impossible. But the obstinate cannot conform their will to the divine. They are therefore not held to this conformity. And so neither are others; otherwise the obstinate would draw an advantage from their obstinacy.

7. Since God wills from charity whatever He wills, being charity Himself, if we are obliged to confirm our will to God's, we are obliged to have charity. But a person who does not have charity can not obtain it unless he carefully prepares himself for it. One not having charity is therefore obliged to prepare himself continuously to have it. Thus at every instant at which he does not have charity he sins, since his not having it comes from a lack of preparation.

8. Since the form of an act consists especially in the manner of acting, if we are held to conformity with the divine will, we must will a thing in the same manner in which God wills it. Now a person can imitate the manner of the divine will after a fashion both by natural love and by gratuitous love. The conformity of which we speak, however, cannot be taken with reference to natural love, because even infidels and sinners confirm their will to God's in this manner as long as the natural love of good is alive within them. Similarly it cannot be taken with reference to gratuitous love, that is, charity. In that case we should be obliged to will from charity whatever we will. But this is contrary to the opinion of many, who say that the manner does not fall within the scope of the commandment. It therefore seems that we are not obliged to confirm our will to the divine will.

9. Commenting on the words of the Psalm (32:1): "Praise becometh the upright," the Gloss says: "The distance between God's will and man's is just as great as that between God and man." But God is so distant from man that man cannot be confirmed to Him. Since man is infinitely distant from God, there cannot be any proportion between him and God. Then neither can man's will be confirmed to God's.

10. Those things are said to be confirmed which agree in some one form. Consequently, if our will can be confirmed to the divine, there must be some one form in which the two wills agree. Then there would be something simpler than the divine will. But that is impossible.

11. Conformity is a reciprocal relation. In such relations each one of the extremes is referred to the other by the same relation. Thus a friend is said to be a friend to his friend, and a brother, a brother to his brother. If, then, our will can confirm to the divine will, and as a result we are held to the Conformity in question, the divine will can confirm to ours. But that seems unacceptable.

12. Things that we are able to do or not do fall within the scope of commandments, and we are held to them. But we cannot help but confirm our will to God's, because, as Anselm says, whoever departs from God's will in some particular fulfils the divine will in another, just as the more distant something that is within a spherical body gets from one part of the circumference, the more it draws near to some other part. We are therefore not bound to the conformity in question as we are bound to the matters which fall under a commandment

To the Contrary

1'. Regarding the words of the Psalm (32: 1): "Praise becometh the upright," the Gloss says: "The upright are those who direct their hearts according to the will of God." But everyone is obliged to be upright. Hence everyone is obliged to the above-mentioned conformity.

2'. Every being should conform to its rule. But the divine will is the rule of ours, since correctness of will is found first in God. Our will should therefore conform to the divine will.

REPLY.

Everyone is obliged to confirm his will to God's. The reason for this can be taken from the fact that in every genus there is some one thing which is primary and is the measure of all the other things which are in that genus, for in it the nature of the genus is most perfectly found. This is verified of the nature of colour, for example, in whiteness, which is called the measure of all colors because the extent to which each colour shares in the nature of the genus is known from its nearness to whiteness or its remoteness from it, as is said in the *Meta Physics*.⁶ In this way God Himself is the measure of all beings, as can be gathered from the words of the Commentator.

Every being has the act of existing in the proportion in which it approaches God by likeness. But according as it is found to be unlike Him, it approximates non-existence. And the same must be said of all the attributes which are found both in God and in creatures. Hence His intellect is the measure of all knowledge; His goodness, of all goodness; and, to speak more to the point, His good will, of every good will. Every good will is therefore good by reason of its being confirmed to the divine good will. Accordingly, since everyone is obliged to have a good will, he is likewise obliged to have a will conformed to the divine will.

But it should be noted that this conformity can be taken in many senses. We are speaking here of will in the sense of the volitional act. Our conformity to God on the part of the will as a faculty is natural, belonging to the image. It accordingly does not fall under any commandment. But the act of the divine will has not only this characteristic, that it is an act of will, but at the same time this also, that it is the cause of all things that are acts. The act of our will can therefore conform to the divine will either as an effect to its cause or as a will to a will.

Now the conformity of an effect to its cause is found in a different way among natural and among voluntary causes. In the case of natural causes the conformity is to be found according to a likeness in nature. For example, man begets a man, and fire begets fire. But in the case of voluntary causes the effect is said to conform to the cause by reason of the fact that the cause is fulfilled in the effect. Thus a product of art is likened to its cause, not because it is of the same nature as the art which is in the mind of the artist, but because the form of the art is fulfilled in the product. It is in this way that an effect of the will is confirmed to the will when what the will disposes comes about. And so an act of our will confirms to the divine will by reason of the fact that we will what God wants us to will.

The conformity of one will to another in its act, however, can be taken in two ways: (1) according to the form of a species, as man is like man, and (2) according to an added form, as a will man is like a will man.

One will is like another in species, I say, when the two have in common the same object; for from the object the act draws its species. But in the object of the will two aspects are to be taken into account: one which is, as it were, material—the thing willed; another which is, as it were, formal—the reason for willing, which is the end. It is like the case of the object of sight, in which colour is in effect material, and light is formal, because by light the colour is made actually visible. Thus on the part of the object two sorts of conformity can be found. One derives from the thing willed. A man, for instance, wills some thing that God wills. This conformity is, in a sense, based upon the material cause; for the object is, as it were, the matter of the act. It is accordingly the least among the types of conformity. The other sort of conformity derives from the reason for willing or the end. This is had when someone wills something for the same reason for which God wills it. Conformity of this kind is based upon the final cause.

A form added to an act, however, is the mode which it gets from the habit which elicits it. It is in this way that our will is said to be confirmed to the divine when a person wills something from charity just as God does. This is, in a sense, based upon the formal cause.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The will of God cannot be fully known to us. Hence, neither can we fully confirm our will to His. But we can confirm it in proportion to the knowledge which we have, and we are held to this.

2. A man does not commit two sins in one act, since the essence of sin is an act. There can, however, be two deformities of sin in one act. This is the case when there is joined to the act of some particular sin a circumstance which transmits to it the deformity of another sin. When a man steals the goods of another in order to spend them upon harlots, for instance, the act of theft takes on the deformity of lust from the circumstance of the reason why.

When, however, there is found in the act of some sin, over and above the specific deformity of that sin, some element of deformity which is common to every sin, by that fact neither the sin nor the deformity of the sin is doubled. For such things as are to be found in all sins in common are, as it were, the essential principles of sin as such; and they are included in the deformity of any specific sin just as the principles of a genus are included in the formal character of the species. Not being distinct from the specific deformity of the sin, they do not add to it numerically. Such things are turning away from God, not obeying the divine law, and others, among which must be accounted the lack of conformity of which we are speaking. Hence it is not necessary that such a defect should double the sin or the deformity of the sin.

3. Although one who acts contrary to conformity sins by this very fact, yet by reason of what is generic he does not add anything numerically to what is specific.

4. Although one who sins venially does not in this act confirm his will to the divine, yet he does confirm it habitually. Nor is he obliged always to go into act, but only according to the place and time. He is, however, obliged never to do anything contrary. But one who sins venially does not act contrary to the conformity in question but rather beyond its scope. Hence it does not follow that he sins mortally.

5. The commandment about the conformity of will does not bind every time our will passes into act but just when we are obliged to think about the state of our salvation, as when we are obliged to confess or receive the sacraments or do something of the sort.

6. A person is said to be obstinate in two senses: (1) This is said absolutely, when he has a will irreversibly adhering to evil. In this sense those who are in hell are obstinate, but not anyone in this life. Those who are in hell are still held to the conformity of which we are treating. Although they cannot attain it, nevertheless they were themselves the cause of their own impotence. They accordingly sin in not confirming their wills, although it happens that they do not incur demerit because they are not wayfarers. (2) A person is said to be obstinate in a certain respect, when, namely, he has a will adhering to evil which is not altogether irreversible but reversible only with great difficulty. It is in this sense that some are said to be obstinate in this life. These are able to confirm their will to God's. Hence in not confirming they not only sin but also incur demerit.

7. Everyone is obliged, as far as depends upon him, to have charity; and whoever does not sins by a sin of omission. Still he does not necessarily sin at every moment in which he does not have it, but at the time at which he was bound to have it, as when it was incumbent upon him to do something which cannot be done without charity, such as to receive the sacraments.

8. We are said to be obliged to something in two ways: (1) We are obliged in such a way that, if we do not do it, we incur a penalty. And this is the proper sense of being obliged. According to the more common opinion we are not obliged in this way to do anything from charity; but we are so obliged to do something from natural love, and without at least this whatever is done is badly done. By natural love I mean not only that which is implanted in us by nature and is common to all, as all desire happiness, but also that to which a person can attain by natural principles. It is found in actions that are good by reason of their genus, and also in the political virtues. (2) We are said to be obliged to something because without it we are unable to attain our end, beatitude. In this way we are obliged to do something from charity, without which nothing that merits eternal life can be done. It is accordingly clear how the mode of charity in one way fails within the scope of commandment and in another does not.

9. Man is confirmed to God since he is made to God's image and likeness. It is true that, because man is infinitely distant from God, there cannot be a proportion between him and God in the proper sense of proportion as found among quantities, Consisting of a certain measure of two quantities compared to each other. Nevertheless in the sense in which the term proportion is transferred to signify any relationship of one thing to another (as we say that there is a likeness of proportions in this instance: the pilot is to his ship as the ruler to the commonwealth), nothing prevents our saying that there is a proportion of man to God, since man stands in a certain relation_ ship to Him inasmuch as he is made by God and subject to Him.

Or the answer could be given that, although there cannot be between the finite and the infinite a proportion properly so called, yet there can be a proportional or the likeness of two proportions. We say that four is proportioned to two because it is the double; but we say that four is proportionable to six because four is to two as six is to three. In the same way, although the finite and the infinite cannot be proportioned they can be proportionable, because the finite is equal to the finite just as the infinite is to the infinite. In this way there is a likeness of the creature to God, because the creature stands to the things which are its own as God does to those which belong to Him.

io. The creature is not said to be confirmed to God as to one who shares in the same form in which it shares, but because God is substantially the very form in which the creature participates by a sort of imitation. It is as if fire were likened to a separate subsistent heat.

11. Although likeness and conformity are reciprocal relations, these terms do not always designate indifferently the reference of either one of the related members to the other. It is only when the form on which the likeness or conformity is based is in each of the extremes in the same way, as whiteness is in two men. In that case either one can aptly be said to have the form of the other; and this is what is meant when something is said to be like another. But when the form is in one principally and in the other in a secondary way, reciprocity of the likeness is not had. Thus we say that the statue of Hercules is like Hercules, but not the other way about; for it cannot be said that Hercules has the form of the statue, but only that the statue has the form of Hercules. In this way creatures are said to be similar and Conformed to God but not God to creatures. But since confirmation is a motion toward conformity, it does not imply a reciprocal relation but presupposes one of the related members and denotes that something else is moving toward conformity with it. Succeeding things are confirmed to preceding, but not conversely.

12. The statement of Anselm is to be understood as meaning, not that man always does the will of God as far as he can, but that the divine will is always fulfilled in his regard whether he wills it or not.

ARTICLE VIII: ARE WE OBLIGED TO CONFORM OUR WILL TO THE DIVINE WILL AS REGARDS ITS OBJECT SO AS TO BE BOUND TO WILL WHAT WE KNOW GOD WILLS?

Parallel readings: I Sentences 48, aa. 2 & 4; Sum. Theol., I-II, 19, 10.

Difficulties:

It seems that we are not, for

1. Paul desired "to be dissolved and to be will Christ," as is said in the Epistle to the Philippians (j: 23). But God did not want this. Hence Paul adds: "I know that I shah abide" (1:25) for your sake. If, then, we are obliged to will what God wills, in desiring to be dissolved and to be will Christ, Paul sinned. But that is absurd.
2. What God knows can be revealed to someone else. Now God knows that a certain person is reprobated. He can therefore reveal to someone his reprobation. On the supposition that He reveals this to someone, it therefore follows that this person is bound to will his own damnation if we are bound to will what we know God wills. To will one's own damnation, however, is contrary to charity, by which each one loves himself even to eternal life. A person would therefore be bound to will something against charity. But that is not befitting.
3. We are obliged to obey a superior as God Himself since we obey him in God's stead. But a subject is not obliged to do and to will whatever he knows his superior wishes, even if he knows that the superior wishes him to do it, unless the superior expressly commands it. We are therefore not obliged to will whatever God wills or what ever He wishes us to will.
4. Whatever is praiseworthy and honorable is found in Christ most perfectly and without the admixture of anything contrary. But will some will Christ willed the Contrary of what He knew God wished; for will some kind of will he willed not to suffer, as the prayer He prayed shows: "My Father, if it be possible, let this chalice pass from me" (Matthew 26: even though God wished Him to suffer. To will whatever God wills is therefore not praiseworthy, nor are we held to it.
5. According to Augustine sadness is had regarding the things which have happened to us against our will. But the Blessed Virgin felt sorrow at the death of her son, as is indicated in the words of Simeon; "Thy own soul a sword shall pierce" (Luke 2:35). The Blessed Virgin therefore did not will Christ to suffer, but God wished it. Now if we are obliged to will what God wills, the Blessed Virgin sinned in this instance. But that cannot be granted. Thus it is seen that we are not obliged to confirm our will to God's as to the object.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. Concerning the words of the Psalm (100:4): "The perverse heart did not cleave to me," the Gloss says: "He who does not will whatever God wills has a twisted heart." But everyone is obliged to avoid having a twisted heart. Therefore everyone is obliged to will what God wills.
- 2'. According to Tully friendship is willing and not willing the same thing. But everyone is obliged to have friendship for God. Hence everyone is obliged to will what God wills and not to will what He does not will.
- 3'. We should confirm our will to God's for the reason that the will of God is the rule of our will, as the Gloss says, commenting on the words of the Psalm (32:1): "Praise becometh the

upright." But the object of the divine will, too, is the rule of every other object, Since it is the first thing willed, and the first in each genus is the measure of the things that come after, as is said in the Metaphysics. We are therefore obliged to confirm the objects of our will to the object of the divine will.

4'. Sin consists principally in perversity of choice. But there is perversity of choice when the lesser good is preferred to the greater. Now whoever does not will what God wills does this, Since it is evident that what God wills is best. Hence, whoever does not will what God Wills Sins.

5'. According to the Philosopher the virtuous man is "the rule and measure" for all human acts. But Christ is most virtuous. We should therefore most of all confirm ourselves to Christ as our rule and measure. Now Christ confirmed his will to the divine will even as regards its objects; and all the blessed do the same. Therefore we too are obliged to confirm our will to the divine even as regards its objects.

REPLY:

In regard to the object of our will we are in a sense obliged to conform our will to God's and in a sense we are not. We are obliged to confirm our will to God's in this respect (as has been said that the divine goodness is the rule and measure of every good will. But since good depends upon the end, a will is called good on the basis of its relation to the reason for willing, which is the end. The reference of the will to the object, however, does not in itself make the act of will good, since the object stands materially, as it were, to the reason for willing, which is an upright end. One and the same object can be desired either rightly or wrongly according as it is referred to different ends; and on the other hand different and even contrary objects can both be willed rightly by being referred to an upright end. Therefore, although the will of God cannot be anything but good, and whatever He wills He wills rightly, nevertheless the goodness in the very act of the divine will is viewed from the standpoint of the reason for willing, that is, the end to which God refers whatever He wills, His own goodness.

Thus we are obliged to confirm absolutely to the divine will in regard to the end, but in regard to the object only in so far as it is viewed under the aspect of its relation to the end. This relation must always please us too, though the same object of will can justly displease us under some other aspect, such as its being referable to some contrary end. Hence it is that the human will is found to conform to the divine will in its object inasmuch as it stands related to the divine will.

The will of the blessed, who are in continuous contemplation of the divine goodness and regulate by it all their affections, knowing fully the relationship to it of each object of their desires, is conformed to the divine will in every one of its objects. For everything that they know God wills, they will absolutely and without any motion to the contrary.

Sinners, however, who are turned away from willing the divine goodness, are at variance in many respects from what God wills, disapproving of it and in no way assenting to it.

Righteous wayfarers, on the other hand, whose will adheres to the divine goodness but who yet do not so perfectly contemplate it that they clearly perceive every relation to it of the things to be willed, conform to the divine will as regards those objects for which they perceive the reason, though there is in them some affection for the contrary. It is praiseworthy in them, however, because of the other relation considered in their case. They do not follow this affection obstinately but subject it to the divine will, because it pleases them that the order of the divine will be fulfilled in all things. A man, for instance, who wishes his father to live because of his filial affection while God wishes him to die, if he is saintly, subjects his own

will to God's so as not to bear it impatiently if the will of God contrary to his own will is fulfilled.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Paul desired to be dissolved and to be will Christ as something good in itself. Nonetheless the contrary was pleasing to him will reference to the fruit that God willed to draw from his living. For this reason he said: "But to abide still in the flesh is needful for you" (Philippians I: 24).

2. Although in His absolute power God could reveal to someone his damnation, this can nevertheless not be done in His ordered power, because such a revelation would drive the man to despair. And if such a revelation were made to anyone, it would have to be understood, not as a prophecy of predestination or foreknowledge, but as one of warning, which is based upon the supposition that merits are taken into account. But granted that it were to be understood in the sense of a prophecy of foreknowledge, the one to whom such a revelation were made would still not be obliged to will his own damnation absolutely but only according to the order of justice, in which God wills to damn those who persist in sin. For God does not on His own part will to damn anyone, but only in accordance will what depends upon us, as is clear from what has been said above. To will one's own damnation absolutely, then, would not be to confirm one's will to God but to confirm it to the will of sin.

3. The will of the superior is not, like the divine will, the rule of our will; rather his command is. Thus the case is not the same.

4. The passion of Christ could be considered in two ways: (1) in itself, inasmuch as it was an affliction of an innocent person, and (2) in its relation to the fruit to which God ordained it. In this latter sense it was willed by God, not in the former. The will of Christ which could consider that relation, namely, His rational will, there fore willed this passion as God did; but the will of sensuality, which is not capable of comparing but is brought to bear upon something absolutely, did not will this passion. In this respect also it was confirmed to the divine will, in a sense, even as regards the object, because even God Himself did not will the passion of Christ taken in itself.

g. The will of the Blessed Virgin was averse to the passion of Christ considered in itself; yet it willed the fruit of salvation which was coming from the passion of Christ. Thus it was confirmed to the divine will both as regards what it was willing and as regards what it was not willing.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. The words of the Gloss are to be understood of the objects of the divine will as they stand under the reference to the end and not absolutely.

2'. Friendship consists in harmony of wills rather as regards the end than as regards the direct objects themselves. A fever patient whose craving for will was denied by his physician because of their common desire for the patient's health would find in that physician a truer friend than if the latter were willing to satisfy the patient's desire for a drink of will at the peril of his health.

3'. As was said above, the first object of God's will and the measure and rule of all its other objects is the end which His will has, His own goodness. All other things He wills only for this end. Thus, as long as our will is confirmed to the divine will in regard to the end, all the objects of our will are regulated by the first object of will.

4'. Choice includes both the judgment of reason and appetitive tendency. If, then, anyone should in a judgment prefer what is less good to what is more good, there will be perversity of

choice, but not if he should prefer it in tending appetitively; for a man is not obliged always to carry out in his action what is better unless it is something that he is bound to by a commandment. Otherwise everyone would be obliged to follow the counsels of perfection, which clearly are better.

5' There are certain respects in which we can admire Christ but not imitate Him. Examples would be whatever pertains to His divinity and to the beatitude which He had while still in this life. An instance of this is the conformity of Christ's rational will to the divine will even as regards its objects.

QUESTION 24: Free Choice

ARTICLE I: IS MAN ENDOWED WITH FREE CROICE?

Parallel readings. De veritate, 22, 6; il Sentences 25, a. 2; Sum. Theol., I, 3; 83, I-II, 13, 6; De na1o, 6; In I Perihermen., 14, nn. 23 & 24.

Difficulties:

It seems that he is not, for

1. It is written in Jeremias (10:23): "The way of man is not his:

neither is it in a man to walk and to direct his steps." But a man is said to be endowed will free choice inasmuch as he is the master of his own actions Man is therefore not endowed will free choice.

2. The answer was given that the statement of the prophet refers to meritorious acts, which are not in man's natural power.—On the Contrary, regarding things that are not in our power we do not have free choice. If, then, merits are not in our power, we do not have free choice as to meriting; and so meritorious acts will not proceed from free choice.

3. According to the Philosopher "that is free which is for its own sake." But the human mind has a cause of its own motion other than itself, namely, God. On the words of the Epistle to the Romans (1:24): "Wherefore, God gave them up..."the Gloss comments: "It is evident that God works in the minds of men to turn their wills to whatever He wishes." The human mind therefore is not endowed will free choice.

4. It was answered that the human mind is as the principal cause of its own act and God is as the remote cause, and that this does not prevent the freedom of the mind.—On the contrary, the more a cause influences the effect, the more it stands as the principal cause. But the first cause influences the effect more than the second, as is said in The Causes. Hence the first cause is more the principal cause than the second; and thus our mind is not the principal cause of its own act, but God is.

5. Every mover that is moved, moves as an instrument, as is clear from the Commentator. But an instrument is not free in its action, since it does not act except inasmuch as it is used. Since, then, the human mind operates only when moved by God, it does not seem to be endowed will free choice.

6. Free choice is said to be a capability of the will and reason by which good is chosen with the help of grace or evil is chosen without it. But there are many who do not have grace. Hence they cannot freely choose good; and so they do not have free choice regarding good things.

7. Slavery is opposed to freedom. But in man there is found the slavery of sin because "whoever committed sin is the servant of sin," as is said in John (8:34) In man, then, there is no freedom of choice.

8. Anselm says that if we had the power of sinning and not sinning, we should not need grace. But the power of sinning and not sinning is free choice. Then, since we need grace, we do not have free choice.

9. Each thing is named from the best, as is gathered from the Philosopher. But as applied to human actions "the best" means meritorious acts. Therefore, since man does not have free choice as to these, because "without me you can do nothing," as is said in John (15:5) will reference to meritorious acts, it seems that man should not be said to be endowed with free choice.

10. Augustine says that, because man did not will to abstain from sin when he could have, he has had inflicted upon him the inability to do so when he wishes. It is therefore not in man's power to sin and not to sin; and so it seems that he is not the master of his own actions and is not endowed with free choice.

11. Bernard distinguishes a threefold freedom: of choice, of counsel, and of liking. He says that freedom of choice is that by which we decide "what we are permitted to do"; freedom of counsel, that by which we decide "what it is expedient to do"; and freedom of liking, that by which we decide "what it pleases us to do." But human discernment is wounded by ignorance. It therefore seems that freedom of choice, which consists in discernment has not remained in man after his sin.

12. Man does not have freedom concerning those things in regard to which he is under necessity. But in regard to sins man is under necessity, because, according to Augustine, since original sin it has been necessary for man to sin mortally before reparation and at least venially after reparation. Regarding sin, therefore, man does not have free choice.

13. Whatever God foreknows must necessarily come about. Since God's foreknowledge cannot be in error. But God foreknows all human acts. They therefore come about of necessity, and so man is not endowed with free choice in his action.

14. The nearer a mobile being is to the prime mover, the more uniform it is in its motion. This is apparent in the heavenly bodies, whose motions are always the same. Now, since every creature is moved by God, for "He moves corporeal creatures in time and space, and spiritual creatures in time," as Augustine says, a rational creature is the mobile being nearest to God, the prime mover of all. It therefore has a motion most uniform; and its capacity accordingly does not extend to many different things so that it can by that fact be said to have free choice.

15. According to the Philosopher, it belongs to the excellence of the highest heaven that it attain its end in a single motion. But the rational soul is more excellent than that heaven, since, according to Augustine, spirit ranks higher than body. The human soul therefore has a single motion, and so it does not seem to be endowed with free choice.

16. It befitted the divine wisdom to place the most sublime creature in the best conditions. But that which immovably adheres to the most excellent being has been placed in the best conditions. It has therefore befitted God to make rational nature, which is the most sublime among creatures such that it adheres to Him immovably. But if that nature were endowed with

free choice, it would not have such immovable adherence so it seems. It was therefore fitting that rational nature be made without free choice.

17. The philosophers¹³ define free choice as a free judgment of reason. The judgment of reason, however, can be constrained by the force of a demonstration. But what is constrained is not free. Man is therefore not endowed with free choice.

18. The reason why the intellect or reason can be constrained is that there is some truth which has no admixture or appearance of falsity. On this account the intellect cannot escape assenting to it. But there is likewise found a good which has no admixture of evil either in fact or in appearance. Now since good is the object of the will as truth is that of the intellect, it therefore seems that the will is constrained just like the intellect. Thus man does not have freedom either as to his will or as to his reason; and so he does not have free choice as a capability of will and reason.

19. According to the Philosopher, "each person judges of the end in accordance with his own character." But it is not in our power to be one kind of person rather than another, since a man's particular temperament is had from birth and, as some maintain, depends upon the arrangement of the stars. It is therefore not in our power to approve this or that end. But every judgment about a course of action is based upon the end. We are therefore not endowed with free choice.

20. Free choice is opposed to necessity. But in certain respects the will of man is under necessity, for he necessarily wills happiness. He therefore does not have freedom in regard to all things, and so is not endowed with free choice in regard to all.

To the Contrary:

1' Ecclesiasticus (15:14) says: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the Gloss comments: "That is, in the power of his free choice."

2' There is found in reality one agent which acts out of nothing and not from necessity. That is God. And there is found another agent which acts out of something and from necessity, namely, natural agents. But according to the Philosopher, when extremes are given in reality, it follows that means are given. But between the above two extremes there can be only two different means, and it is impossible for one of these to exist: namely, an agent acting out of nothing and of necessity; for only God acts out of nothing, and He does not act from necessity but from will. There is left, therefore, only a being which acts out of something and not from necessity. This is a rational nature, which acts upon pre-existing matter and not from necessity but from free choice.

3' Free choice is a capability of will and reason. But reason and will are found in man. So too, then, is free choice.

4' According to the Philosopher, "counsel is taken only in regard to the things that are in our power." But men take counsel about their own actions. Men are therefore masters of their own actions, and are accordingly endowed with free choice.

5' Commands and prohibitions should be imposed only upon one who can do or not do; otherwise they would be imposed in vain. But Prohibitions and commands are divinely imposed upon man. It is therefore in man's power to do or not to do; and so he is endowed with free choice.

6' No one should be punished or rewarded for something which it is not in his power to do or not to do. But man is justly punished and rewarded by God for his deeds. Therefore man can do and not do; and so he is endowed with free choice.

7'. A cause must be assigned for everything which happens. But we cannot assign as the cause of human actions God Himself immediately, because the things which are immediately from God cannot be anything but good; and human actions are sometimes good, sometimes bad. It further cannot be said that the cause of human actions is necessity, because there proceed from necessity things which are always the same; but we do not see this verified in human actions. It likewise cannot be said that fate or the arrangement of the stars is the cause of these actions, because human actions would have to come about from necessity, just as their cause is necessary. Nor can nature be their cause, as is shown by the variety of human actions; for nature is determined to one course of action and cannot fail in it except in a minority of cases. Nor can fortune or chance be the cause of human actions, because fortune and chance are the cause of things that happen rarely and without being intended, as is said in the Physics; but this is not verified in human actions. Nothing is left, then, but that the man who is doing the acting is himself the principle of his own acts, and consequent has free choice.

REPLY.

Without a doubt it must be affirmed that man is endowed with free choice. The faith obliges us to this, since without free choice there cannot be merit and demerit, or just punishment and reward. Clear indications from which it appears that man freely chooses one thing and refuses another, also lead us to this. Evident reasoning also forces us to this conclusion. Tracing out by its means the origin of free choice for the purposes of our investigation, we shall proceed as follows.

Among things which are moved or which act in any way, this difference is found. Some have within themselves the principle of their motion or operation; and some have it outside themselves, as is the case with those which are moved violently, "in which the principle is outside and the being subjected to the violence contributes nothing," as the Philosopher teaches. We cannot hold free choice to be in the latter inasmuch as they are not the cause of their own motion, whereas a free being is "that which is for its own sake," as the Philosopher teaches.

Among the things whose principle of motion is within themselves some are such as to move themselves, as animals; but there are some which do not move themselves even though they do have within themselves some principle of their motion, as heavy and light things. These do not move themselves because they cannot be distinguished into two parts, of which one does the moving and the other is moved. This double principle is verified in animals. Their motion is consequent upon a principle within them, their form. Because they have this from the being which generated them, they are said to be moved essentially by their genitor and accidentally by that which removes an obstacle, according to the Philosopher. These are moved by means of themselves but not by themselves. Hence free choice is not found in these either, because they are not their own cause of acting and moving but are set to acting or moving by something which they have received from another.

Among those beings which are moved by themselves, the motions of some come from a rational judgment; those of others, from a natural judgment. Men act and are moved by a rational judgment, for they deliberate about what is to be done. But all brutes act and are moved by a natural judgment. This is evident from the fact that all brutes of the same species work in the same way, as all swallows build their nests alike. It is also evident from the fact that they have judgment in regard to some definite action, but not in regard to all. Thus bees have skill at making nothing but honeycombs; and the same is true of other animals.

It is accordingly apparent to anyone who considers the matter aright that judgment about what is to be done is attributed to brute animals in the same way as motion and action are attributed

to in animate natural bodies. Just as heavy and light bodies do not move themselves so as to be by that fact the cause of their own motion, so too brutes do not judge about their own judgment but follow the judgment implanted in them by God. Thus they are not the cause of their own decision nor do they have freedom of choice. But man, judging about his course of action by the power of reason, can also judge about his own decision inasmuch as he knows the meaning of an end and of a means to an end, and the relationship of the one will reference to the other. Thus he is his own cause not only in moving but also in judging. He is therefore endowed with free choice—that is to say, with a free judgment about acting or not acting.

Answers to Difficult

1. In man's activity two elements are to be found: (1) the choice of a course of action; and this is always in a man's power; and (2) the carrying out or execution of the course of action; and this is not always within a man's power; but under guidance of divine providence the project is sometimes brought to completion, sometimes not. Thus a man is not said to be free in his actions but free in his choice, which is a judgment about what is to be done. This is what the name free choice refers to.—Or we can distinguish. Concerning meritorious deeds, as has been done in the objections. The first answer, however, is that of Gregory of Nyssa.

2. A meritorious deed does not differ from an unmeritorious deed by reason of what is done but by reason of how it is done; for there is nothing which one man does meritoriously and from charity which another cannot do or even will without merit. The fact, then, that a man cannot perform meritorious deeds without grace in no way detracts from the freedom of his choice, because a man is said to have free choice in so far as he can do this or that, not in so far as he can do it in this way or in that; for even according to the philosophers²⁴ One who does not yet have the habit of a virtue does not have it in his power to act in the same way as a virtuous man acts except in the sense that he can acquire the habit of the virtue.

Although man cannot by his free choice acquire the grace which makes works meritorious, he nevertheless can prepare himself to have grace, which will not be denied him by God if he does what is within his power. Thus it is not altogether outside the power of free choice to perform meritorious works, although the power of free choice does not of itself suffice for this, inasmuch as the manner of operating which is required for merit exceeds the capabilities of nature. The mode which is in works arising from the political virtues, however, does not. But no one would say that man does not have free choice merely because he cannot will or choose in the manner in which God or an angel can.

3. God works in each agent, and in accord with that agent's manner of acting, just as the first cause operates in the operation of a secondary cause, since the secondary cause cannot become active except by the power of the first cause. By the fact, then, that God is a cause working in the hearts of men, human minds are not kept from being the cause of their own motions themselves. Hence the note of freedom is not taken away.

4. The first cause is called the principal cause, absolutely speaking, because it has the greater influence upon the effect. But the secondary cause is called the principal cause in a certain respect, inasmuch as the effect is more confirmed to it.

5. An instrument is spoken of in two ways: (1) Properly when something is so moved by another that there is not conferred upon it by the mover any principle of such a motion, as a saw is moved by the carpenter. Such an instrument is wholly without freedom. (2) More commonly whatever moves something and is moved by another is called an instrument, whether there is in it the principle of its own motion or not. In this sense it is not necessary for the notion of freedom to be wholly excluded from that of an instrument, because something can be moved by another and still move itself. This is the case with the human mind.

6. One who does not have grace can choose good, but not meritoriously. This, however, does not detract from the freedom of choice, as has been said.

7. The slavery of sin does not imply force, but either inclination, inasmuch as a preceding sin in some way leads to following ones, or a deficiency in natural virtue, which is unable to free itself from the stain of sin once it has subjected itself to it. Thus there always remains in man the freedom from force by which he naturally has free choice.

8. In the words quoted Anselm is speaking as an objector. He himself shows later on that the need of grace does not contradict free choice.

9. The power of free choice extends to the very work which is meritorious, although not without God, without whose power nothing in the world can act. But the mode by which a work becomes meritorious exceeds the capabilities of nature, as has been said.

10. On this matter there are two opinions. Some say that a man in the state of mortal sin cannot long avoid sinning mortally, but he can avoid this or that particular mortal sin, as all say it common concerning venial sins. Thus this necessity does not seem to take away the freedom of choice. There is another opinion holding that a man in the state of mortal sin can avoid all mortal sin but cannot avoid being in the state of sin, because he cannot rise from sin by himself as he can fall into sin by himself. According to this opinion the freedom of choice is more easily upheld. We shall inquire about this below when the scope of free choice is treated.

11. Our will is brought to bear upon an end or upon a means to an end. And the end may be honorable useful, or pleasurable in accordance with the threefold division of good into the honorable, the useful, and the pleasurable. In regard to an honorable end Bernard lays down freedom of choice. In regard to a useful good, which is a means, he lays down freedom of counsel. In regard to a pleasurable good he lays down freedom of liking. Now, although our discernment is diminished by ignorance, it is still not altogether taken away. Thus the freedom of choice is indeed weakened by sin but is not wholly lost.

12. According to one opinion after a sin and before reparation man necessarily sins in the sense of having sin but not in that of using sin. Thus sinning is spoken of in two ways, like seeing, as the Philosopher explains.³² Or, according to another opinion,³³ man necessarily sins by some sin, though he is under no necessity in regard to any particular sin.

13. From God's foreknowledge it cannot be concluded that acts are necessary with absolute necessity, which is called the necessity of the consequent, but merely by a conditioned necessity which is called the necessity of consequence, as Boethius makes clear.

14. Being moved is spoken of in two ways: (1) Properly, as the Philosopher defines motion, saying that it is "the act of a being in potency in so far as it is such." In this sense it is true that the nearer a mobile being is to the prime mover, the greater the uniformity of motion which is found in it, because the nearer it is to the prime mover, the more perfect it is and the more in act and less in potency, and therefore the fewer the motions by which it is movable. (2) Broadly, as applied to any operation, such as to understand or to sense. Taking motion in this sense, the Philosopher says that motion is "the act of what is perfect," because everything acts in so far as it is in act. Thus understood, the statement in question is in some sense true and in some sense is not.

If the uniformity of the motion is considered from the point of view of its effects, the statement is false, because the more powerful and perfect an operator is, the more effects its power extends to. But if it is considered from the point of view of the manner of acting, the statement is true; for the more perfect an operator is, the more it preserves the same manner

in acting, Since it departs less from its nature and disposition, and the manner of acting follow these.

Now rational minds are not called mobile in the first sense of motion, because such motion belongs only to bodies; but rather in the second. It is in this sense that Plato affirmed that the prime mover moves itself inasmuch as it wills and understands itself, as the Commentator points out. It is accordingly not necessary that rational minds be determined to any particular effects. They rather have efficacy in regard to many; and it is by reason of this that freedom be longs to them.

15. It is not always necessary that a thing which can attain its end will fewer motions or operations be nobler, because sometimes one thing attains a more perfect end will many operations than another can attain will a single operation, as the Philosopher says. In this way rational minds are found to be more perfect than the highest heaven, which has only one motion, because they attain a more perfect end, although they do it will many operations.

16. Although a creature would be better if it adhered unchangeably to God, nevertheless that one also is good which can adhere to God or not adhere. And so a universe in which both sorts of creatures are found is better than if only one or the other were found. And this is the answer of Augustine. It can be said, following Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene, that it is impossible for any creature to be capable of adhering to God will an unchangeable will by its own nature, because, being from nothing, it is changeable. If however, any creature adheres unchangeably to God, it is not on this account deprived of free choice, because it can do or not do many things while adhering to God.

17. The judgment to which freedom is attributed is a judgment of choice, not a judgment by which a man pronounces upon conclusions in speculative sciences. For choice is a sort of decision about what has been previously deliberated.

18. Not only is there something true which is necessarily accepted by the intellect because of its freedom from any admixture of falsity, as the first principles of demonstration; but there is also a good which is necessarily desired by the will because of its freedom from any admixture of evil, namely, happiness itself. Yet it does not follow that the will is constrained by that object, because constraint implies some thing contrary to one's will, which is the inclination of the one willing. Constraint does not imply anything contrary to the intellect, however, because intellect does not mean an inclination of the one understanding.

From the necessity of that good, moreover, there is not introduced into the will any necessity in regard to other objects, as from the necessity of the first principles there is introduced into the intellect a necessity of assenting to conclusions. This is because to that first object of will other objects do not either really or apparently have a necessary relationship which would make it impossible to have the first object of will without those others; whereas demonstrative conclusions have a necessary relationship to the principles from which they are demonstrated such that, if the conclusions did not turn out to be true, the principles would necessarily not be true.

19. Neither from the heavenly bodies nor from anything else do men acquire from birth immediately in the intellective soul any disposition by which they are inclined will necessity to choose any particular end; except that there is in them from their very nature a necessary appetite for their last end, happiness. But this does not prevent the freedom of choice, since different ways to attain that end remain open to choice. The reason for this is that the heavenly- bodies do not have any immediate influence upon the rational soul.

There is acquired from birth, however, in the body of the child a certain disposition both from the power of the heavenly bodies and from inferior causes, which are the semen and the

matter of the one conceived; and by it the soul is in some sense made prone to choose something inasmuch as the choice of the rational soul is inclined by the passions, which are in the sense appetite, a bodily power dependent upon the dispositions of the body. But no necessity in choosing is thereby introduced into it, since it is within the power of the rational soul to admit or to repress the passions which arise. Later on, however, a man is made to be of a certain sort by a habit—either an acquired habit, of which we are the cause, or an infused habit, which is not given without our consent even though we are not the cause of it. From this habit it results that the man efficaciously tends to an end consonant with that habit. And yet that habit does not introduce any necessity or take away the freedom of choice.

20. Since choice is a judgment about what is to be done or follows such a judgment, there can be choice only about what falls under our judgment. But in matters of action our judgment is drawn from the end, just as our judgment about conclusions is drawn from principles. We do not, however, judge about first principles, examining them, but naturally assent to them and examine all other things in their light. In the same way, then, when there is question of the objects of appetite, we do not judge about the last end by any judgment involving discussion and examination but we naturally approve of it. Concerning it there is, accordingly, no choice, but there is will. We have in its regard, therefore, a free will, since according to Augustine the necessity of natural inclination is not repugnant to freedom; but not a free judgment, properly speaking, since it does not fail under choice.

ARTICLE II: IS THERE FREE CHOICE IN BRUTES?

Parallel readings: *De veritate*, 23, i C; *II Sentences* 25, 1, I ad 7; *Contra Gentiles* II, 48; *Sum. Theol.*, I, 59, 3 C; 83, I C; I—II, 13, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that there is, for

- 1.** We are said to have free choice in so far as our acts are voluntary. But according to the Philosopher "children and brutes share in the voluntary." Then there is free choice in brutes.
- 2.** According to the Philosopher in everything which moves itself there is the ability to be moved and not be moved. But brutes move themselves. There is in them, therefore, the ability to be moved and not be moved. But we are said to be endowed with free choice from the fact that there is in us the ability to do something, as is clear from Gregory of Nyssa and from Damascene. There is, therefore, free choice in brutes.
- 3.** Free choice implies two things, judgment and freedom, both of which are to be found in brutes. They have some judgment about what is to be done, as appears from the fact that they go after one thing and run from another. They have freedom, since they can be moved or not. Hence there is in them free choice.
- 4.** When a cause is placed, the effect is placed. But Damascene gives as the cause of free choice the fact that our soul begins with a change; because it is from nothing, it is changeable, and stands in potency to many different things. But the soul of a brute also begins with a change. Hence in it also there is free choice.
- 5.** That is said to be free which is not obliged to anything. But the soul of a brute is not obliged to either of two opposites, because its power is not determined to one course of

action, like the power of natural things, which always act in the same way. The soul of a brute therefore has free choice.

6. Punishment is not due to anyone unless he has free choice. But in the Old Law punishment is found to be inflicted upon brutes, as appears in Exodus 19: i 3 in the case of the beast touching the mountain, in Exodus 21:28 in the case of the goring ox, and in Leviticus 20:16 in the case of the beast of burden with which a woman has intercourse. Brutes therefore seem to have free choice.

7. As the saints so point out, it is a sign that man has free choice that he is instigated to good and withdrawn from evil by commands. But we see brutes enticed by favors, moved by precepta, or made afraid by threats w do something or w let it alone. Brutes therefore have free choice.

8. A divine command is given only w someone that has free choice. But a divine command is given to brutes. In Jonas (4:7) according to one version it is said: "God commanded a worm... and it struck the ivy." Brutes therefore have free choice.

To the Contrary:

1'. Man is seen to be made to the image of God from the fact that he has free choice, as Damascenes and Bernard both say. But brutes are not made to the image of God. Therefore they are not endowed with free choice.

2'. Whatever is endowed with free choice acts and is not merely acted upon. But "brutes do not act but are acted upon," as Damascene says. Brutes therefore do not have free choice.

REPLY:

Brutes are by no means endowed with free choice. In explanation of this it should be noted that, since three elements concur in our activity: knowledge, appetite, and the activity- itself, the whole for mal character of freedom depends upon the manner of knowing. For appetite follows knowledge, since there is appetite only for a good which is proposed to it by a cognitive power. If appetite sometimes seems not to follow knowledge, this is because the appetite and the knowledge are not judged from the same point of view. Appetite is concerned with a particular object of operation, whereas the judgment of reason is sometimes concerned with something universal, and this is at times contrary to our appetite. But a judgment about this particular object of operation here and now can never be contrary to our appetite. A man who wishes to fornicate, for instance, although he knows in general that fornication is evil, nevertheless judges this present act of fornication to be good for him and chooses it under the aspect of good. As Dionysius says, no one acts intending evil.

Unless there is something to prevent it, a motion or operation follows the appetite. Thus, if the judgment of the cognitive faculty is not in a person's power but is determined for him extrinsically, neither will his appetite be in his power; and consequently neither will his motion or operation be in his power absolutely. Now judgment is in the power of the one judging in so far as he can judge about his own judgment; for we can pass judgment upon the things which are in our power. But to judge about one's own judgment belongs only to reason, which reflects upon its own act and knows the relationships of the things about which it judges and of those by which it judges. Hence the whole root of freedom is located in reason. Consequently, a being is related to free choice in the same way as it is related to reason.

Reason is found fully and perfectly only in man. Only in him, therefore, is free choice in its full sense found.

Brutes have a certain semblance of reason inasmuch as they share in a certain natural prudence, and in this respect a lower nature in some way attains to the property of a higher. This semblance consists in the well-regulated judgment which they have about certain things. But they have this judgment from a natural estimate, not from any deliberation, since they are ignorant of the basis of their judgment. On this account such a judgment does not extend to all things like that of reason, but only to certain determined objects.

In like fashion there is in them a certain semblance of free choice inasmuch as they can, according to their judgment, do or not do one and the same thing. As a result there is in them a sort of conditional freedom. For they can act if they judge that they should or not act if they do not so judge. But because their judgment is determined to single course of action, their appetite and activity also are consequently determined to a single course. Hence "they are moved by things seen," as Augustine teaches; and as Damascene says, they are driven by passions, because they naturally judge as they do about a particular thing seen or a particular passion. They are accordingly under the necessity of being moved to flight or pursuit by the sight of a particular thing or by a passion which is aroused. A sheep, for example, is under the necessity of fearing and fleeing at the sight of a wolf, and a dog under the influence of the passion of anger has to bark and pursue, intent upon hurting. But man is not necessarily moved by the things which he meets or by the passions which arise, because he can admit or repress them. Consequently, man has free choice, but brutes do not.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. "Something voluntary" is held by the Philosopher to be in brutes, not in the sense of coming from will but in that of being opposed to what is violent. Thus the voluntary is said to be in brutes and in children because they act of their accord but not by the exercise of free choice.
2. The motive power of brutes considered in itself is not any more inclined to one of two opposites than to the other. In this sense they are said to be able to be moved or not. But the judgment by which the motive power is applied to one or the other of the opposites is determined; and so they do not have free choice.
3. Although there is in brutes a certain indifference in their actions, still there cannot properly be said to be in them freedom of action, that is, of acting or of not acting. This is so both because their actions, being carried out by the body, can be forced or prevented (which is true not only of brutes but also of men, so that not even man is said to be free in his action); and also because, although there is in brutes an indifference to acting or not acting if the action is considered in itself, nevertheless, if the relation of the action to the judgment from which it gets its determination is considered, a certain restriction passes over even to the actions themselves, so that there cannot be found in them the character of freedom in an absolute sense. Yet, even granted that there were in brutes some freedom and some judgment, it would still not follow that they have freedom of judgment, since their judgment is naturally determined to a single pronouncement.
4. Damascene assigns beginning from a change or being from nothing, not as the cause of the freedom of choice, but as the cause of the possibility of our free choice deflecting to evil. Not only Damascene¹⁴ but also Gregory and Augustine assign reason as the cause of free choice.
5. Although the motive power in brutes is not determined to one type of action, their judgment about what is to be done is so determined, as has been said.
6. Since brutes are made for the service of man, disposition is made of them according to the advantage of men, for whose sake they were made. By the divine law brutes are therefore punished, not because they have sinned themselves, but because the men who own them are

punished by their punishment or frightened by the sharpness of their pains or instructed by the meaning of the mystery.

7. Both men and brutes are induced by favors and restrained by chastisements, or by commands and prohibitions, but in different ways. It is within the power of men when the same things are similarly represented, whether they be commands or prohibitions, favors or chastisements, to choose or refuse them by a judgment of reason. In brutes, however, there is a natural judgment so determined that whatever is proposed or met in one way is accepted or rejected in the same way. It happens, though, that from the memory of past favors or chastisements brutes apprehend something as friendly and to be pursued or hoped for, and something else as hostile and to be fled or feared. Thus after a beating they are induced by the passion of fear which arises from it to obey the will of their instructor. Nor is it necessary that such things take place in brutes on account of freedom of choice, but on account of the indifference of their actions.

8. According to Augustine the divine command given to brutes "is not to be thought to have occurred in such a way that a voice expressing a command came to them from the clouds in certain words that rational souls, hearing them, are wont to understand and obey. For the beasts of the field and the birds have not received the ability to do such a thing. They obey God in their own way, however, and not by the choice of a rational will; but just as God moves all things in their own appointed times without being moved in time Himself, so too brutes are moved in time to carry out His commands."

ARTICLE III: IS THERE FREE CHOICE IN GOD?

Parallel readings: [II Sentences 25, 1, 1](#); [Contra Gentiles I, 88](#); [Sum. Theol., I, 19, 10](#); [De malo, 16, 5c](#).

Difficulties:

It seems that there is not, for

- 1.** Free choice is a capability of will and reason. But reason is not attributable to God, since it designates discursive knowledge, whereas God knows all things in a simple intuition. Free choice, then, is not attributable w God.
- 2.** Free choice is the capacity by which good and evil are chosen, as Augustine makes clear.¹ But in God there is no capacity for choosing evil. Hence there is no free choice in God.
- 3.** Free choice is a potency capable of Opposite acts. But God is not capable of opposites, since He is immutable and cannot turn to evil. There is therefore no free choice in God.
- 4.** The act of free choice is to choose, as is clear from the definition given.² But choice is not proper to God, since it depends upon a deliberation, which is proper to one who doubts and inquires. Hence there is no free choice in God.

To the Contrary:

- 1'.** Anselm says that if the ability to sin were a part of free choice, God and the angels would not have free choice, but that that is most absurd. It is therefore fitting to say that God has free choice.
- 2'.** Commenting on the words of the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12: 11): "But all these things one and the same Spirit worked, dividing to every one according as He will," the Gloss

adds: "according to the free choice of His will." The Holy Spirit therefore has free choice, and by the same token, also the Father and the Son.

REPLY.

Free choice is to be found in God, but it is found in Him in a different way than in angels and in men. That there is free choice in God is apparent from the fact that He has for His will an end which He naturally wills, His own goodness; and all other things He wills as ordained to this end. These latter, absolutely speaking, He does not will necessarily, as has been shown in the preceding question, because His goodness has no need of the things which are ordained to it, and the manifestation of that goodness can suitably take place in a number of different ways. There remains for Him, then, a judgment free to will this or that, just as there is in us. On this account it must be said that free choice is found in God, and likewise in the angels; for they too do not of necessity will whatever they will. What they will they will by means of a free judgment, just as we.

Free choice is found in us and in the angels, however, in a different way than in God. When what is prior changes, what is posterior must also change. The capacity of free choice presupposes two things: a nature and a cognitive power.

Nature is of a different sort in God than in men and in angels. The divine nature is uncreated and is its own act of being and its own goodness. Consequently there cannot be in it any deficiency either in existence or in goodness. But human and angelic nature is created, taking its origin from nothing. Hence, viewed in itself, it is capable of deficiency. For this reason God's free choice is by no means able to be turned to evil, whereas the free will of men and angels, considered in its natural endowments, is capable of turning to evil.

Knowing also is found to be a different sort in man than in God and in the angels. Man has a process of knowing which is obscured and gets its view of the truth by means of a discourse. From this source comes his hesitation and difficulty in making decisions and in judging; for "the thoughts of... men are fearful, and our counsels are uncertain" (Wisdom 9:14). But in God, and also in angels in their own way, there is a simple view of the truth without any discourse or inquiry. There consequently does not occur in them any hesitation or difficulty in deciding or judging. And so God and the angels have a ready choice on the part of their free will, whereas man experiences difficulty in choosing because of his uncertainty and doubt. It is evident, then, that the free choice of an angel occupies a middle ground between that of God and that of man, having some thing in common with each of the two.

Answers to Difficulties:

2. Reason is sometimes taken broadly for any immaterial cognition; and in this sense reason is found in God. Dionysius accordingly places reason among the divine names. It is also taken properly, as meaning a power which knows without discourse. In this sense reason is not found in God or the angels, but only in men. It can be said, then, that reason is used in the definition of free choice in the first sense. But if it is taken in the second sense, then free choice is defined after the manner in which it is found in men.

2. The ability to choose evil is not essential to free choice. It is a consequence of free choice as found in a nature which is created and capable of failing.

3. The divine will is capable of opposites, not in the sense that it first wills something and afterwards does not (which would be repugnant to its immutability), nor in the sense that it can will good and evil (for that would put delectability in God), but rather in the sense that it can will or not will this particular thing.

4. The fact that choice follows a deliberation, which involves inquiry, is accidental to choice, occurring because it is found in a rational nature, which gets its view of the truth through a reasoning process. But in an intellectual nature, which has a simple acceptance of the truth, choice is found without any previous inquiry. It is thus that choice is in God.

ARTICLE IV: IS FREE CHOICE A POWER OR NOT?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 2, 1; Sum. Theol., 1, 83, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. According to Augustine free choice is a capability of will and reason. But a capability is spoken of as the ability to do easily. Since the ease of a power comes from a habit, because according to Augustine a habit is that by which a person acts easily, it seems that free choice is a habit.
2. Some operations are moral and some are natural. But the capability of moral operations is a habit, not a power, as is clear of the moral virtues. Hence free choice, which implies a facility for natural operations, is a habit, not a power.
3. According to the Philosopher, if nature were to make a ship it would make it the same as art makes one. Natural facility, then, is of the same character as the facility which comes from art. But the facility which comes from art is a habit acquired from acts, as is evident in the moral virtues. As a consequence we say that whatever is done by reason is produced by art. Then the capability or natural facility which is free choice will also be a habit.
4. According to the Philosopher⁴ it is by habits that we act in a given way, but by powers that we simply act. But free choice designates not only that by which we act, but also that by which we act in a given way—freely. Free choice therefore designates a habit.
5. The answer was given that, when we say that a habit is that by which we act in a given way, we must understand rightly or wrong 1 the contrary, whatever is essential to habit is common to all habits. But acting rightly or wrongly is not common to all habits; for speculative habits, as it seems, do not have any reference to acting rightly or wrongly. Acting rightly or wrongly is therefore not essential to habit.
6. Anything taken away by sin cannot be a power, but is a habit. Now free choice is taken away by sin, because, as Augustine says, "by using his free choice badly man has destroyed both it and him self." Free choice is therefore a habit and not a power.
7. The answer was given that the statement of Augustine is to be understood of the freedom of grace, which comes from a habit.—On the contrary, according to Augustine "no one uses badly" the habit of grace. Therefore the freedom of choice, which a person uses badly cannot be understood to be the freedom of grace.
8. Bernard says that free choice is "a habit of the spirit which is free in its own regard." Thus the conclusion is the same as before.
9. It is easier to undertake an act of knowing than of doing. But there has been given to the cognitive power a natural habit, the understanding of principles, which is at the summit of knowledge. Hence there has also been given to the operative or motive power a natural habit.

Since in matters of motion free choice seems to hold the highest place, it seems to be a habit or else a power perfected by a habit.

10. A power is narrowed down only by a habit. But will and reason are narrowed down in free choice; for the will is concerned with both possibles and impossibles, while free choice is concerned only with possibles. In the same way reason is concerned both with the things that are in our power and with those that are not, whereas free choice is concerned only with those that are in our power. Free choice therefore designates a habit.

11. Just as a power designates something added to an essence, a capability designates something added to a power. But what is added to a power is a habit. Then, since free choice is a capability, it seems to be a habit.

22. Augustine says that free choice is "a motion of the vital and rational soul." But "motion" refers to an act. Free choice is therefore an act and not a power.

23. According to Boethius "judgment is the act of one judging." But a choice or decision is the same as a judgment. Then a choice or decision is also an act. But the addition of free does not take it out of the genus of act, because acts too are called free if they are in the power of the agent. Free choice, then, is an act and not a power.

24. According to Augustine, whatever goes beyond its subject is in something essentially, not accidentally. From this he proves that love and knowledge are in the mind essentially, because the mind loves and knows not only itself but also other things. Now free choice extends beyond its subject, because the soul acts by free choice upon things which are outside itself. Free choice is therefore in the soul essentially. Thus it is not a power, since powers are added to the essence.

25. No power brings itself into act. But free choice brings itself into act when it wishes. Hence free choice is not a power.

To the Contrary:

1'. According to the Philosopher "there are three things in the soul: power, habit, and passion." Now free choice is not a passion, since it is in the higher part of the soul, whereas passions and passible qualities are found only in the sensitive part. Similarly it is not a habit, since it is the subject of grace (for according to Augustine its relation to grace is that of a horse to its rider), whereas a habit cannot be the subject of anything else. We are therefore left with the Conclusion that free choice is a power.

2'. There seems to be this difference between a power and a habit, that a power which is open to opposites is determined to one of them by a habit. But free choice designates something which is open to opposites and by no means determined to one of them. Free choice is therefore a power and not a habit.

3'. Bernard says: "Take away free choice and there is nothing which will be saved." But what is saved is the soul or a power of the soul. Free choice, then, not being the soul, because it belongs only to the higher part of it, must, by elimination, be a power.

4'. The Master says: "That power of a rational soul by which it can will good or evil, distinguishing between the two, is called free choice." And so free choice is a power.

5'. Anselm says that free choice is "the power of preserving the uprightness of the will for its own sake." Thus the Conclusion is the same as before.

REPLY:

If the term is taken literally, free choice designates an act. But by usage it has been transferred to mean the principle of the act. When we say that a man has free choice, we do not mean that

he is actually judging freely, but that he has within himself that by which he can judge freely. Consequently, if the act of judging freely should contain anything which goes beyond the capacity of a power, then it will designate a habit or a power perfected by some habit. To get angry will moderation for instance, implies something which goes beyond the capacity of the irascible power; for the irascible power cannot moderate the passion of anger by itself unless it is perfected by a habit by means of which there is impressed upon it the moderation of reason. If, however, to judge freely should not imply anything that exceeds the capacity of the power, free choice will not designate anything but a power without any further addition, just as to get angry does not go beyond the capacity of the irascible power, and for this reason its proper principle is a power and not a habit.

Now it is clear that to judge, if nothing is added, does not go beyond the capacity of a power, because it is the act of a power, reason, by its own nature, without requiring the addition of any habit. Similarly, what is added in the adverb freely does not exceed the scope of the power, for something is said to be done freely inasmuch as it is in the power of the one doing it. But the fact that something is under our control is in us as the consequence of an operative power, not of a habit. That power is the will.

Free choice accordingly does not designate a habit but the power of will or reason—one as subordinated to the other. Thus the act of choosing proceeds from one of them in subordination to the other in accordance with what the Philosopher says: choice is an appetite on the part of the intellective power or an understanding on the part of the appetitive.

It is clear too from what has been said why some were led to hold that free choice is a habit. For some have held this on account of the addition which free choice makes to will and reason, the subordination of the one to the other. But this cannot have the character of a habit if the term is taken in the proper sense, for a habit is a quality by which a power is inclined to act. Others, considering the facility with which we judge freely, have said that free choice is a power modified by a habit. But, as has already been said, to judge freely does not go beyond the nature of a power.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Something is said to be easy in two senses: (1) because of the removal of a hindrance, and (2) because of the reception of help. The case which belongs to a habit is had by the reception of help, for a habit inclines a power to act. But free choice does not designate an ease of this kind, because of itself it is not inclined to one thing rather than to another; but it does designate a case which is had by the removal of a hindrance, because free choice is not hindered from performing its own operation by anything which forces it. Augustine accordingly calls free choice a capability, not a facility-, because a capability seems to imply that something is in the power of the one having the capability.

2-3. This same is to be said of these difficulties, which also argue from the facility of a habit.

4. Regarding acts two senses of the term *way* can be taken into account, one which belongs to the essence of a habit, as when something is done rightly or wrongly, and another which belongs to the essence of a power, as it belongs to the intellect from the very nature of that power to know immaterially. The way implied in the phrase *to judge freely* does not pertain to a habit which is added, but to the very nature of the power, as has been said.

5. [The answer to this is not given.]

6. Man has not entirely destroyed his [of I free choice by using it badly, but just in a certain respect, because after sinning he cannot be without it as he could before he sinned.

7. Even though no one can use grace badly, nevertheless a person can use his free choice badly even when it has the freedom of grace, in the sense that we are said to use badly something which is the principle of bad use, such as a power or a habit. Moreover, if we should be said to use something badly as the object of the use, in this sense even virtues and grace are subject to bad use, as appears in those who get proud of their virtues.

8. Bernard is taking habit loosely for any facility whatsoever.

9. There are two reasons why a power needs a habit: (1) because the operation which is to be evoked by the power is beyond the ability of the power, though it is not beyond the ability of the whole of human nature; and (2) because it is beyond the ability of the whole of nature. In this second way all of the powers of the soul, whether affective or intellectual need habits by which meritorious acts are elicited, because they are not capable of such acts unless habits of grace are added to them.

In the first way the intellect has need of a habit because it cannot understand anything unless it is assimilated to it by an intelligible species. The intellect must accordingly have added to it intelligible species by which it is brought into act. An ordering of species, however, produces a habit.

For the same reason the lower appetitive powers, that is, the irascible and the concupiscible, need habits by which the moral virtues are completed. That their acts should be moderate does not exceed human nature, but it does exceed the scope of the powers mentioned. It is accordingly necessary that what belongs to a higher power, reason, be impressed upon them; and the very imprint of reason in the lower powers formally completes the moral virtues.

The higher affective power, however, does not need any habit in this way, because it naturally tends to a good connatural to it as to its proper object. Consequently, in order that it will good, nothing is required except that good be shown to it by the cognitive power. For this reason the philosophers did not put in the will any habit, either natural or acquired; but in order to give direction in operative matters they put prudence in reason, and temperance and courage and the other moral virtues in the irascible and the concupiscible powers. But according to the theologians the habit of charity is put into the will for the sake of meritorious acts.

10. That narrowing down of reason and will does not take place by any habit that is added, but by the subordination of one power to the other.

11. The capability which is had by the inclination of a habit adds to the power something which is of another nature, a habit. But the capability which is had through the removal of coercion adds to the power a positive determination which nevertheless belongs to the very nature of the power, just as a differentia which is added to a genus belongs to the nature of the species.

12. Augustine defines [the power of] free choice by its proper act, because powers come to be known by their acts. Hence the predication in that case is not essential but causal.

13. Though in the strict meaning of the term free choice designates an act, nevertheless by usage it has been transferred to mean the principle of the act.

14. Knowledge and love can be referred to the mind in its two distinct aspects: (1) As loving and knowing. In this sense they do not exceed the mind, nor do they become unlike other accidents. (2) As loved and known. In this sense they exceed the mind, because the mind loves and knows not only itself but other things as well; and they also become unlike other accidents. For the other accidents in that regard in which they are referred to their subject are not referred to anything outside it. By acting they are referred to something outside; by inhering, to the subject. Love and knowledge, however, under a single aspect are referred to

their subject and to things outside, though there is an aspect under which they are referred to the subject alone. In this sense it is therefore not necessary that they be essentials of the mind, except in so far as the mind is known and loved through its own essence.

15. [The answer to this is not given.]

ARTICLE V: IS FREE CHOICE ONE POWER OR SEVERAL?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 2 1, 2; Sum. Theol., I, 83, 3 & 4.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is several powers, for

- 1.** As Augustine says, free choice is a capability of will and reason. But reason and will are distinct powers. Free will then pertains to distinct powers.
- 2.** Powers are known by their acts. But acts of several different powers are ascribed to free choice; for, as Damascene says, "these things occur in us: to be moved or not, to attack or not, to desire or not," and the like, which unquestionably belong to several different powers. Free choice is therefore several powers.
- 3.** Boethius says that free choice is in "divine substances" (that is, angels) inasmuch as there is in them "a penetrating judgment and an uncorrupted will." But penetration of judgment belongs to reason. Free choice therefore includes will and reason, and thus it is several powers.
- 4.** The answer was given that it is one power having the virtuality of two.—On the contrary, in the lower part of the soul are found an affective and a cognitive power just as they are in the higher. But in the lower part there is no power which has in itself the virtuality of the cognitive and the affective powers. Then neither is there any in the higher part.
- 5.** Boethius says that "the extreme form of slavery is had when human minds, given over to vices..., grow dark will the cloud of ignorance and are put in a turmoil will pernicious affections." But the slavery of which there is question is opposed to free choice. Hence free choice includes reason and the affections, and so the conclusion is the same as before.

To the Contrary:

Man is called a microcosm inasmuch as there is found in him a re semblance to the macrocosm. But in the macrocosm two extreme natures are not found without an intermediate one. Then neither in man are two extreme powers found without one that is intermediate. We find in men, however, one power which always tends to good, synderesis, and another practically the opposite of this, which always inclines to evil, sensuality. Hence there is also found a power which is open to good and evil, and this is free choice. Thus it seems that free choice is one power.

REPLY:

Two considerations have led some to hold that free choice is several powers: (1) They saw that by free choice we have control over the acts of all the powers. They accordingly affirmed that free choice is a sort of universal whole will respect to all the powers. But this cannot be, because, were it so, there would be required in us many powers of free choice on account of the multiplicity of powers; for many men are many animals. Nor are we forced to hold this by

the reason mentioned, for all the acts of the different powers are referred to free choice only through the intermediary of one act, to choose. We are moved by free choice inasmuch as by our free choice we choose to be moved; and the same is true of other acts. It is therefore not shown by this that free choice is several powers, but rather that it is one power which moves different powers by its own efficacy.

(2) Some were moved to affirm a plurality of powers in free choice by the fact that they saw concur in the act of free choice the functions of different powers: judgment, which belongs to reason, and appetite, which belongs to will. They accordingly said that free choice includes several powers as an integral whole contains its parts. Now this cannot be true. Since the act which is attributed to free choice is a single specific act, to choose, it cannot proceed immediately from two distinct powers; but it proceeds from one immediately and from the other mediately, inasmuch as the characteristic of the prior power is communicated to the posterior. It remains, then, that free choice is a single power.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Augustine says that free choice is a capability of will and reason because man is ordained to the act of free choice through both powers, though not immediately.
2. Free choice is not referred to the acts of different powers except through the intermediary of its own single act, as has been said.
3. Boethius attributes to free choice the characteristics of different powers inasmuch as through different powers man is ordained to the act of free choice, as has been said.
4. In the irrational part of the soul there is found on the part of the cognitive power only simple apprehension and not any comparing or ordering, as is found in the rational apprehensive power. Consequently, in the sensitive part appetite is brought to bear upon its object absolutely, without having in the appetitive power any order derived from the apprehensive. In the sensitive part, therefore, there is no power which embraces in some sort both the apprehensive and the appetitive, as there is in the rational part.
5. This is to be answered in the same way as the fourth difficulty.

ARTICLE VI: IS FREE CHOICE THE WILL OR A POWER OTHER THAN THE WILL?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, r, Sum. Theol., I, 83, 4; I-II, 13, 1; III, 18, 3 & 4.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is another power, for

1. Whatever is predicated of something essentially should not be put in its definition obliquely, as animal is not put obliquely in the definition of man. But reason and will are placed in the definition of free choice obliquely, for it is said to be "a capability of will and reason." Free choice is therefore not reason or will but a power other than either.
2. The differences of powers are known from the differences of acts. But to choose, which is the act of free choice, is other than to will, which is the act of the will, as the Philosopher makes clear. Hence free choice is a power other than the will.
3. In the term free choice, choice is expressed in the abstract and freedom in the concrete. Now choice or decision belongs to reason; freedom, to the will. What belongs to reason, then,

pertains to free choice essentially; but what belongs to the will pertains to it denominatively and accidentally. Thus free choice seems to be reason rather than will.

4. According to Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa we are free in our choice because we are rational. But we are rational because we have reason. Because we have reason, then, we are free in our choice; and SO it seems that free choice is reason.

5. In accordance will the order among habits there is also an order among powers. But the act of faith, which is a habit of reason, is informed by charity, which is a habit of the will. An act of reason is accordingly informed by the will, and not the other way about. Thus, if the act of free choice belongs to one of two powers, the will and reason, to one as eliciting and to the other as informing, it seems that it belongs to reason as eliciting it. And so free choice is essentially reason, and therefore a power other than the will.

To the Contrary:

1'. Damascene says: "Free choice is nothing but the will."

2'. The Philosopher says that choosing is appetite for what has been previously deliberated. But choosing is the act of free choice. Free choice is therefore the appetitive power. But it is not the lower appetite, which is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible; for then brutes would have free choice. It is therefore the higher appetite, and according to the Philosopher this is the will.

REPLY:

Some say that free choice is a third power distinct from will and reason, because they see that the act of free choice, which is to choose, is different both from that of the will by itself and from that of reason. The act of reason consists in mere knowledge. The act of the will is concerned with a good which is an end. But free choice deals with a good which is a means to an end. Just as a good which is a means to an end lies outside the nature of an end, and appetite is outside of knowledge, they say that in a natural order will proceeds from reason, and from these two a third power, free choice, proceeds.

But this cannot consistently stand. The object and that which constitutes the formality under which the object is attained belong to the same power, as colour and light belong to sight. Now the whole formality of the appetibility of a means as such is the end. It is consequently impossible that it should belong to distinct powers to tend to the end and to tend to the means. Nor can this difference, that the end is sought absolutely and the means relatively, bring about a distinction of appetitive powers; for the reference of one thing to another is not in appetite of itself but because of something else, namely, reason, whose function it is to refer and compare. This can therefore not be a specific difference constituting a distinct species of appetite. Whether to choose is an act of reason or of will, however, the Philosopher seems to leave in doubt in the sixth book of the Ethics; but he supposes that it is somehow a function of the two, saying that choice is either an understanding on the part of the appetitive power or an appetite on the part of the intellective. That it is an act of appetite, however, he says in the third book, defining choice as a desire of what has been previously deliberated.

That this is true its very object makes clear. For, just as the pleasurable and the honorable good, which have the formality of an end, are the object of the appetitive power, so too is the useful good, to which choice properly applies.

It is clear also from the name. For free choice, as has been said, is the power by which man can freely judge. Now whatever is said to be the principle of performing an act in a determined way need not be the principle of that act taken without qualification, but it is designated chiefly as the principle of that particular manner of acting. Grammar, for example,

when called the science of correct speech, is not taken to be the principle of speech in an unqualified sense, because man can speak even without grammar; but it is taken as the principle of correctness in speech. In the same way the power by which we freely judge is not taken to be that by which we judge without further qualification, for that is the function of reason; but it is taken as the power which accounts for our freedom in judging, and this belongs to the will.

Free choice is therefore the will. The term does not designate the will absolutely, however, but will reference to one of its acts, to choose.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Free choice does not refer to the will absolutely but in subordination to reason. To signify this, will and reason are put in the definition of free choice obliquely.
2. Although choosing is a different act from willing, that difference cannot bring about a distinction of powers.
3. Though judgment is a function of reason, the freedom of judging belongs immediately to the will.
4. We are called rational not merely from the power of reason, but from the rational soul, of which the will also is a power. In this sense we are said to have free choice inasmuch as we are rational. If rational were taken from the power of reason, however, the passages cited in authority would mean that reason is the primary source of free choice but not the immediate principle of choosing.
5. The will in some sense moves reason by commanding its act; and reason moves the will by proposing to it its object, which is the end. Thus it is that either power can in some way be informed by the other.

ARTICLE VII: CAN THERE BE ANY CREATURE WHICH HAS ITS FREE CHOICE NATURALLY CONFIRMED IN GOOD?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 5, 1, 1; 23, I, 1; [Contra Gentiles III](#), 108-10; in Job, c. 4, lectura. (P 14 20h); Sum. Theol., I, 63, I; 95, 1 ad 3; De malo, 16, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that there can, for

A spiritual nature is nobler than a corporeal one. But there is a corporeal nature for which it would be out of keeping to have any disorder in its motion. That is the nature of a heavenly body. With all the more reason, then, can there be a created spiritual nature capable of free choice in whose motions there naturally cannot be any disorder. But this means that it is impeccable or confirmed in good.

2. The answer was given that it belongs to the nobility of a spiritual creature that it be able to merit, but that this would be impossible unless it could sin or not.—On the contrary, the ability to merit is within the competence of a spiritual creature by reason of its having the mastery of its own acts. But if it were notable to do anything but good, it would nonetheless still have the mastery of its own acts; for it could do something good or not do it without falling into evil, or it could at least choose between something good and something better. The ability to sin is therefore not required for meriting.

3. Free choice, by which will the help of grace we merit, is an active power. But it is not of the nature of an active power that it fail. A spiritual creature can therefore have the power to merit even if it is naturally impeccable.

4. Anselm says: "The power of sinning is neither freedom nor a part of freedom." But freedom is the reason why man is capable of meriting. Then, even if the power of sinning is taken away, there will still remain to man the power of meriting.

5. Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene assign as the reason why a creature is changeable in its free choice the fact that it is from nothing. But it is more closely a consequence of being a creature that it can fall into nothingness than that it can do evil. Now there are found creatures which are by nature incorruptible, such as the soul and heavenly bodies. Even more surely, then, can there be found a spiritual creature which is by nature impeccable.

6. What God does in one thing He can do in others. But He grants to spiritual creatures by their very nature to tend so invariably to a certain good, happiness, that they can by no means tend to the contrary. He could in the same way, then, grant to some creature that it should naturally tend to all good so that it could by no means incline to evil.

7. Since God is supremely good, He communicates Himself in the highest degree. He consequently communicates to creatures every thing of which creatures are capable. But creatures are capable of the perfection which is confirmation in good or impeccability. This is evident because it is granted to some creatures by grace. Consequently there is also some creature which is naturally impeccable and confirmed in good.

8. Substance is the principle of a power, and a power is the principle of operation. But there is a creature which is naturally invariable in substance. There can therefore be some creature naturally invariable in its operation so as to be naturally impeccable.

9. Attributes of creatures consequent upon their efficient principle belong to them more essentially than those consequent upon their material principle, because the effect takes on a likeness of its efficient cause but stands opposed to its material cause. Opposites are from opposites, as white from black. But confirmation in good comes to some creatures from God, their efficient principle. Much more, then, should confirmation in good be said to be natural to them than the ability to sin, which belongs to them as being made out of nothing.

10. Civic happiness is unvarying. But man can attain to civic happiness by natural means. He can therefore naturally have invariability in good.

11. Whatever is in a being from nature is unvarying. But man naturally tends to good. Hence he does it invariably.

To the Contrary:

1'. Damascene says that the reason why a rational creature can turn to evil in its choice is that it is from nothing. But there cannot be any creature which is not from nothing. Hence there cannot be any creature whose free choice is naturally confirmed in good.

2'. The characteristics of a higher nature cannot belong to a lower nature unless it is changed into the higher. Thus it is impossible for water to be naturally hot unless it is changed into the nature of fire or air. But to have a goodness incapable of failure is the characteristic of the divine nature. It is therefore impossible that this should naturally belong to any other nature unless it is changed into the divine nature. But that, of course, is impossible.

3'. Free choice is not found in any creatures except angels and men. But both man and the angels have sinned. The free choice of no creature, therefore, is naturally confirmed in good.

4'. No rational creature is kept from attaining happiness except by reason of sin. If any rational creature were naturally impeccable, therefore, it could attain to happiness by purely natural means without grace. But that seems to smack of the Pelagian heresy.

REPLY:

There is not and cannot be any creature whose free choice is naturally confirmed in good so that the inability to sin belong to it by its purely natural endowments. The reason is this. A failure in an action is caused by a failure in the principles of the action. Consequently, if there is something in which the principles of action cannot fail in themselves nor be hindered by something extrinsic, its action cannot possibly fail. This is seen in the motions of the heavenly bodies. But it is possible for a failure to occur in the actions of those things in which the principles of acting can fail or be hindered. This is seen in beings subject to generation and corruption, which undergo failure in their active principles by reason of their changeableness and have defective actions as a result. For this reason in the operations of nature something amiss frequently happens, of which the births of monsters are examples. For something amiss, whether it be spoken of in natural or artificial or voluntary matters, is nothing but a defect or disorder in the agent's proper action when something is done otherwise than as it should be, as is explained in the Physics.

A rational nature endowed with free choice, however, is different in its action from every other agent nature. Every other nature is ordained to some particular good, and its actions are determined in regard to that good. But a rational nature is ordained to good without further qualification. Good, taken absolutely, is the object of the will, just as truth, taken absolutely is the object of the intellect. That is why the will reaches to the universal principle of good itself, to which no other appetite can attain. And for this reason a rational creature does not have determined actions but is in a state of indifference in regard to innumerable actions. Now, since every action proceeds from the agent with a certain similarity to the agent, as hot things heat, any agent which is ordained in its action to some particular good must have the formality of that good naturally and invariably within itself if its action is to be naturally indefectible. If a body, for instance, naturally has an unvarying heat, it heats invariably.

A rational nature, accordingly, which is directed to good, taken absolutely, through many different actions, cannot have actions naturally incapable of going astray from good unless it have in it naturally and invariably the formality of the universal and perfect good.

That can be had, however, only in the divine nature. For God alone is pure act, admitting no admixture of any potentiality, and thus is pure and absolute goodness. But any creature is a particular good, since it has in its very nature the admixture of potentiality, which belongs to it because it is made out of nothing. And hence it is that among rational natures only God has a free choice naturally impeccable and confirmed in good, whereas it is impossible for this natural impeccability to be in a creature because of its being made out of nothing, as Damascene⁶ and Gregory of Nyssa say. From this, too, is the particular good in which the nature of evil is founded, as Dionysius says.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Corporeal creatures are directed to some particular good through definite actions, as has been said. Consequently, in order that error and sin be naturally absent from their actions, it is sufficient for them to be fixed by their own nature in some particular good. But this is not sufficient in the case of spiritual natures ordained to good taken absolutely, as has been said.

2. There is no contradiction between being naturally impeccable and having the mastery over one's own actions, since both are verified in God. But there is a contradiction between natural impeccability and the possession of the mastery over one's own actions by a created nature,

which is a particular good; for no creature which has determined actions directed to a particular good has the mastery of its own acts.

3. Although it is not of the nature of an active power that it fail, it is of the nature of an active power which does not have within itself the sufficient and unvarying principles of its own action that it be able to fail.

4. Though the ability to sin is not a part of free choice, yet it results from freedom of choice in a created nature.

5. A creature gets an act of existence which is determined, particular, and from another. Consequently, a creature can have a stable and unvarying existence even though there is not found in it the formality of the absolute and perfect good, but by its actions it can be directed to good taken absolutely. Hence there is no parallel.

6. Every rational mind naturally desires happiness in an undetermined and general way, and in this regard it cannot fail. But the motion of the will of a creature is not determined in particular to seek happiness in this or that. And so a person can sin even in seeking happiness if he seeks it where he should not, as one who seeks it in sensuous pleasures. The same is also true in regard to all goods, for nothing is desired except under the aspect of good, as Dionysius says. This is so because the tendency to good is naturally in the mind, but not to this or that good. Hence it can fall into sin in this matter.

7. A creature is capable of impeccability, but not so as to have it naturally. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

8. The principle of a correct operation proceeding from free choice is not merely the substance and the faculty or power, but there is also needed the due application of the will to certain things which are extrinsic, such as the end, and other things of the sort. Consequently, even when there is no defect in the substance of the soul or in the nature of free choice, a failure in its action can follow. From the natural invariability of the substance, then, natural impeccability cannot be concluded.

9. God is the cause of creatures not only in their natural endowments but also in everything additional. It is accordingly not necessary that whatever creatures have from God should be natural to them, but only what God has endowed them with in instituting their nature. But confirmation in good is not something of this sort.

10. Since civic happiness is not happiness without qualification, it does not have invariability without qualification; but it is called unvarying because it is not easily changed. Yet even if civic happiness were simply unvarying, it would not follow on this account that free choice would be naturally confirmed in good. For we are not speaking of something natural in the sense that it can be acquired by the principles of nature, as political virtues can be called natural, but in the sense that it follows from the necessity of the principles of nature.

11. Although man naturally tends to good in general, he does not so tend to a specific good, as has been said. It is for this reason that sin and failure occur.

ARTICLE VIII: CAN THE FREE CHOICE OF A CREATURE BE CONFIRMED IN GOOD BY A GIFT OF GRACE?

Parallel readings: II Sentences, 1, 1; 23, 1, r; III Sentences 3, I, 2 sol. z & 3; IV Sentences 6, 1, I sol. Sum. Theol., 1, 62, 8; 100, 2; Expos. super salut. angel.

Difficulties:

It seems that it cannot, for

1. Grace, coming to a nature, does not destroy but perfects it. Since it is a natural characteristic of the free choice of a creature that it can be turned to evil, it therefore seems that it cannot be removed from it by grace.
2. It is within the power of free choice to use grace or not to use it, for free choice is not forced by grace. But if free choice does not use a grace imparted to it, it falls into evil. Consequently no grace that comes to it can confirm free choice in good.
3. Free choice has the mastery of its own acts. But the use of grace is an act of free choice. It is therefore within the power of free choice to use it or not to use it, and so it cannot be confirmed by grace.
4. The possibility of turning to evil is in the free choice of a creature because it is from nothing, as Damascene says. But no grace can remove from a creature its origin from nothing. Then no grace can confirm our free choice in good.
5. Bernard says that free choice is "the most powerful thing" under God, that it gets no increase from grace and justice, and that it suffers no loss from a fault. But confirmation in good when added to free choice increases it, because according to Augustine "in things of great mass to be larger is to be better." Hence free choice cannot be confirmed in good by grace.
6. As is said in The Causes, whatever is in a subject is in it after the manner of that subject. But free choice is by its nature capable of change to good or evil. A grace that comes to it is therefore received into it in such a way that it can be turned to good or evil; and so it cannot confirm it in good.
7. Whatever God adds to a creature He could also, as it seems, confirm upon it from the beginning of its creation. Consequently, if He could confirm free choice by a grace added to it, He could also confirm it by something implanted in the spiritual creature in the very constitution of the nature; and so it would be naturally confirmed in good. But this is impossible, as has been said. Then neither can it be confirmed through grace.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. The saints who are in their heavenly home are confirmed in good so as not to be able w sin any more; otherwise they would not be secure in their happiness and so would not be happy. But this confirmation is not in them by nature, as has been said. It is therefore by grace; and so free choice can be confirmed by a gift of grace.
- 2'. The human body is by nature corruptible, just as man's free choice is by nature capable of turning to evil. But the human body is made incorruptible by a gift of grace; for it is written in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (15:53): "For this corruptible must put on incorruption." Free choice can therefore be confirmed in good by grace.

REPLY:

Origen was in error concerning this question. He held that the free choice of a creature could in no way be confirmed in good, not even in the blessed, except in Christ because of the union to the Word. As a result of this error, moreover, he was forced to affirm that the happiness of the saints and even of the angels is not everlasting but is at some time to come to an end; and from this it follows that theirs is not true happiness, since changelessness and security are essential to happiness. Consequently because of its inadmissible consequences Origen's

position is to be entirely rejected; and we must say without cavil that free choice can be confirmed in good by grace.

This is evident from the following consideration. The free choice of a creature cannot be naturally confirmed in good, because it does not have in its nature the note of perfect and absolute good but only of a certain particular good. By grace, however, free choice is united to this perfect and absolute good, that is, God. If the union should be perfect, so that free choice would have God Himself as the whole cause of its acting, it could not turn to evil. That does happen in some cases, and especially in that of the blessed.

The reason is this. The will naturally tends to good as its object. That it sometimes tends to evil happens only because the evil is presented to it under the aspect of a good. But evil is involuntary, as Dionysius says. Consequently there cannot be any sin in the motion of the will so that it tends to evil unless there previously exists some deficiency in the apprehensive power, as a result of which something evil is presented as good. This deficiency in reason can come about in two ways: either from reason itself, or from something extrinsic to it.

It can come about from reason itself because the knowledge of good in general, both of the good which is the end and of that which is a means, is had by it naturally and invariably and without error, but not of good in particular. In regard to the latter it can err so that it judges something which is not the end to be the end, or something which is not useful to the end to be useful. For this reason too the will naturally desires the good which is the end, namely, happiness in general, and likewise the good which is a means to the end (for every one naturally desires his own profit); but the sin on the part of the will occurs in desiring this or that particular end or in choosing this or that means.

Reason proves deficient because of something extrinsic to it when the lower powers are drawn to something intensely and the act of reason is consequently interrupted so that it does not propose to the will its judgment about the good clearly and firmly. For example, someone who has a proper regard for the necessity of observing chastity may desire something contrary to chastity through a lust for what is pleasant because the judgment of reason is in some sense fettered by concupiscence as the Philosopher says.

Both of those types of deficiency will be entirely removed from the blessed by their Union to God. For, seeing the divine essence, they will recognize that God Himself is the end to be loved above all else. They will know too in particular all the things which either unite a person with Him or separate one from Him, knowing God not only in Himself but also as the reason for which other things are to be desired. And from the clarity of this knowledge their minds will be strengthened to such an extent that no motion will be able to arise in the lower powers except according to the rule of reason. Consequently, just as we now invariably desire good in general, the minds of the blessed invariably desire in particular the good which they ought. Furthermore, over and above this natural inclination of the will they will have perfect charity binding them entirely to God. Sin will therefore be unable to occur in them in any way; and so they will be confirmed by grace.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. It is due to the deficiency of a created nature that it can turn to evil; and grace removes this deficiency by perfecting the nature, confirming it in good, just as light which comes to the air takes away the darkness which it naturally has without light.
2. It is within the power of free choice not to make use of a habit; yet even the non-use of a habit can be proposed to it under the aspect of good. But this cannot happen in the blessed regarding grace, as has been said.
3. The answer to this is clear from what has just been said.

4. Because free choice is from nothing, it is consonant will it not to be naturally confirmed in good; nor can natural confirmation in good through grace be granted to it through grace. It is not, however, consonant will free choice as being from nothing to be incapable of confirmation in good in any way, just as it is not in air from its own nature to be altogether incapable of being illuminated, but merely to be not by nature actually luminous.

5. Bernard is speaking of free choice will reference to freedom from force, which does not admit of increase or lessening.

6. Concerning anything received into a subject we eau consider its existence and its formal character. In regard to its existence it is in its subject after the manner of the subject, but it nevertheless draws the subject to its own formal character. Thus heat that is received into water has existence in the water after the manner of the water, being in the water as an accident in a subject; yet it draws the water from its natural state to one in which it is hot and takes on the character of heat. Similarly, light affects the air, though not against the nature of air. In the same way grace too in regard to its existence is in free choice after its manner as an accident in a subject; yet it draws free choice to the formal character of its own invariability, joining it to God.

7. The perfect good, God, eau be united to the human mind by grace but not by nature. Consequently free choice eau be confirmed in good by grace but not by nature.

ARTICLE IX: CAN THE FREE CHOICE OF MAN IN THE^{ns} PRESENT LIFE BE CONFIRMED IN GOOD?

Parallel readings: In Job, c. 4, Iect. 3; Sum. Theol., 111,27,4; 5 ad 2; Cornp. theol 1, 224.

Difficulties:

It seems that it cannot, for

In appetitive matters the principle is the end, as the Philosopher says, just as in speculative matters axioms are the principle. But in speculative matters the intellect is not confirmed in truth when it takes on the certitude of science unless it makes the reduction to the first axioms. Then neither can free choice be confirmed in good except after it shall have come to the last end. But this is not attained in this present life. Consequently in this present life free choice cannot be confirmed in good.

2. Human nature is not more highly endowed than angelic nature. But the confirmation of their free choice was not granted to the angels before the state of glory. Then neither should it be granted to men.

3. A mover comes to rest only in the end. But free choice does not come to its end so long as it is in this present life. Then neither does its variability, by which it can be directed to good and evil, come to rest here.

4. As long as something is imperfect it can fail. But men's imperfection is not taken away from them so long as they are in this present life, as is said in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (13: 12) "We see flow through a glass in a dark manner." Then, as long as man is in this present life he can fail through sin.

. As long as a person is in the state of meriting, that which increases his merit should not be taken away from him. But the ability to sin is advantageous for merit. For this reason it is said in praise of a just man in Ecclesiasticus (31: 10): "Me that could have transgressed, and hath

not transgressed; and could do evil things, and hath not done them." Hence, as long as a man is in this present life in which he can merit, his free choice should not be confirmed in good.

6. The failing of the body is corruption, just as that of free choice is sin. But the body of man does not become incorruptible in this present life. Then neither can man's free choice be confirmed in good in this life.

To the Contrary:

1' The Blessed Virgin was confirmed in good in this life; for, as Augustine says, "when there is question of sin," no mention should be made of her.

2' The Apostles too were confirmed in good by the coming of the Holy Spirit, as is seen from what is said in the Psalms (74:4): "I have made its pillars firm," which the Gloss applies to the Apostles.

REPLY:

A person can be confirmed in good in two ways: (1) Absolutely, so that he has within himself a principle of his firmness sufficient to make him unable to sin at all. It is in this sense that the blessed are confirmed in good in the way explained above. (2) Some are said to be confirmed in good because there is given to them some gift of grace by which they are so inclined to good that they cannot easily be drawn away from it; but they are not thereby so drawn away from evil that apart from the protection of divine providence they are unable to sin at all. It is like the immortality of Adam, who is held to have been immortal, not because he was entirely protected by some intrinsic principle from every external lethal agent, like a wound from a sword, etc., but because divine providence preserved him from such things. It is in this way that some in the present life are confirmed in good, and not in the first way.

This is shown as follows. A person cannot be made altogether impeccable unless every source of sin is removed. Now the source of sin is found either in an error of reason, which is led astray in a particular case concerning the end (good) and the means to it, which he naturally desires in general; or in the obstruction of the judgment of reason by some passion of the lower powers. Although it could be granted to someone in this life through the gift of wisdom and of counsel that his reason should in no way be concerned regarding the end (good) and regarding the means in particular, yet to have the judgment of reason unobstructed surpasses the state of this present life for two reasons: primarily and principally because it is impossible for reason in this life here below to be always in the act of correct contemplation so that the reason for everything we do is God; secondly, because the lower powers do not happen to be so subject to reason in this life that the act of reason is in no way obstructed by them, except in the case of our Lord, Jesus Christ, who was at the same time on the way to God and in possession of Him.

By the grace proper to this life, however, a man can be so attached to good that he cannot sin except with great difficulty because his lower powers are held in check by the infused virtues, his will is more firmly inclined to God, and his reason is made perfect in the contemplation of the divine truth with a continuousness that comes from the fervor of love and withdraws the man from sin. But everything that is lacking for confirmation in good is supplied by the watchfulness of divine providence over those who are said to be confirmed. As a consequence, whenever the occasion for sin presents itself, their mind is divinely inspired to resist.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Affection attains the end not only when it perfectly possesses the end but also in some sense when it intensely desires it. It is in this way that a person in the present life can in a sense be confirmed in good.
2. The gift of grace does not follow the order of nature will necessity. Consequently, although human nature is not nobler than that of an angel, there has nevertheless been conferred upon a human being a grace greater than upon any angel, namely, upon the Blessed Virgin and upon Christ as man. Now confirmation was fitting for the Blessed Virgin because she was the mother of divine wisdom, into which nothing defiled comes, as is said in the Book of Wisdom (7:25). It was similarly fitting the Apostles because they served as the foundation and groundwork of the whole ecclesiastical edifice and for that reason had to be firm.
3. The answer is the same as that given for the first difficulty.
4. From that line of argument it can be concluded that there is no one in this present life wholly confirmed, just as there is no one wholly perfect. In some sense, however, a person can be said to be confirmed, just as he can be said in some sense to be perfect.
5. The ability to sin does not contribute to merit, but only to the manifestation of merit, inasmuch as it shows that a good work is voluntary. It is put among the praises of the just man because praise is the manifestation of virtue.
6. The corruption of the body does contribute to merit in a material way, in so far as a person suffers it with patience. For this reason it is not taken away by grace from a man in the state of meriting.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

The answers to these are clean from what has been said.

ARTICLE X: CAN THE FREE CHOICE OF ANY CREATURE BE OBSTINATE OR UNALTERABLY HARDENED IN EVIL?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 7, I, 2; Sum. Theol., I, 6 2; De malo, 16, 5; cf. parallels to art. 11.

Difficulties:

It seems that it cannot, for

1. Sin is "contrary to nature," as Augustine says. But according to the Philosopher nothing contrary to nature is permanent. Hence sin cannot remain permanently in free choice.
2. A spiritual nature is stronger than a corporeal one. But if there is introduced into a corporeal nature an accident which is beyond its nature, it returns to what is in keeping with its nature unless the accident introduced is preserved by some cause acting continually. If water is heated, for example, it returns to its natural coolness unless there is something constantly keeping it hot. Then a spiritual nature having free will, if it should happen to fall into sin, will likewise not remain permanently subject to sin, but will eventually return to the state of justice unless some cause is assigned to preserve the evil in it constantly. But it seems that no such cause is to be assigned.
3. It was said in answer that the cause introducing and preserving sin is internal and external. The internal cause is the will itself. The external is the object of the will, which attracts it to sin.—On the contrary, the thing which is outside the soul is good. Now a good cannot be the

cause of evil except accidentally. The thing existing outside the soul is therefore only accidentally the cause of sin. But every accidental cause is reduced to an essential cause. Something must therefore be assigned which is the cause of sin essentially. But that cannot be anything but the will. Now when the will inclines to anything, it retains the ability still to tend to the opposite, since the object of its inclination does not take away from it its nature, by which it can be directed to opposites. Then neither the will nor anything else can be the cause making free choice invariably and more or less necessarily adhere to sin.

4. According to the Philosopher³ there are two kinds of necessary being: one has its necessity of itself; the other has it from something else. That sin should be in free choice cannot be necessary with a necessity of itself, because to be necessary in this way is proper to God alone, as even Avicenna says. Nor again is it necessary with a necessity from something else, because everything necessary in this way is reduced to what is necessary of itself. God, however, cannot be the cause of sin. It can therefore in no way be necessary for free choice to remain in sin; and so the free choice of no creature adheres immovably to sin.

5. Augustine seems to distinguish two kinds of necessity: one, called the necessity of constraint, takes away freedom, removing something from our power; the other, which is the necessity of natural inclination, does not take away freedom. Now it is not necessary that sin be in free choice by the latter necessity, since sin is not natural but rather against nature; nor again by the former, because then the freedom of choice would be removed. It is therefore in no way necessary; and so the same must be concluded as before.

6. Anselm says that free choice is "the power of preserving the rectitude of the will for its own sake." Then if there is any free choice which cannot have rectitude of will, it will lose the character of its own nature. But that is impossible.

7. Free choice is not susceptible of degrees. But a free choice which is incapable of good is less than one which is capable of it. Consequently there is no free choice which is incapable of good.

8. Voluntary motion is related to voluntary rest as natural motion to natural rest. But according to the Philosopher, if the motion is natural, then the rest in which it terminates is also natural. So too, if the motion is voluntary. Then the rest by which one persists in a sin committed is also voluntary, and therefore not necessary.

9. The will stands to good and evil in the same relation as the intellect to the true and the false. But the intellect never so clings to the false that it cannot be brought back to the knowledge of what is true. Then the will never so clings to evil that it cannot be brought back to a love of good.

10. According to Anselm "the ability to sin is not freedom for a part of freedom." The essential act of free choice is therefore the ability to do good. Consequently, if the free choice of any creature were unable to do good, it would be useless, since nothing is of any avail if it is deprived of its proper act; for "each thing exists for the sake of its operation," as the Philosopher says.

11. Free choice is incapable of anything but good or evil. Consequently, if the ability to sin is not freedom for a part of freedom, it remains that the whole of freedom consists in the ability to do good; and so a creature which could not do good would not have any free dom. Free choice can accordingly not be so confirmed in evil that it cannot do any good at all.

12. According to Hugh of St. Victor a change in accidentals does not change any of the essentials of a thing. But the ability to do good is essential to free choice, as has been proved. Since sin comes to free choice accidentally, this power cannot be so changed as to be rendered incapable of good.

13. Natural endowments are wounded by sin, as is commonly said; but they are not entirely taken away. But the capability of good is natural to free choice. Hence this power is never so hardened in evil by Sin that it is impotent regarding good.

14. If sin causes in free choice obstinacy in evil, it does this either by subtracting something from natural endowments or by adding something to them. Now it does not do it by subtracting, because even in the demons natural gifts remain intact, as Dionysius says. Neither is it done by adding, because what is added, being an accident, must be in the recipient in the manner of the recipient. Thus, since free choice can be directed to either of two alternatives, it is not there by made to cling immovably to evil. Free choice can therefore in no way be entirely confirmed in evil.

15. Bernard says: "It is impossible for the will not to obey itself." But sin and a good act are committed by willing. It is therefore impossible that free choice should not be able to will good if it wished. But whatever a person can do if he wishes is not impossible. It is therefore not impossible for anyone having the free choice of will to do good.

16. Charity is stronger than the cupidity which attracts us to sin, because "charity loves the law of God more than cupidity loves thousands of gold and silver," as the Gloss says in comment upon the words of the Psalm (118:72): "The law of thy mouth is good to me, above thousands of silver and gold." But the demons and even men have fallen from charity into sin. So much the more, then, can they return from sin to an attachment to good. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

17. The goodness and rectitude of the will are opposed to its obstinacy. But the demons and the damned have a good and correct will, because they desire what is good and the best: "to be, to live, and to understand," as Dionysius says. They therefore do not have a free choice obstinate in evil.

18. Anselm traces out the common nature of free choice in God, in the angels, and in men. But God's free choice cannot become obstinate in evil. Then neither can it in angels and in men.

To the Contrary:

1'. The misery of the damned is opposed to the happiness of the blessed. But it is a property of the happiness of the blessed that they have a free choice so strengthened in good that they can by no means turn aside to evil. It is therefore also a property of the misery of the damned that they are so confirmed in evil that they are by no means capable of good.

2'. Augustine expressly says the same thing.

3'. There is no means of return from sin to good other than by repentance. But repentance does not take place in a bad angel. He is therefore unalterably confirmed in evil.—Proof of the minor: Repentance does not seem to take place in one who sins from malice. But an angel has sinned from malice, because, having an intellect like God's, when he considers anything he at the same time beholds every thing which pertains to that thing; and so he cannot sin except with certain knowledge. Repentance therefore does not take place in him.

4'. In the words of Damascene, "the fall is the same for the angels as death for men." But after death men are incapable of repentance. Then so too are the angels after the fall.—Proof of the minor: Augustine says¹ that, because there will be no room for conversion after this life for those who depart without grace, no prayers are to be offered for them. Thus it is evident that after death men are not capable of repentance.

REPLY:

On this question we find that Origen has erred. He held that after long course of time the way would lie open for both demons and damned men to return to justice; and he was led to affirm this because of the freedom of choice. Now this opinion has been disliked by all Catholics, as Augustine says, not because they begrudged the demons and damned men their salvation, because it would seem necessary to say will equal reason that the justice and glory of the blessed angels and men is at some time to come to an end. For a verse in Matthew (25:46) makes clear at the same time that the glory of the blessed and the misery of the damned will be everlasting: "And these shall go into everlasting punishment: but the just, into life everlasting." And Origen seems to have been of this opinion also. It must therefore be simply granted that the free choice of the demons is so hardened in evil that it cannot return to right willing.

The basis for this conclusion is to be sought in the cause of deliverance from sin. Now two things concur in this deliverance: divine grace working as the principal agent, and the human will cooperating with grace; for according to Augustine "He who created you will out you, will not justify you without you." The cause of obduracy in evil is therefore to be found partly in God and partly in free choice. It is to be found in God, not as causing or preserving evil, but as not bestowing grace. And indeed His justice demands this, for it is just that those who have not been willing to will rightly when they could, should be brought to such a pass of misery that they are altogether unable to will rightly. On the part of free choice, however, the cause of the possibility or impossibility of turning away from sin is to be found in the things by means of which man falls into sin. Now, since there is naturally in any creature the desire for good, no one is led to commit a sin except by some appearance of good. Though a fornicator, for instance, knows in general that fornication is evil, nevertheless when he consents to fornication he judges that fornication is good for him to commit at the time.

In this judgment three influences are to be taken into account. The first is the surge of passion, such as concupiscence or anger, by which the judgment of reason is hindered from actually judging in particular what it habitually holds in general, but is moved rather to follow the inclination of passion so that it consents to that to which passion is tending as good in itself. The second is the inclination of habit, which is a sort of nature for the one having it. The Philosopher says, for instance, that custom is a second nature; and Tully says that virtue accords will reason after the manner of a nature, and in the same way a habit of vice inclines one as a sort of nature to what agrees with it. The result is that to the one who has the habit of lust whatever fits in will lust as being of the same nature seems good. This is the Philosopher's meaning when he says that "each person judges of the end in accordance with his own character." The third is a false judgment of reason in regard to a particular object of choice. It comes either from one of the two influences mentioned above, the surge of passion or the penchant of habit, or else from a universal ignorance, as when one is of the erroneous opinion that fornication is not a sin.

Against the first of these influences free choice has a remedy where by it can abandon sin. He in whom the surge of passion occurs has a right judgment of the end, and the end is equivalently a principle in matters of operation, as the Philosopher says. By means of the true judgment which he has of the principle, a man can do away with any errors that he may have fallen into regarding his conclusions. In the same way by being rightly disposed regarding the end, he can do away with every surge of passion. The Philosopher accordingly says that an incontinent man who sins because of passion is capable of repentance and remedy.

Against the penchant of habit there is likewise a remedy. No habit corrupts all the powers of the soul. Consequently, when one power is corrupted by a habit, a man is led by any rectitude that remains in the other powers to ponder and to take action against that habit. If, for example, someone has his concupiscible power corrupted by the habit of lust, he is urged by

the irascible power to attempt something hard, and its exercise will take away the softness of lust. Thus the Philosopher says: "A wicked person who is brought to better practices will advance and become better."

Against the third influence too there is a remedy. What a man assents to he assents to in a rational manner, by way of inquiry and comparison. Consequently, when reason errs in one respect, from whatever source the error may have come, it can be removed by contrary reasonings. This is why a man can abandon sin.

In an angel, however, sin cannot be from passion, because, as the Philosopher says, passion is only in the sensitive part of the soul, which an angel does not have. In the sin of an angel, therefore, only two influences concur: a habitual inclination to the sin and a false judgment of the cognitive power about a particular object of choice. Now, since angels do not have a multiplicity of appetitive powers as men have, when their appetite tends to something, it inclines to it all together, so that it does not have any inclination drawing it to the contrary. And because they do not have reason but intelligence, whatever they judge, they accept in the manner of understanding. But whatever is accepted in the manner of understanding is accepted irreversibly, as when one accepts the proposition that every whole is greater than its part. As a consequence angels cannot put aside a judgment which they have once accepted, whether it be true or false.

It is therefore clear from what has been said that the cause of the confirmation of the demons in evil depends upon three factors, to which all of the reasons assigned by the doctors can be reduced. The first and principal one is the divine justice. There has accordingly been assigned as the cause of the obstinacy of the demons that, because they have not fallen through the instrumentality of anyone else, they should not rise through the instrumentality of anyone else—and any other such reason based upon congruity will divine justice. The second factor is the indivisibility of the appetitive power. In this connection some say that, because an angel is simple, it turns entirely to whatever it turns to. This must not be understood of the simplicity of its essence, but of a simplicity excluding the distinction of different powers of the same genus. The third is intellectual knowledge. This is the cause assigned by some who say that the angels have sinned irremediably because they have sinned against an intellect like God's.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Something is said to be natural in two ways: (1) A sufficient principle exists from which it follows necessarily unless something interferes. In this sense it is natural for the element earth to move downward. And this is the Philosopher's meaning when he says that nothing which is against nature is permanent. (2) Something is called natural for a thing because it has a natural inclination to it, although it does not have within itself a sufficient principle from which it necessarily follows. In this sense it is said to be natural for a woman to conceive a son though she cannot do so without receiving the male seed. Now nothing prevents what is contrary to nature in this sense from being permanent, as that a particular woman should remain permanently without issue. But it is in this second sense that it is natural for free choice to tend to good, and also to sin against nature. The argument therefore proves nothing.

Or the answer may be given that, although sin is against nature for a rational mind as it was established, yet inasmuch as it has already adhered to sin, sin has become in some sense natural for it, as Augustine says. The Philosopher also says that, when a man passes from virtue to vice, he becomes in a way another man because he takes on, as it were, another nature.

2. The situation is different for a corporeal nature and for a spiritual nature. A corporeal nature is determinately of a single genus. Consequently nothing else can be made natural to it without entirely corrupting its nature. Thus heat cannot be made natural to water unless the

species of water is destroyed. And because its heat is not natural, when the obstacle is removed, the water returns to its own nature. But a spiritual nature is created undetermined and capable of becoming all things in its secondary act of being. Thus it is said in *The Soul*, "The soul is in some sense all things." By adhering to something it is made one will it, as the intellect in some sense becomes the intelligible object by understanding it, and the will becomes the object of appetite by loving it. And so, although the inclination of the will is naturally directed to one determined object, the contrary can be made natural to it by love to such an extent that it does not return to its original disposition unless some cause brings this about. In this way sin is made as it were natural to the one who clings to sin. Hence nothing prevents free choice from remaining permanently in sin.

. The essential cause of sin is the will, and by it sin is preserved. Although in the beginning the will was equally determinable to sin or to good, after it submitted to sin, sin became in a sense natural to it. As a consequence, as far as depends upon itself it remains unalterably in it.

4. The necessity of remaining in sin is reduced to God as its cause in two senses: (1) from the point of view of His justice, as has been said, inasmuch as He does not confer healing grace; (2) inasmuch as He established such a nature, which was also capable of sinning and had from the condition of its own nature the necessity of remaining in sin after having submitted to it.

5. Since sin has been made in some sense natural to the rational mind, the necessity in question will not be one of force but one of a quasi-natural inclination.

6. The power of preserving the rectitude of one's will when one has it is in everyone having free choice, as Anselm says. But the demons and other damned cannot preserve it since they do not have it.

7. Free choice is not susceptible of degrees in so far as it is said to be free from force. But when freedom from sin and from misery is taken into account, it is said to be freer in one state than in another.

8. An effect of nature is always natural. For this reason the motion and action of nature always terminate in a natural rest. But the action and motion of the will can terminate in a natural effect and natural rest inasmuch as the will and art help nature. A motion can accordingly be voluntary while at the same time the effect or the rest consequent upon it is natural and has a natural necessity. Thus from a voluntary blow death follows as natural and necessary.

9. If the intellect of an angel accepts some false judgment, it is unable to set it aside for the reason given above. The argument is therefore based upon a false supposition.

10. Even though something is deprived of its proximate end, it is not as a consequence altogether useless, because it still retains its ordination to its ultimate end. Accordingly, even though free choice is deprived of the good operation to which it is naturally destined, it is still not without purpose, because this very fact turns to the glory of God, who is its ultimate end, inasmuch as His justice is thereby manifested.

11. A sin is not committed through free choice except by the choosing of an apparent good. In any sinful action there accordingly remains some good, and in this respect freedom is preserved. If the aspect of good were taken away, the act of free choice, choosing, would cease.

12. The ability to do good is not essential to free choice as belonging to its primary existence, but rather as belonging to its secondary existence. But Hugh is speaking of essentials with reference to primary existence.

13. That argument is speaking of the natural in the sense of that which belongs to the constitution of a nature, not in the sense of that to which the nature is ordained. But it is in the latter sense that it is natural to be able to do good.

14. The sin which comes to free choice does not take away any of its essentials, because in that case the species of free choice would not remain. But something is added by sin—the coupling of free choice with a perverse end; and this becomes in a sense natural to it. It therefore has necessity, like the other things which are natural to free choice.

15. In some sense the will always obeys itself, so that, however a man wills what he wills, he wills that he will it. But in another sense it does not always obey itself, inasmuch as a person does not perfectly and efficaciously will what he wishes that he perfectly and efficaciously willed, as Augustine explains. Nor does it follow that, if the will of the demons obeys itself, it is for that reason not confirmed in evil, because it cannot possibly will that it efficaciously will good. Hence, if the conditional proposition were true, it would not follow that the apodosis is possible, since the protasis is impossible.

16. In itself charity is more powerful than sin if the two are com

pared as had under the same conditions; that is, if for both of them we take the free choice either of one who has reached his final state or of one who is still on the way. One in the final state of wickedness, however, is more firmly established in evil than one going along in the way of charity is established in charity. Now the demons either never had charity, as some hold; or, if they ever had it, they never had it except as being on the way. Damned men, however, could not similarly have fallen except from the grace proper to wayfarers.

17. That argument proceeds on the supposition of the goodness and rectitude of the nature itself, not the goodness and rectitude of free choice. The appetite by which demons desire good and the best is an inclination of their very nature, not one by the election of free choice. Such a rectitude is consequently not opposed to the obstinacy of free choice.

18. Anselm is searching for that element in the nature of free choice which is common to God, to angels, and to men on the basis of a very broad analogy. It is therefore not necessary that likeness be found from the standpoint of all the special conditions.

ARTICLE XI: CAN THE FREE CHOICE OF MAN IN THIS PRESENT LIFE BE OBSTINATE IN EVIL?

Parallel readings: I Sentences 40, 4, in Matt., C. 13, lectura 2, § 1 (P 10: 124b- 127ab); [Contra Gentiles III](#), 162; in 11 Cor., C. 4, lectura 2 (P i 3 Sum. Theol., I-II, 7 In Joan., c. 12, lectura, § 3 (P 10: 520a); in Rom., c. 9, lectura (end) (P 13: 98ab).

Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

1. Whatever is inflicted because of the deserts of fallen nature is present in all before the reparation of fallen nature. But the sin of fallen nature is deserving of obstinacy, as the Glossa says in commenting upon the Epistle to the Romans (9:18). Hence every man before reparation in this present life is obstinate.

2. A sin against the Holy Spirit in all its species can be found in a person in this life. But obstinacy is a species of sin against the Holy Spirit, as is taught in the Sentences. Consequently a person in this present life can be obstinate.

3. No one in the state of sin can return to good unless there remains in him some inclination to good. But whoever falls into mortal sin lacks all inclination to good; for a person sins mortally through an inordinate love; but according to Augustine in spirits love is like weight in bodies. A heavy body is so inclined in one direction, as a stone downward, that it retains no contrary inclination—e.g., upward. Then neither does a sinner retain any inclination to good. Whoever sins mortally is accordingly obstinate in evil.

4. No one withdraws from the evil of guilt except by repentance. But according to the Philosopher one who sins through malice is incapable of repentance, because he is corrupted in regard to the principle in matters of choice, namely, the end. Consequently, since it happens that a person in this present life may sin from malice, it seems that it is possible for man in this life to be obstinate in evil.

5. It was said in answer that, although such a person is incapable of repentance by his own powers, he can nevertheless be brought back to repentance by the gift of divine grace.—On the contrary, when something is impossible from the viewpoint of lower causes even though it could be done by a divine operation, we say that simply speaking it is impossible; for example, that a blind man should see or a dead person rise. If, then, someone is not capable of repentance by his own powers, he should simply be said to be obstinate in evil, even though he could be brought to repentance by the divine power.

6. Every sickness that works against its cure seems to be incurable, as the physicians say. But a sin against the Holy Spirit works against its cure, divine grace, by which a person is freed from sin. A person in this present life can therefore have an incurable spiritual sickness, and can accordingly be obstinate in evil.

7. In support of this seems to be the fact that a sin against the Holy Spirit is called unforgivable (Matthew 12:31). But that is a sin which some people in this life commit.

8. Augustine and Gregory assign as the reason why the saints will not pray for the damned in the day of judgment that the damned can not return to the state of justice. But there are some in the present life for whom we are not to pray, as is written in the first Epistle of St. John (5:16): "There is a sin unto death: for that I say not that any man ask"; and in Jeremias (7:16): "Therefore do not thou pray for this people..." There are therefore some in this present life so obstinate that they cannot return to the state of justice.

9. It belongs to the misery of the damned to be confirmed in evil, just as it belongs to the glory of the saints to be confirmed in good. But a person in this present life can be confirmed in good, as was shown above. With equal reason, then, it seems that a person in this life can be obstinate in evil.

10. Augustine speaks to the effect that the angels are endowed with greater capabilities than man. But after sinning the angels could not return to justice. Then neither can man; and so man in this life can be obstinate.

To the Contrary:

1' Concerning the Epistle to the Romans (2:4—5) Augustine says, and is quoted in the Gloss: "That impenitence or impenitent heart cannot be judged as long as a person is living in this flesh; for we are not to despair of anyone so long as the patience of God leads him to repentance." And so it seems that no one in this present life is obstinate in evil.

2' It is written in the Psalm (67: 23): "I shall turn to the depth of the sea," i.e., to those who are the most desperate. And so those who seem to be the most desperate in this life are sometimes converted to God and God to them.

3' On the words of the Psalm (147:6): "He sendeth his crystal..."the Gloss comments: "Crystal means the obstinate, by whom He feeds others; that is, He makes them such that they feed others will the word of God."¹³ And so the same is to be concluded as before.

4' A sickness can be incurable either because of the nature of the sickness or because of the lack of skill of the physician or because of the indisposition of the patient. But the spiritual sickness of a man in this life, sin, is not incurable from the nature of the sickness; for he has not arrived at the term of malice. Nor again is it incurable because of the lack of skill of the physician, because God has the knowledge and ability to cure. Nor again is it incurable because of the indisposition of the man, because he can rise by another's means just as he has fallen by another's means. Man in this present life can therefore by no means be confirmed in evil.

REPLY:

Obstinacy implies a certain firmness in sin by reason of which a person cannot turn from sin. Now the inability to turn from sin can be understood in two senses:

In the first sense the person's own powers are not sufficient to free him entirely from sin. It is in this sense that anyone who falls into mortal sin is said to be unable to return to justice. But from this sort of firmness in sin a person is not properly called obstinate.

In the second sense he has a firmness in sin such that he cannot even cooperate in rising from sin. But this inability can be of two kinds: (1) It is such that he is unable to cooperate at all. This is the perfect obstinacy by which the demons are obstinate. For their minds are so hardened in evil that every motion of their free choice is inordinate and sinful. They can accordingly in no way prepare themselves to have the grace by which sin is remitted. (2) It is such that the person is not able easily to cooperate in his deliverance from sin. This is the imperfect obstinacy by which a person can be obstinate in this present life, as long as he has a will so hardened in sin that there do not arise in him any except weak motions to good. Nevertheless, because some arise, the way is open by their means to prepare for grace.

The reason why no one can be so obstinate in evil in this life that he is unable to cooperate in his liberation is clear from what has been said. For passion is dissipated and repressed; habit does not wholly corrupt the soul; and reason does not cling so stubbornly to what is false that it cannot be led away from it by a contrary argument. But after this present life the separated soul will not understand by receiving anything from the senses, nor will it engage in the act of the sense appetitive powers. The separated soul is thus confirmed to the angels in the manner of understanding and in the indivisibility of its appetite, which were seen to be the causes of the perfect obstinacy in the sinful angels. Hence there will be obstinacy in the separated soul for the same reason. In the resurrection, moreover, the body will follow the condition of the soul; and so the soul will not return to its present state, in which it must necessarily receive something from the body, though it will use bodily instruments. Consequently, even then the same reason for obstinacy will remain.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The sin of fallen nature is said to be deserving of obstinacy inasmuch as the same sin is deserving of everlasting damnation. For by the deserts of the first sin the whole human nature became subject to damnation, except that some should be snatched from it by the grace of the Redeemer. But this does not mean that a man is obstinate immediately from his birth, nor that he is damned will final damnation.

2. That argument is speaking of imperfect obstinacy, by which a person is not absolutely confirmed in evil. Such an obstinacy is a species of sin against the Holy Spirit.

3. Augustine compares love to weight because both incline. It is not necessary, however, that there be likeness in all respects. It consequently does not follow that one who loves something has no inclination to the contrary, except perhaps in the case of perfect love, such as the love of the saints in heaven.
4. One who sins from malice is said to be incapable of repentance, not because he cannot repent at all, but because he cannot easily repent. He does not perfectly repent upon the urging of reason alone, because this urging proceeds from a principle, the end, regarding which the sinner is corrupted. He can, however, be led to repent by gradually growing accustomed to the contrary. He can be led to this customary attitude both by reason of the manner of judging, because he comes to a judgment rationally and more or less by comparison, and also because his whole appetitive power does not tend to a single objective. From this familiarity he will get a correct conception of the principle, that is, the appetible end. The Philosopher accordingly says: "Neither in speculative matters nor in operative can reasoning teach principles; but virtue, whether natural or acquired by habit, is the reason why we have a correct opinion about the principle."
5. When a lower nature is able to dispose things for some operation or in any way cooperate in it, that operation is not called simply impossible even though it cannot be achieved except by divine action. We do not say, for instance, that it is simply impossible for the offspring in the womb of the mother to be animated by a rational soul. In the same way, although deliverance from sin takes place by the divine action, nevertheless, because free choice also cooperates in this, it is not said to be simply impossible.
6. Although one who sins against the Holy Spirit works against the grace of the Holy Spirit because of the inclination of sin, yet, because he is not wholly corrupted by this sin, there remains some motion, though weak, by which he can cooperate in some way with grace; for he does not always actually resist grace.
7. A sin against the Holy Spirit is not called unforgivable in the sense that it cannot be forgiven in this life, but because it cannot easily be forgiven. The reason for this difficulty is that the sin in question goes directly contrary to grace, by which sin is remitted.—Or it is called unforgivable because, being committed out of malice, it does not have in itself the cause of its forgiveness, as does a sin committed out of weakness or ignorance.
8. We are not forbidden to pray for sinners, however great, in this life. But in the words of the Apostle which were quoted, the meaning is that it is not the business of anyone and everyone to pray for those hardened in sin but of a perfect man.—Or the Apostle is speaking of a sin unto death, that is, which continues all the way up to death. In the words of the prophet, however, the people in question are shown to have been in the just judgment of God unworthy of obtaining mercy, but not to have been altogether obstinate in evil.
9. Confirmation in good is brought about by a divine gift. Consequently, nothing prevents its being granted to some people in this life as a special privilege even though they are not confirmed in good in the same way as the blessed in heaven, as was said above. But this cannot be said of confirmation in evil.
10. From the very fact that the angels were endowed with greater capabilities it follows that immediately after their first choice they were obstinate in sin, as is clear from what has been said. It is not Augustine's intention, however, to prove that man is obstinate in sin, but that he lacks the power to rise from sin by himself.

ARTICLE XII: CAN FREE CHOICE IN THE STATE OF MORTAL SIN AVOID MORTAL SIN WITHOUT GRACE?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 22, ad 24, i ad 10 & 12; II Sentences 20, 2, 3 ad 5; 24, 1,4 ad 2; 28, a. 2; [Contra Gentiles](#) III, 160; In I Cor., c. 12, lectura 1 (P 13: 25 In Hebr., c. 10, lectura (P 13: 751a); Sum. Theol., I-II, 6 2 ad 2; 74, ad 2 109, 8; De malo, 1 ad 9.

Difficulties:

It seems that it cannot, for

- 1.** In the Epistle to the Romans (7:15) it is said: "For I do not that good which I will; but the evil which I hate, that I do." This is said in the person of the damned, as the Gloss says in commenting on this passage. Hence a man without grace cannot avoid sin.
- 2.** Actual mortal sin is more serious than original sin. But a person in original sin, if he is an adult, cannot avoid sinning mortally without grace; for in that case he would avoid damnation to the pain of sense, which actual mortal sin merits. Since in the case of adults there is no mean between that damnation and the glory of eternal life, it would accordingly follow that he could obtain eternal life without grace. But that is the Pelagian heresy. Even less, then, can a person in the state of mortal sin avoid mortal sin unless he receives grace.
- 3.** On the words of the Epistle to the Romans (7:20): "Now in do that which I will not..." the Gloss quotes the comment of Augustine: "This is a description of man living under the Law and prior to grace. For man is bound by his sins as long as he tries to live justly by his own strength without the help of liberating grace, which frees the free choice so that it trusts in its liberator and so does not sin against the Law." But to sin against the Law is to sin mortally. It therefore seems that a man without grace cannot avoid mortal sin.
- 4.** Augustine says that evil has the same relation to the soul as crookedness has to the lower leg, and that the act of sin is like limping. Now limping cannot be avoided by one having a crooked leg unless the leg is first made straight. Neither can mortal sin be avoided, then, by one who is in sin unless he first be freed from sin by grace.
- 5.** Gregory says: "A sin which is not wiped out by repentance soon by its weight pulls the person into another." But sin is wiped out only by grace. Without grace, then, a sinner cannot avoid sin.
- 6.** According to Augustine fear and anger are passions and sins. But man cannot avoid passions by his free choice. Then neither can he refrain from sinning.
- 7.** What is necessary cannot be avoided. But some sins are necessary, as is clear from the words of the Psalm (24:17): "Deliver me from my necessities." Consequently man cannot avoid sin by his free choice.
- 8.** Augustine says: "When flesh lusts against the spirit there is some
5jfl But it is not within the power of free choice to have flesh not lust against the spirit. Hence the power of free choice does not extend to the avoidance of sin.
- 9.** The possibility of dying is a consequence of the possibility of sinning, for in the state of innocence man could die only in the sense that he could sin. Then the necessity of dying also is a consequence of the necessity of sinning. But in the present state man cannot keep from dying. Then neither can he keep from sinning.

10. According to Augustines in the state of innocence man could remain upright because he had an uncontaminated nature free from all stain of sin. But that in contamination is not in a sinner destitute of grace. He consequently cannot stand up, but after sinning is under the necessity of falling.

11. To the victor a crown is due, as is evident from the Apocalypse (3:1 1). But if anyone avoids sin when he is tempted, he conquers sin and the devil, as appears from the Epistle of St. James (4:7): "Resist the devil, and he will fly from you." If, then, a person can avoid sin without grace, he will be able to merit a crown without grace. But that is heretical.

12. Augustine says: "When cupidity compels, the will cannot resist." But cupidity leads to sin. Hence the human will without grace cannot avoid sin.

13. One who has a habit necessarily acts according to the habit. But a person in sin has the habit of sin. It therefore seems that he cannot avoid sinning.

14. According to Augustine free choice is that by which we choose good will the assistance of grace and evil will its lack. It therefore seems that one who lacks grace always chooses evil by his free choice.

15. Whoever can avoid sin can conquer the world, for no one conquers the world in any other way than by ceasing to sin. But no one can conquer the world except by grace, because "this is the victory which overcometh the world, our faith," as is said in the first Epistle of St. John (5:4). Consequently a person without grace cannot avoid sin.

16. The commandment to love God is affirmative and accordingly so obliges to its observance as place and time demand, that if it is not observed one sins mortally. But the commandment of charity cannot be observed without grace, because "the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us," as is said in the Epistle to the Romans (5:5). Without grace, then, a man can not help sinning mortally.

17. According to Augustine the precept of mercy to oneself is included in the precept of mercy to one's neighbour. But a person sins mortally unless he is merciful to his neighbour in a necessity involving bodily death. All the more, then, does he sin mortally unless he has mercy upon himself when he is in sin, by repenting of his sin. And so, unless his sin is wiped out by repentance, a man cannot avoid sinning.

18. The contempt of God is related to sin in the same way as the love of God is to virtue. But every virtuous man must necessarily love God. Then every sinner must condemn God and thus sin.

19. According to the Philosopher like acts come from like habits.

If a man is in sin, then, it seems that he must necessarily produce like acts, that is, acts of sin.

20. Since form is the principle of operation, whatever lacks form lacks the operation proper to that form. But to turn away from evil is the work of justice. Then, since one who is in sin lacks justice, it seems that he cannot turn away from evil.

21. The Master says: "After sin and before the reparation of grace free choice is pressed and conquered by concupiscence and has a weakness for evil. But it does not have grace for good. It can accordingly sin even so as to merit damnation." And so without grace a person cannot avoid mortal sin.

22. Should it be answered that he is unable not to sin in the sense of not having sin, but he is able not to sin in the sense of not using sin— on the contrary, even the Pelagians conceded this, and yet their opinion is censured by Augustine, who says: "The Pelagians say that the grace of God which is given through faith in Jesus Christ, which is neither the law nor nature,

exerts its influence only in the remission of sins, not in the avoidance of future sins or in overcoming resistance. But if this were true, in the Lord's Prayer after saying 'Forgive us our trespasses we should surely not add 'and lead us not into temptation. The former phrase we say in order that sins be forgiven, but the latter, that they be warded off or overcome. We should by no means ask this of our Father who is in heaven if we were able to bring it about by the effort of the human will."

It therefore seems that the supposed answer is invalid.

23. Augustine says: "The light of truth deservedly abandons the transgressor of the law, and when he is abandoned by it he becomes blind; and it is furthermore necessary for him to stumble and, falling, to be kicked about, and after he has been kicked about, not to rise." Hence the sinner who is destitute of grace must necessarily sin.

To the Contrary:

1'. Jerome says: "We say that man is always able to sin or not to sin, so that we always profess that we have free choice." To say that a man in the state of sin cannot avoid sin is therefore to deny free choice. But this is heretical.

2'. If there is a defect in an agent which has it in its power to use or not use that defect, it is not necessary for the agent to fail in its action. If a lower leg which is crooked, for instance, could avoid the use of that crookedness in walking, it could avoid limping. But free choice subject to sin can make use of sin or not, because making use of sin is an act of free choice, which is master of its own action. Consequently, however much it is in sin, it is able not to sin.

3'. In the Psalm (118:95) it is written: "The wicked have waited for me to destroy me"; and the Gloss comments: "That is, they have waited for my consent." A person is therefore not led to commit sin without consenting. But consent is in the power of free choice. A person is therefore able by his free choice not to sin.

4'. Because the devil is unable not to Sin, he is said to have sinned irremediably. But man has sinned remedially, as is commonly said. He is therefore able not to sin.

5'. The passage from one extreme to the other is not made except by going through the mean. But before sin man has the power of not sinning. Therefore after Sin he is not led immediately to the other extreme, so as to be unable not to sin.

6'. The free choice of a sinner can sin. But it sins only by choosing, since choosing is the act of free choice, just as sight operates only by seeing. But since choosing is the desire of what has been previously deliberated, as the Philosopher says, it follows deliberation or counsel, which is concerned only with the things which are within our power, as he also says. Therefore to avoid or to commit sin is in the power of a man in the state of sin.

7'. According to Augustine no one sins in doing something which he cannot avoid, because it would then be necessary. If, then, a person in the state of sin could not avoid sin, he would not sin in committing a sin. But that is absurd.

8'. Free choice is equally free from constraint before and after sinning. But the necessity of sinning seems to be one of constraint inasmuch as, even if we are unwilling, that necessity is in us. After sin a man therefore does not have the necessity of sinning.

9'. All necessity is either that of constraint or that of natural inclination. But the necessity of sinning is not one of natural inclination; for then our nature would be evil, since it would incline us to evil. Consequently, if there were any necessity for sinning in the sinner, he would be constrained to sin.

10'. What is necessary is not voluntary. If, then, it is necessary for one who is in sin to sin, sin is not voluntary. But that is false.

11'. If a sinner must necessarily sin, this necessity attaches to him only by reason of sin. He can, however, withdraw from sin; other will sinners would not be commanded: "Depart, depart, go ye out from thence, touch no unclean thing," as is written in Isaiah (52: 1

REPLY:

Opposite heresies have arisen regarding this question. Some, judging of the nature of the human mind after the manner of corporeal natures, have been of the opinion that man does from necessity everything to which they saw there was an inclination of the human mind. For the human mind has two contrary inclinations. One, from the instinct of reason, is to good. Noting this, Jovinian said that man can not sin. The other inclination is in the human mind from the lower powers, especially as corrupted by original sin. By this the mind is inclined to choose the things which are pleasurable to the carnal senses. Noting this inclination, the Manicheans²³ said that man necessarily sins and cannot in any way avoid sin. Thus both, though by opposite paths, fell into the same inadmissible position, denying free choice; for man does not have free choice if he is driven will necessity to either good or evil. That it is inadmissible is proved by experience, by the doctrines of the philosophers, and by arguments from Scripture, as appears to some extent from what has been said above.

On the other hand there arose Pelagius, who, wishing to defend free choice, opposed divine grace and said that man is able to avoid sin without the grace of God. This error very evidently contradicts the teaching of the gospels, and has therefore been condemned by the Church.

Now the Catholic faith takes a middle course, so saving free choice as not to exclude the necessity of grace.

For the clarification of this point it should be noted that, since free choice is a power established under reason and over the executive and motive power, something is found to be outside the power of free choice for either of two reasons: (1) It exceeds the efficacy of the motive and executive power, which works at the command of free choice. For example, to fly does not fall within the free choice of a man, because it exceeds the power of man's motive faculty. (2) The act of reason does not extend to it. For since the act of free choice is choosing, which depends upon counsel, that is, the deliberation of reason, free choice cannot extend to anything that escapes the deliberation of reason. Such, for example, would be actions which occur without premeditation.

The avoidance or commission of sin does not exceed the power of free choice for the first reason, because, though the accomplishment of a sin by an external act is carried out by the execution of the motive power, nevertheless the sin is completed in the will by mere consent before the execution of the deed. Consequently free choice is not kept from a sin or its avoidance by the failure of the motive power, even though it is sometimes kept from its execution. This would be the case, for example, when someone wishes to kill or fornicate or steal and cannot.

A sin or its avoidance can exceed the power of free choice for the second reason, however, inasmuch as a particular sin occurs suddenly and more or less by surprise, thus escaping the election of free choice, even though by directing its attention or efforts to it free choice could commit the sin or avoid it.

Now something can happen in us more or less by surprise in two ways: (1) From a fit of passion. For the movement of anger or concupiscence sometimes anticipates the deliberation

of reason. Tending to something illicit by reason of the corruption of our nature, this movement constitutes a venial sin. In the state of corrupt nature it is accordingly not within the power of free choice to avoid all 5 of this sort, because they escape its act, although it can prevent any particular one of those movements if it makes the effort against it. But it is not possible for man continuously to make the contrary effort to avoid movements of this kind on account of the various occupations of the human mind and the rest required for it. This comes about from the fact that the lower powers are not wholly subject to reason as they were in the state of innocence. It was then easy for man to avoid each and every one of these sins by his free choice, because no movement could arise in the lower powers except at the dictate of reason. In his present state, however, man is not, commonly speaking, restored by grace to this harmonious condition; but we look forward to it in the state of glory. In this state of misery, then, even after reparation by grace man cannot avoid all venial sins. This is, however, in no respect prejudicial to the freedom of choice.

(2) Something happens in us more or less by surprise by reason of the inclination of habit; for, as the Philosopher says: "It is more indicative of a brave man to remain fearless and unperturbed in sudden terrors than in those seen coming." The less an action is from preparedness, the more it is from habit; for a person chooses things seen coming, that is, known ahead of time, by reason and thought even without a habit, but sudden things according to habit. Now this is not to be taken as meaning that an action according to the habit of a virtue can be altogether without deliberation, since a virtue is a habit of choice, but that one having the habit already has the end determined in his choice. Consequently, whenever anything agreeable to that end presents itself, it is immediately chosen unless the choice is blocked by a greater and more attentive deliberation.

A man who is in the state of mortal sin, however, habitually clings to sin. He may not always have the habit of a vice, because from one act of lust, for instance, the habit of lust is not formed; but the will of one sinning has abandoned the unchangeable good and clung to a changeable good as its end, and the force and bent of this clinging remains in it up to the time that it again dings to the unchangeable good as its end. As a consequence, when something to be done which is confirmable to the previous choice presents itself to a man so disposed, he straightway goes out to it in a choice unless he holds himself in check by much deliberation. And yet by the fact that he chooses it straightway in this fashion he is not excused from mortal sin, which requires some deliberation, because that deliberation suffices for a mortal sin in which what is chosen is judged to be a mortal sin and against God.

Such a deliberation, however, does not suffice to restrain one who is in the state of mortal sin. For no one is held back from doing any thing to which he is inclined except in so far as it is proposed to him as evil; but one who has already repudiated the unchangeable good for a changeable good no longer considers it an evil to be turned away from the unchangeable good, and mortal sin essentially consists in being so turned away. He is consequently not restrained from sinning by adverting that something is a mortal sin. What is further needed is to go ahead in the consideration until one arrives at something that one cannot fail to judge evil, such as unhappiness or something of the sort. The consequence is that, before as much deliberation as a man so disposed requires to avoid mortal sin, consent to a mortal sin is given.

Given the adherence of free choice to a mortal sin or to an illicit end, it is not in the power of free choice to avoid all mortal sins, though it can avoid any particular one if it resists. For, even though it has avoided this one or that by employing as much deliberation as is required, it is still unable to keep consent from a mortal sin from some times stealing up on a person before so much deliberation when he is not ready to deliberate, since it is impossible, because of the many cares with which the human mind is occupied, for a man always or for a long time to

remain in such great watchfulness as is required for this. Furthermore, he is removed from this disposition only by grace, by which alone the human mind is made to adhere by charity to the unchangeable good as its end.

It is therefore clear from what we have said that we do not take away free choice, since we say that free choice can avoid or commit any sin taken singly; nor again do we take away the necessity of grace, since we say that man (even one having grace, as long as that grace has not been made perfect in the state of glory), because of the corruption of human nature called "fuel of sin," cannot avoid all venial sins though he can avoid each one. Since we say, moreover, that a man in the state of mortal sin and deprived of grace cannot avoid all mortal sins unless grace should come to his aid (though he can avoid each one singly) because of the habitual adherence of his will to an inordinate end (referred to by Augustine under the figure of the crookedness of a lower leg which brings on the necessity of limping) —in this way are verified the opinions of the doctors which appear quite different on this question.

Some of them say that without habitual ingratiatory grace man can avoid mortal sin, though not without the divine help by which divine providence guides man to do good and avoid evil. This is true when the person has been willing to make an effort against Sin; and as a result of it any single mortal sin can be avoided. Others say that without grace man cannot remain long without sinning mortally. This is true in the respect that man cannot be habitually disposed to sin for a long time without having unexpectedly presented to him a need for action. When that occurs, because of the inclination of the bad habit he slips into consent to a mortal sin, since it is not possible for a man long to be sufficiently attentive to the need of taking pains to avoid mortal sin.

Now because the conclusion w the arguments for either side is to a certain extent true and to a certain extent false, answers to both sets of arguments must be given.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That statement of the Apostle, according to different explanations, can be understood either of mortal sin and the evil of mortal sin if we take Paul to be speaking in the person of a sinner, or of the evil of venial sin as regards the first movements if we take him to be speaking in his own person or in that of other just men. But in either interpretation it must be understood that, though there is a natural will to avoid all evil, a sinner without grace cannot succeed in avoiding all mortal sins, even though he can avoid each one singly; and so he cannot without grace fulfil his natural will. And the same is true of a just man in regard to venial sins.

2. It is not possible for an adult without grace to be only in original sin, because as soon as he has attained the use of free choice, if he has prepared himself for grace, he will have grace; otherwise his very negligence will be imputed to him as a mortal sin. The argument given, moreover, seems to suppose the very difficulty which it adduces. If it is possible for an adult to be in original sin and no other, should he happen to die at that instant, he will be midway between the blessed and those who are being punished with the pain of sense— which is the difficulty which the argument itself adduces. In order that no force may be attributed to this argument, it should be observed that there is in original sin a habitual aversion from the unchangeable good, since the man having original sin does not have his heart joined to God by charity; and consequently, as far as the habitual aversion goes, the same is to be said of one in original sin and of one in mortal sin, though in mortal sin there is added to this an habitual conversion to an undue end. Furthermore, it does not follow that if someone should escape damnation by his free choice, he can for that reason by the strength of his free choice attain glory; for that is something more. And the rejoinder about man in the state of innocence is obvious.

3. Man without grace is bound by sin so that he acts contrary to the law, because, even though he can avoid this or that sin by a contrary effort, he still cannot avoid all sins, for the reason already given.
4. Augustine's example about the crookedness of the leg is not parallel in some respects, because it is not within the power of the leg to make use of crookedness or not, and so every movement of the crooked leg must be a limp. But free choice can make use of its crookedness or not; and so it is not necessary for it to sin in every one of its acts, but it can sometimes avoid sin. But the example is parallel in this, that it is not possible to avoid all sins, as has been said.
5. Although a sin not wiped out by repentance leads to another sin by giving an inclination, it is not necessary for free choice always to obey that inclination, but in an individual act it can make efforts against it.
6. Fear and anger, as passions, are not mortal sins but venial; for they are first movements.
7. Sins are said to be necessary inasmuch as not all can be avoided, though each singly can.
8. When flesh lusts against the spirit it is a vice, but one of venial sin.
9. The necessity of sinning either venially or mortally accompanies the necessity of dying except in the privileged persons, Christ and the Blessed Virgin; but the necessity of sinning mortally does not, as is clear of those having grace.
10. [The answer to this is lacking].
11. A crown is given to one who entirely conquers the devil and sin. But a man who avoids one sin while continuing in another, being a slave, is not a victor except perhaps in a certain respect. He therefore does not deserve a crown.
12. Cupidity cannot be understood absolutely to compel free choice, which is always free from force. But it is called compelling because of the vehemence of the inclination, which can still be resisted, though only with difficulty.
13. Free choice can make use of a habit or not. It is accordingly not necessary for a person always to act according to a habit, but he can sometimes also act contrary to it, though with difficulty. While the habit lasts, however, the person cannot by any chance remain long without acting according to the habit.
14. When grace is lacking, free choice can of itself choose evil. It is not, however, necessary that without ingratiatory grace it always choose evil.
15. It does not follow that by avoiding sin a person conquers the world, unless he is altogether free from sin, as was said above.
16. A commandment is observed in two ways: (1) Its observance merits glory. In this sense no one can observe the commandment in question or any other without grace. (2) Its observance averts punishment. In this sense it can be observed without ingratiatory grace. It is observed in the first way when the substance of the act is fulfilled along with the appointed manner, which is supplied by charity. In this sense the commandment to love is not so much a commandment as the end of the commandment and the form of other commandments. It is observed in the second way when only the substance of the act is fulfilled. This undoubtedly happens even in one who does not have the habit of charity. For according to the Philosopher even an unjust man can do something just.
17. That argument is not to the point. Granted that a man would commit a new sin in not having mercy upon himself by preparing himself for repentance, he is still able to avoid this

sin, since he can prepare himself. Nor does a sinner necessarily commit a sin whenever he does not have mercy upon himself by repenting, but only when for some special reason he is obliged to this.

18. A man of virtue is able not to love God actually but to act in a contrary fashion, as appears when he sins.

19. Although habits always produce acts like themselves, the one who has a habit can still enter upon an act contrary to the habit, because he does not always have to make use of the habit.

20. A man who lacks justice can perform an imperfect act of justice, which is to do something just and this by reason of the principles of natural law implanted in reason. But he cannot perform an act of perfect justice, which is to do something just in a just manner. An unjust person can accordingly sometimes turn aside from evil.

21. The statement of the Master is not to be understood as meaning that it is necessary for a man in the state of mortal sin to succumb to every temptation, but that, unless he is freed from sin by grace, he will fall into some mortal sin at some time.

22. It is necessary for us to pray in the Lord's Prayer not only that past sins be forgiven but also that we be freed from future sins, because, unless a man is freed by grace, he must necessarily sometimes fall into sin in the manner mentioned, though he can avoid this or that sin by striving against it.

23. It is necessary for a man abandoned by the light of grace to fall at some time; but it is not necessary for him to succumb to every temptation.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. It would be prejudicial to the freedom of choice if we could not avoid sin by making an effort to the contrary. It is not, however, prejudicial to this freedom if a man cannot succeed in being constantly careful to resist sin. But when a man is not careful about this, he is drawn by his habitual inclination to what agrees with the habit.

2'. Because free choice has the mastery over its own act, it can, when it takes the trouble, not make use of its own defect. But since it is impossible for it always to take the trouble, the consequence is that it sometimes fails in its act.

3'. Mortal sin is not committed without the consent of free choice. But consent follows the habitual inclination unless a great deal of deliberation is exercised beforehand, as has been said.

4'. A man is said to have fallen remedially because he can find a remedy in the help of grace even though the power of his free choice is not sufficient for this.

5'. To be unable to sin and to be unable not to sin are contraries, but to be able to sin and not sin falls between them. The supposition of the argument is therefore false.

6'. Choosing and deliberating are concerned only with what is in our power; but, as is said in the Ethics, "what we do through friends we somehow do through ourselves." Free choice can accordingly have choice and deliberation not only about the matters for which its own power suffices but also about those for which it needs divine help.

7'. A person in the state of mortal sin can avoid all mortal sins by the help of grace. He can also avoid them singly by his own natural power, though not all. It therefore does not follow that in committing a sin he does not sin.

8'. The necessity of sinning does not impose any constraint upon free choice. For even though a man cannot by himself free himself from that necessity, he can nevertheless to some extent resist that to which he is said to be necessitated, inasmuch as he can avoid individual sins, though not all.

9'. Sin becomes in some sense natural to the sinner, for a habit works in the one who has it like a sort of nature. The necessity which is had from a habit, then, is reduced to a natural inclination.

10'. According to Augustine something can be necessary and still voluntary. The will, for instance, necessarily abhors misery; and it does so because of a natural inclination. It is to such a natural inclination that the inclination of a habit is likened.

11'. A man in the state of sin can by no means free himself from a sin which he has already committed except by the help of grace; for, since sin consists in aversion, he is not freed from it unless his mind clings to God by charity, which does not come from free choice but is poured into the hearts of the saints by the Holy Spirit, as is said in the Epistle to the Romans (5:5).

ARTICLE XIII: CAN A PERSON IN THE STATE OF GRACE AVOID MORTAL SIN?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 24, 14 27, ad 3 II Sentences 29, Expos. text.; Sum. Theol., I-II, 109,9; In Psalm. 31:7

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

2. No one has to ask of God what he can do by himself. But how ever much grace a person has, he must ask of God that he be freed from future sins. In the second Epistle to the Corinthians (13:7) the Apostle, addressing the faithful and the saints, accordingly says: "Now we pray God, that you may do no evil." Hence even those having grace cannot avoid sin.

2. Even those having grace must say the Lord's Prayer. Now in that prayer the petition is made that man may persevere without sin, according to the interpretation of Cyprian, as Augustine reports. A person having grace therefore cannot of himself avoid mortal sin.

3. Perseverance is a gift of the Holy Spirit. But it is not within the power even of a person having grace to have the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Since abstaining from mortal sin up to the end of one's life belongs to perseverance, it therefore seems that even a person having grace cannot avoid mortal sin.

4. The defect of sin is related to the existence deriving from grace as nothingness is related to natural existence. But a creature, which has obtained natural existence from God, cannot keep itself in natural existence without falling into nothingness unless it is conserved by the hand of its Creator. Consequently, a person who has obtained grace likewise cannot of himself keep from falling into mortal sin.

To the Contrary:

2'. In the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:9) it is written: "My grace is sufficient for thee." Now it would not suffice if mortal sin could not be avoided by its means. A man can therefore avoid mortal sin by means of grace.

2'. This is seen from the words of the Master: "After reparation before a man is confirmed in good he is pressed by concupiscence, but he is not conquered. He has, to be sure, weakness in regard to evil, but grace in regard to good. As a result he is able to sin because of his freedom and weakness, and he is able not to sin mortally because of his freedom and helping grace."

REPLY:

It is one thing to say that someone can abstain from sin and another to say that he can persevere until the end of his life in abstaining from sin. When it is said that someone can abstain from sin, emphasis is placed only upon the negation, as meaning that someone is able not to sin. And, when there is question of mortal sin, anyone in the state of grace is able to do this, because there is no habitual inclination to sin in one who has grace. Rather there is in him a habitual inclination to avoid sin. As soon as anything is presented to him under the aspect of mortal sin, therefore, because of his habitual inclination he refuses it consent, unless he makes an effort to the contrary, following his concupiscence. But there is no necessity of following it, even though he cannot avoid having some movement of concupiscence arise entirely preceding the act of free choice. Because, then, he cannot help having such movements, he is notable to avoid all venial sins. But because in him no movement of free choice precedes full deliberation, drawing him to sin as by the inclination of a habit, he is therefore able to avoid all mortal sins.

But when it is said that he can persevere in abstaining from sin up to the end of his life, the emphasis is placed upon something affirmative, meaning that a person places himself in a state such that sin can not be in him; for in no other way could a man make himself persevere by the act of his free choice than by making himself impeccable. This, however, does not fall within the power of free choice, because the motive and executive power does not extend to this. Consequently, a man cannot be the cause of his own perseverance, but is under the necessity of begging for perseverance from God.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** The Apostle prayed that they do no evil in view of the fact that they could not succeed in persevering in abstinence from evil except with divine help.
- 2.** The same is to be said in answer to this.
- 3.** Perseverance is spoken of in two senses: (1) Sometimes it is a special virtue; and so it is a habit whose act is to have the determination to persevere unshakably. In this sense everyone who has grace has perseverance, even though he is in fact not going to persevere unto the end. (2) Perseverance is taken as a particular circumstance of virtue designating the permanence of virtue up to the end of life. In this sense perseverance is not in the power of one who has grace.
- 4.** When we speak of nature we do not exclude the things by which nature is kept in existence. In the same way, when we speak of grace we do not exclude the operation of God conserving grace in existence. Without God's operation a person is notable to continue either in natural existence or in the existence deriving from grace.

ARTICLE XIV: IS FREE CHOICE CAPABLE OF GOOD WITHOUT GRACE?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 28, a. I; and as in art. 13, especially Sum. Theol., I-II, 109, 9.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. A commandment is not given about something impossible. Jerome says in this respect: "Cursed is he who says that God has commanded man to do anything impossible." But man is commanded to do good. Man is therefore able to do good by his free choice.
2. No one should be reprimanded if he does not do what he is notable to do. But a man is justly reprimanded if he omits doing good. Hence man is able by his free choice to do good.
3. Man is able by his free choice to avoid sin to some extent, at least as regards a single act. But it is good to avoid sin. Man can therefore do something good by his free choice.
4. Everything is more capable of what is natural to it than of what is against its nature. But free choice is naturally ordained to good, and sin is against its nature. It is therefore more capable of good than of evil. But it is capable of evil by itself. Much more, then, is it capable of good.
5. A creature retains a likeness to the Creator by reason of the vestige, and much more by reason of the image. But the Creator can do good by Himself. Then so too can a creature, especially free choice, which pertains to the image.
6. According to the Philosopher it is by the same causes that virtue is destroyed and engendered. But by free choice virtue can be destroyed, because mortal sin, which a man can commit of his free choice, destroys virtue. By his free choice, then, man is capable of engendering the good which is virtue.
7. In the first Epistle of St. John (5:3) it is said: "His commandments are not heavy." But what is not heavy man can do by his free choice. Man can therefore of his free choice fulfil the commandments, and that is good above all.
8. According to Anselm free choice "is the power of preserving the rectitude of the will for its own sake." But the rectitude of the will is preserved only by doing good. A person can therefore do good by his free choice.
9. Grace is stronger than sin. But grace does not so bind free choice that man cannot commit sin. Then neither does sin so bind free choice that a man in the state of sin cannot do good without grace.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. In the Epistle to the Romans (7: 18) we read: "For to will, is present will me; but to accomplish that which is good, I find not." Man therefore cannot do good by his free choice.
- 2'. Man can do good only by an external or an internal act. But free choice does not suffice for either; for, as is said in the Epistle to the Romans (9: 16): "It is not of him that willed"; i.e., to will, which refers to the internal act, [is not in his power]; "for of him that runneth"; i.e., to run, which refers to the external act; "but of God that sheweth mercy." Free choice without grace can therefore in no way do good.
- 3'. Commenting on the words of the Epistle to the Romans (7: 11): "The evil which I hate, that I do," the Gloss says: "Man wills good naturally, to be sure; but this will always is without effect unless God's grace has strengthened his act of willing." Without grace, then, man cannot accomplish any good.
- 4'. The thought of good precedes the doing of good, as the Philosopher makes clear. But man cannot think anything good by himself; for it is said in the second Epistle to the Corinthians

(3:5): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves." Hence man cannot do good by himself.

REPLY:

Nothing acts outside the limits of its own species. But everything can act according to the requirements of its species, since nothing is deprived of its proper activity.

Now there are two kinds of good, one which is proportioned to human nature, and another which is beyond the ability of human nature. If we are speaking of acts, these two kinds of good do not differ in the substance of the act but in the manner of acting. Take, for instance, the act of giving alms. It is a good proportioned to human powers in so far as a man is moved to it by a certain natural love or kindness; but it is beyond the ability of human nature in so far as a man is led to it by charity, which unites man's heart to God.

It is apparent that without grace free choice is incapable of the kind of good which is above human nature; and—because it is by this kind of good that man merits eternal life—it is apparent that man can not merit without grace. The kind of good which is proportioned to human nature, however, man can accomplish by his free choice. Augustine accordingly says that man can cultivate fields, build houses, and do a number of other things by his free choice without actual grace.

Although man can perform good actions of this kind without ingratulatory grace, he cannot perform them without God, since nothing can enter upon its natural operation except by the divine power, because a secondary cause acts only by the power of the first cause, as is said in The Causes. This is true of both natural and voluntary agents. Yet it is verified in a different way in either case.

In natural beings God is the cause of their natural operation inasmuch as He gives and conserves the intrinsic principle of their natural operation, and from that principle a determined operation flows of necessity. In the element earth, for example, He conserves its heaviness, which is the principle of its motion downward. But man's will is not determined to any particular operation but remains indifferent in regard to many. It is thus in some sense in potency unless it is moved by an activating principle, which is either something presented to it from the outside, such as an apprehended good, or something which works within it interiorly, as God Himself. Augustine explains this, showing that God works in the hearts of men in many ways. All external motions, moreover, are also governed by divine providence, according as God judges that someone is to be aroused to good by such and such particular actions. Should we will, accordingly, to call the grace of God, not a habitual gift, but the very mercy of God by which He interiorly moves the mind and arranges external condition for man's salvation, in this sense also man cannot do any good without God's grace. But commonly speaking, we use the name of grace for a habitual gift which justifies. It is accordingly clear that each set of reasons comes to a conclusion in some sense false. Consequently answers must be given to both.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. What God commands is not impossible for man to observe; for the substance of the act can be observed by his free choice; and the prescribed manner by which the act is raised above the ability of nature, that is, in so far as it is done from charity can be observed by a gift of grace, though not by man's free choice alone.
2. A man who does not fulfil the commandments is rightly reprimanded, because it is by reason of his negligence that he does not have the grace by which he can observe the

commandments even as to the manner (since he could, even without grace, observe them as to their substance).

3. By performing an act that is good generically man avoids sin, though he does not merit a reward. Consequently, even though man can avoid a particular sin by his free choice, it still does not follow that he is capable of any meritorious good by his free choice alone.

4. By his free choice man is capable of a good which is natural to him; but a meritorious good is above his nature, as has been said.

g. Although in a creature there is a likeness to the Creator, it is not perfect. Such a likeness is exclusively proper to the Son. It is therefore not necessary that whatever is found in God be found in a creature.

6. The Philosopher is speaking of political virtue, which is acquired by acts; not of infused virtue, which is the only principle of a meritorious act.

7. As Augustine says, the commandments of God are understood to be easy for love but hard for fear. It accordingly does not follow that they can be fulfilled perfectly by anyone but a person having charity. Though a person without charity could fulfil a particular one as to its substance and will difficultly, he could not fulfil all, just as he could not avoid all sins.

8. Though free choice can keep the rectitude which it has, it can not keep it when it does not have it.

9. Free choice does not need to be bound for it to be incapable of meritorious good, since this is beyond its nature, just as a man is incapable of flying even if he is not bound.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

The answers to these are clear, because they are either arguing on the basis of meritorious good, or they show that man can do no good without the operation of God.

ARTICLE XV: CAN MAN WITHOUT GRÂCE PREPARE HIMSELF TO HAVE GRACE?

Parallel readings: II Sentences g, 2, 1 28, a. IV Sentences 17, 1, z sol. 2; [Contra Gentiles](#) III, 549; in Hebr., e. 52, lectura 3 (P 13: 778a); Quodibet I, (4), 7; Sum. Theol., 1,62, 2; I-II, 109, 6; in Joan., c. 1, lect. 6 (P 10: 302b-303a).

Difficulties:

It seems that he can, for

1. It is useless to exhort a man to something which he is unable to do. But man is exhorted to prepare himself for grace (Zacharias 1:3): "Turn yet to me...: and I will turn to you." Man without grace can therefore prepare himself for grace.

2. This is seen from the words of the Apocalypse (3:20): "If any man shall open to me the door, I will come in to him." It appears, then, that it is man's business to open his heart to God—which means to prepare himself for grace.

3. According to Anselm the reason why a person does not have grace is not that God does not give it, but that man does not accept it. But this would not be true if man were notable without grace to prepare himself to have grace. Man can therefore by his free choice prepare for grace.

4. It is written in Isaias (1: 19): "If you be willing, and will hearken to me, you shall eat the good things of the land." It accordingly depends upon man's will to approach God and be filled with grace.

To the Contrary:

1'. It is written (John 6:44): "No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him."

2'. It is said in the Psalm (42:3): "Send forth thy light and thy truth: they have conducted me."

3'. Truly praying we ask of God to convert us to himself, as is shown in the Psalm (84:5): "Convert us, O God our saviour." But it would not be necessary for man to ask this if he could by his free choice prepare himself for grace. It therefore seems that without grace man cannot do so.

REPLY:

Some say that man cannot prepare himself to have grace except through a gratuitous grace. But this does not seem to be true if by a gratuitous grace they mean some habitual gift of grace; and this for two reasons: (1) Because the whole reason for speaking of the preparation necessary for grace is to point out some sort of reason on our part why ingratulatory grace is given to some and not to others. Now if there cannot even be this preparation for grace without some habitual grace, either that grace is given to all or it is not. If it is given to all, it does not seem to be any different from a natural gift; for there is no respect in which all men are found to agree except in what is natural; but even natural gifts can be called graces inasmuch as they are given to man by God without any previous merits on man's part. If they are not given to all, however, we shall have to return to the preparation again and for the same reason posit some other grace, and so on to infinity. And so it is better to stop at the first stage.

(2) Because to prepare oneself for grace is just another way of saying: to do what one is capable of—as it is commonly said that, if man does what he is capable of, God gives him grace. But a man is said to be capable of that which is within his power. If, then, a man is not able by his free choice to prepare himself for grace, to do what one is capable of will not mean to prepare oneself for grace.

If, on the other hand, those who hold this opinion mean by gratuitous grace the divine providence by which a man is mercifully directed to good, then it is true that without grace man cannot prepare himself to have ingratulatory grace. And this is evident for two reasons:

(1) Because it is impossible for a man to begin to will something originally unless there is something to move him. It is as the Philosopher explains when he says that the movements of animals after rest must be preceded by other movements by which the soul is aroused to action. Thus, when a man begins to prepare himself for grace by turning his will to God for the first time, he must be brought to this by some external occasions, such as an external admonition or a bodily sickness or something of the sort, or else by some interior instinct, as God works in the hearts of men, or even in both ways together. All of this, however, is taken care of for man by divine providence; and so it comes about by divine mercy that man prepares himself for grace.

(2) Because not any movement whatsoever of the will is a sufficient preparation for grace, just as not any sorrow whatsoever suffices for the forgiveness of sins, but it must occur in a definite manner. And this cannot be known by man, since even the gift of grace surpasses human knowledge. The manner of preparation for a form cannot be known unless the form

itself is known. But whenever a definite manner of acting which is unknown w the agent is required for doing something, he needs someone to govern and direct him.

It is accordingly evident that free choice cannot prepare itself for grace unless it is divinely directed to this end. And because of the two reasons given, God is supplicated in two different ways in the Scriptures w work this preparation for grace in us: (1) By asking that He convert us, turning us from the state in which we were to Himself, as when it is written (Psalm 84:5): "Convert us, O God, our salvation." This is because of the first reason. (2) By asking that he direct us, as when it is written (Psalm 24:5): "Direct me in thy truth." This is because of the second reason.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. We are told to turn to God because we can do this, but not without divine help. We accordingly beg of Him (Lamentations 5:21): "Convert us, O Lord, to thee, and we shah be converted."

2. We can open our hearts to God, but not without His help. For this reason we beg of Him (II Machabees 1:4): "May he open your heart..."

3-4. The same is to be said in answer to these; for man can neither prepare nor will unless God brings this about in him, as has been said.

QUESTION 25: Sensuality

ARTICLE I: IS SENSUALITY A COGNITIVE OR ONLY AN APPETITIVE POWER?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 2, 1; Sum. Theol., I, 81, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is a cognitive power, for

1. As the Master says, "anything in our soul that is found to be had in common will beasts belongs to sensuality." But the sense cognitive powers are common to us and the beasts. They therefore belong to sensuality.

2. Augustine says: "The movement of the sensual soul, which is directed to the senses of the body, is common to us and beasts and quite outside reason as the principle of wisdom." In expatiating upon this he adds: "Corporeal things are sensed by a sense of the body, whereas eternal and unchangeable things are understood by spiritual reason, the principle of wisdom." But to sense corporeal things is the function of a cognitive power. Consequently sensuality, to which the act of sensual movement belongs, is a cognitive power.

3. The answer was given that Augustine adds this in order to point out the objects of the senses, for die movement of sensuality is attributed to the senses of the body inasmuch as it is concerned will the objects of sense.—On the contrary, Augustine adds this to show in what respect sensuality is discriminated from reason. But reason too is concerned will corporeal things, which Augustine says are the objects of the senses—lower reason by disposing them, and higher reason by judging them. And so sensuality is not by this fact discriminated from reason. Augustine therefore did not have the meaning alleged in the answer.

4. In the commission of a sin in progress within us sensuality has the role of the serpent, as Augustine says. Now in the temptation of our first parents the serpent's role was that of suggesting and proposing the sin. But that is the function of the cognitive, not the appetitive power, because the business of the latter is to be drawn to the sin. Sensuality is therefore a cognitive power.

5. Augustine says again: "Sensuality is very close to reason as the principle of science." it would not be very close to it, however, if it were only an appetitive power, since reason as the principle of science is cognitive; for in that case it would belong to a different genus of the powers of the soul. Consequently sensuality is cognitive, and not only appetitive.

6. According to Augustine⁶ sensuality is distinguished from both higher reason and lower, in both of which is contained the higher appetite, the will. Otherwise there could not be any mortal sin in them. But the lower appetite is not distinguished from the higher appetite as a different power, as will be proved directly. Therefore sensuality is not the lower appetite. It is, however, some sort of lower power of the soul, as appears from its definition. It is therefore the lower cognitive power.—Proof of the minor: An accidental difference in objects does not indicate a specific difference in powers. Sight, for example, is not divided into different species by the difference between seeing a man and seeing an ass; for man and ass are accidental differences in the object of sight as such. But the object of appetite apprehended by sense and that apprehended by intellect—the difference on which the distinction of higher and lower appetite seems to be based—are accidental to the object of appetite as such, since the appetible as appetible is good, and it is accidental to good to be apprehended by sense or by intellect. The lower appetite is therefore not a power distinct from the higher.

7. The answer was given that the two appetites mentioned are distinguished on the basis of good in an unqualified sense and some thing good here and now.—On the contrary, appetite is related to good as the intellect to truth. But truth in an unqualified sense and something true here and now, which is contingent, do not distinguish the intellect into two powers. Then neither can the appetite be distinguished into two powers on the basis of good in an unqualified sense and something good here and now.

8. Something good here and now is an apparent good, it seems, whereas good in an unqualified sense is the true good. But the higher appetite sometimes consents to an apparent good, and the lower appetite sometimes tends to a true good, such as the necessities of the body. Consequently good here and now and good in an unqualified sense do not distinguish a higher and a lower appetite. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

9. The sensitive power is set over against the appetitive, as is clear from the Philosopher's distinction of five genera of activities in the soul: to nourish, to sense, to tend appetitively, to be moved locally, and to understand. But sensuality is included in the sensitive power, as even the name shows. Sensuality is therefore not an appetitive but a cognitive power.

10. What is defined corresponds to the same thing as the definition. But the definition of sensuality which the Master gives corresponds to lower reason, which also is sometimes directed to the senses of the body and the body's concerns. Lower reason and sensuality are therefore the same thing. But reason is a cognitive power; then so too is sensuality.

To the Contrary:

1'. In its definition sensuality is said to be an appetite for things which pertain to the body.

2'. Sin consists in tending by appetite, not in knowing. But in sensuality there is some very slight sin, as Augustine says. Therefore sensuality is an appetitive power.

REPLY:

Sensuality seems to be nothing but the appetitive power of the sensitive part of the soul, and it is called sensuality as being some thing derived from sense. The movement of the appetitive part arises somehow from apprehension, because every operation of a passive principle takes its origin from an active principle. Now appetite is a passive power, because it is moved by the object of appetite, which is an "unmoved mover," as is said in *The Soul*. But the object of appetite does not move the appetite unless it is apprehended. inasmuch as the lower appetitive power is moved by the appetible object apprehended by sense, its movement is called sensual, and the power itself is called sensuality.

Now this sense appetite stands midway between natural appetite and the higher, rational appetite, which is called the will. This can be seen from the fact that in any object of appetite there are two aspects which can be considered: the thing itself which is desired, and the reason for its desirability, such as pleasure, utility, or something of the sort.

Natural appetite tends to the appetible thing itself without any apprehension of the reason for its appetibility; for natural appetite is nothing but an inclination and ordination of the thing to something else which is in keeping with it, like the ordination of a stone to a place below. But because a natural thing is determined in its natural existence, its inclination to some determined thing is a single one. Hence there is not required any apprehension by which an appetible thing is distinguished from one that is not appetible on the basis of the reason for its appetibility. But this apprehension is a prerequisite in the one who established the nature, who gave to each nature its own inclination with a thing in keeping with itself.

The higher appetite, the will, however, tends directly to the very reason for appetibility itself in an absolute way. Thus the will tends primarily and principally to goodness itself, or utility, or something like that. It tends to this or that appetible thing, however, secondarily, inasmuch as it shares in the above reason. This is because a rational nature has a capacity so great that an inclination to one determinate thing would not be sufficient for it, but it has need of a number of different things. For that reason its inclination is to some thing common found in many things; and so by the apprehension of that common aspect it tends to the appetible thing in which it knows that this aspect is to be sought.

The lower appetite of the sensitive part, called sensuality, tends to the appetible thing itself as containing that which constitutes the reason for its appetibility. It does not tend to the reason for the appetibility in itself because the lower appetite does not tend to goodness or utility or pleasure itself, but to this particular useful or pleasurable thing. In this respect the sense appetite is lower than the rational appetite. But because it does not tend only to this or only to that thing, but to every being which is useful or pleasurable to it, it is higher than natural appetite. For this reason it too has need of an apprehension by which to distinguish the pleasurable from what is not pleasurable.

It is a manifest sign of this distinction that natural appetite is under necessity in regard to the thing to which it tends, as a heavy body necessarily tends to a place downward; whereas sense appetite does not lie under any necessity in regard to any particular thing before it is apprehended under the aspect of the pleasurable or the useful, but of necessity goes out to it once it is apprehended as pleasurable (for a brute animal is unable, while looking at something pleasurable, not to desire it); but the will is under necessity in regard to goodness and utility itself (for man of necessity wills good), but is not under any necessity in regard to this or that particular thing, however much it may be apprehended as good or useful. This is so because each power has some kind of necessary relationship to its proper object.

From this it can be understood that the object of natural appetite is this thing inasmuch as it is of this particular kind; that of sense appetite is this thing inasmuch as it is agreeable or pleasurable (as water inasmuch as it is agreeable to taste, and not inasmuch as it is water); and

the proper object of the will is good itself taken absolutely. And the apprehension of sense and that of intellect differ in the same way; for it is the function of sense to apprehend this colored thing, but of intellect to apprehend the very nature of colour.

It is accordingly clear that the will and sensuality are specifically different appetites, just as goodness itself and a particular good thing are tended to in different ways; for goodness is tended to for its own sake, but a particular good thing is tended to as sharing in something. And so, just as things which share are perfected by what they share, as a particular good thing by goodness, in the same way the higher appetite rules the lower, and the intellect likewise judges about the things which sense apprehends. The proper object of sensuality is accordingly a thing which is good or suitable for the one sensing. This comes about in two ways: (1) because it is suitable for the very existence of the one sensing, as food and drink and the like; and (2) because it is suitable to our senses for sensing, as a beautiful colour is suitable for sight to see and a modulated sound suitable for hearing to hear, and so on.

The Master thus explains sensuality completely. For in saying that it is "a lower power of the soul," he points out its distinction from the higher appetite; in saying "from which there is a movement which is directed to the senses of the body," he shows its relation to the things which are suitable to our senses for sensing; and in saying "and an appetite for the concerns of the body," he shows its relation to the things which are suitable for preserving the existence of the one sensing.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Something belongs to sensuality in three ways: (1) As of the essence of sensuality. In this way only the appetitive powers belong to sensuality. (2) As a prerequisite for sensuality. In this way the sense apprehensive powers belong to sensuality. (3) As pursuant to sensuality. In this way the motive and executive powers belong to sensuality. It is accordingly true that everything which is common to us and the beasts belongs in some way to sensuality, though not every thing is of the essence of sensuality.
2. Augustine adds the passage quoted in order to exemplify to what sort of acts the movement of sensuality is directed. He does not mean that sensing corporeal things is itself the movement of sensuality.
3. Lower reason has a motion in regard to the senses of the body, but not of the same kind as that by which the senses perceive their objects. For the senses perceive their objects in particular, whereas lower reason has an act concerning sensible things according to a universal intention. But sensuality tends to the object of the senses in the same way as the senses themselves, that is, in particular, as has been said. The conclusion accordingly does not follow.
4. In the temptation of our first parents the serpent not only proposed something to be sought, but by his suggestions he deceived them. Now a man would not be deceived when a pleasurable object of sense is proposed if the judgment of reason were not inhibited by a passion of the appetitive faculty. Sensuality is accordingly an appetitive power.
5. Sensuality is said to be very near reason as the principle of science, not as regards the genus of the power, but as regards its objects, because both deal with temporal matters, though in different ways, as has been said.
6. The difference in the apprehensions would be accidental to the appetitive powers if there were not joined to it a difference of things apprehended. For sense, which attains only particulars, does not apprehend goodness taken absolutely, but a particular good; whereas the

intellect, which attains universals apprehends goodness itself taken absolutely. But from this difference the difference of lower and higher appetite is taken, as has been said.

7. The good here and now o which sense appetite is directed is a particular good considered as it is here and now, whether it be necessary or contingent (for "it is delightful for the eyes to see the sun," as is had in Ecclesiastes [11:7]), and also whether it be a true or an apparent good.

8. From the previous answer the answer to this difficulty is clear.

9. The sensitive part is taken in two ways: (1) Sometimes it is taken as opposed to the appetitive power, and then it includes only the apprehensive powers. Thus taken sensuality does not belong to the sensitive part except as to that which is, so to speak, its source. This is enough to justify the name derived from it. (2) It is sometimes taken as including both the appetitive and the motive powers, as is the case when the sensitive soul is opposed to the rational and the vegetative. In this usage sensuality is included in the sensitive part of the soul.

10. Lower reason is directed to the senses of the body and the body's concerns in a different way from sensuality, as was said above. For this reason the argument is not consequent.

ARTICLE II: IS SENSUALITY ONE SIMPLE POWER OR IS IT DIVIDED INTO SEVERAL: THE IRASCIBLE AND THE CONCUPISCIBLE POWERS?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 26, I, 2 Sum. Theol., I, 8i, 2; 82, 5; in III de an., 14; De malo, 8, 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is one simple power not divided into several, for

1. In its definition sensuality is said to be a lower power of the soul. This would not be said if it contained several powers. It there fore does not seem to be divided into several powers.

2. One and the same power of the soul "is concerned will one contrariety, as sight is concerned will white and black," as is said in The Soul. But agreeable and harmful are contraries. One and the same power of the soul is therefore referred to both. But the concupiscible power is referred to the agreeable, and the irascible to the harmful. The irascible and the concupiscible are therefore one and the same power, and sensuality is accordingly not divided into several powers.

3. It is by the same force that a person withdraws from one extreme and approaches the other, as by reason of gravity a stone leaves the top and goes to the bottom. But by the irascible power the soul will draws from the harmful by shunning it; and by the concupiscible power it approaches the agreeable by craving it. The irascible and the concupiscible are therefore the same power of the soul. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

4. The proper object of joy is the agreeable. Now joy is found only in the concupiscible power. The proper object of the concupiscible power is therefore the agreeable. But the agreeable is the object of the whole of sensuality, as is evident from the definition of sensuality explained above; for the body's concerns are things agreeing will the body. Consequently the whole of sensuality is nothing but the concupiscible power. Then either the irascible and the concupiscible powers are the same, or the irascible does not belong to

sensuality. Whichever of these two is granted, the thesis (that sensuality is one simple power) stands.

5. The answer was given that the object of sensuality is also the harmful or disagreeable, which the irascible power attains.—On the contrary, the harmful or disagreeable is the object of sadness, just as the agreeable is the object of joy. But both joy and sadness are found in the concupiscible power. Consequently both the agreeable and the harmful are the object of the concupiscible. Thus, whatever is the object of sensuality is the object of the concupiscible. And so the same must be concluded as above.

6. Sense appetite presupposes apprehension. But the agreeable and the harmful are apprehended by the same apprehensive power. Then the same appetitive power is concerned with both. Thus the conclusion is the same as above.

7. According to Augustine "hatred is inveterate anger." But hatred is in the concupiscible power, as is proved in the Topics, because love is in the same power. But anger is in the irascible. Therefore the irascible and the concupiscible are one and the same power, for other will anger could not be in both.

8. That function of the soul which belongs to every power does not require a definite power distinct from the rest. But to crave (*concupiscere*) belongs to every power of the soul, as is evident from the fact that every power of the soul delights in its object and craves it. Consequently a power distinct from the rest need not be referred to craving. Thus the concupiscible power is not distinct from the irascible.

9. Powers are distinguished according to their acts. But in any act of the irascible power the act of the concupiscible is included, for anger has a craving for revenge, and so of the others. The concupiscible is therefore not a power distinct from the irascible.

To the Contrary:

1'. Damascene distinguishes the sensitive appetite into the irascible and the concupiscible powers, and so does Gregory of Nyssa. But the lower appetite is sensuality. Sensuality therefore includes several powers.

2'. In Spirit and Soul these three motive powers are distinguished: "the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible." But the rational power is distinct from the irascible. Then so also is the irascible from the concupiscible.

3'. The Philosopher places in the sensitive appetite "desire and high spirit," that is, the concupiscible and the irascible.

REPLY:

The appetite of sensuality contains these two powers: the irascible and the concupiscible, which are faculties distinct from one another. This can be seen from the following consideration.

Sense appetite has something in common with natural appetite inasmuch as both tend to a thing agreeing with the subject of the tendency. Natural appetite is found to tend to two things in accordance with the two types of operation of a natural being. One of these is that by which the natural being strives to acquire what is capable of preserving its nature, as a heavy body moves downward in order to be preserved there. The other type is that by which the natural being destroys its contraries by an active quality. This is necessary for a corruptible being because, if it did not have the strength to conquer its contrary, it would be destroyed by it.

Natural appetite accordingly has a twofold tendency: to obtain what is suited and favorable to this nature, and to gain, as it were, a victory over whatever is opposed to it. The first is done

by way of reception, the second by way of action. They are consequently reduced to different principles, for receiving and acting are not from the same principle, as fire is borne upward by its lightness and by heat destroys things contrary to it.

In sense appetite those same two tendencies are likewise found. For by its appetitive faculty an animal desires what is suited and favorable to it. This is done by the concupiscible power, whose proper object is what is delightful to sense. It also seeks to gain the mastery and victory over things that are contrary to it. This it does by the irascible power. Its object is accordingly said to be something arduous.

From this it is clear that the irascible is a different power from the concupiscible. If something is pleasurable it has a different reason for its appetibility than if it is arduous, since the arduous sometimes keeps us away from pleasure and involves us in affairs that bring sadness, as when an animal leaves the pleasure which he was enjoying and enters a light and is not made to withdraw from it by the pains which he incurs. One of the two, moreover, the concupiscible power, seems to be directed to reception; for it tends in order that the object of its delight may be joined to it. The other, however, the irascible power, is directed to action, because by its action it overcomes something which is contrary or harmful to it, getting the upper hand by victory over it. It is found to be the case among the powers of the soul in general that receiving and acting belong to different powers, as is clear of the agent and possible intellect. It is for this reason too that according to Avicenna courage and faintness of heart pertain to the irascible power as the faculty directed to action, whereas the expansion and contraction of the heart pertain to the concupiscible power as the faculty directed to reception.

It is clear, then, from what has been said that the irascible power is in some sense subordinated to the concupiscible as its defender. For it is necessary for an animal to gain victory over the things contrary to it by means of the irascible power, as has been said, in order that the concupiscible may possess the object of its delight without hindrance. An indication of this is the fact that animals fight among themselves on account of things that give them pleasure, such as copulation and food, as is said in *Animals*. For this reason all the passions of the irascible power have their beginning and end in the concupiscible. Anger, for instance, begins with some sadness that has been caused (in the concupiscible power) and, after revenge has been got, ends with joy (which is likewise in the concupiscible power). In the same way hope begins with desire or love and ends in enjoyment.

It should be noted, however, that not only in the apprehensive powers but also in the appetitive there is something which belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its own nature and something else according as it has some slight participation in reason, coming into contact at its highest level of activity will reason at its lowest. There is verified here the statement of Dionysius that the divine wisdom "joins the ends of the first things to the beginnings of the second."

Thus the imaginative power belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its own nature, because forms received from sense are stored up in it; but the estimative power, by which an animal apprehends intentions not received by the senses, such as friendship or hostility, is in the sensitive soul according as it shares somewhat in reason. It is accordingly in virtue of this estimative power that animals are said to have a sort of prudence, as is seen in the beginning of the Metaphysics. A sheep, for example, flees from a wolf whose hostility it has never sensed.

The same principle is verified also in regard to the appetitive power. The fact that an animal seeks what is pleasurable to its senses (the business of the concupiscible power) is in accordance with the sensitive soul's own nature; but that it should leave what is pleasurable

and seek something for the sake of a victory which it will pain (the business of the irascible), this belongs to it according as it in some measure reaches up to the higher appetite. The irascible power, therefore, is closer to reason and the will than the concupiscible. On this account a man unable to control his anger is less base than one unable to control his concupiscence, being less deprived of reason, as the Philosopher says.

It is therefore clear from what has been said that the irascible and the concupiscible are distinct powers, and also what is the object of each and how the irascible power helps the concupiscible and is higher and nobler than it, like the estimative among the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Sensuality is called a power in the singular because it is one in genus although it is divided into different species or parts.

2. Both the agreeable object of delight and the harmful object of sadness belong to the concupiscible inasmuch as one is to be fled, the other to be pursued. But to get the upper hand over both of them, so as to be able to overcome the harmful and possess with some security the pleasurable, belongs to the irascible power.

3. To draw away from the harmful and to draw near to the pleasurable are both the business of the concupiscible power. But to fight against and overcome what can be harmful pertains to the irascible.

From the above answer the answer to these also is clear, because the agreeable is the object of the concupiscible power inasmuch as it is pleasurable, but it is the object of the whole of sensuality inasmuch as it is in any way advantageous to the animal, either by way of the arduous or by way of the pleasurable.

6. The same concupiscible appetitive power pursues the agreeable and flees the disagreeable. Consequently the irascible and the concupiscible powers are not distinguished on the basis of the agreeable and the harmful, as appears from what has been said.

7. The statement that "hatred is inveterate anger" is a predication by cause, not by essence; for the passions of the irascible power end in the passions of the concupiscible, as has been said.

8. To crave (concupiscere) will an animal appetite belongs to the concupiscible power alone; but to crave will natural appetite belongs to every power, for every power of the soul is a nature and naturally inclines to something. And the same distinction is to be applied to love and pleasure and the like.

9. In the definition of the passions of the irascible power there is placed the common act of the appetitive power, to tend, but not any thing that belongs to the concupiscible except as the beginning or the end, as would be the case if one were to say that anger is the desire for revenge because of a previous saddening.

ARTICLE III: ARE THE IRASCIBLE AND THE CONCUPISCIBLE POWERS ONLY IN THE LOWER APPETITE OR ALSO IN THE HIGHER?

Parallel readings: III Sentences i a. i sol. 3; Sum. Theol., I, S In III de an., 14.

Difficulties.

It seems that they are also in the higher, for

- 1.** The higher appetite extends to more things than the lower, since it is concerned with both corporeal and spiritual things. Now if the lower appetite is divided into two powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, then all the more should the higher be so divided.
- 2.** To the higher part of the soul pertain those powers which belong to it alone, for the lower powers are common to the soul and the body. But the irascible and the concupiscible are powers of the soul alone. Thus it is said in *Spirit and Soul*: "The soul has these powers before being commingled with the body, since they are natural to it and are nothing but the soul itself as a whole. For the full and complete substance of the soul consists in these three: rationality, concupiscibility, and irascibility." Consequently the irascible and the concupiscible powers pertain to the higher appetite.
- 3.** According to the Philosopher only the rational part of the soul is separable from the body. But the irascible and the concupiscible powers remain in the soul when it is separated from the body, as is said in *Spirit and Soul*. They therefore belong to the rational part.
- 4.** The image of the Trinity is to be sought in the higher part of the soul. But according to some the image is ascribed to the rational, the irascible, and the concupiscible powers. Hence the irascible and the concupiscible belong to the higher part of the soul.
- 5.** Charity is said to be in the concupiscible power; hope, in the irascible. But charity and hope are not found in the sensitive appetite, which cannot extend to immaterial things. The irascible and the concupiscible powers are therefore not only in the lower appetite but also in the higher.
- 6.** Those powers are called human which man has beyond the other animals and which belong to the higher part of the soul. But two kinds of irascible powers are distinguished by the masters: one human and another not human; and the same is done with the concupiscible. The powers in question are therefore not only in the lower appetite but are also in the higher.
- 7.** The operations of the sensitive powers, both apprehensive and appetitive, do not remain in the separated soul because they are exercised through organs of the body; otherwise the sensitive soul in brutes would be incorruptible, as being capable of having its operation by itself. But in the separated soul there remain joy and sadness, love and fear, and the like, which are attributed to the irascible and the concupiscible powers. The irascible and concupiscible powers are therefore not only in the sensitive part but also in the intellective.

To the Contrary:

Damascene, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Philosopher hold that they are in sensitive appetite only.

REPLY:

Since the acts of the appetitive parts presuppose the act of the apprehensive, the distinction of the appetitive parts from each other is also somewhat similar to the distinction of the apprehensive.

Among the apprehensive faculties we find that the higher apprehensive remains one and undivided with reference to things regarding which the lower apprehensive faculties are distinguished. By one and the same intellective power we come to know as to their natures all sensible things with reference to which the sense powers are distinguished. According to Augustine what a man sees and what he hears is different externally, but internally in the intellect it is the same. And the same is to be said of the appetitive powers: the higher appetitive is one and the same in regard to all the objects of appetite, though the lower appetitive powers are distinguished in regard to all the different appetible objects.

The reason for tins is found in the nature of each. The higher power has a universal object; the lower powers have particular objects. Many things correspond essentially to particulars which have only an accidental reference to something universal. Since it is not an accidental difference but only an essential one which distinguishes a species, the lower powers are found to be specifically distinct while the higher power remains undivided. It is clear, for example, that the object of the intellect is the what, and that the same faculty of intellect extends to all things that have quiddity and is not distinguished by any differences that do not differentiate the very notion of quiddity. But since the object of sense is a body, which is capable of moving the sense organ, the sensitive powers must be differentiated according to differences in the manner of moving. Sight and hearing are accordingly distinct powers because colour and sound move the sense in different ways.

The same is true of the appetitive powers. For the object of higher appetite is good taken absolutely, as was said above, whereas the object of the lower appetite is a thing in some way advantageous to the animal. But the arduous and the pleasurable are not suited to the animal under the same aspect, as appears from what has been said." Consequently the object of lower appetite is thereby essentially diversified, but not the object of higher appetite, which tends to what is good absolutely in any way whatever.

It should, however, be borne in mind that, just as the intellect has some of its operations directed to the same things as the senses, but in a higher way, since it knows universally and immaterially what sense knows materially and in particular; in the same way higher appetite has some of its operations directed to the same things as the lower appetites, though in a higher way. For the lower appetites tend to their objects materially and accompanied by a bodily passion; and it is from these passions that the irascible and concupiscible get their names. Now higher appetite has certain acts similar to those of lower appetite, though without any passion. The operations of higher appetite are accordingly sometimes given the names of passions. Thus the will for revenge is called "anger," and the repose of the will in some object of spiritual affection is called "love." By the same process the will itself which produces these acts is sometimes called "irascible" or "concupiscible," not properly but by a figure of speech; and even so there is no implication in this that there are in the will two distinct powers corresponding to the irascible and the concupiscible.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Even though the higher appetite extends to more things than the lower, yet, because it has good in general as its proper object, it is not divided into several powers.
2. That book is not Augustine's, nor need it be accepted as an authority. We can nevertheless say that it is either speaking of the irascible and concupiscible powers figuratively, or it is speaking of them from the point of view of their source; for all of the powers, even the sensitive, now from the essence of the soul.
3. There are two opinions on the sensitive powers of the soul. Some say that these powers remain in the separated soul essentially; others say that they remain in the essence of the soul radically. And whichever opinion is taken, the irascible and the concupiscible powers do not remain in any other way than the rest of the sensitive powers. Thus it is said in the work mentioned that when withdrawing from the body, the soul takes with it sense and imagination.
4. In his work *The Trinity* Augustine investigates many sorts of trinities in our soul in which there is some resemblance to the uncreated Trinity, though the image in the proper sense of the term exists only in the mind. By reason of the resemblance mentioned some place the image in the rational, irascible, and concupiscible powers, though this is not said in a proper sense.

5. Charity and hope are not in the irascible and concupiscible powers, properly speaking, since the love of charity and the expectation of hope are without any passion. But charity is said to be in the concupiscible power inasmuch as it is in the will, viewed as having acts like those of the concupiscible; and in the same way hope is said to be in the irascible.

6. The irascible and concupiscible powers are said to be human or rational, not by their essence, as if they belonged to the higher part

of the soul, but by participation, inasmuch as they obey reason and participate in its rule, as Damascene again says.

7. Joy and fear, which are passions, do not remain in the separated soul, since they take place with a bodily change. But there remain acts of the will similar to those passions.

ARTICLE IV: DOES SENSUALITY OBEY REASON?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 24, 3, 1 ad In I Eth., o; Sum. Theol., 1, 81, I-II, 17, Quodibet IV, (II), 21; in III de an., 16.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. In the Epistle to the Romans (7: 15) it is written: "For [good } which I will, I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do." As a comment in the Gloss explains, this is said because of the motions of sensuality. Sensuality- therefore does not obey the will and reason.

2. In the same Epistle (7:23) It is written: "But I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind..." Now this law is concupiscence. It is therefore fighting against the law of the mind, that is, reason; and so it does not obey it.

3. The relation among the appetitive powers is the same as that among the apprehensive. But the intellect does not have control of the acts of the external senses, for we do not see or hear whatever the intellect decides. Then neither are the motions of sensuality under the control of rational appetite.

4. Natural activities in us are not subject to reason. But sensuality tends to the object of its desire by a natural appetite. Consequently the motions of sensuality are not subject to reason.

5. The motions of sensuality are passions of the soul, for which definite dispositions of the body are required, as Avicenna determines. Thus for anger, hot thin blood is needed; and for joy, temperate blood. But one's bodily disposition is not subject to reason. Then neither are the motions of sensuality.

To the Contrary:

Damascene says that the irascible and the concupiscible powers participate to some extent in reason. But they are the parts of sensuality. Consequently the motions of sensuality also are under the control of reason. And the same can be gathered from what is said by the Philosopher and by Gregory of Nyssa.

REPLY:

In a series of mobile beings and movers we must arrive at some first being which moves itself and by which is moved whatever is not moved by itself, because everything that exists through another is reduced to that which exists through itself, as is gathered from the Physics.

Then, since the will moves itself by reason of its being the master of its own act, the other powers which do not move themselves must somehow be moved by the will. Now the nearer any of the other powers comes to the will, the more it participates in the will's motion. Consequently the lower appetitive powers obey the will in their principal acts as being nearest to the will; and the other powers farther removed, as the nutritive and generative, are moved by the will in some of their external acts.

Now the lower appetitive powers, the irascible and the concupiscible, are subject to reason in three respects: (1) On the part of reason itself. For since the same thing considered under different conditions can be made either pleasurable or repulsive, by means of the imagination reason lays a particular thing before sensuality under the aspect of the pleasurable or the disagreeable as it appears to reason; and so sensuality is moved to joy or to sorrow. The Philosopher accordingly says that reason persuades "to the best." (2) On the part of the will. For among powers hierarchically connected the situation is such that an intense movement in one, and especially in the higher, overflows into the other. Accordingly, when by a choice the movement of the will is directed to something intensely, even the irascible and the concupiscible powers follow the movement of the will. It is accordingly said in *The Soul* that appetite moves appetite (that is, the higher moves the lower) as sphere moves sphere among the heavenly bodies.

(3) On the part of the motive power which carries it out. For just as in an army the advance to battle depends upon the command of the general, so in us the motive power moves the members only at the command of that which rules in us, namely reason, whatever sort of movement may occur in the lower powers. Reason therefore holds the irascible and the concupiscible powers in check lest they proceed to an external act. On this account it is said in Genesis (4:7): "The just thereof shall be under thee."

Thus it is clear that the irascible and the concupiscible powers are subject to reason, and likewise sensuality, though the name sensuality does not refer to these powers according to their participation in reason but according to the nature of the sensitive part of the soul. It is consequently not said in as proper a sense that sensuality is subject to reason as that the irascible and the concupiscible powers are so subject.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The statement of the Apostle is to be understood as meaning that it is not in our power universally to prevent all inordinate movements of sensuality, though we can prevent individual ones, as is clear from what has been said.
2. As far as sensuality itself goes, it fights against reason; yet reason can keep it in check, as is clear from what has been said.
3. The lower apprehensive powers also obey the higher, as is clear in the case of the imagination and the other internal senses; but the fact that the external senses do not obey the intellect is due to their need of a sensible thing, and to their inability to sense without it.
4. The lower appetitive power does not naturally tend to anything until after that thing is presented to it under the aspect of its proper object, as is clear from what has been said. Since it is in the power of reason to present one and the same thing under different aspects, a particular sort of food, for instance, as delicious or as deadly, reason is able to move sensuality to different objects.
5. A disposition of the body which is in its very constitution is not subject to reason. But that such a disposition be had is a requisite not directly for the actualization of the passions in question, but for man to be capable of them. The actual modification of the body, however,

such as the boiling of the blood around the heart, or something of the sort, which actually accompanies passions of this kind, depends upon the imagination, and on that account is subject to reason.

ARTICLE V: CAN THERE BE SIN IN SENSUALITY?

Parallel readings: [II Sentences 24, 3, 2](#); [De malo, 7, 6](#); [Sum. Theol., I-II, 74, 3 & 4](#); [Quodibet IV, \(11\), 21 & 22](#).

Difficulties:

It seems that there cannot, for

- 1.** According to Augustine no sin is ever committed except by the will. But sensuality is distinguished from the will. Sin is therefore not in sensuality.
- 2.** [No difficulty is given for this number.]
- 3.** Sins remain in the separated soul. But sensuality does not remain in the separated soul, since it is a power of the composite; for its act is exercised by means of the body. "But the act belongs to the same subject as the power," as the Philosopher says. Consequently there is no sin in sensuality.
- 4.** According to Augustine there is something which acts and is not acted upon, that is, God; and in this there is no sin. There is some thing else which acts and is acted upon, namely, the will; and in this there is clearly sin. And there is something else which is acted upon and does not act, that is, sensuality. Then sin is not in this either.
- 5.** The answer was given that there can be sin in sensuality by the mere fact that reason can prevent its movement.—On the contrary, the fact that reason can prevent it and does not, merely indicates the interpretative consent of reason, which is not sufficient for sin since nothing less than express consent suffices for merit. "For God is more ready to have mercy than to punish," as is said in the Gloss in a com merit upon the beginning of Jeremias. Then not even for this reason can it be said that there is sin in sensuality.
- 6.** No one sins in doing something which he cannot avoid. But we cannot keep the movements of sensuality from being inordinate; for, as Augustine says, because man was unwilling to avoid sin when he was able, there has been inflicted upon him the inability to avoid it when he so wills. There is therefore no sin in sensuality.
- 7.** When the movement of sensuality is to something licit, there is no sin, as when a husband is aroused in regard to his will. But sensuality does not distinguish between what is licit and what is illicit. Then not even when it is moved to something illicit will there be sin in it.
- 8.** Virtue and vice are contraries. But virtue cannot be in sensuality. Then neither can vice.
- 9.** Sin is in that to which it is imputed. But since sensuality does not have control over its own act, sin is not imputed to it, but rather to the will. There is therefore no sin in sensuality.
- 10.** The material element of mortal sin can be in sensuality; and yet we do not say that mortal sin is there, because the formal element of mortal sin is not found in it. But the formal element of venial sin, the privation of due order, is not in sensuality but in reason, whose business it is to put things in order. Consequently venial sin is not found in sensuality.
- 11.** If a blind man being led by one who sees falls into a ditch, it is not the fault of the blind man but of the one who sees. Since sensuality is, so to speak, blind in regard to divine things,

should it fail into some thing illicit, that will not be its own sin but that of reason, which is supposed to guide it.

12. Like sensuality, the external members are guided by reason; and yet we do not say that there is sin in them. Then neither is it in sensuality.

13. Disposition and form are in the same subject, because the acts of active principles are in the thing acted upon and disposed. But venial sin is a disposition for mortal sin. Therefore, since mortal sin cannot be in sensuality, neither can venial sin.

14. The act of fornication is nearer to sensuality than to reason. If, then, there could be any sin in sensuality, it would be a mental sin, namely, that of fornication. But since that is false, it seems that there cannot be any sin in it.

To the Contrary:

2'. Augustine says: "There is some fault when the flesh lusts against the spirit." Now that just of the flesh belongs to sensuality. There can therefore be some sin in sensuality.

2'. The Master says that there is venial sin in sensuality.

REPLY:

Sin is nothing but an act which lacks the right order which it was supposed to have. It is in this sense that "sin" or defect is taken in matters applying to nature and to art, as the Philosopher says. But there is question of mortal sin only when the defective act is moral.

An act is moral by the fact that it is somehow in our power, for thus it deserves praise or blame. Consequently an act which is completely in our power is completely moral and is capable of verifying the full notion of mortal sin. Such are the acts which the will elicits or commands. The act of sensuality however, is not completely in our power, because it precedes the judgment of reason; yet it is in our power to some extent inasmuch as sensuality is subject to reason, as appears from what has been said. Its act accordingly attains to the genus of moral acts, but incompletely. In sensuality there consequently cannot be mortal sin, which is complete sin, but only venial sin, in which the incomplete character of mortal sin is found.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The subject of a thing is of either of two kinds: it is either first or secondary, as a surface is the first sub of colour, and a body is its secondary sub inasmuch as it is the subject of the surface. Similarly we must say that the first subject of sin is the will, but sensuality is the subject of sin inasmuch as it in some way shares in the will.

2. The act of sensuality is in our power in some fashion, not from the nature of sensuality, but in so far as the powers of sensuality are rational by participation.

3. The marks of our sins remain in our conscience, regardless of which faculty it may have been by which they were committed. Granted, then, that sensuality does not remain at all, in the sense explained above, the sin of sensuality can remain. The problem whether sensuality remains, however, is to be discussed elsewhere."

4. Although it is not the function of sensuality considered in itself to act, it is its function in so far as it in some measure participates in reason.

5. The reason why sin is said to be in sensuality is not the interpretative consent of reason. When the movement of sensuality precedes the judgment of reason, there is no consent either interpreted or expressed; but from the very fact that sensuality is able to be subjected to reason its act, even though it precedes reason, has the character of sin. It should, however, be borne in mind that, even though interpreted consent sometimes may suffice for sin, it does not

have to suffice for merit. There are more requisites for good than for evil, since evil occurs from individual defects, whereas good depends upon a total situation not vitiated in any particular, as Dionysius says.'

6. We can in fact avoid individual sins of sensuality, though not all, as is clear from what was said in another question.'

7. When a man approaches his will from concupiscence there is venial sin, provided that he does not exceed the bounds of wedded life. It is accordingly clear that the very movement of concupiscence preceding reason in a married person is a venial sin. But when reason determines what one may licitly crave, then even though sensuality goes out to it, there will be no sin.

8. Moral virtue is in the powers of sensuality, the irascible and the concupiscible, as the Philosopher makes clear when he says that temperance and fortitude belong to the non-rational parts. But because sensuality designates these powers as having an inclination which is natural to sense but to something contrary to reason, and not as participating in reason, on this account vice is more properly said to be in sensuality, and virtue to be in the irascible and the concupiscible powers. The sin which is in sensuality, however, is not opposed to virtue as its contrary. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

9. Every sin is imputed to man inasmuch as he has a will; and yet sin is said to be in some sense in that power whose act happens to be deformed.

10. The material element in mortal sin can be taken in three ways: (1) In so far as the object is the matter of the act. In this sense the matter of mortal sin is sometimes in sensuality, as when a person consents to sensual pleasure. (2) In so far as the external act is called material with reference to the internal act, which is the formal element in mortal sin, since the external and the internal act constitute one sin. In this sense too the act of sensuality can be regarded as the material element in mortal sin. (In so far as the material element in mortal sin is the turning towards a changeable good as one's end, whereas the formal element is the turning away from the unchangeable good. In this sense the material element in mortal sin cannot be in sensuality. Nor does it follow (for the reason given above) that, if mortal sin cannot be found there, then there is no venial sin there either.

11. Sin is said to be in sensuality, not as being imputed to that power, but as being committed through its act. Sin is rather imputed to the man inasmuch as that act is in his power.

12. The external members are merely moved, whereas the lower appetitive powers do the moving somewhat like the will. In so far, then, as they in some sense participate in the will, they can be the subject of sin.

13. Dispositions are of two kinds. There is one by which a patient is disposed to receive a form. Such a disposition is in the same subject as the form. There is another disposition by which an agent is disposed to act. Regarding this kind it is not true that it is in the same subject as the form for which it disposes. Venial sin, which is in sensuality, is this kind of disposition to mortal sin, which is in reason; for sensuality is like an agent in regard to mortal sin, since it inclines reason to sin.

14. Although the act of fornication is closer to the concupiscible power than to reason as regards the nature of the object, it is nonetheless closer to reason as regards the nature of command. The external members are applied to the act only by the command of reason. Mortal sin can accordingly be in them but not in the act of sensuality, which precedes the judgment of reason.

ARTICLE V: IS THE CONUPISCIBLE POWER MORE CORRUPT AND INFECTED THAN THE IRASCIBLE?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 31, 2, 2; De malo, 4, 2 ad 12; Sum. Theol., I-II, 83, 4.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. The corruption and infection of human nature comes from original sin. But original sin is in the essence of the soul as its subject, as some say, because the soul contracts it from its union with the body, to which it is joined by its essence. Since all the powers of the soul are equally close to its essence, being rooted in it, the infection and corruption does not seem to be any more in the concupiscible than in the irascible and other powers.
2. From the corruption of our nature there is in us a certain inclination to sin. But the sins of the irascible power are more serious than those of the concupiscible, because according to Gregory spiritual sins are more culpable than carnal sins. The irascible power is therefore more corrupt than the concupiscible.
3. Sudden movements of the soul occur in us because of the corruption of our nature. But the movements of the irascible power seem to be more sudden than those of the concupiscible. For the irascible is moved with a certain virility of spirit, whereas the concupiscible is moved with a certain effeminacy. The irascible is therefore more corrupt than the concupiscible.
4. The sort of corruption and infection of which we are speaking is a corruption of nature handed on by generation. But the sins of the irascible power are "more natural" and are handed on from parents to children more than sins of the concupiscible, as the Philosopher says. The irascible is therefore more corrupt than the concupiscible.
5. Corruption in us comes from the sin of our first parent. But the first sin of our first parent was one of pride or self-exaltation, which is in the irascible power. Consequently the irascible power is more corrupt and infected in us than is the concupiscible.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. Where there is greater foulness there is greater corruption and infection. But according to the Philosopher a man unable to control his concupiscence is fouler than one unable to control his anger. Then the concupiscible power is more corrupt and infected than the irascible.
- 2'. We are more corrupt where we resist with greater difficulty. But it is more difficult to fight against sensual pleasure, which pertains to the concupiscible power, than against anger, as the Philosopher makes clear. We are therefore more corrupt in the concupiscible power than in the irascible.

REPLY:

The corruption and the infection of original sin differ in this respect, that infection refers to guilt, corruption to penalty.

Now original guilt is said to be in a power of the soul in two different ways: essentially and causally. Essentially it is either in the very essence of the soul or in the intellectual part, formerly the seat of original justice, which is taken away by original sin. Causally it is in the powers concerned in the act of human generation, by which original sin is handed on: the generative power, which carries it out, the concupiscible power, which commands it for the

sake of pleasure, and the sense of touch, which perceives the pleasure. That infection is accordingly attributed to touch among the senses, to the concupiscible among the appetitive powers, and among the faculties of the soul in general to the generative power, which is said to be infected and corrupted.

The corruption of the soul of which we are speaking is to be viewed after the manner of bodily corruption. The latter comes about from the fact that, when the principle which holds the individual contrary parts together is removed, they tend to whatever agrees with them individually according to their own natures, and so the dissolution of the body takes place. So too since the loss of original justice, through which reason held the lower powers altogether subject to itself in the state of innocence, each of the lower powers tends to what is proper to it: the concupiscible to pleasure, the irascible to anger, and so on. The Philosopher accordingly compares these parts of the soul to palsied members of the body.

Now the corruption of the body is not said to be in the soul, whose withdrawal occasions the body's dissolution, but rather in the body, which is dissolved. In the same way the corruption spoken of is in the sensitive powers inasmuch as they are deprived of the unifying control exercised by reason and go out in all directions; but it is not in reason itself except to the extent that it is deprived of its own proper perfection when separated from God. On this account the more one of the lower powers gets away from reason, the more corrupt it is; and consequently since the irascible power is closer to reason as participating to some extent in reason in its own movement, as the Philosopher teaches, the irascible power will be less corrupt than the concupiscible.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Even though all the powers are rooted in the essence of the soul, some flow from that essence more immediately than the others and have a different relationship to the cause of original sin. The corruption and infection of original sin are accordingly not in all in the same way.
2. From the fact that the irascible power shares in the movement of reason more than the concupiscible it results that the sins of the irascible power are more serious but those of the concupiscible more shameful. The very discernment of reason increases the guilt, just as ignorance lessens it. But because the whole human dignity consists in reason, withdrawal from it entails shamefulness. It is accordingly clear from this that the concupiscible power is more corrupt as will drawing farther from reason.
3. The movement of the irascible and of the concupiscible powers can be considered in two respects: in desiring and in executing. In desiring, the movement of the concupiscible power is more sudden than that of the irascible, because the irascible is moved by deliberating and comparing, as it were, the intended revenge with the insult received, as if syllogizing, as is said in the Ethics. But the concupiscible power is moved to enjoyment upon the mere apprehension of the pleasurable object, as is said in the same place. But in executing, the movement of the irascible is more sudden than that of the concupiscible, because the irascible power acts with a certain courage and confidence, whereas the concupiscible with a certain pusillanimity tends to the attainment of its purposes by wiles. The Philosopher accordingly says that "the wrathful man does not lay snares but works out in the open, whereas concupiscence lays snares." And he alludes to the verse of Homer who said that Venus is guileful and her seducing girdle is cunningly adorned, thereby conveying the deception by which Venus snatches away the understanding even of a very wise man.
4. Something is said to be natural in either of two senses: from the point of view of the nature of the species or from that of the nature of the individual. From the point of view of the nature

of the species sins of the concupiscible power are more natural than those of the irascible. Thus the Philosopher says that sensual pleasure "grows up will all of US from our infancy," as if it were contemporary will life. But from the point of view of the nature of the individual the sins of the irascible power are more natural.

The reason for this is that, if the motion of the sensible appetite is viewed from the standpoint of the soul, the concupiscible power tends more naturally to its object as being more natural and better suited to it in itself; for this power is concerned will food and drink and other things of the sort by which nature is preserved. But if this sort of motion is viewed from the standpoint of the body, a greater alteration and commotion of the body is brought about by the motion of anger than by that of concupiscence, commonly and proportionately speaking.

For this reason the bodily make-up, in which children are for the most part like their parents, has more influence in the control of anger than in that of concupiscence. Consequently children imitate their parents more in sins of anger than in those of concupiscence. For what depends upon the soul relates to the species, but what depends upon a definite make-up of the body relates more to the individual. Original sin, however, is a sin of the whole of human nature. Hence it is clear that the argument proves nothing.

5. Corruption occurs in us in an order the inverse of that in Adam, because in Adam the soul corrupts the body, and the person the nature, whereas in us it is the other way about. Consequently, although the sin of Adam belonged first to the irascible power, yet in us corruption belongs more to the concupiscible.

ARTICLE VII: CAN SENSUALITY BE CURED IN THIS LIFE OF THE AÇORESAID CORRUPTION?

Parallel readings: Sum. Theol., I-II, 74, ad 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

1. The aforesaid corruption is called the "fuel of sin." But it is said of the Blessed Virgin that even in this life she was entirely freed from the fuel of sin, especially after the conception of the Son of God. Sensuality is therefore curable in this life.

2. Whatever obeys reason is susceptible of the rectitude of reason. But the powers of sensuality, the irascible and the concupiscible obey reason, as was made clear above. Sensuality is therefore susceptible of the rectitude of reason, and so can be cured of the contrary corruption.

3. Virtue is opposed to sin. But there can be virtue in sensuality; for, as the Philosopher says, temperance and fortitude belong to the non-rational parts of the soul. Sensuality can therefore be cured in this life of the corruption of sin.

4. It is a part of the corruption of sensuality that there proceed from it inordinate movements of depraved concupiscence. But "the temperate man does not have movements of concupiscence of this sort" and consequently differs in this respect from the continent man, who has them but does not follow them, as is explained in the Ethics. Sensuality can therefore be entirely cured in this life.

5. If this corruption is incurable, the reason is to be found either in the physician, or in the medicine, or in the sickness, or in the nature to be healed. Now it is not to be found in the physician that is, God, because He is omnipotent; nor in the medicine, because, as the Epistle to the Romans (5: 15) makes clear, Christ's gift is more potent than Adam's sin by which this corruption was brought on; nor in the sickness, because it is against nature, since it was not in nature as instituted; nor in the nature to be healed, for it would be useful to have this infirmity removed, since because of it man is prone to evil and sluggish in good. Sensuality is therefore curable in this life.

To the Contrary:

1'. The necessity of sinning, at least venially, is a consequence of the necessity of dying. But in this life the necessity of dying is not taken away. Then neither is the necessity of sinning, and therefore neither is the corruption of sensuality from which the said necessity comes.

2'. If sensuality were curable in this life, it would be cured particularly through the sacraments of the Church, which are spiritual medicines. But it still remains even after the reception of the sacraments, as is evident from experience. Sensuality is therefore not curable in this life.

REPLY:

Sensuality cannot be cured in this life except by a miracle. The reason for this is that what is natural cannot be changed except by a supernatural power. But the sort of corruption by which the parts of the soul are said to be corrupt, in some sense follows the inclination of nature.

The gift bestowed upon man in his first state, as a result of which reason kept the lower powers entirely in check, and the soul kept in check the body, was not from the efficacy of any natural principles but from the efficacy of original justice, which was given by divine liberality over and above them. When this justice was removed by sin, man returned to a state which befitted him according to his own natural principles. Dionysius accordingly says that by sin human nature "was deservedly brought to an end befitting its beginning."

Just as man naturally dies and cannot be restored to immortality except miraculously, in the same way the concupiscible power naturally tends to what is pleasurable and the irascible to what is arduous, even outside the order of reason. As a consequence it is not possible for that corruption to be removed unless a supernatural power miraculously brings it about.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The Blessed Virgin was freed from the fuel of sin miraculously.

2. The irascible and the concupiscible powers obey reason inasmuch as their motions are either ordered or restrained by reason, but not so that their inclination is entirely taken away.

3. The virtue which is in the irascible and the concupiscible powers is not opposed to the aforesaid corruption as its contrary. Consequently it is not entirely removed. It is, however, contrarily opposed to any excess in the inclination of the said powers toward their objects; and this is removed by the virtue.

4. In the explanation of the Philosopher the temperate man is not altogether without any movements of concupiscence but without vigorous movements, such as can be in the continent man.

5. The reason why sensuality is not cured in this life is to be found in all four of the factors proposed. For God Himself, though able to cure it, has nevertheless appointed according to the order of His wisdom that it should not be cured in this life. In like manner the gift of grace

which has been conferred upon us by Christ, though more efficacious than the sin of the first man, is not ordained to the removal of the corruption in question, which is one of our nature, but to the removal of the guilt of the person. In like manner too, although this corruption is against the state of nature as originally instituted, it is nevertheless a consequence of the principles of nature left to itself; and it is also useful for man in order to avoid the vice of self-exaltation that the infirmity of sensuality remain: "And lest the greatness of the revelations should exalt me, there was given me a sting of my flesh" (2 Cor. 12:7). Consequently this infirmity remains in man after The Question Is about the Passions of the Soul, and in baptism, just as a will physician discharges a patient without having cured his illness if it could not be cured without the danger of a more the First serious illness.

QUESTION 26: The passions of the soul

Parallel readings: IYSentences «, 3, 3 sol. (cf. a. 2 sol. I-3 47, 2, i sol. z & [Contra Gentiles](#) IV, o; Quodibet II, (7), 13 III, (10), 23; VIII, (8), 18; De spir. creat., I ad 20; Sum. Theol., I, 64,4 ad 1; Q.D. de an., 6 ad 1; Comp. theol. I, '80.

ARTICLE I: HOW DOES THE SOUL SUFFER WHEN SEPARATED FROM THE BODY?

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not suffer from a corporeal fire, for

1. Augustine says: "An agent is superior to its corresponding patient." But the soul is superior to any body whatsoever. Therefore the soul cannot suffer from corporeal fire.
2. It was said in answer that fire acts upon the soul as an instrument of divine vindictive justice.—On the contrary, an instrument accomplishes its instrumental action only by exercising its natural action, as the water of baptism sanctifies the soul by washing the body, and a saw makes a bench by cutting wood. But fire cannot have any natural action upon the soul. It therefore cannot act upon the soul as the instrument of divine justice.
3. The answer was given that the natural action of fire is to burn up, and so it naturally acts upon the soul in so far as the soul has a complement of combustibles.—On the contrary, the combustibles which are said to form the complement of the soul are sins, to which corporeal fire is not contrary. Since all natural action is by reason of contrariety, it therefore seems that the soul cannot suffer from corporeal fire as having a complement of combustibles.
4. Augustine says: "The things by which souls freed of their bodies are affected either for good or for ill are not corporeal but similar to corporeal things." Then the fire by which the separated soul is punished is not corporeal.
5. Damascene says: "The devil and his demons and his man, the Antichrist, and the wicked and sinners will be given over to eternal fire—not a material one such as is familiar to us but one such as God surely knows." Now all corporeal fire is material. Then the fire from which the separated soul suffers is not corporeal.
6. The answer was offered that such a corporeal fire afflicts the soul inasmuch as it is seen by it, as Gregory says: "The soul suffers from fire by the very fact of seeing it"; and so what

immediately afflicts the soul is not something corporeal but the apprehended likeness of something corporeal.—On the contrary, the thing seen, by being seen, is the perfection of the seer. Consequently by being seen it does not give pain to the one seeing but rather pleasure. If, then, something that is seen causes pain, this will be because it is harmful in some other way. But fire cannot afflict the soul by acting upon it in some other way, as has been proved. Then neither does the soul suffer from fire simply by seeing it.

7. Between an agent and its patient there is some proportion. But there is no proportion between an incorporeal and a corporeal being. The soul, therefore, being incorporeal, cannot suffer from corporeal fire.

8. If corporeal fire acts upon the soul in a way that is not natural, this action must be due to some superadded power. Now that power is either corporeal or spiritual. But it cannot be spiritual, because corporeal being is not susceptible of a spiritual power. If, on the other hand, it is corporeal, fire will still not be able to act upon the soul by this power, since the soul is superior to every corporeal power. The soul therefore cannot suffer either naturally or supernaturally.

9. It was advanced in answer that by sin the soul is made less noble than a corporeal creature.—On the contrary, Augustine says that a living substance is nobler than any non-living substance. But a rational soul, even after sinning, still remains living by its natural life. It therefore does not become less noble than corporeal fire, which is a non-living substance.

10. If corporeal fire afflicts the soul, it does so only inasmuch as it is apprehended or sensed as harmful. But a thing does harm to another by taking something away from it. Thus Augustine says that evil does harm because it takes good away. Now a corporeal fire cannot take anything away from the soul. Thus it cannot afflict it.

11. It was said that it takes away the glory of the vision of God.—On the contrary, children who are damned for original sin alone are deprived of the vision of God. If, then, corporeal fire does not take away from the damned anything more, the pains of those who are being punished in hell for actual sins will be no greater than those of children who are being punished in limbo. But this is against Augustine's doctrine.

12. Whatever acts upon another impresses upon it a likeness of the form through which the agent acts. But fire acts through heat. Now since the soul cannot be heated, it therefore seems that it cannot be acted upon by fire.

13. God is more ready to show mercy than to punish. But one who deliberately resists, especially an adult, is not helped through the instruments of divine mercy, the sacraments. Then through the instrument of divine justice, corporeal fire, the soul will not undergo punishment against its will. Obviously it does not undergo it voluntarily. Hence the soul is in no way punished through corporeal fire.

14. Whatever suffers anything from another being is in some way moved by it. But under no species of motion can the soul be moved by corporeal fire, as is clear by induction. Consequently the soul can not suffer anything from corporeal fire.

15. Whatever is made to suffer by another has matter in common with it, as is seen from Boethius.¹ But the soul does not have matter in common with corporeal fire. It therefore cannot suffer from corporeal fire.

To the Contrary:

1' The rich man buried in hell as to his soul only, says: "I am tormented in this name." (Luke 16:24.)

2'. Commenting on the words of Job (20:26): "A fire that is not kindled shall devour him," Gregory says: "Though the lire of hell is corporeal and corporeally burns the reprobates cast into it, it is not kindled by any human effort or fed with wood; but once created, it continues inextinguishable without needing kindling or losing its heat."

3'. Cassiodorus says that the soul separated from the body "hears and sees with its senses more keenly" than when it is in the body. But while it is in the body it suffers from something corporeal by sensing it. All the more then does it do so when it is separated from the body.

4'. Like the soul, demons are incorporeal. But demons suffer from corporeal lire, as is clear from Matthew (25:41): "Depart from me, you cursed,..." So too, then, does the separated soul.

5'. For the soul to be justified is something greater than for it to be punished. But certain corporeal beings act upon the soul for its justification in so far as they are instruments of divine mercy, as is evident in the case of the sacraments of the Church. Some corporeal beings, then, can likewise act upon the soul for its punishment in so far as they are instruments of divine justice.

6'. What is less noble can suffer from what is more noble. But corporeal fire is nobler than the soul of a damned person. Therefore the souls of the damned can suffer from corporeal fire.—Proof of the *mi nor*: Any being at all is nobler than non-being. But non-existence is nobler than the existence of the souls of the damned, as is clear from Matthew (26: 24): "It were better for him, if that man had not been born." Then any being at all, and therefore corporeal lire, is nobler than a damned soul.

REPLY:

To clear up this issue and those of the following articles we must understand what passion or suffering is in its proper sense. It must therefore be borne in mind that the term passion is taken in two senses: one general and the other proper.

In its general sense passion is the reception of something in any way at all. This usage confirms to the root meaning of the word itself, for passion is derived from the Greek *patin*, meaning "to receive."

In its proper sense passion is used of motion, since action and passion consist in motion, inasmuch as it is by way of motion that reception in a patient takes place. And because all motion is between contraries, that which the patient receives must be contrary to some thing given up by the patient. Now conformably with what is received the patient is made like the agent; and hence it is that by passion in the proper meaning of the term the agent is opposed to the patient as its contrary, and every passion removes something from the substance of the patient. Passion in this sense, however, is found only in the motion of alteration. For in local motion nothing is received in the mobile, but the mobile itself is received in a place. But in the motion of increase and decrease what is received or given up is not a form but something substantial, like nourishment, on whose addition or subtraction the greatness or smallness of quantity depends. In generation and corruption there is no motion or contrariety except by reason of a previous alteration. Consequently passion is properly found only in alteration, in which one contrary form is received and the other is driven out.

Because passion in its proper sense involves a certain loss, inasmuch as the patient is changed from its former quality to a contrary one, the term passion is broadened in usage, so that whatever is in anyway kept from what belongs to it is said to suffer (*pati*). Thus we should say that something heavy suffers when prevented from moving down ward, or that a man suffers if prevented from doing his own will.

Taken in the first sense, then, passion is found in the soul and in every creature, because every creature has some potentiality in its composition, and by reason of this every subsistent creature is capable of receiving something. Taken in the second sense, however, passion is found only where there is motion and contrariety. Now motion is found only in bodies, and the contrariety of forms or qualities only in beings subject to generation and corruption. Hence only such beings can properly suffer in this sense. Consequently the soul, being incorporeal, cannot suffer in this sense; for even though it receives something, this does not happen by an exchange of contraries but simply by a communication from the agent, as air is lighted by the sun. But in the third sense, in which the term passion is taken figuratively, the soul can suffer in the sense that its operation can be hampered.

Some, aware that passion in a proper sense cannot be in the soul, have asserted that everything said in the Scriptures about the bodily pains of the damned is to be understood metaphorically. Thus by the bodily pains will which we are familiar there would be indicated the spiritual afflictions by which damned spirits are punished; just as on the other hand, by the bodily delights promised in Scripture we understand the spiritual delights of the blessed. Origen and Algazel seem to have been of this opinion. But because, believing in the resurrection, we believe that there will be suffering not only for spirits but also for bodies, and because bodies cannot be punished except by bodily suffering, and because the same suffering is due both to men after the resurrection and to spirits, as is clear from Matthew (25:41): "Depart from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire...", it is therefore necessary to say, as Augustine proves, that even spirits are affected in some way by bodily pains. Nor is there a parallel between the glory of the blessed and the pains of the damned, because the blessed are raised up to a state that surpasses their nature and thus are given beatitude through the enjoyment of the divinity, whereas the damned are pushed down to a state that is below them and thus are punished even will bodily torments.

Others have accordingly said that the separated soul will be affected by certain pains, to be sure, which, though not bodily, are nevertheless like bodily pains, something like the pains will which people asleep are afflicted. Augustine seems to have thought this, and also Avicenna. But this also cannot be true. For such likenesses of bodies cannot be intellectual, because intellectual likenesses are universal and attention to them would not cause affliction of the soul but rather pleasure in the contemplation of truth. This expression must therefore be understood of imaginational likenesses, which can exist only in a bodily organ, as is proved by the philosophers. But there is no such organ, of course, in the separated soul and in the spirits of the demons.

Others accordingly say that the separated soul suffers from bodies themselves. How this can be is explained by some in one way and by others in another.

Some say that the separated soul uses its senses, and therefore, by sensing a corporeal fire, is punished by fire. This is what Gregory seems to say when he says: "The soul suffers from fire by the very fact of seeing." But that does not seem to be true; first of all because the acts of the sensitive powers cannot be had except by means of bodily organs, for otherwise the sentient souls of the brutes would be incorruptible, as being capable of having their operations by them selves; and in the second place because, granted that the separated souls would sense, they could still not be afflicted by sensible things; for the sensible object is the perfection of the sentient being as such, just as the intelligible object is the perfection of the intelligent being.

It is therefore not as sensed or understood that something sensible or intelligible causes pain or sadness, but inasmuch as it is harmful or is so apprehended. Thus it is necessary to find a way in which fire can be harmful to the separated soul.

Nor can it be true, as some say, that, although corporeal fire can not be harmful to a spirit, yet it can be apprehended as harmful. This seems to agree with what Gregory says: "Because the soul sees itself being burned, it is burned." For it is improbable that demons, who enjoy sharpness of perception, do not know their own nature and that of corporeal fire much better than we do, so that they could falsely believe it possible for a corporeal fire to harm them.

It must therefore be said that really, and not only apparently, souls are afflicted by corporeal fire. This is what Gregory says: "We can gather from the statements of the gospels that the soul suffers burning not only by seeing but also by experiencing it."

To assign the way in which this happens some say that as the instrument of divine justice corporeal fire can act upon the soul, even though it cannot do so according to its own nature. For there are many things that are not sufficient of their own nature to accomplish something which they are nonetheless able to accomplish as the instruments of another agent. Thus the element fire is not sufficient for the generation of flesh except as the instrument of the nutritive power. But this solution does not seem to be adequate, for an instrument does not perform an action which surpasses its own nature except by exercising some action natural to it, as was said in the difficulties.

It is therefore necessary to find some other way in which the soul somehow suffers naturally from corporeal fire. This can be understood as follows. An incorporeal substance may be united to a body in two ways: (1) as a form, inasmuch as it vivifies the body; and (2) as a mover is united to the thing moved or as a thing placed is united to its place, namely, by some operation or some relationship. But because there is one act of existing for the form and that of which it is the form, the union of a spiritual substance to a corporeal one after the manner of a form is a union in the act of existing. Now the existence of no being lies within its own power; and consequently it is not within the power of a spiritual substance to be united to a body or to be separated from it after the manner of a form, but this is accomplished either by a law of nature or by the divine power. But because the operation of a thing which operates voluntarily is within its own power, it is within the power of a spiritual nature, conformably to the order of nature, to be united to a body or to be separated from it after the manner of a mover or of a thing placed; but that a spiritual substance thus united to a body should be confined and hampered and, as it were, fettered by it, that is above nature. The corporeal fire in question, then, acting as the instrument of divine justice, accomplishes something above the power of nature, that is, to confine or fetter the soul; but the union itself in the manner mentioned is natural.

The soul accordingly suffers from corporeal fire in the third way proposed above, namely, in the sense in which we say that anything suffers which is obstructed in its proper activity or kept from some—thing which belongs to it. Augustine affirms this sort of passion when he says: "Why should we not say that even incorporeal spirits can be afflicted by the punishment of corporeal fire in true though wonderful ways if the spirits of men, which are also unquestionably in corporeal, both could now be enclosed in bodily members and will in the future be able to be indissolubly bound by the chains of their own bodies? The incorporeal spirits of the demons...will therefore cling to corporeal fires to be tormented, not in such a way that the fires themselves to which they cling will be animated by union with them and become living beings,...but by clinging in marvellous and inexpressible ways they will receive pain from the fires yet not give life to them."

Gregory also proposes this sort of passion, saying: "As long as Truth presents the rich sinner as damned in fire, what man of any wisdom will deny that the souls of the reprobate are held by fires?"

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The agent does not have to be superior to the patient in every respect, but merely as agent. And so, inasmuch as fire acts upon the soul as the instrument of divine justice, it is superior to the soul, though not in every respect.
2. There is something natural in that passion and action, as has been said.
3. That difficulty is speaking about a passion as used in the second sense, which is had through the contrariety of forms; and this is impossible in the case at hand.
4. On this matter Augustine does not expressly decide anything in the place cited, but he is speaking there by way of inquiry as if proposing a difficulty. Hence he does not say absolutely that the things by which the separated souls are affected are not corporeal but similar to corporeal things, but he is speaking hypothetically: if the things were of this kind, they could still affect the souls with joy or sorrow. In the same way, when he says that the soul is not borne to corporeal places except in company with another body, he says this as part of a disjunction, adding: "or else not locally," that is, by commensuration to a place.
5. In the pain of a separated soul there are two principles to be taken into account: the first afflicting principle, and the proximate one. The first afflicting principle is corporeal fire itself which confines the soul as explained above. But this would not arouse sadness in the soul unless it were apprehended by the soul. The proximate afflicting principle is therefore the confining fire as apprehended; and this fire is not material but spiritual. In this sense Damascene's statement can be verified.—Or it can be said in answer that he says it is not material because it does not punish the soul by acting materially, as it punishes bodies.
6. That fire is apprehended as harmful inasmuch as it is confining and fettering. In this sense the sight of it can be the source of affliction.
7. There is no proportion of the spiritual to the corporeal if proportion is taken in its proper sense, according to a definite relationship of quantity to quantity, either of dimensive quantity to dimensive quantity or of virtual quantity to virtual quantity, as two bodies are proportioned to each other in dimension and power; for the power of a spiritual substance is not of the same genus as corporeal power. If, however, proportion is taken broadly as meaning any relationship, then there is some proportion of the spiritual to the corporeal through which the spiritual can naturally act upon the corporeal, though not conversely except by divine power.
8. An instrument performs its instrumental activity inasmuch as it is moved by the principal agent and through this motion shares in some way in the power of the principal agent, but not so that that power has its complete existence in the instrument, because motion is an incomplete act. The difficulty argues as if a complete power were required in the instrument for the performance of the instrumental action.
9. The soul, even when sinful, is simply nobler than any corporeal power as regards its nature; but as regards guilt it is made less noble than corporeal fire, not simply but inasmuch as it is the instrument of divine justice.
10. That fire harms the soul, not in such a way that it takes away from it some form inhering in it absolutely, but in so far as it prevents its free action, confining it, as has been said.
11. In children because of the lack of grace there is only the privation of the vision of God without anything contrary actively hampering them. But the damned in hell are not only deprived of the Vision of God because of the lack of grace, but are also hampered as by something contrary because they are overwhelmed with bodily pains.
12. The soul does not suffer from fire as if it were altered by it but in the manner explained above.

13. Voluntariness is essential to justice but not to punishment; rather it is contrary to it. Hence the instruments of divine mercy, which are intended to justify, do not act upon a soul which resists; but the instruments of divine justice for punishing do act upon a soul which resists.

14. That difficulty argues on the supposition of a passion properly so called, which consists in motion. But we are not speaking of that now.

15. To have a passion in the proper sense of the term a thing must have matter subject to contrariety, as has been said. Arid for two things to have a reciprocal passion, they must have a common matter. Yet a thing can suffer from another will which it does not have any matter in common, as an inferior body suffers from the sun. And a thing which does not have any matter at all can suffer in some way, as is evident from what was said above.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

Because these in some way come to true conclusions, but not by a true process, they must be answered in order.

1'. Augustine shows that that proof is invalid: "I should indeed say that spirits without any body are going to burn, just as that rich man was burning in hell when he said, 'I am tormented in this name, if I did not see that it would fittingly be answered that that name was of the same kind as the eyes which he raised to see Lazarus, as the tongue upon which he craved a little water to be poured, as the finger of Lazarus by which he asked that it be done, while they were nevertheless souls without bodies. Thus that name by which he was burning can be understood to have been incorporeal as well.'" From this it is clear that that passage cited in authority is not effective as a proof of the point at issue unless something else is added to it.

2'. The fire of hell burns incorporeal substances corporeally from the point of view of the agent, not from that of the patient. But the bodies of the damned it will burn corporeally from the latter point of view as well.

3'. The statement of Cassiodorus does not seem to be true if he is speaking of the external senses. For it to be true it must be understood of internal spiritual senses.

4'. An answer to that passage of the gospel could be that the fire is spiritual, except for the fact that the bodies of the damned could not be punished by it. That argument, then, does not sufficiently prove the point at issue.

5'. The same is to be said of this difficulty, which argues from a parallel.

6'. In so far as a damned soul is a real being it is better than non being. But the words of our Lord that it would be better for it not to be, mean: in so far as it is subject to misery and guilt.

ARTICLE II: HOW DOES THE SOUL SUFFER WHILE JOINED TO THE BODY?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 15, 2, I sol. Sum. Theol., I-II, 22, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not suffer indirectly, for

1. As is said in the work Spirit and Soul, because of the friendship of the body and soul, the soul while joined to the body cannot be free; and though the soul cannot be destroyed, it can nevertheless fear destruction. But to fear is a sort of suffering. Therefore the soul while joined to the body suffers in itself, because the inability to be destroyed belongs to it in itself.

2. Whatever gives perfection to another is superior to it. But the body gives perfection to the soul, for the soul is united to the body that it may be perfected there. The body is therefore superior to the soul; and so the soul can suffer directly from the body to which it is united.

3. The soul is moved in place indirectly because it is indirectly in the place in which the body is directly. But a form or quality which is in the body directly is not said to be in the soul indirectly. Now, since a passion or suffering is concerned with a form or quality, being of the type of motion which is alteration, it therefore seems that the soul in the body cannot suffer indirectly.

4. Being moved indirectly is distinguished from being moved in part, as is made clear in the Physics. But the soul is part of a composite which is moved directly, as appears from The Soul. The soul should therefore not be said to be moved indirectly, but as a part will reference to the movement of the whole.

5. The direct is prior to the indirect. But in the passions of the soul the role of the soul is prior to that of the body, because the body is transformed by the apprehension and appetency of the soul, as is evident in anger, fear, and so on. It should therefore not be said that by those passions the soul suffers indirectly and the body directly.

6. Whatever is formal in anything is more important than what is material in it. But in the passions of the soul the role of the soul is formal, and that of the body is material. The formal definition of anger is that it is the desire for revenge; its material definition, that it is the boiling of the blood around the heart. In such passions, then, the role of the soul is more important than that of the body. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

7. Just as joy and sorrow and such passions of the soul do not belong to the soul without the body, neither does sensing. But the soul is not said to sense indirectly. Then neither should it be said to suffer indirectly.

To the Contrary:

1'. Taken strictly passion is a certain motion in the line of alteration, as has been said. But the soul is not altered except indirectly. Then neither does it suffer except indirectly.

2'. The powers of the soul are not more perfect than the substance of the soul itself. But according to the Philosopher the powers do not grow old directly but only because of the failure of the body. Then neither does the soul suffer directly but only indirectly.

3'. Whatever is moved directly is divisible, as is proved in the Physics. But the soul is indivisible. It therefore is not moved directly, and so neither does it suffer directly.

REPLY:

If passion is taken strictly, it is impossible for anything incorporeal to suffer (*pati*), as was shown above. Then in a passion properly so called it is the body that suffers directly. Consequently, if such a passion belongs in any way to the soul, this is only inasmuch as it is united to the body, and therefore indirectly.

Now the soul is united to the body in two respects: (1) as a form, inasmuch as it gives existence to the body, vivifying it; (2) as a mover, inasmuch as it exercises its operations through the body. And in both respects the soul suffers indirectly, but differently. For anything that

is composed of matter and form suffers by reason of its matter just as it acts by reason of its form. Thus the passion begins with the matter and in a certain sense indirectly belongs to the form. But the passion of the patient is derived from the agent, because passion is the effect of action.

A passion of the body is therefore attributed to the soul indirectly in two ways: (1) In such a way that the passion begins with the body and ends in the soul inasmuch as it is united to the body as its form. This is a bodily passion. Thus, when the body is injured, the union of the body with the soul is weakened; and so the soul, which is united to the body in its act of existing, suffers indirectly. (2) In such a way that the passion begins with the soul inasmuch as it is the mover of the body, and ends in the body. This is called a psychical passion. An example is seen in anger and fear and the like; for passions of this kind are aroused by the apprehension and appetency of the soul, and a bodily transformation follows upon them, just as the transformation of a mobile being follows from the operation of the mover in any one of the ways in which the mobile being is disposed to obey the motion of the mover. Thus, when the body is transformed by an alteration, the soul itself also is said to suffer indirectly.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The soul does not fear destruction as if it would be destroyed in itself, but it fears the destruction of the composite through the separation of itself from the body. And even if it should fear its own destruction, this would be only in so far as there is some doubt whether upon the destruction of the body the soul is corrupted indirectly. Not even destruction, then, is compatible with the soul directly, and even the passion of fear is not attributable to it apart from its union with the body.
2. Even though the soul is perfected in the body, it is not perfected by the body, Augustine proves. But either it is perfected by God or it perfects itself with the assistance of the body working at its command, just as the possible intellect is perfected by the power of the agent intellect with the help of phantasms which are made actually intelligible by this power.
3. Although a quality of the body by no means belongs to the soul, yet the act of being of the composite is common to soul and body, and likewise the operation. The passion of the body therefore overflows into the soul indirectly.
4. A passion happens to the composite of body and soul only by reason of the body. It therefore happens to the soul only indirectly. The argument proceeds, however, as if the passion belonged to the whole composite by reason of the whole and not by reason of one of the two parts.
5. Anger, and any passion of the soul for that matter, can be viewed in two ways: (1) According to the specific characteristic of anger. From this point of view it is primarily in the soul rather than in the body. (2) Inasmuch as it is a passion. From this point of view it is primarily in the body, for there it first gets the character of a passion. We accordingly do not say that the soul becomes angry indirectly, but that it suffers indirectly.
6. The answer to this difficulty is clear from what has just been said.
7. The soul is not said to sense indirectly any more than to rejoice, though it is said to suffer indirectly.

ARTICLE III: IS PASSION ONLY IN THE SENSE APPETITIVE POWER?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 15, 2, I sol. 2; IV Sentences 49, 3, I sol. 2 ad x; In De div. nom., C. 2, lectura 4, n. 1 in II Eth. 5; Sum. Theol., I, 20, I ad i & 2; Si, I; I-II, 22, 2 & 3.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. Christ suffered in His whole soul, as appears from the words of the Psalm (87:4): "For my soul is filled with evils," which are referred to the sufferings of His passion in the explanation given in the Gloss. But totality as applied to the soul refers to powers. Consequently there can be passion in any power of the soul, and therefore not only in the sensitive appetitive power.

2. Every movement or operation which belongs to the soul in itself independently of the body is a function of the intellective, not the sensitive, part. But, as Augustine says, "the soul is not influenced by flesh alone to crave, fear, rejoice, or be distressed; but it can also be stirred up with these movements by itself." Such passions are therefore not only in the sensitive appetitive part.

3. The will belongs to the intellective part, as is made clear in The

Soul. But Augustine says: "There is will in all of these (that is, fear, joy, and the like). They are all, in fact, nothing but acts of the will. For what is craving and joy but the will in its acceptance of the things which we will? And what is fear and sorrow but the will in its rejection of the things which we do not will?" Passions of this kind are therefore also in the intellective part.

4. It is not the function of the same power to act and to be acted upon or suffer. But sense seems to be an active power; for the basilisk is said to kill by its gaze, and a menstruating woman ruins a mirror by looking into it, as is explained in the work Sleep and Wakefulness. Hence the passion of the soul is not to be placed in the sensitive part.

5. An active power is nobler than a passive one. But the vegetative powers are active, and the sensitive powers are nobler than they. Therefore the sensitive powers are also active. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

6. The rational powers are capable of opposite determinations according to the Philosopher. But delight is opposed to sadness. Now, since delight is properly in the intellective part, as is made clear in the Ethics, it seems that sadness is also there. And so passions can be in the intellective part.

7. The answer was advanced that the Philosopher's statement refers to opposite acts.—On the contrary, knowledge and ignorance, which are opposites, are in the intellective part of the soul, and yet they are not acts. The Philosopher's statement therefore does not refer only to acts.

8. According to the Philosopher the same thing by its absence and by its presence is the cause of contraries, as the pilot is the cause of both the saving and the sinking of the ship. But the intelligible object when present causes delight in the intellective part. When absent, therefore, it causes sadness in the same part. Thus the same is to be concluded as before.

9. Damascene says: "Pain is not a passion but the sensing of a passion." It is therefore in the sensitive power and not in the appetitive; and, for the same reason, so are pleasure and the other things which are called passions of the soul.

10. According to Damascene and the Philosopher a passion is that which is followed by joy and sadness. The passions of the soul therefore precede joy and sadness. But joy and sadness are in the appetitive part. Then the passions of the soul are in the part which precedes the appetitive. Since it is the apprehensive part which precedes the appetitive, they are therefore in the apprehensive part.

11. The body undergoes change in the operations of the sense apprehensive power just as it does in those of the sense appetitive power. Passions are therefore not only in the appetitive but also in the apprehensive.

12. A passion strictly so called is had through the loss of something and the reception of its contrary. But this happens in the intellective part; for guilt is lost and grace is received, and the habit of lust is lost and the habit of chastity is introduced. Passion is therefore properly in the higher part of the soul.

13. The movement of the sense appetitive power follows the apprehension of sense. But sometimes such passions of the soul are aroused in us by objects which cannot be apprehended by sense, such as shame for a disgraceful action or fear for the future. Such passions therefore cannot be in the sense appetitive part, and so we are left with the conclusion that they are in the rational appetitive part, the will.

14. Hope is listed among the passions of the soul. But hope is in the intellective part of the soul, because the holy fathers while in limbo had hope, and the movement of the sensitive part does not remain in the separated soul. Passions are therefore also in the intellective part.

15. The image [of the Trinity] is in the intellective part. But the soul suffers in the powers of the image, since the powers of the image which are now perfected by grace will be perfected by the glory of enjoyment in the state of glory. Consequently passions are not only in the sense appetitive part of the soul.

16. According to Damascene "passion is a movement from one thing to another." Now the intellect moves from one thing to another by proceeding from principles to conclusions. Therefore passion is in the intellect. And so the same is to be concluded as before.

17. The Philosopher says that "to understand is in a way to be passive (pati)." But understanding is in the intellect. Hence there is passion in the intellect.

18. Dionysius says of Hierotheus that "by suffering divine things" he learned divine truths. But he could not undergo or suffer divine things in the sensitive part, which is not proportionate to divine things. Then passion is not only in the sensitive part.

19. No definite power of the soul has to be allotted to that which is in the soul accidentally; for there is neither science of things that exist accidentally nor a definite power for them. But the soul does not suffer except accidentally or indirectly. Passion is therefore not in any definite power of the soul, and so not in the sensitive appetite alone.

To the Contrary:

u'. Damascene says: "A passion is a movement of the appetitive power in imagining good or evil"; and again: "A passion is a movement of the non-rational soul due to the apprehension of good or evil."¹⁶ Passion is therefore only in the non-rational appetitive part.

2' In the strict sense passion is taken according to the movement of alteration, as has been said. But there is alteration only in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in the Physics.¹⁸ Therefore passion is only in the sensitive part.

REPLY:

Strictly speaking, passion is only in the sense appetitive part, as appears from the definitions of passion quoted from Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa. This is shown as follows.

Passion is used in three senses, as was said above. It is taken first in general, in the sense in which all receiving is undergoing or suffering. In this usage passion is in every part of the soul and not only in the sense appetitive part. Understanding passion in this way, the Commentator says that all the powers of the vegetative soul are active; all those of the

sensitive soul, passive; and those of the rational soul, partly active (because of the agent intellect) and partly passive (because of the possible intellect). Now, although this sort of passion is compatible with both the apprehensive and the appetitive powers, yet it is more proper to the appetitive. The reason for this is that, since the operation of the apprehensive power is directed to the thing apprehended as it is in the one apprehending, whereas the operation of the appetitive power is directed to the thing as it is in itself, there is less of the individuality of the thing apprehended in what is received into the apprehensive power than there is of the specification of the appetible thing in what is received into the appetitive power. Consequently, truth, which perfects the intellectual power, is in the mind, whereas good, which perfects the appetitive, is in things, as is said in the Metaphysics.

In the second sense passion is understood strictly, as consisting in the loss of one contrary and the reception of another by way of a transformation. This sort of passion cannot pertain to the soul except because of the body; and this under two aspects: (1) Inasmuch as it is united to the body as its form. In this respect it suffers along with the body suffering by a bodily passion. (2) Inasmuch as it is united to the body as its mover. In this respect a transformation is produced in the body through the operation of the soul. This latter is called a psychical passion, as was said above.

The bodily passion just mentioned reaches to the powers of the soul as rooted in its essence, by reason of the fact that the soul in its essence is the form of the body; and thus it pertains first to the essence of the soul. This sort of passion can, however, be attributed to a power in three ways: (1) Inasmuch as it is rooted in the essence of the soul. Since all powers are rooted in the soul's essence, the passion in question pertains to all powers in this way. (2) Inasmuch as the acts of the powers are hindered by an injury to the body. Thus the passion in question pertains to all powers using bodily organs, since the acts of all of these are hindered when the organs are injured. But indirectly passion in this sense applies also to the powers which do not use bodily organs, the intellectual, in so far as they receive something from powers which do use organs. Thus it happens that when the organ of the imaginative power is injured, the operation of the intellect also is hampered because the intellect has need of phantasms in its own operation. (It belongs to some power as apprehending it. In this way it properly belongs to the sense of touch; for touch is the sense of the things from which an animal is composed, and likewise of those by which an animal is corrupted.

On the other hand, since by a psychical passion the body is altered because of an operation of the soul, this kind of passion has to be in a power which is joined to a bodily organ and whose business it is to alter the body. As a consequence, such a passion is not in the intellectual part, which is not the actuality of any bodily organ. Nor again is it in the sense apprehensive power, because from sense apprehension no movement in the body follows except through the mediation of the appetitive power, which is the immediate mover. According to its manner of operating, then, a bodily organ (the heart) from which motion takes its beginning is at once given a disposition suitable for carrying out that to which the sense appetite inclines. In anger the heart accordingly heats up, and in fear it in a way cools off and tightens up.

Thus psychical passion is properly found only in the sense appetitive faculty. For the powers of the vegetative soul, though using an organ, are clearly not passive but active. Moreover passion more properly attaches to the appetitive power than to the apprehensive, as was said in the beginning of this reply. And this is one reason why the sense appetitive faculty is more properly the subject of passion than the sense apprehensive, just as the higher affective power comes closer to the true character of passion than the intellectual.

In the third sense passion was said to be taken more or less figuratively, in so far as a thing is barred in any way whatsoever from what is suited to it. In this sense the powers of the soul suffer in the same way as they are barred from their proper acts. And this occurs in one way

or another in all the powers of the soul, as has been said. But we are now speaking of psychical passion properly so called, which is found only in the sense appetitive power, as has been shown.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The whole soul of Christ suffered with a bodily passion; and therefore that passion attached to all the powers, at least inasmuch as they are rooted in the essence of the soul; not, however, in such a way that a psychical passion was in every power of His soul as its proper subject.
2. Augustine is speaking against certain Platonists who said that the starting point of all those passions was in the flesh. Augustine shows, however, that even if the flesh were in no respect corrupted, these passions could take their beginning in the soul. He therefore does not say that such passions are brought about apart from the flesh, but that the soul is not moved by these passions because of the flesh alone.
3. Augustine is either taking the term will broadly for any appetite, or he is taking fear and joy and the like as acts of the will similar to passions in the sense appetite. For in some sense joy and sorrow and the like are in the will itself, as was said in the question on sensuality, but not in the sense that they are passions properly so called.—Or it can be said that Augustine calls these passions acts of the will because man is led into these passions by an act of the will inasmuch as the lower appetite follows the inclination of the higher appetite, as was said in the question on sensuality. Thus Augustine himself afterwards adds: "Just as the will of man is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned to these affections or those."
4. Sense is not an active but a passive power. Not every power that has an act which is an operation is called active, for then every faculty of the soul would be active; but a faculty that is related to its object as an agent to a patient is called active, and that which is related to its object as a patient to an agent is called passive. Now sense is related to the sensible thing as a patient to an agent, because the sensible thing alters the sense; and if the sensible object is sometimes altered by the sense, this is incidental, inasmuch as the organ of sense has some quality by which it is naturally capable of changing another body. Consequently the ruination in question (by which a menstruating woman damages a mirror or a basilisk kills a man by a look) does not contribute anything to the act of seeing; but the seeing is accomplished by the fact that the visible species is received in sight; and this is a sort of passivity or suffering. Sense is therefore a passive power. And even if it were granted that sense acted upon something actively, it would not follow from this that there is no passivity in sense; for nothing prevents the same thing from being active and passive in different respects. And again if it were granted that sense, which designates an apprehensive power, were incapable of any passion, this would not exclude the possibility of passion being in the sensitive appetite.
5. Although what is active is simply and from the same point of view nobler than what is passive, still nothing prevents something passive from being nobler than something active inasmuch as the passive thing suffers by a passion that is nobler than the action by which the active being acts, as is the case with regard to the passion by which the possible intellect is called a passive power. And even sense by receiving something immaterially is nobler than the action by which the vegetative power acts materially, that is, by means of the qualities of the elements.
6. There is nothing in contrary opposition to that delight which is in the intellective part by reason of its union with a suitable intelligible object, since to have a cause of the contrary passion we should need to have something contrary to that suitable intelligible object. But this is impossible, because nothing is contrary to an intelligible species; for the species of contraries are not contrary in the soul, as is said in the Metaphysics. Man accordingly takes

delight not only in understanding good but also in understanding evil, as far as understanding is concerned; for the understanding of evil is a good for the intellect. And so intellectual delight has no contrary. Sadness or pain are nevertheless said to be in the intellective part, broadly speaking, inasmuch as the intellect understands something as harmful to man, to which the will is averse. Because that harmful thing, however, is not harmful to the intellect as understanding it, sadness or pain is not contrarily opposed to the delight of the intellect, which comes from understanding something suitable to the intellect in so far as it understands.

7. The rational power is capable of contrary determinations in its own way and also in a way common to itself and all other powers.

To be the subject of contrary accidents is common to the rational and the other powers, because all contraries have the same subject. But to be capable of contrary actions is proper to it alone, for natural powers are determined to one course of action. It is in this sense that the Philosopher is speaking when he says that the rational powers are open to opposites.

8. The absence of the pilot is not the cause of the sinking of the ship except indirectly, inasmuch as it takes away the supervision exercised by the pilot which up to then prevented the sinking of the ship. In the same way the removal or absence of the intelligible object is not the cause of sadness but merely of not being delighted. Effects are proportioned to their causes. Then understanding and not understanding, which are contradictorily opposed, are the cause of being delighted and of not being so, which are likewise contradictories; not of being delighted and of being sad, which are contraries. Further more, if we take the contrary of the understanding of truth, namely, error, this cannot be the cause of sadness; for either error is deemed to be truth, in which case it causes delight just as truth does; or it is recognized as error (which can be done only by coming to know the truth), in which case again error causes delight in understanding.

9. Sadness and pain differ in that sadness is a psychological passion, beginning with the apprehension of a source of harm and ending in an operation of the appetite and even further in an alteration of the body, whereas pain is dependent upon a bodily passion. Thus Augustine says that "pain is more commonly said of bodies." It begins, then, with an injury to the body and ends in an apprehension by the sense of touch, and on this account pain is in the sense of touch as apprehending it, as has been said.

10. That joy and sadness follow upon a passion is said by both Damascene and the Philosopher, but by each with a different meaning. Damascene (as also Gregory of Nyssa, who makes the same statement) is speaking of a bodily passion, which causes joy and sadness when apprehended and pain when experienced by sense. But the Philosopher is without any doubt here speaking of psychological passions, maintaining that joy and sadness follow upon all the passions of the soul. The reason for this is that among all the passions of the concupiscible power joy and sadness, which are caused by the attaining of the agreeable or the harmful, hold the last place; and all the passions of the irascible power terminate in passions of the concupiscible, as was said in the question on sensuality. It remains, then, that all the passions of the soul terminate in joy and sadness. In neither meaning of the words quoted, however, does it follow that passions are in the apprehensive power, because bodily passion is in the very nature of the body, and the other psychological passions are in the same appetitive part in which joy and sadness are found, but only with reference to its previous acts. If, on the other hand, there were no order in the acts of the appetitive part, it would follow from the words of the Philosopher that psychological passions are not in the appetitive part, where joy and sadness are found, but in the apprehensive.

1. Neither sense nor any other apprehensive power moves immediately, but only mediately through the appetitive. Consequently, upon the operation of the sense apprehensive power, the body is changed in its material dispositions only if the movement of the appetitive power supervenes. For the alteration of the body disposing itself to obey follows immediately upon this movement. Accordingly, although the sense apprehensive power is changed together with the bodily organ, passion strictly so called is still not in it, because in the operation of sense the bodily organ undergoes, properly speaking, only a spiritual change, inasmuch as the species of the sensible objects are received into the sense organs "without matter," as is said in *The Soul*.

12. Even though something is lost and something else is received in the intellective part, this does not take place by way of a transformation so that reception and loss occur in a continuous succession. In the case of infused habits it comes about through a simple influx; for in an instant grace is infused and by it guilt is instantly expelled. And even an alteration from vice to virtue or from ignorance to knowledge affects the intellective part only indirectly, while the transformation is directly in the sensitive part, as is made clear in the Ethics. For upon the occurrence of a transformation in the sensitive part there straightway results a perfection in the intellective part, so that the result in the intellective part is the term of the transformation in the sensitive part, just as illumination may be the term of a local motion and generation in an unqualified sense may be the term of an alteration. This is the explanation with regard to acquired habits.

13. From the apprehension of something by the intellect there can follow a passion in the lower appetite in two ways: (1) In so far as that which is understood by the intellect in a universal way is represented in the imagination in particular, thus moving the lower appetite. When, for example, the intellect of a believer assents intellectually to future punishment and forms phantasms of the pains, imagining the fire burning and worm gnawing and the like, the passion of fear follows in the sensitive appetite. (2) In so far as the higher appetite is moved by the intellectual apprehension, will the result that the lower appetite also is stirred up by the higher through a kind of overflow or through a command.

14. The hope which remains in the separated soul is not a passion but either a habit or an act of the will, as is clear from what was said previously.

15. From the bestowal of beatitude or the perfecting of the image nothing can be concluded other than that there is passion in the intellective part in the sense in which every reception is called a passion.

16. Passion is said to be a movement from one thing received to another thing received, not from one thing produced to another thing produced. In the former sense there is movement in the intellect from one thing to another.

17. Understanding is said to be passive in the broad use of the term according to which all reception is passivity or passion.

18. The passion of which Dionysius is speaking is nothing but affection for the things of God, which has more of the character of a passion than mere apprehension, as is clear from what has been said above. For from affection for divine things comes their manifestation, as is written in John (14:21): "And he that loveth me, shall be loved by my Father; and I will love him and will manifest myself to him."

Article IV: ON WHAT GROUNDS ARE THE CONTRARIETY AND DIVERSITY AMONG THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL BASED?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 26, 1, 3; in II Eth., 5, 1m. 291-96; Sum. Theol., I—II, q. 23; 46, 1 ad 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not on the grounds of good and evil, for

1. Boldness is opposed to fear. But both of these passions regard evil, because boldness tackles the same thing that fear runs away from. The contrariety of the soul's passions is therefore not based on good and evil.

2. Hope is opposed to despair. But both regard good, which hope expects to attain and despair has no confidence of attaining. The contrariety of the soul's passions is therefore not based on good and evil.

. Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa distinguish the passions of the soul on the basis of the present and the future and on that of good and evil. Thus hope and desire have to do with a future good; pleasure, delight, and gladness, with a present good; fear has to do with a future evil; sadness, with a present one. But the present and the future are accidental as regards good and evil. Consequently the difference in the soul's passions is not of itself based on good and evil.

4. Augustine distinguishes between sadness and pain in that sadness refers to the soul, pain to the body. But again this distinction is not made on the basis of good and evil. The conclusion is therefore the same as before.

5. Exultation, joy, gladness and pleasure, good humor and mirth are somehow different; otherwise it would be useless to couple two of them as is done for example, in Isaiah (35: 10): "They shall obtain joy and gladness." Now since all of those terms are used with reference to good, it seems that good and evil do not differentiate the passions of the soul.

6. Damascene distinguishes four kinds of sadness: "boredom, distress, envy, and pity," in addition to which there is also repentance. All of these are used with reference to evil. The same is therefore to be concluded as before.

7. He also distinguishes six species of fear: laziness, bashfulness, shame, awe, astonishment, and anxiety. These again do not involve the difference in question. The conclusion is therefore the same as before.

8. Dionysius ranks jealousy with love, but both of these are passions regarding good. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

To the Contrary:

1'. Acts are distinguished by their objects. But the passions of the soul are acts of the appetitive power, whose object is good and evil. The passions of the soul are therefore distinguished by good and evil.

2'. According to the Philosopher the passions of the soul are changes from which joy and sadness result. But joy and sadness are distinguished on the basis of good and evil. Good and evil therefore distinguish the passions of the soul.

REPLY:

In the passions of the soul a threefold distinction is found. The first is that by which they differ generically, as belonging to distinct powers of the soul. It is in this way that the

passions of the concupiscible power are distinguished from those of the irascible. Now the basis of this distinction is taken from the basis for distinguishing the powers. For since the object of the concupiscible power is something sensuously pleasurable and that of the irascible something arduous or lofty, as was said above in the question on sensuality, those passions belong to the concupiscible power in which there is implied a reference to the sensuously pleasurable in an unqualified sense or to its contrary; whereas those belong to the irascible which are referred to something arduous concerning such an object. Thus the difference between desire and hope becomes evident; for desire denotes that the appetite is attracted to something pleasurable, whereas hope expresses a certain raising of the appetite to some good which is deemed arduous or difficult. And the same is to be said of the other passions.

The second distinction of the passions of the soul is that by which they are distinguished in species within the same power. In regard to the passions of the concupiscible power this distinction is made on two different grounds: (1) According to the contrariety of objects. In this way joy, which regards good, is distinguished from sadness, which regards evil (2) According as the concupiscible power is referred in different ways to the same object, or in other words according to the different stages that can be considered in the course of an appetitive movement. For the pleasurable object is first united psychically will the man who seeks it, by being apprehended as like him or agreeable to him. From this there follows the passion of love, which is nothing but the specification of the appetite by the form of the appetible object. For that reason love is said to be a sort of union of the lover with the beloved. But what has thus been united psychically is sought further with a view to its being united really, so that the lover enjoys the possession of the beloved. Thus is born the passion of desire, which, when the object has been obtained in reality, begets joy. The first stage, then, in the movement of the concupiscible power is love; the second, desire; and the last, joy. And through the contrary to these the passions bearing upon evil are to be distinguished, will hate opposed to love, aversion to desire, sadness to joy.

The passions of the irascible power, as was said in another question, arise from the passions of the concupiscible and end in them. There is accordingly found in them a distinction confirmable to that in the concupiscible power; and there is in them furthermore a distinction proper to them based upon the specific character of their proper object. Deriving from the concupiscible there is the distinction of the passions on the basis of good and evil and on that of the pleasurable and its contrary, and again on that of what is really possessed and what is not really possessed. But proper to the irascible power is the distinction of its passions on the basis of what exceeds the capacity of the one who has the appetite and of what does not exceed it, and this according to his evaluation of the matter. For these grounds seem to distinguish the arduous as essential differences.

A passion in the irascible power can therefore regard either good or evil. If it regards good, this can be a good possessed or one not possessed. Regarding a good possessed there can be no passion in the irascible power, because once a good is possessed it causes no difficulty to the possessor. Consequently the notion of the arduous is not verified in it. But regarding a good not yet possessed, in which the notion of the arduous can be verified because of the difficulty of obtaining it, if that good is judged to exceed the capacity of the one seeking it, despair ensues; but if it is judged not to exceed that capacity, hope arises.

If, on the other hand, the excitation of the irascible power with reference to evil is considered, this will be of two kinds: either with reference to an evil not yet possessed which is regarded as arduous inasmuch as it is difficult to avoid, or with reference to an evil already possessed or joined to oneself, and this again has the character of the arduous inasmuch as it is deemed difficult to get rid of. Now if it is with reference to an evil not yet present, if that evil is

regarded as exceeding one's capacity, then it causes the passion of fear; but if it is regarded as not exceeding one's capacity, then it causes the passion of boldness. If, however, the evil is present, either it is regarded as not exceeding one's capacity, and then it arouses the passion of anger; or it is regarded as exceeding that capacity, and then it does not arouse any passion in the irascible power, but in the concupiscible power alone there remains the passion of sadness.

The distinction which is based upon the different stages in the appetitive movement is not the cause of any contrariety, because such passions differ as perfect and imperfect, as is seen, for example, in desire and joy. But the distinction which is based on the contrariety of the object properly effects a contrariety in the passions. In the concupiscible power, accordingly, passions are regarded as contrary on the basis of good and evil, as joy and sadness or love and hate. In the irascible power a twofold contrariety can be considered: (1) According to the distinction of the proper object, as exceeding one's capacity or not. From this point of view hope and despair, boldness and fear are contrary; and this contrariety is the more proper one. (2) According to the difference in the object of the concupiscible power, i.e., according to good and evil. From this point of view hope and fear seem to be contrarily opposed. From neither point of view, however, can anger have a passion contrary to it—not on the basis of the contrariety of good and evil, because there is no passion in the irascible power regarding a present good; and likewise not on the basis of the contrariety of what exceeds one's capacity and what does not, because an evil which exceeds one's capacity does not cause any passion in the irascible, as has been said. Hence among the passions anger has as proper to itself that nothing is contrary to it.

There is a third difference of the passions of the soul which is, so to speak, accidental. This can come about in two ways: (1) According to the intensity or mildness of the passion, as jealousy implies an intensity of love, and rage an intensity of anger. (2) According to the material differences of good or evil, like the difference of pity and envy, which are both species of sadness; for envy is sadness about the prosperity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as an evil for oneself, whereas pity is sadness about the adversity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as one's own evil. Certain other passions also can be considered in the same way.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** The object of the irascible power is good and evil, not in an unqualified sense, but with the added circumstance of arduousness. There is therefore contrariety in its passions not merely on the basis of good and evil but also on that of the differences which distinguish the arduous both in good and in evil.
- 2.** The answer is clear from what has just been said.
- 3.** Present and future are regarded as differences to distinguish the powers of the soul inasmuch as what is future is not yet really united to the soul and what is present is already united, and the movement of the appetite to what is really united is more perfect than to what is really at a distance. Consequently, although future and present account for some distinction in the passions, like the perfect and the imperfect they cause no contrariety.
- 4.** In its strict sense pain should not be numbered among the passions of the soul, because it involves nothing on the part of the soul beyond mere apprehension; for pain is the feeling of an injury, but the injury itself is in the body. For this reason even Augustine adds in the same place that he has preferred to use the term sadness rather than pain; for sadness is completed in the appetitive power itself, as appears from what has been said.
- 5.** Pleasure and joy differ in the same way as sadness and pain; for sensible pleasure involves on the part of the body union with something agreeable, and on the part of the soul the feeling

of this agreeable ness. Similarly spiritual pleasure involves a certain real union of two things that agree with each other, and the perception of this union. Thus in defining sensible pleasure Plato said that pleasure is a sensible process toward a natural state. Aristotle, defining pleasure in general, said that pleasure is the unhampered operation of a habit confirmable to nature. For an agreeable operation is that united agreeable thing which causes pleasure, especially spiritual pleasure. Thus pleasure of either kind begins with a real union and is completed in its apprehension. Joy, however, begins with apprehension and ends in the affections. Thus pleasure is sometimes the cause of joy, just as pain is sometimes the cause of sadness. Joy, on the other hand, differs accidentally from gladness and the rest of the passions mentioned on the basis of intensity or slackness. For the others express a certain intensity of joy. Either this intensity is considered from the viewpoint of one's interior disposition; and then it is gladness, which implies an interior expansion or dilation of heart; for gladness (*laetitia*) is spoken of as a sort of expansiveness (*latitia*). Or the intensity of inner joy is considered from the viewpoint of its bursting forth into certain outward signs, and then it is exultation; for exultation is so named from the fact that inner joy in a way outwardly leaps (*exilit*). This leaping is noted either in a change of countenance, in which the evidences of emotion first appear because of its nearness to the imaginative power; and then the passion is mirth; or it is noted inasmuch as one's words and deeds are influenced by the intensity of the inner joy; and then it is good humor.

6. The various species of sadness which Damascene lays down are types of sadness which add to it certain accidental differences. These may be regarded from the viewpoint of the intensity of the move merit. In that case in so far as the intensity consists in an interior disposition, it is called boredom, which is sadness weighing a man down (that is, his heart) so that he does not care to do anything; or, in so far as the bile proceeds to an external disposition, the passion is distress, which is sadness that takes the voice away. The differences may, on the other hand, be regarded from the viewpoint of the object inasmuch as what is in another is looked upon as one's own evil. Then if another's good is considered one's own evil, the passion will be envy; but if another's evil is considered one's own evil, it will be pity. Repentance, however, does not add to sadness in general any specific note, since it concerns one's own evil taken absolutely. For this reason it is omitted by Damascene. Yet many different types of sadness can be listed if everything that has any accidental bearing upon the evil which causes sadness is taken into account.

7. Since fear is a passion coming from something harmful apprehended as exceeding one's capacity, the types of fear will be differentiated according to the difference in such harmful things. Now what is harmful can be referred to the one affected in three different respects: (1) With regard to one's own operation. In this case inasmuch as one's own operation is feared as laborious, the passion is laziness; and inasmuch as it is feared as disgraceful, the passion is shame, which is fear in a disgraceful action. (2) With regard to knowledge, according as some object of knowledge is apprehended as altogether exceeding cognition. In that case the study of it is looked upon as fruitless and so as harmful. Now its exceeding cognition either is due to its greatness, and then the passion is awe, which is fear from the imagining of something great; or it is due to its unusualness, and then the passion is astonishment, which is "fear from the imagining of something unusual," as Damascene defines it.¹² (3) With regard to suffering that comes from another. That suffering can be feared either under the aspect of disgrace, and then the passion is bashfulness, which is fear in anticipation of ridicule; or under the aspect of injury, and then the passion is anxiety, by which a man is afraid that some misfortune will befall him.

8. Jealousy adds to love a certain intensity, for it is a vehement love that brooks no sharing of one's beloved.

ARTICLE V: ARE HOPE, FEAR, JOY AND SADNESS THE FOUR PRINCIPAL PASSIONS OF THE SOUL?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 26, 1, 4; Sum. Theol., I-II, 25, 4 (cf. aa. 1-3); 84, ad 2; II-II, 141, 7 ad 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are not, for

1. In enumerating the four principal passions, Augustine puts cupidity in place of hope. And the same, it seems, can be gathered from the words of Vergil in which he designates the main passions: "Hence men crave and fear, rejoice and sorrow."
2. The more perfect a thing is, the more important it seems to be. But the movement of boldness is more perfect than that of hope, since it tends to its object with greater intensity. Boldness is therefore a more important passion than hope.
3. Everything takes its name from the most important in its line. But the irascible power gets its name from anger. Anger should therefore be numbered among the principal passions.
4. There is a passion that looks to the future not only in the irascible power but also in the concupiscible. But the passion looking to the future which is in the concupiscible power, desire, is not included as one of the principal passions. Then neither are fear and hope, which in the irascible similarly look to the future.
5. Principal means coming before the rest; for according to Gregory "to be prince (*principiari*) means to come before the others." But love comes before the rest of the passions; for from love all the other passions are born. Love should therefore be placed as one of the principal passions.
6. Those passions seem to be the principal ones upon which the others depend. But all the others seem to depend upon joy and sadness; for a passion of the soul is that from which joy or sadness follows, according to the Philosopher. These two passions, joy and sadness, then, are the only principal passions.
. It was said in answer that joy and sadness are the principal ones in the concupiscible power, but that hope and fear are the principal ones in the irascible.—On the contrary, it is said in Spirit and Soul: "From concupiscibility joy and hope arise; from irascibility, pain and dread."
8. In accord with the special character of the irascible power hope is opposed to despair, fear to boldness. But on the part of the concupiscible power are listed two chief passions which are contrary on the basis of the special character of the concupiscible power, namely, joy and sadness. Then on the part of the irascible there should be listed as principal passions either hope and despair or fear and boldness.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. In Spirit and Soul it is said: "Emotion is distinguished into four kinds, since we already take joy in what we love, or we hope for it as something that will be enjoyed; and we already grieve over what we hate or we dread it as something to make us grieve." Consequently these four are the principal passions: joy, pain or sadness, hope, and fear.
- 2'. Enumerating the main passions, Boethius says: Drive away joy, and drive away fear. Hope put to flight; let grief not stay near. And so the conclusion is the same as above.

REPLY:

There are four principal passions of the soul: sadness, joy, hope, and fear. The reason for this is that passions which come before the others and are their source are called the principal ones. Now, since the passions of the soul are in the sense appetitive part, those passions will come first which arise immediately from the object of the appetitive part; that is, from good and evil. Those which arise through the intermediary of others will be in a sense secondary.

For a passion to arise immediately from good or evil two conditions are required. The first is that it arise from good and evil essentially or directly, because what is accidental or indirect cannot be first. The second is that it arise without presupposing any other. A passion is accordingly said to be a principal one for these two reasons: It does not come accidentally from the object, which has the role of an active principle, nor does it come subsequently. Now a passion which proceeds from a good inasmuch as it is good, comes from good essentially; but one which proceeds from a good inasmuch as it is evil, comes from good accidentally. And the inverse is to be understood of evil. Good as such attracts and draws to itself. Hence any passion of an appetite tending to good will be a passion essentially and directly dependent upon good. But it is proper to evil as such to repel the appetite. Hence if there is any passion regarding good by which the good is shunned, that passion will not be from good essentially but in so far as it is apprehended as somehow evil. And the contrary is to be understood of evil: a passion which consists in flight from evil comes from evil essentially or directly, whereas one which consists in an approach to evil comes from evil accidentally. It is therefore clear how a passion arises from good or from evil essentially.

Because, however, to the extent to which a thing is last in the attainment of the end it is first in intention and in desire, those passions which consist in the attainment of the end therefore arise from good or evil without presupposing any others, and will these presupposed others arise. Now joy and sadness come from the attainment of good or evil, and that essentially; for joy comes from a good inasmuch as it is good, and sadness comes from an evil inasmuch as it is evil. And all other passions of the concupiscible power likewise come from good or evil essentially. This is so because the object of the concupiscible power is good or evil in an absolute sense. Yet the other passions of the concupiscible power presuppose joy and sadness as their cause; for a good becomes loved and desired by the concupiscible by reason of its being apprehended as pleasurable, and an evil becomes hateful and repulsive by being apprehended as saddening. Thus in the order of appetency joy and sadness are prior, though in the order of execution and attainment they are posterior.

In the irascible power not all the passions follow from good or evil essentially, but some essentially and others accidentally. This is so because good and evil are not the object of the irascible power in their absolute sense, but as they are modified by the condition of arduousness. Under this condition a good is repudiated as being beyond one's capabilities, and an evil is tended to as able to be driven away or mastered. But in the irascible power there cannot be any passion which follows from good or evil without any other being presupposed; for after the good is possessed, it does not arouse any passion in the irascible power, as was said above. An evil that is present, on the other hand, does arouse a passion in the irascible power, not essentially but accidentally, inasmuch as the person tends to something evil that is present as something to be driven away or mastered. This is evident in the case of anger.

It is clear, then, from what has been said that there are some passions which first and essentially arise from good and evil, as joy and sadness, and some others that essentially but not first so arise, as the other passions of the concupiscible power and two of those of the irascible, fear and hope, one of which expresses a flight from evil, the other an approach to good. And there are some other passions which neither essentially nor first arise from good

and evil, as the others in the irascible power, such as despair, boldness, and anger, which express an approach to evil or a withdrawal from good.

The most important passions, therefore, are joy and sadness. But fear and hope are the principal ones in their own class, because they do not presuppose any other passions in the power in which they are found, the irascible. Although the other passions of the concupiscible power, such as love and desire, hate and aversion, are from good or evil essentially, they are nevertheless not the first in their class, since they presuppose others in the same power. Thus they cannot be called the principal passions either simply or in their genus. It remains, then, that there are only four principal passions: joy and sadness, hope and fear.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Cupidity or desire is preceded by another passion in the same power, joy, which is the reason for desiring. Desire therefore cannot be a principal passion. Even though hope presupposes another passion, it does not presuppose one in the same power but in the concupiscible. All of the passions of the irascible power, in fact, arise from the passions of the concupiscible, as was said in another question. For this reason it can be one of the principal passions. Augustine, however, lists desire or cupidity in place of hope on account of a certain resemblance between them, because both look to a good not yet possessed.

2. Boldness cannot be one of the principal passions, for it arises from evil accidentally, since it looks to evil with a view to attacking it. For a bold man attacks evil inasmuch as he judges victory over evil and its repulse to be a good, and from the hope of such a good boldness arises. When carefully considered in this way, hope is found to be prior to boldness; for the hope of victory or at least of escape causes boldness.

3. Anger too arises from evil accidentally, inasmuch as an angry person considers revenge for an evil done to him a good and seeks it. Thus the hope of revenge to be obtained is the cause of anger. Therefore, when a person is injured by someone upon whom he does not hope to be able to get revenge, he does not become angry, but he merely grows sad or he fears, as Avicenna points out a countryman is injured by a king, for instance. Consequently anger can not be a principal passion; for it presupposes not only sadness, which is in the concupiscible power, but also hope, which is in the irascible. The irascible power gets its name from anger, however, because it is the last of the passions which are in the irascible.

4. The passions regarding the future which are in the concupiscible power arise in some sense from the passions in the same power regarding the present. But the passions regarding the future in the irascible do not arise from any passions regarding the present in the same power but rather from such passions in another power, that is, from joy and sadness. Hence there is no parallel.

5. In the time of execution and attainment love is the first passion, but in the time of intention joy is prior to love and is the reason for loving, especially in the sense in which love is a passion of the concupiscible power.

6. Joy and sadness are the most Important among the passions, as has been said. Nonetheless hope and fear are the principal ones in their own class, as is clear from what has been said.

7. Since that work is not by Augustine, it does not impose upon us any necessity of accepting its dicta as authoritative. Here especially it is seen to contain a patent error. For hope is not in the concupiscible but in the irascible power; and sadness is not in the irascible but in the concupiscible. Yet if we must uphold its authority, we can say that it is speaking of those powers according to the meaning of their names: concupiscence is concerned with good, and on this basis all passions directed to good can be attributed to the concupiscible power; and because anger is concerned with an evil inflicted, all the passions which regard evil can be

attributed to the irascible power. On this basis sadness is attributed to the irascible power and hope to the concupiscible.

8. The contrariety which is proper to the passions of the irascible power, namely, exceeding one's capacity or not, makes the second passion arise from good or evil accidentally. For something which exceeds one's capacity leads to withdrawal, whereas something which does not exceed it leads to approach. If these differences are taken with reference to good, then, a passion which follows from something which exceeds one's capacity will come from good accidentally. If, on the other hand, they are taken with reference to evil, then a passion which follows from something that does not exceed one's capacity will be accidental. Consequently in the irascible power there cannot be two principal passions which are directly contrary (e.g., hope and despair, or boldness and fear), as are joy and sadness in the concupiscible.

ARTICLE VI: DO WE MERIT BY OUR PASSIONS?

Parallel readings: De malo, 12, 1; Sum. Theol., I-II, 24, 1; 3 ad I; II-II, 158, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that we do, for

- 1.** We merit by fulfilling commands. But by divine commandments we are induced to rejoice, to fear, to grieve, and to have other such passions, as Augustine says. We therefore merit by our passions.
- 2.** According to Augustine² such passions of the soul are not had without the will. In fact they are nothing but acts of will. But by our acts of will we can merit not only materially but also formally. Then so can we by such passions.
- 3.** Psychical passions come closer to being voluntary than do bodily passions, because the psychical passions are to some extent within our power in so far as the concupiscible and the irascible powers obey reason, whereas bodily passions are not. But bodily passions or sufferings are meritorious, as is evident in the case of martyrs, who merit the aureola of martyrs by their bodily passions. With all the more reason, then, are psychical passions meritorious.
- 4.** The answer was given that bodily passions or sufferings are meritorious in so far as they are willed.—On the contrary, the will to suffer for Christ can also be in one who will never suffer, and yet he will not get the aureola. A bodily passion therefore merits the aureola not only by reason of being willed but by being actually undergone.
- 5.** If from the intensification of a given thing there follows the intensification of reward, that thing is essentially and not just materially meritorious. But from the intensification of bodily passion or suffering there follows the intensification of reward, because the more a person suffers, the more gloriously he will be crowned, as is said. We consequently merit by our passions or sufferings essentially and not just materially.
- 6.** Hugh of St. Victor says: "After the act of will there follows the deed, so that the will is increased in its own work." Thus the external deed contributes something to merit. But the will can similarly be increased in passion. Passion therefore contributes something to merit; and so the conclusion is the same as before.
- 7.** Since merit is situated in the will, that in which the will terminates as formally completing it must pertain to merit as formally completing it. But in so far as a passion is willed, it is the

object of the will; and so it determines the will more or less formally. The passion itself therefore pertains formally to merit.

8. Some of the confessors endured more grievous trials than some of the martyrs. It is accordingly said of them that they underwent a protracted martyrdom, though the passion of certain martyrs was finished in a short space of time. Yet the aureola is not due to the confessors. It accordingly seems that the bodily passion of the martyrs in itself directly merits the aureola.

9. Commenting on the words of the Epistle of St. James (1:2): "My brethren, count it all joy...", the Gloss says: "Tribulation increases justice in the present life and the crown in the future." But it increases these only by meriting. Since tribulation is suffering or passion, passion is meritorious.

10. The same appears from what is said in the Psalm (115: 15): "Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints." But precious means worthy of a price. Now the price of our labors is the reward which we merit by our labors. We can therefore merit by our passions.

It was said in answer that we merit by our passions or sufferings in so far as they are willed.— On the contrary, there is the truth which St. Lucy expressed: "If you cause me to be violated against my will, my chastity will be doubled in value for my crown." Even the undergoing of rape, then, which she would have suffered in this life, would have been meritorious for a crown. Thus passion or suffering does not merit merely because it is voluntary.

12. Difficulty is a necessary condition for merit. This is clear from what the Master says: in the state of innocence man did not merit, because nothing urged him to evil or drew him away from good. Now since passions or sufferings occasion difficulty, they therefore seem to have a direct influence upon merit.

13. Fear is a type of passion. Now we can merit by it even formally, since it is in the intellective part, as is clear when we fear things that we know only by the intellect, as eternal punishment. We can therefore merit by our passions.

14. Reward corresponds to merit. But the reward of glory will be not only in the soul but also in the body. Then merit too consists not only in the action of the soul but also in the passion of the body.

15. Where there is greater difficulty there is a greater score of merit.

But there is greater difficulty regarding sufferings and passions than regarding the operations of the will. Sufferings and passions are therefore more meritorious than the acts of the will, which are, however, formally meritorious.

16. We formally merit by virtues. But certain passions are listed by the saints as virtues—pity and repentance, for example. And certain ones are set down by the philosophers as laudable and the mean between extreme vices, as shame and indignation are instanced by the Philosopher. But all this refers to virtue. We therefore merit formally by passions.

17. Merit and demerit, being contraries, are in the same genus. But demerit is found in the genus of passions; for the first movements, which are sins, are passions. Anger and sloth also are passions, and yet they are listed as capital sins. The Apostle (Romans 1:26) calls sins against nature "shameful passions." Then we also merit by passions.

To the Contrary:

1'. Nothing can be meritorious unless it is within our power, because according to Augustine "it is by the will that one sins or lives rightly."12 But passions are not in our power, because,

as Augustine says, "we yield to passions unwillingly."¹³ We therefore do not merit by passions.

2' Whatever is a preamble to willing cannot be meritorious, since merit depends upon the will. But the passions of the soul precede the act of the will, since they are in the sensitive part, whereas the act of the will is in the intellective part; but the intellective part receives its object from the sensitive. The passions of the soul therefore cannot be meritorious.

3' Every meritorious deed is praiseworthy. But according to the Philosopher "we are neither praised nor blamed for passions." We therefore do not merit by our passions.

4' The ability to merit was greater in Christ than it is in us. But Christ did not merit by His passion. Then neither do we merit by our passions.— Proof of the minor: To merit is to make one's own something which is not one's own or at least to make more one's own what is less one's own. But Christ was notable to make His own what was not His own or to make more His own what was less so, because from the first instant of His conception everything that comes under the heading of merit was most completely due to Him. Christ there fore merited nothing by His passion.

5' It was answered that He merited by making what was His in one way His in more ways.— On the contrary, a double bond makes the obligation greater. In like fashion a double reason for indebted ness makes a greater debt. Therefore, if Christ was notable to cause something to be more due to Him, neither was He able to make some thing due to Him in more ways.

6' Difficulty diminishes voluntariness. Since merit must be voluntary, difficulty therefore seems to diminish merit. But passions cause difficulty. They therefore diminish merit rather than contribute to it.

REPLY:

If meriting is taken in the strict sense, we do not merit by our passions directly but, so to speak, indirectly. Since we speak of meriting in connection will recompense, to merit in the proper sense is to ac quire something for ones if as a recompense. Now this is not done unless we give something that is equal in value to that which we are said to merit. We cannot give anything, however, unless it is ours and we have dominion over it. But we have dominion over our acts through our will—not only over those which are immediately elicited by the will, such as loving or willing, but also over those which are elicited by other powers at the command of the will, such as walking, speaking, and the like. These actions, however, are not equal to eternal life in value as if they were a price paid for it, except in so far as they are informed by grace and charity. Consequently, in order that an act may be directly meritorious, it must be an act either commanded or elicited by the will, and must moreover be informed by charity.

Because the principle of an act consists in the habit and the power and even the object, we are on this account said to merit secondarily, as it were, by our habits and powers and objects. But what is primarily and directly meritorious is a voluntary act informed by grace. Passions, however, do not belong to the will either as commanding or as eliciting them; for the principle of passions as such is not in our power, whereas things are said to be voluntary from the fact that they are in our power. Passions accordingly sometimes even anticipate the act of the will. Directly, then, we do not merit by passions. Yet, in so far as they in some way accompany the will, they somehow have a bearing upon merit so that they can be called meritorious indirectly.

Now a passion has a bearing upon the will in three ways: (1) As the object of the will. In this sense passions are said to be meritorious inasmuch as they are willed or loved. That by which we essentially merit in this case will not be the passion itself but the willing of the passion.

(2) As arousing or intensifying the act of the will. This can come about in two ways, either directly or indirectly—directly when the passion arouses the will to something like itself, as when the will is inclined by concupiscence to consent to the thing coveted or by anger to will revenge; or indirectly when by furnishing the occasion a passion arouses the will to its contrary, as in the case of a chaste person, when the passion of concupiscence wells up, the will resists with a greater effort; for we try harder in regard to difficult things. Thus passions are said to be meritorious inasmuch as the act of the will aroused by the passion is meritorious. (3) Conversely, when a passion is aroused by the will because the movement of the higher appetite overflows into the lower. For example, when by his will a person detests the filth of sin, the lower appetite is by that very fact moved to shame. In this sense shame is said to be either praiseworthy or meritorious by reason of the act of will which caused it.

In the first way, then, passion has a bearing upon the will as its object, in the second as its principle, and in the third as its effect. Thus the first way is more remote from meritoriousness; for will equal reason gold or silver could be called meritorious or demeritorious on the grounds that by willing these we merit or incur demerit. The last way is closer to merit, since the effect receives something from the cause and not the other way about. Thus if merit is taken in its strict sense, we do not merit by our passions except indirectly.

Merit, however, can be taken broadly in the sense in which any disposition that confers a fitness to receive something is said to merit it; for example, if we should say that by reason of her beauty a woman merits marriage to a king. In this sense even bodily passions are said to merit inasmuch as those passions make us in some sense fit to receive some glory.

Answers must therefore be given to each set of difficulties.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. By God's commandments we are admonished to rejoice or to fear in so far as joy and fear and the like consist in acts of the will and are not passions, as is clear from what was said previously, or also in so far as such passions follow from the will.

2. Augustine says that these passions are acts of will because they come about in us from our will. Thus he adds: "In general depending upon the various things sought or shunned, not only is a man's will attracted or repelled, but it is also changed and turned into these different affections." On else he is speaking of these passions in the sense in which the terms designate acts of the will, as has been said.

3. The bodily passion of a martyr has nothing to do with the meriting of the essential reward except in so far as it is willed, but it has bearing upon an accidental reward, the aureola of martyrs, through the kind of merit which confers a certain fitness for the aureola; for it is fitting that one who is confirmed to Christ in His passion should be confirmed to Him in His glory, as we gather from the Epistle to the Romans (8:17): "Yet so, if we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified with him." We should bear in mind, however, that the will cannot have the same attitude toward bodily sufferings when a man is not suffering them as it has because of their keenness while he is actually suffering them. In such matters, then, according to the Philosopher it suffices for a brave man not to be saddened. Consequently the bodily passion actually being experienced is both the sign of a firm and constant will and also that which evokes it, because a man makes an effort regarding difficult things. And so the aureola is not due to the confessor, though it is due to the martyr.

4. The answer is clear from what has just been said.
5. An increase in the rewards follows from an intensification of the suffering either because of a certain fittingness or because of the intensity of the will.
6. Even though the will is increased in both a passion and an external act, the case is not the same for both; for the act is commanded by the will, but the passion is not. They therefore do not have the same bearing upon merit.
7. The object determines the will as to the species of the act. Strictly speaking, however, merit consists in the act, not from the viewpoint of the species of the act, but from that of its root, which is charity. Thus it is not necessary that we formally merit by a passion even though it does stand as the object.
8. All the toil which a confessor endures over a long period of time cannot, under the aspect of the genus of the deed, equal the death which a martyr undergoes even in a moment. For by death one is deprived of what is most valued, life and being; and for this reason it is the ultimate among things that strike terror, according to the Philosopher, and in its regard the virtue of bravery is exercised most of all. This appears very clearly from the fact that men worn out will long-continued afflictions shrink away from death, choosing in effect to undergo further afflictions rather than death. The Philosopher accordingly says that a man of virtue exposes himself to death, choosing rather "one good and great deed than many small ones," as if that act of bravery in facing death outweighed many other virtuous deeds.

Consequently, from the standpoint of the genus of his deed, the least martyr merits more than any confessor whatever. From that of the root of his deed, however, the confessor can merit more to the extent that he acts from greater charity, because the essential reward corresponds to the root, charity, whereas the accidental reward corresponds to the genus of the act. Hence it is that a confessor can surpass a martyr in the essential reward, but the martyr surpasses him in the accidental reward.

9. That comment in the Gloss is speaking of tribulation in so far as it is willed or excites the will.

10. The same is to be said of this difficulty.

11. For a virgin who would be violated for the sake of Christ, that very violation would be meritorious, just like the other sufferings of the martyrs, not because the violation itself would be voluntary, but because its antecedents, her remaining constant in the confession of Christ, from which the violation followed as a consequence, would be voluntary. Thus that violation would be voluntary, not will an absolute will but will a will in some sense conditioned, seeing that the virgin chooses to suffer this disgrace rather than deny Christ.

12. There are two kinds of difficulty: one which comes from the magnitude and excellence of the task, and this kind is required for virtue; another which is from the agent himself to the extent that he is deficient or hampered in his correct operations, and this kind is removed or diminished by virtue. It is in the latter sense that passions cause difficulty. The first kind of difficulty, on the part of the task, has a direct bearing upon merit in the same way as the excellence of the act; whereas the second, from the weakness of the agent, has no bearing upon merit unless perhaps as an occasion, inasmuch as it supplies the occasion for a greater effort. It is not true, however, that in his first state Adam would not have been able to merit—if we grant that he had grace, even though there were nothing drawing him away from good or urging him to evil—because, if he had stood fast, he would have arrived eventually at glory; and it is clear that this would not have been without merit. Nor does the Master say that he would not have been able to merit in the first state, but he does say that he would have been

able to avoid sin without meriting; for he could avoid sin without grace because nothing was pushing him to evil, and without grace nothing can be meritorious.

13. That fear of eternal punishment which is directly meritorious is in the will and is not a passion strictly speaking, as is clear from what has already been said. A passion of fear can, however, be aroused in the lower appetite by reason of eternal punishment either because of an overflow from the higher appetite into the lower or because the intellect's conception of eternal punishment is represented in the imagination, with the consequence that the lower appetite is moved through the passion of fear. But such fear does not have anything to do with merit except indirectly, as has been said.

14. [The answer is missing.]

15. If we are speaking of difficulty on our part, then passions and sufferings involve more difficulty than acts of the will. But in that case the difficulty does not contribute anything to merit except indirectly, as has been said; and similarly neither do passions and sufferings. But if we are speaking of the difficulty which comes from the excellence or goodness of the task, which does contribute to merit directly, then there is greater difficulty in acts of the will.

16. Some passions are called laudable by the philosophers because they are the effects and signs of a good will, as is evident in the example of shame, which shows that the man's will is averse to the filth of sin, and in that of pity, which is a sign of love. On this account the names of these passions are sometimes used by the saints for the habits which elicit the act of will which is the source of these passions.

17. First movements do not have the complete nature of sin or demerit but are in a way dispositions for demerit just as venial sin is a disposition for mortal sin. The movements of sensuality themselves, then, do not have to be directly meritorious, because what is meritorious cannot be anything but a voluntary act, as has been said. But those passions are sometimes called vices or sins inasmuch as acts of the will or even habits are designated by the names of passions. Moreover, vices against nature are called passions even though they are voluntary acts, inasmuch as by such vices nature is disturbed from its proper order.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. We yield to passions unwillingly, not as regards consent, since we do not consent to them except by our will, but as regards some bodily alteration such as laughter and weeping and the like. Consequently, in so far as by our will we consent or refuse consent to them, they are meritorious or demeritorious.

2'. Though the passions of the lower appetite sometimes anticipate the act of the will, they do not always; for the appetitive powers do not stand in the same relationship as the apprehensive. Our intellect receives its object from sense; consequently there cannot be an operation of the intellect unless there is some previous operation of sense. The will, however, does not receive anything from the lower appetite, but rather moves it; and so it is not necessary that a passion of the lower appetite precede the act of the will.

3'. Even though passions are not directly praiseworthy, they can nevertheless be praiseworthy indirectly, as has been said.

4'. By His passion Christ merited for Himself and for us. For Himself He merited the glory of His body; for although He merited this through His other merits which preceded it, yet the splendor of the resurrection is by a certain fittingness properly a reward of the passion, because exaltation is the proper reward of humility. He merited for us, moreover, inasmuch as in His passion He gave satisfaction for the sin of the whole human race, but not by His

preceding works, though He did merit for us by them. Retribution by way of suffering is required for satisfaction as a sort of compensation for the pleasure of sin.

5'. By His passion Christ did not make the glory of His body due after it was not due, nor did He make it more due after it was less due. He did, however, make it due in another way than that in which it was due before. But it does not follow that He made it more due. This would follow if the cause for which it was due were either increased or multiplied, as happens when an obligation is increased by a two fold promise. But that did not occur in the case of the merit of Christ, because His grace was not augmented.

6'. Directly difficulty hampers voluntariness, but indirectly it increases it in so far as a person makes an effort against the difficulty. But the difficulty itself contributes to satisfaction by reason of its penal character.

ARTICLE VII: DOES A PASSION ACCOMPANYING A MERITORIOUS ACT DETRACT FROM ITS MERIT?

Parallel readings: De malo., li; 12, 1; Sum. Theol., I-II, 24, 3; 77, 6 ad 2.

That is to say, who merits the more, he who helps a poor man with a certain compassion of pity, or he who does it without any passion solely because of a judgment of reason?

Difficulties:

It seems that he who does it solely because of a judgment of reason merits the more, for

1. Merit is opposed to sin. But a man who commits a sin solely by choice sins more than one who sins under the urging of passion; for the first is said to sin out of definite malice, the second out of weakness. Then a man who does a good deed solely because of a judgment of reason also merits more than one who does it with a passion of pity.

2. The answer was given that for something to be meritorious or to be an act of virtue there is required not only a good which is done but also a good manner of doing it, which in this case cannot be had without the emotion of pity.—On the contrary, for an act to be done in a good manner there are three requisites according to the Philosopher: the will choosing the act, reason establishing the mean in the act, and the relation of the act to the due end. Now these requisites can all be met without the passion of pity in one who gives an aim. Without it, then, there can be not only the good which is done but also the good manner of doing it.—Proof of the Minor: all three requisites mentioned are fulfilled by an act of the will and of reason. But an act of the will and of reason does not depend upon a passion, because reason and the will move the lower powers in which the passions are found, and the motion of the mover does not depend upon the motion of the thing moved. The three requisites mentioned can therefore be fulfilled without any passion.

3. For an act of virtue the discernment of reason is needed. Thus Gregory says that unless the other virtues do will prudently the things to which they tend, they cannot be virtues at all. All passions, however, hinder the judgment or discernment of reason. Hence Salustius says: "all men who deliberate about doubtful matters ought fittingly to be free of anger, love, hate, and pity; for the spirit does not readily see truth where these emotions hold sway." Such passions therefore detract from the praiseworthiness of virtue, and so from merit.

4. The concupiscible power hampers the judgment of reason no less than the irascible. But a passion of the irascible accompanying even an act of virtue disturbs the judgment of reason.

Thus Gregory says: "By its fervour anger disturbs the eye." Then pity, which is a passion of the concupiscible, similarly disturbs the judgment of reason.

5. Virtue is "a disposition of a perfect being for what is best," as is said in the Physics. Then that in which we most closely approach perfect beings is most virtuous in us. But we approach God and the

angels most closely when we act without passion from a judgment of reason; for God punishes without anger and alleviates misery without the passion of pity. It is therefore more virtuous to do good without these passions.

6. The virtues of a purified soul are more noble than those of other kinds. But, as Macrobius says, the virtues of a purified soul make one forget passions altogether. An act of virtue performed without passion is therefore more praiseworthy and meritorious.

7. The more the love of charity in us is purified of carnal love, the more praiseworthy it is; "for the affection among us should not be carnal but spiritual," as Augustine says. But as a passion love is to some extent carnal. Consequently an act of charity is more praiseworthy without the passion of love. And the same holds true of the other passions.

8. Tully says that it is fitting that "benevolence should be characterized not by the ardour of love but by steadfastness" of mind. But ardour is a matter of passion. Passion therefore lessens the praiseworthiness of an act of virtue.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says: "So long as we bear the infirmity of this life, if we have no passions at all, then we do not live correctly; for the Apostle heaped blame and scorn upon some who he said were, among other things, without feeling (Rom. 1:31). The sacred Psalmist found fault with those of whom he said (Psalm 68:2 1): 'I looked for one that would grieve together with me, but there was none.' Thus it seems that without passions we cannot live correctly.

2'. Augustine says: "To be angry with a sinner that he may reform, to sympathize with an afflicted person that he may be delivered, to fear for one in danger lest he perish—I do not know whether anyone of sound judgment would find fault with these. The Stoics, indeed, are wont to blame even pity. But Cicero spoke far better and more conformably to human nature and to the feelings of the pious when he said in praise of Caesar: 'No one of your virtues is either more admirable or more pleasing than your pity.' And so the conclusion is the same as before.

REPLY:

The passions of the soul can stand in either of two relationships to the will, either as preceding it or as consequent upon it: as preceding it, inasmuch as the passions spur the will to will something; as consequent upon it, inasmuch as the lower appetite is stirred up with these passions as a result of the vehemence of the will through a sort of overflow, or even inasmuch as the will itself brings them about and arouses them of its own accord.

When the passions precede the will they detract from its praiseworthiness, because the act of the will is praiseworthy in so far as it is directed by reason to good in due measure and manner. Now this manner and measure is not kept except when the action takes place from discretion; and discretion is not kept when a man is stirred up to will something, even though good, by the onslaught of passion; for then the manner of the action will depend upon whether the onslaught of passion is great or small; and so it will happen only by chance that the due measure is kept.

When the passions are consequent upon the will they do not lessen the praiseworthiness of the act or its goodness, because they will be moderated in conformity with the judgment of reason upon which the act of will follows; but they will rather add to the goodness of the act. This will be done under two aspects:

(1) As a sign, because the passion itself consequent in the lower appetite is a sign that the movement of the will is intense. For in a nature subject to passion it is impossible for the will to be strongly moved to anything without some passion following in the lower part. Thus Augustine says: "So long as we bear the infirmity of this life, if we have no passions, we do not live correctly." And after a few other remarks he adds the cause, saying: "For not to grieve at all while we are in this place of misery... takes place only at the great cost of inhumanity in the soul and stupor in the body."

(2) As a help, because when by a judgment of reason the will chooses anything, it does so more promptly and easily if in addition passion is aroused in the lower part, since the lower appetitive power is closely connected with a change in the body. Thus Augustine says: "The movement of pity is of service to reason when pity is shown in such a way that justice is preserved." And this is what the Philosopher also says, bringing in the verse of Homer: "Stir up your courage and rage," because when a man is virtuous will the virtue of courage, the passion of anger following upon the choice of virtue makes for greater alacrity in the act. If it preceded, however, it would disturb the manner requisite for virtue.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Praiseworthiness and reprehensibility consist essentially in voluntariness. Consequently whatever detracts from voluntariness diminishes the praiseworthiness in a good and the reprehensibility in an evil. Now a passion which precedes choice diminishes voluntariness, and therefore diminishes the praise of a good act and the blame of a bad one. But a passion which follows is a sign of the greatness of the will, as has been said. Then not only does it add to the praise in the case of a good act, but it also adds to the blame in that of a bad act. A man is said to sin from passion, however, if it is passion which leads him to choose sin. But if because of the choice of a sin he falls into the passion connected with that sin, he is said to sin not from passion but with passion. It is true, then, that acting from passion lessens praise and blame, but acting with passion can increase both of them.

2. The movement of virtue, which consists in a perfect act of will, cannot be had without any passion, not because the act of will depends upon the passion, but because in a nature subject to passion a passion necessarily follows upon a perfect act of will.

3. Both choice and execution are necessary in a virtuous deed. Discernment is required for choice. For the execution of what has been decided upon, alacrity is required. It is not, however, highly necessary that a man actually engaged in the execution of the deed deliberate very much about the deed. This would rather stand in the way than be of help, as Avicenna points out. Take the case of a lute player, who would be greatly handicapped if he had to give thought to each touch of the strings; or that of a penman if he had to stop and think in the formation of each letter. This is why a passion which precedes choice hinders the act of virtue by hampering the judgment of reason necessary in choosing. But after the choice has already been made purely by a rational judgment, a passion that follows helps more than it hurts, because even if it should disturb rational judgment somewhat, it does make for alacrity in execution.

4. The answer is evident from what has just been said.

5. God and the angels are not susceptible of passions, and so in their case no passion follows upon a perfect act of will, though it would follow if they were capable of passions.

Consequently, because of a certain resemblance in the operations, in the usage of human speech the names of passions are applied to the angels; it is not because of any infirmity in their affection.

6. Those who have the virtues of a purified soul are in some sense free from passions that incline us to the contrary of that which virtue chooses, and likewise from passions that influence the will, but not from those consequent upon the will.

7. There is question of the carnality of spiritual affection only if the passion of love precedes the affection of the will, but not if it follows. For in the latter event there would be question of the fervour of charity, which consists in the fact that the spiritual affection, which is in the higher part, by reason of its vehemence overflows to the extent of altering the lower part.

8. The answer to this is clear from the above.

ARTICLE VIII: WERE THERE ANY SUCH PASSIONS IN CHRIST?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 13, I, 2 sol. 1 ad 2 15, 2, I sol. 3; aa. 2 & 3; 33, expos. text.; in Matt., C. 26, § 5 (P 10: z 253a, z in ban., C. 12, lectura g, § r (Pro: 51 C. 13, lectura, § r (5 Sum. Theol., III, 15, 4-9; Comp. Theol., I, 232.

Difficulties:

It seems that there were not, for

1. According to Augustine every agent is nobler than a patient. But nothing created is nobler than the soul of Christ. There would therefore not be any passion in the soul of Christ.

2. According to Macrobius "it is characteristic of the strength of the purified soul to have no experience of passions, not to conquer them." But Christ had the virtues of the purified soul in the highest degree. There were therefore no such passions in Him.

3. According to Damascene passion is "a movement of the appetitive soul because of a surmise about good or evil." But in Christ there was no surmise, for that implies ignorance. There was therefore no passion of soul in Christ.

4. According to Augustine passion is "a movement of the soul against reason." But no movement in Christ was against reason. Consequently there was no passion of soul in Christ.

5. Christ was not made less than the angels as to His soul but only as to the infirmity of His body. But there are no passions in the angels, as Augustine says. Then neither were there any in the soul of Christ.

6. Christ was more perfect in soul than man in the first state. But man in the first state was not subject to these passions, because as Augustine says, "it is a part of the infirmity of our present life to undergo emotion of this kind even in every one of our good works." But there was no infirmity in the first state. Then neither were there such passions in Christ.

7. According to Augustine pain is "the feeling of dissolution and destruction." But in Christ there neither was the feeling of destruction and dissolution (because, as Hilary says, He had "the violence of punishment without the feeling of punishment" nor was there actual dissolution and destruction in Him (because from the highest good there can be no loss). Consequently there was no pain in Christ.

8. Where the cause is the same, the effect is the same. But the cause of the absence of passion in the bodies of the blessed will be that they are purified from the "fuel of sin" and united to glorious souls. Now since this was verified in Christ's body, it therefore seems that there could be in Him no pain of a bodily passion.

9. No will man grieves or is saddened except at the loss of his own good. For the reason why evil itself is lamentable is that it takes away good. But man's good is virtue, for only by this is he himself made good. Therefore, since that good was not taken away in Christ's case, there was no sadness or grief in Him.

10. According to Augustine "when we refuse consent to what happens to us against our will, our state of will is sadness." But in Christ nothing happened that He Himself did not will. The passion of sadness or grief was therefore not in Christ.

11. No one is reasonably saddened or grieved except for some injury. But, as Chrysostom proves, no one is injured except by himself; and a will man does not do that. Consequently, since Christ was most will, there was no sadness in Him.

To the Contrary:

1' It is written in Mark (54:33): "(Jesus) began to fear and to be heavy and to be sad."

2' Augustine says that an upright will "has these movements not only without blame but also laudably." But there was an upright will in Christ. Then these movements were in Him.

3' In Christ there were the deficiencies of this life which are not inconsistent with the perfection of grace. But such passions are not inconsistent with the perfection of grace but are rather caused by grace, as Augustine brings out: "These movements, these emotions come from the love of good and from holy charity." Such passions were therefore in Christ.

REPLY:

The passions in question are in sinners in one way; in the just, both the perfect and the imperfect, in another way; in Christ as man in another; and in the first man and the blessed in still another. They are not in the angels or in God at all, because in them there is no sense appetite, of which such passions are movements.

For the clarification of the statements quoted it should be borne in mind that such affections of the soul can be distinguished on four different grounds, all concerned with whether these affections have the character of passion more or less properly: (1) According to whether a person is affected with a passion of the soul by something contrary or harmful or by something suited and advantageous. The character of passion or suffering is more fully kept when the affection follows from something harmful than if it should follow from something advantageous, because passion implies an alteration of the patient from its natural state to a contrary one. This is why grief and sadness and fear and other such passions which have to do with evil possess the character of passion or suffering more than do joy and love and other emotions that have to do with good, though in these latter also the character of passion is kept inasmuch as the heart is dilated or stimulated by such things or is in any way modified from its ordinary state, so that it can happen that a man dies from such emotions.

(2) According to whether the passion is entirely from the outside or is from some internal principle. The character of passion is better preserved when it is from without than when it is from within. It is from without when the passion is suddenly stirred up from the chance meeting with something suited or something harmful. It is from within when the passions are caused by the will itself in the manner explained, in which case they are not sudden, since they follow the judgment of reason.

(3) According to whether a thing is transformed completely or not. We do not so properly say that a thing which is altered to some extent but is not completely transformed suffers, as we say this of one which is completely transformed to the contrary. We more properly say, for example, that a man suffers an illness if his whole body is ill than if a disease attacks some particular part of it. Now a man is completely transformed by such emotions when they do not stay in the lower appetite but carry along the higher appetite as well. When, however, they remain in the lower appetite alone, then the man is changed by them only as it were in part. In this case they are called "propassions," while in the first case "passions."

(4) According to whether the transformation is slight or intense. Slight transformations are less properly called passions. Thus Damascene says: "Not all passive movements are called passion, but those which are more vehement and become sensible; for those which are slight and insensible are not yet passions."

It should therefore be noted that in men in this present life, if they are sinners, there are passions will regard to good and will regard to evil, not only foreseen but also sudden and intense ones and frequently even complete. These men are accordingly called in the Ethics "followers of passion." In the just, on the other hand, the passions are never complete, because in such men reason is never led by passions. In the imperfect they are vehement, whereas in the perfect they are weak, will the lower powers kept in check by the habit of the moral virtues. Yet these do have not only foreseen but also sudden passions, and not only regarding good but also regarding evil.

In the blessed, however, and in man in the first state, and in Christ as subject to our infirmity, such passions are never sudden, seeing that because of the perfect obedience of the lower powers to the higher no movement arises in the lower appetite except at the dictate of reason. Thus Damascene says: "In our Lord natural tendencies did not precede the will; for he hungered willing it, he feared willing it, etc." And the same is to be understood of the blessed after the resurrection and of men in the first state. But there is this difference: in Christ there were not only passions will regard to good but also will regard to evil; for He had a passible body, and therefore from the imagining of something harmful the passion of fear and of sadness and the like could naturally arise in Him. But in the first state and in the blessed there cannot be the apprehension of anything as harmful; and therefore there is in them no passion except will regard to good, as love, joy, and the like, but not sadness or fear or anger or anything of the sort.

We therefore concede that there were true passions in Christ. Hence Augustine says: "For a very definite providential purpose Christ took these movements upon Himself in His human soul when He willed, just as He became man when He willed."

Answers to Difficulties:

1. It is not necessary for the agent to be more noble than the patient absolutely, but it suffices that it be so in a certain respect: in so far as it is an agent. Thus nothing prevents the object of Christ's soul from being nobler than His soul in so far as the object is active and the soul of Christ has some passive potentiality.

2. According to Augustine there was a dispute on this question between the Stoics and the Peripatetics which seemed, however, to be more one of words than of fact. The Stoics, who called will a man perfect in virtue, having the virtue of a purified soul, said that such passions were not found in the soul of a will man at all. The Peripatetics, on the other hand, say that these passions of the soul do occur even in a will man, but under control and subject to reason. Now Augustine proves from the admission of a certain Stoic that even the Stoics held that such emotions were in the soul of a will man, but sudden and without being approved or consented to; and they did not call them passions but appearances or phantasies of the soul.

From this it is clear that the Stoics really did not hold anything different from the Peripatetics, but that there was disagreement only in words, because what the Peripatetics named passions the Stoics called by another name.

Following the opinion of the Stoics, Macrobius and Plotinus say that passions are not found together with the virtue of a purified soul, not because there are no sudden movements of passion in those who have this kind of virtue, but because they neither draw reason along with them nor are so vehement as to disturb seriously one's peace of mind. In agreement with this the Philosopher says that cravings in the temperate are not strong as they are in the self—controlled, though in neither is reason drawn to consent.

Or it can be said (and this is better) that, since these passions arise from good and evil, they should be distinguished on the basis of the difference in goods and evils. For there are certain natural goods and evils, such as food and drink, health or sickness of body, and others of the sort; and some not natural, such as wealth, honours, and the like. With these latter civic life is concerned. Now Plotinus and Macrobius distinguish the virtues of the purified soul from political virtues. From this it appears that they place the virtues of the purified soul in those who are entirely removed from civic affairs, giving their time exclusively to the contemplation of wisdom. In them, as a consequence, certain passions do not arise from civic goods and evils; yet they are not immune to those passions which arise from natural goods and evils.

3. Whatever is caused by a weak cause can be caused also by a stronger one. Now a certain judgment is a stronger cause for arousing the passions than a surmise. Damascene accordingly set down that minimum which can cause passion, giving us to understand by this that a stronger passion is caused by a stronger cause.

4. According to Augustine impassibility is spoken of in two ways: (1) as doing away with emotions that occur against reason and disturb the mind, and (2) as excluding all emotion. In the passage quoted passion is understood as opposed to the first sort of impassibility, not as opposed to the second. Only the first sort was found in Christ.

5. In His intellectual soul Christ was superior to the angels. Nevertheless He had sensitive appetite, according to which passions could be in Him, and the angels did not have this.

6. In the first man there were certain passions, such as joy and love, which have to do with good, but not fear or grief, which have to do with evil. The latter are a part of our present infirmity which Adam did not have but Christ voluntarily assumed.

7. In Christ there was a true injuring of the body and a true feeling of the injury. In His divinity He is the highest good from which nothing can be taken away, but not in His body. The statement of Hilary, moreover, was afterward (as some say) retracted by him.— Or it can be said that he asserts that Christ did not have the feeling of punishment, not because He did not feel the pains, but because that feeling did not go so far as to affect His reason.

8. By the very fact that a soul has been glorified, the body united to it in the ordinary course of events is made glorious and incapable of suffering injury. Thus Augustine says: "God made the soul of so potent a nature that from its complete happiness, which is promised to the saints at the end of time, there will overflow into man's lower nature, the body, not the happiness which is proper to one capable of enjoying and understanding, but the fullness of health, namely, the vigour of incorruptibility."² But having in His power His own soul and body in virtue of His divinity, by a dispensation Christ had both happiness in His soul and passibility in His body, since the Word allowed to the body what is proper to it, as Damascene says. It was therefore a singular occurrence in Christ that from the soul's fullness of beatitude glory did not overflow into the body.

9. The Stoics called the good of man only that by which men are said to be good, the virtues of the soul. Other things, such as those which pertain to the body or to external fortune, they did not call goods but conveniences. These latter the Peripatetics called goods, but the least goods, and virtues they called the greatest goods. The difference was merely one in terminology-. Just as from the "least goods" of the Peripatetics, so also from the "conveniences" of the Stoics there arise certain movements in the soul of the will man, though not such as to disturb reason. It is not true, then, that sadness can arise in the soul of the will man only from the lack of virtue.

10. Although the injuring of His body did not occur in Christ will His reason unwilling, yet it did occur against the appetitive tendency of sensuality. In this way there was sadness there.

11. Chrysostom is speaking of an injury by which someone is made miserable, i.e., one by which he is deprived of the good of virtue. But the passion of sadness does not arise exclusively from such an injury, as has been said. The conclusion therefore does not follow.

ARTICLE IX: WAS THE PASSION OF PAIN IN THE SOUL OF CHRIST AS REGARDS HIGHER REASON?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 15, 2, 3 sol. 2; Quodibet VII, (2), 5; Sum. Theol., III, 15, 5; 46, 7; Comp. Theol., I, 232.

Difficulties:

It seems that it was not, for

A man is said to be disturbed and to be led by passion when the turmoil of passion reaches all the way to reason. Now it is not the part of a will man to be disturbed and led by passion. Therefore, since Christ was most will, it seems that in His case pain did not reach all the way to higher reason.

2. Every power is said to get pleasure as a result of the appropriateness of its proper object. Pain should therefore not be attributed to any power except by reason of harm which comes from its object. But in regard to eternal things, which are the objects of higher reason, Christ did not suffer any defect or encumbrance. The passion of pain was therefore not in Christ's higher reason.

3. According to Augustine pain is one of the bodily passions. It therefore does not apply to the soul except in so far as it is joined to the body. But as regards higher reason the soul is not joined to the body, since according to the Philosopher² the intellect is not the act of any body. Pain therefore cannot be in higher reason.

4. It was said in answer that higher reason is not joined to the body by its operation, but it is joined to it as its form.—on the contrary, according to the Philosopher "power and action belong to the same subject." Consequently, if the action of the intellect belongs to the soul without any participation in it by the body, the intellective power also will belong to the soul independently of its union with the body; and so higher reason will not be joined to the body as its form.

5. According to Damascene passion is a movement of the irrational and appetitive soul. But pain and sadness and the like are passions. They were therefore not in the realm of higher reason in Christ.

6. According to Augustine pain or sadness is among the things which happen to us against our will. But Christ willed His bodily passion in His higher reason, and nothing happened to Him against His will, which was most perfectly confirmed to the divine will. Sadness or pain was therefore not in Christ as regards His higher reason.

7. It was said that His higher reason as reason willed the passion of His body, but not as a nature.—On the contrary, reason is the same power considered as reason or as a nature, for a different way of looking at it does not differentiate the substance of the thing. Now if higher reason as reason willed anything and as a nature did not will it, the same power at one and the same time willed something and did not will it. But that is impossible.

8. According to the Philosopher there is no sadness contrary to the pleasure which is taken in contemplation. But higher reason finds its pleasure in contemplating eternal truths. Consequently there cannot be any pain or sadness in it, for this sadness or pain would be opposed to the pleasure of contemplation. Thus there was no passion of pain or sadness in Christ's soul as regards higher reason.

To the Contrary:

1'. It is written in the Psalm (87:4): "My soul is filled with evils," which is interpreted in the Gloss: "Not with vices but with pains." Pain was accordingly in every part of Christ's soul, and therefore in higher reason.

2'. Atonement corresponds to the fault. But by His passion Christ atoned for the fault of the first man. Now since that fault reached as far as higher reason, the passion of Christ must also have reached to higher reason.

3'. As the Gloss says in comment upon the words "My soul is filled with evils" (Psalm 87:4), in feeling pain the soul suffers together with the body to which it is united. But reason as reason implies a reference to the body. This appears from the fact that we do not speak of reason but of intellect in the angels, who do not have a body naturally united to them; whereas we do speak of reason in souls united to bodies. Therefore the pain of Christ's passion was in higher reason inasmuch as it is reason.

4'. According to Augustine "the whole soul is in the whole body." Every part of it, then, is united to the body. But higher reason as reason is a part of the soul. It is therefore united to the body, and so suffers pain along with the suffering body.

REPLY:

As is evident from what was said above, there are two kinds of passion by which the soul suffers indirectly, one bodily, which begins with the body and ends in the soul as united to the body, the other psychological, which is caused by the soul's apprehending something by which the appetite is moved, with a resultant bodily alteration.

If we are speaking of the first kind of passion, to which pain belongs according to Augustine, then it must be said that the pain of Christ's passion was in some sense in higher reason and in some sense not. For there are two elements in pain: an injury, and the experiential perception of that injury. The injury is principally in the body, but resultantly in the soul as united to the body. Now the soul is united to the body by its essence, and in the essence of the soul all its powers are rooted. In this respect, then, that injury in Christ had reference to the soul and to all its parts, even to higher reason in so far as it is grounded in the essence of the soul. The experiential perception of the injury, however, has reference only to the sense of touch, as was said above.

If, on the other hand, we are speaking of psychical passion, sadness, which is properly a passion of this kind, can be only in that part of the soul whose object, when apprehended and appetitively attained, begets sadness. Now in Christ's soul no reason for sadness could derive from the object of higher reason, that is, from the eternal verities of which He was in perfect possession. Consequently psychical sadness could not have been in the higher reason of Christ's soul.

In Christ, therefore, higher reason suffered will bodily pain in so far as this power is rooted in the essence of the soul, but it did not suffer will psychical sadness in so far as by its proper act it was directed to the contemplation of eternal truths.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. A man is disturbed and led by passion when reason in its own operation follows the inclination of passion by Consenting and choosing. Bodily pain, however, reached the higher reason of Christ's soul, not by changing its proper operation, but only in so far as it is rooted in the essence, as has been said. Thus the conclusion does not follow.
2. Although pain was not in the higher reason of Christ's soul will relation to its proper object, it was in it nevertheless as referred to its proper root, which is the essence of the soul.
3. A power can be the act of the body in two ways: (1) Inasmuch as it is a power; and thus it is said to be the act of the body as informing some bodily organ in order to carry out its own act. The visual power, for example, perfects the eye in order to carry out the act of seeing. In this sense the intellect is not the act of the body. (2) By reason of the essence in which it is grounded. In this sense the intellect as well as the other powers are joined to the body as its form inasmuch as they are in the soul which by its essence is the form of the body.
4. That difficulty is speaking of a power under the aspect of its being a power, not under that of its being rooted in the essence of the soul.
5. Damascene is speaking of psychical passion, which is in the sense appetitive power as its proper subject, but in the apprehensive power causally, so to speak, inasmuch as the movement of passion arises in the appetitive from the apprehended object. There are, however, in the higher appetite certain operations similar to the passions of the lower appetite, and by reason of this similarity the names of the passions are sometimes attributed to the angels or to God, as Augustine says. In this way too sadness is sometimes said to be in higher reason as regards the apprehensive and the appetitive powers. We do not, however, say that pain was in the higher reason of Christ's soul in this way, but in so far as it is rooted in the essence of the soul, as has been said.
6. This difficulty proves that pain was not in higher reason as referred to its object through its own operation. In that sense nothing Occurs against its will.
7. The distinction made between reason as reason and reason as a nature can be understood in two ways: (1) In such a way that "reason as a nature" is used to mean reason in so far as it is the nature of a rational creature, that is, as being grounded in the essence of the soul and giving natural existence to the body; and "reason as reason" is spoken of from the point of view of the distinguishing characteristic of reason inasmuch as it is reason; and that is its act, since powers are defined by their acts. Because, then, pain is not in higher reason as referred to its object on the basis of its proper act but as rooted in the essence of the soul, it is said for this reason that higher reason suffered pain as a nature, not as reason.

It is like the case of sight, which is founded on the sense of touch inasmuch as the organ of sight is also an organ of touch. Sight can accordingly suffer an injury in two different ways: through its proper act, as when sight is blurred by too strong a light, in which case this is a

passion of sight as sight; or again as founded upon the sense of touch, as when the eye is punctured or dissolved by heat, in which case the passion is one of sight not as sight but as a sort of sense of touch.

(2) The distinction mentioned can be understood in such a way that we use "reason as a nature" to mean reason as referred to the things which it naturally knows and tends to, and "reason as reason" to mean reason as directed to an object of knowledge or desire by means of a comparison, since it is the proper function of reason to compare. For there are certain things which are to be shunned when considered in themselves, but are sought because of their relation to something else. Thus hunger and thirst considered in themselves are to be shunned, but to the extent that they are considered useful for the health of the soul or body they are sought. Reason as reason accordingly takes pleasure in them, whereas reason as nature is saddened by them. So too the bodily passion of Christ considered in itself was something to be shunned, and reason as nature was as a consequence saddened by it and did not want it. But from the point of view of its being destined for the salvation of the human race it was something good and desirable, and so reason as reason willed it and then rejoiced in it.

This cannot be referred to higher reason, however, but only to lower reason, which directs its attention to the things of the body as its proper object. Hence it can be directed to bodily passions both absolutely and comparatively. But higher reason is not concerned with the things of the body as its objects, for it is directed in this way only to eternal things. It does, however, look at corporeal things to judge them in the light of eternal standards, to which it directs its gaze not only to look upon them but also to consult them. In Christ, accordingly, higher reason did not look at the passion of His body except with reference to the eternal standards, and in the light of them it rejoiced in the passion as pleasing to God. Hence sadness or pain by no means occurred in higher reason in virtue of its proper operation.

Now it is not out of keeping for one and the same power to will in relation to something else the same thing that it does not will in itself, for it is possible for something which is not good in itself to take on a certain goodness from its relation to something else. This did not take place, however, in higher reason in Christ with regard to the passion of His body; for it is not directed to such a passion except as willed [of God], as is apparent from what has just been said.

8. Contemplation can cause pleasure in two different ways: (1) From the standpoint of the operation, that is, contemplating. In this sense there is no sadness contrary to the pleasure which is taken in contemplating, because opposed to this contemplation which is the cause of pleasure there is no contrary contemplation which would be the cause of sadness; for all contemplation is pleasurable. This is not the case, however, on the part of sense, because from the point of view of its operation sense can be both saddened and pained; for example, we take pleasure in touching something suited to the sense, but we experience pain from touching something harmful. (2) Contemplation causes pleasure from the standpoint of the thing contemplated; that is, according as the object is considered as good or as evil. Thus either pleasure or contrary sadness can arise from contemplation; for even failure to understand causes sadness when considered as an evil, though in itself it does not cause anything but the negation of pleasure. Nevertheless it is not in this way that we say that pain was in the higher reason of Christ's soul, but as being rooted in the essence of the soul.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

I'. The Gloss does not say that the soul of Christ was filled with sadness but that it was filled with pains in the sense that it was suffering along with the body. It is accordingly not necessary for the suffering of pain to be ascribed to higher reason except in so far as it is in the essence of the soul; for in that way it is united to the body.

2'. Christ's passion would not have atoned except in so far as it was undertaken voluntarily and from charity. It is accordingly not necessary that, just because the fault was in Adam through the operation of higher reason, pain be in the higher part of Christ's reason as regards its proper operation; for the sufferer's movement of charity, which is in the higher part of reason, corresponds for the purpose of atonement to whatever was in the fault from higher reason.

3'. In reason there are two aspects to be kept in mind: a certain participation in the power of understanding, and also the clouding or defectiveness of understanding. The defectiveness of the power of understanding is a consequence of the soul's ordination to union with a body, but the power of understanding is in the soul inasmuch as it is not immersed in the body like other material forms. Consequently, since the operation of reason is in the soul as participating in the power of understanding, such an operation is not exercised by means of the body.

4'. "Reason as reason" does not designate a power distinct from "reason as a nature," but it designates a way of looking at that power. Now even though, in one way of looking at it, suffering does not apply to some particular power of the soul, that does not prevent the whole soul from suffering.

ARTICLE X: DID THE PAIN OF THE PASSION WHICH WAS IN CHRIST'S HIGHER REASON PREVENT THE JOY OF FRUITION, AND CONVERSELY?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 10, 1 ad III Sentences 15, 2, 3 sol. 2 ad Quodibet VII, (2), 5; Sum. Theol., III, 46, 8; Comp. Theol., I, 232.

Difficulties:

It seems that it did, for

1. Blessedness is more properly in the soul than in the body. But the body cannot be said to be blessed and glorious while it is suffering, because impassibility belongs to the glory of the body. Then neither could there at the same time be the suffering of pain and the joy of blessed fruition in Christ's higher reason.

2. The Philosopher says that any pleasure drives out the sadness which is contrary to it, and if it is keen it drives out all sadness. But the pleasure which higher reason in the soul of Christ enjoyed the divinity, was most keen. It therefore drove from Christ all sadness and pain.

3. Christ's higher reason was engaged in a more vivid contemplation than Paul in his rapture. But by the force of his contemplation Paul's soul was carried out of his body not only as regards the operation of reason but also as regards sense operations. Then Christ too did not experience any pain either in reason or in sense.

4. From a strong cause there comes a strong effect. Now the operation of the soul is the cause of bodily change; for example, when terrors or delights are represented in imagination, the body is made cold or hot. Consequently, since there was the keenest joy in Christ's soul as to His higher reason, it seems that even His body was changed by this joy; and so pain could not have been either in His body or in His higher reason under the aspect of its being united to the body.

5. The vision of God in His essence is more effective than the vision of God in a creature serving as a medium. But the vision by which Moses saw God in a creature resulted in his not suffering from hunger during his fast of forty days. With all the more reason, then, did the vision of God in His essence, which belonged to Christ in His higher reason, remove all bodily affliction. And so the conclusion is the same as before.

6. Whatever exists in the highest degree of anything but yet can fall off, does not admit of any admixture of the contrary. Thus the heat of fire, which stands at the highest degree of heat, does not admit of any admixture of cold, though that heat is exchangeable. But the joy of fruition was in Christ's higher reason in the highest degree and unchangeably. There was therefore no pain mixed with it.

7. Man is made blessed in both his soul and his body, and he lost both kinds of blessedness by sin. In Christ, however, human nature was re-established in blessedness of soul, which consists in the enjoyment of the divinity by higher reason. All the more, then, was it re-established in blessedness of body, which is something less; and consequently there was no pain in Him even as to His body, and so neither was there in higher reason in virtue of its union with the body.

8. Not only Christ's soul but also His flesh was united to the Word. But if His flesh were glorified through union with the Word, there could not be any pain in it. Therefore, since His higher reason is made blessed through union with the Word, there can be no pain in it.

9. According to Augustine joy and pain are in the soul essentially. But joy and pain are contraries. Since contraries cannot be in the same subject essentially, it therefore seems that the joy of fruition and the pain of the passion could not have been in the higher part of Christ's reason at the same time.

10. Pain follows from the apprehension of something harmful; joy, from the apprehension of something agreeable. But it is not possible to apprehend simultaneously something harmful and something agreeable, because according to the Philosopher it is possible to understand only one thing. Pain and joy could therefore not have been in Christ's higher reason at the same time.

11. In uncorrupted nature reason has more power over sensuality than sensuality has over reason in corrupted nature. But in corrupted nature sensuality draws reason along with it. All the more surely, then, in the case of Christ, in whom human nature was uncorrupted, does reason draw sensuality along with it. Thus sensuality shared in the joy of fruition which was in reason. From this it seems that the soul of Christ was altogether free from pain.

12. An infirmity contracted is greater than one assumed; and similarly union in person is stronger than union by grace. But in the three young men, whose infirmity was contracted, union with God by grace kept their bodies incapable of suffering injury from fire. All the more, then, in the case of Christ, who had only an assumed infirmity, did union with God in the person of the Word and fruition of Him keep His reason free from the pain of the passion.

i 3. The joy of fruition is in higher reason from its being turned to God, and the pain of suffering from its being turned to the body. But reason, being simple, cannot at the same time be turned to God and to the body, because when anything simple turns to something, it turns as a whole. In Christ's higher reason, then, there could not have been at the same time the joy of fruition and the pain of the passion.

14. It was said in answer that there was a twofold state in Christ, that of a wayfarer and that of a possessor, and that on the basis of these two states there could be in Him both the joy of fruition and the pain of the passion. On the contrary, the duality of states in Christ neither

removes the contrariety between joy and pain nor differentiates the subject of the joy and of the pain. Now contraries can not be in the same subject. The duality of states in Christ therefore does not make it possible for pain and joy to be in Him as regards higher reason at the same time.

15. The states of a wayfarer and of a possessor are either contrary or not. If they are contrary, they cannot be in Christ at the same time. If, on the other hand, they are not contrary, seeing that contraries have contrary causes, it seems that the duality of states cannot be the cause by which the contraries, joy and pain, were in Christ at the same time.

16. When one power becomes intense in its act, another is will drawn from its act. With all the more reason, then, when one power is intense in one act, is the very same power withdrawn from an other act. But in higher reason there was intense joy. By this fact, then, it was altogether withdrawn from pain.

17. It was said that pain was material will reference to joy, and for this reason joy was not prevented by pain.—On the contrary, the pain was from the suffering of the body, the joy, from the vision of God. The pain of the passion was therefore not material will reference to the joy of fruition. Then pain and joy could not be in Christ's higher reason at the same time.

To the Contrary:

1'. There is a proportion among effects similar to that among their causes. But the union of Christ's soul with His body was the cause of pain, whereas its union with the divinity was the cause of joy. But these two unions do not preclude each other. Then neither do pain and joy preclude each other.

2'. At the same instant Christ was a true wayfarer and a true possessor. He therefore had the attributes of each. But it is proper to a possessor to rejoice intensely from the divine fruition, and of a wayfarer to feel bodily pains. Therefore in Christ there were at the same time the pain of the passion and the joy of fruition.

REPLY:

In Christ the two dispositions in question, the joy of fruition and the pain of the bodily passion, by no means precluded each other. For the clarification of this matter it should be borne in mind that, in conformity with the order of nature, because of the conjunction of the powers of the soul in one essence and of the soul and body in the one existence of the composite, the higher powers and the lower, and even the body and the soul, let flow from one to the other whatever superabounds in any one of them. And hence it is that because of the soul's apprehension the body is altered with regard to heat and cold, and sometimes even to the extent of health and sickness and even to death; for it does happen that a person meets with death from joy or sadness or love. For this reason too there occurs an overflow from the very glory of the soul into the body, glorifying it, as is made clear in the passage from Augustine cited above. And contrariwise the alteration of the body overflows into the soul. For a soul joined to a body imitates its make-up in point of insanity or docility and the like, as is said in the work *Six Principles*.

In the same way too there occurs an overflow from the higher powers into the lower, as when a passion in sense appetite follows upon an intense movement of the will, and the animal powers are withdrawn or barred from their acts by intense contemplation. And conversely there occurs an overflow from the lower powers into the higher, as when a man's reason is clouded because of the vehemence of passions in sense appetite, with the result that it judges as simply good that to which the man is moved by passion.

In Christ, however, the situation is quite different. Because of the divine power of the Word the order of nature was subject to His will. It was therefore possible that the above-mentioned overflow, whether from the soul into the body or vice versa, or from the higher powers into the lower or vice versa, should not take place; and the Word saw to this in order that the genuineness of His human nature in all its parts might be clearly proved and that the mystery of our reparation might be fittingly fulfilled in all respects. Damascene thus says: "He was moved in conformity with this nature, while the Word in the manner of a supervisor so willed and permitted, to suffer and to perform all works proper to it, in order that through its works the nature's genuineness might be believed."

It is therefore evident that, since there was the most complete joy in His higher reason in view of the fact that by its activity His soul enjoying the possession of God, that joy remained in higher reason and did not flow out to the lower powers of the soul or to the body; otherwise there could not have been any pain or passion in Him. Accordingly too the effect of fruition did not reach to the essence of the soul as the form of the body or as the root of the lower powers. Had it done so it would have reached the body and the lower powers, as happens in the blessed after the resurrection. Conversely also the pain which was in the body itself from the injury of the body and in the essence of the soul as the form of the body and in the lower powers, was notable to reach to higher reason in so far as by its act it turns towards God, in such a way that this turning might thereby be hindered in the least degree.

It therefore remains that the pain itself attained higher reason as rooted in the essence of the soul and that the greatest joy was there inasmuch as reason was enjoying the possession of God by its act. Thus the joy belonged to higher reason directly, because by its proper act, whereas pain was there as if indirectly, because by reason of the essence of the soul in which it was grounded.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Just as God is the good and the life of the soul, so the soul is the good and life of the body, but not contrariwise so that the body should be the good of the soul. Now the ability to suffer is a sort of barrier or harmful factor as regards the union of the soul with the body. Thus the body cannot be blessed in its own way while still able to suffer, having a barrier to participation in its own good. For this reason impassibility is a part of the glory of the body. The soul's blessedness, however, consists entirely in the enjoyment of its own good, which is God. Hence the soul which enjoys the possession of God is perfectly happy, even if it happens to be passible from the point of view of its being united to the body, as was the case in Christ.
- 2.** The fact that keen joy drives out all sadness, even that which is not contrary, is due to the overflow of the powers upon one another (which did not take place in Christ), as has been explained. In this way because of the intensity of St. Paul's contemplation his lower powers were withdrawn from their acts.
- 3.** The answer is clear from that just given.
- 4.** In the same way there results from the operation of the soul some change in the body. From this the answer to this difficulty is obvious.
- 5.** In the same way also Moses suffered from thirst and hunger not at all or little, because of his contemplation of God even though in a creature serving as a medium. Thus the answer to this difficulty is clear.
- 6.** In Christ there was no mingling of joy and pain. For joy was in His higher reason viewed under the aspect of its being the principle of its own act, for it was in this way that it enjoyed the possession of God. Pain, however, was not in it except in so far as the injuring of the body

touched it as the act of the body through the essence in which it was rooted, yet in such a way that the act of higher reason was in no way hampered. Thus there was pure joy and likewise pure pain, and both in the highest degree.

7. It happened by a sort of dispensation that glory of soul, though not that of body, was conferred upon Christ from the first moment of His conception, so that He was confirmed to God by the glory of His soul while by the passibility of His body He was like us. Thus He was a fitting mediator between God and man, leading us to glory and offering His passion to God in our name in accordance with the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews (2: 10): "For it became him...who had brought many children into glory, to be perfected by his passion."

8. The soul of Christ was joined to the Word in two ways: (1) by the act of fruition, and this union made it blessed; (2) by union, and this did not furnish the reason for its blessedness but did account for its being the soul of God. Now if one were to suppose that the soul was assumed in a unity of person without fruition, it would not be blessed properly speaking, because not even God Himself is blessed except by the fact that He enjoys the possession of Himself. The body of Christ is therefore not glorious by reason of being assumed by the Son of God in a unity of person, but only because glory came down into it from the soul; but this was not the case before the passion, because it was not glorious then.

9. It is impossible for contraries to be in the same subject directly; yet it does happen that contrary movements are in the same subject in such a way that one of them belongs to it directly and the other indirectly, as when a person walking in a ship is borne in a direction contrary to that in which the ship is moving. So too in the higher reason of Christ's soul there was joy directly, because by its proper act, but pain indirectly, because through the suffering of the body.—It can also be said that that joy and that pain were not contraries since they were not about the same thing.

10. The intellect cannot understand many things at the same time by means of different species, but it can understand many things at once by means of one species or by understanding in any other way many as one. It is in this way that the intellect of Christ's soul and of any one of the blessed understands many things at once, since in seeing the divine essence it knows other things.

Yet granted that the soul of Christ could understand only one thing at a time, the possibility is not thereby removed of its understanding one thing and at the same time sensing something else with a bodily sense. And as a matter of fact from those two different objects of apprehension in Christ's soul there followed joy from the vision of God and the pain of the passion from the feeling of injury.

Granted further that it could not simultaneously understand one thing and sense or imagine another, nonetheless from that one object of understanding higher and lower appetite could be affected in different ways, so that the higher would rejoice and the lower fear or grieve, as happens in one who hopes to get health from some horrible remedy. For considered by reason as health-giving, the remedy begets joy in the will; but because of its horribleness it arouses fear in the lower appetite.

11. That argument proceeds on the assumption of the ordinary course of events. In Christ, however, it occurred by way of exception that there should not take place the overflow from one power into another.

12. The bodies of the three young men were not made impassible in the furnace; but by the divine power it was miraculously brought about that while remaining passible their bodies should not be injured by the fire, as it also could have happened by the divine power that

neither Christ's soul nor His body should suffer anything. But why this was not done has been explained.

13. The turning of a power towards something takes place by means of its act. Thus joy was in Christ's higher reason by means of it turning to God, to whom it was kept turned entirely, whereas pain was in His higher reason as a result of the inhesion or adherence by which it clung to the essence of the soul as its root.

14. The state of a wayfarer is a state of imperfection, whereas that of a possessor is a state of perfection. Christ therefore had the state of a wayfarer by reason of bearing a body capable of suffering, and likewise such a soul; but He had the state of a possessor by reason of perfectly enjoying the possession of God through the act of higher reason. This was possible in Christ because by the divine power the overflow from one to another was inhibited, as has been said. This is the reason also why joy and sadness could be in Him simultaneously. It is accordingly said that these two feelings were in Him in accordance with His two states because His having two states and His simultaneously experiencing pain and joy came from the same cause.

15. Even though the states of a wayfarer and of a possessor are in a sense contrary, they could still be in Christ at the same time, not in the same respect but in different respects. For the state of a possessor was in Him according as He adhered to God by fruition in higher reason; and the state of a wayfarer, according as His soul was joined to a body capable of suffering and His higher reason joined to the soul itself by a sort of natural conjunction. As a result the state of a possessor has reference to the act of higher reason, and that of a wayfarer to His passible body and its consequent properties.

16. It was something special in Christ, for the reason already explained, that however much one power was intensified in its act, another was not withdrawn from its act or in any way hampered. The joy of higher reason was accordingly hindered neither by the pain which was in sense as a consequence of the act of sensing nor by the pain which was in higher reason itself, because that pain was not in it as a consequence of its act, but it attained it in some manner as a consequence of its being grounded in the essence of the soul.

17. Just as blessed knowledge is principally of the divine essence and secondarily of the things which are known in the divine essence, in the same way the affection and joy of the blessed is principally about God but secondarily about the things that have God as the reason why we rejoice over them. The pain of the passion can accordingly be in some sense material with reference to the joy of fruition, for that joy was principally over God and secondarily over the things which were pleasing to God; and so it was even over the pain in so far as it was acceptable to God as destined for the salvation of the human race.

QUESTION 26: Grace

ARTICLE I: IS GRACE SOMETHING CREATED WHICH IS IN THE SOUL POSITIVELY?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 26, a. 1; [Contra Gentiles III, 150](#); Sum. Theol., I-II, 110, 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. According to Augustine, "just as the soul is the life of the body, God is the life of the soul." But the soul is the life of the body without any intervening form. Then God is also the life of the soul in the same way. Thus the life which is had through grace is not had through any created form existing in the soul.

2. Ingratulatory grace (*gratia gratum faciens*), of which we are speaking, seems to be nothing but that according to which a man is in God's good graces. But a man is said to be in God's good graces in so far as he has been favorably received by God; and a person is said to be favorably received by God because of God's acceptance, which is of course in God Himself. It is just as we say that a person is acceptable to a man, not by something which is in the one accepted, but by the acceptance which is in the one accepting. Grace therefore does not imply anything in man but only in God.

3. We come closer to God by the spiritual existence that comes from grace than by natural existence. But God causes natural existence in us without the intervention of any other cause, because He created us immediately. He therefore also causes gratuitous spiritual existence in us without the intervention of anything else; and so the conclusion is the same as before.

4. Grace is a sort of health of the soul. Now health does not seem to imply anything else in the healthy person than balanced humors. Then grace too does not imply any form in the soul, but presupposes that the powers of the soul are balanced in an equality of justice.

5. Grace seems to be nothing but a sort of liberality; for "to give gratuitously" seems to mean the same as "to give liberally." Liberality, however, is not in the recipient but in the giver. Then grace too is in God, who gives us His good things, and not in us.

6. No creature is nobler than the soul of Christ. But grace is nobler, because Christ's soul is ennobled by grace. Grace is therefore not something created in the soul.

7. Grace bears the same relation to the will as truth to the intellect. But according to Anselm the truth, which all intellects understand, is one. Then the grace by which all wills are perfected is also one. But no one created thing can be in many. Consequently grace is not some thing created.

8. Nothing but a composite is in a genus. Now grace is not a composite but a simple form. It is therefore not in a genus. But everything created is in some genus. Then grace is not something created.

9. If grace is anything in the soul, it seems to be only a habit. "There are three things in the soul," the Philosopher says, "power, habit, and passion." Now grace is not a power, because in that case it would be natural. Nor is it a passion, because then it would be concerned principally with the irrational part of the soul. But it is furthermore not a habit, for a habit is a quality difficult to displace, according to the Philosopher, whereas grace is very easily removed, because this can be done by one act of a mortal sin. Grace is therefore not something in the soul.

10. According to Augustine nothing created intervenes between our soul and God. But grace intervenes between our soul and God, because our soul is united to God through grace. Grace is therefore not something created.

11. Man is nobler and more perfect than the other creatures. But in order to make these latter acceptable to Himself God did not confer upon them anything over and above their natural endowments, since they have been approved by Him as they were, according to the words of Genesis (1:31): "And God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good."

Then neither is anything added to man's natural gifts on the basis of which he is said to be acceptable to God; and so grace is not something positively existing in the soul.

To the Contrary:

1' Commenting on the words of the Psalm (103:15): "That he may make the face cheerful with oil," the Gloss says: "Grace is a certain splendour of the soul winning holy love." But splendour is something in the soul positively which is created. Then so is grace.

2' God is said to be in His saints by grace in a special way that distinguishes them from other creatures. Now God is not said to be in anything in a new manner except by reason of some effect. Grace is therefore an effect of God in the soul.

3' Damascene says that grace is the delight of the soul. But delight is something created in the soul. Then so is grace.

4' Every action is from some form. But a meritorious action is from grace. Grace is therefore a form in the soul.

REPLY:

The term grace is wont to be taken in two senses: (1) For some thing which is given gratis, as we are accustomed to say, "I do you this grace or favour." (2) For the favorable reception which one gets from another, as we say, "That fellow is in the king's good graces" because he is favorably received by the king. And these two senses are related, for nothing is gratuitously given unless the recipient is somehow favorably received.

In divine matters we accordingly speak of two kinds of grace. One is called grace gratuitously given or gratuitous grace, as the gift of prophecy and of wisdom and the like. But this is not in question at present, because it is evident that such gifts are something created in the soul. The other is called grace that makes one pleasing to God or ingratiatory grace, and according to it man is said to be acceptable to God. It is of this that we are now speaking. That this grace implies something in God is obvious, for it implies an act of the divine will welcoming that man. But whether along with this it implies some thing in the man welcomed was doubted by some, since some asserted that this kind of grace was nothing created in the soul, but was only in God.

But this cannot stand. For God's accepting or loving someone (for they are the same thing) is nothing else but His willing him some good. Now God wills the good of nature for all creatures; and on this account He is said to love all things: "For thou lovest all things that are..." (Wisdom 11:25) and to approve all: "And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good" (Genesis 1:31). But it is not by reason of this sort of acceptance that we are accustomed to say that someone has the grace of God, but inasmuch as God wills him a certain supernatural good, which is eternal life, as is written in Isaiah (64:4): "The eye hath not seen, O God, besides thee, what things thou has prepared for them that love thee." Hence it is written in the Epistle to the Romans (6:23): "The grace of God [life everlasting."

God does not, however, will this for anyone unworthy. But from his own nature man is not worthy of so great a good, since it is supernatural. Consequently, by the very fact that someone is affirmed to be pleasing to God with reference to this good, it is affirmed that there is in him something by which he is worthy of such a good above his natural endowments. This does not, to be sure, move the divine will to destine the man for that good, but rather the other way about: by the very fact that by His will God destines someone for eternal life, He supplies him with something by which he is worthy of eternal life. This is what is said in the Epistle to the Colossians (1:12): "... who hath made us worthy to be partakers of the lot of the saints in light." And the reason for this is that, just as God's knowledge is the cause of things

and is not, like ours, caused by them, in the same way the act of His will is productive of good and not, like that of ours, caused by good.

Man is accordingly said to have the grace of God not only from his being loved by God will a view to eternal life but also from his being given some gift (ingratiatory grace) by which he is worthy of eternal life. Otherwise even a person in the state of mortal sin could be said to be in grace if grace meant only divine acceptance, since it can happen that a particular sinner is predestined to have eternal life. Thus ingratiatory grace can be called gratuitous grace, but not conversely, because not every gratuitous grace makes us worthy of eternal life.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** The soul is the formal cause of the life of the body, and for this reason gives life to the body without the intervention of any form. God, however, does not give life to the soul as its formal cause, but as its efficient cause. For this reason a form intervenes, as a painter effectively makes a wall white by means of whiteness, but whiteness makes it white by means of no other form, because it makes it white formally.
- 2.** The very acceptance which is in the divine will regard to an eternal good produces in the man accepted something from which he is worthy to obtain that good, though this does not occur in human acceptance. Ingratiatory grace is accordingly something created in the soul.
- 3.** God causes natural existence in us by creation without the intervention of any agent cause, but nevertheless will the intervention of a formal cause; for a natural form is the principle of natural existence. Similarly God brings about gratuitous spiritual existence in us will out the intervention of any agent, yet will the intervention of a created form, grace.
- 4.** Health is a certain bodily quality caused by balanced humors, for it is listed in the first species of quality. Thus the argument is based upon a false Supposition.
- 5.** From the very liberality of God by which He wills us an eternal good it follows that there is in us something given by Him by which we are made worthy of that good.
- 6.** No creature is simply nobler than the soul of Christ; but in a certain respect every accident of His soul is nobler than it inasmuch as the accident is compared to it as its form.—Or it can be said that grace is nobler than the soul of Christ, not as a creature, but in so far as it is a certain likeness of the divine goodness more explicit than the natural likeness which is in Christ's soul.
- 7.** There is one first uncreated truth, from which many truths, likenesses of the first truth, so to speak, are nevertheless caused in created minds, as the Gloss says in comment upon the words of the Psalm (2 1:2): "Truths are decayed from among the children of men." Similarly there is one uncreated good, of which there are many likenesses in created minds through participation in it by means of grace. Yet it should be noted that grace does not bear the same relation to the will as truth to the intellect For truth is related to the intellect as its object, but grace to the will as its informing form. Now distinct beings may have the same object, but not the same form.
- 8.** Everything that is in the genus of substance is composite will a real composition, because whatever is in the category of substance is subsistent in its own existence, and its own act of existing must be distinct from the thing itself; otherwise it could not be distinct in existence from the other things will which it agrees in the formal character of its quiddity; for such agreement is required in all things that are directly in a category. Consequently everything that is directly in the category of substance is composed at least of the act of being and the subject of being.

Yet there are some things in the category of substance reductively, such as the principles of a subsistent substance, in which the composition in question is not found; for they do not subsist, and therefore do not have their own act of being. In the same way, because accidents do not subsist, they do not properly have existence, but the subject is of a particular sort as a result of them. For this reason they are properly said to be "of a being" rather than beings. For something to be in some category of accident, then, it does not have to be composite with a real composition, but may have only a conceptual composition from genus and differentia. Such composition is found in grace.

9. Even though grace is lost because of one act of mortal sin, it is still not easily lost, because for one who has grace, which confers an inclination to the contrary, it is not easy to perform that act. Thus even the Philosopher says that it is difficult for a just man to act unjustly.

10. Nothing intervenes between our mind and God either as an efficient cause (because our soul is created and justified immediately by God) or as the beatifying object (because the soul is made blessed by enjoying the possession of God Himself). There can nonetheless be a formal medium by which the soul is made like God.

11. Other creatures, which are irrational, are accepted by God only with regard to natural goods. Consequently, in their case divine acceptance does not add anything above the natural condition by which they are made proportionate to such goods. But man is accepted by God with regard to a supernatural good; and so there is required something added to his natural gifts by which he is proportioned to that good.

ARTICLE II: IS INGRATIATORY GRACE THE SAME AS CHARITY?

Parallel readings: [II Sentences 26, a. Sum. Theol., I-II, 110, 3.](#)

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Ingratiatory grace in us is that gift of God by which we are

acceptable to Him. But we are so by charity, as is written in Proverbs (8:17): "I love them that love me." Ingratiatory grace is therefore the same as charity.

2. Augustine says that the benefit of God by which the will of man is prepared antecedently is faith—not unformed but formed faith, which is achieved by charity. Now since that benefit is antecedent grace, it therefore seems that charity is grace itself.

3. The Holy Spirit is sent invisibly to a person in order to dwell within him. By the same gift, then, He is sent and indwells. Now He is said to be sent by the gift of charity, just as the Son is said to be sent by the gift of wisdom, because of the similarity of these gifts to the divine persons. But the Holy Spirit is said to dwell in the soul by grace. Grace is therefore the same as charity.

4. Grace is that gift of God by which we are made worthy to have eternal life. But man is made worthy of eternal life by charity, as is evident from the words in John (14:21): "If anyone shall love me, he shall be loved of my Father: and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him." Now eternal life consists in that manifestation. Charity is therefore the same as grace.

5. In charity we can distinguish two aspects that are essential to it:

by it man is dear to God, and by it man holds God dear. But man's being dear to God is essential to charity antecedently to his holding God dear, as is made clear in the first Epistle of St. John (4:10): "Not as though we had loved God, but because he hath first loved us." But this is the essence of grace: by it man is pleasing to God. Now, since it is the same thing to be dear to God and to be pleasing to Him, it therefore seems that grace is the same as charity.

6. Augustine says: "It is only charity which distinguishes between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of perdition," for the rest of God's gifts are common to the good and the bad alike. But ingratulatory grace distinguishes between the sons of perdition and those of the kingdom and is found only in the good. It is therefore the same as charity.

7. Since ingratulatory grace is an accident, it can only be in the genus of quality, and there only in the first species: habit and disposition. Since it is not knowledge, it does not seem to be anything else than virtue. And no virtue can be called grace except charity, which is the form of the other virtues. Grace is therefore charity.

To the Contrary:

1. Nothing precedes itself. But "grace precedes charity," as Augustine says. Grace is therefore not the same as charity.

2'. It is written in the Epistle to the Romans (5:5): "The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost who is given to us." Then the giving of the Holy Ghost precedes charity as a cause its effect. But the Holy Ghost is given to us as a result of a particular gift of His. Then there is a particular gift in us which precedes charity, and this does not seem to be anything but grace. Consequently grace is something other than charity.

3'. Grace is always in its act, because it always ingratiates man with God. But charity is not always in its act; for a man who has charity does not always actually love. Charity is therefore not grace.

4'. Charity is a type of love. Now it is on the basis of love that we are loving. It is therefore on the basis of charity that we are loving. But we are not acceptable to God inasmuch as we are loving, but rather the other way about; for our acts are not the cause of grace, but vice versa. Consequently the grace by which we are made acceptable to God is something other than charity.

5'. Whatever is common to many is not in any one of them by reason of anything that is proper to that one. But to produce a meritorious act is common to all virtue. It therefore belongs to no particular virtue on the basis of anything proper to it, and so not to charity either. It belongs to charity, then, on the basis of something common to it and all the virtues. But a meritorious act is from grace. Grace therefore expresses something common to charity and the other virtues. But it is apparently not common just predicatively, because then there would be as many graces as there are virtues. It is therefore common causally; and so grace is essentially distinct from charity.

6'. Charity perfects the soul in relation to a lovable object. But grace does not imply a relation to any object, because it does not imply a relation to an act but to a particular way of being, namely, being pleasing to God. Therefore grace is not charity.

REPLY:

Some say that grace is essentially the same as virtue in reality, though it differs conceptually, so that virtue is spoken of in so far as it perfects an act, and grace in so far as it makes man and his act acceptable to God. And among the virtues charity especially is grace according to

these men. Others, on the contrary, say that charity and grace differ essentially, and that no virtue is essentially grace. This latter opinion seems the more reasonable.

Since different natures have different ends, there are three pre requisites for obtaining any end among natural things: a nature proportioned to that end, an inclination which is a natural appetite for that end, and a movement toward the end. Thus it is clear that in the element earth there is a certain nature by which being in the center is characteristic of it, and consequent upon this nature there is an inclination to the center according to which earth naturally tends to such a place even when it is violently kept away from it; and so when the obstacle is removed it always moves downward.

Now in his nature man is proportioned to a certain end for which he has a natural appetite and for the obtaining of which he can work by his natural powers. That end is a contemplation of divine things such as is possible to man according to the capabilities of his nature; and in this contemplation philosophers have placed man's ultimate happiness.

But there is an end for which man is prepared by God which surpasses the proportion of human nature, that is, eternal life, which consists in the vision of God by His essence. That vision is not proportionate to any creature whatsoever, being connatural only to God. It is therefore necessary that there be given to man not only something by which he can work toward that end or by which his appetite should be inclined to that end, but also something by which man's very nature should be raised to a dignity which would make such an end suited to him. For this, grace is given. But to incline his will to this end charity is given; and for carrying out the works by which that end is acquired, the other virtues are given.

Accordingly, just as in natural things the nature itself is distinct from the inclination of the nature and its motion or operation, in the same way in man's gratuitous gifts grace is distinct from charity and the other virtues. And that this comparison is rightly taken can be seen from Dionysius where he says that no one can have a spiritual operation unless he first receives a spiritual existence, just as he can not have the operation of a particular nature unless he first has existence in that nature.

Answers to Difficulties:

2. God loves those who love him, yet not in such a way that the love of those who love him is the reason why He Himself loves, but rather the other way about.

2. Faith is said to be an antecedent grace inasmuch as there appears in the first movement of faith the effect of antecedent grace.

3. The whole Trinity dwells in us by means of grace; but indwelling can be appropriated specially to one person because of some other special gift which bears a resemblance to that person and provides the basis for saying that that person is sent.

4. Charity would not suffice for meriting eternal life unless it presupposed the fitness of the one meriting, and this is had by means of grace. Otherwise our love would not be deserving of so great a reward.

5. It is not out of keeping that something which is prior in reality should only posteriorly fulfil the notion of a particular name. Thus the cause of health is prior to health itself in the subject of health, and yet the term healthy signifies the one having health before it signifies the cause of health. In the same way, even though the divine love by which God loves us is prior to the love by which we love Him, yet charity implies in its notion that it makes God dear to us before it implies that it makes us dear to God. For the first belongs to love inasmuch as it is love, but not the Second.

6. The fact that charity alone distinguishes between the sons of perdition and those of the kingdom belongs to it inasmuch as it cannot be unformed like the other virtues. Hence grace, by which charity itself is formed, is not thereby excluded.

7. Grace is in the first species of quality, though it cannot properly be called a habit because it is not immediately directed to an act but to a certain spiritual existence which it causes in the soul; and it is like disposition in regard to glory, which is consummated grace. Yet nothing like grace is found among the accidents which the philosophers knew, because the philosophers knew only those accidents of the soul which are directed w acts proportioned to human nature.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

We concede these even though some of them do not arrive at their conclusions correctly.

ARTICLE III: CAN ANY CREATURE BE THE CAUSE OF GRACE?

Parallel readings: I Sentences 14, q. 3; 40, 4, 2 ad II Sentences 26, a. IV Sentences 5, 1, sol. 1; Sum. Theol., I-II, 112, 1; III, 62, 1; 64, I.

Difficulties:

It seems that it can, for

1. In John (20:23) our Lord says to His disciples: "Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them." From this it is evident that men can forgive sins. But S are forgiven only by means of grace. Then men can confer grace.

2. Dionysius says that, just as the spheres closer to the sun receive light from it and transmit it to other spheres, in the same way the sub stances that come close to God receive His light more fully and hand it on to others. But divine light is grace. Consequently certain creatures that more fully receive grace can hand it on to others.

3. According to Dionysius good tends to pour itself out. Then anything that has goodness in greater measure also has diffusiveness in greater measure. But spiritual forms have more goodness than bodily forms, being closer to the highest good. Now, since bodily forms existing in some creatures are the principle of their sharing in the like ness of the species, all the more then can one who has grace cause grace in another.

4. The intellect is perfected by the light of truth just as the will is perfected by the divine light of grace. But one creature can furnish another will the light of the intellect. This is evident from the fact that according to Dionysius the higher angels enlighten the lower, and according to him that enlightenment is "the assumption of divine knowledge." A rational creature can therefore also furnish another will grace.

5. Christ is our head in His human nature. But it is the function of the head to send forth feeling and movement into the members. Then Christ too in His human nature sends forth into the members of the Mystical Body spiritual feelings and movements, which mean graces according w Augustine.

6. It was said in answer that by His ministry Christ in His human nature poured out grace upon men.—On the contrary, Christ all alone and in preference w all others is the head of the Church. But to work for the confirming of grace by way of the ministry is attributable to other

ministers of the Church as well. It therefore does not suffice for the character of the head that He imparts grace by way of the ministry.

7. The death and resurrection of Christ belong to Him according to His human nature. But in commenting upon the words of the Psalm (29:6): "In the evening weeping shah have place," the Gloss says: "Christ's resurrection is the cause of the resurrection of the soul in the present time and of the body in the future." Now the resurrection of the soul in the present is through grace. In His human nature therefore Christ is the cause of grace.

8. A substantial form, which gives existence and life, is nobler than any accidental form. But a created agent has power over a substantial form which gives existence and life, that is, a vegetative and sensitive form. With all the more reason, then, does it have power over an accidental form, grace.

9. It was said that the reason why a creature cannot cause grace is that, since it is not drawn out of the potentiality of matter, it does not come into being except through creation, whereas an infinite power is needed to create because of the infinite distance between being and nothing; and so it cannot be within the competence of any creature.— On the contrary, it is impossible to traverse infinite distances. But the distance from being to nothing is in fact traversed, since a creature would of itself fall into nothingness "unless sustained by the hand of its Creator" according to Gregory. The distance between being and nothing is therefore not infinite.

10. The ability to cause grace does not imply a power that is infinite simply but only in a certain respect. That can be seen from this:

if we said that God could not make anything but grace, we should not be saying that He has a power simply infinite. But it is not incongruous for a power that is infinite in a certain respect to be conferred upon a creature; for grace itself has a power which is in some sense infinite, inasmuch as it joins one to the infinite good. Consequently nothing prevents a creature from having the power of causing grace.

x It is a part of the glory of a king to have under him powerful and valorous soldiers. Then it is a part of God's glory that the saints who are subject to Him should be of great power. If, then, it is held that a saint is able to confer grace, the divine glory will not be prejudiced at all.

12. In the Epistle to the Romans (3:22) it is written: "Even the justice of God, by faith of Jesus Christ." And again in the same Epistle (10:17) we read: "Faith then cometh by hearing; and hearing by the word of Christ." Now since the word of Christ comes from a preacher, it therefore seems that grace or justice is from the preacher of the faith.

13. Anyone can give to another what is his own. But grace or the Holy Spirit belongs to a man because it is given to him. A person can therefore give another grace or the Holy Spirit.

14. No one has to give an account of what is not under his control. But the prelates of the Church are to give an account of the souls of their subjects; for we read in the Epistle to the Hebrews (13:17): "For they watch as being to render an account of your souls." The souls of the subjects are therefore under the control of the prelates so that the latter can justify them by grace.

15. God's ministers are more acceptable to Him than are the ministers of a temporal king to that king. But the ministers of a king can bestow upon someone the king's grace or favour. Then God's ministers too can bestow the grace of God.

16. Whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of the effect. But a priest is the cause of the imposition of hands, which in turn is the cause of the Holy Spirit's being given, according to the Acts of the Apostles (8:17): "They laid their hands upon them, and they received the Holy Ghost." The priest is therefore the cause of grace in which the Holy Spirit is given.

17. All power that is communicable to creatures has been communicated to them, because, if God could have communicated it and was unwilling to, He was jealous, as Augustine argues to prove the equality of the Son. But the power of conferring grace was communicable to creatures, as the Master says. Therefore the power of conferring grace has been communicated to some creature.

18. According to Dionysius it is a law of the godhead to lead the last things back to God through intermediate things. But the leading of rational creatures back to God is accomplished especially by means of grace. By means of the higher rational creatures, then, the lower obtain grace.

19. To drive out something principal is more than to drive out some thing accessory. But the power of driving out demons, the cause of our wickedness, has been given to men, as is evident from Luke (10:17) and Matthew. Then there is also given to men the power of driving out sins, and therefore of conferring grace.

20. It was answered that a man does this only through his ministry.— On the contrary, the priest of the gospel is more powerful than the priest of the Law. But the priest of the Law works by way of ministry. The priest of the gospel therefore has something more than ministry.

21. The soul lives by the life of nature and by the life of grace. But it communicates the life of nature to another, the body. Then it can also communicate to another the life of grace.

22. Guilt and grace are contraries. But the soul can be the cause of its own guilt. Consequently it can be the cause of its own grace.

23. Man is called a microcosm inasmuch as he bears within him self the likeness of the macrocosm. But in the macrocosm a spiritual effect, the sentient and vegetative soul, is from a creature. Then in the microcosm too, that is, in man, the spiritual effect of grace is from a creature.

24. According to the Philosopher anything is perfect when it can make another like itself; and he is speaking of the perfection of nature. But the perfection of grace is greater than that of nature. Therefore one who has the perfection of grace can establish another in grace.

25. The action of a form is attributed to the one having the form, as heating, which is the act of heat, is attributed to fire. But to justify is the act of justice. It is therefore attributed to a just person. But justification is effected only through grace. Therefore a just man can give grace.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says that holy men cannot give the Holy Spirit. But in the gift of grace the Holy Spirit is given. A holy man therefore cannot give grace.

2'. If one who has grace can give it to another, he does not do so by creating grace in him from nothing, because creating is the work of God alone. Nor again does he do so by bestowing some of the grace which he himself has, because then his own grace would be diminished and he would become less acceptable to God by doing a work acceptable to God. But that is unreasonable. In no way, then, can a man give grace to another.

3'. Anselm proves" that the reparation of the human race could not have been done by an angel, because then the human race would have been indebted to the angel for its salvation, and it could by no means attain equality with the angel. But the salvation of man is by grace. The same difficulty would therefore follow if an angel were to give man grace. But much less can a man give man grace. No creature, therefore, can give grace.

4'. According to Augustine "to justify a sinner is greater than to create heaven and earth." But a sinner is justified through grace. Consequently, since no creature can create heaven and earth, neither can it confer grace.

5'. Every action takes place through some connection of the agent with the patient. But no creature insinuates itself into the mind, in which grace is found. Therefore no creature can confer grace.

REPLY:

It must simply be granted that no creature can effectively create grace, though a creature can make use of a ministry ordained to the reception of grace. There are three reasons for this.

The first reason is taken from the nature of grace itself. For grace is a perfection raising the soul to a supernatural existence, as has been said. But no supernatural effect can be caused by a creature, for two reasons: (1) Because advancing a thing beyond the state of its nature is the work of him alone whose business it is to establish the degrees of nature and set their limits. But it is obvious that only God can do that. (2) Because no created power acts without presupposing the potentiality of matter or of something taking the place of matter. But the natural potentiality of a creature does not go beyond natural perfections. Hence a creature cannot perform any supernatural action. It is for this reason that miracles are worked only by the agency of divine power, even though a creature may cooperate in the accomplishment of a miracle either by praying or by making use of a ministry in any other way whatsoever. Consequently no creature can effectively cause grace.

The second reason is taken from the working of grace. For the will of man is changed by grace, since it is grace which prepares the will of man to will good, according to Augustine. But it is the work of God alone to change the will, even though a person can in some way change another's intellect. This is due to the fact that, since the principle of any act is the power and the object together, the act of any power can be changed in two ways: (1) From the point of view of the power, when someone works upon the power itself. Now in regard to the powers which are not attached to organs, namely, the intellect and the will, that belongs to God alone. Upon the other powers someone else can work indirectly, inasmuch as he acts upon their organs. (2) From the point of view of the object, by making use of an object that will move the power.

Now no object moves the will with necessity except one which is naturally willed, such as happiness or the like, which is presented to the will only by God. The other objects do not necessarily move the will. But the intellect is moved with necessity not only by naturally known first principles but also by conclusions, which are not naturally known, because of their necessary relationship to principles. This necessary relationship is not found on the part of the will with regard to the good naturally desired when it is willing other goods, since it is possible to arrive at that good naturally desired in many different ways, at least in one's own opinion. A creature can therefore sufficiently move the intellect from the point of view of its object, but not the will. But from the point of view of the power neither the intellect nor the will can be so moved. Because, then, no creature can change the will, neither can any creature confer grace, by which the will is changed.

The third reason is taken from the end of grace. For the end is proportioned to the principle which is acting, seeing that the end and principle of the whole universe are one. Consequently, just as the first action by means of which things come into being, creation, is from God alone, who is the first principle and last end of creatures; in the same way the conferring of grace, by means of which a rational mind is immediately joined to the last end, is from God alone.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Only God forgives sins by reason of authority, as is made clear in Isaias (43:25): "I am he that blot out thy iniquities by my own power." Men are said to forgive sins by their ministry.
2. Dionysius is speaking of the outpouring of divine light through teaching, for it is in this way that the lower angels are enlightened by the higher. That is his meaning in the passage.
3. It is not from any lack of goodness in grace that the one who has it cannot impart it to another; but it is from its surpassing nobility as well as from the deficiency of the one who has it, because it transcends the state of created nature and the one who has it does not share it to such a degree of perfection that he can communicate it.
4. The case of the will is not the same as that of the intellect, for the reason already explained.
5. Christ as God imparts grace effectively, but as man by His ministry. Thus it is written in the Epistle to the Romans (15:8): "For I say that Christ Jesus was minister..."
6. The reason why Christ in His human nature is called the head of the Church in preference to all the other ministers is that He had a higher ministry than the others inasmuch as we are justified by faith in Him, we undergo the influence of the sacraments by calling upon His name, and by His passion the whole of human nature is cleansed of the sin of our first parent; and there are many other such marks of pre-eminence that are peculiar to Christ.
7. As Damascene says, Christ's humanity was like an "instrument of His divinity." For this reason the works of His humanity, such as the resurrection, the passion, etc., are instrumental with regard to the effect of His divinity. Christ's resurrection, accordingly, does not cause spiritual resurrection in us as the principal agent but as the instrumental cause.—Or it can be said that it is the cause of our spiritual resurrection in so far as we are justified by faith in Him.—Or again the answer could be that it is the exemplary cause of spiritual resurrection inasmuch as there is in Christ's resurrection a pattern of our spiritual resurrection.
8. Like other natural forms, the sentient and vegetative soul does not go beyond the state of created nature. And therefore, given the potentiality which there is in nature as regards such forms, a natural agent has some influence upon their education. But the case is not the same with grace, as is evident from what has been said.
9. The reason given in answer is not sufficient in every respect. To be created properly applies to subsistent beings, to which it properly belongs to be and to become; but forms that are not subsistent, whether accidental or substantial forms, are properly not created but co-created, just as they do not have being of themselves but in another. Even though they do not have as one of their constituents any matter from which they come, yet they do have matter in which they are, upon which they depend and by whose change they are brought forth into existence. Consequently their becoming is properly the transformation of their subjects. Hence by reason of the matter in which they are, creation is not properly ascribed to them. The case is different, however, for a rational soul, which is a subsistent form; and so being created properly applies to it.

But granting the reason given, we must answer the argument of the rejoinder, which comes to a false conclusion and in a false manner. It must be said in answer that there are three different cases as regards the distance between two things: (1) It is infinite on both sides, as, for instance, if one man would have infinite whiteness and another would have infinite blackness. The distance between the divine existence and absolute non-existence is infinite in this way. (2) It is finite on both sides, as when one man would have finite whiteness and the other finite blackness. In this way created existence is distant from non-existence under a certain aspect. (3) It is finite on the one side and infinite on the other, as, for example, if one

man would have finite whiteness and the other infinite blackness. The distance between created existence and absolute non-existence is of this kind; for created existence is finite, and absolute non-existence is infinite in the sense that it exceeds every lack that can be thought of. This distance, then, can be traversed from its finite side, inasmuch as finite existence is either acquired or lost, but not from its infinite side.

10. The ability to cause grace belongs to a power that is absolutely infinite, seeing that it belongs to the power which establishes nature, which is infinite. To be able to give grace and to be unable to create other things are therefore incompatible.

11. The power of his soldiers is a part of the glory of a king if it is of such a kind and of such a degree that it does not withdraw them from their subjection to him, but not if by their power they are removed from that subjection. Now by the power of conferring grace a creature would be made equal to God, as having infinite power. It would therefore derogate from the divine glory if a creature had such power.

12. Hearing is not the adequate cause of faith, as is evident from the fact that many hear who do not believe. But he who makes the believer assent to what is said is the cause of faith. The believer is not, however, forced to assent by any necessity of reason but by his will. Consequently it is not the man who announces the truths externally that causes faith, but God, who alone can change the will. He causes faith in the believer by inclining his will and enlightening his intellect with the light of faith so that he does not fight against the truths proposed by the preacher. The preacher meanwhile does the work of exteriorly disposing him for the faith.

13. I can give what is mine as a possession, but not what is mine as an inherent form. I cannot, for instance, give my colour or my quantity. Now grace belongs to a man in this way, and not in the first.

14. Even though a prelate cannot give grace to his subject, still by admonishing and rebuking he can cooperate in giving grace to some one or in keeping him from losing the grace already given. In virtue of such a responsibility he is held to give an account of the souls of his subjects.

15. The ministers of a king do not bestow the king's grace upon anyone except by way of intercession. God's ministers too can in the same way bestow grace upon a sinner by obtaining it with their prayers, but not by effectively causing the grace.

6. The imposition of hands does not cause the coming of the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit comes simultaneously with the imposition of hands. It is accordingly not said in the text that the Apostles, imposing their hands, gave the Holy Spirit, but that they imposed their hands and the people received the Holy Spirit, i.e., from God.

Yet if the imposition of hands is in some sense called the cause of the reception of the Holy Spirit (in the manner in which the sacraments are the cause of grace, as will be explained later the imposition of hands will have this power, not as being from man, but from its divine institution.

17. The opinion of the Master is not commonly held on this point, namely, that the power of creating and justifying can be conferred upon a creature, though even the Master did not say that the power of justifying by authority could be conferred upon a creature, but only of doing so by ministry.

Yet even if it is communicable to a creature, it still does not follow that it was in fact communicated. For when it is said that everything that is communicable to creatures has been communicated to them, this must be understood of the things that their nature requires, not of

the things that can be superadded to their natural attributes by the divine liberality alone. Concerning these no jealousy is apparent even if they are not conferred. There is consequently no parallel will the Son. For it is essential to sonship that the son have the nature of his begetter. Hence, if God the Father did not communicate to His Son the fullness of His nature, that would seem to be due either to impotency or to jealousy; and particularly if one follows the opinion of those who said that the Father begot the Son by His will.

18. The statement of Dionysius is not to be taken to mean that the lowest things are joined to the last end by means of the intermediate causes, but that the intermediate causes dispose them for that union either by enlightenment or by any other sort of ministry.

19. That power was given to the Apostles in order to expel demons from bodies, and obviously that is less than to expel sin from the soul. And furthermore it was not given to them to expel the demons by their own power but by calling upon the name of Christ, obtaining it through prayer. This appears from what is said in Mark (16: 17): "In my name they shall cast out devils."

20. The priests of the Law did not do anything to confer grace even by way of ministry except remotely, by their exhortation and doctrine. For the sacraments of the Old Law, of which they were the ministers, did not confer grace, as do the sacraments of the New Law, whose ministers are the priests of the gospel. The new priesthood is therefore nobler than the old, as the Apostle proves in the Epistle to the Hebrews (chs. 7—10).

21. The soul has a different relation to natural life than it has to the life of grace. It stands to the life of grace as that which lives by some thing else, but to the life of nature as that by which something else lives. Consequently it cannot communicate the life of grace, but receives it when communicated. It does, however, communicate the life of nature; but it does this only as being formally united to the body. Now it is not possible for the soul to be formally united to another soul capable of living by the life of grace. Hence there is no parallel.

22. It is not impossible for an agent to act according to its own species or even beneath it; but nothing can act above its own species. Now grace is above the nature of the soul, whereas guilt is either on the level of nature as regards the animal part or beneath it as regards reason. There is accordingly no parallel between guilt and grace.

23. Even in the microcosm, man, a spiritual accident which does not surpass nature is to some extent caused by a created power; that is, knowledge is caused by a teacher in his pupil. This is not true of grace, however, because it surpasses nature. But the sentient and vegetative soul is contained within the order of natural beings.

24. The perfection of grace is superior to the perfection of nature from the standpoint of the perfecting form, not from that of the thing perfected. For in a way what is natural is more perfectly possessed than what is above nature, inasmuch as it is proportioned to a natural active power which does not measure up to a supernatural gift. It therefore cannot transmit a supernatural gift by its own power, though it can make something like itself in nature.

This is, however, not universally true, because the more perfect creatures cannot make anything like themselves. The sun, for example, cannot produce another sun, nor an angel another angel. It is true only among corruptible creatures, which have been divinely provided with a generative power in order that what cannot perdure as an individual may perdure in the species.

25. The act of a form is of two kinds. There is one which is an operation, such as to heat. This is a second act. And such an act of the form is attributed to the supposite. Another act of the

form is the information of the matter, as to give life to the body is the act of the soul. This is the first act. Such an act is not attributed to the supposite of the form. Now it is in this sense that the act of justice or of grace is to justify.

ARTICLE IV: ARE THE SACRAMENTS OF THE NEW LAW THE CAUSE OF GRACE?

Parallel readings: IV Sentences I, I, 4 sol. i & 2; i8, I, 3 sol. i ad I; In Gal., c. 2, lectura (P 13: 397 [Contra Gentiles](#) IV, 56 & g7; De art. fidei et eccl. sac. Sum. Theol., I-II, 112; i ad 2; III, 62, i & 6; Quodibet XII, (10), 1.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are not, for

1. Bernard says: "Just as a canon is invested by means of a book, an abbot by means of a crosier, and a bishop by means of a ring, so the different classes of grace are bestowed by the different sacraments." But the book is not the cause of the canonry; nor the crosier, of the abbacy; nor the ring, of the episcopacy. Then neither are the sacraments the cause of grace.
2. If a sacrament is the cause of grace, it is either the principal or the instrumental cause. Now it is not the principal cause, because only God is the cause of grace in this way, as has been said. Nor again is it the instrumental cause, because every instrument has some natural action upon the thing on which it works instrumentally. But since a sacrament is something corporeal, it cannot have any natural action upon the soul, which is the recipient of grace. And so it cannot be the instrumental cause of grace.
3. Every active cause is either perfective or dispositive, as can be gathered from the words of Avicenna. But a sacrament is not a perfective cause of grace, because in that case it would be its principal cause. Nor is it a dispositive cause, because the disposition for grace is in the same subject that grace is in, the soul, which is not affected by anything corporeal. A sacrament is therefore in no way the cause of grace.
4. If it is the cause of grace, it is so either by its own power or by some power added to it. It is not so by its own power, because in that case any water would sanctify just as well as the water of baptism. Likewise it is not so by any power added to it, because whatever is received into another is received after the manner of the recipient. Thus, since a sacrament is "a material element," as Hugh of St. Victor says, it will not receive anything but a material power, which does not suffice for the production of a spiritual form. A sacrament is therefore in no way the cause of grace.
5. The power received into this "material element" will be either corporeal or incorporeal. If it is incorporeal, since it is an accident and its subject is a body, it will be nobler than its subject; for some thing incorporeal is nobler than a body. If, on the other hand, it is a corporeal power and causes grace, which is a spiritual form and incorporeal, the effect will as a consequence be nobler than its cause. But that again is impossible. It is therefore also impossible for a sacrament to cause grace.
6. It was said in answer that this added power is not something complete in a species but something incomplete. On the contrary, what is incomplete cannot be the cause of what is complete. But grace is something complete, whereas this power is something incomplete. Such an incomplete power therefore cannot be the cause of grace.

7. A perfect agent should have a perfect instrument. But the sacraments act as the instruments of God, who is the most perfect agent. They should therefore be perfect, and so have perfect power.

8. According to Dionysius it is a law of divinity to conduct the intermediate things by means of the first, and the last thing by means of the intermediate. It is therefore against the law of divinity for intermediate or first things to be led back to God by means of the last things. But in the hierarchy of creatures corporeal ones are the last, and spiritual substances are first. It is consequently out of keeping for grace, by which the human mind is led back to God, to be conferred upon it by means of corporeal elements.

9. Augustine distinguishes a twofold action on the part of God: one which He performs "by means of a creature which stands for Him," and another which He immediately performs "by Himself." "To enlighten souls" is of this latter kind. But to confer grace upon a soul is to enlighten it. God therefore does not make use of a sacrament as an intermediate instrument to confer grace.

10. If any power is conferred upon a material element by which it might cause grace, when the sacrament is finished that power either remains or not. If it remains, then in the case of baptismal water after it has been sanctified by the word of life, if a person were to be baptized after another's baptism without the pronouncing of any words, he would be baptized. But that is false. If, on the other hand, it does not remain, since no contrary cause of its perishing can be assigned, it will wear out of itself. But since it is something spiritual and one of the greatest goods, being the cause of grace, it seems incongruous for it to disappear so quickly.

11. An agent is superior to its patient. Thus Augustine proves that a body does not imprint upon the soul the likenesses by which the soul knows. But that a body not joined to the soul should cause in it the supernatural form of grace is even more to be rejected than that the body united to it should cause in it a natural effect. It therefore seems by no means possible that such bodily elements, which are found in the sacraments, should be the cause of grace.

12. The soul disposes itself to have grace more effectively than it is disposed by the sacraments, because the disposition which the soul produces in itself leads to grace even without any sacrament, but not vice versa. Now even though the soul disposes itself for grace, it is not called the cause of grace. Consequently, even if the sacraments in some way dispose for grace, they should not be called the cause of grace.

13. No craftsman uses a tool except in accordance with its fitness, as a carpenter does not use a saw for hewing. But God is a most craftsman. He therefore does not make use of a corporeal instrument for a spiritual effect, which is beyond the competence of a corporeal nature.

14. A physician uses more powerful remedies for more virulent diseases. But the disease of sin is most virulent. Consequently for its cure through the conferring of grace God should have used powerful remedies and not corporeal elements.

15. The re-creation of the soul ought to be similar to its creation. But God created the soul without the intervention of any creature. Then in like manner He should re-create it by means of grace without the intervention of a sacrament.

16. It is a sign of the impotence of the agent to have helps. But instruments help toward producing the effect of the principal agent. Then it does not befit God, who is the most powerful agent, to confer grace by means of the sacraments as His instruments.

17. In every instrument its natural action, which contributes some thing to the effect intended by the principal agent, is required. But the natural action of a material element does not seem

to have any thing to do will the effect of grace which God intends to produce in the soul. In baptism, for instance, the washing does not have any closer bearing upon the soul than the water itself. Such sacraments therefore do not work toward the conferring of grace as instruments.

18. Sacraments are not conferred without a minister. Now if sacraments are in any way the cause of grace, man will in some way be the cause of grace. But that is contrary to the teaching of Augustine, who says that the power of justifying has not been conferred upon the minister, lest hope be placed in a man.

19. In grace Holy Spirit is given. If, then, the sacraments are the cause of grace, they will cause the giving of the Holy Spirit. But that is contrary to Augustine, who says that no creature "can give the Holy Spirit." Sacraments are therefore by no means the cause of grace.

To the Contrary:

1'. Defining a sacrament of the New Law, the Master says: "A sacrament is the visible form of an invisible grace, in the sense that it bears the image and becomes the cause of the grace."

2'. Ambrose says that grace is stronger than guilt. And this is evident also from the Apostle in his Epistle to the Romans (5: 15-19). But guilt is caused in the soul through the infection of the body. Then grace too can be caused in the soul through the sanctification of a bodily element.

3'. Through the institution of the sacraments there is added to the natural instruments either something or nothing. If nothing, then nothing has been conferred upon the world in the institution of the sacraments. But that is unacceptable. If, on the other hand, something is added, since it is not added in vain, the natural instrument will be capable of effecting something that it was previously unable to effect. But this can be only grace, since sacraments were instituted to this end. The sacraments are therefore capable of effecting grace.

4'. It was said that only a certain ordination to grace is added.— On the contrary, an ordination is a relation. But a relation is always founded upon something absolute, on which account there is motion in the category of relation indirectly. Consequently, if an ordination is added, something absolute must be added.

5'. What is absolute is not caused by what is relative, because what is relative has a very weak act of being. Now if nothing but a relation is added to the sacraments by their institution, they will not be able to sanctify by reason of their institution. But this is contrary to Hugh of St. Victor.

6'. It was said that the cause of the sanctification is not that relation but the divine power attached to the sacraments.—On the contrary, the divine power, which is God Himself, is connected with the sacraments after their institution either in a different way than before or not. If not in a different way, they will not have any different effect after their institution than they did before. If, however, in a different way, since God is said to be in a creature in a new way only because He causes a new effect in it, something new will have to be added to the sacraments themselves. And so the conclusion is the same as before.

7'. In certain sacraments consecrated matter is required, as in extreme unction and confirmation. But that consecration is not without purpose. By it, then, some spiritual power is conferred upon the sacraments by reason of which they can be in some measure the cause of grace, since that power is directed to this end.

REPLY:

It is necessary to hold that the sacraments of the New Law are in some sense the cause of grace. For the Old Law was said to kill and to increase the transgressions because it gave knowledge of sin but did not confer any grace as a help against sin. Now if the New Law did not confer grace, it would likewise be said to kill and to increase the transgressions. But the teachings of the apostles proclaim the contrary. It does not, however, confer grace merely by instruction (because even the Old Law had this feature), but by causing grace in some sense through its sacraments. The Church is accordingly not content with the catechizing by which it instructs a convert; but it adds the sacraments that he may have grace, which the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer but merely signified. But signification pertains to instruction. Thus, because the Old Law merely instructed, its sacraments were only signs of grace; whereas, because the New Law both instructs and justifies, its sacraments are both the sign and the cause of grace. But how they are the cause of grace not all explain in the same way.

Some say that they are the cause of grace, not because they themselves by any power vested in them do anything effective for bringing about grace, but because in their reception grace is given by God, who upholds the sacraments. As a result they are called the cause of grace in the manner of an indispensable (*sine qua non*) cause. They give as an example of this the case of a man who hands over a lead nickel and receives a hundred dollars in exchange, not because the lead nickel is the cause which brings on the reception of the hundred dollars, but because one who is able to give it has decreed that whoever brings in such a nickel should receive so much money. It has similarly been decreed by God that whoever sincerely receives the sacraments should receive grace, not indeed from the sacraments but from God Himself. And they say that the Master was of this opinion when he said that one receiving a sacrament seeks salvation in things beneath himself, though not from them.

Now this opinion does not seem sufficiently to safeguard the dignity of the sacraments of the New Law. For if the example proposed by them and similar cases are rightly considered, we find that what they call an indispensable cause is related to the effect only as a sign. For the lead nickel is nothing but a sign of the reception of the money, like the staff of authority which is conferred upon an abbot.

Consequently, if the sacraments of the New Law are so related to grace, it will follow that they are only signs of grace; and thus they will have nothing to set them above the sacraments of the Old Law— unless perhaps one were to say that the sacraments of the New Law are signs of a grace given simultaneously with them, whereas those of the Old Law are signs of a grace that is promised. But this refers more to a difference of time than to the dignity of the sacraments, because at that time grace was promised, but now is the time of the fullness of grace on account of the restoration of human nature already accomplished. According to this opinion, then, if these same sacraments of the New Law had existed then, everything which they now have, they would not have effected anything more than those of the Old Law, nor would the ancient sacraments now effect anything less than the present ones even if nothing were added to them.

We must therefore solve the problem differently and say that the sacraments of the New Law have some effect upon our having grace. Now a thing works for the production of an effect in two ways: (1) By acting of itself. And something is said to act of itself if it acts by means of a form inherent to it after the manner of a complete nature, whether it has that form of itself or from another, and whether naturally or violently. In this way the sun and the moon are said to light things, and fire and red-hot iron and heated water to heat things. (2) A thing is said to work toward the production of an effect instrumentally if it does not do so by means of a form inherent to it but only in so far as it is moved by an agent that acts of itself.

It is the nature of an instrument as instrument to move something else when moved itself. The motion by which the instrument is moved by the principal agent is therefore related to the

instrument as a complete form is related to an agent acting of itself. It is in this way, for instance, that a saw works upon a bench. Now although the saw has an action which attaches to it in accordance with its own form, that is, to divide, nevertheless it has an effect which does not attach to it except in so far as it is moved by a craftsman, namely, to make a straight cut agreeing with the pattern. Thus an instrument has two operations, one which belongs to it according to its own form, and another which belongs to it in so far as it is moved by the principal agent and which rises above the ability of its own form.

We must therefore say that neither a sacrament nor any other creature can give grace as a principal agent, because this is proper to the divine power exclusively, as is evident from the preceding article. But the sacraments work instrumentally toward the production of grace. This is explained as follows.

Damascene says that in Christ His human nature was like a tool of His divinity, and thus His human nature shared somewhat in the working of the divine power. By touching a leper, for instance, Christ made him clean. The very touch of Christ thus caused the health of the leper instrumentally.

It was not merely in corporeal effects that Christ's human nature shared instrumentally in the effect of the divine power but also in spiritual effects. Thus Christ's blood poured out for us had the ability to wash away sins, as is said in the Apocalypse (1:5): "Christ] washed us from our sins in his own blood," and in the Epistle to the Romans (3: 24): "Being justified...in his blood."

Thus the humanity of Christ is the instrumental cause of justification. This cause is applied to us spiritually through faith and bodily through the sacraments, because Christ's humanity is both spirit and body. This is done to the end that we may receive within ourselves the effect of sanctification, which is had through Christ. As a consequence the most perfect sacrament is that in which the body of Christ is really contained, the Eucharist; and it is the consummation of all the others, as Dionysius says. But the other sacraments also share some of the efficacy by which Christ's humanity works instrumentally for our justification. By reason of it a person sanctified by baptism is said by the Apostle in the Epistle to the Hebrews (10: 10—22) to be sanctified by the blood of Christ. Christ's passion is accordingly said to work in the sacraments of the New Law. Thus the sacraments of the New Law are causes of grace working in some sense instrumentally to produce it.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Bernard does not deal adequately with the nature of the sacraments of the New Law, for he speaks of them inasmuch as they are signs and not inasmuch as they are causes.
2. The sacraments of the New Law are not the principal cause of grace as agents acting of themselves, but the instrumental cause; and after the manner of other instruments they have a twofold action: one which surpasses its own form, being from the power of the form of the principal agent, God; and this is to justify; and another which they exercise according to their own form, as to wash or to anoint. This latter action affects in a bodily manner the man who is justified in his body directly and in his soul, which senses the bodily action, indirectly. But it affects in a spiritual manner the soul itself inasmuch as by means of the intellect the soul perceives it as a sign of a spiritual Cleansing.
3. Because the last end corresponds to the first agent as principal to principal, for this reason not the last end but a disposition for the last end is attributed to instrumental agents. And so the sacraments are said to be the cause of grace as disposing instruments.

4. The sacraments do not work for the production of grace by the power of their own form, for in that case they would work as principal agents; but they work by the power of the principal agent, God, existing in them. That power does not have a complete act of being in nature, but is something incomplete in the line of being. That is shown from the fact that an instrument moves in so far as it is moved. But motion is "an imperfect act" according to the Philosopher. Consequently, things which cause motion as being at the term of the motion and already assimilated to the agent, move by means of a perfect form; but things which cause motion as being in the midst of motion, move by means of an incomplete power. It is this sort of power which is in the air to move sight in so far as it is changed by the colour of a wall, in the sense of being in process and not in that of already being in the completed state. The species of the colour is accordingly in the air after the manner of an intention, and not after the manner of a complete being as it is in the wall.

In the same way the sacraments have an effect upon grace inasmuch as they are, as it were, moved by God to this effect. And that motion can be considered on the basis of their institution, their sanctification, and their application to the one who goes to the sacraments. They consequently do not have their efficacy after the manner of a complete being, but in a sense incompletely. Thus it is not out of keeping for a spiritual power to be in a material being, just as the species of colour are spiritually in the air.

5. That power cannot, properly speaking, be called either corporeal or incorporeal; for corporeal and incorporeal are differences of complete being. Properly it is called a power for something incorporeal, just as motion is rather said to be to a being than a being. But the difficulty argues as if that power were a complete form.

6. Something incomplete cannot be the cause of something complete as a principal agent; yet something incomplete can in a sense be directed after the manner of a cause to something complete, as we say that the motion of the instrument is the cause of the form introduced by the principal agent.

7. It does not pertain to the perfection of an instrument to act by a complete power, but to act in so far as it is moved, and thus by an incomplete power. It therefore does not follow that the sacraments are imperfect instruments even though their power is not a complete being.

8. An instrument is related to an action more like that by which it is done than like that which does it; for the principal agent acts by means of the instrument. Accordingly, although the lowest beings do not lead the intermediate or highest beings back to God, they can still serve as the means by which the intermediate and higher beings are led back to God. Consequently Dionysius also says that it is con natural for us to be led to God by means of sensible things, and he gives this as the reason for the necessity of visible sacraments.

9. It is suitable for God to enlighten the soul without the intervention of any creature which would act in this work as a principal agent acting of itself. There can nevertheless be a means acting instrumentally and dispositively.

10. There are some sacraments in which consecrated matter is required, e.g., extreme unction and confirmation; but there are others in which this is not required as necessary for the sacrament. It is therefore true in the case of all that the power of the sacrament does not consist in the matter alone, but in the matter and form together, both of which constitute a single sacrament. Consequently, however much the matter of the sacrament is applied to a man, if the due form of the words and the other requisites are missing, the effect of the sacrament does not follow.

But in the case of the sacraments which need consecrated matter, the power of the sacrament remains partially though not completely in the matter of the sacrament after its use. But in the

case of the sacraments which do not need consecrated matter, nothing remains after the use of the sacrament. Thus the water with which baptism has been conferred has nothing more than any other water, unless it be because of the mingling of the chrism, which is not, however, necessary for the sacrament. Nor is there anything incongruous in the fact that the power ceases immediately, because that power is like a thing in the process of becoming and moving, as has been said. Such things cease to exist when the motion of the mover ceases; for as soon as the mover ceases to move, the mobile ceases to be moved.

11. Although a bodily element is inferior to the soul, and for this reason cannot effect anything in the soul by virtue of its own nature, it can nonetheless effect something in the soul inasmuch as it is an instrument acting by the divine power.

12. In disposing itself for grace the soul acts by virtue of its own nature, whereas a sacrament acts by the divine virtue as God's instrument. And so the case is not the same.

13. In keeping will its own form a sacrament signifies or is such as to signify the effect to which it is divinely ordained. In this respect it is a suitable instrument, because the sacraments cause by signifying.

14. The sacraments of the New Law are not weak remedies, but powerful, seeing that the passion of Christ works in them. The sacraments of the Old Law, however, which preceded the passion of Christ, are called weak, as appears in the Epistle to the Galatians (4:9): "You have turned to the weak and needy elements."

15. Creation does not presuppose anything in which the action of an instrumental agent could terminate, but re-creation does. There is accordingly no parallel.

16. It is not because of His own need but for the meetness of the effects that God uses instruments or intervening causes in His action. For it is meet that the divine remedies should be presented to us conformably to our condition, that is, through sensible things, as Dionysius says.

17. The natural action of a material instrument helps toward the effect of the sacrament in so far as the sacrament is applied by it to the recipient and in so far as the signification of the sacrament is completed by the said action, as the signification of baptism by washing.

18. There are some sacraments in which a definite minister is not required, as in baptism. In these the power of the sacrament is not situated in the minister at all. But there are some sacraments in which a definite minister is required. The power of these is partially situated in the minister as well as in the matter and the form. And yet the minister is not said to justify except by way of the ministry, inasmuch as he cooperates in justification by conferring a sacrament.

19. The Holy Spirit is given only by him who causes grace as the principal agent; and this is the business of God alone. Thus only God gives the Holy Spirit.

ARTICLE V: IN ONE MAN IS THERE ONLY ONE INGRATIATORY GRACE?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 26, a. 6; IV Sentences 1, 2, 4 sol. 5.

Difficulties:

It seems that there is not, for

1. Nothing is distinguished from itself. But grace is distinguished into operating and cooperating grace. Operating and cooperating grace are therefore different kinds, and in one man there is not just one ingratiatory grace.
2. It was said in answer that operating and cooperating grace are one and the same from the viewpoint of the habit, but the distinction is made from the viewpoint of the distinct acts.—On the contrary, habits are distinguished by their acts. If, then, the acts are distinct, the two kinds of grace cannot be a single habit.
3. No one has to ask for what he already has. But a person who has antecedent grace has to ask for subsequent grace, according to Augustine. Antecedent grace and subsequent grace are therefore not one and the same.
4. It was said that a person having antecedent grace does not ask for subsequent grace as a distinct grace but as the preservation of the same one.—On the contrary, grace is stronger than nature. But man in the state of uncorrupted nature was able by himself to remain in possession of what he had received, as is said in the Sentences. Consequently one who has received antecedent grace is able to remain in it, and so he does not have to ask for this.
5. Form is distinguished in the same way as the things to be perfected. But grace is the form of virtues. Since there are many virtues, grace therefore cannot be one.
6. Antecedent grace refers to this present life, but subsequent grace refers to glory. Thus Augustine says: "It precedes in order that we may live piously, and it follows in order that we may always live with God; it precedes that we may be called, and it follows that we may be glorified." Now the grace of this present life is different from that of our heavenly home, since nature as created and nature as glorified do not have the same perfection, as the Master says. Antecedent grace and subsequent grace are therefore not the same.
7. Operating grace pertains to the internal act, whereas cooperating grace pertains to the external act. Augustine thus says: "It precedes in order that we may will, and it follows lest we will in vain." But the principle of the internal act and that of the external act are not the same. In regard to the virtues, for instance, it is evident that charity is given for the internal act, but fortitude, justice, and the like for external acts. Consequently operating and cooperating grace or antecedent and subsequent grace are not the same.
8. Ignorance is a defect in the soul on the part of the intellect like guilt on the part of the will. But no one habit drives all ignorance out of the intellect. Consequently there cannot be a single habit which would drive all guilt out of the will. But grace drives out all guilt. Then grace is not a single habit.
9. Grace and guilt are contraries. But a single guilt does not infect all the powers of the soul. Then neither can a single grace perfect all.
10. On the words of Exodus (33:13): "If therefore I have found favour..." the Gloss comments: "A single grace is not sufficient for the saints; there is one which precedes in order that they may know and love God; and there is another which follows in order that they may keep themselves clean and inviolate and make progress." There is accordingly not merely one grace in one man.
11. A different manner of acting having a special difficulty requires different habit. In regard to the granting of large gifts, for example, which cause difficulty because of their magnitude, there is required a special virtue, magnificence, over and above liberality, which is concerned with ordinary gifts. But to persevere in willing rightly has a special difficulty over and above that of simply willing. But simply to will rightly is a matter of antecedent grace, whereas perseverance in willing rightly is a matter of subsequent grace. Thus Augustine says that

grace precedes in order that man may will, and follows in order that he may fulfil and persist. Subsequent grace is therefore in different habit from antecedent grace.

12. The sacraments of the New Law are the cause of grace, as has been said. But different sacraments are not ordained to the same effect. Consequently there are different graces in man which are conferred by the different sacraments.

13. It was answered that later sacraments are not conferred in order to introduce grace but to increase it.—On the contrary, the increase of grace does not change its species. If, then, causes are proportioned to their effects, it will follow from the answer given that the sacraments do not differ in species.

14. It was said that the sacraments differ specifically in accordance with the different gratuitous graces which are conferred in the different sacraments and are the distinctive effects of the sacraments.— On the contrary, gratuitous grace is not opposed to guilt. Now since the sacraments are especially directed against guilt, it therefore seems that the distinctive effects of the sacraments, in accordance with which the sacraments are distinguished, are not gratuitous graces.

15. Different wounds are inflicted upon the soul by different sins, but all are healed by grace. Since different medicines correspond to different wounds, because (in the words of Jerome) "what heals a heel will not heal an eye," it therefore seems that there are distinct graces.

16. The same thing cannot at the same time be had and not had by the same thing. But some people who do not have cooperating grace do have operating grace—baptized infants, for instance. Operating grace and cooperating grace are therefore not the same.

17. Grace is proportioned to nature as a perfection to a perfectible thing. But in human nature it so happens that being and operation are not immediately from the same principle; for the soul is the principle of being on the basis of its essence, but that of operation on the basis of its power. Now since on the supernatural plane operating or antecedent grace is the principle from which spiritual existence is had, but cooperating grace is the principle of spiritual operation, it therefore seems that operating and cooperating grace are not the same.

18. One habit cannot produce two acts at one and the same time. But the act of operating grace, which is to justify or heal the soul, and the act of cooperating or subsequent grace, which is to act justly, are in the soul at the same time. Operating grace and cooperating grace are therefore not identical; and so there is not just one grace in man.

To the Contrary:

1'. Where one thing suffices it is superfluous to posit many. But one grace suffices for man's salvation, as is said in the second Epistle to the Corinthians (12:9): "My grace is sufficient for thee." Then there is only one grace in man.

2'. A relation does not multiply the essence of a thing. But cooperating grace does not add anything to operating grace except a relation. Cooperating grace is therefore essentially the same as operating grace.

REPLY:

As is clear from what has been said, grace is so called either because it is gratuitously given or because it puts us in God's good graces. Now it is evident that there are different graces gratuitously given. For there are different gifts which are conferred upon man by God gratuitously and above the merit and capability of human nature, such as prophecy, the working of miracles, and the like, of which the Apostle says in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:4): "Now there are diversities of graces." But our present inquiry is not concerned with these. But as can be gathered from what has been said, the grace that puts us in

God's good graces, or ingratiatory grace, is taken in two ways: (1) for the divine acceptance itself, which is the gratuitous will of God, and (2) for a created gift which formally perfects a man and makes him worthy of eternal life.

Now if we take grace in this second sense, it is impossible for more than one grace to be in one man. The reason for this is that grace is spoken of inasmuch as by it man is destined for eternal life, and adequately. For to have grace means to be accepted by God with a view to having eternal life. Now anything held to direct things adequately to one term must itself be only one, because if there were many such, either no one of them would be adequate or every other would be superfluous.

But it is not necessary on this account for grace to be one simple thing. For it is possible that no one thing would sufficiently make a man worthy of eternal life, but that man would be made worthy of it by many things, as by many virtues. But if that were the case, no one of those many things would be called grace, but all taken together would be called one grace, because from all of them there would arise in the man only one worthiness with regard to eternal life. Grace is, however, not one in this way, but rather as one simple habit. This is so because habits in the soul are differentiated in relation to different acts. The acts themselves, however, are not the reason for the divine acceptance; but first the man is accepted by God and then his acts, as is indicated in Genesis (4:4): "And the Lord had respect to Abel, and to his offerings."

That gift, then, which God grants to those whom He accepts into His kingdom and glory is presupposed to the perfections or habits by which human acts are perfected so as to be worthy of acceptance by God. Thus the habit of grace must remain undivided, as preceding the things by which the differentiation of habits takes place in the soul.

If, on the other hand, grace is taken in the first sense, namely, for God's gratuitous will, then it is evident that from the viewpoint of God who does the accepting there is only one grace of God, not only in regard to one man, but also in regard to all, because whatever is in Him cannot be distinct. But from the viewpoint of its effects it can be multiple. As a result we say that every effect which God works in us by His gratuitous will accepting us into His kingdom, pertains to ingratiatory grace, such as giving us good thoughts and holy affections.

In so far, then, as grace is a habitual gift within us, it is only one; but in so far as it refers to an effect of God within us destined for our salvation, there can be said to be many graces in us.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Operating and cooperating grace can be distinguished from the Truth point of view of God's gratuitous will and from that of the gift conferred upon us. Grace is called operating in regard to an effect which the will of God brings about in us, whereas grace is called cooperating in regard to an effect which God's will does not produce alone, but with the cooperation of our free choice.

From the point of view of God's gratuitous will, therefore, the very justification of a sinner, which is brought about by means of the infusion of a gratuitous gift, will be called operating grace. For only God's gratuitous will causes this gift in us, and free choice is in no way its cause except as a disposition, and that is inadequate. From the same point of view grace will be called cooperating inasmuch as it works in our free choice, causing its movement, removing the obstacles to the execution of the external act, and giving perseverance, in all of which our free choice plays a part. Thus it is clear that operating grace is distinct from cooperating grace.

From the point of view of the gratuitous gift essentially the same grace will be called operating and cooperating. It will be called operating grace in so far as it informs the soul, so that the term operating will be understood formally, in the way in which we speak of whiteness making a wall white. For this information it is nowise the act of our free choice. It will be called cooperating, however, in so far as it inclines us to the internal and the external act and supplies the ability to persevere to the end.

2. The different effects which are attributed to operating and to cooperating grace cannot differentiate the habit. For the effects which are attributed to operating grace are the causes of the effects which are attributed to cooperating grace. As a consequence of being informed by a habit, the will passes into the act of willing, and from the act of willing the external act is caused. Moreover the resistance which we offer to sin is caused by the firmness of the habit. Thus it is one and the same habit which informs the soul, elicits the internal and the external act, and in a sense accounts for perseverance inasmuch as it resists temptations.

3. However much a man has the habit of grace, he still has need of the divine operation working in us in the ways mentioned above. This is because of the infirmity of our nature and the multiplicity of impediments, which were of course not found in the state of nature as it was created. Man was accordingly better able to stand by himself than even those who have grace can now, not because of any deficiency in the grace but because of the infirmity of our nature, though even then men needed divine providence to guide and help them. One who has grace therefore has the necessity of asking for divine help, which is a form of cooperating grace.

4. The answer is clear from what has just been said.

5. Grace is not called the form of the virtues as being an essential part of the virtues. Were that the case, when the virtues are multiplied, grace would have to be multiplied. But it is called the form of the virtues as formally completing the act of virtue.

Now an act of virtue is given form in three ways. This is done first of all in so far as the due conditions for the substance of the act are placed, setting limits to the act and establishing it in the mean of virtue. The act of virtue has this from prudence; for the mean of virtue is determined by a correct norm, as is said in the Ethics. In this sense prudence is called the form of all the moral virtues. But the act of virtue thus established in the mean is, as it were, material in regard to the ordination to the last end. This order is conferred upon the act of virtue by the command of charity. In this sense charity is said to be the form of all the other virtues. And furthermore grace contributes efficacy for meriting. For no value on the part of our works would be held to be deserving of eternal glory unless divine acceptance were presupposed. In this sense grace is said to be the form both of charity and of the other virtues.

6. Antecedent and subsequent grace are distinguished on the basis of the sequence of factors found in gratuitous existence. The first of these is the information of the subject by grace or the justification of a sinner (which is the same thing). The second is the act of the will. The third is the external act. The fourth is spiritual progress and perseverance in good. The fifth is the obtaining of one's reward.

Antecedent and subsequent grace are therefore distinguished in the following ways: (1) The grace by which sinners are justified is called antecedent; that by which those already justified operate is called subsequent. (2) That by which a person wills correctly is called antecedent; that by which he carries out his correct will in the external act is called subsequent. (3) Antecedent grace is referred to all of these; subsequent grace, to perseverance in the foregoing. (4) Antecedent grace is referred to the whole state of merit; subsequent grace, to reward.

In the first three distinctions it is clear from what was said about operating grace and cooperating grace, in what sense antecedent grace and subsequent grace are the same or different, because in these ways antecedent and subsequent grace seem to be the same as operating and cooperating grace. According to the fourth distinction too, if the gratuitous gift which is called grace is taken in itself, antecedent grace and subsequent grace are found to be the same thing. For just as the charity of this present life is not taken away but remains and is increased in our heavenly home because it involves no defect in its essence; in the same way grace too, involving no defect in its essence, when increased becomes glory. Nor is the perfection of nature in the present life and in heaven said to be different in point of grace because of any difference in the perfecting form but because of a difference in the measure of perfection. But if we take grace along with all the virtues to which it gives form, then grace and glory are not the same thing, because some virtues, such as faith and hope, are voided in heaven.

7. Although the external act and the internal act are distinct subjects of perfection, they are nevertheless subordinated, because one is the cause of the other, as has been explained.'

8. There are two aspects to be taken into account in sin: turning towards creatures and turning away from God. As regards turning toward creatures sins are distinguished from one another, but as regards turning away from God they are linked, inasmuch as by any mortal sin a man is turned away from the unchangeable good. Virtues are therefore opposed to sins from the standpoint of turning toward creatures, and in this sense different sins are driven out by different virtues, as different types of ignorance by different sciences. From the standpoint of turning away from God, however, all sins are forgiven by one and the same thing, grace. But different types of ignorance are not linked in any one thing; and so the case is not the same.

9. One type of guilt is not found to be the formal completion of all types of guilt as one habit of virtue or of grace completes all the virtues. For this reason one type of guilt does not infect all the powers as one grace perfects them—not, of course, in such a way that it is in all as its subject, but as giving form to the acts of all the powers.

10. The grace which follows means either another effect of the divine gratuitous will or the same habit of grace referred to another effect, as is clear from what has been said above.

11. To have the habit and the operation firmly and unchangeably is a condition which is required for every virtue, as is made clear by the Philosopher. That manner, then, does not require a special habit.

12. Just as different virtues and different gifts of the Holy Spirit are directed to different actions, so too the different effects of the sacraments are like different medicines for sin and different shares in the efficacy of our Lord's passion, which depend upon sanctifying grace, as do the virtues and gifts.

The virtues and gifts have a special name, however, because the acts to which they are directed are evident. They are accordingly distinguished from grace in name also. But the defects of sin, against which the sacraments are instituted, are hidden. Hence the effects of the sacraments do not have a proper name but go by the name of grace; for they are called sacramental graces, and the sacraments are distinguished on the basis of these graces as their proper effects. Those effects, moreover, belong to ingratiatory grace, which also is joined to those effects. Thus along with their proper effects they have a common effect, ingratiatory grace, which is given by means of the sacraments to one who does not have it and increased by them in one who does.

13—14. The answer is clear from the above.

15. From the point of view of turning away from God all sins inflict a single wound, as has been said, and so are healed by a single gift of grace. But from the point of view of turning towards creatures they inflict different wounds, which are healed by different virtues and by the different effects of the sacraments.

i 6. Even though there is no cooperating grace in infants actually, there is nonetheless virtually; for the operating grace which they have received will be sufficient to cooperate will free choice when they have its use.

17. Just as the essence of the soul is immediately the principle of being but, through the mediation of the powers, the principle of acting; in the same way the immediate effect of grace is to confer spiritual existence. This concerns the information of the subject or the justification of sinners and is the effect of operating grace. But the effect of grace through the mediation of the virtues and gifts is to elicit meritorious acts, and this has reference to cooperating grace.

18. Two acts which are distinct operations not subordinated to one another cannot be caused at one and the same time by one habit. But two acts of which one is an operation and the other the information of a subject, or even two operations of which one is the cause of the other, as an internal act is the cause of an external, can be caused by one habit. It is in this way that operating and cooperating grace are related, as appears from what has been said.

ARTICLE VI: IS GRACE IN THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 26, a. 3; IV Sentences, 1, sol. s; sol. 3 ad s; Sum. Theol., I-II, 110, 4.

Difficulties

It seems that it is not, for

1. A habit or perfection which is in the essence of the soul has the same relation to the effect of the essence as a habit which is in a power has to the effect of the power. But a habit which is in a power perfects the power for its act, as charity perfects the will for willing. But the proper effect of the essence is to be, which the soul confers upon the body, because the soul in its essence is the form of the body. Now since grace does not perfect the soul will regard to the natural act of being which the soul confers upon the body, it will not be in the essence of the soul as its subject.

2. Opposites are by their nature concerned with the same thing. Now grace and guilt are opposed. But guilt is not in the essence of the soul, as is evident from the fact that the essence of the soul suffers no privation, though according to Augustine sin or guilt is "the privation of measure, species, and order." it therefore seems that grace is not in the essence of the soul as its subject.

3. Gratuitous gifts presuppose natural ones. But the powers are natural properties of the soul according to Avicenna. Grace is there fore not in the essence of the soul unless a power is presupposed. Thus it is immediately in the power as its subject.

4. A habit or form is there where its effect is found. But any effect of grace, whether operating or cooperating, is found in the powers, as can be seen from an enumeration of the effects. Grace therefore has the powers of the soul as its subject.

5. "The image of re-creation" corresponds to "the image of creation." These two sorts of image are distinguished in the Gloss in its comment upon the words of the Psalm (4:7): "The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." But the image of creation is taken with reference to the powers, memory, intelligence, and will, which are three faculties of the soul, as the Master says. Then grace also refers to the powers of the soul.

6. Acquired habits are distinguished from infused habits. But all acquired habits are in the powers of the soul. Then so is grace, which is a habitual infused gift.

7. According to Augustine "the good will of man is prepared" by means of grace. But this is done only in so far as the will is perfected by means of grace. Grace is therefore a perfection of the will, and so it has as its subject the will and not the essence of the soul.

To the Contrary:

1'. Grace is in the soul in that respect in which the soul is ordained to God. But the whole soul is ordained to God as being in potency to receive something from Him. The soul in its totality is therefore capable of receiving grace. But in the soul the whole is the substance itself, whereas the parts are powers. The soul in its substance is therefore the subject of grace.

2'. The first gift of God is in that which is in us first and is closest to God. But grace is the first gift of God in us, "for it precedes both faith and charity" and other such gifts, as Augustine brings out. But what is first and nearest to God in us is the essence of the soul, from which the powers flow. Grace therefore has its subject in the essence of the soul.

3'. The same created thing cannot be in distinct subjects. But grace is something created. It therefore cannot be in distinct powers. But since grace extends to the acts of all the powers inasmuch as they are meritorious, it is either in the essence of the soul or in all the powers. But it is not in all. Therefore it is in the essence of the soul as its subject.

4'. A secondary cause receives the influence of the first cause before the effect of the secondary cause does. But the soul's essence is the principle of its powers, and so it is the secondary cause of the powers, whose first cause is God. The soul's essence therefore receives the influence of grace before its powers do.

REPLY:

As was said above, there are two opinions about grace. There is one which says that grace and virtue are the same essentially. According to this opinion it is necessary to say that in reality grace is in a power as its subject. This is because a virtue, which perfects for operating, cannot be anywhere but in a power, the principle of operation. But according to this opinion, by a sort of appropriation it can be said that grace looks to the essence, and virtue to a power, in so far as grace and virtue differ conceptually though not essentially; for being constituted in grace refers to the soul itself before it refers to its act, since the soul is not accepted by God on account of its acts but vice versa, as has been said.

The other opinion, which we hold, is that grace and virtue are not the same essentially. According to this opinion it is necessary to say that grace has as its subject the essence of the soul and not the powers; for in view of the ordination of powers as such to operations, the perfection of powers according to their proper character must be ordained to operation. Now what constitutes the formal character of a virtue is that it proximately perfects a power to act rightly. Consequently, if grace were in a power of the soul, it would have to be the same as some virtue. If, then, this is not maintained, it is necessary to say that grace is in the essence of the soul, perfecting it inasmuch as it gives it a spiritual existence and makes it by a certain assimilation "a partaker of the divine nature," in the words of the second Epistle of St. Peter (1:4), just as virtues perfect the powers to operate rightly.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Even though grace is not the principle of natural existence, it nevertheless perfects natural existence inasmuch as it adds to it a spiritual existence.
2. Actual guilt can be only in a power, which is the principle of an act, but original guilt is in the soul as to its essence; through its essence it is joined to flesh as its form, and from the flesh the original infection is contracted in the soul. And even though none of its essentials are taken away, nevertheless the ordination of the soul's essence to grace is hindered by a sort of remoteness, as contrary dispositions make the potency of the matter remote from the act of the form.
3. Gratuitous gifts presuppose natural ones if both kinds are taken proportionally. Thus virtue, which is the gratuitous principle of operation, presupposes a power, which is the natural principle of the same thing; and grace, which is the principle of spiritual existence, presupposes the essence of the soul, which is the principle of natural existence.
4. The first and immediate effect of grace is found in the essence of the soul, namely, information in the line of spiritual existence.
5. "The image of creation" is situated in both the essence and the powers according as the unity of the divine essence is represented by the essence of the soul, and the distinction of the divine persons by the distinction of the powers. Similarly "the image of re-creation" is found in grace and the virtues.
6. Acquired habits are caused by our acts, and so they do not belong to the soul except through the mediation of the powers of which they are the acts. But grace is from the divine influence, and so there is no parallel.
7. Grace prepares the will by means of charity, of which grace is the form.

ARTICLE VII: IS GRACE IN THE SACRAMENTS?

Parallel readings: I Sentences i q, i sol. r ad 2; IV Sentences 1, 1, 4 sol. Sum. Theol., 1, 6 ad 4; III, 6; 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. Guilt is opposed to grace. But guilt is not anything corporeal. Then neither is grace in the sacraments, which are "material elements" according to Hugh of St. Victor.
2. Grace is subordinated to glory. But only a rational nature is capable of glory. Consequently, in it alone can there be grace, and therefore not in the sacraments.
3. Grace is counted among the greatest goods. But the greatest goods are in intermediate goods as their subject. Now since the intermediate goods are the soul and its powers, it seems that grace cannot be in any other subject, and therefore not in the sacraments.
4. A spiritual subject stands to a spiritual accident as a corporeal subject to a corporeal accident. Then by transposition, a spiritual subject stands to a corporeal accident as a corporeal subject to a spiritual accident. But a corporeal accident cannot be in any spiritual subject. Then neither can the spiritual accident, grace, be in the corporeal elements of the sacraments.

To the Contrary:

1' Hugh of St. Victor says: "From their sanctification the sacraments contain an invisible grace."

2' In his Epistle to the Galatians (1.:9) the Apostle says that the sacraments of the Law are "weak and needy elements," and this is because they do not contain grace, as the Gloss explains. Then if grace were not in the sacraments of the New Law, they also would be "weak and needy elements" themselves. But that is absurd.

3' On the words of the Psalm (17:12): "And he made darkness his covert," the Gloss comments: "The forgiveness of sins has been placed in baptism." Now the forgiveness of sins is had through grace. Grace is therefore in the sacrament of baptism, and for like reason in the other sacraments.

REPLY:

Grace is in the sacraments, not as an accident in a subject, but as an effect in a cause—in the manner in which the sacraments can be the cause of grace. Now an effect can be said to be in its cause in two ways. In one way it is in the cause inasmuch as the cause has control over the effect, as our acts are said to be in us. In this sense no effect is in an instrumental cause, which does not move except when moved. Consequently neither is grace in the sacraments. In another way it is in the cause by means of its own likeness, inasmuch as the cause produces an effect like itself. This happens in four ways:

(1) When the likeness of the effect is in the cause as regards its natural existence and in the same manner, as it is in univocal effects. In this way it can be said that the heat of the air is in the lire which heats it.

(2) When the likeness of the effect is in the cause as regards its natural existence but not in the same manner, as is the case with equivocal effects. In this way the heat of the air is in the sun.

(3) When the likeness of the effect is in the cause not as regards its natural existence but as regards a spiritual existence, and yet statically, as the likenesses of works of art are in the mind of the artist; for the form of a house in the builder is not a real being, like the heating power in the sun or heat in a fire, but it is an intellectual intention at repose in the soul.

(4) When the likeness of the effect is in the cause not in the same manner nor as a real being nor statically, but as a dynamic influence, as the likenesses of effects are in instruments, through the mediation of which forms flow from the principal causes into their effects. It is in this way that grace is in the sacraments, and even less, seeing that the sacraments do not arrive directly and immediately at the grace of which we are now speaking in itself, but at their proper effects, called sacramental graces, upon which the infusion or increase of ingratulatory grace follows.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Even guilt is in something purely corporeal as its cause; that is, original sin is in the seed.

2-3. These difficulties conclude that grace is not in the sacraments as its subject.

4. Something spiritual cannot be the instrument of a corporeal thing, as a corporeal thing may be of a spiritual. Thus the transposed proportion does not hold in the case at hand.

Contrary Difficulties:

We concede these arguments, yet will the understanding that grace is in the sacraments as its instrumental and disposing causes, and this by reason of the power through which they work toward the production of grace.

QUESTION 28: Justification of Sinners

ARTICLE I: IS THE JUSTIFICATION OF SINNERS THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS?

Parallel readings: IV Sentences 17, 1, x sol. i & g; Sum. Theol., I-II, 11 1 & 6; Comp. I, 239.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. Justification gets its name from justice, which is one of the virtues. But the forgiveness of sins is not effected by one virtue alone, for sins are not opposed to just one virtue but to all. Justification is therefore not the forgiveness of sins.
2. The answer was given that the forgiveness of sins is effected by generic justice the contrary, generic justice is the same as all virtue, according to the Philosopher.¹ But the forgiveness of sins is not the effect of virtue but of grace. The forgiveness of sins should therefore not be called justification but rather the conferring of grace.
3. If the forgiveness of sins is effected by any virtue, it should be by that one in particular which cannot coexist with sin. But this is charity, which is never unformed. The forgiveness of sins should therefore not be attributed to justice but rather to charity.
4. The same is seen from the words of Proverbs (10: 12): "Charity covered all sins."
5. Sin is the spiritual death of the soul. Now life is opposed to death. Since in Holy Scripture spiritual life is especially attributed with faith, as in Habacuc (2:4) and the Epistle to the Romans (1:17): "The just man lived by faith," it therefore seems that the forgiveness of sins should be ascribed to faith and not to justice.
6. The same is seen from the words of the Acts (15:9): "purifying their hearts by faith."
7. Justification precedes grace just as a motion precedes its term. But the forgiveness of sins follows grace as an effect follows its cause. Justification is therefore prior to the forgiveness of sins, and so the two are not the same.
8. The act of justice is to return what is due. But what is due to a sinner is not pardon but rather punishment. The forgiveness of sins should therefore not be attributed to justice.
9. "Justice is concerned with merit; mercy, with misery," as Bernard says. But a sinner has no merit but is rather in a state of misery, because "sin maketh nations miserable," as is written in Proverbs (14:34). The forgiveness of sins should therefore not be attributed to justice but rather to mercy.
10. The answer was given that, although there is no condign merit in the sinner, there is congruous merit. -On the contrary-, justice demands equality. But congruous merit is not equal to the reward. Then congruous merit is not sufficient for the notion of justice.
11. The forgiveness of sins is one of four prerequisites for the justification of sinners. The justification of sinners is therefore not the forgiveness of sins.
12. Whoever becomes just is justified. But some have become just without having had any sins forgiven, as Christ and (if he had grace) the first man while in the state of innocence. Justification is therefore not the forgiveness of sins.

To the Contrary:

In commenting upon the words of the Epistle to the Romans (8:30): "Whom he called, them he also justified," the Gloss adds "by the forgiveness of sins." The forgiveness of sins is therefore justification.

REPLY:

There is no difference between motion and change. For a single motion is that by which something signified affirmatively is lost and something else signified affirmatively is acquired. "Motion is from a subject to a subject," as is said in the Physics. By subject is meant here something affirmatively designated, as white or black. Hence there is no single motion of alteration by which white is lost and black is acquired. But it is otherwise with becoming and perishing, which are types of change. For becoming is a change from a non-subject to subject, as from non-white to white; and perishing is a change from a subject to a non-subject, as from white to non-white. Thus in the loss of one thing that is affirmed and in the acquisition of another two changes must be understood, one of which is becoming and the other perishing, in either an unrestricted or a restricted sense. If, then, in the passage from whiteness to blackness we consider the motion itself, the very same motion is designated by the removal of the one and the introduction of the other. But the same change is not designated, but rather different ones which are nevertheless associated, because the becoming of the one does not take place without the perishing of the other.

Now justification means a motion to justice, just as whitening means a motion to whiteness, though justification could also signify the formal effect of justice; for justice justifies in the same way as whiteness makes white.

If, then, justification is taken as a motion, since we must mean the same motion by which sin is removed and justice is introduced, justification will be the same as the forgiveness of sins. They will differ only in concept, seeing that both names apply to the same motion, but one designates it with reference to the starting point, the other will reference to the final term. If, however, justification is taken in the line of change, then justification will signify one change, namely, the coming of justice into being, and the forgiveness of sins will signify another, the perishing of guilt. From this point of view justification and the forgiveness of sins will not be the same except by association. But in whichever way justification is taken, it must get its name from a justice which is opposed to any sin whatever; for not only is motion from contrary to contrary, but also becoming and perishing, when taken in a common reference, apply to contraries. Justice is used, however, in three different ways:

(1) As a specific virtue distinguished from the other cardinal virtues, in this sense justice is spoken of as the virtue by which man is directed in acts which contribute to community life, such as the different types of contracts. Now this virtue is not contrary to every sin, but only to those sins which are concerned with such interchanges, as theft, robbery, and the like. Justice cannot, therefore, be taken in this sense in the present context.

(2) It is used of legal justice, identified by the Philosopher with all virtue, as differing from virtue only in concept. In so far as virtue directs its act to the common good, which is also the aim of the legislator, it is called legal justice because it upholds the law, as when a brave man fights valiantly on the field of battle for the safety of the commonwealth. It is thus evident that, although every virtue is in some sense legal justice, yet not every act of virtue is an act of legal justice, but only one which is directed to the common good, as can be true of the act of any virtue. Consequently, neither is every act of sin opposed to legal justice. Then neither can the justification which is identified with the forgiveness of sins be so designated from legal justice.

(3) Justice designates a distinctive state in which man stands in the right relation to God, to his neighbour, and to himself, so that his lower powers are subject to the higher. This is what the Philosopher calls "justice taken metaphorically," since it is viewed as between different powers of the same person, whereas justice in the proper sense is always between different persons. To justice in this sense every sin is opposed, since some of the order mentioned is destroyed by every sin. Consequently it is from this sort of justice that justification gets its name, whether it is taken as a motion from a starting point or as the formal effect of a form.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. That objection is based upon specific justice.
2. Justification is not so called from legal justice, which is all virtue, but from the justice which means a general good order in the soul; for it is from this good order rather than from grace that justification gets its name, because every sin is opposed directly and immediately to this good order, involving as it does all the soul's powers, whereas grace is in the essence of the soul.
3. Charity is called the cause of the forgiveness of sins because by it man is united to God, from whom he had been turned away in sinning. Yet not every sin is directly and immediately opposed to charity, but rather to the justice mentioned above.
4. The answer is clear from what has just been said.
5. Spiritual life is attributed to faith because in the act of faith spiritual life is first manifested. Life is said in The Soul⁸ to be in living beings by reason of the vegetative soul, not because every act of physical life is due to the vegetative soul, but because in its act life first appears. In the same way not every act of spiritual life is an act of faith, but it may be of the other virtues as well. Hence not every sin is directly and immediately opposed to faith.
6. The purifying of hearts is attributed to faith in so far as the meritorious merit of faith first appears in the said purification, as is expressed in the Epistle to the Hebrews (11: 6): "For he that cometh to God must believe that he is."
7. Not only justification but also the forgiveness of guilt can be taken either as the motion to justice or as the formal effect of justice; for justice not only formally justifies but also formally casts out guilt, just as whiteness formally casts out blackness. Thus the forgiveness of guilt, as the formal effect of justice, like justification, follows grace; but taken as a motion, it is, like justification, understood prior to grace.
8. An operation can get its name in two ways: either from its principle or from its end. Thus the action by which a physician acts upon a sick person is called medication from the point of view of the principle, because it is the effect of medicine; but it is called healing from the point of view of the end, because it is the way to health. The forgiveness of sins is accordingly called justification from the term or end. It is also called having mercy from the principle, inasmuch as it is a work of divine mercy. Nevertheless in the forgiveness of sins a sort of justice is observed, since "all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth" (Psalm 24: 10). This is especially true on the part of God, since in forgiving sins He does what befits Him, as Anselm says: "When You pardon sinners it is just, for it does benefit You." And that is what is said in the Psalm (30: 1): "Deliver me in thy justice." From another point of view also, but not adequately, justice appears on the part of the one whose sin is forgiven inasmuch as there is found in him some disposition for grace, though inadequate.
- 9-10. The answer to these is clear from what has just been said.

11. The forgiveness of sins is in some sense distinguished from justification either in reality or in concept, and so it is differentiated from the infusion of grace and listed as one of the four prerequisites for the justification of sinners.

12. The conferring of justice belongs to justification as such, but the forgiveness of sins pertains to it as the justification of sinners. In this sense it is not referable to Christ or even to man in the state of innocence.

ARTICLE II: CAN THERE BE FORGIVENESS OF SINS WITHOUT GRACE?

Parallel readings; IV Sentences 17, I, 3 sol. 1; in Ephes., C. 5, lectura 5; Sum. Theol., I-II,

Difficulties:

It seems that there can, for

1. It is easier to tear down than to build up. But man is able to build up sin by himself. He is therefore able to tear it down by himself, and so the forgiveness of sins can take place without grace.

2. Contrary sins cannot be in the same subject at the same time. But a person who has been in sin of one kind can by himself pass to its contrary, as a man who has been a miser can by himself become a spendthrift. A person can therefore free himself from a sin in which he has been; and so grace is apparently not required for the forgiveness of sins.

3. It was said in answer that sins are contrary as contrary acts, not as contrary forms.—On the contrary, as Augustine says, sin still remains when its act has passed; and it is not enough for the forgiveness of sin that the act of sin has passed. Something therefore remains from the sin which needs forgiveness. But contraries have contrary effects. The remnants of contrary sins are therefore contrary and so cannot coexist. Thus the same conclusion follows as before.

4. One mediated contrary can be removed without introducing the other, as blackness can be driven out independently of the introduction of whiteness. But between the state of guilt and the state of grace there is a mean, the state of created nature, in which according to some man had neither grace nor guilt. It is therefore not necessary for the forgiveness of sins that a person receive grace.

5. God can repair more than man can spoil. But man was able to plunge from the state of nature, in which he did not have grace, to the state of guilt. Consequently without grace God can lead man back from the state of guilt to the state of nature.

6. After the act of sin has passed its guilt is said to remain, according to Augustine, in the sense that the past act of a sin is laid to the account of the sinner for punishment. Then contrariwise it is said to be forgiven in the sense that it is not laid to his account for punishment, according to the words of the Psalm (31: 2): "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin." But to impute or not to impute implies something positive only in God, who imputes or does not. For the forgiveness of sin grace is therefore not required in the one whose sin is forgiven.

7. Whoever is the complete cause of anything has complete power over it both to tear it down and to set it up, because the effect ceases when the operation of the cause ceases. But man is

the complete cause of sin. He therefore has complete power over the tearing down or the setting up of sin, and so man seemingly does not need grace for the forgiveness of sin.

8. Since sin is in the soul, the forgiveness of sins can be brought about only by something which enters into the soul. But according to Augustine⁴ only God enters into the soul. Consequently only God can forgive sin by Himself and without grace.

9. If grace removes guilt it is either a grace which exists or one which does not. Now it is not a grace which does not exist, because what does not exist does nothing. But neither is it a grace which exists, because it is an accident and its existence is to exist in something. 'When, however, grace is in the soul, guilt is not there; and so it can not be driven out. Grace is therefore not required for the forgiveness of guilt.

10. Grace and guilt cannot be in the soul together. If, then, grace is infused for the forgiveness of guilt, the guilt must first have been in the soul when grace was not. Now since the guilt has ceased to be, a last instant can be designated in which the guilt existed. Similarly, since the grace begins to be, a first instant can be designated in which grace exists in the soul. But these must be two distinct instants, because grace and guilt cannot exist in the soul at the same time, as has been said. Between any two instants, however, there is an intervening time, as is proved in the Physics. There will therefore be a time in which man has neither guilt nor grace, and so grace is seemingly not necessary for the forgiveness of guilt.

11. Augustine says that God gives us gifts because He loves us, and not the other way about. The gift of grace therefore presupposes divine love. But that divine love by which God the Father loves His only-begotten Son and His members, is not had for a man in the state of guilt. The forgiveness of guilt therefore precedes grace in the order of nature; and so grace is not required for the forgiveness of sins.

12. In the Old Law original sin was forgiven by circumcision, as Bede makes clear. Circumcision, however, did not confer grace, because, since the least grace is sufficient for resisting any temptation, man in the state of the Law would have had the means of conquering concupiscence. Then the Old Law would not have killed by giving occasion, as it is said to have done in the Epistle to the Romans (7: 1).

The death of Christ, moreover, would not have been necessary, because "if justice be by the law, then Christ dies in vain" (Galatians 2:21). But this cannot be admitted. It therefore seems inadmissible that circumcision conferred grace. Thus the forgiveness of sins can take place without grace.

To the Contrary:

1' The words of the Psalm (77: 39): "He remembered that they are flesh: a will that goeth and returned not," are explained in the Gloss as meaning "a will that of itself goeth into sin and of itself returned not from sin; therefore God calls men back because of themselves they cannot return."

2' In the Epistle to the Romans (3:24) it is written: "Being justified freely by his grace..."

REPLY:

There can by no means be any forgiveness of sins without ingratiatory grace. For the clarification of this point it should be borne in mind that, since there are two elements in sin, turning away from something and turning toward something, the forgiveness and retention of sin do not have reference to the turning toward but rather to the turning away and its consequences. For this reason, when a person ceases to have the will to sin, he does not by this fact have his sin forgiven, even if he should change to a contrary attitude of will.

Augustine accordingly says: "If ceasing to sin were the same as not having any sins, it would be enough for Scripture (Ecclesiasticus 21:1) to admonish us: 'My son, hast thou sinned? Do so no more. But that is not enough; Scripture has added: 'But for thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee. "Sin is therefore said to be forgiven in so far as the turning away and its consequences, the result of a past act of sin, are healed.

From the point of view of turning away, there are three factors which account for the impossibility of having sins forgiven without grace: the turning away, the offence against God, and the imputability. For the turning away is from the unchangeable good, which the person could have possessed but in regard to which he has made him self impotent; otherwise the turning away would not be culpable.

The turning away in question cannot, then, be removed unless there is brought about a union with the unchangeable good from which the man withdrew by his sin. But this union is effected only by means of grace, by which God dwells in souls and the soul cleaves to God by the love of charity. The healing of this turning away, accordingly, requires the infusion of grace and charity, just as the healing of blindness requires the restoration of the power of sight.

The offence, moreover, which follows from sin cannot be blotted out without grace, whether the offence is viewed from the standpoint of man, inasmuch as by sinning he has offended God, or from the standpoint of God, inasmuch as He has taken offence at the sinner, according to the words of the Psalm (5:7): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." For whoever puts the more worthy beneath the less worthy insults it, and the more so, the more worthy it is. Now whoever places his end in anything temporal, as everyone who sins mortally does, by this very fact prefers in his own affections a creature to the Creator, loving a creature more than the Creator; for the end is that which is loved most. Since God infinitely surpasses a creature, one who sins mortally will have offered to God an infinite offence from the point of view of the dignity of Him who is insulted, seeing that God and His commandments are contemned. Human strength is accordingly incapable of blotting out this offence; the good offices of divine grace are required.

God Himself, moreover, is said to take offence at the sinner or to hate him—not will a hate that is opposed to the love which He has for all things, for in this sense He hates none of the things which He has made, as is said in Wisdom (11:25); but will a hate that is opposed to the love which He has for the saints, preparing for them eternal goods. The effect of this love is the gift of ingratulatory grace, as was explained in the question on grace. The offence which God takes at man is accordingly not removed except by His giving grace.

The imputability of sin, furthermore, is an obligation not merely to sensible pain, but especially to the pain of loss, which is the lack of glory. The imputability is therefore not cancelled so long as man is not given the means to arrive at glory. This is grace; and so without grace there cannot be any forgiveness of sins.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Sin itself is the demolition of grace, whereas the forgiveness of sin is its erection. It is consequently easier to incur sin than to get free of it.
- 2.** There is contrariety among sins in so far as they imply turning toward something, but the forgiveness of sins does not have reference to this aspect, as has been said. From the viewpoint of turning away and its consequences, however, they are on common ground. As a result, nothing prevents the imputability of contrary preceding acts from remaining in the soul at the same time; for a man who turns from avarice does not cease to have the imputability of avarice but only its act or habit.

3. Even though sins are contrary from the viewpoint of turning toward something, the residual conditions of aversion or imputability do not have to be contrary, because they are the indirect effects of turning toward creatures since they come about independently of the intention of the agent. From the contrariety of causes there results the contrariety of the effects which are direct, not of those which are indirect. From contrary acts there accordingly follow contrary habits and dispositions, for these are the effects of sinful acts and agree will them in species.

4. if we grant the opinion that Adam at one time had neither grace nor guilt (though some will not concede it), we must say that nothing prevents some contraries from having a mean will regard to some particular subject taken simply, which nevertheless have no mean when limited by a definite time. With reference to a dog, for instance, blind and seeing have a mean, but not after the ninth day. Similarly will reference to man in the state of created nature, grace and guilt are related to each other as contraries will a mean. But from the time when Adam received grace, or could have received it, in such a way that it would be handed on to all his posterity, no one is without grace except by reason of guilt, either actual or original.

5. Even though Adam in the state in which he was created did not have grace, as some hold, he is nevertheless held by the same theologians to have been given grace before the fall. He consequently fell from the state of grace and not just from the state of nature. But even if he had fallen only from the state of nature, the gift of divine grace would nonetheless be required for the expiation of an infinite offence.

6. God's love for us leaves in us a certain ensuing effect, namely grace, by which we are made worthy of eternal life; for that is the extent to which He loves us. In the same way God's abstention from holding us accountable for our sins resultantly leaves in us something by which we deserve to be absolved of the imputability in question; and this is grace.

7. A sinner is the direct cause of his sin from the point of view of turning to something; but from that of turning away and the consequences of this he is the indirect cause, since he does not intend these. They cannot in fact have a direct cause, since the character of evil in sin comes from these, and evil does not have a cause, as Dionysius holds.

Or the answer can be and is better given that the sinner is the cause of his sin II its becoming, but not the cause of the permanence of the remains of the sin. The cause of these is rather in part the divine justice, by which it has been justly ordained that anyone who has not wished to remain in grace when he could, should not be able to do so even if he should so will; in part the cause is the deficiency of the powers of nature, which are insufficient for this expiation, for the reasons already indicated. When a man jumps into a ditch, he is the cause of his fall, but the state of rest which follows upon it is from nature; and for this reason he cannot get out of the ditch as he was able to jump into it. It is the same in the question at hand.

8. The expression *to bring about the forgiveness of guilt* can be taken in either of two ways, effectively or formally, as making some thing white applies to the painter effectively, but formally to white ness. Now in the forgiveness of guilt grace is the means of bringing it about, not effectively, but only formally. When it is said that only God enters into the soul, the qualities of the soul, either natural or gratuitous, are not excluded; for by these the soul is informed. But other subsistent substances are excluded; for they cannot be within the soul in the same way as God, who is within it even more intimately than the forms just mentioned. God is in the very existence of the soul, causing and conserving it; whereas the forms or qualities in question do not reach to the existence but surround as it were the essence of the soul.

9. Grace which exists and exists in the soul drives out guilt—not a guilt which but rather one which does not exist but formerly existed. It does not drive out guilt in the same way as an

efficient cause, for in that case it would have to act upon an existing guilt in order to expel it. Rather it drives it out formally. From the fact that grace in forms the subject it follows that guilt is not in the subject, as is seen in the example of health and sickness.

10. To this and similar difficulties a number of answers are ordinarily given.

The first is that, although that instant is really one, it is nevertheless several in thought, being the beginning of the future and the end of the past; and so nothing prevents guilt and grace from being in the soul at the same time, but in such a way that guilt is in that instant in so far as it is the end of the past, whereas grace is in it in so far as it is the beginning of the future.

But this cannot stand. For the distinction given implies different aspects of the instant which do not multiply its substance but leave it one. The real consequence is that guilt and grace are in the soul in the same indivisible point of time; for the term instant means an indivisible point of time. But this is to be together at the same time; and so it follows that contraries are in the same subject at the same time. Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, when anything in moving makes use of one point as two, a period of rest must intervene. It is by this argument that he proves that reciprocating motions are not continuous. Likewise, if anyone makes use of one instant as two, he must understand some interval; as a consequence the soul would at some time be without guilt or grace. But this is inadmissible.

On this account others say that, just as a line extends between two points on a single line but not between two points on two line-segments in contact at their end-points; in the same way it is not necessary that between the instant which is the last of the time in which guilt was present and the instant which is the first of the time in which grace is present, there be any intervening time, since they are instants of distinct times.

But this again cannot stand. Because a line is an intrinsic measure, it is divided according to the distinction of real things. But time is an extrinsic measure and is one will regard to all things that are in time; for the existence of guilt is not measured by one time and that of grace by another, unless we mean by another time another part of the same continuous time. It is therefore necessary that between any two instants, whatever the things to which they may be referred, there should be an intervening time. Furthermore, two points on two line-segments in contact described on located bodies are united at a single point designated on an external line on the locating body; for contiguous beings are those whose extremities coincide. If, then, it is granted that distinct beings have distinct times which are not continuous but in a sense contiguous, it will nevertheless be necessary that in the time serving as the extrinsic measure there correspond to their end-points a single indivisible instant. Consequently the same inadmissible conclusion mentioned above, that guilt and grace are together, comes back again.

For this reason others say that such spiritual changes are not measured by a time which is the number of the movement of the heavens, because the soul and every spiritual substance are above time; but they have their own time inasmuch as there is found in them a before and after. But this time is not continuous, since according to the Philosopher the continuity of time is dependent upon the continuity of motion, whereas the affections of the soul are not continuous.

But this likewise has no place in the matter at hand. For not only things essentially in time, which is the movement of the heavens, are measured by time, but also those having an accidental reference to the movement of the heavens because they are dependent upon things that have an essential reference to the time just mentioned. And this holds even for the justification of sinners, which is dependent upon thoughts, conversations, and other such motions that are essentially measured by the time of the movement of the heavens.

A different explanation must therefore be given: we cannot indicate the last instant in which the sinner had guilt, but the last time. We can, however, indicate the first instant in which he has grace, and this instant is the end of the time in which he had guilt; but between a time and the end of that time nothing intervenes. We therefore do not have to indicate any time or instant in which a person would have neither guilt nor grace.

This is explained as follows. Since the infusion of grace takes place in an instant, it is the end of a continuous movement, such as a meditation by which the will is disposed for the reception of grace; and the end of the same movement is the forgiveness of guilt, for guilt is forgiven by the very fact that grace is infused. In that first instant, then, there is the end of the forgiveness of guilt, that is, the absence of guilt, and the end of the infusion of grace, that is, the possession of grace. Then in the whole preceding time that ends at this instant, by which the movement of the meditation just mentioned was measured, the sinner had guilt and not grace, except only at the last instant, as we have said. But before the last instant of this time we cannot pick out another immediately next to it, because, if any instant at all other than the last is taken, between it and the last there will be an infinite number of intervening instants.

Thus it is clear that we cannot distinguish a last instant in which the person justified would have guilt and not have grace; but we can distinguish a first instant in which he has grace and does not have guilt. This solution can be gathered from the words of the Philosopher is

11. By His love God not only causes the gift of grace in us but also the forgiveness of guilt. Consequently the forgiveness of guilt does not have to precede grace. Such a necessity would follow, however, if the forgiveness of guilt preceded God's love instead of following from it.

12. The sacraments cause by signifying, for they cause what they represent. And because circumcision has its signification in removing, its effectiveness was directly related to the removal of original guilt and only consequently to grace, whether grace was given in virtue of circumcision in the same way as it is given in virtue of baptism, as some say, or was given by God concomitantly with circumcision. Thus the forgiveness of guilt did not take place without grace. Yet that grace did not as completely repress concupiscence as does the grace of baptism. It was accordingly harder for a circumcised person to resist concupiscence than it is for a baptized person. From this circumstance the Old Law was said to kill by giving occasion, although circumcision is not included among the sacraments of the Mosaic law because it is not "of Moses but of the fathers," as is said in John (7:22). Thus, if circumcision gave any grace, this is not contrary to the state merit that the Old Law did not justify.

ARTICLE III: DOES THE JUSTIFICATION OF SINNERS REQUIRE FREE CHOICE?

Parallel readings: II Sentences 27, a. 2 art 7; IV Sentences 7, 1, 3 sol. 2; In Ephes., c. 5, lectura 5; Sum. Theol., I-II, 113, 3; in Joan., C. 4, lectura 2, § s (P 10: 3)

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. Anything that applies to those who do not have the use of free choice does not require the exercise of free choice. But justification applies to children who do not yet have the use of free choice, for they are justified by baptism. The justification of sinners therefore does not require the exercise of free choice.

2. The answer was given that this is something special for children, who are in the grip only of a sin which is contracted from someone else; and it does not apply to adults, who are in the grip of their own sins.—On the contrary, Augustine says that when a certain friend of his "was suffering from fever, he lay unconscious for a long time in a deadly sweat. Since all hope for him had been given up, he was baptized without his knowledge. I was not much concerned and assumed that his soul would retain what it had received from me rather than what was done to his body while he was unaware of it. But the event proved far different, for he recovered." But recovery takes place by reason of justifying grace. Justifying grace is accordingly sometimes conferred upon an adult without the motion of his free choice.
3. It was said in answer that this takes place only when man is justified by a sacrament. On the contrary, God has not tied His power down to the sacraments. Since justification is a divine work depending upon His power, it therefore seems that an adult can be justified even without the sacraments independently of the motion of his free choice.
4. A man can be in a state in which he is an adult and does not have any actual sin but only original sin. For at the first instant at which a person is an adult, if he has not been baptized he is still subject to original sin without as yet having any actual sin, because by not transgressing anything he has as yet done nothing for which he would be held guilty of sin; nor again is he guilty of omission, because affirmative precepts do not oblige to constant compliance, so that a man does not immediately have to observe affirmative precepts the first instant he is an adult. It accordingly appears that an adult can have original sin without any actual sin. If, then, that is the reason why a child can be justified without any motion of his free choice, it seems that the same reason may apply for an adult.
5. Whenever anything is found in a number of things in common, they must agree in some common cause. Now to be justified applies alike to children and to adults. Since grace alone is the cause of justification in children, it therefore seems that grace without the use of free choice is sufficient for justification in adults.
6. Wisdom is a gift of God as well as justice. But Solomon received wisdom while he was asleep, as is recorded in the third book of Kings (3:5-15). Then in the same way man can also receive justifying grace while he is asleep and without the use of his free choice.
7. It was said that Solomon received wisdom in his sleep as a reward for a previous act of his will.—On the contrary, will is required in evil acts just as well as in good, because nothing is a sin unless it is voluntary. But an act of will previous to sleep does not make what is done during sleep a sin. Then neither does it have anything to do with the reception of a divine gift during sleep.
8. The use of free choice is inhibited not only in one asleep but also in a sick person. But a sick person can be justified without the use of his free choice, as is clear from the passage from Augustine which was cited. Consequently so can one who is sleeping.
9. God is more powerful than any created agent. But the material sun diffuses its light into the air without any previous preparation in the air itself. Then all the more does God infuse the light of His grace without any preparation, which is made through the act of free choice.
10. Since good tends to communicate itself, according to Dionysius, God, who is supremely good, most fully communicates Himself. This would not be true, however, unless He communicated Himself both to those who prepare and to those who do not. Consequently the exercise of free choice as a preparation on the part of man is not required in the justification of sinners.
11. Augustine says that God causes justice in man in the same way as the sun causes light in the air; when the sun's influence ceases, the light ceases. He is not like a cabinetmaker

working upon a cabinet, upon which he does nothing once it is made. The sun works in the air in the same way when the air is first illuminated and as long as the light continues in it. God accordingly causes justice in man when he is first justified and as long as justice is conserved in him. But justice is conserved in man even when the exercise of free choice ceases, as is seen in one asleep. Man can therefore be justified in the beginning without any movement of his free choice.

12. The disposition which is required as a necessity for the introduction of a form is such that without it the form cannot remain, as is exemplified in heat and the form of fire. But without the exercise of free choice justice can remain, as it does in one asleep. Consequently the exercise of free choice is not a disposition which is required as a necessity for the infusion of grace.

13. Anything which is naturally prior to something else and can exist either with or without that which comes after it, has no need of the latter in order to be brought into existence. An example would be heaviness and falling; there can be heaviness without falling, as occurs when a heavy body is kept from its proper motion. But grace naturally comes before the exercise of free choice, and can either be with that exercise or not; for it is the formal principle of free choice as heaviness is that of natural motion. Grace can therefore be infused without the exercise of free choice.

14. An ailing body introduces original sin into the soul without any exercise of free choice. All the more, then, does God, who is most powerful, not need the exercise of free choice in order to infuse grace.

15. God is more ready to have mercy than to condemn, as is said in the Gloss in the beginning of its commentary upon Jeremias. But God punishes children who die without baptism independently of any use of free choice. He therefore much more surely has mercy by infusing grace.

6. The disposition for a form which is needed in the recipient of the form is not from the recipient but from another. Thus heat, which is in wood antecedently as a disposition for the form of fire, is not from the wood itself. But the exercise of free choice is from the man who is to be justified. It is therefore not needed as a disposition for having grace.

17. Justification comes about by the infusion of grace and the virtues. But according to Augustine⁶ only God causes virtue in us without our own efforts. Consequently our own activity, which takes place through the use of free choice, is not needed for our justification.

18. According to the Apostle (Romans 4:4) "to him that worked, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt." But the exercise of free choice is a form of working. If, then, the exercise of free choice is required for justification, justification will not be from grace but from debt. But that is heretical.

19. One who works against grace is farther removed from grace than one who does not work at all. But God sometimes gives grace to someone who by his free choice works against grace, as He did to Paul, to whom it was said: "It is hard for thee to kick against the goad" (Acts 9:5). With all the more reason, then, grace is sometimes imparted to a person independently of his use of free choice.

20. An agent with infinite power does not need any disposition in the patient; for the more powerful the agent, the less he needs a previous disposition for the production of his effect. But God is an agent with infinite power, even to the extent that He does not need pre-existing matter but draws His products out of nothing. Much less, then, does He need a disposition; and so in the justification of sinners, which is a divine work, God does not need the exercise of free choice as a disposition on the part of man.

To the Contrary:

2'. The comment on the words of III Kings (3:5): "Ask what thou wilt that God should give thee" that is given in the Gloss is this: "The grace of God requires free choice." But justification is brought about by the grace of God, as is taught in the Epistle to the Romans (3:24). The exercise of free choice is therefore required for justification.

2'. Bernard says that "there cannot be justification without either the consent of the recipient or the grace of the giver." But the consent of the recipient is an act of free choice. Man therefore cannot be justified without the use of free choice.

3'. For the reception of a form a disposition is needed in the recipient, for it is not possible for just any form at all to be received in any given subject. But the act of free choice serves as a disposition for grace. The exercise of free choice is therefore required for the reception of justifying grace.

4'. In the justification of sinners man contracts a kind of spiritual marriage with God, as is written in Osee (2: 19): "I will espouse thee to me in justice." But in carnal marriage mutual consent is required. With all the more reason, then, is this true of the justification of sinners. And so the use of free choice is needed for it.

5'. The justification of sinners does not take place without charity, because, as is written in Proverbs (10: 12), "charity covereth all sins." But since charity is a kind of friendship, it demands mutual love. For, as the Philosopher makes clear, friendship involves reciprocated love. But mutual love requires the use of free choice in each of the parties. Consequently there cannot be justification without the use of free choice.

REPLY:

No one having the use of free choice can be justified without the use of free choice at the instant of his justification. But in those who do not have control over their own wills, such as children, this is not needed for justification. Three reasons can be assigned for this.

The first reason is taken from the mutual relationship of agent and patient. It is clear that in corporeal beings an action is not performed without some contact. It may be that only the agent touches the patient. This occurs when the patient is not capable of touching the agent, as when higher bodies act upon lower, touching them and not being touched by them. Or it may be that the agent and patient each touch the other. This occurs when both are capable of touching and being touched, as when fire acts upon water or vice versa.

Among spiritual beings, when mutual contact is possible, action is not performed without mutual contact. In other cases it is enough for the agent to touch the patient. Now God, who justifies sinners, touches the soul, causing grace in it. It is accordingly said in the Psalm (143:5): "Touch the mountains"; and the Gloss adds: "will thy grace." But the human soul in some sense touches God by knowing Him or loving Him. As a consequence there is required in adults, who can know and love God, some exercise of free choice by which they know and love Him. That is the turning to God of which Zacharias (1:3) speaks: "Turn ye to me,... and I will turn to you." Children lacking the use of reason, however, cannot know and love God. This is why it is sufficient for their justification that they be touched by Him through the infusion of grace.

The second reason is taken from the very notion of justification. According to Anselm justice is "the rectitude of the will kept for its own sake." Justification is accordingly a change of the will. Now will can be taken either as the power itself or as the act of the power. But the act of the power of will cannot be changed except with its own cooperation; for if it were not from

the power, it would not be its act. The power of will, however, can be changed without its co operation, just as it was made without its cooperation.

In adults a change in the act of the will is needed for justification; for by an act of the will they are turned to something inordinately. The direction in which they are turned cannot be changed except by a contrary act of the will. For the justification of adults an act of free choice is therefore required. But children, who do not have their will turned to anything by the act of their own will but have only the power of will culpably deprived of original justice, can be justified without the activity of their own will.

The third reason is drawn from a likeness to the divine operation upon corporeal things. When producing an effect which nature can likewise produce, God produces it in accordance with the same disposition as nature does. If, for example, God were to heal someone miraculously, He would cause health in him with a certain balance of humors which nature also in some cases brings about when it heals a man. This agrees with the statement of the Philosopher that, if nature produced a work of art, it would produce it in just the same way as art does, and conversely. Now from his natural endowments a man can have some kind of justice in two ways: (1) as natural or innate, inasmuch as some have a natural bent for works of justice; and (2) as acquired. The infused justice, then, by which adults are justified is like that acquired by deeds. Consequently, just as in acquired political justice an act of the will is needed by which one loves justice, similarly justification is not accomplished in adults without the exercise of free choice. But the infused justice by which infants are justified is like the natural aptitude for justice, which is also found in infants; for neither, however, is the exercise of free choice required.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Because children do not have the means of turning to the justifying cause, the justifying cause itself, namely, the passion of Christ, is applied to them through the sacrament of baptism. By this they are justified.

2. Regarding an adult who is not in the possession of his faculties a distinction must be made. If he never had the use of reason, he is to be judged in the same way as infants; but if at any time he had the use of reason, then if he desired baptism during the time when he was in possession of his faculties and is baptized while out of his senses, not being aware of it or even resisting, he obtains the effect of baptism because of his previous disposition of will. This is particularly true when after baptism he recovers the use of his free choice and is pleased with what was done. This is the situation of which Augustine speaks. The resistance which is offered is not imputed to the sick man, since he does not act by his will but is acted upon by his imagination.

If, however, while he was in possession of his faculties he did not desire baptism, he is not to be given baptism even when he is unaware of it or offering no resistance, however great may be the danger of death; for he is to be judged on the basis of the last instant in which he was in his right mind. And if he is given baptism, he receives neither the sacrament nor the grace of the sacrament; though from the invocation of the Holy Trinity and the consecration of the water some disposition may miraculously be left in him so that when he recovers the use of his free choice he will more easily be changed for the good.

3. Even without any sacrament God gives grace to some infants, as is evident of those sanctified in the womb. And He could similarly confer grace without any sacrament upon an adult who was out of his mind, just as he does with a sacrament.

4. The opinion that an adult may have original sin without any actual sin is held by some to be an impossible position. For when he begins to be adult, if he does what he can, there will be

given to him the grace by which he will be freed from original sin; but if he does not do what he can, he will be guilty of a sin of omission. Since every one is obliged to avoid sin and he cannot do this without setting his aim upon the due end, as soon as anyone is in possession of his faculties he is obliged to turn to God and make Him his end. By so doing he is disposed for grace. Furthermore, Augustine says that the concupiscence deriving from original sin makes infants disposed to experience concupiscence, and adults actually to do so; for it is unlikely that one who is infected with original sin will not submit to the concupiscence of sin by consent to a sin.

5. Justification is in infants and in adults from a common cause, grace, which is, however, received differently by infants and by adults in accordance with their different condition. For whatever is received in another is in it after the manner of the recipient. For this reason the reception of grace in an adult is associated with the exercise of free choice, but not in an infant.

6. Three different answers to this difficulty can be given:

(1) It can be said that the sleep in which wisdom was imparted to Solomon was not a natural sleep but one of prophecy, of which it is written in Numbers (12:6): "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will speak to him in a dream or in a vision."¹⁵ In such a sleep, however, the use of free choice is not prevented.

(2) It can be said that in the infusion of wisdom the intellect must be turned to God, just as in the infusion of justice the will, which is its subject, must be turned to Him. Now in sleep the intellect can be turned to God but not free choice or the will. This is because the intellect has two operations, perceiving and judging about what it has perceived.

In sleep the intellect is not prevented from perceiving something either from what it has previously considered (and this is why a man sometimes makes syllogisms in his sleep) or from illumination by some higher substance. The intellect of a sleeping person is more adapted to the reception of this illumination because of the repose of his senses and freedom from their acts, and especially because his phantasms are at rest. It is accordingly written in Job (33:15—16): "By a dream in a vision by night, when deep sleep falleth upon men, and they are sleeping in their beds: then he opened the ears of men, and teaching instructed them in what they are to learn." That is the chief reason why future things are foreseen in sleep.

But the perfect judgment of the intellect cannot be found in one who is sleeping, because at that time our senses, which are the primary source of our knowledge, are inhibited. For a judgment is made by reducing to principles, and for this reason we must judge about every thing on the basis of what we receive by the senses, as is said in Heaven and Earth.¹⁶ But the exercise of free choice depends upon rational judgment; and so the exercise of free choice, which is the means by which the will turns to God, cannot be sufficient during sleep; for even if there should be some motion of the will, it depends more upon the imagination than upon a complete rational judgment. Consequently a man can receive wisdom while sleeping, but not justice.

(2) It can be said that the intellect is forced by the intelligible object, but the will cannot be forced by the object of appetite. For this reason wisdom, which is the rectitude of the intellect, can be infused independently of the use of free choice, but not justice, which is the rectitude of the will.

7. The movement of free choice in one awake antecedent to sleep cannot cause the act of one asleep to be meritorious or demeritorious in itself, but it can cause it to have some aspect of goodness or badness insofar as the influence of our waking acts is left in what we do while asleep, as the influence of the cause is left in the effect. That is why virtuous men have better

dreams in their sleep than others who are not virtuous, as is said in the Ethics. That is why, too, nocturnal Pollution is sometimes accounted as culpable. Solomon could accordingly dispose himself while awake to receive wisdom in his sleep.

8. The sacrament of baptism is not to be given to a sick person while he is out of his senses, even if he previously had the desire for baptism, unless the danger of death is feared; but in the case of a sleeping person that is not feared. In this respect, then, the two cases differ, though in other respects they are alike.

9. According to the nature of its species air is in the final disposition to receive light by reason of its transparency. Thus immediately upon the presence of a source of light it is lighted; and no other preparation is needed unless it be the removal of an obstacle. But the intellectual soul is not in the final disposition for the reception of justice except when it is actually willing, because a power is perfected by its act, being in potency to either of two opposites until determined to one of them by that act, just as matter, which is in potency to a number of forms, by being disposed is fitted for one form rather than another.

10. With infinite goodness God communicates Himself to creatures by means of a certain similarity to His goodness, which He imparts to them by the very fact that He communicates His goodness in the best possible way. It belongs to this way that He impart His gifts in an orderly fashion according to His wisdom; that is to say, He gives to each one according to its own condition. That is why a disposition or some preparation is needed on the part of those to whom God gives His gifts.

An alternative answer would be that the difficulty argues from a preparation which precedes in time the infusion of grace. God sometimes gives grace without such preparation, suddenly causing in someone a sentiment of Contrition and pouring in His grace; for, as is written in Ecclesiasticus (11:23), "it is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the poor man rich." This does not, however, exclude the use of free choice at the instant at which grace is infused. God reveals a more perfect communication of His goodness by causing simultaneously in man the habit and the act of justice than He would by causing the habit alone.

11. The sun is the cause of light not only in its being but also in its becoming. In the same way God is the cause of grace both in its being and in its becoming. Something not required for the existence of a thing is required for its becoming, which involves a kind of change. Thus when light comes to be in the air, it is required that the air stand in a relation to the sun different from before. This comes about through the movement of the sun, though without this movement there could be conservation of the light in the air by the constant presence of the sun. Similarly, for grace to come to be, the will must be related to God in a way different from before. For this a change in the will is required, and this is not had in adults without the exercise of free choice, as we have said.

12. A disposition not needed for the existence of a thing is needed for its becoming, as is particularly clear in the procreation of animals and plants. After a thing has already been made, nothing prevents its being kept in existence even though such dispositions disappear. And so when the motion of free choice, which was necessary for justification, ceases, justice can remain as a habit.

13. Even though something which by nature comes before some thing else can exist without the latter, that does not mean that it can come into being without the thing which comes after it. Thus the soul, being the formal, efficient, and final cause of the body, as is said in *The Soul*, is naturally prior to the body and can exist without the body; yet in accordance with the order of nature it can come into being only in the body. The same is true of grace and the exercise of free choice.

14. The body infects the soul with original sin by the very fact that it is united to the soul. This sin, however, does not concern the will of the one infected but his nature. It is therefore not surprising if the use of free choice is not needed for such infection. Now in a similar way the soul of a child gets grace by the very fact that it is united to Christ through the sacrament of baptism without the exercise of free choice. In adults, however, the exercise of free choice is required, for the reason already explained.

15. The fact that God is said to be more ready to have mercy than to punish does not mean that nothing more is needed for the good which God brings about in us by having mercy than for the evil which God punishes in us; for according to Dionysius good arises from an integral cause all taken together, but evil from any single defect. This shows that God has mercy because of what is from Him, whereas He punishes because of what is from us; and this product of ours is such that it cannot have a place in right order except by means of punishment. He accordingly has mercy from His principal intention but punishes as if it were beyond the intention of His antecedent will by a consequent will. Yet on the point at issue it can be said that by a certain resemblance the justification of children before the use of free choice corresponds to the infection of original sin, which enters the soul before it has the use of free choice.

16. The things of nature can be disposed for a form by a sort of violence, having an extrinsic source of their disposition and contributing nothing themselves to their change. In them, then, the disposition for a form is not from an intrinsic principle but from without. But the will cannot suffer violence. There is accordingly no parallel from which to draw an argument.

17. God causes virtues in us without our causing them but not without our consent.

18. The act of free choice involved in the justification of sinners is related in one way to the habit of justice in general explained above, and in a different way to the execution and increase of justice. It can not be related to the habit as merit, because justice, the principle of meriting, is infused at the very instant; but it is related merely as a disposition. It is related to the execution and increase of justice, however, in the line of merit, because man merits divine help in these by the first act which has grace as its form. Thus justice is not given to human deeds as a reward, but the increase and perdurance of justice are of the nature of a reward which will reference to previous meritorious acts.

19. Although before he was justified Paul was fighting directly against the grace of faith, yet in the very instant of his justification he consented to grace by his free choice, which was moved by divine grace. For God can in an instant induce the movement of a will elevated by grace without which there is no justification; but there can be justification without any previous preparation.

20. The disposition in question is needed, not because of the impotency of the agent, but because of the condition of the recipient, the will, which cannot be changed by violence but is changed by its own motion. The motion of free choice, moreover, is related to grace not only as a disposition but also as a complement; for operations are in a sense the completion of habits. It therefore attests the perfection of the agent if the habit is introduced at the same time as its operation, because the perfection of the effect is a sign of the perfection of the cause.

ARTICLE IV: WHAT MOTION OF FREE CHOICE IS NEEDED FOR JUSTIFICATION. IS A MOTION TOWARD GOD REQUIRED?

Parallel readings: IV Sentences I, 1, 3 sol. 3; in Ephes., C. 2, lectura Sum. Theol., I-II, 113, 4.

Difficulties.

It seems that a motion toward God is not required, for

2. Nothing that follows justification is required for justification. But since being moved toward God comes from grace, this follows justification. Hence it is written in Lamentations (5:2 1): "Convent us, O Lord, to thee..." The motion of free choice toward God is therefore not one of the things required for justification.

2. A motion of free choice is required for justification as a disposition of the part of free choice. Now that to which man needs to be drawn does not pertain to free choice. But since man needs to be drawn in order to be turned toward God, according to the words recorded in John (6:44): "No man can come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him," it therefore seems that the motion of free choice toward God is not one of the things required for the justification of sinners.

3. Man comes to justice by way of fear, "for he that is without fear, cannot be justified," as is written in Ecclesiasticus (1:28). But through fear man is not moved toward God but rather toward punishment. The motion of free choice required for justification of sinners is therefore not a motion toward God.

4. Should it be said that this is true of servile, not of filial fear, the rejoinder would be: all fear includes flight in its essential notion. But by flight we withdraw from that which we are fleeing; we do not approach it. By fearing God, then, a man does not move toward God but rather away from Him.

. If a motion of free choice toward God is required for justification, that motion in particular should be required through which man is most completely moved toward God. Now man is more completely moved toward God through charity than through faith. Consequently, if a motion of free choice toward God is required for justification, justification should not be attributed to faith but rather to charity. The contrary, however, appears in the Epistle to the Romans (5:1): "Being justified therefore by faith".

6. The motion of free choice required in justification is like the last disposition for grace, at the presence of which grace is infused. Now a disposition for a form, at the presence of which the form is introduced, is such that it cannot exist without the form, since it is an exigency for the form. Since the motion of faith can exist without grace, it accordingly seems that justification should not be attributed to the motion of faith.

7. Man can know God by his natural reason. But faith is required for justification only because it makes us know God. It therefore seems that man can be justified without the motion of faith.

8. Man knows God not only by a motion of faith but also by an act of wisdom. Then justification should not be attributed to faith any more than to wisdom.

9. Many articles are contained in faith. Now if a motion of faith is required for justification, it therefore seems that one would have to think of all the articles of faith. But that cannot be done instantaneously.

10. In the Epistle of St. James (4:6) we read that God "giveth grace to the humble." There is accordingly required for justification a motion of humility, which is not a motion toward God; otherwise humility would have God as its object and end and would be a theological virtue. The motion that is required for the justification of sinners is therefore not a motion of free choice toward God.

11. In the justification of sinners man's will is changed to justice. The motion of free choice should therefore be an act of justice; but that is not a motion toward God, for justice does not have God as its object. The motion required for the justification of sinners is therefore not a motion toward God.

Man is related to the justification of sinners as the remover of an obstacle, just as one who opens the shutters is called the cause of lighting the house. But the obstacle to grace is sin. On the part of the one justified, then, a motion of free choice toward God is not required but only one toward sin.

To the Contrary:

1'. In the Epistle of St. James (4:8) it is written: "Draw nigh to God: and he will draw nigh w you." Now God draws near to us by the infusion of grace. Consequently for us w be justified by grace we are required to draw near to God through the motion of our free choice toward Him.

2'. The justification of sinners is a kind of enlightenment of man. But we read in the Psalm (3:6): "Come ye w him and be enlightened." Now, since man does not come to God by steps of the body but by movements of the mind, as Augustine says, it therefore seems that a motion of free choice is required for the justification of sinners.

3'. In the Epistle to the Romans (4:5) we read: "To him that believeth in him that justified the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice." For a sinner to be justified, then, a motion of faith toward God is required.

REPLY:

As was said above, a motion of free choice is required in justification in order that through his own act man may come in contact will the justifying cause. Now the cause of justification is God, who wrought our justification through the mystery of His own incarnation, by which He became the mediator between God and men. A motion of free choice toward God is accordingly required for the justification of sinners.

Since free choice can move toward God in many ways, for justification that motion seems to be required which is the first among all and is included in all others. This is the motion of faith; "for he that cometh God must (first) believe that he is," as is written in the Epistle to the Hebrews (11: 6). Moreover, no one can move toward God by any other motion unless at the same time he move will this motion of faith; for all other motions of the mind toward God the Justifier belong to the affections, whereas only the motion of faith belongs to the intellect. The affections, however, are moved toward their object only in so far as it is apprehended; for the apprehended good moves the affections, as is said in The Soul. Hence the motion of the apprehensive power is required for the motion of the affective, just as the mover needs to move actively for the mobile w be moved.

In this way also the motion of faith is included in that of charity and in every other motion by which the mind is moved toward God.

But because justice is completed in the affections, if man were turned toward God only will his intellect, he would not be coming into contact will God by the power that receives justice, his affections. Thus he could not be justified. It is therefore required that not only the intellect be turned toward God but also the affections. But the first motion of the affections toward anything is the motion of love, as was explained in the question on the passions of the soul. This motion is included in desire as a cause in an effect; for something is desired as loved. Hope, moreover, implies desire accompanied by the rousing of one's spirits as tending w something arduous. Then, just as the motion of cognition is accompanied by a motion of love,

so too the motion of love is accompanied by a motion of hope or desire; for love arouses desire or hope just as the object apprehended arouses love.

Thus in the justification of sinners free choice is moved toward God by the motion of faith, of charity, and of hope; for the one justified must be turned toward God by loving Him will the hope of pardon. These three motions are counted as a single complete motion inasmuch as they are included in one another. Yet that motion takes its name from faith because faith contains the other motions virtually and is included in them.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** To be moved toward God by free choice follows the infusion of grace in some sense by the order of nature, though not by that of time, as will be made clear below. Hence it does not follow from this, seeing that the infusion of grace is one of the requisites for justification, that the motion of free choice toward God follows justification.
- 2.** The drawing in question does not imply violence, but it does imply the operation of God by which He works upon free choice, turning it whithersoever He wills. That to which man is drawn accordingly pertains in some sense to free choice.
- 3.** Servile fear, which has its eye upon punishment alone, is required for justification as a previous disposition, though not as entering into the substance of justification; for fear cannot coexist with charity, but when charity enters fear leaves. Thus we read in the first Epistle of St. John (4:18): "Fear is not in charity." Filial fear, however, which is afraid of separation, is included virtually in the motion of love; for to desire union with one's beloved means the same thing as to fear separation.
- 4.** Filial fear includes some flight—not flight from God, but flight from separation from God, or else flight from equalling oneself to God inasmuch as fear implies a kind of reverence by which man does not dare to compare himself to the divine majesty but rather submits to it.
- 5.** The motion of charity toward God is also required, but in this motion the motion of faith also is included, as has been said.
- 6.** Although it is possible to believe God or to believe about God without justice, yet without grace or justice it is not possible to believe with a tendency toward God, for this is an act of faith informed [by charity]. Such belief is required for justification, as is clear from the Epistle to the Romans (4:5): "To him that... believeth in him that justified the ungodly, his faith is reputed to justice."
- 7.** After the fall of human nature man cannot be restored except through the mediator between God and men, Jesus Christ; and this mystery of the mediation of Christ is held only by faith. For this reason natural knowledge does not suffice for the justification of sinners, but faith in Jesus Christ, either explicit or implicit according to the differences of times or persons, is required. This is what is said in the Epistle to the Romans (3:22): "Even the justice of God by faith in Jesus Christ."
- 8.** Faith stands to infused wisdom in the same relation as the understanding of naturally known principles stands to wisdom or science acquired by reason, as being its source. Hence the first motion of gratuitous knowledge toward God is not one of infused wisdom or science but one of faith.
- 9.** Though there are many articles of faith, not all have to be actually thought of at the very instant of justification; one need only think of God according to that article which holds that He justifies and forgives sins. Implicitly in this is included the article on the incarnation and passion of Christ and the other requisites for our justification.

10. The motion of humility follows that of faith inasmuch as a person considering the sublimity of the divine majesty, submits to it.

11. In generic justice of which we are now speaking, the due subordination of man to God is included, as was said above. Thus faith, hope and charity are all contained within this kind of justice.

12. Sin is an obstacle to grace especially from the point of view of turning away from God. To remove this obstacle there is accordingly required the turning of our free choice toward God.

ARTICLE V: IN THE JUSTIFICATION OF SINNERS IS A MOTION OF FREE CHOICE TOWARD SIN REQUIRED?

Parallel readings: IV Sentences r 1, sol. 4; [Contra Gentiles III, 158](#); Sum. Theol., I-II, 113, 5; III, 86, 2.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. A motion of charity toward forgiveness is enough: "many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" (Luke 7:47). But the motion of charity is directly toward God. For the justification of sinners, then, a motion toward God is enough, and a motion toward sin is not required.

2. The unchangeable good is more efficacious than a changeable good. But it is enough for a man to turn to a changeable good for him to incur sin. It is therefore enough for a man to turn to the unchangeable good for him to be justified.

3. A man cannot move toward sin without thinking of sin. Now no one can think of something which his memory does not retain. But it happens that some have forgotten about sins committed. If the motion of free choice toward sin is required for the justification of sinners, then, it seems that a person who has forgotten about his sins can never be justified.

4. It is possible for a man to be entangled in many crimes. But if a motion of free choice is required in justification, it seems that will equal reason he must at that instant think of each one of his sins— which is impossible. For there is no more reason for singling out one than another.

5. Whoever is turned to something as his last end is by that very fact turned away from any other last end, because it is impossible for one thing to have many last ends. But when a man is moved toward God by faith informed by charity, he is moved to Him as his last end. By this very fact, then, he is turned away from sin. Consequently no motion of free choice toward sin seems necessary.

6. The motion away from sin is not the same as that toward sin, just as the motion from white is not the same as that toward white. But justification is a motion away from sin. It is therefore not a motion toward sin.

To the Contrary:

1'. In the Psalm (31:5) It is written: "I said: I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord. And thou has forgiven the wickedness of my sin." But a man cannot say this without thinking of his sin. A motion of free choice toward sin is therefore required for justification.

2' Contrition, the first part of [the sacrament of] penance, by which sins are taken away, is required for the justification of sinners. But contrition is sorrow for sin. Hence a motion of free choice to ward sin is required in justification.

REPLY:

The justification of sinners adds something to justification taken absolutely. Justification in an absolute sense implies only the infusion of justice. The justification of sinners adds to this the forgiveness of guilt. This forgiveness does not come about merely by the fact that a man ceases to sin, but something further is needed. Hence Augustine says: "If ceasing to sin were the same as not having any sins, it would be enough for Scripture (Ecclesiasticus 21:1) to admonish us: 'My son, hast thou sinned? Do so no more. But that is not enough. Scripture has added: 'But for thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.'"

Thus for justification in an unqualified sense it is required that man by his free choice turn to the justifying cause; and this turning is the motion of free choice toward God. But in the justification of sinners it is required in addition that he be turned toward the destruction of past sin. Now just as turning toward God comes about by the fact that a man knows God by faith and loves Him and desires or hopes for grace, in same way the turning of free choice toward sin must take place by the fact that a man recognizes that he is a sinner (which is an act of humility) and detests his past sin so that he is ashamed to have committed it and does not will to repeat the offence.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. There cannot be love of God apart from a detestation of what separates one from God. In justification there is accordingly required besides the motion of love toward God a detestation for sin. For this reason tears for her sins were shed by Magdalene, of whom were spoken the words (Luke 7:47): "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much."

2. Turning toward the unchangeable good is sufficient for justification in an unqualified sense; but for the justification of sinners a motion toward sin is also required, as has been said; for in order that a man may be justified it is not sufficient merely to will for justice and not to sin, but he must also work against his past wickedness by detesting it. In one who sins, however, the detestation of God or of justice is not required except as a consequence, because no one hates what is good except in so far as it is incompatible with some other good which he loves. The sinner therefore hates justice and God only indirectly, by immoderately loving a changeable good.

3. It is not necessary for a person at the very moment of justification to think of this or that particular sin; but it is necessary, either absolutely or conditionally (if he has turned away from God), only to be sorry for having by his own fault turned away. This condition applies when a person does not know whether he has ever turned away from God by a mortal sin. By such a motion even one who has forgotten about his sin can have contrition for sin.

4. All sins have in common turning away from God, by reason of which they are an obstacle to grace. For justification it is accordingly not required that a person think of his individual sins at the very moment of justification, but it suffices to think of having turned away from God by one's own fault. But the recalling of sins individually must either precede or at least follow justification.

5. If someone fixes upon God as his end, it follows that he does not put his end in sin, and therefore that he is turned away from the intention of sinning. This does not, however, suffice for the wiping out of past sin, as has been said. The argument accordingly proves nothing.

6. The motion of free choice to pursue and embrace sin is opposed to justification, but not the motion of free choice to flee from sin. This rather coincides with justification, which is a motion away from sin; for flight from something is motion away from it.

ARTICLE VI: ARE THE INFUSION OF GRACE AND THE FORGIVENESS OF GUILT THE SAME?

Parallel readings: IV Sentences 17, 1, 3 sol. Sum. Theol., I-II, 113, 6.

Difficulties:

It seems that they are, for

1. The positing of an affirmation and the removal of a negation are the same. But guilt seems to be nothing but the lack of grace. It therefore seems that the removal of guilt and the infusion of grace are the same.
2. Guilt and grace are opposed in the same way as darkness and light. But the removal of darkness and the introduction of light are the same. Then the forgiveness of guilt and the infusion of grace are also the same.
3. In the forgiveness of guilt what we especially have in mind is the effacement of a stain. But the stain does not seem to be anything positive in the soul, because in that case it would somehow be from God. And so it seems to be only a privation; but it is not the privation of anything but that with which it cannot coexist, namely, grace. Now the removal of a privation is nothing but the positing of a possession or habit. The forgiveness of guilt is therefore nothing else than the infusion of grace.
4. The answer was given that the stain posits not only the absence of grace but also an aptitude and an obligation to have grace.—On the contrary, every privation posits an aptitude in a subject, and yet the removal of a privation and the introduction of a habit are the same thing. Then this does not keep the forgiveness of guilt and the infusion of grace from being the same.
5. According to the Philosopher "the coming to be of one thing is the perishing of another." Now, since in some sense the forgiveness of guilt is its perishing, and the infusion of grace is its coming to be, the infusion of grace is the same as the forgiveness of guilt.

To the Contrary:

- 1'. Among the four requisites for the justification of sinners, two are listed together: the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt.
- 2'. Things such that one can be found without the other are not the same. But the infusion of grace can take place without the forgiveness of guilt, as is seen in the blessed angels, in the first man before the fall, and in Christ. The forgiveness of guilt and the infusion of grace are therefore not the same.

REPLY:

The forgiveness of guilt and the infusion of grace are not the same. This is shown as follows.

Changes are distinguished on the basis of their terms. Now the term of the infusion of grace is the existence of grace in the soul, whereas the term of the forgiveness of guilt is its non-existence. In this connection there is a difference between opposites to be taken into account.

There are some opposites each of which posits some natural being, such as white and black. In such opposites the negation of either term is a real negation, that is, the negation of a real being. Accordingly, since affirmation is not negation, to be white. is not the same as not to be black, but they are really different; and likewise the destruction of black (whose term is not to be black) and the coming to be of white (whose term is to be white) are really different changes, although there is a single motion, as was said above.

There are other opposites of which only one of the two terms is a natural being, and the other is only its removal or negation. This appears, for instance, in opposites based upon affirmation and negation or upon privation and possession. In such cases the negation of an opposite which posits a natural being is real, because it is the negation of a real being; but the negation of the other opposite is not real, because it is not the negation of any real being. It is the negation of a negation. Consequently, this negation of a negation, which is the negation of the second opposite, in no way differs in reality from the positing of the other. In reality, then, the coming to be of white and the destruction of not-white are the same. But because a negation, though not a real being, is nevertheless a conceptual being, the negation of the negation is distinct conceptually or in our manner of understanding from the positing of the affirmation. Thus in the manner of understanding it the destruction of not-white is distinct from the coming to be of white.

It is therefore clear that if guilt is nothing positive at all, the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt are the same in reality, but conceptually they are not the same. If, on the other hand, guilt posits something not only conceptually but also really, the forgiveness of guilt is distinct from the infusion of grace if they are considered as changes, even though from the point of view of motion they are one, as was said above.

Now guilt posits something, and not only the absence of grace. The absence of grace considered in itself has only the note of punishment and not that of guilt except in so far as the guilt is left from a preceding voluntary act. Darkness, for instance, does not have the note of a shadow except in so far as it is left from the interposition of an opaque body. Then, just as the removal of a shadow implies not only the removal of darkness but also the removal of the obstructing body, in the same way the forgiveness of guilt implies not only the removal of the absence of grace but also the removal of the obstacle to grace, which arose from a preceding act of sin. This does not mean that that act must be made not to have been, for that is impossible, but it means that the entry of grace is not hindered by it. It is therefore clear that the forgiveness of guilt and the infusion of grace are not the same in reality.

Answers to Difficulties:

1-4. These answers are clear from the re

5. The coming to be of one thing is said by the Philosopher to be the perishing of the other by concomitance, because they are necessarily simultaneous, or else because of the oneness of the motion which terminates in these two changes.

ARTICLE VII: DOES THE FORGIVENESS OF GUILT NATURALLY PRECEDE THE INFUSION OF GRACE?

Parallel readings: IV Sentences 22, 4 sol. I; Sum. Theol., I-II, 113, 8.

Difficulties.

It seems that it does, for

1. In its comment upon the words of the Psalm (62:3): "So in the sanctuary have I come before thee," the Gloss says: "Un a man first is wanting in evil, he will never arrive at good." But the forgiveness of guilt makes a man wanting in evil, whereas the infusion of grace makes him arrive at good. The forgiveness of guilt is therefore naturally prior to the infusion of grace.
2. In the order of nature our understanding of the recipient is prior to that of the reception itself. But a form is not received save in its proper matter. Our understanding of the proper matter is therefore prior to that of the reception of the form. But for a matter to be proper to a given form it must be stripped of the contrary form. Matter is therefore by a natural priority stripped of one form before it receives another; and so by a natural priority the forgiveness of guilt comes before the infusion of grace.
3. It was said in answer that, from the standpoint of its relation to God who infuses it, grace is naturally prior to the forgiveness of guilt; but from that of its relation to the subject, it is posterior to the forgiveness of guilt. - On the contrary, in the infusion of grace is included the relation of grace to the subject into which it is infused. If it is posterior to the subject on the basis of this relation, it therefore seems that in itself the infusion of grace naturally comes after the forgiveness of guilt.
4. It was said that grace has two different relations to the subject: one as informing the subject, and from the standpoint of this relation it is posterior to the forgiveness of guilt; another as driving guilt out of the subject, and in this sense the infusion of grace naturally precedes the forgiveness of guilt.—On the contrary, grace drives out guilt by reason of its opposition to guilt. Opposites drive each other out because they do not suffer one another in the same subject. Then by the very fact that grace informs the subject it drives out guilt. Thus it is impossible for grace to be posterior on the basis of its relation to the subject that it informs, and prior on the basis of its relation to the guilt that it drives out.
5. The being of a thing is naturally prior to its acting. But since grace is an accident, its being is to be in a subject. Its relation to the subject that it informs is therefore naturally prior to its relation to the contrary which it drives out. It accordingly seems that the answer given above cannot stand.
6. Turning away from evil is naturally prior to doing good. But the forgiveness of guilt refers to turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace is directed to doing good. The forgiveness of guilt is therefore naturally prior to the infusion of grace.
7. The sequence of causes corresponds to the sequence of effects. Now the effect of the forgiveness of guilt is to be clean, and the effect of the infusion of grace is to be graced. But to be clean is naturally prior to being graced, for everything graced is Clean; but the converse does not hold. For according to the Philosopher "the prior is that from which there is a sequence that cannot be reversed." The forgiveness of guilt is therefore naturally prior to the infusion of grace.
8. Guilt and grace are related to each other like contrary forms in the order of nature. Now in natural things the expulsion of one form is naturally prior to the introduction of the other, because it is impossible for contrary forms to be simultaneously in matter. It must accordingly be understood that the form that was there before is driven out before the new form is introduced. Likewise, then, the forgiveness of guilt is naturally prior to the infusion of grace.
9. Leaving the starting point is naturally prior to arriving at the terminal point. But in the justification of sinners guilt stands as the starting point which is left through the forgiveness

of guilt, whereas the terminal point is grace itself, which is arrived at through its infusion. The forgiveness of guilt is therefore naturally prior to the infusion of grace.

10. The answer was given that the infusion of grace is posterior in so far as grace is the term of justification; but in so far as it is a principle which disposes by removing the contrary, it is prior. On the contrary, an agent of infinite power does not need a disposition in the matter upon which it works. But the infusion of grace is effected by an agent of infinite power, God Himself. Consequently no disposition is needed.

1. No form that is wholly from without needs a disposition in matter. But grace is such a form. Therefore.

2. The forgiveness of guilt and the infusion are related in the same way as cleansing and enlightenment. But according to Dionysius cleansing is placed before enlightenment. Therefore, the forgiveness of guilt likewise naturally precedes the infusion of grace.

3. If God worked successively in the justification of sinners, He would first will chronological priority remove the guilt before He infused grace, just as nature in whitening first removes blackness before it introduces whiteness. Now by effecting justification instantaneously God obviates chronological sequence but not that of nature. The forgiveness of guilt is therefore naturally prior to the infusion of grace.

To the Contrary:

1'. A cause naturally precedes its effect. But grace is the cause of the forgiveness of guilt only inasmuch as it is infused. The infusion of grace therefore naturally precedes the forgiveness of guilt.

2'. A natural agent drives out of matter a form contrary to its own only by introducing into the matter a likeness of its own form. In the same way, then, God removes guilt from the soul only by introducing into it a likeness of His own goodness, grace. Thus the infusion of grace naturally precedes the forgiveness of guilt.

3'. Grace is sometimes driven out, and that by guilt, just as at times guilt is forgiven, and that through grace. But grace is driven out by guilt that precedes the driving out of grace. In the same way, then, guilt is forgiven through a grace that precedes the forgiveness of guilt.

4'. Grace is infused by being created and is created by being infused. But the creation of grace is naturally prior to the forgiveness of guilt. Then the infusion of grace also is naturally prior.

5'. An agent is naturally prior to its patient. But in the justification of sinners grace derives from the agent and guilt derives from the patient or recipient. The infusion of grace is therefore naturally prior to the forgiveness of guilt.

REPLY:

In each genus of cause the cause is naturally prior to that which is caused. It happens, however, that according to different genera of causes one and the same thing is both cause and caused in regard to a single term of reference. Thus purgation is the cause of health in the genus of efficient cause, but health is the cause of purgation in the genus of final cause. Similarly matter is in a way the cause of the form in so far as it sustains the form, and the form is in a way the cause of the matter in so far as it confers upon matter actual existence. Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing from being prior and also posterior to another in different genera of causes.

What must be called simply prior in the order of nature, however, is that which is prior in the line of that cause which is prior in the very character of causality. The outstanding example of

this is the end, which is called the cause of causes because all the other causes receive from the final cause their status as causes; for the efficient cause does not act except for the sake of the end, and by reason of the action of the efficient cause the form perfects the matter and the matter supports the form.

It must accordingly be said that, whenever one form is driven out of matter and another is introduced, the expulsion of the previous form is naturally prior in the line of material causality; for every disposition for a form is reduced to the material cause, and stripping the matter of the contrary form is a kind of disposition for the reception of the form. Furthermore, the subject or matter is number able, as is said in the Physics; for it is numbered conceptually, since in addition to the substance of the subject there is found in it privation, which attaches to matter and the subject.

In the line of formal causality, however, the introduction of the form, which formally perfects the subject and drives out the contrary, is naturally prior. And because the form and the end coincide in numerically the same thing, and the form and the efficient cause coincide in species inasmuch as the form is the likeness of the agent, for this reason the introduction of the form is also naturally prior in the line of efficient and final causality. And from this it is evident, according to what was said above, that it is prior without qualification in the order of nature.

It is accordingly clear that, speaking without qualification according to the order of nature, the infusion of grace is prior to the forgiveness of guilt; but according to the order of the material cause the reverse holds true.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The comment in question refers to the avoidance of an evil action and the performance of a good one. To put aside evil is less than to do good, and therefore is naturally prior. The comment does not refer to the habit which is infused or driven out.
2. That argument is based upon the order of the material cause, according to which even as regards the subject the infusion of grace is prior.
3. From the above answer the answer to this difficulty is clear.
4. This difficulty is based upon the order of the formal cause; for by inhering, grace drives out guilt formally.
5. Grace does not drive out guilt efficiently but formally. Hence it does not exist before it drives out guilt but simultaneously will this effect.
6. This difficulty like the first, applies to actions and not to habits.
7. To be clean is not the proper effect of the forgiveness of guilt, because it can be found even if the forgiveness of guilt is not taken into account, as for example in man in the state of innocence. The proper effect of the forgiveness of guilt is to become clean; and that is not more general than to be graced, because no one can become clean except through grace. It should be noted, moreover, that the argument given would not prove natural priority except in the line of material causality; for genera have the function of matter with reference to their species.
8. There is need of the same distinction in natural forms and in the matter at hand.
9. Leaving the starting point is prior in the line of coming to be and of motion. These are reduced to the order of matter, for motion is the act of a being that is in potency. The arrival at the terminus, however, is prior in the line of formal causality.

10. In God's operations a disposition is needed, not because of the impotence of the agent, but because of the condition of the effect; and especially such a disposition the removal of the contrary—because contraries cannot exist together.

11. Even a form which is wholly from without requires the right disposition in the subject, either one pre-existing, as light requires transparency in the air, or one inserted by the same agent at the same time, as heat in its fullness is introduced along with the form of fire. In the same way guilt is driven out by God simultaneously with the infusion of grace.

12. The same distinction is to be applied to the sequence of cleansing and enlightenment as is applied in the matter at hand.

13. If God effected justification successively, the driving out of guilt would be prior in time but posterior in nature; for the order of time follows that of motion and matter. In agreement with this distinction the Philosopher says that in the same being act is posterior to potency in time but prior in nature, because what is prior in the line of final causality is prior in nature without qualification, as has been said.

ARTICLE VIII: IN THE JUSTIFICATION OF SINNERS DOES THE MOTION OF FREE CHOICE NATURALLY PRECEDE THE INFUSION OF GRACE?

Parallel readings: IV Sentences 17, 1, sol. 2 & Sum. Theol., I-II, 113, 8.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does, for

1. A cause naturally precedes its effect. But contrition is the cause

of the forgiveness of guilt. It therefore naturally precedes it; and consequently it also precedes the infusion of grace, because forgiveness and the infusion of grace are concomitant.

2. The answer was given that contrition is not the cause of the forgiveness of guilt except as a material disposition on the contrary, contrition is the sacramental cause of the forgiveness of guilt and of the infusion of grace. Since penance is a sacrament of the New Law, it causes grace, and therefore also the forgiveness of guilt; and it does not do this by reason of its other parts, confession and satisfaction, which presuppose grace and the forgiveness of guilt. We are thus left with the conclusion that contrition itself is the sacramental cause of the forgiveness of guilt and of the infusion of grace. But a sacramental cause is an instrumental cause, as is evident from the preceding question. Since an instrument is reduced to the genus of efficient cause, contrition will not be the cause of the forgiveness of guilt as a material disposition but rather in the genus of efficient cause.

3. Attrition precedes the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt. But contrition differs from attrition only in the intensity of sorrow, and that does not change its species. Then contrition also at least naturally precedes the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt.

4. It is written in the Psalm (88: 15): "Justice and judgment are the preparation of thy throne." Now the soul is made the throne of God by the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt. Consequently, since a man works justice and judgment by being contrite for his sin, it seems that contrition is a preparation for the infusion of grace; and so it is naturally prior.

5. Motion to a term naturally precedes the term. But contrition is a kind of motion tending to the destruction of sin. It therefore naturally precedes the forgiveness of sin.

6. Augustine says: "He who created you without you will not justify you without you." Thus the motion of free choice, which is from us, is required for justification and naturally precedes it. But justification terminates in the forgiveness of guilt. The motion of free choice therefore naturally precedes the forgiveness of guilt.

7. In carnal marriage mutual consent naturally precedes the marriage bond. But through the infusion of grace a certain spiritual marriage of the soul with God is contracted, according to the words of Osee (2: 19): "I will espouse thee to me for ever." Consequently the motion of free choice, by which the consent of the soul to God is given, naturally precedes the infusion of grace.

8. The relation between the imparting of motion by the mover and its reception by the thing moved is the same in things moved by an other and in those which are moved by themselves. But the motion imparted by an external agent, whether it acts as a principal agent or only as a helper, naturally precedes its reception by the thing moved. Now, since in the justification of sinners the soul is not moved wholly from without, but in a certain sense it moves itself as a helper, according to the words of the first Epistle to the Corinthians (3:9): "We are God's coadjutors," it therefore seems that the operation of the soul, that is, the motion of free choice, naturally precedes the forgiveness of guilt, in which the soul is moved from vice to virtue.

To the Contrary:

1'. Contrition is a meritorious act. But a meritorious act comes only from grace. Then grace is the cause of contrition. But the cause naturally precedes the effect. The infusion of grace therefore naturally precedes contrition.

2'. In its comment upon the words of the Epistle to the Romans (5: 1): "Being justified therefore by faith...", the Gloss says: "No meritorious act of man precedes the grace of God." But contrition is a meritorious act of man. It therefore does not precede the infusion of grace.

3'. It was said in answer that it precedes as a kind of disposition.— On the contrary, a disposition is less perfect than the form for which it disposes. But contrition is something more perfect than grace. Contrition is therefore not a disposition for grace. Proof of the minor: A second act has greater perfection than a first act. But grace is a first act since it is like a habit; but contrition is a second act since it is the operation of grace, just as considering is the operation of science. Then contrition is more perfect than grace, just as considering is more perfect than science.

4'. The effect of an efficient cause is never a disposition for that efficient cause, because in the line of motion it follows the efficient cause, though in the same line a disposition precedes that for which it disposes. But contrition is related to grace as the effect of an efficient cause is related to that cause. Contrition is therefore not a disposition for grace; and so the conclusion is the same as above. Proof of the minor: Habit and power are reduced to the same genus of causes, since the habit supplies what is lacking to the power. But a power is the cause of its act in the line of efficient causality. Then so is a habit. But the relation of grace to contrition is that of a habit to its act. The relation of contrition to grace is therefore that of an effect to an efficient cause.

5'. Whatever has no influence upon the introduction of a form is not a disposition for the form. But contrition has no influence upon the infusion of grace, because apart from contrition the infusion of grace can take place. Examples are had in Christ, in the angels, and

in the first man in the state of innocence. Contrition is therefore not a disposition for grace; and so we must conclude the same as before.

6'. Bernard says that there are two requisites for the work of our salvation: God to give it, and free choice to receive it. But giving is naturally prior to receiving. Consequently grace, which in our justification is from God who gives it, naturally precedes contrition, which is from our free choice which receives it.

7'. Contrition cannot coexist with sin. The forgiveness of sin therefore naturally precedes contrition.

REPLY:

On this matter there are three opinions.

Some say that the motion of free choice naturally precedes without qualification the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt. For they say that that motion of free choice is not contrition but attrition, and that it is an act not of formed but of unformed faith. But this does not seem to be to the point. For all sorrow for sin in one who has grace is contrition; and similarly every act of faith joined to grace is an act of formed faith. Accordingly the act of unformed faith and the attrition of which these men speak precede in time the infusion of grace of such motions of free choice we are not at present speaking, but rather of those which are accompanied by the infusion of grace and without which there cannot be any justification in adults; for it can take place without any preceding acts, as is clear from what was said above.

For this reason others say that those motions are meritorious and informed by grace, and hence naturally follow grace; but they naturally precede the forgiveness of guilt, because through those acts grace brings about that forgiveness. Now this cannot be true. For any thing that causes an effect by its operation causes it as an efficient cause. If, then, grace causes the forgiveness of guilt through an act of contrition and of faith that is formed, it will cause it as an efficient cause. But that is impossible; for a cause which effectively destroys something is placed in existence before the thing destroyed is reduced to non-existence, because it would not work for the destruction of something which already does not exist. It would accordingly follow that grace would be in the soul before guilt is forgiven. But that is impossible. It is therefore clear that grace is not the cause of the forgiveness of sin through any operation, but through the information of its subject implied in the infusion of grace. Nothing intervenes, then, between the infusion of grace and the forgiveness of guilt.

We must therefore hold, as another opinion has it, that the motions in question are so related in the same order to both forgiveness and grace that in one sense they precede and in another they follow by the order of nature. For if we view the order of nature in the line of material causality, the motion of free choice naturally precedes the infusion of grace as a material disposition precedes the form. If, on the other hand, we view them in the line of formal causality, the sequence is reversed. The same situation obtains in natural things as regards a disposition that is an exigency for a form, which in some sense precedes the substantial form, namely, in the line of material causality; for a material disposition attaches to the matter. In the other line of causality-formal-however, the substantial form is prior inasmuch as it perfects both the matter and the material accidents.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Contrition is the cause of the forgiveness of guilt in so far as it is a disposition for grace.
- 2.** The sacrament of penance has the ability to confer grace from the power of the keys, to which the penitent submits. If contrition is considered in itself, then, it is related to grace only

as a material disposition; but if it is considered in so far as it has the power of the keys in desire, then it works sacramentally in virtue of the sacrament of penance, as also in virtue of baptism, as is clear in the case of an adult who has the sacrament of baptism only in desire. We do not conclude from this, then, that contrition is itself directly the efficient cause of the forgiveness of guilt, but rather that the power of the keys or baptism is.

Or the answer may be given that will reference to the debt of temporal punishment contrition stands as an efficient cause, but will reference to the stain and the debt of eternal punishment it stands only as a disposition.

3. Contrition does not differ from previous attrition merely in the intensity of the sorrow but also in information by grace. Thus contrition has a certain relation of posteriority to grace which attrition does not have.

4. That preparation is by way of a material disposition.

5. Contrition is a motion to the forgiveness of guilt, not as if the contrition were distant from the forgiveness but as joined to it. Hence it is considered as being in the condition of having been moved rather than in that of being moved. And yet the motion precedes the term in the line of material causality, because motion is the act of a being that is in potency.

6. The words "He will not justify you without you" are to be understood as meaning "not without you in some way disposing your self for grace." So the motion of free choice does not have to precede except as a disposition.

7. Consent is the efficient cause of carnal marriage; but the motion of free choice is not the efficient cause of the infusion of grace; and so there is no parallel.

8. In the justification of sinners man is not God's helper in the sense of producing grace along with Him, but only in the sense that he prepares himself for grace.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. Contrition is from grace as from that which informs it. It accordingly follows that in the line of formal causality grace is prior.

2'. The meritorious act of man does not precede grace in the line of meriting so that grace becomes subordinate to the meritorious act. Yet the human act can precede grace as a material disposition.

3'. Contrition is from free choice and from grace. Inasmuch as it proceeds from free choice it is a disposition for grace that arrives simultaneously with grace, just as a disposition that is an exigency exists simultaneously with the form; but inasmuch as it is from grace it is related to grace as a second act.

4'. Just as a habit perfects a power formally, in the same way the remnant of the habit left in the act is formal as regards the substance of the act which the power furnishes. Thus the habit is a formal principle of the formed act, although in regard to the formation it has the character of an efficient cause.

5'. A disposition does not have any influence upon the form effectively but only materially, inasmuch as through the disposition the matter is made suitable for the reception of the form. Contrition accordingly has an influence upon the infusion of grace in one who has guilt, though it is not required in an innocent person. For there are more dispositive requisites for the removal of a contrary form and the simultaneous introduction of a form than for the introduction of a form alone.

6'. The contribution of the giver is prior formally, but that of the receiver is prior materially.

7'. It does not follow from that argument that the removal of guilt precedes contrition, because guilt is in some sense forgiven through contrition itself, just as the form of water is driven out by means of heat in the highest degree and therefore the two forms are not simultaneous. In the same way, neither are guilt and contrition.

ARTICLE IX: IS THE JUSTIFICATION OF SINNERS INSTANTANEOUS?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 28, 2 ad 'o; IV Sentences 17, I, 5 sol. 2 & 3; Sum. Theol., I-II, 113, 7.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

It is impossible for the same power to have several motions at one and the same time, just as a single matter is not under different distinct forms at one and the same time. But in the justification of sinners two different motions of free choice are required, as is clear from what has been said. The justification of sinners therefore cannot be instantaneous.

2. The answer was given that those two motions belong to different powers; for the motion of free choice toward God belongs to the concupiscible power, and that toward sin, being a sort of detestation of sin, is in the irascible. —On the contrary, to detest is the same as to hate. But hatred, like love, is in the concupiscible power, as the Philosopher teaches. To detest is therefore not in the irascible power.

3. According to Damascene the irascible and concupiscible powers are parts of sense appetite. But sense appetite extends only to a good suited to it or to the contrary of this. But objects of this kind are not God Himself and sin under the aspect of being detestable. The motions in question therefore do not pertain to the concupiscible and irascible powers but to the will; and so they belong to the same power.

4. It was said in answer that the motion of free choice toward God is the motion of faith, which belongs to the intellect, whereas contrition belongs to the will, whose business it is to sorrow for sin; and thus they are not motions of a single power.—On the contrary, according to Augustine "man cannot believe unless he so wills." Consequently, even though an act of the intellect is required in believing, there is nevertheless required in it an act of the will. We are accordingly left with the conclusion that two motions of the same power are required for the justification of sinners.

5. To be moved from one term to another belongs to the same being. But to detest sin is to be moved from a term, and to be moved toward God is to be moved to a term. Consequently contrition, which is detestation for sin, is an act of the same power to which motion toward God belongs; and so they cannot coexist.

6. Nothing is moved at the same time to distinct and contrary terms. But God and sin are distinct and contrary terms. The soul therefore cannot at the same time be moved toward God and toward sin and so we must conclude as before.

7. Grace is given only to one who is worthy. But as long as a person is subjected to guilt he is not worthy of grace. Guilt must therefore be driven out before grace is infused. Then justification, which includes the two, is not instantaneous.

8. A form susceptible of more or less must, it seems, come to be in a subject successively, just as a form not susceptible of more or less comes to be in the subject all at once, as is clear of substantial forms. But grace is intensified in its subject. It therefore seems to be introduced successively; and so the infusion of grace is not instantaneous, and consequently neither is the justification of sinners.

9. In the justification of sinners, as in any change, two terms must be set down, a starting point and a finish. But the two terms of any change are incompatible; that is, they cannot coexist. In the justification of sinners, then, two things are included which are related as prior and posterior; and so the justification of sinners is successive and not instantaneous.

10. Nothing which is in the process of becoming before it is in the state of having become, comes into being instantaneously. But grace is in the process of becoming before it is in the state of having become. The infusion of grace is therefore not instantaneous. Thus the conclusion is the same as above. Proof of the minor: In permanent beings what is becoming is not; but when it has become it already is. But grace belongs to permanent beings. If, then, it is becoming and has become at the same time, it at the same time is and is not. But that is impossible.

11. All motion is in time. But in the justification of sinners a motion of free choice is required. The justification of sinners therefore takes place in time, and so it is not instantaneous.

12. Contrition for sins is required for the justification of sinners. But when someone has committed many sins, he cannot at the same instant be contrite for all his sins or even think of them. Consequently: the justification of sinners cannot be instantaneous.

11. Whenever there is anything intermediate between the extremes a change, the change is successive and not instantaneous. But between guilt and grace there is something intermediate, the state of created nature. The justification of sinners is therefore a successive change.

14. Guilt and grace are not in the soul simultaneously. Then the instant at which guilt is last in the soul is distinct from the instant at which grace is first there. But between any two instants a time intervenes. Then a time intervenes between the expulsion of guilt and the infusion of grace. But justification includes both of these. Therefore justification takes place in time and is not instantaneous.

To the Contrary:

1'. The justification of sinners is a sort of spiritual enlightenment. But corporeal enlightenment takes place instantaneously, not in time. Now since spiritual beings are simpler than corporeal and less subject to time, it therefore seems that the justification of sinners is instantaneous.

2'. The more powerful an agent is, the shorter the time in which it produces its effect. But God, who has infinite power, works justification. Justification is therefore instantaneous.

3'. In The Causes we read that both the substance and the action of a spiritual substance (which is the genus to which the soul belongs) is in a moment of eternity and not in time. But justification pertains to the action of the soul. It is therefore not in time.

4'. At the same instant at which the disposition is complete in the matter, the form also is present. But the motion of free choice which is required in justification is a complete disposition for grace. Therefore, at the same instant at which those motions are given, grace is present.

REPLY:

The justification of sinners is instantaneous.

For the clarification of this matter it should be noted that, when any change is said to be instantaneous, we do not mean that its two terms exist at the same instant; for this is impossible, since every change is between terms that are, properly speaking, opposed. We mean rather that the passage from one term to the other is instantaneous. That does in fact happen in some opposites, though in others it does not.

Whenever any mean must be recognized between the terms of a motion, the passage from one term to the other must be successive, because the thing which is undergoing continuous motion is first changed to the mean before it is changed to the final term, as the Philosopher makes clear. And by "mean" I refer to any sort of distance from the extremes, whether it be distance in situation, as is had in local motion; or distance in the line of quantity, as is had in increase and decrease; or in the line of form, as in alteration; and this whether the mean is of another species, as gray is between white and black, or of the same species, as the less warm is between the more warm and cold.

Whenever, on the other hand, there cannot be a mean between the two terms of a motion or change in any of the ways mentioned, then the passage from one term to the other is not in time but is instantaneous. This occurs whenever the terms of motion or change are affirmation and negation or privation and form. For between affirmation and negation there is no mean in any sense, nor between privation and form will regard to its proper subject. I am speaking here in the sense in which there is a mean of another species between the extremes.

But in the sense in which there is a mean in intensity and slackness, even though there cannot be a mean essentially, there nevertheless can be a mean accidentally. For essentially negation or privation is neither intensified nor abated; but accidentally some intensification or abatement of it can be viewed on the basis of its cause. Thus a man who has his eye gouged out may be said to be more blind than one who has a bandage over his eye, because the cause of blindness is more efficacious.

If, then, we take such changes according to their proper terms and speak essentially, they must be instantaneous and not in time. Examples are illumination, coming to be and perishing, and the like. But if we take them from the point of view of the causes of their terms, we can consider succession in them. This is evident in illumination; for, although the air passes straightway from darkness to light, the cause of darkness is successively removed, that is, the absence of the sun, since by means of local motion the sun becomes successively present. In this way illumination is the term of a local motion and is indivisible, like any term of a continuum.

I say, then, that the extremes of justification are grace and the privation of grace, between which no mean as regards their proper subject intervenes. The passage from the one to the other must accordingly be instantaneous, although the cause of such a privation is removed successively, either inasmuch as by taking thought the man disposes him self for grace, or at least inasmuch as a time passes after which God has preordained that He will give grace. Thus the infusion of grace takes place instantaneously. And because the driving out of guilt is the formal effect of the grace infused, hence it is that the whole justification of sinners is instantaneous; for the form and the disposition for the form and the loss of the other form are all instantaneous.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. When the two motions are altogether different, they cannot co exist in the same power. But if one is the reason for the other, then they can coexist, because they are in some sense a single motion. When, for example, a person desires something for the sake of an end, he at the

same time desires the end and the means. In the same way when someone flees from what is repugnant to the end, he at the same time desires the end and flees from the contrary. It is in this way that the will at the same time is moved toward God and hates sin as contrary to God.

2. Such motions of free choice pertain to the will, not to the irascible and the concupiscible power. This is because their object is something intelligible, not something sensible. Yet they are sometimes found to be attributed to the irascible and the concupiscible powers in so far as the will itself is sometimes called irascible or concupiscible because of the resemblance of its act to theirs. In this case contrition can be attributed both to the concupiscible power inasmuch as the man hates sin, and to the irascible inasmuch as he is worked up against the sin, purposing within himself revenge for it.

3-5. The answers to these are clear from the above.

6. The will is not moved at the same time to pursue contraries, but it can be moved at the same time to flee from one thing and to pursue another, particularly if the pursuit of the one is the reason for the flight from the other.

7. Grace is given to one worthy of it, not in the sense that anyone is sufficiently worthy before he has grace, but in the sense that grace by being given makes the man worthy. Hence he is at the same time worthy of grace and in possession of grace.

8. It is not the intensification or abatement of the form itself in a subject, but rather the intensification or abatement of the contrary form or opposite term, which brings about the successive reception of the form in its subject. Now the privation of grace is not susceptible of more or less except accidentally, by reason of its cause, as has all ready been explained. Consequently it is not necessary for grace to be received successively in its subject. If, however, it did abate in the subject, this could have some influence upon the successive loss of grace; but grace does not abate in the same subject. Therefore it is not successively lost, because it does not abate itself; nor is it successively introduced, because its privation does not abate.

9. The answer is clear from what has been said; for a change is not said to be instantaneous because the two terms coexist at the same instant, as has been explained.

10. The coming to be of a permanent being can be taken in two senses: (1) Properly. In this sense a thing is said to be coming to be so long as the motion, whose term is the coming of the thing into existence, continues. So what comes to be is not in permanent beings, but the becoming of the thing takes place through a succession. It is in this sense that the Philosopher says that what is in process of becoming was becoming and will become. (2) Improperly, so that a thing is said to come to be at the instant at which it first has become, and this because that instant, inasmuch as it is the term of the previous time in which the thing was becoming, appropriates to itself what rightly belongs to the previous time. In this sense it is not true that what is in process of becoming is not, but rather that it is now for the first time and was not before this. This is the meaning of the statement that in things that become all at once, the becoming and the having become are simultaneous.

i Motion is not taken in the present context as a passage from potency to act (in which sense it is measured by time); but the motion of free choice is taken for its very operation, and this is an "act of a perfect being," as is said in *The Soul*. It can accordingly be instantaneous, just as to be perfect is also instantaneous.

12 At the instant at which a man is justified it is not required that he have contrition in particular for each one of his sins, but in general for all of them, will particular contrition for each sin either preceding or following.

13. After a man has fallen into sin there cannot be any mean between grace and guilt, because guilt is not taken away except through grace, as is evident from what was said above. Nor is grace destroyed except through guilt, though before guilt there would be a mean between grace and guilt in the opinion of some.

14. We should not take the last instant at which there was guilt, but the last time, as was said above."

QUESTION 29: Grace of Christ

ARTICLE I: IS THERE CREATED GRACE IN CHRIST?

Parallel readings: III Sentences i 1, I; In Joan., C. 3, lectura 6, § (P 'o: 357b- Sum. Theol., III, 7, 1; Comp. Theol., I, 213 & 214.

Difficulties:

It seems that there is not, for

1. By created grace a man is said to be an adopted son of God. But according to the saints Christ was not an adopted son. He therefore did not have created grace.

2. Where there is a union of one thing with another through its essence, there is no need of union through a likeness. Thus for knowledge there is required a union of the knower with the thing known; and yet when things are in the soul through their essence, in order to be known they do not need to be in the soul through a likeness. But God is really united to the soul of Christ by His essence in the unity of the person. There is consequently no need of His being united to it through grace, that is, through a likeness.

3. We do not need grace for actions which we can perform by our natural powers. But Christ was able to attain glory by His natural powers; for He is the natural Son, and if the Son, then the heir also. Now since grace is imparted to minds for the purpose of attaining glory, it therefore seems that Christ had no need of created grace.

4. A subject can be understood without an accident. But if grace was in Christ, it was an accident. Christ can therefore be understood without grace; and when He is so understood, either eternal life is due Him or not. If it is, then grace will be added to no purpose. If not, since eternal life is due to adopted sons because they are sons, it seems that adoptive sonship is worth more than natural sonship. But that is untenable.

5. Whatever is good by its essence does not need participated goodness. But Christ is good by His essence, because He is true God. He therefore does not need grace, which is a participated goodness.

6. Uncreated goodness surpasses the goodness of grace more than the light of the sun surpasses that of a candle. But since uncreated goodness was in Christ through the union, it therefore seems that He did not need grace.

7. The union of the divinity to Christ is either sufficient for Him or not. If it is not, the union in question will be imperfect; but if it is sufficient, the addition of grace would be superfluous. Now nothing superfluous is found in God's works. Christ therefore did not have created grace.

8. One who knows something will a nobler kind of knowledge, such as that had through a demonstrative medium, does not need to know the same thing will a less noble kind of knowledge, as through a probable medium. But Christ was good will the noblest goodness, which is uncreated goodness. He therefore did not need to be good by a less noble sort of goodness, namely, created goodness.

9. An instrument does not need a habit for its operation, especially if the agent whose instrument it is has perfect power. But the humanity of Christ is a kind of "instrument of the divinity" which is united to it, as Damascene says. Since the divine power is most perfect, it seems that the humanity of Christ did not need grace.

10. It is not necessary for anything to be added to one who has the fullness of all goodness. But Christ's soul had the fullness of all good ness because the Word, the treasure-house of all goodness, was united to it. It was therefore not necessary for the goodness of grace to be added to it.

11. That by which something is made better is nobler than the thing itself. But no creature is nobler than the soul united to the Word. Then Christ's soul cannot be made better by any created grace; and so created grace would be useless in it.

12. The image of God in us is twofold, as is gathered from the Gloss in its comment upon the words of the Psalm (4:7): "The light of thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." One is that of creation, which consists in the mind considered as one essence will three powers. The other is that of re-creation, viewed from the standpoint of the light of grace. Now either the image of grace is more like God than the image of Christ's mind, or not. If it is more like God, then grace is a nobler creature than Christ's soul. If it is not more like God, then by its means the mind of Christ would not come any closer to conformity will God—which is the purpose for which grace is in fused into the mind. Grace would therefore be held to be in the soul of Christ in vain.

13. If effects are incompatible, they will have incompatible causes. Just as the unifying and the breaking up of a field of vision, for in stance, are mutually incompatible, so also are white and black. But natural sonship, whose principle is eternal birth, is incompatible will adoptive sonship, whose principle is the infusion of grace. Then in fused grace is also incompatible will eternal birth; and since eternal birth applies to Christ, it therefore seems that He did not have infused grace.

To the Contrary:

1'. It is written in John (1:14): "We saw... [him] full of grace and truth." But in Christ there was created knowledge, to which truth refers. Then there was also created grace.

2'. Merit requires grace. But Christ merited for Himself and us, as the saints say. Christ therefore had created grace, for it is not attributable to the Creator to merit.

3'. Christ was at the same time a wayfarer and a possessor. But the perfection of a wayfarer is created grace. Christ therefore had created grace.

4'. No perfection found in other souls was missing from Christ's, since it is the most perfect of all. But the souls of saints have not only the perfection of nature but also that of grace. Both kinds of perfection were therefore found in Christ.

5'. The relation of grace to the wayfarer is the same as that of glory to the possessor. But in Christ, who was both wayfarer and possessor, there was created glory, because He enjoyed the divinity by a created act. Consequently there was created grace in Him.

REPLY:

It is necessary to hold that there was created grace in Christ. The reason for this necessity- can be gathered from the two different kinds of union will God which a soul can have: one consequent upon existence within a single person, which belongs uniquely to the soul of Christ; and another consequent upon an operation, which is common to all who know and love God.

The first kind of union is not sufficient for beatitude without the second, because not even God Himself would be blessed if He did not know and love Himself; for He would not take pleasure in Himself, as is required for beatitude. For the soul of Christ to be blessed, then, it requires besides its personal union with the Word also a union through its operation, that it may see God by His essence and, seeing Him, rejoice. Now this surpasses the natural ability of any creature and is proper to God alone according to His own nature. Something must therefore be added to the nature of Christ's soul by which it is ordained to the beatitude in question. We call this grace. It is therefore necessary to hold that there was created grace in Christ's soul.

This shows the inanity of a certain opinions which affirmed that the higher part of Christ's soul did not have habitual grace but was united immediately to the Word and from this union grace flowed into the lower powers. For if it refers to personal union, then not only the higher part of Christ's soul but the whole soul is united to the Word. But if it refers to union by operation, then habitual grace is required for this kind of union, as has been said.

Answers to Difficulties:

- 1.** Attributes of such a kind as to belong to a person by reason of personality itself cannot be predicated of Christ if they are incompatible with the properties of an eternal person, which is the only kind of person in Him. An example would be the name creature. But things which belong to a person only by reason of his nature or a part of his nature can be predicated of Christ, even though they imply some incompatibility with an eternal person. This is because of the duality of natures. Examples would be to suffer, to die, and the like. Now sonship refers primarily to the person, whereas grace refers to the person only by reason of the mind, which is a part of the nature. Thus adoptive sonship by no means applies to Christ, though having grace does.
- 2.** That argument is valid when union by essence and union by likeness are ordained to the same end. But that is not true in the matter at hand. The real union of the divinity with Christ's soul is ordained to personal unity, whereas the union by the likeness of grace is ordained to the enjoyment of beatitude.
- 3.** Beatitude is natural to Christ according to His divine nature, but not according to His human nature. For this reason He has need of grace.
- 4.** Should it be asserted that Christ's soul did not have grace, then uncreated beatitude will belong to Christ inasmuch as He is the natural Son, but not the created beatitude which is due to adopted Sons.
- 5.** Christ is good by His essence in His divine nature but not in His human nature. It is with reference to the latter that He needs the participation of grace.
- 6.** The light of the sun and of a candle are ordained to the same end, but not the union of the divinity to the soul of Christ by nature and that by grace. Thus there is no parallel.
- 7.** The union of the divinity with Christ's soul is sufficient for its purpose. It does not follow, however, that the union of grace is superfluous, because it is ordained to something else.
- 8.** Both the nobler and the less noble knowledge are ordained to the same end, the cognition of a thing. But that is not the case in the question at issue. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

9. An instrument can be of either of two kinds: one inanimate, which is acted upon and does not act, such as an ax, and such an instrument does not need a habit; the other animate, as a slave, which acts and is acted upon, and this kind needs a habit. Christ's humanity is the latter kind of instrument of the divinity.

10. The fullness of all goodness was, by reason of its personal union with the Word, united to Christ's soul, not formally but personally. For this reason it needed to be informed by grace.

11. No creature is better, simply speaking, than the soul united personally to the Word; but if we speak in a qualified way, nothing prevents it. Colour was nobler than His body in a certain respect, namely, as being its act. In the same way Christ's grace is better than His soul inasmuch as it is its perfection.

12. Grace is more like God in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is related to Christ's soul as act to potency. From this point of view Christ's soul was conformed to God through grace. But in other respects His mind itself is more like God, that is, from the standpoint of natural properties, in which it imitates God.

13. This is to be answered in the same way as the first difficulty.

ARTICLE II: FOR CHRIST'S HUMAN NATURE TO BE UNITED PERSONALLY TO THE WORD IS HABITUAL GRACE REQUIRED?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 2, 2, 2 sol. 1; 13, 3, s; Quodibet IX, (2), 2 ad 3; in Coloss., c. 2, lectura 2; Sum. Theol., III, 2, 10; 6, 6; Comp. Theol., 1, 214.

Difficulties:

It seems not, for

1. Before we can understand an accident inhering in a substance, we must understand the substance in the existence of a supposite. But by the union of the human nature with the Word the human nature is established in the existence of a supposite. Since grace is an accident, it seems that the union of the human nature with the Word must be understood before grace. Thus grace is not required for the union.

2. Human nature is capable of being assumed by the Word inasmuch as it is rational. And it does not get this from grace. Then it is not disposed for the union by grace.

3. The soul is infused into the body in order that in it the soul may be perfected with knowledge and virtues, as the Master makes clear. But Christ's soul is united to the Word before it is to the body; other will it would follow that a supposite was assumed, for from the union of the soul with the body a supposite is constituted. The union of Christ's soul with the Word must therefore be understood before we understand grace in it. Thus grace does not dispose for the union in question.

4. Between the nature and the supposite no accident intervenes. But the human nature is united to the Word as to a supposite. Grace therefore does not intervene there as a disposition.

5. The human nature is united to the Word not only as regards the soul but also as regards the body. Now the body is not capable of receiving grace. Consequently for the union of human nature to the Word grace is not needed as an intervening disposition.

6. As Augustine says, in miraculous occurrences "the whole reason for the miracle is the power of the miracle-worker." But the union of human nature to the divine is a miraculous occurrence above all others. It is therefore not necessary to posit a disposition on the part of the miracle, but the power of the miracle-worker suffices. Thus no intervening grace is required.

To the Contrary:

1'. Augustine says that whatever belongs to the Son of God by nature belongs to the Son of Man by grace. But it belongs to the Son of God by nature to be God. This also belongs to the Son of Man, then, by grace. But this belongs to Him through the union. Therefore grace is required for the union.

2'. Union in person is more excellent than union through fruition. But grace is required for the latter union. Then so is it for the former.

REPLY:

The proposition that habitual grace is required for the union in question can be understood in two ways: (1) It is required as a principle causing the union. To hold that the union in Christ is brought about by grace in this sense smacks of the heresy of Nestorius, who held that the humanity is united to the Word in Christ in no other way than on the basis of a perfect likeness in grace. (2) It is required as a disposition. This in turn can be of two kinds: either necessary or suitable—necessary, as heat or rarity is a disposition necessary for the form of fire, because matter cannot be the proper matter for fire unless it is taken together with heat and rarity; or suitable, as beauty is a disposition suitable for marriage.

Some therefore say that habitual grace is a necessary disposition, as making human nature capable of being assumed. But that does not seem to be true. For grace is rather the end of that assumption than a disposition for it. Damascene says that Christ assumed human nature in order to cure it. But that curing is accomplished through grace. Habitual grace in Christ is accordingly to be understood rather as an effect of the union than as a preparation for that union. This is indicated in the of John (s: 84.): "We saw him as it were the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth," as if the fullness of grace belongs to Him by the very fact that He is the Only-begotten of the Father through the union.

Thus habitual grace is not to be understood as a disposition for the union except as suitable. In this sense habitual grace can be called the grace of union, though more fittingly and more in conformity with the meaning of the saints the grace of union is understood as the very existence in the person of the Word, which is conferred upon the human nature without any previous merits; but for this, habitual grace is not required as it is for the fruition, which consists in an operation; for a habit is not a principle of being but of operating.

Answers to Difficulties:

These are obvious from what has just been said.

ARTICLE III: IS THE GRACE OF CHRIST INFINITE?

Parallel readings: I Sentences 17, 2, 4 ad 3; a. 2 ad 3; III Sentences 13, 1, 2 sol. 2; in Joan., C. 3, lectura 6, § (P 10: 357 Sum. Theol., 111,7, 11; Comp. theol, I, 215.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is, for

1. Everything finite is measured. But the grace of Christ is not measured, because the Spirit has not been given to Christ by measure, as we read in John (3:34). The grace of Christ is therefore infinite.

2. For any finite thing whatsoever God can make a greater. But God could not have given Christ greater grace, as the Master says. Then the grace of Christ is infinite.

. The answer was given that the grace of Christ is said to be finite, not because God could not give greater grace, but because the soul of Christ was notable to receive greater, for its entire capacity was filled with grace.—On the contrary, according to Augustine "the good of a creature consists in measure, species, and order; and where these three characteristics are great the good is great, and where they are small, the good is small." Consequently, as a creature grows in goodness, the measure grows, and as a result the amount of its capacity is increased; for a thing's measure depends upon its capacity, as Augustine says. Thus the more his grace is increased, the more the capacity in the soul of Christ is increased.

4. Anselm proves that God had to be incarnated because atonement for human nature could not be made except through infinite merit, which could not be that of a mere man. From this it is evident that the merit of Christ as man was infinite. But the cause of merit is grace. The grace of Christ was therefore infinite, because an infinite effect can proceed from a finite cause.

5. The charity of a wayfarer can increase to infinity, because how ever much a man advances in this life, he can always advance still further. Now if the grace of Christ were finite, the grace of some other man could increase to such an extent that it would be greater than Christ's, and so that man would be better than Christ. But that is inadmissible.

6. The capacity of Christ's soul is either finite or infinite. If it is infinite, and its entire capacity full, then He has infinite grace. If, on the other hand, it is finite, and for anything finite God can make something greater, then He can make a greater capacity than that had by Christ's soul; and so He can make Christ better. But that seems to be absurd.

7. It was answered that God could make a greater capacity as far as He is concerned, but a creature would not be able to receive it.— On the contrary, the most excellent creature stands at an infinite distance from God. There are therefore an infinite number of intermediate degrees between God and the most excellent creature. Thus for any created goodness or capacity God can make a better.

8. Nothing finite has power over an infinite number of things. But the grace of Christ had such power, for it had power over the salvation of an infinite number of men and over the effacement of an infinite number of sins. The grace of Christ was therefore infinite.

To the Contrary:

1'. Nothing created is infinite; otherwise a creature would be equal to the Creator. But the grace of Christ was something created. Therefore it was finite.

2'. It is written in Wisdom (x 1:21): "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight." But nothing infinite has definite weight and measure. All things, therefore, which are made by God are finite; and so the grace of Christ is not infinite.

REPLY:

The occasion for the introduction of this question was the passage in John (3:34): "For God doth not give the Spirit by measure." We must therefore get an understanding of these words in order to get at the truth of the present question.

There may first of all come to mind an interpretation of those words in which the Spirit is said not to be given to Christ in measure, because the Holy Spirit, who is infinite, filled Christ by means of grace. But that interpretation is not in accord with the meaning of the text. For the words under discussion are introduced in order to distinguish between Christ and John [Baptist] and all the saints, as the Gloss points out. In that interpretation Christ does not differ in this respect from creatures; for the Holy Spirit, who is the third person of the Trinity, both is infinite in Himself and dwells in each one of the saints.

For this reason another interpretation is set down in the Gloss: the words in question refer to eternal generation, in which the Father gave the Son an infinite nature, so that by "spirit" is understood the spiritual divine nature. The Gloss accordingly says: "That there should be a Son just as great as the Father, the Father begot a Son equal to Himself." But this meaning does not agree with the words that follow; for the passage continues (John 3:35): "The Father loved the Son," so that it is to be understood as if the love of the Father for the Son is the reason for the giving that is spoken of. Nor can it be said that love is the reason for the eternal generation, since personal love is rather from the generation. Essential love, of course, pertains to the will; but we do not grant that the Father begot the Son by will.

Still another interpretation is accordingly given in the Gloss: the statement refers to the union of the Word with the human nature. For the very Word of God, which is the divine wisdom, is communicated to each creature in some definite measure inasmuch as God has spread indications of His wisdom through all His works, according to the words of Ecclesiasticus (1:20): "And he poured her (wisdom) out upon all his works, and upon all flesh, according to his gift: and hath given her to them that love him." But the Word Itself is united to the human nature in Christ fully, without measure, so that by "the spirit" which is not given "by measure" is understood the Word of God. Hence the Gloss explains: "As the Father begot the Word full and perfect, so It is united to human nature full and perfect." But this interpretation also does not agree in all respects with the following words. For the gift of which the words under discussion speak was made to the Son, as is shown in the words which are added (John 3:35): "The Father loved the Son: and He hath given all things into his hand." Now by the union nothing has been given to the Son, but it has been given to a man to be the Son.

The words in question therefore seem to refer properly to habitual grace, in which the Holy Spirit is shown to have been given to the soul of Christ, the union by which that man was the Son of God being presupposed. Now this grace, absolutely speaking, was finite; but in a certain sense it was infinite.

To get a clear understanding of this matter we should bear in mind that finite and infinite are taken with reference to quantity, as the Philosopher makes clear.¹⁰ Now there are two kinds of quantity: dimensive, which is referred to extension; and virtual, which is referred to intensity; for the excellence (virtus) of a thing is its perfection, as the Philosopher teaches: "Anything is perfect when it attains its proper excellence"; and the virtual quantity of each form is considered according to the degree of its perfection. Both kinds of quantity are differentiated into many species. Under dimensive quantity are included length, width, and depth, and potentially number. Virtual quantity is distinguished into as many classes as there are natures and forms, whose degree of perfection constitutes all the measure of quantity that they have.

Now it sometimes happens that what is finite as regards one sort of quantity is infinite as regards another. This is easily seen if we take dimensive quantity in both cases, for we can conceive a surface which is finite in width but infinite in length. It is also clear if we take one dimensive quantity and another virtual; for if we conceive an infinite white body, its whiteness will not on this account be infinite in intensity, but only (indirectly) in extension; for something whiter might be found. The same is no less evident if both quantities are

virtual; for in one and the same subject different virtual quantities can be taken into consideration on the basis of different formalities of the attributes predicated of this subject. Thus if a thing is called a being, virtual quantity is considered in it will regard to the perfection of existing; and if it is called sentient, this quantity is considered will regard to the perfection of sensing; and so on.

With regard to the formality of existing, then, only that can be infinite which includes all the perfection of existing—a perfection which is capable of being diversified in an infinite number of different modes. In this respect only God is infinite essentially, because His act of existing is not limited to any determined perfection but embraces every mode of perfection to which the formality of being can extend. For this reason He is essentially infinite. This kind of infinity cannot apply to any creature, for the act of existing of every creature is limited to the perfection of its own species. if, then, we conceive of a sentient soul which has in it whatever can contribute in the perfection of sensing in any way whatsoever, that soul will be finite essentially, because its act of being is limited to a particular perfection of existing, namely, sentience, which is surpassed by another perfection, intelligence. Yet it would be infinite as regards the formality of sentience, because its sentience would not be limited to any definite mode of sensing.

In like manner I say of the habitual grace of Christ that it is essentially finite because its act of being is limited to a particular species of being, that of grace; yet it is infinite in the line of grace. For, although a person's perfection in point of grace can be considered to be of any one of an infinite number of modes, no one of them was wanting to Christ, but He had grace in all the fullness and perfection to which the formality of this species, grace, can extend.

This interpretation [of the words quoted at the beginning of this reply] the Gloss expressly sets down, saying: "God gives the spirit to men by measure, to the Son not by measure; but just as He begot His Son wholly from Himself, so to His incarnate Son He gave His spirit wholly, not in part, not by any subdivision, but universally and generally." Augustine also says that Christ is the head, in which all the senses are located; but in the saints, to whom the spirit is given by measure, there is only, as it were, the sense of touch.

Thus it must be said that the grace of Christ was finite essentially, but it was infinite in the perfection of the specific formality of grace.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. This answer is obvious from what has been said.
2. Because grace is finite essentially but infinite in the line of grace, God can make a better essence than that of grace, but nothing better in the genus of grace, since the grace of Christ includes everything to which the specific formality of grace can extend.
3. The capacity of a creature is predicated on the potency of reception which it has. Now the potency of a creature to receive is of two kinds. One is natural; and this can be entirely fulfilled, because it extends only to natural perfections. The other is obediential potency, inasmuch as it can receive something from God; and such a capacity cannot be filled, because whatever God does with a creature, it still remains in potency to receive from God. Now a measure which increases when goodness increases is determined by the amount of perfection received rather than by that of the capacity to receive.
4. Form is the principle of act; but in so far as it has existence in act, it is not possible for an action infinite in intensity to proceed from a form whose essence is finite. Hence even the merit of Christ was not infinite in the intensity of the act, for He loved and knew finitely. But

it had a certain infinity from the circumstance of the person, who was of infinite dignity; for the greater the one who humbles himself, the more praiseworthy his humility is found to be.

5. Even though the charity or grace of a wayfarer can increase to infinity, it can never arrive at equality with the grace of Christ. That something finite can by a continuous increase attain to any finite degree however great, is true if the same sort of quantity is referred to in both of the finite factors (for example, if we compare a line to a line or whiteness to whiteness), but not if different sorts of quantity are referred to. This is evident in dimensive quantity; for no matter how much a line is increased in length, it will never reach the width of a surface.

The same likewise appears in virtual or intensive quantity; for no matter how much the knowledge of one who knows God by a likeness may advance, it can never equal the knowledge of a possessor, who sees God through His essence. Similarly the charity of a wayfarer cannot equal the charity of a possessor; for a person is differently affected toward things which are present and toward those which are absent. In like manner also, however much the grace of a man who possesses grace in the line of a particular participation may increase, it can never equal the grace of Christ, which is full in every respect.

6. The capacity of Christ's soul is finite, and God can make a greater capacity and a better creature than the soul of Christ if the latter is separated in thought from the Word. Yet it does not follow that He could make Christ better, because Christ has His goodness from another, that is, from union with the Word, from which point of view His goodness cannot be conceived to be greater.

7. The answer to this is clear from what has just been said.

8. From the circumstance of the person Christ's soul has power over an infinite number of things; and that is also the source from which His merit has infinity, as was said above.

ARTICLE IV: DOES THE GRACE OF HEADSHIP BELONG TO CHRIST IN HIS HUMAN NATURE?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 13, 2, I; a. 2 sol. I; in I Cor., c. 11, lectura I (P 13: 234b-2 in Ephes., c. I, lectura 8; in Colos., C. I, lectura Sum. Theol., III, 8, r & 4; Comp. Theol., 1, 254.

Difficulties:

It seems that it does not, for

1. It is characteristic of the head to have an influence upon the members. But Christ in His human nature does not have an influence upon men, that is, not a spiritual influence, because such an influence relates especially to the soul. For, as is brought out in the comment in the Gloss on John 5:2, taken from Augustine, souls are vitalized by the Word of God; bodies, by the Word made flesh. Therefore Christ in His human nature is not the head of the Church.

2. It was said in answer that Christ has an influence upon souls efficiently in His divine nature and dispositively in His human nature.— On the contrary, the ministers of the Church, as dispensers of the sacraments, dispose men for spiritual life; for a sacrament is a dispositive cause of grace. But the ministers of the Church are not called the head of the Church. Then neither is Christ as a dispositive cause to be called the head of the Church.

3. The Church would have existed even if man had not sinned, but the Word of God would not have assumed human nature, as is said in a comment in the Gloss upon the words of the first Epistle to Timothy (1:15): "Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners." But the

Church cannot be without a head. Christ is therefore not the head of the Church in His human nature.

4. It was said that, had man not sinned, Christ would have been the head of the Church inasmuch as He is the Word of God, whereas after that sin He is the head inasmuch as He is the Word made flesh.— On the contrary, for the full reparation of mankind it is required that man should not be indebted for his salvation to anyone to whom he was not previously indebted. For this reason, as Anselm says, reparation could not be made by an angel. But if Christ had been the head of the Church before only as the Word, man would not have been indebted to any creature for his salvation, whereas after his sin he is indebted to Christ in His human nature if Christ is the head in this nature. It would therefore seem that full reparation of mankind has not been effected. But that is inadmissible.

5. The good angels and men belong to one Church. But there is one head of the one Church. Since Christ is not the head of the good angels, who have never sinned and are, moreover, not like Him in nature, it therefore seems that He is not the head of men either in His human nature.

6. The head is a member of the body. Christ, however, is not a member of the Church, so it seems, because to be a member implies partiality and therefore imperfection. Christ is therefore not the head of the Church.

7. According to the Philosopher, "the heart is the source of sensation, motion, and life." Now if Christ deserves any name by reason of a spiritual influence, it is rather heart than head, particularly since the head undergoes the influence of the heart, whereas Christ does not undergo that of any member of the Church.

8. The Church is the congregation of the faithful. But Christ did not have faith. Then if Christ is the head of the Church, He will not be like the members. But that is contrary to the notion of a head.

9. The head does not come after the members. But many of the members of the Church came before Christ. Consequently Christ is not the head of the Church.

10. The answer was given that, although Christ did not then exist in the real order of things, He did exist in the faith of the fathers. On the contrary, as head of the Church Christ imparts grace to its members. Now if it fulfils the notion of a head that Christ existed in the faith of believers, it accordingly seems that the supply of grace in the Old Testament was equal to that in the New. But that is false.

11. What does not exist cannot act. But when Christ existed only in the faith of the fathers, He did not have existence in Himself in His human nature. He could therefore not exercise influence, and so could not be the head.

12. Every proposition whose subject is a conceptual being and the predicate is a real being is false; for example, if one were to say that a genus or species runs. But as existing in faith Christ is designated as a conceptual being. Since to be head or to exercise influence implies a real being, it therefore seems that the proposition "As existing in faith Christ is the head of the Church" is false.

13. There is one head of one body. But Christ is the head of the Church in His divinity. Then He is not the head in His humanity.

14. A head does not have a head. But God is Christ's head (I Corinthians 11:3). Christ is therefore not the head of the Church.

15. It belongs to the notion of a head to have all the senses that there are in the body, as Augustine points out. But there are some spiritual senses in the Church that are not in Christ, namely, faith and hope. Christ is therefore not the head of the Church.

16. On the words of the Epistle to the Ephesians (1:22): "He hath made him head...", the Gloss comments: "Things are subjected to Him as their head, from whom they originate." Now men and angels do not originate from Christ in His human nature but in His divine nature. Consequently Christ is the head of the Church not in His human but in His divine nature.

17. Augustine says that to enlighten souls is an act proper to God alone. It is therefore not proper to Christ in His human nature. Consequently Christ in His human nature is not the head of the Church.

To the Contrary:

1'. To the words of the Epistle to the Ephesians (1:22): "He hath made him head over all the church," the Gloss adds: "in His humanity."

2'. The union of the head with the body is based upon a conformity in nature. Now Christ's conformity to the Church is not in His divine nature but in His human nature. Therefore Christ in His human nature is the head of the Church.

REPLY:

The term head as applied to spiritual beings is taken in a transferred sense from the head of a physical body. To see in what sense Christ is the head of the Church we must accordingly consider the relation ship of a head to the members of a body.

The head is found to stand in a twofold relationship of distinction and conformity to the other members. There is distinction in three respects: (1) in point of dignity, because the head fully possesses all the senses, but the other members do not; (2) in point of government, because the head governs and regulates all the other members in their acts by means of both the external and the internal senses, which have their seat in the head; (3) in point of causality, for the head causes sensation and motion in all the members, and hence physicians say that the nerves and everything pertaining to the apprehensive and motive powers of animals originate in the head. The conformity of the head to the members is also found to be threefold: (1) in nature, for the head and the rest of the members are parts of one nature; (2) in order, for there is a union of order between the head and the members inasmuch as the members are of service to each other, as is pointed out in the first Epistle to the Corinthians (12:25); (3) in continuity, for the head is continuous with the other members in a physical body. In accordance with these points of conformity and distinction the term head is attributed metaphorically to different beings in different ways.

There are some things among which there is conformity in nature. To one of these the term head is attributed only by reason of its eminence or dignity. Thus the lion is said to be the head of the animal kingdom, or a certain city is called the head of the realm because of its dignity. Isaias (7:8), for instance, says: "The head of Syria is Damascus." Certain other things have mutual conformity in a union of order, being ordained to one end. Among these the term head is attributed by reason of government, which is concerned with the relation to an end. Thus princes are called the heads of the people. For example, it is written in Amos (6:1): "Ye great men, heads of the people..." But where there is continuity, head is predicated by reason of influence, as a spring is called the head of a river.

In these three different ways Christ in His human nature is called the head of the Church. He is of specifically the same nature as other men; and so the name head belongs to Him by reason of His dignity, on the grounds that grace is found more abundantly in Him. In the

Church we also find a unity of order, since the members of the Church are of service to each other and are ordained to God; and in this respect Christ is called the head of the Church as its ruler. We also find in the Church a certain continuity by reason of the Holy Spirit, who, being one and numerically the same, fills and unites the whole Church. Christ in His human nature is accordingly called the head by reason of His influence.

In causing spiritual sensation and motion a thing can be understood to be operative in two ways: (1) As a principal agent. In this way it belongs to God alone to pour grace into the members of the Church.

(2) Instrumentally. In this way the humanity of Christ also is the cause of that in-pouring. For as Damascene says, just as iron burns because of the fire joined to it, the actions of Christ's humanity were salutary because of the divinity united to it, of which the humanity was like an instrument. This seems to be enough for the notion of a head. For even the head of a physical body does not exercise its influence upon the members except by reason of its latent power.

In the second and third respects in which something is called a head Christ in His human nature can be called the head of the angels, and He can be called the head of both angels and men in His divine nature; but not in the first respect, unless we take the community involved to be based on their generic nature, seeing that man and the angels have in common the rationality of their nature; and in addition a community of analogy, seeing that, as Basil points out, the Son has in common with all creatures the reception of His nature from the Father, by reason of which He is called "the first horn of every creature" (Colossians 1:15).

If, then, we are to speak properly, the whole Christ in both of His natures together is the head of the whole Church in the three respects mentioned. And the Apostle proves that Christ is the head of the Church in these three respects, saying (Colossians 1:18-20): "He is the head of the body, the church: who is the beginning, the first horn from the dead, that in all things he may hold the primacy" (referring to government): "because in him, it hath well pleased the Father that all fullness should dwell" (referring to dignity): "and through him to reconcile all things" (referring to influence).

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Vitalizing both souls and bodies is attributed to the divinity of the Word as the principal agent and to the humanity as an instrument. The life of souls, however, is attributed to the divinity of the word and the life of bodies to the humanity by a kind of appropriation in order to bring out the conformity between the head and the members, in the same way in which the passion is called the cause of the forgiveness of sin, and the resurrection, the cause of justification.

2. The other ministers of the Church neither dispose men for spiritual life nor contribute to it by their own power but do so by the power of another, whereas Christ does this by his own power. This is why Christ could bring about the effects of the sacraments by Him self, for the whole efficacy of the sacraments was in Him as its origin; but the other ministers of the Church cannot do so. Hence they can not be called the head unless perhaps by reason of governing, in the same sense as any prince is called a head.

3. If we assume the opinion that Christ would not have become incarnate if man had not sinned, then before the sin Christ would have been the head of the Church in His divine nature alone, but since the sin He must be the head of the Church in His human nature as well. For by sin human nature has been wounded and immersed in sensible things so that it is no longer sufficiently suited to the invisible govern merit of the Word. For this reason medicine had to be applied to the wound through Christ's humanity, through which He made atone merit. He

also had to assume a visible nature in order that man might be recalled to invisible things through a visible exercise of govern merit.

4. Christ's human nature takes on a certain infinity in dignity by being united to the divine nature personally. As a result it is not insulting to man to be indebted for his salvation to Christ in His human nature, because the human nature works by the power of the divine, as has been said. Thus we venerate Christ in both His natures with the same veneration, that of latria.

5. Christ is the head of the angels not only in his divine nature but also in his human nature, because even in his human nature He enlightens them, as Dionysius teaches. Thus He is said in the Epistle to the Colossians (I:16) to be the head of all principalities and powers. Yet Christ's humanity is related differently to angels than to men in two respects: (1) as to His conformity in nature, being in the same species as men but not as the angels; (2) as to the end of the Incarnation, which was carried out principally for the sake of man's liberation from sin; and so Christ's humanity is ordained to the influence which He exercises upon men as the end intended, whereas His influence upon the angels is not the end of the Incarnation but a consequence of the Incarnation.

6. Christ is expressly said by the Apostle (I Corinthians 12:27) to be a member of the Church: "You are the body of Christ and members of member." Now He is called a member by reason of His distinction from the other members of the Church, but He is distinguished from the other members by reason of His perfection (because grace is in Christ in its fullness, but not in any one of the others), just as the head of a physical body is distinguished from the other members. Hence there is no need of attributing any imperfection to Christ.

7. The heart is a hidden member, but the head is apparent. By the heart, accordingly, the divinity of Christ or the Holy Spirit can be meant; but by the head, Christ Himself in his visible nature, which is under the influence of the nature of the invisible divinity.

8. Christ had perfect knowledge of the things about which others have faith. Thus as regards knowledge He is confirmed to the others as the perfect to the imperfect. That is the sort of conformity that is conceived between the head and the members.

9. Christ as man is the mediator between God and men, as is said in the first Epistle to Timothy (2:5). Now God is said to justify us in two ways: principally by his own action inasmuch as He is the efficient cause of our salvation, and also by our operation inasmuch as He is the end known and loved by us. In the same way, then, Christ as man is said to justify us in two ways: (1) By His own action, inasmuch as He merited and atoned for us. In this respect He could not be called the head of the Church before the Incarnation. (2) By our operation in His regard, in the sense that we are said to be justified by faith in Him. In this respect He could be the head of the Church in His humanity even before the Incarnation. In both ways, moreover, He is the head of the Church in His divinity, both before and after the Incarnation.

10. Because the merit of Christ was not yet actual, nor was there atonement before the Incarnation, there was not the same fullness of grace as there was afterwards.

11. Christ has a claim to the title of head not only by His own action, but also by our action in His regard. The argument therefore proves nothing.

12. The predicates "to be the head" or "to exercise influence" in the sense of "through our operation in His regard, inasmuch as we believe in Him" are not real beings but only conceptual. Hence the conclusion does not follow.

13. "The one Christ is God and man." Consequently, from the fact that Christ is the head of the Church in His humanity and in His divinity it cannot be concluded that the Church has two heads.

14. We do not say in exactly the same sense that God is the head of Christ and that Christ is the head of the Church. The difficulty is therefore arguing from an equivocation.

15. Whatever perfection there is in faith and hope belongs to Christ in its entirety. Only the imperfection which they contain is denied in His regard.

16. Although in one respect Christ is the head in His divinity, the possibility of His being the head in His humanity in another respect is not thereby removed; for we draw our spiritual origin from Christ in His humanity, as is written in John (1:16): "of His fullness we have all received."

17. It is proper to God alone to enlighten souls principally and effectively. It is not in this sense that Christ in His humanity has a spiritual influence upon us, but in another, as has been said.

ARTICLE V: IS ANY HABITUAL GRACE REQUIRED IN CHRIST FOR HIM TO BE THE HEAD?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 13, 3, 2 sol. 1 & 2; In Joan., c. I, lectura 8, § 3; Sum. Theol., III, 8, 5.

Difficulties:

It seems that it is not, for

1. The Apostle in writing to the Colossians (1: 19) places the head ship in Christ "because in him, it hath well pleased the Father that all fullness should dwell," as appears in the passage quoted above. But all the fullness of the divinity dwells in Christ from the union. Besides the union, then, no grace is required for Him to be the head.

2. Christ is the head of the Church in so far as He works for our salvation. But, as Damascene says, the action of His humanity conferred salvation upon us inasmuch as the humanity was in a way "the instrument of the divinity." Now since an instrument does not require any habit but moves only when moved by the principal agent, it seems that Christ did not require habitual grace in order to be the head.

3. The action of one man can contribute to the salvation of another in two ways: (1) Inasmuch as he acts as an individual person. Then grace is required in order that his action may be meritorious for him self or for another. (2) As a person representing the community. This applies to the ministers of the Church, who work for the salvation of others by administering the sacraments and pouring forth prayers to God in the name of the Church. No grace is needed for this but only a power or state, for such actions are performed not only by good but also by wicked men. Now Christ as head of the Church is considered as a person representing the community, and all the ministers of the Church are His vicars. He therefore had no need of habitual grace in order to be the head.

4. Christ was the head of the Church because His merit was infinite. Thus He was able to exercise an influence upon all the members of the Church and will out their sins. But He did

not get the infinity of His merit from habitual grace, which was finite. Christ was there fore not the head by reason of any habitual grace.

5. Christ is the head of the Church inasmuch as He is the "mediator of God and man" (I Timothy 2:5). But He is the mediator of God and man inasmuch as He is intermediate between God and men, having divinity God and humanity will men. Now this comes from the union. Consequently the union alone without habitual grace is enough for the headship.

6. One subject has one life. But grace is the life of the soul. In one soul there is therefore one grace; and so in Christ besides the grace which is His as an individual person there is not required any other habitual grace by which He is the head.

7. Christ is the head because He influences the members of the Church. But no matter how much grace He had, He could not influence them unless He were God and man. Consequently no habitual grace by which He is the head is required, but He has this position from the union alone.

To the Contrary:

1'. There are the words of John (1:16): "of His fullness we all have received: and grace for grace." Thus He had some grace by which He in turn poured out grace upon us.

2'. The head of the Mystical Body has some resemblance to the head of a physical body. But for the perfection of a physical body it is required that the power of sensation be in the head most fully in order that it can communicate sensation to the members. In Christ too, then, for Him to be the head the fullness of grace is required.

3'. Dionysius says that those who have the office of enlightening, perfecting, and cleansing others first have light, cleanness, and perfection themselves. But as head of the Church Christ cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. In order to be the head, therefore, He must have the fullness of grace, by which He is pure, full of light, and perfect.

REPLY:

As Damascene says, the humanity of Christ in some sense "was the instrument of the divinity"; and for this reason His actions could be salutary for us. Inasmuch as it was the instrument of the divinity, then, it had to have a special connection will the divinity.

The closer a substance stands to the goodness of God, the more fully it participates in His goodness, as Dionysius makes clear. Consequently the humanity of Christ also, because it is connected will the divinity more closely than the others and in a more special way, has participated in the divine goodness through the gift of grace in a more excellent way.

As a result there was a fitness in this humanity not only to have grace but also to communicate it to other beings, as the most shining bodies transmit the light of the sun to others. And because in some sense Christ communicates the effects of grace to all rational creatures, this is why He is in some sense the source of all grace in His humanity, just as God is the source of all being. Then, as all the perfection of being is united in God, in Christ the fullness of all grace and virtue is found, and because of it He not only is capable of the work of grace Himself but can bring others to grace. For this reason He has the headship.

In a physical head there is not only the power of sensing, in order that it may sense by sight, hearing, and touch and such senses; but this power is in it in such a way that it is the root from which sensation flows into all the other members. In Christ, accordingly, one and the same habitual grace is called the grace of union as befitting a nature united to the divinity, and the grace of headship as the means by which grace is communicated to others for their salvation, and also the grace of an individual person as perfecting Him for meritorious works.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. In Christ two different kinds of fullness are referred to: one, of the divinity, according to which Christ is fully God; and the other, of grace, according to which He is said to be full of grace and truth.

It is of this latter fullness that the Apostle speaks in Colossians 1:18—20, and of the former in Colossians 2:9. The second is derived from the first and by it the grace of headship is formally constituted.

2. An inanimate instrument such as an ax does not need a habit; but an animate instrument such as a servant does. The human nature in Christ is such an instrument.

3. A minister of the Church does not act in the sacraments by his own power but by the power of another, that is, Christ. The minister accordingly does not need personal grace but only the authority of orders, by which he is constituted the vicar of Christ. But Christ wrought our salvation by His own power. The fullness of grace was therefore necessary in Him.

4. Although Christ's merit has a certain infinity from the dignity of the person, it gets its meritoriousness from habitual grace, without which there cannot be any merit.

5. Christ is the mediator between God and men even in His human nature, in so far as He has passibility together with men, and justice together with God. But His justice is in Him by means of grace. For this reason besides the union there is required habitual grace in Christ in order that He may be the mediator and the head.

6. One and the same habitual grace is from different points of view the grace of the head, the grace of an individual person, and the grace of union, as was explained above.

7. Although both natures are required in Christ for Him to be the head, from the union of the divine nature with the human there results in the human nature a certain fullness of grace, which issues in an overflow from Christ the head into others.

Parallel readings: III Sentences x8, a. 2; a. sol. 1-3; a. 5; Sum. Theol., III, 59, 3; Comp. Theol., I, 231.

ARTICLE VI: COULD CHRIST MERIT?

Difficulties:

It seems that He could not, for

1. All merit proceeds from free choice, which is undetermined with regard to many things. But in Christ free choice is determined to good. He therefore could not merit.

2. The relation of the one meriting to the reward is the same as that of a recipient to the thing received, because a person merits in order to receive what he merits. But "the recipient must be devoid of the thing received," as is made clear in The Soul. Then one who merits must be without reward. But that cannot be said of Christ, since He was a true possessor. It therefore seems that Christ could not merit.

3. Whatever is due to someone does not have to be merited. But because Christ was a possessor, impassibility of mind and body was due Him. He therefore did not merit these.

4. Merit does not have to do with events that occur necessarily as if by a natural sequence, because merit concerns that which is voluntarily given by another in return for something as its recompense. But the glory of the body comes from the glory of the soul by a certain natural

sequence, as is seen from Augustine. Since Christ was blessed in His soul, enjoying as He did the possession of the divinity, it seems that He could not merit the glory of the body.

5. The saints who are now in glory have glory of soul and not of body, just as Christ had before His passion. But the saints do not now merit the glory of the body. Then neither did Christ.

6. The same thing cannot be the principle and the term of merit, and so the same thing cannot be the reward and the principle of meriting. But the charity which was found in Christ was a part of His reward, because it belonged to the perfection of His beatitude, since by its means He had enjoyment. It could therefore not be the principle of meriting. But all merit is from charity. Consequently there could not have been any merit in Christ.

7. Do away will what goes before, and you do away will what comes after. But before all else merit refers to the blessedness of the soul, which Christ did not merit, because He had it from the instant of His conception. Then neither could He have merited anything else.

To the Contrary:

1'. On the words of the Psalm (15:1): "Preserve me, O Lord," the Gloss comments: "Behold the reward"; and on the words "for I have put my trust in thee" the comment is: "behold the merit." Christ therefore merited.

2'. Whoever is given any recompense in proportion to his deed, merits. But because of the humility of His passion Christ was given the recompense of exaltation, as is shown in the Epistle to the Philippians (2:9): "For which cause, God also hath exalted him...." There fore Christ merited.

3'. Merit is the act of a wayfarer just as enjoyment is that of a possessor. But as a possessor Christ had enjoyment. Then Fie also merited as a wayfarer.

REPLY:

Christ merited before His passion when Fie was both a wayfarer and a possessor. This is shown as follows. There are two requisites for merit: the state of one who merits and the ability to merit. For the state of one who merits, the lack of that which is said to be merited is required, though some say that a person can merit what he already has. Thus they say of the angels that they merited their blessedness, which they received simultaneously will grace, by the subsequent actions performed will regard to us.

But this does not seem to be true for two reasons: (1) Because it is contrary to Augustine's argument by which he proves against the Pelagians that grace cannot fail under merit because before grace there are no deserts except evil, since before receiving grace man is a sinner and not grace but punishment is what sinners deserve. For [if the opinion in question is admitted] it could be said that one merits grace by the deeds which he does after receiving grace. (2) Because it is against the nature of merit; for merit is the cause of reward, not as a final cause (for in this sense the reward is rather the cause of the merit), but rather by reduction to efficient causality, inasmuch as merit makes a man worthy of a reward and in this way disposes him for it. Now anything that is a cause in the line of efficiency can by no means be posterior in time to that of which it is the cause. It is impossible, then, for a person to merit what he already has. If in human affairs someone serves his master in return for a favour received, this is more of the nature of thanksgiving than of merit.

The ability to merit is required both on the part of nature and on that of grace. It is required on the part of nature because no one can merit by his own act unless he has dominion over his act. If he has that dominion he can, as it were, give his act as a price for the reward. Now a

man has dominion over his own acts through the power of free choice. The natural ability of free choice is therefore required for meriting. On the part of grace it is required because the reward of blessedness exceeds the capabilities of human nature, and so man is notable to merit it by his unaided natural powers. Grace by which he is enabled to merit is accordingly required.

Now all these conditions for merit were fulfilled in Christ. He was lacking in some of the factors required for perfect blessedness: impassibility of soul and glory of body. By reason of this lack He was a wayfarer. There was in Him, moreover, the ability of nature by reason of His created will, and the ability of grace because of the fullness of grace. He was therefore able to merit.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Although in the line of moral conduct the soul of Christ was determined to one course of action, that is, good, it nevertheless was not determined to one in an unqualified sense for it could perform this or that particular act or not perform it. He therefore retained the freedom which is required for meriting.
2. He did not merit blessedness of soul, by reason of which He was a possessor, but only the blessedness of body and impassibility of soul. These were lacking to Him.
3. Christ did not merit anything not due Him in such a way that it became due, as men merit in their first meritorious act. Nor again did He merit in such a way that what was due Him should become more due, as occurs in those whose grace increases. But He merited in such a way that what was due Him in one way—by reason of grace—should become due Him in another way by reason of merit.
4. The glory of the body results from the glory of the soul when the soul is glorified in every respect, both in its relation to God and in its relation to the body. It was not in this way that the soul of Christ was glorified, but only in its relation to God. Inasmuch as it was the form of the body, it was passible.
5. The souls of the saints in their heavenly home are entirely out of the state of wayfarers because they are already blessed both by enjoy merit and by impassibility. The soul of Christ was not. There is therefore no parallel.
6. As far as charity itself is concerned, it is always a source of merit; but sometimes it is not in fact a source of merit because of the one who has it, since he is out of the state of meriting. This is seen in the saints in heaven. Christ, however, was not out of the state of meriting, because He was a wayfarer. By the same charity, accordingly, He both enjoyed and merited, as also by the same will. Yet the same thing was not both the source of merit and the reward, because He did not merit glory of soul, to which charity is relevant, but glory of body, as has been said.
7. That argument would prove something if it resulted from any defect on Christ's part that He could not merit glory of soul. From what has already been said it is clear that that is false.

ARTICLE VII: COULD CHRIST MERIT FOR OTHERS?

Parallel readings: De veritate, 26, 6 ans. to Contr. 4; II Sentences 20, 2, 3 ad 3; III Sentences 18, a. 6 sol. 1; Sum. Theol., I-II, 114,6; III, 19,4; 48, 1; a. 6 ad Comp. Theol., I, 231 & 239.

Difficulties:

It seems that He could not, for

1. Christ merited only inasmuch as He was a man. But other men cannot merit for others condignly. Then neither could Christ.

2. Praise as well as merit depends upon an act of virtue. Now no one is praised for the act of someone else but only for his own. Then neither is the act of someone else imputed to anyone for his merit. Christ's acts are accordingly not meritorious for others.

3. Because He holds the primacy in the Church, Christ is the Church's head, as is made clear in the Epistle to the Colossians (1:18). But other prelates who have the primacy in the Church cannot merit for their subjects. Then neither could Christ do so.

4. In itself Christ's merit is related in the same way to all men. If, then, Christ merited salvation for anyone, He merited it for all. But the merit of Christ cannot be frustrated. All therefore obtain salvation. But that obviously is false.

5. Christ is the head not only of men but also of angels. But He did not merit for the angels. Then neither did He do so for men.

6. If Christ could merit for others, then any one of His acts was meritorious for us—and that means for our salvation. His passion was accordingly not necessary for our salvation.

7. Where one means will get results it is superfluous to use two. But the grace which is given to man is sufficient for man to merit eternal life for himself. It would therefore be superfluous for Christ to have merited it for us.

8. Christ merited for us either sufficiently or insufficiently. If sufficiently, then our merit is not required for our salvation. If insufficiently, then His grace was insufficient. But both of these alternatives are inadmissible. Christ therefore did not merit for us.

9. Something necessary for glory is lacking to Christ's members now as it was before His passion. Since He does not merit for us now, neither did He then.

10. Had Christ merited for us, our condition would have been changed by His merit. But the condition of man seems to be the same after Christ as it was before. Just as the devil could tempt but not force man before, so too now. As punishment was due to sinners, so too now. As meritorious works were required in the just, so too now. Christ therefore did not merit for us.

11. In the Psalms (61:13) it is written: "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works." But this would not be so if the merits of Christ were imputed to us. Christ therefore did not merit for us.

12. Reward is meted out in proportion to the root of merit. Now if Christ merited for us, the reward of glory will be given to each one of us in proportion to the quantity of Christ's grace. But that clearly is false.

13. That which is given on the basis of merit is paid rather than gratuitously given. If, then, Christ merited justification for us, it seems that we are not gratuitously justified by God. Then grace will not be grace. Christ therefore did not merit anything for us.

To the Contrary:

1'. That Christ atoned for us is expressly said in the first Epistle of St. John (2:2): "He is the propitiation for our sins." But there cannot be atonement without merit. Christ therefore merited for us.

2' The head in a physical body works not only for itself but also for all the members. Now Christ is the head of His body, the Church. His activity was therefore meritorious for His members.

3' Christ and the Church are in a sense one person. On the basis of that unity He speaks in the name of the Church in the words of the Psalm (21:1): "O God, my God, look upon me," as the Glass brings out. Consequently Christ could likewise by reason of that same unity merit in the name of others.

REPLY:

A human action informed by grace has value for obtaining eternal life in two ways that correspond to the two respects in which man falls short of winning glory.

The first respect is the lack of dignity of the person. One who does not have charity, for example, is neither suited nor worthy to have eternal life. In this respect a human action is of value for winning eternal life to the extent that by it a certain dignity and aptness for winning glory is acquired. As an act of sin leads to a certain deformity of the soul, a meritorious act leads to the soul's adornment and dignity. From this there arises merit that is called condign.

The other respect in which man fails short of winning glory is the interposition of an obstacle, will the result that a man who otherwise is worthy does not win glory. This is the debt of some penalty. A man who is justified, for example, is indebted to pay some temporal penalty. In this respect a human action is related to glory much like the price paid to free a man from a penalty due. Under this aspect the human action has the character of atonement.

In both of these respects Christ's actions were more efficacious than those of other men. By the actions of other men only the one acting is made suited for the reception of glory, because one man cannot exercise a spiritual influence upon another. As a consequence one cannot merit grace or eternal life for another condignly. But Christ in His humanity could exercise spiritual influence upon other men. His actions could accordingly cause in others suitableness for the winning of glory. He could therefore merit condignly for others, just as He could exercise influence upon others, inasmuch as His humanity was "the instrument of His divinity," as Damascene teaches.

In the second respect also we can discover greater efficacy in Christ than in other men. Although one man can atone for another provided that the former is in the state of grace, he cannot atone for the whole nature, because the act of one mere man is not equal in value to the good of the whole nature. But the action of Christ, being that of God and man, had a dignity that made it worth as much as the good of the whole nature, and so could atone for that nature.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. As man Christ is of greater dignity than other men. It is accordingly not necessary to ascribe to other men whatever belonged to Christ as man.

2. An act of virtue is praiseworthy in its relation to the agent, and so one man cannot be praised for the act of another. But it gets its meritoriousness from its relation to the end, for which a person can be made suited by the influence of Christ. Christ could therefore merit for us.

3. Christ holds the primacy in the Church by His own power, but other prelates hold it inasmuch as they represent the person and take the place of Christ. Christ could therefore merit for the faithful as for His own members, but other prelates cannot do so.

4. Christ's merit bears the same relation to all men in point of sufficiency, not in point of efficacy. This happens partly from men's free choice, partly from divine election, through

which the effect of Christ's merits is mercifully bestowed upon some but by a just judgment is withdrawn from others.

5. Just as it belongs to a wayfarer to merit, so no one can merit except for a wayfarer, because the one for whom anyone merits must be lacking in some point that fails within the scope of merit. Now angels are not wayfarers will reference to the essential reward, and so Christ did not merit for them in this respect. But they are in some sense wayfarers will reference to the accidental reward in so far as they minister to us. In this respect, then, Christ's merit is of value to them as well. It is accordingly said in the Epistle to the Ephesians (I:10) that through Him are re-established all things that are in heaven and on earth.

6. Although every one of Christ's acts was meritorious for us, yet to give satisfaction for the debt of human nature, which was made liable to death by the divine sentence, as is seen in Genesis (2: 17), He had to undergo death in the place of all.

7. The grace which is given to someone personally is sufficient for the needs of that person himself but not for paying the debt of the whole nature. This is evident in the case of the ancient patriarchs, who, though having grace, were unable because of the debt of the nature to arrive at glory. The merit and satisfaction of Christ was accordingly needed to remove that debt. Furthermore, personal grace was never given to anyone after the sin of the first man except through faith, either explicit or implicit, in the Mediator.

8. The merit of Christ is operative will sufficient efficacy as a universal cause of the salvation of men, but this cause must be applied to each by means of the sacraments and of informed faith, which works through love. Thus something else besides Christ's merit is needed for our salvation, though the merit of Christ is the cause of that other factor as well.

9. [The answer to this difficulty is missing.]

10. After the passion of Christ the condition of mankind has been much changed, because, will the debt of human nature paid, men can fly unrestrained to their heavenly home. Moreover, the eternal punishment due for personal sins is remitted by means of faith in the passion of Christ; and the temporal punishment is reduced by the power of the keys, in which the passion of Christ is operative. Furthermore, the demons are kept in check by the power of Christ's passion so that they cannot tempt us so violently, and many helps are given to the faithful for resisting temptation. Finally, as a result of Christ's passion grace will which to merit is given in the sacraments.

11. Christ and His members are one mystical person. Consequently the works of the head are in some sense the works of the members. Thus, when something is given us on account of Christ's works, that is not opposed to the statement of the Psalms (61: 3): "Thou will render to every man according to his works." And yet Christ's merits are of profit to us in such a way that through the sacraments they cause in us grace by which we are bestirred to meritorious works.

12. Christ's merit is related to our reward as a first and remote cause. Our reward is therefore not commensurate to Christ's merit but to that merit which is its proximate cause, which derives from the act of the one given the reward.

13. The very fact that any one of us obtains the benefit of Christ's merit is itself gratuitously conferred upon us by God. Consequently grace is not thereby deprived of its essence.

ARTICLE VIII: COULD CHRIST MERIT IN THE FIRST INSTANT OF HIS CONCEPTION?

Parallel readings: III Sentences 18, a. 3; Sum. Theol., III, 34, 3.

Difficulties:

It seems that He could not, for

1. Deliberation is required for merit. But deliberation takes time. Therefore in the first instant of its creation the soul of Christ could not merit.

2. Not only merit but also demerit depends upon an act of free choice. But the angels could not sin in the first instant of their creation, because they would in that case have been evil at the very instant of their creation. But that is false. Then neither could the soul of Christ merit at the first instant of its creation.

3. Whenever there are two movements of which one is subordinated to the other, it is impossible for both to come to an end at the same instant. But the creation of Christ's soul and the motion of free choice are subordinated movements, because the motion of free choice presupposes its creation. It is therefore impossible for the motion of free choice to come to an end at the very instant at which creation comes to an end, as soon as the soul is created.

4. The answer was given that Christ's soul was helped by grace to merit at its first instant.—On the contrary, no grace conferred upon a creature carries it beyond the limits of creaturehood. But it attaches to the soul inasmuch as it is a creature to be unable to have the motion of its free choice at the first instant in which it is, as is evident from the argument given. It therefore cannot be helped by grace to merit at its first instant.

. Grace perfects the soul after the manner of a habit. Now since a habit presupposes a power, it does not confer upon the soul an unqualified ability to act which it otherwise would not have; it confers rather the ability to act in a given way in which it could not act without the habit. If, then, Christ's soul in its own nature could not have the use of free choice at the first instant of its creation, it seems that grace did not confer upon it the ability to merit at its first instant.

6. An instant has the same relation to time as a point to a line. But according to the Philosopher, when a being in motion makes use of one point as two, that is, as the beginning of one line and the end of another, there necessarily intervenes a period of repose, as is shown in a reciprocating motion. Now, since the instant at which Christ's soul was created is taken as the end of creation and as the beginning of the motion of free choice, and so we use one instant as two, it therefore seems that time intervenes. Thus Christ's soul did not merit at the first instant of its creation.

7. Grace stands to the act of grace as nature to the act of nature. By transposition, then, nature stands to the act of grace as grace to the act of nature. But nature is not capable of an act of grace. Then neither is grace capable of an act of nature. Consequently Christ's soul at the first instant of its conception could not have had through grace an act which is within its competence by nature, namely, to choose.

8. A form has three acts: it gives being, it distinguishes, and it orients to an end. Now these acts are related in the same way as being, the one, and the good; for being results from the first act, one from the second, and good from the third. A thing is accordingly a being before

it is oriented to an end. Now Christ's soul was oriented to its end by a meritorious act. It is therefore not possible for it to have merited at the first instant of its creation at which it had being.

9. Merit depends upon an act of virtue, which is brought to completion particularly by choice, as the Philosopher teaches. But Christ's soul could not have had an act of choice at the first instant of its creation; for choice presupposes deliberation, since it is appetency for what has been previously deliberated, as is pointed out in the Ethics.⁴ But deliberation takes time, since it is an investigation Christ's soul could therefore not have merited at the first instant of its creation.

10. Feebleness of our organs prevents the use of free choice, as is seen in newly born infants. But Christ assumed this feebleness, just as He did the rest of our weaknesses. The soul of Christ therefore did not merit at the first instant of its creation.

To the Contrary:

1'. At the very instant of His creation Christ was most perfect in soul. But a perfection which is actual as well as habitual is greater than one which is habitual only. There were therefore virtues in Christ not only habitually but also actually at the first instant of His creation. But the acts of the virtues are meritorious. Christ therefore merited at the first instant of His creation.

2'. At the first instant of His creation Christ had enjoyment as a true possessor. But enjoyment is had by means of an act of charity. He accordingly had an act of charity at the first instant of His creation. But this act of charity was meritorious in Christ. Therefore we must conclude as before.

3'. It was said in answer that the act of charity was not meritorious unless accompanied by deliberation.—On the contrary, deliberation or counsel is not concerned "with the last end, but with the means to it," as is brought out in the Ethics. But the movement of charity is meritorious particularly inasmuch as it tends to the last end. For this act to be meritorious it therefore does not have to involve any comparison or deliberation.

4'. It was said that the motion to the last end is meritorious only in so far as the person relates it to the end. It thus involves a comparison and that cannot take place in an instant.—On the contrary, the intellectual part of the soul is more powerful in its operation than the sensitive. But as soon as anyone senses, he senses that he is sensing. Consequently, as soon as the will is directed toward God there can be a reference of this motion to God Himself; and so this need not take place successively.

5'. Whoever understands anything understands at the same time whatever belongs to its notion; as in understanding man, we understand at the same time animal. But of two relative terms each is in the notion of the other. Then whoever understands one relative term at the same time understands the other. It is therefore possible for the mind at one and the same instant to relate the motion of charity to God, referring one to the other. Thus no time is needed in that act.

6'. Anselm says that whatever we understand to belong to perfection we must attribute entirely to Christ. But to have a perfect operation at the first instant of one's creation belongs to perfection. We must therefore attribute it to Christ.

7'. As regards the merit of His soul Christ had no room to advance. He would have had, however, if He had not merited at the first instant of His creation. Therefore

8'. The rational power in Christ was no less perfect than the natural power of any other creature. But some of the powers of other creatures can have their operation at the first instant at which they begin to be. A candle, for instance, at the very instant at which it is lighted lights up the air. Consequently Christ's soul at the first instant of its creation had the act of its rational power, and so it could merit.

9'. Gregory says: "The love of God is not inert. If it exists, it does great deeds. If it ceases to do deeds, it is not love." But Christ had perfect charity at the first instant of His creation. Some act of love was therefore present; and so He had merit at that instant.

10'. Something posterior by nature cannot be prior in time, though it may perhaps be simultaneous. Now merit is prior to reward by nature; but at the first instant of His conception Christ had the reward, because He was a true possessor. He therefore had merit at least at the same instant.

REPLY:

On this question there are two opinions. Some say that Christ did not have merit at the first instant of His conception, but began to merit immediately after the first instant. Others say that He did merit at the very first instant. This latter opinion is the one which seems to be the more reasonable. For we believe that any spiritual perfection which any other creature can possibly have was conferred in its entirety upon the soul of Christ at the first instant of its creation. Now the impossibility of meriting at a given instant could come from either of two sources: (1) from the agent, or (2) from the act.

This could come from the agent because of a lack of either of two capabilities. One is gratuitous. 'We might, for example, say that in the instant in which someone sins mortally, he cannot merit because he does not have grace. Again it could be because of the lack of a natural capability, as a child at the first instant at which it is conceived cannot merit because it does not have the use of free choice.

Now neither of these reasons is applicable in the matter at hand. For at His first instant Christ had the capability of grace, being full of grace, and also the capability of nature, having the full use of free choice; otherwise He could not have been a possessor. Consequently no impossibility of meriting at the first instant of His conception came from Christ, the agent.

Similarly no such impossibility came from the meritorious act either. That a given act could not be performed at a given instant could come about in two ways: (1) Because that act involves successiveness and so cannot be completed in an instant. Thus local motion cannot take place in an instant. (2) Because the act presupposes certain conditions that cannot precede a definite instant. Thus, if a fire has been kindled out of its proper place, it is impossible for that fire to be in its proper place at the first instant at which it comes into existence, because motion is a prerequisite, and that motion cannot be before the first instant of its existence.

Now in neither of these two ways was Christ prevented from meriting at His first instant. Not in the first, because the motion of free choice upon which merit depends is not successive but simple and instantaneous. Not in the second, because nothing is prerequisite for the motion of the will except the act of the apprehensive power; and that motion is at the same instant as the act of the will, because the apprehended good moves the will; for the mover moves and the being in motion is moved at the same time and will the same motion. In Christ, moreover, the apprehension of the good does not need any previous inquiry in order to reach a certain judgment about the good, because Christ immediately had a true judgment about everything with certitude.

It is evident, then, that there was nothing to keep Christ from meriting at the first instant. It must therefore be granted that at the first instant of His conception He merited.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. The term deliberation can imply either of two meanings. The first is the perception by reason in a certain judgment of the matter about which the deliberation is being carried on. From this point of view it can take place in an instant in one devoid of any perplexity about what is to be done. in this sense deliberation found place in Christ. The term can also mean an inquiry or investigation. Then it implies a discourse and cannot take place in an instant. Christ needed no such deliberation, because He was not in doubt about what was to be done.

2. The will of a rational nature is naturally oriented to good, not to evil. It can accordingly at the first instant of its creation, unless prevented, be attracted to good, but not to evil; for it is attracted to evil only through an error which occurs in comparing and investigating. Time for comparing is accordingly needed for evil, but not for good.

3. That argument is valid for successive but not for instantaneous movements. The reason for this is that, when two movements are in sequence, the same instant which is the end of the first movement can be the beginning of the second. Thus at the same instant at which the coming into existence of fire is completed outside its natural place, the local motion of the fire begins, unless there is some impediment.

If the beginning of the second movement and the end of the same movement are the same, as happens in the instantaneous movements, then the end of the second movement occurs at the same instant as the end of the first illumination and vision, for example, terminate at the same instant. But if the end of the second movement cannot be at the same instant will the beginning of that movement, as happens in all successive movements then it will be impossible for the end of the second movement to be at the same instant as the end of the first movement Now since the motion of free choice is instantaneous, nothing prevents its end from being at the same instant as the end of the creation of Christ's soul.

4. The answer to this is clean from what has just been said, for it is not beyond the capabilities of a creature that its instantaneous move merit should be completed at the first instant.

5. Although the rational power can have its operation at the first instant of its creation as far as it is concerned, yet, if it is taken as coupled with an organ which is not yet suited to a perfection, it is prevented by the defect of the organ from being able to have its operation at that time. But that obstacle was removed from Christ's soul by grace. On this score it enjoyed through grace the ability to act at its first instant.

6. An instant in time and a point in space are not alike as regards the matter at hand. For a being in motion cannot use as two the same point in space except in the same species of motion; but a being in motion can use as two the same instant of time even as regards different species of motion.

In the same species of motion it is not possible to have continuity of motion if one movement actually ends and the other actually begins, because in this case repose intervenes, and consequently a time. In specifically different motions, however, it is possible for the end of one movement and the beginning of another to coincide, because between them no continuity or order is needed since both can exist together. For instance, while a thing is being moved it can at the same time be whitened, and at the instant at which it begins to be come white the local motion ends. Between the parts of the same motion, however, there sometimes is an order, will the result that the two parts cannot exist together. In that case the end of one part does not coincide with the beginning of the other part if both are taken as actual. It is evident,

then, that the use of one instant as two does not demand an intervening time, as does the use of one point as two in local motion.

7. Since grace perfects nature it does not have the same relation to nature as nature to grace. When a proportion is transposed it does not hold good in all matters but only in continuous and discrete measure.

8. That argument holds for the order of nature, not for the order of time. This is clearly shown from the fact that at the very same instant the form gives being, orients, and distinguishes.

9. Deliberation is required for choice when the person is not certain in regard to the things to be done. But that does not apply to Christ.

10. Christ did not assume any defects that could result in the imperfection of grace and of knowledge. Such a defect is the unsuitability of one's organs for the activity of the soul. Christ therefore did not assume this defect, but His organs were strengthened by grace so that they were suited for the operation of the soul, as would perhaps also have happened in the state of innocence.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

We concede these arguments because they arrive at true conclusions even though some of them do not do so by adequate reasons.

THE 29 QUESTIONS ON TRUTH